UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ISSAC ABDINOOR, an individual,

CASE NO.: 9:20-cv-80801-WPD

Plaintiff,

vs.

LEWIS RENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, a Delaware limited 

partnership,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant, LEWIS RENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all other applicable law, hereby moves

this Court for an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s, ISAAC ABDINOOR, Complaint filed in this action, 

and in support thereof states as follows:

THE COMPLAINT

1. This matter arose from claims that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff in 

violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

2. According to Plaintiff, Defendant owns, leases, leases to, or operates a place of 

public accommodation, namely, a chain of “brick and mortar” stores. See Complaint, ¶ 19. 

3. The Complaint further alleges that Defendant has denied Plaintiff equal access to the 

goods and services provided to Defendant’s non-disabled customers through its website, 

www.lewisrentalproperties.com (the “Website”). See Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 23. Among other things, 

Plaintiff alleges the Website is not compatible with screen reader software used by blind persons 

such as Plaintiff, leaving Plaintiff unable to enjoy the Website. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 16, 24 – 26. Plaintiff 

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further claims that Defendant has made no attempts to modify its Website accordingly following 

Plaintiff’s request for same. See id. at ¶ 3.

4. Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, however, the Website stopped operating before 

Defendant was served with process in this action. Since May 29, 2020, the only content on the 

Website, which is indeed compatible with screen reader software, is the phrase, “our new site is 

coming soon stay tuned.” See Website Screenshot, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 

“A.” 

5. Since the Website has not been operating, Plaintiff has no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

12181, et. seq.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Standard for Motion to Dismiss

6. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a Complaint may be dismissed for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.

7. The standard for dismissal is as follows:

[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain ‘sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its own face.’ While a 

court must accept well-pled facts as true, it need not assume the truth of conclusory 

allegations, nor are plaintiffs entitled to have the court view unwarranted deductions 

of fact or argumentative inferences in their favor. 

Woodburn v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 854 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

(internal citations omitted).

8. Moreover:

[t]o escape dismissal, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to move claims 

‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ ‘The plausibility standard is met 

only where the facts enable ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged’... The complaint’s allegations must 

establish ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’

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Siskos v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92565 *14 – 15 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 

2013)).

9. While “analysis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ‘limited to the face of the complaint 

and attachments thereto,’ a court may consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they 

are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” See Starship Enters. of 

Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta County, 708 F.3d 1243, 1252 fn. 13 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Blue 

Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 – 1370 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

Argument

10. The Complaint fails to state a cause of action, as it fails to meet the pleading 

standards for ADA violations relating to websites and alleges that a website violated the ADA when 

in fact the subject website is not operating.

11. Plaintiff brings a one-count Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), which states, 

“no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place 

of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

public accommodation.” See also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.

12. A place of public accommodation is a “‘place’ or a ‘facility, operated by a private 

entity, whose operations affect commerce” and which falls under one of the twelve public 

accommodations categories listed under § 12181(7).” See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 

1279, 1283 fn. 3 (11th Cir. 2002).

13. The circuit courts are split as to whether places of public accommodation are limited 

to physical spaces, such as a store, or, rather, may include virtual spaces such as websites. See Gil v. 

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Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F.Supp.3d 1340, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2017). The Eleventh Circuit has taken 

a middle ground in deciding:

Title III covers both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that 

would prevent a person from entering an accommodation’s facilities and accessing 

its goods, services and privileges, and tangible barriers... that restrict a disabled 

person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.

Rendon v. Valleycrest, 294 F.3d at 1283. 

14. While it is still unclear as to whether a website constitutes a place of public 

accommodation in the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff, at the very least, must “allege some nexus 

between the website and the physical space of public accommodation to survive a motion to 

dismiss.” See Haynes v. Pollo Operations, Inc., 2018 WL 1523421 *5 – 6 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (citing 

Gomez v. Bang & Olufsen Am., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15457 (S.D. Fla. 2017)).

15. In this case, however, no such nexus has been established. In fact, the Complaint 

fails to identify any physical locations to begin with, instead referring to Defendant’s supposed 

“brick and mortar” stores. Moreover, it fails to allege that Plaintiff ever attempted to visit these 

stores or intended to do so. See id. (stating, “[b]ased on Plaintiff’s failure to allege a nexus between 

Defendant’s website and physical locations and failure to establish that the website impeded his 

access to Defendant’s physical locations and services offered therein, the Complaint shall be 

dismissed”); Buchholz v. Aventura Beach Assocs., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2177 *7 (S.D. Fla. 2018) 

(stating, “Buchholz has failed to sufficiently allege a nexus between Ramada Plaza’s website and its 

physical facility. He does not allege that his inability to use and comprehend Ramada Plaza’s 

website impeded his access to the Ramada Plaza Hotel and resort. Indeed, he never alleges that he 

attempted to access or even intends to access the hotel. As such, the Court must dismiss his 

Complaint”).

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16. In any event, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because 

the supposed non-compliant website does not exist, nor did it exist at the time Defendant was served 

with process in this action. Instead, the only content on the Website, which, again, is compatible 

with screen reader software, is the phrase, “our new site is coming soon stay tuned.” See Exhibit A;

Starship Enters. v. Coweta County, 708 F.3d at 1252 fn. 12.1

 Thus, the Website is informational at 

best and has no link to a physical space. See Gomez v. La Carreta Enters., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

202662 *9 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (dismissing complaint because, “[c]ourts in this district require the 

website to provide more than information about a defendant’s business in order to state a claim 

under the ADA for website inaccessibility”). 

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendant, LEWIS RENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, respectfully requests this Court enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s, ISAAC 

ABDINOOR, Complaint, and granting such further relief as is just and proper. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mahra C. Sarofsky

Jeremy E. Slusher, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 145769

jes@slusherandrosenblum.com

Mahra Sarofsky, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 33637

mcs@slusherandrosenblum.com

SLUSHER & ROSENBLUM P.A.

444 W. Railroad Avenue, Suite 470

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Telephone: (561) 814-2020

Facsimile: (561) 557-4598

Attorneys for Defendant

1 The Website may be considered for purposes of this 12(b)(6) Motion because it is referenced in 

the Complaint and is the source of the alleged ADA violation.

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LOCAL RULE 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Pursuant to S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.1(a)(3), the undersigned certifies she conferred with counsel 

for Plaintiff by telephone and e-mail prior to filing this Motion in a good faith attempt to resolve 

the issues raised in the instant Motion, which proved unsuccessful.

Dated July 24, 2020

/s/ Mahra C. Sarofsky

Jeremy E. Slusher, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 145769

jes@slusherandrosenblum.com

Mahra Sarofsky, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 33637

mcs@slusherandrosenblum.com

SLUSHER & ROSENBLUM P.A.

444 W. Railroad Avenue, Suite 470

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Telephone: (561) 814-2020

Facsimile: (561) 557-4598

Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via 

electronic mail through the Southern District of Florida CM/ECF system on this 24th day of July,

2020 on all counsel or parties of record.

By: /s/ Mahra C. Sarofsky

Jeremy E. Slusher, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 145769

jes@slusherandrosenblum.com

Mahra C. Sarofsky, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 33637

mcs@slusherandrosenblum.com

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