ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 1 

I

n today’s knowledge-based global society, economic wealth, resources, information, and power are widely distributed, contributing to the emergence of 

new sources of disruptive innovation. While the importance of technology 

to military competitiveness is a broadly accepted fact, the role that the Department of Defense (DOD) plays in catalyzing the emergence of technology-based 

products with broad social and economic impact is somewhat less recognized. 

Enrico Moretti, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen identified a strong 

correlation between defense research and development (R&D) investment and 

private R&D outputs.1 Moreover, many of the foundational general purpose 

technologies that drive the global high-tech economy—such as interchangeable 

parts and mass production, aircraft, nuclear energy, semiconductors, the Internet, 

and space technology—are either direct offshoots of, or strongly linked to, military procurement activities.2

 Mirko Draca attributed a sharp increase in U.S. corporate research and development spending in the 1980s to high DOD technology investment during the administration of President Ronald Reagan.3

 Draca 

likewise showed a corresponding deceleration in private research and development coincident with the post–Cold War defense drawdown under Presidents 

George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Efforts such as the Defense Innovation Initiative, launched in 2014 by then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, combined 

with projected defense spending increases of $500 billion to $1 trillion in the 

administration of President Donald Trump, will reinforce the positive correlation between DOD and commercial high-tech industry and increasingly expose 

Developing an InnovationBased Ecosystem at the U.S. 

Department of Defense: 

Challenges and Opportunities

by Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, and Bala Mulloth

DEFENSE HORIZONS

National Defense University

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

About the Authors

Adam Jay Harrison is a Visiting 

Distinguished Research Fellow at 

the National Defense University. Dr. 

Bharat Rao is an Associate Professor at New York University. Dr. Bala 

Mulloth is an Assistant Professor at 

the University of Virginia.

Key Points

◆ The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD) is looking at new ways 

to spur entrepreneurship and 

innovation among its stakeholders 

and related constituencies.

◆ We recommend creating a platform 

within the DOD focused on developing the Human and Relational 

Capital components of the innovation ecosystem such as the MD5 

National Security Technology Accelerator, an initiative that develops 

innovators and human-centered 

networks that create high-tech 

“ventures” relevant to national 

security.

◆ The proposed ecosystem would not 

only facilitate the development of 

high-tech ventures in the national 

security interest, but also educate 

and build networks of innovators 

and entrepreneurs, both inside 

and outside of DOD, who would 

be equipped with the incentives, 

expertise, know-how, and resources 

required to continuously develop, 

commercialize, or apply technology 

relevant to military needs.

◆ A competency framework for 

developing such an ecosystem that 

would encourage venture-led, dualuse products that provide a sustainable, competitive advantage for the 

DOD and the national economy is 

presented and discussed.

May 2017
2 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

the defense research and development enterprise to the 

tumult of creative destruction in the civilian sector.4

The world has entered a period of hyper-innovation 

in which the military-industrial complex and commercial industry alike are subject to continuous business 

process and technology disruption. Ray Kurzweil described this phenomenon, where technology evolution 

“advances [at least] exponentially” driven by “human 

ingenuity combined with ever changing market conditions,” as the Law of Accelerating Returns.5

 Within this 

context, succeeding generations of technologies interact in a multiplicative manner to produce a cascading 

flow of future innovations. Individuals and small teams, 

enabled by the proliferation of emerging, creative technologies, play an increasingly significant role in accelerating innovation. For example, Chris Anderson linked 

the diversification of the consumer media marketplace 

to the democratization of the tools of digital content 

production and distribution.6

 Klaus Schwab defined the 

shift from traditional forms of industry-led research 

and development to more local-scale, entrepreneur-led 

forms as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution.”7 According 

to this paradigm, talent, more than capital, represents 

the critical factor of innovation, where people “connected by mobile devices, with unprecedented processing power, storage capacity, and access to knowledge” 

disrupt entire industries as well as traditional power 

relationships in society.

In the future, businesses and militaries that rely on 

technology for competitive advantage will depend on the 

cultivation of people who continuously invent, reinvent, 

and apply value-creating technology interventions. To 

the extent that individual and small-team actors outside 

of the traditional corporate context are not constrained 

by sunk costs, legacy markets, and organizational inertia, they can efficiently explore the technology-application decision space. This phenomenon is enabled by the 

aforementioned democratization of technology associated with the widespread expansion of knowledge and 

creative tools.8

 Clayton Christensen defined “disruptive 

innovation” as the discovery of new products that disrupt 

markets and the firms that lead those markets.9 Eric Ries 

identified entrepreneur-led startups that target emerging 

or underserved markets as a key source of disruptive innovation.10 Within this context, startups develop minimally viable products, observe the customer response 

to these products, and deploy subsequent generations 

of products in rapid succession until an optimum value 

proposition is achieved.

A military example underscoring the impact of disruptive innovation instigated by networks of individuals 

and based on rapid, iterative product development cycles 

is the improvised explosive device (IED) threat that 

manifested in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2003.11

Anthony Cordesman, Charles Loi, and Vivek Kocharlakota, based on the compilation of U.S. Government 

data, found that IEDs were responsible for the majority 

of coalition combat fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq.12

Costing on the order of 10s to 100s of dollars per device 

to manufacture, IEDs, as the name implies, are improvised from materials on hand augmented with electronic 

triggers re-purposed from consumer electronics. While 

opinions vary, it is generally accepted that the main challenges posed by IEDs are lack of standardization, which 

complicates countermeasures, and an accelerated product 

development cycle that measures in weeks to months. In 

the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, almost as soon as the 

U.S. military deployed a threat-specific IED countermeasure through traditional development channels, new 

a military example underscoring 

the impact of disruptive innovation 

instigated by networks of individuals 

and based on rapid, iterative 

product development cycles is 

the improvised explosive device 

threat that manifested in Iraq and 

Afghanistan beginning in 2003
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 3 

IED variants would appear on the battlefield rendering 

the countermeasure obsolete.13 James Revill has identified specific factors related to the nature of IEDs that 

have contributed to the diffusion and disruptive adaptation of the technology.14 Peter Singer and others have 

concluded that the Pentagon spent $60 to $100 billion on 

various counter-IED capabilities since 2003, an investment that has funded such products as Mine Resistant 

Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, radio-controlled 

IED jamming devices, and a host of IED detection systems.15 By contrast, the manufacturing of IED components, underwritten primarily by diversified commercial 

markets and adapted for use by networks of individuals 

in direct contact with the application space, benefit from 

economies of scale as well as rapid product development 

and improvement cycles. This competitive asymmetry 

means that America’s nonstate adversaries can produce 

IEDs at a small fraction of the cost and time associated 

with the U.S. military’s development of countermeasures.

