i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 66 0- CV WE EKS Marine, I

nc., Appellant
v . Maxi mino GARZA , Appellee Fr om the 381st J udicial District Court, Starr County , Texas

Trial Court No. DC-06-195 Honora ble J ose L

uis Garza, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: April 21, 2010 AFF I RMED Weeks Marine , I nc. appe als the judg ment rende red in Maximino Garza’s favo r u n der the J ones Ac t and for c laims related to a seama n’s rig ht to m ai n t en an ce and cure. The judgme nt
awa rded G arza $1,121,000.00 in tort damag es, $2,500,000.00 as c ompensation for f ai lure to pay
ma int e na nc e and c ur e , $ 15 ,0 00 .0 0 in

ma int e na nc e , $ 73 ,5 00 .0 0 in a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, and $6 ,1 10 .3 6 in
e xpe rt s’ fe e s. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 2- B ACKG ROUND Ga rza wa s in jur e d w hil e wo rk inga s c re w me mbe r o n v e sse ls o wn e d a nd op e rate d b y

Wee ks
. T h e p ar t i es s t i p u l at ed W ee k s wa s a J o n es Ac t em p l o y er an d t h e o wn er an d o p er at o r o f t h e d re d ge
c a ll e d th e T O M JA M E S a

n d a b ar g e c a ll e d

th e Sk a d g it
. T h e parties also s ti p u late d th a t G ar za sustained an injury to his neck and head on Fe bruar y 15, 2006, while on the Skadg it, but the ex tent of the injuries we re disputed. Ga rza normally

worke d as an e ng ineer

on the TOM JAMES , but on the day of the acc ident he was being trained by his supe rvisor on how to adjust a fr iction bar on the Skadg it. During training , Garza’s supervisor told him to go g et some tools. As Garza lef t to retrieve the tools, his supervisor dropped the friction leve r, which the n struck Ga rza’s har d hat. Garza went to the doctor the next day , underw ent an MRI , and wa s diag nosed with a contused c ranium, mild concussion, and c ervic al sprain. Ga rza was r elea sed for

work with no restric tions. W eeks pa id for the medical visi t and ex ams. Garza returne d to work for a short per iod of time, but had daily co m p l ai n t s o f head and ne ck pain. Ga rza dec ided he c ould no longe r work with the pain and soug ht pe rmission fr om his supervisor to se ek medica l attention. Garza lef t work and testified his super

visor told him t o g o and take car e of himself. Shortly there afte r, Ga

rza filed suit ag ainst Weeks alleg ing f our separate claims: a neglig ence claim under the J ones Ac t; a seama

n’s claim for ma intenance and cur e; a claim the vessel was unseaw orthy ; and a c laim for compe nsatory damag es for

Weeks’s unre asonable failure to pay maintenanc e and c ure. Th e jur y fo un d in Ga

rza ’s fa vo r o n a ll c la ims e xce pt t

he se awo rt

hin e ss c la im. Th e jur

y a lso found Ga rza was a cting under specific orders at the t ime of t he accident and was twenty perc ent at fault for the ac cident. The damag es aw arde d pursuant to the neg lige nce c lai m i n cluded medic al expenses, loss of income, i mpairment of ear ning capa city , phy sical pain, a nd mental anguish. The04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 3- jury also awa rded G arza his maintenanc e and c ure unde r his seama n’s cl ai m . Fi nally , the jury
awa rded G arza damag es for

the phy sical pain a

nd mental anguish that resulted fr om Weeks’s
unre a so na

ble fa ilure to p ay

ma int e na

nc e and c ur e . G arza

wa ive d t he c ur e awa

rd be c a us e it repr esente d the same e lement of damag e as the medical e x penses a war ded under t h e neglig ence claim. The tria l court re ndere d judgme nt on the mainten ance awa rd and a ll elements of dama g es under the neg lige nce a

nd unrea sonable fa ilure to pay maintenanc e and c ure c l ai m s . Ba s ed on the jury ’s finding that Garza was ac ting in re sponse t o a spec ific orde r at the time of the acc ident, the tr ia l c ourt did no t re du c e Ga rza ’s dama g e awa

rd du e to t he tw e nty pe rc e nt o f f

a ult a ttr ibute d to him
. Weeks contends: (1) the trial cour t erre d in rende ring judgme nt for tort d am age s for a ll of the damag es aw arde d beca use it constitutes a double recover y of t he same damag e elements; (2) the
e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

