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95–131 PS 2005

HOW TO BEST PREPARE FOR THE

ACTS OF TERROR: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND FIRST RESPONDER

FUNDING

(108–66)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 13, 2004

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

JACK QUINN, New York

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana

BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MAX BURNS, Georgia

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana

VACANCY

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

MIKE THOMPSON, California

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MAX BURNS, Georgia, Vice-Chair

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Foresman, George W., Assistant to the Governor Commonwealth Preparedness, Commonwealth of Virginia ........................................................................ 9

Jenkins, William O., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, General Accounting Office ...................................................................................................... 3

Mitchell, Andrew, Deputy Director, Office of Domestic Preparedness, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 9

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Foresman, George W ............................................................................................... 20

Jenkins, William O .................................................................................................. 115

Mitchell, Andrew ..................................................................................................... 28

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, An Audit

of Distributing and Spending ′′First Responder′′ Grant Funds, report ........... 60

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Homeland Security Presidential

Directive, HSPD-8 ................................................................................................ 109

(1)

HOW TO BEST PREPARE FOR ACTS OF TERROR: NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND FIRST

RESPONDER FUNDING

Thursday, May 13, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m. in room

2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven C. LaTourette,

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting this afternoon to discuss one of the

most challenging issues facing the Congress this session, that of

how do we address the very compelling funding needs facing first

responders around the country, as well as how we should organize

the Federal efforts in these areas.

At its core, the issue resolves around the question of whether the

Federal Government pursues a preparedness strategy that focuses

on preparing the Nation for all hazards, or whether it focuses on

one hazard only. On December 17, 2003, President Bush outlined

the policy of the Administration, which is to pursue a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.

The all-hazards strategy encompasses the idea that the best way

to prepare for every disaster that may happen is to prepare for all

disasters by having in place a comprehensive preparedness strategy. State, local, regional, and tribal governments can ensure that

they are ready to meet all of the challenges. That is why the Federal Government adopted the Federal Response Plan in April 1992,

and why that plan envisions a response system that is prepared for

all potential hazards.

This policy is also one that makes sense for economic reasons. If

we acquire from communities that their preparedness programs

contemplate all hazards that might occur, the result will be preparedness systems that are built in the most efficient way possible.

Duel use equipment, when available, will be purchased. Planning

sessions will be more effective, and better plans will result as all

scenarios are considered.

A key factor that must be remembered as we are proceeding to

discuss at greater length the impact of terrorism on society is that

terrorism is a motive, not an incident in of itself. Terrorism may

take many forms—a bomb in a movie theater, a chemical release

on an airplane, or a biological weapon at a Federal building.
2

Each of these events, while scary, must be dealt with in a particular way. However, what is important to remember is that while

there may be a subtle nuance to an event which is where terrorism

is suspected, until that suspicion can be confirmed, first responders

will likely treat the event as if it were one of the events that they

deal with on a regular basis. All-hazards preparedness is an accepted standard of most State governments, emergency managers, the

Administration, as well as a variety of local and regional organizations. Simply put, all-hazards is the best way to do business at the

Federal, State, and local level. It is where everyone else is going

so it is the policy that we, as a Congress, should be going as well.

We are also here to discuss the funding of first responders. We

will be hearing from witnesses that will discuss how the Administration has been doing in delivering vital responder dollars, and

also what the policies are regarding the distribution of those funds.

There have been complaints in the media that somehow the funds

are not reaching the local governments fast enough. The Homeland

Security Inspector General has completed a study on that issue,

and we will be hearing from the Administration on the results of

that review, as well as the General Accounting Office. Their results, I think, you will find very interesting.

I believe that the information that we gather at today’s hearing

will be helpful as we proceed with drafting legislation to address

these issues. The draft is proceeding very well, and I am hopeful

that we will be able to discuss the draft in the near future.

It is now my pleasure to recognize our distinguished Ranking

Member, Ms. Holmes-Norton for any remarks she would wish to

make.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Chairman LaTourette. Thank you for

calling this important hearing on how best to prepare for acts of

terror, national preparedness, and funding for first responders.

Today we are here to discuss two different approaches to preparing our Nation for possible acts of terror. Since September 11,

2001, the Federal Government has focused on the critical role that

first responders play in responding to and mitigating the effects

disasters. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003 alone, Congress appropriated nearly $13.9 billion dollars for domestic preparedness programs.

Several States and local officials have complained that they are

not receiving the money in a timely fashion and, thus, the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General launched an investigation which found that much of the delay was due to lack of

clear spending plans by recipients as well as the fact that programs

are run on a reimbursable basis. Many of the recipients did not

have the money for the initial outlay. Additionally, the DHS IG

found that most of the problems at the Federal level were due to

the volume of the funds at issue and the newness of the program.

In response to these delays, the Select Committee on Homeland

Security, on which I serve, introduced H.R. 3266, the Faster,

Smarter, Funding for First Responder Act of 2004. The Select Committee decided to focus solely on terrorism preparedness. For example, H.R. 3266 requires a separate State preparedness plan focused

on the threat of terrorism and establishes separate first responder

essential capabilities and training and equipment standards fo-
3

cused solely on terrorism. Additionally, the bill would allocate first

responder grants exclusively on the basis of terrorism risks and

vulnerability.

