IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-31046

PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P.; PHILLIPS 66 PIPELINE, L.L.C., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK COMPANY; GREAT LAKES DREDGE 

& DOCK COMPANY, L.L.C. OF LOUISIANA, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CV-398

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This interlocutory admiralty appeal involves an allision between a 

dredge owned and operated by Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, LLC, 

and an underwater oil pipeline owned by Plains Pipeline, L.P., and used by 

Phillips66 Pipeline, LLC. The alleged allision occurred in the early morning of 

March 17, 2012, when the dredge, seeking to secure its position for anchoring, 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 12, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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lowered its dredge ladder and cutter head1 into the seabed, striking the 

pipeline. Following the allision, Plains and Phillips sued Great Lakes, 

claiming, among other things, that Great Lakes acted negligently in failing to 

discharge its notification responsibilities under the Louisiana Underground 

Utilities and Facilities Protection Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1749.11 et seq.

(referred to as “the One-Call Statute”), before engaging in the anchoring 

procedure.

At issue in this appeal are the district court’s orders with respect to two 

motions for partial summary judgment. In July 2014, Great Lakes moved for 

partial summary judgment on Phillips’s claims seeking recovery for “economic 

loss,” asserting that Phillips lacked a proprietary interest in the pipeline and 

thus that its claims were barred under the rule set out by the Supreme Court 

in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). On the same 

day, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling that 

Great Lakes had engaged in “excavation” the morning of the incident and 

therefore was required to provide advance notice under the One-Call Statute. 

See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:179.12(6). The district court granted Great Lakes’s 

motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. Reviewing these decisions de novo, 

see, e.g., Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 

1033 (5th Cir. 2015), we AFFIRM.

I.

We begin with the district court’s determination that Great Lakes’s 

conduct on the morning of the incident did not subject it to the One-Call 

Statute.

 

1 Although the cutter head is ordinarily a dredging tool, it is undisputed that, at the 

time of the incident, the cutter head was being used, not to dredge, but to bring the vessel to 

a stop and secure its position for anchoring. See also infra pp. 4–5.

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A.

Under the One-Call Statute, persons planning to “excavate” near an 

underground utility or facility must first give at least 48 hours’ notice to the 

appropriate regional notification center. La Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1749.13(A)–

(B). Once notice of excavation is given, the notification center, in turn, notifies 

the owners and operators of nearby underground facilities, id. § 1749.14(B), 

who then must mark the location of their facilities on the surface (or otherwise 

inform the excavator of their facilities’ locations) before excavation begins. Id.

§ 1749.14(C). The purpose of this process is “to promote the protection of 

property” and persons “in the immediate vicinity of an underground facility . . 

. from damage, death, or injury.” Id. § 1749.11(B). Accordingly, excavators 

who fail to give the requisite notice are subject to civil penalties enforced by 

the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the Department)

or by local law enforcement. Id. § 1749.23.2

Because it is “excavation” that triggers the notification requirement, the 

critical question is whether Great Lakes’s anchoring procedure constitutes 

“excavation.”3 The statute defines “excavation” as follows:

 

2 The Department fined Great Lakes $3,000 for the events at issue here. Great Lakes, 

expressing its view that the One-Call Statute did not apply, pleaded nolo contendere and paid 

the fine.

3 The plaintiffs vigorously dispute this characterization of Great Lakes’s activity, 

asserting that the dredge’s use of the cutter head amounted to “much more than 

‘anchor[ing].’” For support, they direct us to (1) statements from Great Lakes’s site manager

to the Department investigator that the dredge was still moving at the time the cutter head 

penetrated the seabed, such that the cutter head itself is what stopped the dredge; and (2) a 

hydrographic survey of the pipeline area showing that the cutter head created a “scour area” 

several feet deeper than the one later created by the dredge’s permanent anchors.