in su ffi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat We e ks a c te d unr e a so na bly in denying the maintenanc e and c ure c laim; (3) the trial c ourt err ed in submitti ng an i nstruction on ag g ravation or activation of injury ; (4) the e vidence is leg ally insufficient to support the findingthat Ga rza wa s a c tin g un de r sp e c if ic or de rs a t th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt; (5 ) G arza ’s e nti re awa rd sh ou ld be re duced by

twenty perc ent and (6) the awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s and costs should be delete d from the judg ment. D OU BLE RE COVE RY Weeks argues the judg ment awa rded G arza a

double re cover

y for t h e s am e elements of damag e und er diff

ere nt cause s. Under the “one satisfaction rule,” Texas prohibits thi s ty pe of
rec overy if it constitutes a “double re cover y .” See Crown Life Ins, Co. v. Casteel , 22 S.W .3d 378, 39 0 ( Te x. 20 00 ); Baribeau v. Gustafson , 1 07 S.W. 3d 52 , 6 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 03 , p e t. denied) , cert. de nied , 543 U.S. 871 (2004). A double re cover y occur s when a

plaintiff obtains more04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 4- than one rec overy

for the sa me injury or loss. W

aite Hi ll Se rv

s, In c . v. W

or ld Clas s Me tal

W or k s, Inc ., 95 9 S. W.2 d 1 82 , 1 84 (T e x. 19 98 ); Stewart Ti tle Guar. Co. v. Sterling , 8 2 2 S. W. 2 d 1 , 7 ( T e x. 1991). A plaintiff is entitled to only one re cover

y for a ny damag es suffe red beca use of one par

ticular injury
. Ut ts v . S

ho rt , 81 S.W. 3d 82 2, 83 1 (T e x. 20 02 ); Casteel , 2 2 S. W.3 d at 39 0; Baribeau , 107 S.W .3d at 60. Howe ver, when a pla intiff pleads multipl e theor ies of liability , a judg ment for damag es on more tha

n one theor

y is proper if the theories de pend on sepa rate and distinct injuries and ther e ar e separate and dis tinct damag e findings m ade as to eac h theory
. Beaumont v . Basham , 205 S.W .3d 608, 614 -615 (Tex
. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied); see Baribe au , 107 S.W .3d at 60 (c i t i n g Bi rc hfi e ld v . Te

x ar k an a M e m’ l H os p ., 747 S.W .2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987)). Wee ks c la ims the jur

y ’s awa rd of me dic a l e xpe ns e s un de r the ne g lig e nc e awa rd is the same element of

damag e as the cure awa

rd. Although Weeks is corr ect that the elements of damag e ar e th e s ame , th e r e is n o d o u

b le r e c o v e r

y b e c a u s e th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s ju d g me n t aw ar d s d ama g e s to G ar za only for his medica l expenses and does not aw ard him dama g es for cure . Weeks also asser

ts the awa rd of lost wag es under the neg lige nce claim and the ma intenance
awa rd under the seama

n’s claim is a double rec overy of the same damag es. W ee k s i s i n co rre ct beca use maintenanc e is not duplicative of lost wag es. Mo re l v . S ab ineTowi ng

& Tra ns p. Co ., 669 F.2d 345, 346 ( 5th Cir. 1982). “Maintena nce is the equivalent of the food and lodging to which a
seama n is entitled while at sea . . . . Ma intenance is neither a su b s t i t u t e fo r wa ges nor is it to be considere d in lieu of a sea man’s wa g es, in whole or in par t.” Id . M a int e na

nc e c an b e awa

rd e d in addition to past and fut u re wag es. Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc ., 883 F.2d 372, 378 ( 5th Cir. 1989).04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 5- Next, W eeks c ontends question 13, which aske d the jury to awar d ment al an gu i sh and phy sical pain damag es that resulted from Weeks’s failure to pa y maintenanc e and c ure, should not hav e been su bm itt e d to the jur y be c a us e it i nc lud e d th e same dama g e e le me nts a s su bmi tte d in question 7. Question 7 asked the jury to awar d phy si ca l p ai n and mental ang uish damag es for Garza’s injuries sustained as a result of the acc ident on Fe bruar y 15, 2006. Although both questions submit phy sical pain and mental anguish e lements of dama g e, ea ch is based on a differ ent theory

of liability
. See B eaumont , 205 S.W .3d at 614 -615; Baribeau , 1 0 7 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 0 -6 1 (c i t i n g Bi rc hfi e ld , 747 S.W .2d at 367). Que stion 7 relates to a se aman’ s claim under the J ones Ac t for an injury in the
course of his employ