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure has a long

history of supporting the all-hazards principle, which has been the

core of the Federal preparedness effort for many years, and has become the guiding principle of the Administration for the Department of Homeland Security, as indicated by the Homeland Security

Presidential Directive. Even the National Response Plan is an allhazards plan. This approach recognizes that the most efficient way

to prepare a community for disaster of whatever type is to develop

an emergency management plan that will allow the community to

respond to every disaster. This Committee is concerned that H.R.

3266 might produce two separate streams of funding, with no requirement for coordination with other preparedness programs,

which could cause overlap and duplication.

Additionally, communities would have to develop a preparedness

plan for terrorism and one for non-terrorist threats in order to receive other preparedness funds. This approach may be counter to

the all-hazards approach to preparedness adopted by DHS, or it

may be necessary in order to properly differentiate between terror

and other kinds of hazards. That is one of the things that we can

find out as we have hearings like this.

I welcome the witnesses. I look forward to hearing their testimony on this important issue.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady very much.

First, I would ask unanimous consent that any opening remarks

that the Chair, Ranking Member, or any member of the Subcommittee may wish to make be made a part of the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

Before I introduce Mr. Jenkins, I just want to make a couple of

caveats for our witnesses, and also for our guests today. We have

been advised by the floor that there is going to be a very lengthy

series of votes, they think beginning about 12:30. When I say

lengthy, there will be a little over a hour of votes. So we are sorry

to inconvenience you in that way, but we will try to get through

as much as we can between now and then.

Secondly, sadly I spent the morning in a dentist’s chair, so I may

not be as friendly and/or loquacious as I usually am. I apologize for

that up front.

We are joined today by our first panel by William Jenkins, who

is the Director of the Homeland Security and Justice team at the

General Accounting Office.

Mr. Jenkins, I welcome you. We appreciate your being here. We

look forward to hearing from you.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Norton, I am

pleased to be here today to discuss Federal funding for first responders. The events of September 11, 2001 spotlighted the critical

role that first responders play in responding to and mitigating the

effects of major emergencies.
4

In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress appropriated almost $14

billion for domestic preparedness programs, the largest sources of

funds for first responders were the State Homeland Security Grant

Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative Grants.

Effectively managing the large growth in Federal grant funds for

domestic preparedness has presented a challenge to the Office of

Domestic Preparedness, States, and Localities. We have ongoing

work in this area. A report on the management of funds in the National Capital Region will be issued within the next few weeks. We

are also examining the intergovernmental efforts to manage the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 grants administered by ODP.

With this Subcommittee, we have begun work examining DHS

efforts to implement an all-hazards approach for enhancing first responder capacities and abilities. Because most of our work is ongoing and our findings remain preliminary. My testimony today focuses principally on the major findings of two recent reports supplemented by some examples from our work in three States in

which we documented the steps and time required to distribute

funds from the ODP to the States and from States to localities.

Most of this concern about possible delays in getting grant funds

to local first responders is focused on the State Homeland Security

Grant funds which required that States transfer 80 percent of

grant funds to local jurisdictions no later than 45 days after ODP

awarded the funds to the States.

Both the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General

and House Select Committee on Homeland Security recently issued

reports on the distribution of first responder grants to States and

local governments, focusing principally on the State Homeland Security grants. Generally, both reports found similar causes of delay

in getting funds to local governments and first responder agencies.

These included the time needed to complete State and local planning requirements and budgets, legal requirements for the procedures local governments needed to use in accepting State grant allocations, the need to establish procedures for the use of the funds,

such as the authority to buy equipment and receive reimbursement

later, and procurement requirements such as bidding procedures.

Our work in three States found examples of each of these issues,

and in some cases, more than one in a single location. For example,

one city was notified on July 17, 2003 that grant funds were available for use. The city council voted to accept the funds on November 7, 2003, almost four months later.

In this same jurisdiction, procurement regulations required that

funds be available prior to issuing equipment purchase orders. A

special procedure had to be established. This took from June 18th

to September 4, 2003. However, once appropriate procedures are in

place, such delays can be reduced.

Because the State and local requirements and procedures vary,

so do the causes of any delays in obtaining and using funds at the

local level. The DHS IG and Select Committee reports both found

that ODP’s grant management requirements, procedures, and processes were not the principal cause of delays in getting grant funds

to local governments and first responders.

In fiscal year 2002 ODP took, on average, 292 days from the date

grant legislation was enacted to the date that it awarded State
5

Homeland Security grants to States. It reduced this time, on average, to 77 days in 2003. In the three States that we looked at, the

time was reduced from eight months in 2002 to three months in

2003.

The DHS IG and Select Committee reports and our preliminary

work support the conclusion that local first responders may not

have anticipated the natural delays that could be expected in the

complex process of distributing dramatically increased funding

through multiple government levels, while maintaining procedures

to assure appropriate accountability.

The available evidence is that the process is becoming more efficient over time as ODP, States, and localities develop processes and

procedures for streamlining the distribution of funds. At the same

time, it is important that the quest for speed in distributing funds

does not hamper the planning and accountability needed to ensure

that the funds are spent on the basis of a comprehensive, well-coordinated plan designed to provide first responders with the equipment, skills, and training needed to respond quickly and effectively

to a range of emergencies, whether a daily event, such as traffic accidents, or major emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions,

whether they are the result of nature, an accident, or a deliberate

act.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased

to answer any questions you or other members of the Committee

may have. I would ask that my testimony be included in its entirety.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Jenkins, thank you very much for that.

