IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHAVEZ WATERS, §

§

§ No. 348, 2023

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

v. §

§ Cr. Id. Nos: 2108006430 A/B (N)

STATE OF DELAWARE, § 2108006834 A/B (N)

§

Appellee. §

§

Submitted: June 26, 2024

Decided: July 15, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER 

This 15th day of July, 2024, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 

record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Chavez Waters seeks review of his convictions on charges of robbery 

in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 

(“PFDCF”), and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”). Waters’ 

sole claim is that the Superior Court’s two-sentence supplemental instruction in 

response to a jury question was reversible error because it suggested that his 

confession during interrogation by the police was valid. Waters argues that, given

the weight that the jury may have placed on the confession as compared to the “lack 
2

of any physical evidence” connecting him to the robberies, the court’s instruction 

was an impermissible comment on the evidence, potentially confused the jury, and 

created a high likelihood of prejudice.1 We conclude that this argument is without 

merit and affirm.

(2) Around 7:00 p.m. on August 8, 2021, a masked individual approached 

a store clerk at Creekside Spirits in Newark, Delaware and said, “‘Don’t be a hero.’”

2

 

The clerk testified that, after hearing the sound of the masked man’s gun, he 

struggled to open the cash register. The clerk also recalled that the suspect was 

“counting down like 10, 9, 8” to speed him up.3 Moments later, the store owner’s 

uncle entered the store, and the suspect pointed the gun at him too, goading him to 

open the register. Once the clerk finally opened it, the masked gunman put money 

in a bag and told the clerk and the uncle to move to the back of the store. The initial 

responding police officer that evening testified that neither the clerk nor the uncle 

was able to positively identify the suspect but both described him as a black male, 

more than six feet tall, weighing about 270 to 300 pounds.

(3) Around midnight four days later, a masked person approached the front 

clerk at Baymont Inn in Newark, Delaware. The clerk described the suspect as a 

1 Opening Br. at 5–8.

2 App. to Opening Br. at A124, A128–31.

3

Id. at A132.
3

“black male, tall, 6’ 3” who weighed “about 250 pounds.”4 The clerk did not recall 

the suspect’s name but recognized him as a “regular,”5estimating to the police that 

night that the suspect had stayed at the inn over 20 times and expressing “80 percent” 

certainty on the identification.6 The clerk testified that the suspect “threw a bag on 

the desk, and said put the money in the bag and pulled out a gun.”

7

 The suspect then 

counted down from ten. The clerk put money in the bag, including an envelope 

labeled “snacks” with cash inside, and gave it to the suspect.8 After calling the 

police, the clerk called his general manager, who reviewed the surveillance footage

from her cellphone at home. She recognized the suspect as someone with whom she 

had interacted multiple times. The manager provided a name to the police—Chavez 

Waters or Walters—expressing about 95 percent certainty that he was the suspect. 

(4) With this lead, the police used a database to find a matching description 

of Waters. The police then arrested Waters at his apartment.

(5) Surveillance footage led the police to search the area surrounding the 

Baymont Inn. A set of items—a jacket and pants, a baseball hat, and a pair of 

sneakers—were located near each other, and these items matched items worn by the 

suspect during the Baymont Inn robbery. Close by were a plastic bag and an 

4

Id. at A197.

5

Id. at A177.

6

Id. at A185.

7

Id. at A177.

8

Id. at A178.
4

envelope with “Snacks $20” written on it.

9

 A detective recognized the logo on the 

baseball hat from a police-produced flyer describing clothing worn by the suspect in 

the Creekside Spirits robbery.10 

(6) The police executed a search warrant at Waters’ apartment, finding 

pants with a logo similar to the one on the jacket found near the Baymont Inn.11 The 

police also located a pair of red shorts matching shorts worn by a person caught on 

surveillance video running near the Baymont Inn about ten minutes after the 

robbery. The police came to believe that the suspect who robbed the Baymont Inn 

had discarded the jacket, pants, and shoes in flight, changing into other clothes, 

including red shorts. 

(7) Detective Taras Gerasimov and Officer Paige Klein interrogated 

Waters, but at one point Officer Klein exited. The recorded interview lasted about 

an hour and a half. Faced with still shots of a person in red shorts running nearby 

the Baymont Inn after the robbery and the flyer that contained still photos of the 

9

Id. at A225–26.

10 Specifically, the baseball hat found near the Baymont Inn, which was red and white, had a logo 

that read, “‘Talk is Cheap.’” Id. at A223. Trial testimony established that the Creekside Spirits 

robbery suspect wore a “white and blue baseball style hat” that had “the same type” of logo as the 

one on the red and white baseball hat. See id. at A124, A223, A231.