Unlike previous generations, where the competitive 

advantage associated with a technology breakthrough 

was measured in years or even decades, technology obsolescence, driven by factors such as Moore’s Law (that 

is, the doubling of the number of transistors in a dense 

integrated circuit every 2 years), is accelerating at faster 

and faster rates. This trend implies that organizations 

in the future will increasingly benefit from the ability 

to rapidly, cost effectively, and continuously recognize 

value-creating applications of technology ahead of the 

competition. This model of competition, derived from 

the theories of military strategist John Boyd,16 is based 

on the idea of executing key decisions ahead of one’s 

adversary—a concept adapted by Steve Blank to the process of startup business creation in a method called Lean 

Startup.17 The shift from technology invention—where 

product development is closely coupled to a prescribed 

future application (that is, if A then B)—to technology 

innovation—where product development and potential 

applications co-evolve in rapid, recursive cycles (that is, 

if A then N)—has major economic and security implications. Successfully competing in the new technology 

environment requires a major shift in framing the entrepreneurial mindset. The individual innovator becomes 

not just the vehicle for the development of technology 

means, but also the agent for the exploration of technology ends.

Early 19th-century military philosopher and strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote on a concept 

he referred to as “military genius”—the qualities of mind 

enabling a military professional to recognize and exploit 

opportunity from the chaos of conflict. A Prussian officer who served during the march of post-revolutionary 

France across Europe, Clausewitz idealized Napoleon as 

the archetypal military genius who combined a competitive, martial spirit with elements of character and modern scientific reasoning to devastating effect. Importantly, 

Clausewitz recognized that developing military genius in 

a systematic and deliberate manner was an impossibility; 

however, nations could influence the underlying cultural, 

intellectual, and social conditions that tend to promote 

the emergence of military genius.18 Fast forward to the 

current era and the qualities that Clausewitz attributed 

to the military genius are much in evidence in the new 

class of entrepreneurial innovators disrupting industries 

and changing the global economy. Today’s technology 

and business innovators are adept at recognizing gaps 

and opportunities (that is, signals) amidst the chaos of 

the competitive environment (that is, noise) and moving 

quickly and efficiently to seize the momentum with new 

today’s technology and business 

innovators are adept at recognizing 

gaps and opportunities (that is, 

signals) amidst the chaos of the 

competitive environment (that is, 

noise) and moving quickly and 

efficiently to seize the momentum 

with new products and services
4 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

products and services. Such agents of change emerge 

because of and in response to environmental conditions 

present in innovation ecosystems—a combination of 

economic assets, networking assets, and physical assets 

that facilitates the transfer and application of knowledge 

and associated technology value creation.19

Given the prominent, if not decisive, role that technology plays in the modern economic and security landscape, the cultivation of entrepreneurial innovators who 

can rapidly, cost effectively, and continuously recognize 

the value-creating applications of technology in a national security context is an imperative. To this end, the 

development of a robust innovation ecosystem that promotes the development of entrepreneurs in relation to 

the DOD represents a unique and timely opportunity to 

gain and sustain a competitive military advantage. In the 

current global security environment, the government can 

no longer function as a “coach on the sidelines,” content 

to set innovation strategies and call initiatives into action. Instead, it must play a leading role in executing the 

collective strategies of education, innovation, and entrepreneurship. In short, a successful DOD innovation enterprise must eschew a purely bureaucratic role and “lead 

by example” by becoming more entrepreneurial.

Within this context, the MD5 National Security 

Technology Accelerator (MD5) initiative was created to 

catalyze entrepreneur-led venture creation relevant to national security. Established in 2016 at the U. S. National 

Defense University, MD5 promotes the development 

of an entrepreneurial national security workforce that 

drives emergent innovation opportunities by a) providing academic programming on topics related to science 

and technology, entrepreneurship, and innovation; b) establishing a technology and knowledge transfer platform 

to facilitate new venture creation; and c) creating business 

accelerator services to encourage DOD employees and 

their peers in academia and industry to create startups 

based on emerging technology-market opportunities relevant to national security. Figure 1 provides an overview 

Figure 1. MD5 Overview

Ventures

Phase 1: Develop

Defense Entrepreneurs

Phase 2: Form Venture 

Concepts (Hypotheses)

Phase 3: Grow Civil-Military 

Technology Ventures

People Innovators Opportunities

Education Collaboration Acceleration

Civil-Military Technology Ecosystem

Hacking for Defense

University-based venture-creation course 

focusing on national security

Adaptive-Agile Leader Networks

Collaborative problem-solving course for 

rising military leaders

MD5 Boot Camp

5-day course on the fundamentals of 

business and the practical aspects of 

evaluating and executing business ideas

MD5.net

Web-based defense entrepreneur 

community that incorporates people, 

problems, technology, resources, and 

solution concepts

MD5 Hack

54-hour hackathons bringing together 

civilian and military innovators to build 

protypes that address national security 

challenges

MD5 Labs

Prototyping and experimental resources 

for translating solution concepts developed 

by defense innovators to applications 

suitable for transition or commercialization

MD5 Fulcrum

Program that osets startup development 

costs by providing access to Defense 

Department lab infrastructure
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 5 

of MD5 and its programs; the broader impacts are described in a later section of this paper.

Why Focus on Innovation?

Innovation is a complex and multifaceted topic. 

Scholars have studied many aspects of the subject and 

have delineated the differences between types of innovation (for example, radical vs. incremental innovation 

or product vs. process innovation).20 Scholars also noted 

that technological innovation takes place in different 

settings (for example, large corporations, entrepreneurial 

start-ups and growing enterprises, government-funded 

basic R&D environments, and large-scale, macro-level 

endeavors), and that innovation operates somewhat differently in each of these venues.21 Today, innovation visà-vis the accelerated development of new technologies to 

solve problems is a crucial strategic weapon in corporate 

and government arsenals—a fact that has been accompanied by an upsurge in the study of disruptive innovation 

in recent years.22

Entrepreneurship is a major engine of noted economist Joseph Schumpeter’s dynamism of “creative destruction.” Schumpeter described creative destruction 

as an economy-wide process, which “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 

destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.”23

The dynamism of modern market-based economies 

and the firms that thrive in these economies is attributed to the process of creative destruction; however, this 

process can also be seen at work in the contemporary 

national security landscape. Today, a new class of innovators is emerging within the military and expanding the boundaries of the traditional defense industrial 

base. These public entrepreneurs watch for opportunities, 

make decisions “under uncertainty, and then meld the 

factors of change in sticky [that is, locally commercialized] ways.”24 According to B.J. Armstrong, defense entrepreneurs create networks with the aim of organizing 

internal and external stakeholders to tackle problems 

related to staffing, organization structure, and training 

of the military enterprise.25 To bring such entrepreneurs 

to action, mission-oriented investments in science and 

technology are required.26 “Mission-oriented” policies 

target the development of particular technologies that 

address a given societal challenge, for instance “putting 

a man on the moon,” in the case of the Apollo Program. 

Dominique Foray, David Mowery, and Richard Nelson 

further argued that a Manhattan Project or Apollo Program model is inappropriate for confronting new challenges such as climate change and that the focus now 

should not be about developing a single “silver bullet.” In 

the case of complex, heterogeneous challenges, solutions 

are more likely to result from a web of interaction among 

different institutional actors working together to develop 

multiple technologies.27

Several disruptive trends have accelerated the rise of 

new models of innovation in recent decades, including 

flexible Intellectual Property (IP) policies, universityindustry collaborations, micro-entrepreneurs, venturing, 

distributed innovation in global locations, open innovation, etc. Further, there has been a perceptible shift away 

from the single organization as a core source of technological innovation and a move toward using networks 

and leveraging external ecosystems to enhance innovation. This ecosystem emphasis in technological innovation and technology management is a growing trend and 

presents firms in an ever-increasing number of sectors 

with significant opportunities and challenges.28 New 

networks of innovation and changing mindsets among 

people have a distinctive impact on “re-perceiving” many 

of the enormous and urgent challenges such as climate 

in the case of complex, 

heterogeneous challenges, solutions 

are more likely to result from a 

web of interaction among different 

institutional actors working together 

to develop multiple technologies
6 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

change, oil depletion, water scarcity, global warming, and 

ever-increasing environmental pollution into opportunities to “leverage the power of markets and business to 

have transformative, system wide impacts.”29

One notable development in this area is the concept 

of Open Innovation, which is an innovation model whereby ideas and technologies at various stages of development are allowed to flow in and out of proprietary R&D 

pipelines.30 According to Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West, “open innovation is the use of 

purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 

internal innovation and expand the markets for the external use of innovations, respectively.”31 Open Innovation 

theorists have also recognized the importance of customer 

involvement in the overall innovation processes.32 In fact, 

users are increasingly regarded not as just passive adopters 

of innovations, but as developers of their own innovations, 

which producers can imitate. Users, for example, regularly 

modify their current machines, equipment, and software 

to better satisfy process needs.33 Firms may benefit from 

their customers’ ideas and innovations by proactive market research, by providing tools for user experimentation, 

or by making products based on the designs of customers 

and evaluating what may be learned from user-created designs. Some have argued that open research methods that 

encourage information flows from the commercial sector 

to the military sector and from global supply centers to 

domestic supply centers would be a good approach for enhancing the strength of military R&D.34

Andrew Hunter and Ryan Crotty described a secular trend where R&D spending outside the United 

States and in commercial (nongovernment, nondefense) 

industry is eclipsing traditional sources of R&D investment.35 To the extent that the DOD does not maintain 

proprietary access to technology stemming from the 

global, commercial R&D marketplace, the emergence of 

advanced, potentially disruptive technology derived from 

the civilian high-tech sector poses an orthogonal threat to 

the traditional technology superiority of the U.S. military. 

Mitigating this threat requires the military to simultaneously optimize internal R&D activities—which Hunter 

and Crotty defined as inside-direct (that is, internal R&D 

corresponding to an explicit military demand signal) and 

inside-indirect (that is, internal R&D corresponding to 

an implicit or speculative military demand signal)—and 

to increase exposure to external R&D activities relevant 

to the military.36 In this context, external R&D activities 

are defined as outside-direct (that is, external R&D corresponding to an explicit military demand signal) and 

outside-indirect (that is, external R&D developed for the 

commercial market with applicability to military applications). With the center of gravity for R&D shifting to the 

commercial marketplace, Jay Stowsky identified “spin-on” 

as a strategy to provide the military with leading-edge 

technology initially developed to satisfy commercial market demand (that is, outside-direct and outside-indirect). 

A complementary strategy, “spin-off,” involves the military taking advantage of economies of scale associated 

with commercial markets that are much larger than organic military markets. The spin-off strategy enables the 

military to shift technology production costs to commercial industry and capitalize on lower per-unit costs.37

Capitalizing on “spin-off ” and “spin-on” opportunities requires that needed information and problem-solving capabilities be brought together. Eric Von Hippel 

wrote that information regarding technologies and potential applications is often difficult to acquire, transfer, 

and use in a new context, making it tacit or “sticky.”38 

Significant physical, cultural, and regulatory barriers 

between the defense and civilian R&D communities 

exacerbate the challenge of sticky information transfer 

across industry lines.39 When information required for 

the emergence of advanced, 

potentially disruptive technology 

derived from the civilian hightech sector poses an orthogonal 

threat to the traditional technology 

superiority of the U.S. military
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 7 

innovation-related problem-solving is concentrated, 

there are fewer opportunities to internalize (that is, spinon) or externalize (that is, spin-off ) the development of 

new technologies and associated applications. Von Hippel identified multiple behaviors to reduce the friction of 

sticky information transfer, including iteration between 

complementary information nodes, partitioning of problems, and investments.40

Given the complex and multifaceted nature of innovation, it is clear to observers and researchers that the underlying set of linkages among individuals, institutions, 

and other stakeholders can be a critical determinant to 

the eventual success or failure of the group—whether or 

not there is a thriving innovation ecosystem.

What Is an Innovation Ecosystem? 

Although the concept of an innovation ecosystem 

has only begun to attract attention as a framework for 

policymakers in recent years, the core concepts of the 

term are rooted in the theory of innovation, particularly 

the theories of Schumpeter. His views on innovation-related technological changes and entrepreneurship as drivers for economic growth became the basis for innovation 

policy in many regions.41 In his opinion, innovations resulted not from rational thinking, but from a creative process led by entrepreneurs.42 Thus, entrepreneurial efforts 

are necessary to bring innovations to market. A vast array 

of theories and concepts havebeen employed to explore 

the entrepreneurship phenomenon.43 Several studies have 

focused on units of analysis, theoretical perspectives, and 

methodologies related to entrepreneurship.44 In addition 

to studying new firm development, exploration and exploitation of opportunities, and entrepreneurial behavior 

of existing firms, entrepreneurship research also examines 

institutional approaches.45 At the same time, researchers 

have evaluated the differences in innovation systems in 

different territories, with the conclusion that every country and region has its own innovation system that reflects 

particular institutional elements.46 For example, Douglass 

North has correlated innovation development to national 

or regional “adaptive efficiency” (that is, the rate at which 

institutions are able to change).47

The term ecosystem is drawn from the term ecology

defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as a “branch of 

biology dealing with living organisms’ habits, modes of 

life, and relations to their surroundings.” Similarly, the 

“innovation ecosystem” refers to all the organizations that 

interact with each other to produce some given level of 

innovation in an economy and the relation of that complex to the influences surrounding it. An innovation ecosystem is the term used to describe the large number and 

diverse nature of participants and resources that are necessary for innovation. In this context, the actors involved 

in creating an innovation ecosystem would include the 

material resources (for example, funds, equipment, facilities) and the human capital (for example, students, faculty, staff, industry researchers, industry representatives) 

that make up the institutional entities participating in 

the ecosystem (for example, universities, colleges of engineering, business schools, business firms, venture capitalists, industry-university research institutes, federal or 

industry-supported Centers of Excellence, state or local 

economic development and business assistance organizations, funding agencies, policymakers).48

Figure 2 depicts the principles that underpin the 

role and value of interactions and relationships within 

the innovation ecosystem.49

In figure 2, Structural Capital refers to the companies, organizations, programming, funding, and infrastructure projects that support and develop innovation 

activity in geographic or sectoral settings. The Relational 

an innovation ecosystem is the term 

used to describe the large number 

and diverse nature of participants 

and resources that are necessary for 

innovation
8 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

Capital and Human Capital aspects draw attention to 

the wider and more intangible, qualitative, and subtle, 

but important, interactions and relationships that affect 

innovation. We believe that all three factors play an important role in developing an innovation ecosystem and 

are interconnected.

Per a report by Meirion Thomas, successful innovation ecosystems are typically characterized by an active 

knowledge economy comprised of strong public-private 

partnerships between academia, government, and business, which are all together supported by robust and flexible public policy mechanisms.50 Successful innovation 

ecosystems also need a culture of innovation based on interaction and openness to new opportunities and change. 

The firms within a geographically concentrated cluster 

share common technologies, skills, knowledge, inputs, 

consumers, and institutions, facilitating agglomeration 

across complementary and related industries. A strong 

cluster environment enhances growth at the region-industry level by facilitating operational efficiency and raising the returns to business expansion, capital investment, 

and innovation, thereby increasing job creation and productivity.51 Thus an effective innovation ecosystem enables 

entrepreneurs, companies, universities, research organizations, investors, and government agencies to interact effectively to maximize the economic impact and potential 

of their research and innovation. Others have also argued 

that the presence of a cluster of related industries in a location will foster entrepreneurship by lowering the cost of 

starting a business, enhancing opportunities for innovaFigure 2. Interactions and Relationships Within the Innovation Ecosystem

Human Capital

People – Skills – Networks – Demand – Ambition – Knowledge

Structural Capital

Companies – Organizations – Programs – Funding – Infrastructure

Relational Capital

Trust

Condence

Shared Vision

Behaviors
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 9 

tion, and enabling better access to a more diverse range 

of inputs and complementary products.52 The collocation 

of companies, customers, suppliers, and other institutions 

also increases the perception of innovation opportunities 

while amplifying the pressure to innovate.53 Since entrepreneurs are essential agents of innovation, a strong cluster environment should foster entrepreneurial activity.

There appear to be two key features that suggest the 

importance for developing an innovation-based ecosystem at the DOD as a vehicle for the value-maximizing 

behaviors associated with the efficient transfer of tacit 

knowledge and resulting inside-indirect, outside-direct, and 

outside-indirect R&D activities. These features include:

◆ Flexibility: the innovation ecosystem is dynamic 

and flexible, allowing new entrants to become part of 

the ecosystem with minimal entry barriers, while allowing other parts of the ecosystem to fade and leave active 

involvement.

◆ Openness: the innovation ecosystem is an open 

system that is not concerned with its structures, but is, 

rather, focused on the range and quality of interactions 

within and between the structures in the ecosystem.

The degree of flexibility and dynamism, the openness of the ecosystem, and the extent and quality of its 

interactions and relationships will provide important evidence of the health of the innovation ecosystem and the 

contribution that the innovation ecosystem can potentially make to the organization and its innovation performance. To help understand the innovation ecosystem, 

it is useful to identify the key stakeholders, participants, 

and contributors as a basis for later discussion around key 

interactions and relationships and, crucially, the engagement and interaction of innovative individuals, networks, 

and companies in the innovation ecosystem.

Framework for Innovation 

Ecosystem Development

The DOD has recently embarked on a series of initiatives designed to capitalize on the innovation outputs 

of the non-defense high-tech industry to offset what 

military leaders and national security experts agree is the 

accelerating, systemic erosion of the U.S. military-technology edge.54 Such efforts, while necessary, only address 

a fraction of the benefit to national security of a more 

comprehensive partnership between the military and the 

commercial marketplace. The DOD needs the commercial marketplace not just as a source of advanced technology (that is, outside-direct and outside-indirect), but 

also as a partner in the commercialization (for example, 

maturation, validation, production) of military-relevant 

Intellectual Property (IP).

The transfer of IP and know-how from the DOD 

to the civilian world has resulted in some of the most 

transformative technologies of the modern era. For instance, the Internet, a technology initially developed with 

funding from the Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA, now the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency or DARPA), is credited with contributing over 

$1.5 trillion to the global economy each year.55 In the past, 

the primary beneficiary of military-to-civilian technology 

transfer or spin-off was assumed to be the commercial 

marketplace; today’s reality is considerably different. As 

the Global Positioning System (GPS) and numerous 

other examples attest, the military stands to gain an equal 

share of the benefit from outflows of technology. Revenues from technology licenses can be reinvested in DOD 

laboratory operations, partially mitigating the impact of 

DOD needs the commercial 

marketplace not just as a source 

of advanced technology (that 

is, outside-direct and outsideindirect), but also as a partner in 

the commercialization (for example, 

maturation, validation, production) 

of military-relevant Intellectual 

Property
10 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

stagnating defense R&D budgets; economies of scale associated with the adoption of nonsensitive, military-relevant technology by commercial markets can reduce the 

DOD’s cost burden for sustaining and scaling products; 

and commercial partners operating in parallel, nondefense 

markets can assume or even accelerate the development 

of DOD-derived IP for future civilian and military applications. Perhaps most importantly, prominently positioning the DOD as part of the commercial technology value 

chain provides a powerful mechanism to attract, grow, 

and retain innovators who would not otherwise consider 

careers in defense. Taking advantage of such opportunities, however, requires an efficient mechanism to facilitate 

the placement and incubation of military technology with 

commercial (or consumer) potential.

Ventures are one such mechanism. A venture-focused strategy that expands the range of useful applications for DOD-developed inventions, prototypes novel 

business models and processes, and provides a channel 

to partner with the nondefense high-tech community, 

is essential for the United States to maintain and extend its military-technology advantage. Such a strategy 

involves three aspects: a) attracting and developing innovators, entrepreneurs, and partners both inside and 

outside of the DOD who are ready, willing, and able to 

externalize defense-derived technology or otherwise incubate military-relevant technology in the commercial 

marketplace; b) furnishing programs and resources that 

allow these stakeholders to efficiently identify and connect the building blocks associated with venture creation 

(technologies, problems or market gaps, sales channels, 

enabling resources, etc.) and to collaborate in the formation of venture concepts and teams; and c) providing 

resources to mature, nascent ventures for success in commercial and defense markets. To this end, on July 1, 2015, 

New York University (NYU) initiated a study effort incorporating inputs from noted scholars, business leaders, 

technologists, and defense practitioners to explore key 

issues and practical recommendations regarding implementation of a National Security Technology Accelerator (NSTA)—a platform of education and resources designed to catalyze formation of a rich venture ecosystem 

that complements the traditional military-industrial base 

by expanding opportunities for innovators and entrepreneurs to commercialize military-relevant R&D from 

traditional and nontraditional sources. Study activities 

focused on surveying academic, government, and industry best practices for educating, connecting, and enabling 

an innovative national workforce that builds technology 

ventures relevant to the U.S. military. Based on the findings of the NYU study, the DOD officially launched the 

MD5 National Security Technology Accelerator (MD5) 

on October 14, 2016.

The DOD maintains and operates over one hundred 

major research laboratories, University Affiliated Research Centers, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers that span the widest possible range 

of technology areas. The DOD laboratory enterprise is 

augmented by a massive technology test and evaluation 

infrastructure that consists of 24 sites and covers some 

18,000 square miles of land and 180,000 square miles 

of airspace. In the aggregate, the laboratory enterprise 

along with the defense industrial base underwrites tens 

of thousands of scientists, researchers, and technical staff 

in government, academia, and industry and executes over 

$70 billion in R&D funding per year. This legacy DOD 

R&D complex constitutes the Structural Capital component of a DOD innovation ecosystem.

The mission of emerging efforts like MD5 is to develop complementary Relational Capital (that is, trust, 

confidence, shared vision, and behaviors) and Human 

Capital (that is, people, skills, networks, demand, ambition, and knowledge) components to leverage, augment, 

and optimize the available Structural Capital elements 

to do the following: a) increase access to technological 

innovations in the commercial and global economy; b) 

reduce the cost and time to field defense systems and 

improvements thereto; c) introduce innovative, costeffective business practices to the DOD; and d), grow 

a culture of innovation that is a reflection of the rapidly 

changing operational and technological environments 

confronting the American military. To accomplish its 
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 11 

mission, MD5 executes three portfolios of activities as 

depicted in figure 3: Education, Collaboration, and Acceleration. MD5 Education programs provide the academic and values-based resources to develop innovators 

and entrepreneurs prepared to solve defense problems 

throughout their careers; MD5 Collaboration programs 

enable extended communities of collaborators to network, self-organize, and collaborate in the selection and 

refinement of value-creating projects; and MD5 Acceleration programs provide resources to build, test, and refine solutions relevant to the national security enterprise.

Development of a viable innovation ecosystem 

aligned with the interests of the DOD requires a systemic process. The first step in this process is to identify 

the objectives of such a DOD innovation platform, including factors such as defined goals, academic programs 

and credentials as indicated in figure 3. The second step is 

to analyze these identified objectives across the targeted 

audience at the individual, organizational, and inter-organizational levels. The third step involves exploring the 

innovation competency of the DOD with respect to the 

university entrepreneurial competency model.56 The four 

specific entrepreneurial competencies are:

◆ Opportunity development competency: the need 

to develop a viable business (or mission) opportunity

◆ Championing competency: the need for championing individuals who provide meaning and energy to 

the entrepreneurial process

◆ Resource-leveraging competency: the need to access the resources necessary to develop the new venture

◆ Location-leveraging competency: the need to locate the new venture in the right ecosystem and support 

infrastructure.

The above four competencies provide the basis of a useful analytical framework as they highlight how different 

factors could play varying roles in the development of the 

DOD’s innovation competency.

Opportunity Development Competency. The ability 

of seeing a potential opportunity for value creation and 

developing it into a viable business or project is a cognitive act with different individuals playing different roles 

Figure 3. DOD Innovation Ecosystem Development Framework

DOD-Specic 

Objectives

Intended Audience 

and Impacts

Innovation Competency of DOD

(Adapted from Rao and Mulloth, 2016)

DOD Innovation 

Ecosystem Model

Dened 

Goals

Academic Program 

and Credentials

Startup 

Activities

Formal and Informal 

Networks

Access to Resources 

and Knowledge

Impact on 

National Security

Individuals

Organizational

Interorganizational

Opportunity

Development

Competency

Championing

Competency

Resource

Leveraging

Competency

Location

Leveraging

Competency
12 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

throughout the entrepreneurial process.57 Indeed, the perception of an opportunity is related to the knowledge and 

experience of the individual and this “opportunity recognition capacity” has been found to be the most important 

factor in the individual’s engagement in new ventures.58

Championing Competency. In the case of entrepreneurs, the individual motivation could be related to a 

range of factors such as technology diffusion, technology 

development, financial gain, public service, and peer motivations.59 Within the DOD setting, support from peers, 

managers and senior leaders, technology transfer office 

staff, and people in external networks is often critical, 

particularly in early stages.60 The role of these champions 

is to provide emotional meaning and energy to the venture process and, in so doing, procure the commitment of 

others to the new venture.61 As an example, it has been 

argued that organizations such as DARPA should empower their program managers to develop explicit social 

networks connecting researchers. Such networks would 

enable the program managers to have expanded access 

to the research community in order to surface emerging 

R&D themes that correspond to military requirements.62

Resource-Leveraging Competency. Several different 

resources, such as human capital, financial capital, physical assets, technological resources, and organizational resources, are essential for building a new startup venture. 