ment. Se e Cha nd

ris , I nc . v . La tsi

s , 515 U. S. 347 , 354 (1 99 5) (c iti ng 46 U. S.C. App. § 688(a )). Que stion 13 is based on a seaman’s rig ht to compensatory damag es when the shipowner is responsible for the seama n’s m aintenanc e and cure , but acts unre asonably in failing to pay the claim. See M

orales v. Garijak, Inc ., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 ( 5th Cir. 1987). Ga rz a pled both a J ones Ac t neg lige nce c laim and a c laim based on Weeks’s unrea sonable failure to pay maintenanc e and cur e, and ques t ion 7 and 13 inquired a bout damag es for

eac h of the two sepa

rate and distinct
cause s of ac tion. The trial cour t did not err in submitti ng both questions. Simi larly , Weeks argues Ga rza is not entitled to recove r both the mentalanguish and phy sical pa in a nd su ff e ri ngawa rd s f ound in r e sp on se to q

ue sti on s 7 and

13 becau se it

pr ov ide s a

do ub le
rec overy for the sa me injury . To the contra

ry , the charg e subm itted two differ ent damag e questions fo r two dif

fe re nt ca us e s of ac tio n. Qu e sti on 7 spe c if ic a lly a sk e d the jur

y to c omp e ns a te Ga

rza fo r h is inj u r i e s t h a t r e s u l t e d f

r o m t h e a c c i d e n t o n F e b r u ar y 1 5 , 2 0 0 6
. Q u e s t i o n 1 3 a s k e d t h e jur y to compensate Garza for his injuries that resulted from Weeks’s failure to pa y maintenanc e and c ure. Garza pled and submitted differ ent cause s of action, and obta ined sepa rate jury finding s on damag es04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

1 ... In it s re p ly b rie f, W e e k s o b liq u e ly state s “[t] h e re a l p o int is: t h e re is n o e v id e n c e G a rz a su sta ine d a se p a ra te and dis t i nct i njury be cause W eeks di d not p ay, or d i d not t i m el y pa y , m ai nt enanc e a n d c ure . . . . ” H o wever, W eeks m a k e s this a rg u m e n t in re la tio n to the c o m p la int tha t G a rz a re c e ive d a d o u b le re c o v e ry f o r th e sa m e inj u ry. W e e k s d id n ot r ai s e or br i ef

a c ompl ai n t t h at t h er e i s l eg al l y i n s u f f i ci en t e v i den ce t o s u ppor t t h e j u r y ’ s da mag e aw ar d u n der qu es t i on 13
. W eek s wai ved a ny i s s ue on t he s uf f i ci enc y of

t he evi dence t o s uppo r t t he j ur y ’ s f i ndi ng t hat G ar za s uf

f er ed i nj ur i es a s a re su lt o f W e e k s’s failu re to p a y m a inte n a n c e a n d c u re . T EX . R . A PP . P . 3 8 .1 (f), (I ); Eas t i n v . D i al , 288 S. W
. 3d 491, 5 0 1 ( T e x . A p p .— S a n A n to n io 2 0 0 9 , p e t. d e n ie d ); G ardner v. G ardner , 2 2 9 S .W .3 d 7 4 7 , 7 5 6 (T e x . A p p .— S a n A n to n io 2 0 0 7 , no p e t.).

- 6- under e ach the ory . The theor ies of l iability depend on se parate and distinct injuries. See Morales , 829 F.2d at 1358. The aw ard of both the neg lige nce da

mag es and the damag es that re sulted from t h e u n r e a s o n a

b l e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e m a i n t e n an c e an d c u r e i s n o ta

d o u b l e r e c o v e r

y. 1 U N R EASON A BLE D EN IAL O F M AI NT E NANCE AND C U R E C L A IM Weeks’s next complaints relate to Ga rza ’s claim that he wa s unrea sonably denied maintenanc e and cure . Garza reque sted medical treatment af ter the a ccide nt on Febr

uary 15, 2006. Weeks authorized initial medical t reatment for Ga rza, but after

one phy sician re lease d him to return to work, W eeks denied all additional reque sts for medical t rea tment and his seama

n’s maintenanc e and cur e. Maintenance is a li ving allowance paid as long as the seaman is not hospitaliz ed and ha s not rea ched the point of max imum cure. Maritime Ove rseas Corp. v. Thomas , 681 S.W .2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.— Houston [14t h Dist.] 1984, no writ). C u re pay s therape utic, medical, a nd hospital expenses not otherwise pr ovided to the seaman unt il the poi nt of “max imum cure.” Id . Maxi mum
cure is reac hed whe n it appear s probable that furt h er tre atment will not better the sea man’s condition. Id . at 16 2- 62 . Garza fi le d suit and so ug ht d ama g e s c la imi ngWee ks unre a so na bly de nie d h is c la im for maintena