11 The logo on pants consisted of two concentric circles (the outer one white and the inner black),

black letters appearing to spell GBGC in the inner circle, and a check mark inside the C. State’s

Trial Ex. 15–17; App. to Opening Br. at A205–06. A witness testified that “the logo on the jacket 

was the same type that we had recovered that was on the pants that we found in Mr. Chavez’s 

apartment.” App. to Opening Br. at A205–06. The witness believed that, because both articles of 

clothing appeared to be made of the same material, they were “one piece.” See id. at A205–06, 

A231. 
5

Creekside Spirits suspect, Waters confessed to both robberies, saying he wielded a 

BB gun. He also admitted that he had discarded the clothing captured on video 

during the Baymont Inn robbery. 

(8) Later that evening, Waters sought out Detective Gerasimov and told 

him that he had used a real gun, which could be found in a vacant apartment adjacent 

to his. Following Waters’ lead, the police located the gun in a utility closet, the gun 

wrapped in a T-shirt “between the ceiling and the duct.”12 The gun had an extended 

magazine. Surveillance footage from both robberies appeared to show that the 

suspect used a gun with an extended magazine. The T-shirt had a logo that matched 

the logo on other clothing that had been found in Waters’ apartment.13 

(9) The police also conducted a forensic examination of Waters’ phone. 

On the morning of August 8, the phone had been used to search for “‘a liquor store 

near me[]’” on the same street where Creekside Spirits was located.

14

 A few hours 

before the robbery occurred, the phone was used to search “‘what time does it get 

dark in Delaware.’”15 Four days later and a few hours before the second robbery, 

12 Id. at 242–43.

13 In making this connection, Detective Gerasimov did not specify which clothing he was referring 

to. But a photograph shows a logo on a black article of clothing in Waters’ apartment that has 

irregular shapes with six points and lettering, only one word of which—weight—is legible. State’s 

Trial Ex. 19; App. to Opening Br. at A206–07. The T-shirt found in the adjacent apartment 

displayed the same logo. State Trial’s Ex. 40–42; App. to Opening Br. at A242–43.

14 Id. at A281–82.

15 Id. at A283.
6

the phone was used to search “‘Baymont hotel.’”16 Searches run about an hour later 

queried “‘what is Baymont shift hours[]’” and “‘what is first shift[]’” and “‘what is 

second shift.’”17

(10) A three-day trial was held on the robbery and PFDCF charges 

separately from the PFBPP charges. During closing arguments, the defense asked, 

after revisiting Waters’ interrogation, “[w]as this really a confession or was this a 

coerced statement?”18 The jury deliberated for about five hours; about two hours in, 

the jury posed a question to the trial judge. The jury’s note read: “‘During the 

interrogation they read Miranda rights and the female asks him are you willing to 

talk to me. When she is asked to leave, does the Miranda right still apply to the 

male detective?’”

19

 

(11) The Superior Court advised counsel that, “because this is a legal 

question, I’m going to answer the question, let them know that the Miranda reading 

and the acknowledgement does apply to both officers[.]”20 The court continued, “I 

am going to remind them that they should not be concerned with any of the wisdom 

of any legal rule that I give them because I don’t want to—they need to focus on the 

16 Id. The witness says August 11 here, the day before the robbery, but elsewhere the witness 

correctly identifies the date as August 12. Id. at A196.

17 Id. at A283–84.

18 Id. at A324.

19 Id. at A364 (italics added).

20 Id. at A356–57 (italics added).
7

evidence. This is a legal ruling. It is not evidentiary.”21 The court then heard 

argument from counsel. The defense did not dispute that there were no Miranda22

issues for the jury to consider. The defense maintained, however, that the court 

should not answer the question at all. The defense contended that any instruction 

would amount to a comment on the evidence because it could lead the jury to “think 

that the interrogation is completely valid[.]”23 After a ten-minute recess, the court 

read the following instruction to the jury: “Any issue of Miranda rights and 

defendant’s constitutional rights [has] already been resolved. It is within the jury’s 

province to determine the credibility of all statements.”24

(12) The jury asked two more questions arguably related to the first25 and

ultimately found Waters guilty of all robbery and PFDCF charges. That same 

afternoon, the jury also found Waters guilty of the PFBPP charges. Later, the court 

sentenced Waters to thirty-nine years at Level V incarceration, followed by 

probation. 26

21 Id. 

22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

23 Id. at A357–58.

24 Id. at A363–64 (italics added).

25 First, “‘[i]n the case of a split decision on one of the counts, what are the ramifications?’” Id. at 

A365–66. Without objection, the court answered, “you must not be concerned with the 

ramifications of your verdict or allow it to influence you in any way in arriving at the verdict. 

Your verdict must be based solely and exclusively on the evidence presented at trial.” Id. at A366. 

Second, the court answered—also without objection—that a transcript of Detective Gerasimov’s 

testimony was not available and that the jury was to rely on its recollection of all testimony. 