It has also been mentioned that, very often, the intangible 

“soft” resources are more useful than tangible resources, 

especially during the early stage of venture development.63 Successful creation of a new venture depends on 

the ability both to assemble and to organize resources.64

The likelihood of launching viable spin-offs (and spinons) increases as researchers have access to more financial 

resources, Intellectual Property assets, knowledge assets in 

the fields of computer sciences and engineering, knowledge expertise in application fields, social capital assets, 

and resources of large research universities.65

Location-Leveraging Competency. A significant debate is underway regarding the role of the regional economic environment in shaping differences in the rate of 

regional entrepreneurship and overall economic performance.66 A strong cluster environment surrounding a 

particular region-industry enhances the incentives and 

potential for entrepreneurship. New ventures greatly benefit from the locational advantage of the cluster where 

the new venture is located.67 David Brannon noted that 

new ventures are imprinted with characteristics that fit 

the specific environment in which they were founded.68

The internal and external characteristics at founding have 

long-term effects on the development, survival, and performance of new ventures.69 Studies also indicate that the 

perceived viability to act entrepreneurially is to a high degree influenced by the local environment. Individuals who 

are trained or currently work in a setting where entrepreneurial behavior is encouraged are more likely to become entrepreneurs themselves.70 However, if the culture 

and environment do not actively support entrepreneurship, potential entrepreneurs are discouraged.71 The role 

of the local work environment is particularly important 

in the DOD context because these ventures are usually 

developed by teams where several persons play an active 

championing role.72

Discussion

Based on our literature review, we recommend creating a platform within the DOD focused on developing 

the Human and Relational Capital components of the 

innovation ecosystem. Such a platform would include an 

the mission of emerging efforts like 

MD5 is to develop complementary 

Relational Capital (that is, trust, con 

dence, shared vision, and behaviors) 

and Human Capital (that is, people, 

skills, networks, demand, ambition, 

and knowledge) components to 

leverage, augment, and optimize the 

available Structural Capital elements
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 13 

organization such as MD5 that leverages human-centered 

networks. Such an initiative would encourage venture-led, 

dual-use products that provide a sustainable, competitive 

advantage for the DOD and the national economy. Given 

the size and complexity of the DOD, a coordinated strategy that fosters civil-military industry collaboration is more 

likely to be successful than a strategy that focuses narrowly 

on the DOD. Specifically, we emphasize using several different criteria, including social and technical metrics, for 

developing and evaluating the innovation ecosystem. Furthermore, each of the four competencies identified in the 

framework will need to be explored in more detail within 

the context of the DOD. Accordingly, in the next stage 

of our research, we will interviewkey decisionmakers and 

stakeholders in academia, industry, and relevant departments at the DOD to determine current thinking related 

to entrepreneurship and innovation-related activities and 

best practices. A representative sample of respondents will 

be selected in the following categories: current and former 

DOD uniformed and civilian leaders; DOD and foreign 

military innovators; DOD principal investigators and researchers; DOD educators; civilian innovation scholars 

and thought leaders; venture capitalists; defense industry 

leaders; commercial high-tech industry leaders; and congressional stakeholders.

The research approach used will be qualitative in nature using evidence based on interpretative interviews and 

direct observations. The qualitative method is expected to 

give us a rich and deep interpretation of the organization being studied.73 The inductive approach will build 

on existing concepts in research on innovation ecosystems while exploring for new strategies, processes, and 

relationships.74 We will explore models that can deliver a 

broad range of innovation-related activities across organizational boundaries and develop multiple project scenarios that will put our key literature findings into practice. 

We will report our findings in a subsequent paper and 

recommend key characteristics that the Department of 

Defense would need to develop with regard to the identified competencies.

Notes 1 Enrico Moretti, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen, 

“The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and Spillovers,” Working Paper, London School of Economics, 2016.

2 Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? 

Military Procurement and Technology Development (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 2006), 11‒20.

3 Mirko Draca, “Reagan’s innovation dividend? Technological 

impacts of the 1980s US defense build-up,” CAGE Online Working 

Paper Series 168 (2013).

4 Charles Tiefer, “President Trump Is Likely to Boost U.S. 

Military Spending By $500 Billion To $1 Trillion,” Forbes, November 9, 2016, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2016/11/09/president-trump-is-likely-to-boost-u-s-militaryspending-by-500-billion-to-1-trillion/#1186cc094108>.

5 Ray Kurzweil, “The Law of Accelerating Returns,” March 7, 

2001, available at <http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-acceleratingreturns>.

6 Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More (New York: Hyperion, 2006), 14‒17.

7 Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2015, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/2015-12-12/fourth-industrial-revolution>.

8 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: 

Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), 8‒13; and Eric Von Hippel, “Innovation by User Communities: Learning from Open-source Software,” 

MIT Sloan Management Review 42, no. 4 (2001), 82.

9 Christensen Clayton, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School 

Press, 1997).

10 Eric Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use 

Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses (New 

York: Crown Books, 2011). 

11 Anthony Cordesman, Marissa Allison, and Jason Lemieux, 

“IED Metrics for Afghanistan January 2004‒September 2010,” Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (2010).

12 Anthony Cordesman, Charlies Loi, and Vivek Kocharlakota, 

“IED Metrics for Iraq: June 2003‒September 2010,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011).

13 Adam Higginbotham, “US Military Learns to Fight Deadliest 

Weapons,” Wired Magazine, July 28, 2010.

14 James Revill, Improvised Explosive Devices: The Paradigmatic 

Weapon of New Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

15 Peter W. Singer, “The evolution of improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs),” Brookings Institution, February 7, 2012, available at <https://

www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolution-of-improvised-explosivedevices-ieds/>.

16 John R. Boyd, Destruction and Creation (U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College, 1976).

17 Steve Blank, The Four Steps to the Epiphany: Successful Strategies 

for Startups That Win (Pescadero, CA: K&S Ranch, 2013).

18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 

19 Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner, “The rise of innovation districts: 

A new geography of innovation in America,” Metropolitan Policy 

Program at Brookings (2014).

20 Sumner Myers and Donald George Marquis, Successful industrial innovations. A study of factors underlying innovation in selected firms

(Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1969); and James M. 

Utterback and William J. Abernathy, “A Dynamic Model of Process 

and Product Innovation,” Omega 3, no. 6 (1975), 639‒656.

21 Mel Horwitch and C.K. Prahalad, “Managing Technological 

Innovation—Three Ideal Modes,” Sloan Management Review 17, no. 2 

(1976), 77.
14 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

22 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School 

Press, 1997).

23 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An 

Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New 

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1934).

24 James Hasik, “Defense Entrepreneurship: How to Build 

Institutions for Innovation Inside the Military,” Joint Force Quarterly 

81, no. 2 (2016).

25 B.J. Armstrong, “More Than an Offset: Defense Innovation 

from the Inside,” War on the Rocks, November 26, 2014, available at 

<http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/more-than-an-offset-defenseinnovation-from-the-inside/>.

26 Dominique Foray, David C. Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson, 

“Public R&D and Social Challenges: What Lessons from Mission 

R&D Programs?” Research Policy 41, no. 10 (2012), 1697‒1702.

27 Ibid.

28 Ron Adner, “Match Your Innovation Strategy to Your Innovation Ecosystem,” Harvard business Review 84, no. 4 (2006), 98.

29 Jay Inslee and Bracken Hendricks, Apollo’s Fire: Igniting America’s Clean Energy Economy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2009).

30 Henry Chesbrough, “The logic of Open Innovation: Managing 

Intellectual Property,” California Management Review 45, no. 3 (2003), 

33‒58.

31 Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West, Open 

Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2006).

32 Oliver Gassmann, “Opening Up the Innovation Process: Towards an Agenda,” R&D Management 36, no. 3 (2006), 223‒228.

33 Eric Von Hippel, “Democratizing Innovation: The Evolving 

Phenomenon of User Innovation,” International Journal of Innovation 

Science 1, no. 1 (2009), 29‒40.

34 Jay Stowsky, “The Dual-Use Dilemma,” Issues in Science and 

Technology 13, no. 2 (1997).

35 Andrew P. Hunter and Ryan A. Crotty, “Keeping the 

Technological Edge: Leveraging Outside Innovation to Sustain the 

Department of Defense’s Technological Advantage,” A Report of the 

CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and the CSIS International 

Security Program, September 2015, available at <https://csis-prod.

s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/150925_

Hunter_KeepingTechnologicalEdge_Web.pdf>.

36 Ibid.

37 Jay Stowsky, “The Dual-Use Dilemma,” Issues in Science and 

Technology 13, no. 2 (1997).

38 Eric Von Hippel, “‘Sticky Information’ and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation,” Management Science 40, no. 

4 (1994), 429‒439.

39 Nayanee Gupta, Brian J. Sergi, Emma D. Tran, Rashida 

Nek, and Susannah V. Howieson, “Research Collaborations Between 

Universities and Department of Defense Laboratories,” International 

Development Agency Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2014; 

and Renaud Bellais and Renelle Guichard, “Defense Innovation, 

Technology Transfers and Public Policy,” Defence and Peace Economics

17, no. 3 (2006), 273‒286.

40 Von Hippel, “Sticky Information,” 429‒439.

41 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism in the Postwar World, in Seymour E. Harris, Postwar Economic Problems (New York and London: 

McGraw-Hill, 1943). 

42 Gert-Jan Hospers, “Joseph Schumpeter and His Legacy in 

Innovation Studies,” Knowledge, Technology & Policy 18, no. 3 (2005), 

20‒37.

43 N.M Carter, M. Williams, P.D. Reynolds, P. Westhead, and M. 

Wright, “Discontinuance Among New Firms in Retail: The Influence 

of Initial Resources, Strategy, and Gender,” Advances in Entrepreneurship 3 (2000), 72‒92. 

44 Murray B. Low, “The Adolescence of Entrepreneurship Research: Specification of Purpose,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

25, no. 4 (2001), 17‒26.

45 See the following: William Gartner, “Who is an Entrepreneur? 

Is the Wrong Question,” American Journal of Small Business 12, no. 4 

(1988): 11–32; Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development; Scott 

Shane and Sankaran Venkataraman, “The Promise of Entrepreneurship As a Field of Research,” Academy of Management Review 25, no. 

1 (2000), 217‒226; Tatiana Iakovleva, “Entrepreneurial Orientation 

of Russian SME,” in The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Economics, vol. 

9 of Research on Technological Innovation, Management and Policy, ed. 

G.T. Vinig and R.C.W. Van Der Voort (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group 

Publishing Limited, 2005), 83–97; J.C. Jarillo and H.H. Stevenson, “A 

Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Management,” Strategic Management Journal 11, no. 4 (1990), 17–27; Lowell W Busenitz, 

Carolina Gomez, and Jennifer W. Spencer. “Country Institutional Profiles: Unlocking Entrepreneurial Phenomena,” Academy of Management 

Journal 43, no. 5 (2000), 994‒1003; and W. Richard Scott, Institutions 

and Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995).

46 B. Carlsson, Technological Systems and Economic Performance: The 

Case of Factory Automation (New York: Springer Science & Business 

Media, 2012); and Charles Edquist, Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations (London and Washington: Pinter 

Publishers, 1997).

47 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 

Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 

48 Deborah J. Jackson, “What Is an Innovation Ecosystem,” 

National Science Foundation (2011), 1‒11.

49 Department of Business Innovation and Skills, “Insights 

from International Benchmarking of the UK Science and Innovation 

System” BIS Analysis Paper 3 ( January 31, 2014), available at <https://

www.gov.uk/government/publications/science-and-innovation-systeminternational-benchmarking>.

50 Meirion Thomas, “Innovation Ecosystems As Drivers of 

Regional Innovation—Validating the Ecosystem,” available at <http://

www.know-hub.eu/knowledge-base/videos/innovation-ecosystems-asdrivers-of-regional-innovation-validating-the-ecosystem.html>. 

51 See the following: Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990); AnnaLee Saxenian, 

Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and 

Route 128 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Maryann 

P. Feldman and David B. Audretsch, “Innovation in Cities: Sciencebased Diversity, Specialization and Localized Competition,” European 

Economic Review 43, no. 2 (1999), 409‒429; Timothy Bresnahan and 

Alfonso Gambardella, Building High-tech Clusters: Silicon Valley and 

Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Mercedes 

Delgado, Michael E. Porter, and Scott Stern, “Clusters and Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Economic Geography 10, no. 4 (2010), 495‒518.

52 See the following: Saxenian, Regional Advantage; Porter, 

Competitive Advantage of Nations; and Edward Glaeser and William R. 

Kerr, “Local Industrial Conditions and Entrepreneurship: How Much 

of the Spatial Distribution Can We Explain?” Journal of Economics & 

Management Strategy 18, no. 3 (2009), 623‒663.

53 Michael E. Porter, “Location, Competition, and Economic 

Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy,” Economic Development Quarterly 14, no. 1 (2000), 15‒34.

54 Defense Business Board, “Innovation: Attracting and Retaining the Best of the Private Sector,” February 2014, available at <http://

dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2014/DBB-FY14-

02-Innovation%20report%20(final).pdf>.

55 Stephen J. Ezell and Robert D. Atkinson, “Fifty Ways to 

Leave Your Competitiveness Woes Behind: A National Traded Sector 

Competitiveness Strategy,” Information Technology & Innovation 

Foundation (2012).

56 Bharat Rao and Bala Mulloth, “The Role of Universities in Encouraging Growth of Technology-Based New Ventures,” International 

Journal of Innovation and Technology Management (2017).
ndupress.ndu.edu DH No. 81 15 

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

helps national security decisionmakers and their staffs understand emerging impacts of technology and integrate 

them effectively into policies through research, teaching, 

and outreach. CTNSP supports the Department of Defense 

leadership and Congress while also encouraging wholeof-government and public-private collaboration.

The Defense Horizons series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

Philip J. Stockdale

Acting Director

CTNSP

Laura J. Junor 

Interim Director of Research

and Strategic Support

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

William T. Eliason 

Director

NDU Press

57 Einar Rasmussen, Simon Mosey, and Mike Wright. “The 

Evolution of Entrepreneurial Competencies: A Longitudinal Study of 

University Spin‐off Venture Emergence,” Journal of Management Studies 48, no. 6 (2011), 1314‒1345.

58 Bart Clarysse, Valentina Tartari, and Ammon Salter, “The 

Impact of Entrepreneurial Capacity, Experience and Organizational 

Support on Academic Entrepreneurship,” Research Policy 40, no. 8 

(2011), 1084‒1093.

59 Christopher S. Hayter, “In search of the Profit-maximizing Actor: Motivations and Definitions of Success from Nascent Academic 

Entrepreneurs,” The Journal of Technology Transfer 36, no. 3 (2011), 

340‒352.

60 Rasmussen, Mosey, and Wright. “Evolution of Entrepreneurial 

Competencies,”1314‒1345.

61 Jane M. Howell and Christopher A. Higgins, “Champions of 

Technological Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly (1990), 

317‒341.

62 Erica R. Fuchs, “Rethinking the Role of the State in Technology Development: DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network 

Governance,” Research Policy 39, no. 9 (2010), 1133‒1147.

63 Benyamin Lichtenstein and Candida G. Brush, “How Do 

Resource Bundles Develop and Change in New Ventures? A Dynamic 

Model and Longitudinal Exploration,” Entrepreneurship: Theory and 

Practice 25, no. 3 (2001), 37-39.

64 Candida G. Brush, Patricia G. Greene, and Myra M. Hart, 

“From Initial Idea to Unique Advantage: The Entrepreneurial Challenge of Constructing a Resource Base,” The Academy of Management 

Executive 15, no. 1 (2001), 64‒78.

65 Rejean Landry, Nabil Amara, and Imad Rherrad, “Why Are 

Some University Rresearchers More Likely to Create Spin-offs Than 

Others? Evidence from Canadian Universities,” Research Policy 35, no. 

10 (2006), 1599‒1615.

66 See the following: Porter, “Location, Competition, and Economic Development, 15‒34; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: 

Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1996); and Janet Bercovitz and Maryann 

Feldman, “Academic Entrepreneurs: Organizational Change at the 

Individual Level,” Organization Science 19, no. 1 (2008), 69‒89.

67 David Keeble, Clive Lawson, Barry Moore, and Frank Wilkinson, “Collective Learning Processes, Networking and ‘Institutional 

Thickness’ in the Cambridge Region,” Regional Studies 33, no. 4 (1999), 

319‒332.

68 David L. Brannon, Johan Wiklund, and J. Michael Haynie, 

“The Varying effects of Family Relationships in Entrepreneurial 

Teams,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 37, no. 1 (2013), 107‒132.

69 Martin Ganco and Rajshree Agarwal, “Performance Differentials Between Diversifying Entrants and Entrepreneurial Start-ups: 

A complexity Approach,” Academy of Management Review 34, no. 2 

(2009), 228‒252.

70 Bercovitz and Feldman, “Academic Entrepreneurs,” 69‒89; and 

Martin Kenney and W. Richard Goe, “The Role of Social Embeddedness in Professorial Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of Electrical 

Engineering and Computer Science at UC Berkeley and Stanford,” 

Research Policy 33, no. 5 (2004), 691‒707.

71 Bercovitz and Feldman, “Academic Entrepreneurs, ” 69‒89.

72 Iris Vanaelst, Bart Clarysse, Mike Wright, Andy Lockett, 

Nathalie Moray, and Rosette S’Jegers, “Entrepreneurial Team Development in Academic Spinouts: An Examination of Team Heterogeneity,” 

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 30, no. 2 (2006), 249‒271.

73 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (London: 

Routledge, 1988); and Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2012).

74 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013). 
16 DH No. 81 ndupress.ndu.edu

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and Control Structure

David C. Logan

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Strategic 

Forum 299, November 2016)

Cross-Functional Teams in 

Defense Reform: Help or 

Hindrance?

By Christopher J. Lamb

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 298, 

August 2016)

Will Technological Convergence 

Reverse Globalization?

T.X. Hammes

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 297, July 

2016)

The NATO Warsaw Summit: 

How to Strengthen Alliance 

Cohesion

Alexander Mattelaer

Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 296, June 

2016)

Reflections on U.S.-Cuba 

Military-to-Military Contracts

Hal Klepak

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 295, July 

2016)

China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

Assessing PLA Organizational 

Reforms

Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affair, Strategic 

Forum 294, April 2016)

National Security Reform and 

the 2016 Election

Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph C. Bond

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 293, April 

2016)

Supporting Democracy in 

Erdogan’s Turkey: The Role of 

Think Tanks

Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan Schwing

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 292, May 

2016)

Korean Unification and the 

Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance

David F. Helvey

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Strategic 

Forum 291, February 2016)

Posing Problems Without an 

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after the Nuclear Deal

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