nce a nd cure . The jury

found in Garza’s favor
. The rig ht of a sea

man to rec eive maintena nce a nd cure benef

its is well-establis h ed , and “[a]dmi ralty

courts have been liber al in interpre ting this duty ‘for the bene fit and protec tion of04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 7- seame n who are its wards.’” Vaughan v. Atkinson , 3 6 9 U. S
. 5 2 7 , 5 3 1 -3 2 (1 9 6 2 )( qu o t i n g Calmer S.S. Corp. v. Taylor , 30 3 U. S. 52 5, 52 9)
. Th e Un ite d State s Sup re me Court ho lds a sh ipo wn e r’ s li a

bil ity for maintena

nce a nd cure should not be defeated by restric tive distinctions nor narrowly confine d. Aguilar v. S tandard Oil Co. , 3 18 U. S. 7 24 , 7 35 -3 6 ( 19 43 ). Whe n th e re a re ambi g uit ie s o r d ou

bts reg ardingliability , they

are resolved in f

avor of the seaman. See V

aughan , 369 U.S. at 532. A s hip -o wn e r i s n ot r e qu ir e d to imm e dia te ly c omm e nc e pa

y me nts up on

re c e ivi nga

c la im; he is ent i t l ed t o investigate and r equire corr oboration of the c laim. Morales , 829 F.2d at 1358. Howeve r, if af

ter a n investigation, the ship-owner unr easona bly denies the claim when the seama n is due maintenanc e and cu re, the owner become s liable not only for the ma intenance and cur e pay ments, but also for comp ensatory damag es. Id. ; Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p. v . W aite rs , 923 S.W .2d 36, 40-42 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), modified on other grounds and aff’d , 917 S.W .2d 17 (T ex . 1 9 9 6). Compensatory damag es enc ompass injuries cause d by the denial of pay ment, such as the a g g ravation of the seama n’s conditio n , an d are deter mined by the usual principles applied in tor

t c ases to measure compensatory damag es. Morales , 82 9 F .2 d at 13 58 ; Sm ith

v. Delaware Bay Launch Se rv., Inc ., 842 F.Supp. 770, 775 (D. Del. 1994), aff’d , 54 F.3d. 770 ( 3rd Cir . 1 99 5)
. A fa ilure to p ay ma y be re a so na

ble if “ a dil ig e nt i nv e sti g a tio n” re ve a ls that th e c la im i s not leg itimate or “if the se aman f ails to provide medica l rec ords to support his claim.” Morales , 829 F.2d at 1360. Weeks first contends que stion 12, which asked if Wee ks acte d unrea sonably in f ailing to pay maintenanc e and c ure, should not have been submit t ed t o the jury . Howeve r, any err or in the submissi on of question 12 was w aived be cause Weeks did not object to submissi on of the que stion. T EX . R. A PP . P. 33 .1 (a ); Holland v. W al-Mart Stores Inc. , 1 S.W .3d 91, 94-95 (Tex. 1999). Weeks04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 8- also argues the jury

instruction defining ag g ravation of injury should not have been included in the char g e. Howeve r, any err or in the submissi on of the instruction is also waived bec au s e W eeks’ s objection at trial a

nd his argumen t o n appea l are differ ent. T EX . R. A PP . P. 33 .1 (a ); Scurlock Pe rm ian Cor

p. v . B ra zo s Ct y ., 86 9 S. W.2 d 4 78 , 4 84 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t] Di st
. 19 93 , w ri t denied) (“obje ction at trial that is not the same a s the objection urg ed on appe al pre sents nothing f or appellate revie w”)
. Weeks n ext contends the evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s finding that Weeks ac ted unre asonably in failing to pay

maintenanc e and c ure to Ga rza. Weeks ana l yzes the evidenc e under

the standar d of re view utiliz ed in Texas state law ca s es . Under the Texas leg al sufficie ncy

standard of

revie w, we view the evide nce in a light most favor able to the f inding a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e to support it. City of Keller v. W ilson , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d