26 Opening Br. Ex. B. at 1–3.
8

(13) On appeal, Waters does not contend that the court’s instruction to the 

jury’s first question was an inaccurate statement of law. Rather, Waters claims that, 

“[i]nstructing the jury on the question posed was tantamount to commenting on the 

evidence, i.e., that the interrogation as a whole [was] valid because Miranda 

applied.”27 And he contends that, because the jury’s questions reveal that the jury 

“was focused on the circumstances surrounding the confession” and because the 

“weight and validity” of the confession was “central to the jury’s determination[,]” 

the court’s instruction was reversible error.28 Waters supports this claim by insisting 

that the “record is completely devoid of any physical evidence”—that is, no 

fingerprints or DNA evidence tied Waters to Creekside Spirits, Baymont Inn, or the 

gun, and the police never submitted any clothing for DNA analysis.

29

 

(14) “After the submission of the case to the jury, the court in its discretion 

may provide supplemental instructions based on a question submitted to the court 

by the jury during deliberations.”30 Hence, such instructions are reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion.31 

(15) To begin with, we reject Waters’ claim that the lack of “physical

evidence” means that the confession was so “central to the jury’s determination”

27 Opening Br. at 7.

28 Id. at 6–7, 9.

29 Id. at 3–4, 7.

30 Gonzalez v. State, 159 A.3d 712, 2017 WL 1214428, at *3 (Del. Mar. 31, 2017) (TABLE).

31 Id.
9

that, without it, the jury would have returned a not-guilty verdict. Abundant other 

evidence corroborated Waters’ guilt. The robberies were committed only days apart, 

and both the modus operandi of the suspect—who, masked and armed, demanded

that money be put in a bag and counted down from ten—and physical descriptions 

of the suspect—who was a black male, over six feet tall, weighing between 250 to 

300 pounds—were alike. Testimony from two members of Baymont Inn’s staff 

identified Waters with 95 percent and 80 percent certainty, respectively. Thanks to 

Waters’ lead, the gun that was found contained an extended magazine that appeared 

to match the gun and magazine captured in surveillance video from both robberies. 

The gun was wrapped in a T-shirt, which bore a logo resembling a logo found on 

clothing in Waters’ apartment. During the Baymont Inn robbery, surveillance 

footage showed that the suspect’s jacket also bore a logo similar to a logo found on 

pants in Waters’ apartment. About ten minutes after that robbery, separate 

surveillance footage captured a person running with red shorts, and red shorts were 

found in Waters’ apartment. Lastly, online searches on Waters’ phone were related

to Creekside Spirits and Baymont Inn, including by the date and time leading up to 

the crimes.

(16) We also conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in 

answering the jury’s first question. The court conferred with counsel before taking 

a recess to formulate a permitted response. The jury’s question did not refer to the 
10

weight or validity of Waters’ confession; instead, the question focused on the 

Miranda rule, a legal question.32 The court’s instruction thus isolated the legal 

question—“[a]ny issue of Miranda rights and defendant’s constitutional rights [has]

already been resolved”—and underscored the jury’s role—“[i]t is within the jury’s 

province to determine the credibility of all statements.”33 Put simply, the trial court 

“properly combine[d] a statement regarding a fact in issue with a declaration of law”

without commenting on the evidence.

34

 To us, the court’s instruction was 

“‘reasonably informative’” and did not “‘undermine . . . the ‘jury’s ability to 

intelligently perform its duty.’”35

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Gary F. Traynor

Justice

32 United States v. Sanders, 472 Fed. Appx. 376, 380 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the “existence 

of a Miranda violation is a legal question and [is] in the sole purview of the judge. The vehicle 

for a Miranda challenge is the motion to suppress, which a defendant must make before trial.”). 

See also Harris v. State, 622 A.2d 1095, 1993 WL 61667, at *2 (Del. Feb. 3, 1993) (TABLE) 

(citations omitted) (“In Delaware, only the trial judge determines the admissibility of the 

defendant’s statement. The jury’s duty is to judge the reliability or weight that will be given to 

the statement. In that regard, the jury may consider any claim of involuntariness as affecting the 

weight of the evidence.”).

33 App. to Opening Br. at A363–64 (italics added).

34 Herring v. State, 805 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. 2002); see also Barksdale v. State, 832 A.3d 1250, 

2003 WL 22227552, at *1 (Del. Sept. 24, 2003) (TABLE) (“Article IV, Section 19 prohibits a trial 

judge from ‘commenting on the weight of evidence or the credibility of the witnesses’ but permits 

a trial judge to ‘instruct the jury on the law.’”).

35 Brokenbrough v. State, 897 A.2d 767, 2006 WL 954235, at *2 (Del. Apr. 11, 2006) (TABLE) 

(quoting Green v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 791 A.2d 731, 741 (Del. 2002)).