Even viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, however, this evidence is 

insufficient to remove Great Lakes’s activity from the realm of “anchoring.” For one thing, 

the plaintiffs have given no reason to think that a vessel must be at a complete stop for one 

to “anchor” it, and no such requirement seems inherent in the ordinary meaning of the word 

“anchor.” See Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2015) (defining the verb “anchor” as “[t]o 

secure (the ship) with an anchor; to place at, or bring to, anchor”). Furthermore, although 

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“Excavation” or “excavate” means any operation for the purpose of 

movement or removal of earth, rock, or other materials in or on the 

ground by the use of powered or mechanical or manual means, 

including pile driving, digging, blasting, auguring, boring, back 

filling, dredging, compressing, plowing-in, trenching, ditching, 

tunneling, land-leveling, grading, and mechanical probing. 

“Excavation” or “excavate” shall not include manual probing.

§ 1749.12(6). The Louisiana Supreme Court has never interpreted the OneCall Statute’s definition of “excavation.” Our task, then, is to “make an Erie

guess and determine, in our best judgment, how that court would resolve the 

issue if presented with the same case.” Six Flags Inc. v. Westchester Surplus 

Lines Ins. Co., 565 F.3d 948, 954 (5th Cir. 2009).

B.

We think it clear that anchoring does not fall within the statutory 

definition of “excavation.” As an initial matter, the plaintiffs concede that none 

of the explicitly listed examples of “excavation” is implicated here. See

§ 1749.12(6) (listing as examples of “excavation” “pile driving, digging, 

blasting,” etc.). They argue, however, that Great Lakes’s anchoring activity 

was an “operation for the purpose of movement . . . of earth,” and thus 

constitutes “excavation” under § 1749.12(6)’s general definition of the term. 

Specifically, they argue that Great Lakes’s activity had “the purpose of” moving 

earth because, “to accomplish” the objective of stopping the movement of the 

 

the cutter head may indeed have penetrated deeper into the seabed than did the dredge’s 

permanent anchors, this fact suggests a difference only in degree, not in kind.

More to the point than the evidence relied on by the plaintiffs, we think, is the 

deposition testimony from witnesses who were present at the time of the incident and who 

are familiar with the dredge’s cutter-head technique. Those witnesses uniformly testified

that (1) when a dredge uses the cutter head as part of its anchoring process, it does so in 

order to maintain position after coming nearly to a complete stop; and (2) the cutter-head 

technique is necessary for the dredge to anchor in anything other than perfect weather and 

current conditions. In the light of this undisputed testimony, we agree with the district court 

that the dredge’s use of the cutter head on the morning of the incident is properly 

characterized as “anchoring.” 

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dredge, “the cutter head would have to dig into the seabed and displace the 

earth.”

This argument fails to persuade, however, because it overlooks the basic 

legal distinction between purpose and knowledge. See generally Restatement 

(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 1(a) & cmt. a 

(2011). Again, under § 1749.12(6), an activity constitutes “excavation” if it has 

“the purpose of movement . . . of earth.” § 1749.12(6) (emphasis added). 

Persons have the “purpose” of causing a particular result only if that is their 

“conscious object.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i); see also Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “purpose” as “[a]n objective, goal, or end”). 

By contrast, persons act “knowingly” with respect to a result if they are 

“practically certain” the result will follow from their conduct. Model Penal 

Code § 2.02(2)(b)(ii); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining 

“knowledge” as “a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt 

about the existence of a fact”). The plaintiffs may well be right that the 

movement of earth is an inevitable result of anchoring, and thus that a person 

who engages in anchoring does so knowing that he will cause the movement of 

earth. But under the One-Call Statute, an activity constitutes “excavation” 

only if the “purpose”—the actual object—of engaging in it is the “movement . . 

. of earth.” § 1749.12(6). And the object of “anchoring” is, unmistakably, the 

securing of a ship, not the movement of earth.4

 

4 The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized this distinction between “purpose” and 

“knowledge” in other contexts. See, e.g., Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481–82 (La. 

1981) (holding that a person acts “intentionally” for the purposes of the intentional-tort 

exception to Louisiana’s worker’s-compensation law if “the person . . . either (1) consciously 

desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from 

his conduct; or (2) knows that that result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, 

whatever his desire may be as to that result” and explaining that these two prongs are 

disjunctive (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8 (1965)). Given the 

distinction’s ubiquity, the Louisiana legislature’s express choice of the word “purpose” in 

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This plain-language reading of § 1749.12(6)’s “purpose” requirement 

accords with the statutory context. Under “the commonsense canon of noscitur 

a sociis[,] a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with 

which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008); 

see, e.g., State v. Jones, 2007-1052 (La. 6/3/08); 983 So. 2d 95, 105 (“Because 

the word [at issue] is accompanied by . . . specific words . . . , all of which are 

capable of analogous meaning, the principle of noscitur a sociis is appropriately 

invoked in determining the scope of this statutory proscription.”). Here, the 

“neighboring words” of § 1749.12(6)’s general definition of “excavation” confirm 

that in the general definition, “purpose” means purpose. First, each of the 

examples explicitly listed as an “excavation” activity is an activity in which the 

movement of earth is the object, not just a side effect. See § 1749.12(6) 

(“‘Excavation’ . . . includ[es] pile driving, digging, blasting, auguring, boring, 

back filling, dredging, compressing, plowing-in, trenching, ditching, tunneling, 

land-leveling, grading, and mechanical probing.”). Similarly, the word 

“excavation” itself connotes an activity that not only incidentally results in the 

movement of earth, but is actually aimed at it: this is why no one would say, 

for instance, that raking leaves constitutes “excavation.” See, e.g., Oxford 

English Dictionary (online ed. 2015) (defining “excavate” as “[t]o make hollow 

by removing the inside” or “to dig out (soil) leaving a hollow”). Thus, the 

noscitur canon confirms what plain language indicates: an activity falls into 

§ 1749.12(6)’s general definition of “excavation” only if—unlike anchoring—its 

actual goal is the movement of earth.

Finally, we note that, even if there were ambiguity in the statute’s 

“purpose” requirement, our interpretation would not change. Under the rule 

 

§ 1749.12(6), and the other interpretive canons discussed infra pp. 6–7, our Erie guess is that 

the Louisiana Supreme Court would recognize the distinction here also. 

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of lenity, Louisiana courts resolve ambiguities in “penal” statutes (such as this 

one) in the defendant’s favor. See, e.g., Gibbs Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor, 540 

So. 2d 268, 269 (La. 1989). Thus, assuming arguendo that § 1749.12(6) could

be stretched to include activities in which the movement of earth is only a 

substantially certain result, the rule of lenity would nonetheless require us to 

adopt the narrow reading of “purpose” set out above.

* * *

In sum, § 1749.12(6), in relevant part, defines “excavation” to mean “any 

operation for the purpose of movement . . . of earth.” Because the purpose of 

Great Lakes’s activity here—anchoring—is not the movement of earth, the 

district court did not err in concluding that the One-Call Statute was not 

triggered.

II.

We turn next to the district court’s determination that Phillips’s claims 

for economic damages were barred by the Robins Dry Dock rule.

A.

Under the well settled rule set out by the Supreme Court in Robins Dry 

Dock, a plaintiff may not recover in an unintentional maritime tort suit “for 

economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which 

he had no proprietary interest.” Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 

F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The purpose of the Robins Dry Dock

rule, we have said, is to serve as a “pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of 

foreseeability,” giving judges an easily administrable rule of decision and 

allowing parties to order their affairs in view of predictable outcomes. Id. at 

1022, 1028–30. Accordingly, this court has enforced Robins Dry Dock—and in 

particular, its requirement that the plaintiff have a “proprietary interest” in 

the damaged property—as a “bright line,” “hard-edged” rule. See State of 

Veracruz v. B.P., P.L.C. (In re Deepwater Horizon), 784 F.3d 1019, 1023 (5th 

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Cir. 2015); IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee SS, 993 F.2d 1193, 1194 (5th Cir. 

1993). In particular, this court has held that a plaintiff has a sufficient 

“proprietary interest” to recover under Robins Dry Dock only if he is the actual 

owner of the physically damaged property or one who is “tantamount” to an 

owner, Veracruz, 784 F.3d at 1026 (internal quotation marks omitted); that is, 

only if he has “taken over the property at issue ‘lock, stock and barrel.’” Id. at 

1031 (quoting Louisville & N.R. Co. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469, 473 

n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J.)); see also Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. 

McMoran Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214, 1225 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(identifying as incidents of ownership “actual possession or control, 

responsibility for repair, and responsibility for maintenance”).

B.

Citing Robins Dry Dock, Great Lakes argues that Phillips cannot recover 

some of its claimed damages (specifically, the costs it incurred in transporting 

its oil by alternative means during the period following the allision). According 

to Great Lakes, those costs represent economic losses resulting from physical 

damage to the pipeline—property in which Phillips lacks a “proprietary 

interest” because the pipeline is owned by Plains, not Phillips. For its part, 

Phillips does not dispute that these costs represent economic losses, nor does 

it contend that it is the actual owner of the pipeline. Instead, it argues that 

the contractual relationship between it and Plains—a relationship governed 

by two contracts, a Service Agreement and an Operating Agreement—gives it 

a sufficient “proprietary interest” in the Pipeline to recover its economic losses 

even under Robins Dry Dock. This is so, Phillips says, because the Service 

Agreement gives Phillips exclusive use of the full capacity of the Pipeline, and 

because the Operating Agreement makes Phillips “almost totally responsible 

for all of the expense associated with the ownership of the pipeline including 

insurance and taxes.” 

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In our view, however, the district court did not err in concluding that 

Robins Dry Dock barred Phillips’s recovery on its economic-loss claims. Even 

if Phillips indeed does have exclusive use of the full capacity of the pipeline, 

exclusive use, standing alone, does not create a “proprietary interest” within 

the meaning of Robins Dry Dock. See Veracruz, 784 F.3d at 1026. Instead, as 

noted, the plaintiff must have “complete control” over the property—control 

“tantamount to full ownership.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 

the Service and Operating Agreements show that Plains retained significant 

control over and responsibility for the pipeline, such that “[i]t could not be said 

that [Phillips] ha[s] taken over the [pipeline] ‘lock, stock and barrel.’” Id.

(quoting Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d at 473 n.3). 

For one thing, under the agreements, Plains maintained the right as 

owner to sell all or substantially all assets of the pipeline. Furthermore, Plains 

retained the responsibility to “manage, operate, . . . maintain,” and “repair” the 

pipeline using its own employees, as well as to obtain insurance for and pay 

taxes on the pipeline. Finally, Plains paid all pipeline-related costs in the first 

instance, and was obligated to pay maintenance-and-repair costs without 

reimbursement by Phillips to the extent that those costs, when combined with 

other contractually defined “Fixed Costs,” exceeded $2.6 million annually.5 For 

Phillips to have a “proprietary interest” in the pipeline sufficient to withstand 

the Robins Dry Dock rule, the interest left in Plains must amount to nothing 

more than “a right of reversion.” Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d at 473–74. As the 

 

5 The plaintiffs argue that maintenance-and-repair costs are not “Fixed Costs” subject 

to the $2.6 million cap. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the Operating 

Agreement, under which “Fixed Costs” is the “catchall” category that includes “[a]ll amounts 

paid . . . for the provision of . . . services described in” the Operating Agreement that are not 

defined as “Direct Costs.” Because Plains’s maintenance-and-repair obligations are plainly 

“services described in” the Operating Agreement, and because maintenance-and-repair costs 

are not defined as “Direct Costs,” maintenance-and-repair costs are “Fixed Costs” by virtue 

of the catchall clause.

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district court rightly concluded, Plains’s retained interest in the pipeline under 

the Service and Operating Agreements was much more than that.

* * *

Because Phillips lacked a sufficient “proprietary interest” in the pipeline 

under this court’s Robins Dry Dock jurisprudence, the district court did not err 

in dismissing Phillips’s claims for economic damages.

AFFIRMED.

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