8 0 2 , 8 2 2 ( T e x. 2005). We cre dit favora ble evidenc e if a

rea sonable fa ct -f

i n d er could, and disreg ard c ontrary
e v id e n c e u n le s s a r e a s o n a b le f a c t- f in d e r c o u ld n o t. Id
. at 8 27. I f there is more than a sc intill a of evidenc e to support the finding , the leg al suffic iency challeng e fa ils. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Pres i d io Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc ., 960 S.W .2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). More tha n a scintilla of
e vid e nc e e xists “ if the e vid e nc e ‘r ise s to a le ve l th a t w ou ld e na

ble re a so na

ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le to differ in their conc lusions.’” F o rd M o to r Co

. v . R id

g way , 1 3 5 S. W. 3 d

5 9 8 , 6 0 1 ( T e x. 2 0 0 4 )( qu o t i n g Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc. v . Havne r , 953 S.W .2d 706 (Tex. 1997), cert. de nied , 523 U.S. 1119 (1998)). Garza, on the other ha

nd, argues the proper standard of revie w i s the fe dera l standard a pplied in Jon e s A c t c a se s. Th e stan dard of revi e w util ize d in fe de ra l Jone s A c t c a se s v e sts the jur y wi th complete discretion on fac tual issues about liability
. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 9- 402, 406 (Tex.), cert. de nied , 5 2 5 U. S
. 1 0 1 7 (1 9 9 8 )( ci t i n g Rogers v. M issouri Pac. R.R. , 3 52 U. S. 500, 506-07 (1957) ). Unde r the fe dera l s t an d ar d of re view the r eviewingcourt c onsiders the evidenc e “dra

wing all rea sonable infere nces and resolving all cre dibilit y deter minations in the light most favora

ble to the non-moving party [.] ” Brown v. Bryan County, OK , 219 F.3d 450, 456 ( 5th Cir. 2000), cert. de nied , 532 U.S. 1007 (2001). The standard is e specia lly defe rential with re spect to a jury verdic t. Id . A re versa l occur s “onl y i f n o re as onable jury could have arr ived at the ve rdict.” Snyder v . Trepagnier , 1 4 2 F
. 3 d 7 9 1 , 7 9 5 ( 5 th Ci r . 1 9 9 8 ) ( c it a ti o n omitted), cert. dism’d, 5 26 U. S. 1083 (1999). We ne ed not de cide which standard applies beca use the re solution of the issue is the
same un de r b oth

sta nd ard s. I t is uncontested that Garza suffer ed an injury on Fe bruar

y 15, 2006, while workingfor We e k s . T e r e s a O li v io , We e k s ’ s c o r p o r a te c la im s ma

n a g e r , in it ia ll y a

u th o r iz e d tr e a tm e n t f

o r G ar za at a loca l clinic. Olivio testified Weeks acc epted that Ga rza suffe red a

compre ssion injury

cause d by another employ ee. O livio testi fied a bout the investigation pro ce s s , whi ch included he r re view of discover

y documents, depositions, and medica l rec ords. In September 2006, Wee ks rec eived
me d ic a l r e c ords from

G ar za ’ s tr e a ti n g o rth o p e d ic s u r g e o n , D r . F r e d Pe r e z, th a t i n d ic a te d

G ar za neede d surg ery for his ne ck condition. The medical rec ords also ref lect that on four

other oc casions Ga rz a’ s d o ctor remarke d about Garza’s need f or nec k surg ery , which ultimately took place on Oc tob e r 5, 200 7. Ol ivi o tes tif ie d that alth ou g h Wee ks ini tia lly pa id fo r G arza ’s me dic a l tr e a tme nt, Wee ks sto pp e d p ayingfo r m e dic a l tr e a tme nt a ft e r Ga rza wa s fi rs t re le a se d to re tur n to wo rk be c a us e Ga rza de se rt e d the ve sse l and be c a us e he ha d the same ne c k c on dit ion be fo re the a c c ide nt a s h e did afte r the a ccide nt. Olivio did not identify who m ade the decision t hat Garza’s nec k condition was the same; she only s t at ed t h e MRI s from 2004 we re the same a s the ones fr om 2006. Dr. Pere z04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 10- te sti fi e d the a c c ide nt ca

us e d Garza ’s pr ior

ne c k p ro ble ms t o b e c ome sy mpt omatic and

c a us e d h im pain and discomfort. Garza te stified he was unable to w ork af ter the a ccide nt, his supervisor knew he wa s unable to work, a nd the su p er visor told him t o “just g o home and take car e of yourself.” Garza expl ained he was planningto return to wor k when he was a