In reviewing your testimony, and also listening to you now, you

identified three primary areas of delay—the grant process, the

award process, the State and local delays in making purchase decisions, and then their processes and some reimbursement difficulties.

Relative to the first, you indicated that ODP has made some significant progress. You gave us the 292 days to 72 days, and the

eight months down to three months. Are there any specific legislative recommendations that you would have for us to straighten out

that leg of the stool?

Mr. JENKINS. Do you mean in terms of getting it down quicker?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Yes.

Mr. JENKINS. I do not think so. As I said, right now I do not have

any recommendations because the process seems to be sort of working itself out, as both the States and the ODP have worked together to streamline the process. Every indication in 2004 is that

the time that was gained in 2003 has continued, but they are still

streamlining it. It may not be a problem that needs fixing at this

point.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Obviously there is a great deal of excitement

when there is an announcement that free money is available. They

quickly pass a resolution to say, ‘‘Of course, we will take the new—

whatever it happens to be.’’ But then they discover that it requires

a local match, or it is something that requires that the cash be on

hand. Is that where the bulk of the delay has been?
6

Mr. JENKINS. There are a couple of things. That is the bulk of

it. Part of it is just that the expectations were probably a little bit

high. I mean, the grants were announced with great fanfare. Since

there had not been a lot of money for this purpose—the kind of

money that there is now—there really were not procedures and

processes in place for dealing with that. Those had to be created.

Most of that delay, in terms of creating that, was for the 2002

money.

I mentioned one that had to have a procedure whereas they could

basically borrow from other accounts to buy the equipment, get reimbursed, and then repay those accounts, they do not have to do

that again. It is in place now so there is no delay from that one

particular thing.

These new structures and procedures are becoming institutionalized in the States. It is true that there are some localities that do

not have the money or that have problems to front the money. That

is why some States are offering to purchase centrally. That makes

some sense. Just as AVIS should be able to get better deals on a

car than you or I could, if the States are purchasing radios or biohazard equipment, they should be able to get discounts that a local

jurisdiction may not able to get.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do you think Federal guidance is needed to go

out and go forth from here to the States and local communities to

advise them as we get through 2004 and into 2005? Are these

things that you might want to do to prepare yourself in case yourself in case you are going to be seeking? Or do you think the word

is out and it is a problem that is going to slowly diminish.

Mr. JENKINS. Well, I think it would be useful. I mean, already

there is a website that ODP has created. But I think there probably could be a more proactive effort, for example, to identify best

practices for States and localities. ‘‘Here are good ways to do this.

Here are things that have worked.’’

There are a huge variety of ways that this is being done. In

Pennsylvania, it is being done through regional structures. As a

matter of fact, Pennsylvania passed a law to permit this regional

structure to be the grantee, to accept the money. In other places,

it goes to counties and passes from counties to localities. I think

that is what States need. Given my governmental structure, what

are some other places in the country that seem to have addressed

this and figured out how to deal with it? Are there practices that

we could adopt in our location, given the structure of government

that we have?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jenkins, this issue has probably arisen more in homeland security than any other issue. It is getting the money, ‘‘Show me the

money’’ issue. I think your report is the first systematic answer

that I have heard as to what has happened. It turns out not to be

mainly the fault of the Federal Government. That is very interesting because everyone assumed that it was.

Is the distribution of these funds any different from the distribution of Federal formula funds for grant funds generally?
7

Mr. JENKINS. Well, most Federal grant funds are reimbursable

funds. So in that sense, they are not. There has been some concern

by local first responders that these are reimbursable grants. But

most Federal grants are reimbursable.

Ms. NORTON. I am not really sure why, except the anxiety, the

angst about not getting money in case something happened, if they

have to go through this every time they get Federal funds and they

get a lot of Federal funds, then why are these delays of so much

greater concern than the delay that you would ordinarily have in

receiving Federal funds?

Mr. JENKINS. To tell you the truth, we really have not looked at

exactly what the causes are in terms of exactly where that angst

comes from. But I think there are a couple of things. The expectations were high. There was not that much Federal money available

to first responders prior to September 11th.

Stops were at the State level. There were things that the States

were used to dealing with. The reimbursable issue has not really

been an issue for the States. They deal with the Cash Management

Act and the reimbursable requirements under that Act in a variety

of grants that they have.

I think some local governments and first responders really were

not aware of exactly what the steps they would be required to take,

even just their own local steps.

Ms. NORTON. But so much of this money, particularly the first

responder money, is meant for counties and cities.

Mr. JENKINS. It is meant for counties and cities.

Ms. NORTON. By the way, they have been among the loudest of

the complainers about it. They say that it is bad enough that it has

to go to the States and the States complain. But then by the time

it gets down to us, it is so long in coming. Again, you have given

some indication that is not as much of a problem because we do

not usually have as much of this money flowing down, I take it?

Mr. JENKINS. Right. The one thing that does not strike me as unreasonable is one of the reasons that it did not get down in many

States: ‘‘States, you have to have a plan and submit to us a plan

for spending this money before we are going to release it to you.’’

Ms. NORTON. That is fair enough.

Mr. JENKINS. In some cases, it took a while for local governments

to get these plans. One of the States that we looked at, it was six

months for them to get their plan together. They were not going

to get the money until they had a plan for how they were going

to spend it. It took them six months to do that. That strikes me

as a reasonable requirement.

Ms. NORTON. This goes really to the Chairman’s notion, near the

end of what he had to say, that perhaps there is some guidance

from the Department of Homeland Security that can be given to

prepare people in case they are not already prepared by what they

have had to go through. Particularly for unfamiliar local governments, county governments, village governments, and the like,

these are the kinds of things that you start doing now if you want

some money, or be prepared to face a delay.

Did you make any recommendations in this report?

Mr. JENKINS. No, we have not. This is based on some work that

is completed and work that is ongoing. Any recommendations we
8

have will be in the report that is issued later. We do have a couple

of recommendations in the report that will be coming out in a few

weeks.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, this is a lesson in how bureaucracy

works. Sometimes you learn about why bureaucracy does what it

does. For example, you get a plan that we live in a Federal republic

and there are multiple levels of government. You then come to the

conclusion that some of this is just part of the way it has to be,

but I do note that the Department of Homeland Security has reduced its time. I believe they had a 45-day deadline.

Mr. JENKINS. It was 45 days for 2003. It is 60 days for 2004.

Ms. NORTON. Where are they now?

Mr. JENKINS. The monies for 2004 have been awarded.

Ms. NORTON. They are meeting their deadlines?

Mr. JENKINS. I do not know if the States are meeting their deadlines. There is a new procedure that ODP has for 2004. They are

changing the plans that States need to send up. It strikes us that

they are going in the right direction because the plan is going to

require that they have a plan on how they are going to use all the

money that they are getting from various sources of ODP grants

and what projects they are going to spend them on, and how those

projects relate to specific first responder goals that they have. That

is not a bad idea.

States are going to have to submit those plans. I think they are

due in June of this year. Then they will have to report biennially,

twice a year, on how they doing with those projects against those

goals. But the nice thing about it is that this is getting them to pull

together information from all the grants that they are getting, and

how they are consolidating the use of those grants towards specific

purposes or projects. The ODP witness can tell you more about

that. But that does strike us as a good way to go.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Jenkins, we thank you very much for your

testimony today. You have been helpful to our discussion. Your observations and your completed report, I am sure, will help us as

we consider future legislation.

You can go with our thanks.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Now, I would like to welcome our second

panel. We are joined this afternoon by Mr. Andrew Mitchell who

is the Deputy Director of the office of Domestic Preparedness at the

Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. George Foresman, who

is the Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness

of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you both very much for being here.

Thank you for coming. We invite you to share your thoughts with

us for about five minutes.

Mr. Mitchell, we will begin with you.
9

TESTIMONY OF ANDREW MITCHELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GEORGE W. FORESMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS,

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Holmes-Norton.

My name is Andrew Mitchell. I am the Deputy Director of the

Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness. On behalf of Secretary Ridge and ODP Director Sue Mencer,

I am pleased to be here to appear before you today to discuss what

we are doing at ODP and what our current programs are, and how

we are approaching the process of preparedness for the Nation.

ODP is the primary Federal Government agency responsible for

preparing the Nation for a terrorist incident by assisting State and

local jurisdictions, regional authorities, and tribal governments in

building their capacities to prepare for, prevent, and respond to

incidences of domestic terrorism.

Since its creation, ODP has provided assistance to all 50 States,

the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and

other U.S. territories. We have trained in excess of 550,000 emergency responders from more than 5,000 local jurisdictions and conducted more than 300 exercises. By the end of fiscal year 2004, we

will have provided in excess of $8.1 billion in assistance and support.

In fiscal year 2004, ODP has provided, through the State Homeland Security Grant Program, $1.689 billion, the Urban Area Security Initiative, which is $720 million, the Fire Act Grant Program,

which is $745 million, the Citizens Corps Program, which is approximately $40 million, and the new Law Enforcement Prevention

Grant which is $497 million. All of those programs, with the exception of the Fire Grant, are distributed through the States and in

accordance with the strategic plans that they have developed and

submitted to our office.

How States and territories distribute and utilize these funds are

influenced by the results of the strategies that Mr. Jenkins just referred to. Those strategies were submitted to our office by January

31st. We do have all the State’s strategies in. We have approved

all, I think, as of today, with the exception of four. We are working

with those four remaining States. We assume that those will be approved very soon.

These assessments and strategies are important to both the

States and the Federal Government. They provide information regarding vulnerabilities, capabilities, and future requirements in

each State’s preparedness goals and objectives.

I think part of the evolution of the program that we have discussed here a little bit this morning with Mr. Jenkins, we are moving away from counting widgets—how many grants, how many of

these did you buy, which was the genesis of the program; initially

it was an equipment acquisition grant—and looking at developing

specific strategic goals and objectives based on the State and local

government’s articulation of what their requirements and needs

are. They allocate funds accordingly and report to us on a consist-
10

ent basis how they are progressing towards addressing the goals

that they have determined.

Since the Department of Homeland Security was created, we

have worked continuously with the Congress to try to determine

how we can do our job better. We recognize that it is a tough job,

but there are always things we can do better. One such Congressional effort is H.R. 3266, introduced by Chairman Cox. It is a

major attempt to improve how the Department provides assistance

to State and local governments.

Since the bill’s introduction, the Department has worked with

the staff of the Select Committee, and more recently has provided

the Select Committee a White Paper containing the Department’s

observations and comments on the bill’s provision. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to share those views with your

Subcommittee by offering a copy of that White Paper for inclusion

in the record.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Generally, Mr. Chairman, the Department supports much of H.R. 3266 and, in particular supports the bill’s intent to further facilitate funding for our Nation’s first responders.

However, we have shared several concerns with the Select Committee’s staff. For example, we believe that H.R. 3266’s Section

1803 Task Force requirements duplicate efforts and responsibilities

that already exist under the Homeland Security Act, Section 871,

Advisory Committee provisions. Secretary Ridge, pursuant to that

section, has created the Homeland Security Advisory Committee in

2003 as a means of providing the Department with a continuing

source of advice and comment from our State and local constituents

and partners. We believe that it would be more effective and efficient to incorporate any additional roles for activities such as that

to be integrated with this existing advisory committee.

A primary focus of this Task Force is also being addressed in our

HSPD–8 implementation regarding the development of mission-essential tasks. I will touch on the HSPD–8 implementation later in

my presentation.

Funding issues regarding how fast the States and local governments and the Department of Homeland Security to allocate grants

has been a major issue of discussion obviously. The Inspector General’s report, as Mr. Jenkins just discussed, identifies certain areas.

I will not go into your discussions with him, but there are legal impediments. They are unique aspects of local governments and State

governments and how they do business that affect that.

We welcome the Inspector General’s review. We look forward to

implementing some of those things, although I think we have already addressed a number of those issues in the report in our ongoing attempts to streamline this process.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a

copy of that report for inclusion in the record, also.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Secretary believes that it is important to look

more closely at the distribution of funds. Obviously the IG report

was a good start. But on March 15th of this year, Secretary Ridge

announced the creation of the Homeland Security Funding Task
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Force. This Task Force is comprised of governors, mayors, county

executives, and representatives of tribal governments.

It is taking a very proactive and objective look at how DHS’s

funding process for State and local systems works, what can be

done better, and how we can make it more efficient and effective.

It will also identify best practices, as was discussed earlier. Obviously if there is something that works well in a jurisdiction or in

one State, we would like to make that information available to others for their consideration.

Information by this Task Force will hopefully help us all do a

better job. This Task Force will provide us a report sometime probably in the middle to latter part of June. We will share the results

of that Task Force report with the Congress.

Secretary Ridge has also taken a number of steps to ensure that

DHS staff and program offices can more effectively support our

States and localities. On January 26th of this year, the Secretary

informed Congress of his intention to consolidate the Office for Domestic Preparedness with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form a new office, the Office of State and

Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.

This consolidation is in direct response to requests from the Nation’s first responders to provide the emergency response community with a one-stop shop. It will place 25 State and local support

programs and initiatives within one office. It will ensure the simplified and coordinated administration of these programs, eliminate

duplication across program lines, and heighten the complementary

aspects of these programs.

Further, by linking these programs to the States’ strategic plans

and assessments, the consolidation will maximize the impact of

these program funds on the States and localities. We are also continuing to look towards efforts to develop preparedness standards

and establish clear methods for assessing State and local preparedness.

On December 17th, as the Chairman indicated, the President

signed HSPD–8, tasking Secretary Ridge, in coordination with

other Federal departments, State, and local jurisdictions, to develop national preparedness goals to improve delivery of Federal

preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and

strengthen the preparedness capabilities of Federal, States, and

local governments inherent to the successful implementation of

HSPD–8.

Is the development clear to define all measurable standards for

State and local preparedness capabilities? Are these standards

built on an existing body of standards and guidance developed by

ODP and other Federal partners to guide and inform State and

local preparedness efforts?

Again, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for inclusion in the record a summary of the standards and

guidelines issued by ODP over the last several years that we will

utilize as we start this process.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. HSPD–8 would establish these policies of the

United States to permit and respond to threats or actual domestic

terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It re-
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quires a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments and outlining actions to

strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local

entities.

HSPD–8 assigns the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States, in cooperation with other

Federal agencies and departments. Consistent with the Department’s responsibilities, the Secretary named the Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness to oversee HSPD–8 implementation.

In its role of HSPD–8 oversight, ODP has developed an implementation concept which maps the response to the requirements

into four interrelated initiatives—to create a national preparedness

strategy, balance the Federal portfolio of preparedness investments, establish a national training and exercise program, and develop a national preparedness assessment reporting system.

To ensure cross-governmental participation, ODP has established

an HSPD–8 planning framework. This framework consists of an

HSPD–8 Project Management Team, a Senior Steering Committee,

and three integrated concept teams. The Senior Steering Committee, is chaired by ODP Director, Sue Mencer. The integrated concept teams are comprised of representatives from organizations,

Federal departments and agencies, as well as State and local governments with significant roles as providers or recipients of Federal preparedness assistance.

HSPD–8 specifically defines all-hazards preparedness as preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will provide an

HSPD–8 summary, a key milestone fact sheet for the record.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. In closing, let me restate Secretary Ridge’s commitment to support the Nation’s State and local emergency response community, and to ensure that America’s first responders

receive the resources and support that they require to do their jobs.

That concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any

questions the Subcommittee may have. Thank you. I would ask

that my testimony be included in its entirety.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

We thank you very much.

Mr. Foresman, thank you for coming. We look forward to hearing

from you.

Mr. FORESMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Congresswoman Norton, thank you. I will just offer to you that I spent Tuesday morning in the dentist’s chair so I know very much where you are right

now.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, since this Nation experience the tragic attacks on September 11th, much

progress has been made in terms of righting this on the part of

States, communities, and our Federal family to prepare for emergencies and disasters of all kinds, to include terrorism. This is important. It makes a difference in lives saved, property protected,

and negative economic consequences minimized.
13

This past weekend, a line of severe thunderstorms moved

through Northern Virginia. Trees were down; power was cut to

more than 50,000 Virginia citizens; and local and State officials

rapidly reacted to the multiple calls for assistance. They were less

concerned about what caused the crisis, focusing on the need to assess the situation to ensure the safety of their citizens.

That event clearly illustrates that for us in Virginia, and for that

fact, in America, that we are confronted on a daily basis by a number and variety of crises that threaten both the fiscal and economic

well-being of our citizens. Successfully responding to these types of

crises, just as occurred on September 11, 2001, depend on the synchronization of efforts by a multitude of organizations at all levels

of government, the private sector, and our citizens.

I would offer, Mr. Chairman, that this Nation possesses a welldocumented, a well-understood, and a strategic approach for synchronizing the efforts of government in responding to a crisis, irrespective of the hazard. In all that we do from this day forward

should do more to empower that.

September 11th did underscore two important facts. The component of our national system needed a better plan, train, and exercise together. Required equipment must be obtained according to

preestablished and shared goals to address the plethora of issues

associated with managing the unique aspects of a terrorist event.

This was known and articulated previously by those on the front

lines of readiness.

What changed for this Nation, for Virginia, and for communities

around America on that day was the level of support among leaders to putting resources into making this type of coordination possible and a priority. In other words, an all-hazards approach.

Secondly, September 11th underscored that the readiness of our

national system in each of its component disciplines and levels of

government required substantial investment to address the types of

evolving risk and hazards potentially caused by a terrorist attack.

I believe that Virginia’s experience illustrates that an all-hazards

approach provides for the type of tangible benefits needed to manage the full range of risks that we face. When Governor Warner established the post of Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth

Preparedness—not the Director of Homeland Security—but Commonwealth Preparedness in January 2002, he did so not knowing

that America would create a Department of Homeland Security. He

did not know that Federal, State, and local spending and policy

would be dramatically altered, and he did not know whether another attack was imminent.

He did know, however, Mr. Chairman, that Virginia needed to be

as flexible as possible to manage our risks in terms of what we

knew at that time and what we did not know in terms of the future. Our job is not to create a parallel structure to manage the

risks of terrorism. It is to work with and through other State, local,

and Federal partners to create an enterprised approach to preparedness. Our job is synchronizing the efforts of people, money,

and policy to prepare for the full range of potential emergencies

and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, recognizing that our time is a little bit short this

afternoon, I would like to briefly turn to the issue of funding. Mr.
14

Jenkins and Mr. Mitchell both, I think, gave a good overview of the

nature of the situation. This is one of the few times as a State official that I will sit before a Congressional committee and say I am

in violent agreement with everything that they said.

But let me briefly discuss a number of issues. Additional resources, coupled with adjustments in State and local funding focus,

because of the shift in the post–9/11 environment, have been welcome for first responders, emergency managers, public health officials, and a host of other officials charged with ensuring the safety

and security of our citizens.

We are seeing measurable advances in the abilities of local,

State, and Federal officials to prevent, respond to, and recover from

emergencies and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I underscore this point. We cannot—we absolutely cannot measure our progress as a Nation in terms of dollars

spent. In the aftermath of September 11th, and subsequent Anthrax attacks, the first major area to see dramatic increases in

Federal funding was bio-terrorism with more than $1.2 billion of

Federal funding, targeting and beginning to flow to communities

and States by the spring of 2002. Major increases of Federal funding for the so-called first responder community and related activities did not materialize until well in 2003.

DHS has done a monumental job in developing a systemic pro- gram to address the flow of funding which essentially is a $8 billion

increase in what we were doing in this country in the last two

years.

What I would offer, I think, in terms of the Federal funding process is that we have seen major issues with regard to the flow of

Federal dollars to States, from States to communities, and even

from communities to other communities where it flows, for instance, to a county and to a city.

As Mr. Mitchell pointed out, Secretary Ridge appropriately recognized the complexity of the challenge to get funding to States and

communities in a manner that will allow us to report back to you

and to the American people on the progress we have made.

This past March, Secretary Ridge did, in fact, ask representatives of key local and State stakeholder organizations to work with

the Department of Homeland Security to assess the funding situation and to make recommendations on what is working and what

is not, and to provide tangible recommendations that would help

alleviate both real and perceived concerns. Our governor, Governor

Warner, is a member of the Task Force. I have been privileged

with it during the past 60 days.

Mr. Chairman, I will not presuppose the recommendations that

the Task Force is going to make, but one thing I would observe is

this: Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Mitchell both made substantial comments today with regard to the flow of Federal funds. Everything

I heard here is reflected in what we are seeing in Virginia. What

we are seeing reflected in Virginia, I think, will be reflected in the

Task Force report in terms of a systematic approach to fixing some

of the challenges that we have with regard to the movement of

money.

Mr. Chairman, one thing is clear. Today, Virginia and this Nation are much better prepared for emergencies and disasters of all
15

kinds, including terrorism. That is because we have taken an allhazards approach. Every day there are hundreds and thousands of

men and women working hard to fight crime, address infectious

disease outbreak, fight fires, and to keep our citizens safe and secure from the full range of risks that we face.

None of us knows what the next crisis will be, but we do know

that there will be one. Irrespective of its cause, our job is to make

sure that we have a systemic process, an enterprise approach, that

can address the full range of prevention, response, and recovery actions needed. That enterprise approach provides for an all-hazards

capability of readiness that will give us the full capability to deal

with the next surprise. Key to this readiness is moving from concept to completion by applying funding resources effectively.

Mr. Chairman, my one admonition, as I look at the plethora of

activities that are going on out there, is this. Major adjustments in

the funding process right now is not what we need. As an official

who is charged on a day-to-day basis with making sure that we get

money where it is needed into the hands of first responders, I

wholeheartedly agree with what Mr. Jenkins said that our system

is beginning to mature. State and local officials are beginning to

get their arms around the complexities and the challenges of administering an $8 billion improvement enterprise.

Fundamentally, I think we need to recognize that from a Federal

grant program perspective, this effort is very much in its infancy.

We need to let it grow and mature a little before we start determining whether we need to make major changes in how we are

raising the child.

Mr. Chairman, and Congresswoman Norton, thank you for the

opportunity to be here today. I would ask that my testimony be included in its entirety.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.

Thank you very much for your fine testimony. It looks like we

may dodge the votes. We will move as quickly as we can through

our questions so you do not have to sit around for an hour while

we go do that. I appreciate your patience.

Mr. Mitchell, one of the things that concerns me about HSPD–

8 and your observations and some of the things that I see going

on around here, not only at the Department, but also on the Select

Committee that Ms. Norton sits on is that a lot of people are talking all-hazards, but I see them doing terrorism only. I think that

makes us nervous. It makes me nervous, and I think a lot of the

members of this Committee are as well. I know the gentlelady has

spoken on the subject.

We had a full committee hearing yesterday or the day before.

Our Chairman, Ms. Norton, and Mr. Oberstar got us all whipped

up into a frenzy. I am glad that you did not see us on that day.

That dealt with ‘‘Why, for crying out loud, is the Department of

Homeland Security in the real estate business when you do not do

real estate? Why is the Department of Homeland Security in the

Coast Guard business when there are people who have dealt with

Coast Guard issues for years and years.’’

I do have a couple of questions that relate to HSPD–8 and also

some appearances by officials from the Department and other

venues that I want to talk to you about. One was that there was
16

a document that talks about what the Department is doing to establish standards for equipment and training. There was a hearing

before Energy and Commerce here where there was a representative from the Health and Human Services Department who indicated that those efforts seemed to be duplicative of the efforts that

they were currently engaging in relative to the training of health

care workers.

I know you talked about some intergovernmental coordination.

Can you share with us what the Department is doing to make sure

that you are not reinventing things that we do not need to reinvent

and what you are doing over at Homeland Security is not also

being done over at HHS?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I think I had the privilege of attending and testifying at that same Committee that you just referred to with Bill Ropp from HHS. I am quite confident, at least

from the outreach programs and the programs that are developed

for State and local governments that we have a long history of

working very collaboratively with HHS prior to September 11th

and prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

Our primary focus is on the first response community, the public

safety community—police, fire, HAZMAT, and EMS. I think we

have had a very effective relationship. Our people get them to the

emergency room door and then HHS handles the internal part—the

emergency room doctors, the technicians, and the acute care physicians.

Obviously in my previous role in the Department of Justice and

my current role in the Department of Homeland Security, I was not

and am not a medical specialist. People on my staff are not. We are

quite comfortable, I think, that we have the right combination of

programs.

I cannot speak to the resources that they have, whether those

are adequate for what they do or what their requirements are. But

I think that the coordination aspect between the two Departments

has been quite good.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Good. I thank you for that.

The Department submitted a White Paper on H.R. 3266 that, in

part, indicates that grants should not support ‘‘normal’’ first responder activities. I think this goes to the core of what I was trying

to get at before. It is difficult for me to believe that a first responder in the first hours or minutes after a disaster strikes is able

to determine whether or not this is a terrorist attack or whether

it is something else that has happened.

How are we going to ferret out what normal first responder activities are that are not subject to receiving funding, at least in the

opinion of the Department?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I think that is part of the goal of the consolidation that I mentioned where in the Department, the Secretary consolidated some 25 preparedness programs in one office.

I think the issue is not whether the Department is all-hazards or

whether it is terrorism, I think the issue is that it is both. In allhazards, terrorism is one of many hazards. There are certainly

statutory Congressional imperatives, and I think certainly the

American public and the Administration would agree that there is
17

a particular emphasis on the threat posed domestically by terrorist

incidents.

But I do not believe that one is at the exclusion of the other.

They are all complimentary—the basic emergency management

system of this country, the basic fire, EMS, and law enforcement

activities, the day-to-day things that occur, as George mentioned,

every day.

With the Fire Act program that has been moved to our office,

that program continues to have its unique focus on meeting those

basic needs of the American fire service. It has not been changed.

It has not been integrated. It has a separate part that is integrated

into the broader Homeland Security Block Grant Program. There

were some people that were concerned about that.

I do not believe, and I certainly have not seen any indication that

there is any goal to be one or the other. A lot of the investments

that we are making in homeland security technology involve interoperable communications, detection equipment upgraded much

more safely and efficiently, and personal protective equipment—

respiratory equipment for our fire and HAZMAT personnel. They

use those in their day-to-day operations. We are not buying an

enormous amount of esoteric equipment that just sits there waiting

for a terrorist incidence to occur.

I am quite confident that the mission as described in HSPD–8 is

all-hazards. All-hazards are what the DHS does. But we have particular emphasis in both areas for basic emergency management,

basic public safety, as well as specific directed funds to deal with

a terrorism threat specifically.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Good. I appreciate that answer. I am not going

to continue to beat a dead horse, but that is the concern. I think

I speak for most members of this Committee. I will not use a first

responder example, but we will use the example of the Coast

Guard on Lake Erie.

We very much want the Coast Guard to do its job in making sure

that our borders are secure as a part of the terrorism and homeland security, but we still want them to pull us out of the water

when we are drowning. We still want them to keep reign on those

pesky drunk Canadians that come over every once in a while to our

shores.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. I have a lot more questions, but I think since

the bells have gone off, and I know Ms. Norton has an event that

she has to attend at 1:30, let us see if we can get her questions

in. I will submit some questions to both of you, if you would be so

kind to answer.

Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, you could clear up my multiple questions really with

one overarching question. Like the Chairman, I instinctively, and

even at an intellectual level, believe in an all-hazards approach. I

am not for wasting Government money by trying to divide things

up and making no rational sense. You can certainly understand

that when it comes to masks, the inter-operability of emergency vehicles and training.
18

We have not had, fortunately, a lot of experience except with natural hazards since 9/11. Are you prepared to say that at the operational level, the all-hazards approach leaves us fully equipped to

deal with the WMDs and explosives and bioterrorism, Ricin, and

Anthrax, and that it really does all come together so that you are

confident that the county or the city first responders are fully interchangeable, even given differences in these risks and threats?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I cannot commit that as today we are fully

prepared for any and all threats. I think, as George said, that we

are much more prepared for the wide ranging threats that we do

face, both natural and man-made than we have been previously. I

think this time next year it will be better.1

Ms. NORTON. I am really asking another question. I think we

have done very well in tooling up. I am asking another question of

whether or not in operation the natural disasters and the terrorist

threats are interchangeable and people can just go from one to another, assuming the proper training, even though a hurricane is

very different from Ricin or explosives.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I think at some level, obviously the response is going to be the same. But a terrorist incident does afford

different challenges that we do not face in natural disasters. One,

it is a crime. There are national security implications. It is quite

a different situation. Hurricanes can be extraordinarily devastating, but they are not malevolent. They are not predatory. They are

not adaptive. They come and we can track them.

Terrorists are adaptive. They are predatory. They watch what we

do. They change their tactics. That is a completely different adversary than we face in the historical perspectives and experience we

have in dealing with natural disasters.1

Ms. NORTON. I will tell you that I do not think that much matters after the fact. When the first responder goes in, it does not

much matter that there was a predator that did it. A hurricane is

a predator.

Mr. Foresman looks like he may have an answer. I just want to

know whether the first responder is given the all-hazards approach, which we prefer, is truly prepared for all hazards given

how different the nature of the hazards truly are?

Mr. Foresman?

Mr. FORESMAN. Ms. Norton, I would like to address that briefly

with three quick answers. First, we are never going to be fully prepared. We are never going to eliminate 100 percent of the risks in

this country. Having said that, operationally, and particularly here

in the National Capital Region, you know we work closely with our

partner organizations. We are much better prepared because of the

all-hazards approach for the full range of events that have struck.

If we had spent all of our time focused on the nexus of terrorism

since September 11th, we would not have done well as a region in

responding to Hurricane Isabel. We would not have done well as

a region in responding to the sniper event in 2002. I see every day

real operational examples.

The other part to that answer, though, is that there are some

specialty issues associated with responding to a weapon of mass destruction, responding to a conventional attack to a terrorist attack,
19

that you are not going to see with a natural disaster. There are

specialty types of——

Ms. NORTON. And you may not even know.

Mr. FORESMAN. And you probably will not know for the first several hours of the event. I think what I would offer is that as we

are seeing this enterprise approach to preparedness—an all-hazards approach—it says, ‘‘Look at all of the risks that you have out

there. Measure all those risks. Compare them individually and collectively against one another.’’

You as Congress, our governors, our state legislatures, city councils, and local officials have to make a value-added judgment of

how to balance all those risks out there. I think very much what

we are seeing is that right now we want to make sure that every

first responder in the National Capital Region has two sets of turnout gear. That is kind of a pretty basic type of thing, but if one sets

gets contaminated, we want to make sure that they are still operational.

That is going to be great if we have a chemical weapons attack.

That is also going to be wonderful if we have a hazardous materials incident on 495 because a truck gets cut off by a car.

So at the end of the day we very much are seeing measurable

progress because of that all-hazards approach. I personally believe—and this is a humble opinion based on 20 years—that if we

focus exclusively on one threat, we focus exclusively on trying to

manage one risk, we infinitely become much more vulnerable as a

Nation and as a community because, as Andy pointed out, terrorists are adaptable. For everything we do today, they are going to

figure out a way around it. So as we continue to move this kind

of broad enterprise approach forward, we are going to make it

harder for them to get in front of us.1

Ms. NORTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady very much. I again

want to thank both of you for coming today. I apologize for the

votes getting in our way. We may all have a couple of questions

that we could send to you. If you would be so kind, please respond

to those.

Without objection, so ordered.

We really appreciate your participation today, as well as you, Mr.

Jenkins.

If there is nothing further, the subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to

reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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