ble to perf

orm his duties. O n e r e a s o n g iven b y

We e k s f o r it s d e n ia l o f

ma inte n an c e an d

c u r e w a s it s c la im

G ar za deser ted the vesse l. The duty

to provide m aintenanc e and cure is determined by whether the seaman is injured while in service
. See F arrell v. U. S. , 336 U.S. 511, 515- 17 (1949) ; Aguilar , 318 U.S. at 730. I n fac t, the obligation to pay maintenanc e and c ure e x tends eve n afte r a se aman is terminate d if the injury

or illness o ccur

red, w as ag g ravated, or manife sted itself while the sea man was in the ship’s service
. See Ste vens v . McG in n is Inc. , 82 F.3d 1353, 1359 ( 6th Cir.)(seaman was f ired for
e mpl oy me nt p ro ble ms a

nd sti ll e nti tle d to ma int e na

nc e and c ur e wh e n il lne ss w a s inf lic te d w hil e in service of his ship), cert. de nied, 519 U.S. 981 (1996); Le Blan c v . B .G .T. Cor

p ., 992 F.2d 394, 400 (1st Cir. 1993)(rig ht to maintenanc e and cure may attach after termination as l ong as the trig g ering event takes p l ac e wi t h in time of winding up of tasks of employ

ment). He re the re is no question Garza was injured while in service . Fur thermore , Weeks has not cited a ny case that holds desertion is a rea sonable ba sis for deny ing ma intenance and cur e. Weeks also contends its denial of maintenanc e and c ure w as re asonable beca use there is no evi d e n c e G ar za s u f

f e r e d an a g g r av a te d o r a d d it io n a l in ju r y a s a r e s u lt o f We e k s ’ s f ailure to pa y
ma int e na nc e and c ur e . We e ks c on fu se s th e sta nd ard fo r l iabi lity

wi th t he re c ov e ry

of dama g e s. L iability is premised on whe ther a seama n was injured while in service of his ship and the shipowner acte d unrea sonably

in failing to pay maintenanc e and c ure. See M orales , 829 F.2d at 1358. After liability is determined the f

act- finder de termines whe ther the de nial proxi mately cause d the04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

2 ... T h i s i s a l s o de mon s t r at ed by t h e s u bmi s s i on of t h e i s s u es to t he j u r y . T h e j u r y w as a s k ed i n qu es t i on 12 w h e the r W e e k s a c te d un re a so n a b ly i n failing to p a y m a inte n a n c e a n d c u re . Q u e stio n 1 3 a sk e d w h a t sum o f m o n e y w o u ld fair ly co m p e n sa te G a rz a fo r h is inj u rie s, i f any , t hat r es ul t ed f

r om t he f

ai l ur e t o pay mai nt ena nce an d cur e.

- 11- s e am anana d d i t i o n a l i n

j u r y. 2 See Neville v. Am . Barge Line Co. , 2 7 6 F
. 2 d 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 (3rd Cir. 19 60 )( pla int if

f m us t e sta bli sh fa ilure to p ay

wa s c a us e of ina bil ity to r e c e ive tr e a tme nt) ; Sm ith , 842 F. Supp. at 775(se aman c annot re cover damag es for failure to pay maintenanc e and cure unless there is p ro of he su sta ine d in

jur y du e to t he fa ilure ); W

aite rs , 923 S.W .2d at 41-42(s ea m an p re s ented le g a lly su ff

ic ie nt ev ide nc e to sup po rt c omp e ns a tor

y dama g e s o f $ 1, 00 0. 00 fo r s hip -o wn e r f a ilure to pay cure ). Weeks did not attack the leg al or fa ctual sufficiency of the e vidence to support the amount of dama g es ca

used by Weeks’s fa ilure to pay

maintenanc e and c ure. Any complaint about the jury ’s awa

rd of any amount of dama g es as a

result of the unr easona

ble fa ilure to pay

maintenanc e and cur e is waive d. T EX . R. A PP . P. 38. 1(f ), ( i) ; Eastin v. Dial , 2 8 8 S. W. 3 d 4 9 1 , 5 0 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 09 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Gardner v. G ardner , 229 S.W .3d 747, 756 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). Ba sed on the rec ord befor e us, we hold ther e is some evidenc e about whic h rea sonable minds could diffe r that supports the jury ’s finding that Weeks ac t ed unrea sonably in failing to pay maintenanc e and c ure. See Ford Motor Co. , 1 35 S.W. 3d a t 60 1; El lis , 9 7 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 4 0 6
. Al t h o u gh Garza may

have ha d simil ar ne ck proble ms in the past, he testified he w as no long er a ble to work afte r the acc ident. Additionally , Weeks was a war e of D r. Pere z’s medical opinion that the acc ident on Fe bruar

y 15, 2006 ag g ravated Garza’s neck c ondition, for which Ga rza requir ed surg ery . I n light of this evidence , rea sonable minds could diffe r on whe ther Weeks a cted unr easona bly in denying Ga rza ’s c la im, and

a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld h ave fo un d We e ks a c te d unr e a so na bly . T he e vid e nc e is04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 12- there fore leg ally

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding that Weeks ac ted unre asonably in denying Ga rza ’s ma int e na

nc e and c ur e c la im. S P E CI F I C O R D ER E XCE P T I ON We e k s c h a ll e n g e s th e le g a l s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt t h e ju r y ’ s f in in g th a t G ar za was following a specific order at the t ime of his acc ident. Weeks also contends the trial court e rre d in submit ting the spe cific or der que stion to t he jury and the doc trine’s a

pplication to this case. I n maritime law, c omparative n eglig ence bars a n injured par

ty from re cover ing da

mag es sustained as a

result of his own fa

ult. Simeonoff v. Hiner , 249 F.3d 883, 8 8 9 -9 0 (9 t h C i r. 2001). An e xce pti on

to t he do c tr ine of

c omp ara tiv e ne g lig e nc e e xists wh e n a se aman is inj ur e d w hil e following a spec ific orde r. Sim e on off , 2 49 F .3 d at 89 1. Th e e xce pti on is d e sc ri be d a s f

oll ow s: Where a g ener al orde r is g iven, an employ ee must use ordinary car e in its ex ecution, and the g iv i n g of the orde r does not af fec t the question whether

the serva

n t has bee n neg lige nt in his m anner of car rying it out, whe rethe reis a c ho ic e op e n to him .” [Jenk ins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 2 2 F .3 d 20 6, 21 1 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 4) ] I n s uc h c a se s, the plaintiff’s a ction s are revie wable f or contributory

neg lige nce. Ho we ve r, whe n the e mpl oy e e is g ive n a sp e c if ic or de r —

that is , wher e he or

she is told to perf

orm a specific task in a par ticular wa y — “he is not c ontributorily neg lige nt; rather his c onduct fa lls under the abolished doc trine of a ssumption of risk.” I n other wor ds, when a plaintiff ha s no rea l choice , h is recove ry should not be reduc ed beca use he pe rfo rmed the ta sk, reg ardle ss of whethe r the plaintiff acte d rea sonably

or unre asonably . But whe n the plaintiff has re a so na ble a lte rn a tiv e s ava il able t o h im, he mus t a c t r e a so na bly in perf orming his job. And if he acts unrea sonably , he is answe rable for contributory

neg lige nce. Fashauer v. New Jerse

y Transit Rail

Operations, Inc ., 57 F .3 d 12 69 , 1 27 9 ( 3r d Ci r. 19 95 )( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; see also Alholm v. Am. S.S. Co. , 144 F.3d 1172, 1179 ( 8th Cir. 1998)(when a seama n is ordere d to do a task but is not inst ructe d on t h e m et h od to use and he acts ne g lige ntly , the04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

3 ... F ed eral co urt de ci si o ns i nd i cat e t he p rop er way t o ass ert t he specif i c o rder excep t i o n t o co nt ri b ut o ry n e g lige n c e i s b y instr u c ting the ju ry th a t i f t h e p la intiff is f o llo w ing o rd e rs the n he o r sh e c a n n o t b e c o n trib u to rily n e g lige n t. Se e, e . g. , A lh o lm , 1 4 4 F .3 d a t 1 1 7 9 ; Je nki ns v . Uni on Pac. R. Co. , 22 F.3d 20 6 , 21 2 (9t h C i r. 19 9 4 ).

- 13- neg lige nce a

nd the ava ilability

of a safe r alternative may be conside red in de termining contributory
ne g lig e nc e ); W

illiams v. B r a sea, Inc

. , 497 F.2d 67, 73 ( 5th Cir. 1974)(seaman may not be contributorily n eg lige nt for ca rry ing out or ders that r esult in his own injury , even if he re cog nizes possibl e d an ger ), cert. de nied , 4 23 U. S. 9 06 (1 97 5) ; DuBo sev . M ats on Nav iga tio n Co ., 403 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1968)(c ontributory neg lige nce doctrine applies whe n alternative course s of ac tion
are available and injured pa rty chooses the unr easona

ble cour se.). On the day of t he accident, Ga rza’s super

visor asked him to help adjust the fr iction lever on the Ska dg it, wh ic h wa s a dja c e nt to the TO M JAME S. Ga rza ’s su pe rv iso r too k him to t

he Ska dg it and wa s teac hing G arza how to a djust the friction lever when the supe rvisor told Garza to g o g et some tools. Garza testified ther e wa s only one route for him to trave l to ge t his tool s, which re quired Garza walk in f

ront of the friction lever
. When Garza we nt to retrieve his tools he was struck on the he a d by the fr ic tio n ba

r. Th e se fa c ts s up po rt

the a pp lic a tio n o f t

he sp e c if ic e xce pti on

do c tr ine to t

his
case . se e e ., g. Al

ho lm , 14 4 F .3 d at 11 79 (8 th C ir . 1 99 8) ; W illiams , 4 97 F .2 d at 73 ; DuBo se , 403 F.2d at 877 (9th Cir. 1968). The c harg e did not includ e a d efinition or instruction to assist the jury in disti ng uishing betwee n a spec ific orde r and a g ener al orde r. 3 Howeve r, applying the distincti o n s as d i s cussed above, w e find ther e is some evidenc e about whic h rea son ab l e m i n d s co uld differ to support the jury ’s finding that Garza was ac ting under a specific order
. Garza was not enga g ed in his ordinary tasks at the time of the a ccide nt. I nstead he was take n to a diffe rent ve ssel to learn a new job. He04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 14- was fol l o wi n g the direc tions of his supervisor at the time of the a ccide nt. Garza did not have a choice in the manner

of car rying out the or der a s the evidenc e indicate s there w as only one path f

or him to take and it put him in front of the friction lever. The e vidence is leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding that Garza was ac ting unde r a spe cific o rd er at the time he was struc k by the friction leve r. I n addi t i o nt o t h e l ega l s u ff i ci en cy ch al l en ge t o t h e s p ec i fi c o rd er qu es t i o n , W ee k s al s o arg

ues the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in su bmi tti ngthe qu e sti on to t he jur y be c a us e the qu e sti on

did no t take int o consideration Garza’s ne g lige nce a nd brea ch of c are t o h i m self. Weeks c laims this was harmful
err or bec ause the judgme nt was not reduc ed due to the twe nty perc ent of fa

ult attributed to Garza’s
ne g lig e nc e . A lth ou g h We e ks is c or re c t that the qu e sti on do e s no t r e fe r t o G arza ’s ne g lig e nc e , h is
c omp la int that it wa s e rr or to s ub mit the qu e sti on

on tha t ba sis wa s no t pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt
. Wee ks on ly ob

je c tio n to qu e sti on

3 w a s th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e to s up po rt the su bmi ssi on and “ thi s is not a case involving the a pplication of the spec ific orde r’s doc trine.” Th i s o b jection does not prese rve a

ny complaint as to form of the question. T EX . R. Ci v. P
. 17 4; T EX . R A PP . P. 33.1(a); Ba rn e tt v. Kop

pe l North Te

x . D all as Cou rt, LTD ., 123 S.W .3d 804, 820 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)
. Be cause the jury

found that Ga

rza was f ollowing a

specific order

at the time of the a ccide nt and such f

inding is supported by

leg ally sufficie nt evidence , the trial cour t did not err in awa

rding Garza the full amount of damag es found by the jury
. Se e e ., g. Al

ho lm , 1 44 F.3d at 1179 (8th Cir. 19 98 ); W illiams , 4 97 F .2 d at 73 ; DuBo se , 403 F.2d at 877 (9th Cir. 1968).04

- 08

- 00 66 0- CV

- 15- F E E S AND C OSTS Wee ks ’s fi na l c omp la int

is the awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

c os ts s ho uld

be se t a sid e be c a

us e the judg ment is not significa ntly less favor able to it than its settlement offer . Section 42.004 of the Texas Civi l Practice s and Remedies Code pr ovides that if a settl ement offer is made and re jected a nd the judg ment is significa

ntly less favor able to the r ejec ting pa rty , the offe ring party

shall rec over litigation costs. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE § 42.004 (Ve rnon 2008). The statute pr ovides that
a judgme nt is signific antly less favor able to the reje cting defe ndant if the a war d is more than 120% of the re jected of fer
. Id . The judg ment of $3,636,000.00 is more than 120% of t h e reje cted of fer of $850,000.00. Ther efor e, the r ecove ry of litigation costs is proper. The judg ment is affirme d.

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice