### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe brua ry 18, 200 4 S es sio n
CHR ISTOP HERGR EY CU MM INGS v. P EP PE R L YN NE WERN ER CU MM INGS
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Williamson County No. 28924 Russ Heldman, Chancellor

No. M2003- 00086-COA-R 3-CV – F iled October 15, 2004

The trial c ourt g rante d the husband a divorce on the g round of the wife ’s adultery and made various
ru lin g s r e g ard ing the pa

re nti ng arr a ng e me nt fo r the pa rt ie s’ on e y e ar old so n, c hil d s up po rt , p ro pe rt y div is i o n , a n d a w ar d o f

a t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s
. T h e p ar t i e s h a v e ap p e a l e d m o s to f t h e t h o s e ruli ng s. Al though w e af

firm the equa l sharing of re sidential place ment, we f ind the six month alternating
sc he du le is n ot i n th is c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts . We a lso fi nd oth e r pa rt s of the plan mu st b e va c a te d in view of rece nt holdings by the Tennessee Supreme C ourt. Ther efor e, we vacate the par enting plan and re mand fo r en t ry o f a ne w permanent par enting plan addr essing the re sidential schedule, the de sig natio n o f p ri mary

re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, a llo c ati on of

de c isi on -m akin g auth ority , a ndc hil d s up po rt

. I n t h e i n t e r i m , w e r e i n s t a t e t h e tr i a l c o u rt ’s pendente lite arr a ng e me nt, a s mo dif ie d, a nde sta

bli sh interim support. We affirm the division of property , modify the allocation of debt, and modify the
a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Tenn. R. App . P . Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Modified i n Par t, Vac ated in Par t, and Rem anded

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.

Th oma s F . B loo m, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Pe pp e r L

y nn e Werne r C umm ing s. Robert Todd Jackson, Virg inia L ee Story , Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the a ppellee, Christopher

Gre y Cum min g s.
OP IN ION

I n this appeal fr om the trial court’ s o rd er i n t h ei r divorce action, the pa rties have raised a number of issues. The parties we re ma rried only fourtee n month s b ef

o re t h e divorce ac tion was initiated. As with many

divorce actions, the pa

rt i es v i ew their experience s from very differ entA ccor di ng t o t he t es t i mo ny of M s
. Cum mi ng s , he r hu s band wen t hu nt i ng wi t h hi s f r i ends t wo day s af

t er G r ey 1 was bo rn. M r. C um m i ngs d eni ed havi ng d o ne so. W e no t e t hat t hi s was o ne o f t he few fact ual m at t ers ab o ut whi ch t he p art i es and t hei r wi t ness es t est i f i ed i n dir ect co nt radict i o n t o each o t her.

-2- perspe ctives. The wife tells a story of abandonme nt, ne g lect, and loneliness. The husband’s is one of be tr a y a l a ndde c e it.

I. T HE M ARRI AGE Christopher Gre y

Cummi ng s and Pepper

Ly nn Werner me t and beg an dating in May of 2000. Mr. Cummi ng s, then thirty -five y ear s of ag e, was unemploy ed and living in his pare nts’ Br entwood home. His future wife, w ho taug ht I nterior Desig n at Watkins I nstitut e, wa s two y ear s y oung er and liv e d o n a re nte d f arm in L e ipe r’ s Fo rk

. Af

te r the y ha d da te d for a wh ile , Ch ri s Cu mmi ng s le ft his pare nts’ home and moved in with Ms. Cummings, then Ms. Werner

. At so me su bs e q u e n t

p o int , M r. Cum min g s b ou g ht a tr a sh pic k- up se rv ic e a ndbe g a n to de vo te himself to operating thi s new business. He demonstrated e nerg y and ambition in this enterprise,
wo rking e xtre me ly

lon g ho ur s to g e t hi s busi ne ss o ff the g ro un d. Ac c or din g to M s. Cum min g s’ te sti mon y , o n some day s he wo rk e d fr om 4:0 0 a. m. to 10: 00 p. m., a ndin s ome we e ks he wo rk e d a ll
se ve n da y s. Mr . Cummi ng s’ oth e r int e re sts inc lud e d hun tin g , wa tc hin g sp orts, a ndpa rt ic ipatin g in the ac tiviti es of his Masonic L odg e. He stay ed at a hunting lodg e with his long- time friends e very wee ken d d u r in g h u n ti n g s e a s o n a n d tw o w e e k e n d s a mo n th d u r in g th e r e s t o f th e y e ar. On Thursday s, he we nt to meetings at his Masonic L odg e. The se ac tiviti es, co m b i n ed wi th his new business, meant Mr. Cummings wa s rar ely home.

I n M arc h o f 2 00 1, Ms. Cum min g s d isc ov e re d that sh e wa s pr e g na nt. Af te r Mr . Cu mmi ng s’ initiallyang ry

rea ction, Ms. Cumm ings agr ee d to marry him if he promised to reduc e hours a way from home a nd to put an end to his habit of chew ing tobacc o and leaving his spit cups all over the house. He p r o mi s e d to d o b o thth o s e th in g s
. T h e p ar ti e s d r o v e to G a tl in b u r g a n d g o t m arr ie d on Sun day , M a y

20 , 2 00 1. Th ey ret urnedho me a lmo st i mme diate ly be c a us e Mr . Cu mmi ng s h a d to
wo rk on Mo nd a y . Sinc e the re wa s no hon e y moo n, Mr . Cummi ng s pro mis e d tha t th e c ou ple wo uld cele brate their one y ear

anniver sary

by taking a spec ial trip. That trip neve r happe ned.

Af te r the marria g e , the pa

rt ie s re nte d a ho me in B re ntw oo d ne ar Mr

. Cum min gs’ pa rent s. They used the furnishing s from Ms. Cumming s’ home in L eiper ’s For k to se t up the new house hold,
as M r. C u m m i n gs h ad n o n e o f h i s o wn
. M s
. C u m m i n gs t es t i fi ed t h at h er h u s b an d d i d n o tch an ge his way s after

the marriag e, despite his promises to do so. She herself ha d promised, at Mr. Cum min g s’ ins ist e nc e , to sto p w or kin g after the ba by wa s b orn s o s he c ou ld b e a stay -at- ho me mother.

Ms. Cumm ings g ave birth to the parties’ son, Gre y Cummi ng s, on November 21, 2001. Even 1
a ft e r the birth o f the ir

c hil d, Mr . Cu mmi ng s c on tin ue d to div ide his tim e bet ween hi s work a ndhis-3-

frie nd s, de vo tin g ve ry lit tle tim e or a tte nti on to h is w if e , th e ba by , o r h ou se ho ld t a sk s. Ms. Cum min g s, who h ad fe w fr i en d s of her own, g ave up he r job in acc ordanc e with the parties’ ag ree ment, and b e c a m e a f u l l

- t i m e m o t h e r

a n d h o u s e k e e p e r
. M r
. C u m m i n g s c o n t i n u e d t o c h e w t o b a c c o r e g u l ar l y. By M ar ch o f 20 0 2 , t h e p ar t i es we re o p er at i n g o n en t i re l y d i ff er en ts ch ed u l es
. M r. C u m m i n gs wa s g oin g to b e d at 1: 00 or 2:0 0 a .m. e ve ry nig ht, wh ile his wi fe ha d to g o to be d a t 9:0 0 or 9:3 0 s o sh e wo uldbe able to g e t up du ri ng the nig ht t o f e e d th e ba by . M s. Cum min g s te sti fi e d th a t aro un d th is t i m e, h erh u s b an d s t o p p ed co m m u n i c a t i n g wi t h h er
. S h o rt l y t h er ea ft er , i n M ay , M s
. C u m m i n gs de ve lop e d a

frie nd sh ip w ith B ru c e Th omp so n, the ma na g e r of a sta ble wh e re sh e bo ard e d h e r h or se s. T h e f r i e n d s h i p d e e p e n e d a f

t e r M s
. C u m m i n g s ’ m ar e g a v e b i r t h t o a c o l tt h a td i e d t h e f

o l l o w i n g d a y. The re lationship between Ms. Cummings a nd Mr. Thompson esca lated in J une into a sexual aff air. Mr. Cummings found some photos showing his wife, Mr. Thompson, and the baby toge ther, and he be g an to suspect that his wife was ha ving an aff air. He confr onted her with his suspi cions, but sh e d en i ed an y

such re lationship. Mr. Cumm ings did not believe her. H e bec ame ope nly hostile,
es s en t i al l y

h o u n d i n g h i s wi fe

. W h en t h ei r d i s cu s s i o n s b ec am e co n fr o n t at i o n al , an d M s
. C u m m i n gs would attempt to walk away , her husba nd would follow, pointing his fing er at her a nd scre aming that she wa s a fornicator and an adulter er.
The parties continued (tensely ) to sha re the same home, but Mr. Cummi ng s withdrew f inancial
su pp ort fro m hi s wif

e . H e sto pp e d ma

kin g pa y me nts on he r c ar andc re dit c ard s, a ndc los e d th e ir chec king a ccount without telling he r. Her chec ks bounced, and unpaid bills accumulate d. She went ba c k to wo rk , ta

kin g tw o p art -t ime job s th a t g e ne rate d a bo ut $ 80 0 p e r mo nt h. She a lso e nr oll e d in g ra du a te sc ho ol, wi th the int e nti on of ob ta ini ng a

Ma ste r’ s D e g re e in B usin ess Ad min ist ratio n to e nh a nc e he r e arn ing po te nti a l.

Ms. Cumm ings te stified that on the two day s a week when she worke d the opening shift at the Y.M.C.A., she would leave for wor k at 4:00 a.m. and r eturn at 8:00 a.m. to find that the baby had not been f ed, bathe d or clothed. Mr . Cummi ng s te s t i fi ed t o the contra ry , stating that on those day s he properly car ed for Gre y . Ms. Cumm ings a lso testified that when she we n t t o work on Wednesday evening s, her husba nd did not hims elf take car e of the baby , but took him t o his parents’ house

. Af te r a n in it ia l h e ar in g in th e d iv o r c e a c ti o n , th e tria l c o u r t o r d e r e d th a t th e p ar ti e s share residential plac ement and primary custodial responsibility

for Gr ey on an alternating wee k basis. The pa rt ie s c on tin ue d to liv e in t he sam e ho us e . O n th e we e ks Mr . Cu mmi ng s w a s th e pa re nt w ith residential plac ement, he would usually take Gr ey

to his parents’ house and live ther e for the wee k. Simi larl y , o n th o s e w e e k s M s
. Cu mm in g s h a d r e s id e n ti a l c u s to d y , s h e a n d G r e y w o u ldo f te n s pend the week wit h her parents, who would trave l from Mi ssouri and set up residenc e in their re cre ational
ve hic le . A nu mbe r o f p ro ble ms anddif fi c ult situatio ns aro se . M r. Cum min g s c omp la ine d th a t Ms

. Cummi ng s would not tell him wher e Gr ey was a nd that she had sometimes left h i m at d ay car e, c on tr ary to M r. Cum min g s’ wi sh e s. Ms. Cum min g s f e lt that Mr. Cum min g s still did no t sp e ndtim e wi th the ba

by , b ut j us t le ft

him wi th h is p are nts

.-4- II. C OU R T P ROCE E DI NGS
On J u ly 10, 2002, Christopher Cummings filed a Complaint for Divorce on the g round of
a du lte ry , statin g that “

.. .Wif e is c arry ing on a n a ff

a ir wi th B ru c e A. Th omp so n I I a ndthe re la tio ns hip is blatantly

in front of the pa

rties’ minor son.” A pare nting plan f iled with the Complaint proposed that the father be g rante d primary residential custody of Gre y
. On J uly 12, the trial court issued a show
ca use orde r, commanding the wife to appea r on Aug ust 27, and to show cause why the father’s pare nting plan should not be adopted pending a final hearing . A re straining order enjoining the mother f r o mh a v i n g h e r

s o n i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f

M r
. T h o m p s o n w a s i s s u e d o n t h e s a m e d a y. On Aug ust 7, Ms. Cum mings filed an Answer and C ounter-Claim for divorce

. She denied that
s h e wa s i n v o l v ed i n an i m p ro p er re l at i o n s h i p wi t h M r. T h o m p s o n an d as s er t ed t h at M r
. C u m m i n gs neg lected his family , spending very littl e time at home. She also claimed that he withheld financial
su pp ort f ro m he r and “ faile d to pay the famil y ’s ne c e ssa ry a nd re a so na

ble liv ing e xpe ns e s in a

tim e ly
manner .” Ms. Cummings aske d for a divorce on the g rounds of irr econci l ab l e d iffer ence s and inappropriate marital c onduct and f or sole custody

of Gre y , child support, and alimony . She also asked that the sepa

rate property

she broug ht to the marital home be r eturne d to her. During the hea

ring of Aug ust 27, Pepper Cummings denie d that she had e ng ag ed in a se x ual relationship wit h Br

uce Thompson. On S eptember 19, the t rial court enter ed a te mporary order g iving t h e p ar t i es re s i d en t i al cu s t o d y o f Gr ey o n al t er n at i n g we ek s
. P ri o r t o t h e f i n al h eari n g, M r. C u m m i n gs took the deposition of Mr. Thompson, during which he admitted the affair with Ms. C ummings. The pa rt ie s s u b s e q u e n t l y

f i l e d a w r i t t e n s t i p u l a t i o n t h a tM r
. C u m m i n g s w o u l d b e g r a n t e d a n ab s olu te divorce on the g round of a dultery

. The fina l divorce he aring beg an on November 1, 2002, with a sec ond day of testimony

on November

13. When she took the stand, Ms. C u mmings admitted committing pe rjury during the hearing of

Aug ust 27. She apolog ized to the court, and e x plained that s h e h ad l i ed to her husband beca use she was afra id that he would become abusive if he knew of her aff air, a nd that she had lied to the court out of f

ear that the judg e would take her c hild away from her

. While the a c c ou nts of

the pa rt ie s a s to the ma

jor inc ide nts of

the ir marria g e we re larg e ly consistent with e ach other, their perspe ctives wer e widely diverg ent. Chris Cummi ng s testified that he did not understand why his w ife had eng ag ed in immora l c onduct or why she had ne ver a pologized to him or asked for

forg iven es s
. For

her pa rt, Pepper Cumming s was obviously still ang ry

at her hu sb a ndfo r h is f

a ilu re to p ro vid e c omp a nio ns hip a ndsu pp ort a ft e r the birth o f the ir ba by . Sh e a lso testified that he pa id very littl e attention to Gre y , and routinely turned the c hild o ver to his mother wh e n p ur po rt e dly e xer c isi ng c us tod y

ov e r h im.

At the con cl u s ion of the hea ring , the trial judg e honore d the stipulation of the parties a nd g rante d Mr. Cummings an a bsolute divorce on the g round of adultery

. The judge also announce d that he would take all other matters under a dvisement. The f inal determinations of the court a re e mbodied in its Memorandum and F inal Orde r.-5-

Th e Me mor a nd um i nv ok e d th e ma xims o f e qu ity a ndde c lare d th a t be c a us e of Ms. Cum min g s’ pe rj ury , h e r “un c le a n h a nd s, ” it w a s n e c e ssa ry to d e ny he r c la ims fo r r e lie f. Th e c ou rt a c c or din g ly sanctioned Ms. Cummings for her perjury by ordering her to pay attorney ’s fe es and c ourt costs, and by denying he r alimony

and payment of “c erta in debts and expenses.”

The c ourt dec lare d that it would not punis h the child for the mis co n d u ct o f its mot her, but would base its custody and child support decisions on the rele vant statutory fac tors. Finding that, on balanc e, neither pare nt de monstrated g reater fitness for the assumption of primary custody over G rey than the o t h er , t he court ordere d that the mother a nd the father a lternate in the role of primary residential pa

rent e very six months, with each pa rent to exercise rea sonable visitation during the other pare nt’s period of c ustody

. Th e c ou rt g a ve e a c h p are nt the po we r t o ma ke day -t o- day

de c isi on s for Gr e y wh ile the c hil d
was re siding with t hat par ent. Dec ision-making a uthority was a lso temporally

divided betwee n the pa re nts on ma tte rs of

he a lth c are , e xtra c ur

ri c ula r a c tiv iti e s a ndre lig iou s u pb ri ng ing wi th s uc h auth ority g iven t o the parent with residential placement. The c ourt dec ree d one exception to this equal division of dec ision-making a

uthority , howeve r, decla

ring that the husband c ould make the de cisions reg arding Gre y ’s forma l education.

Othe r pr ov isi on s of the F ina l Ord e r inc lud e d ch ild su pp ort ( hu sb a ndto p a y $1 ,1 00 pe r m on th wh e n w if e ha s c us tod y , w if

e to p a y $4 89 pe r mon th wh e n hu sb a nd ha s c us tod y ), ho us ing (h us ba ndto rema in in marital home and be re s p o n s i b l e for pay ment of re nt and utiliti es, wife to leave) , and injunctions (husband to ref rain fr om allowing “spit bottles” of used c hewing tobacc o and saliva to be le ft in h is h ome or

his c ar w hil e the c hil d is in his c us tod y , wi fe to re fr a in fr om ha vin g ov e rn ig ht g ue sts of the op po sit e se x o the r than famil y me mbe rs wh ile the c hil d is in h e r c us tod y ). Th e wi fe wa s a lso enjoined fr om “l o cating or re siding outside of Williamson C ounty absent the e x press c onsent of Plaintiff or the Court.” This appe al followed.

III. T HE P ARE NT I NG A RRANG E M E NT
B othpa rt ie s a g re e that th e iss ue s su rr ou nd ing thepa re nti ng arr a ng e me nt of the ir y ou ng c hil d
are the most important raised in this appea l. I ndeed, decisions as t o the custody of a c hild are among the most im p o rt an t t hat courts are c harg ed with making

. Le ntzv . Le ntz , 717 S.W .2d 876, 877 (T e nn .1 98 6) ; Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). T hey are also among the mos t di ff

ic ult

. By statute as we ll as case law, the we lfare and best int er es t s o f t h e child are the pa ramount conce rn in custody , visitation, and residential plac ement dete rminations, an d the g oal of a ny such decision is to place the child in an environme nt that will best serve his or he r nee ds. Tenn Code Ann. § 3 6- 6-106 (a) ; T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4; Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) ; Parker v . Parker , 986 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1999) ; Le ntz , 717 S.W .2d at 87 7

. T h e Genera l Assembly has found that “ [t ]he best interests of the c hild are se rved by a par enting arr ang ement that best maintains a child’s emotional g rowth, health and st ability , and phy sical ca re.” Tenn. Code Ann.-6-

§ 36-6-401( a). The aim of a custodial or re sidential arr ang ement is to promote the child’s we lfare by
cre ating an envir onment that promotes a nurturing relationship wit h eac h pare nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -6 -4 04 (b ); Aaby v . Strange , 924 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996)

. Tria l c ou rt s mu st e xer c ise br oa d d isc re tio n in c hil d c us tod y ma tte rs
. Parker , 986 S.W .2d at 563. “[T] he deta ils of custody and visitation with children are peculiarly within the broad discr etion of the trial judg e.” Eldridge , 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d at 8 5 , q u o t i n g Suttles v. Suttles , 748 S.W .2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 19 88 ). L ike a

c us tod y de c isi on , a

de te rm inatio n o f the be st re sid e nti a l pla c e me nt p la n f or a c hil d mu st turn on the particular fa cts of ea ch ca se. B eca use of the disc retion g iven trial courts in this area and be c aus e of the fa c t sp e c if ic natur e of

su c h d e c isi on s, app e llate c ou rt s a re re luc ta nt t o s e c on d- g ue ss a t ri al co u rt ’s determination reg arding custody and visitation. Nelson v. Nelson , 66 S.W .3d 896, 901 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); Ru the rfo rd v . R uth e rfo rd , 971 S.W .2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Ga sk ill , 93 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 631). Ac cording ly , appellate courts will decline to disturb a pa renting plan fashioned by

a trial c ourt unless that dec ision i s b ased on application of an inc orre ct leg al standar d, is ag ainst logic or re asoning , or is not suppor t ed b y a p re p o nderance of the evidenc e. Eldridge , 42 S.W. 3d a t 85 ; Nic ho ls v Ni c ho ls , 792 S.W .2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990) ; Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

I n this appeal, Mother arg ues that the trial court err ed in e stablishing an arr ang ement whe reby
eac h pare nt ha d primary custody , or residential place ment, of this ve ry y oung child for six m onths at a time. She ar g ues that prope r application of the fac ts to the rele vant statutory fac tors, as we ll as the child’s nee d for c ontinuityan d s t ab i l i t y , lead to the c onclusion that she should be the primary residential c ustodian of Gre y for the e ntire y ear , with Mr. Cummi ng s having rea sonable visitation.

Mr

. Cu mm in g s a ls o ar g u e s a g a in s t th e a lt e r n a ti n g s ix mo n th s c h e d u le

. H o w e v e r , he ar g ues t h ath e s h o u l d h av e b ee n aw ar d ed re s i d en t i al p l ac em en tfo r t h e e n t i re y ea r, wi t h M s
. C u m m i n gs enjoy ing r easona

ble visitation. He arg ues that the fa cts properly applied to t h e ap plicable statutory fa c tor s sh ow he is c omp arativ e ly mor e fi t th a n M s. Cum min g s.
Be fore trial, both pare nts had submitted proposed permanent par enting plans in which ea ch
as ked to ha ve primary residential place ment or primary or sole custody

. At trial, Ms

. C u m m i n gs testified that she was willing to try , for six months or so, the alternating wee k schedule that the parties had bee n following pending the final divorc e dec ree . Howeve r, she thoug ht addi t i onal visitation
s h o u l d b e gi v en t h e n o n re s i d en t i al p ar en t , s t at i n g: What we do rig ht now is Sunday to Sunday , a wee k on, a we ek off . But I believe that’s a little bit long

. I would like to se e may be perha ps on Wednesday

the opposite pare nt ha ve Gr e y

ov e rn ig ht.

She testified that s he thought such an arr ang ement, providing for a dditional visi tation with the nonresidential pa

rent, would be in the child’s best interest because , at t he child’s y oung ag e, a w eek
was to o lo n g to g o w ith o u t v is it a ti o n w ith th e o th e r p ar e n t. H o w e v e r , h e r p r e f e r e n c e r e main e d that she be g iven primary

custody with rea sonable visitation to the father

.A t t hi s p o i nt , ei t her counsel or t he co urt , or b o t h, i nt erpret ed M s. C um m i ngs’ s earl i er s t at em ent s as s uggest i ng 2

a re si d en t i al sche d ule o f alt ern ati ng si x-m o nth i nterv als. T ha t c o nfusi o n w as clea red u p in co un sel’ s n ex t q ue st i o n, “I t hi nk I und ers t and what s he was s ayi ng was t hat y o u wo ul d have a w e e k , a n d th a t sh e w o ul d have a week, l i ke we’ re d o i ng now , excep t t hat on eve ry W ed nesday i f i t was y o ur week, s he wo ul d have t hat W ed nesday ni ght , and i f i t were h er w ee k , y ou w ou l d h av e a W edn es day n i g h t

. ” T h at i s h ow we i n t er pr et t h e mot h er ’ s e ar l i er t es t i mon y a l s o. -7- When Mr. Cummi ng s was aske d what he thoug ht about a six -month sh a rin g a r r an g e me n t, s uch

2 as the one order ed by

the t rial court, he st ated, “But six months? I would think that would be too long of a period.” When a g ain asked about that proposal by the trial court, the fathe r obviously strug g led with the question of which would be better f or the child. He conc luded that the sche dule he pr oposed, with him having c ontinuous residential place ment and the mother having visitation, would be best.

Ms. Cumm ings e x presse d her obje ction to Mr. Cummi ng s’s proposal that he h av e primary residential c ustody

as being her c oncern that he would not spend time with the child.

I thi nk e ve ry tim e - - the la st tw o w e e ks that Ch ri s h a s h a d w ith Gr e y , w he n I c a lle d to chec k on him, Chris i s alway s at work. He doesn’t make Gre y his priority

and he do e sn ’t sp e ndtim e wi th h im. An d s o, to m e , th e iss ue is sp e nd ing a ll o f h is t ime wi th Chris’ s p are nts

. Whe n Chris wa nts him , he ne e ds to sp e ndtim e wi th h im. I ’m a fr a id that he wo n’ t do that.

Mr . Cu mmi ng s te sti fi e d th a t th e reas on he sh ou ld h a ve prima ry c us tod y wa s th a t Ms

. Cummi ng s had had an aff

air a nd lied to him about it. This caused him to question her de cision making
a n d w h e t h e r

h e c o u l d r e l y o n h e r

t o tru t h f u l l y r e p o r tt o h i mab o u tG r e y.
A. R ESI D ENTIAL S C HED U LE
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-6-4 0 4 require s every final custody

order to incorporate a perma nent par enting plan for any minor children the subject of a divorce, l eg al sepa ration, annulment or sepa rate maintenanc e ac tion. A pare nting plan is de fined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402( 3) as “a written plan for the pare nting and best interests of the child, including the allocation o f parenting responsibilities and the establishment of a residential schedule , as well as an awa rd of child support consistent with titl e 36, cha pter 5.” Ac co rd i n g t o Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-404(a ), a pe rmane nt pa re nti ng plan s ha ll: (1) Provide f

or the c hild’s chang ing needs as the child g rows and matures, in a w ay that minimi zes the need f

or further modifications to t he permanent par enting plan; (2) Establish the authority and re sponsibili ties of ea ch par ent with respe ct t o the child,
c on sis te nt w iththe c ri te ri a in this pa rt ; (3 ) M ini mize the c hil d’ s e xpos ur e to h arm fu l pa re nta l c on fl ic t; (4) Provide f

or a pr ocess f

or dispute re solution, before c ourt ac tion, unless preclude d or limited by

§ 36-6-406; . . . (5) Allocate dec ision-making a uthority to one (1) or bot h parties reg arding the child’s education, he alth car e, extracur ricular activities, and re ligious upbring ing. T he partiesT he p ri m ary res i d ent i al pa rent i s d ef i ned as “t he p arent wi t h w ho m t he chi l d res i d es mo re t han f i f t y pe rcent 3 (50 % ) of t he t i m e. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 4

- 4 0 2 (4).

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -4 0 6 instr u c ts a c o u rt to lim it t h e r e s id e n tial tim e fo r a p a re n t t h a t ha s e n g a g e d in 4

cer t ai n s peci f

i ed conduct or exh i bi t s ce r t ai n t r ai t s , i ncl udi ng , but not l i mi t ed t o: (1) wi l l f ul aban do nment ; ( 2) phy s i cal
or s exu al ab us e; (3) emo t i onal ab us e; (4) neg l ect o r nonperf ormanc e o f

p ar ent al d ut i es ; or ( 5) a n e mo t i onal or phy s i cal i m p ai rme nt whi ch i nt erf eres wi t h pa rent al res p o nsi b i l i t i es. N ei t her part y herei n argues t hat the t ri al co urt s ho ul d have
u til iz e d T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -4 0 6 to li m it re sid e n tial tim e w ith e ithe r p a re n t.

-8- ma y inc or po rate a n a g re e me nt r e la te d to thec are a ndg rowth of thec hil d inthe se sp e c if ie d a re a s, or in o the r a re a s, int o th e ir

plan, c on sis te nt w ith the c ri te ri a in this pa rt

. Reg ardle ss of the allocation of decision making in the parenting plan, the par ties may
a g re e that e ith e r pa

re nt may make e me rg e nc y

de c isi on s a ff

e c tin g the he a lth or

sa fe ty of the c hil d; (6) Provide that eac h pare nt may make the day -to-day

decisions re g arding the ca re of the c hil d w hil e the c hil d is re sid ing wi th t hat pa re nt; (7) Provide that when mutual dec ision making is desig nated but cannot be ac hieved, the pa rt ie s sh a ll make a

g oo d f a ith e ff ort to re so lve the iss ue thr ou g h th e app ro pria te dispute resolution proce ss, subject to the exception se t f orth in subdivision (a) (4)( F) ;

. . . . The c ourt is to d et er m i n e are s i d en t i al s ch ed u l e, wh i ch d es i gn at es t h e p ri m ar y re s i d en t i al pare nt and desig nates in which pa rent’s home t h e ch i ld will reside on g iven day s during the y ear . A
re sid e nti a l sc he du le is d e fi ne d a s:

. . . the sc he du le of wh e n the c hil d is in e a c h pa re nt’ s ph y sic a l c are , a nd it sh a ll de sig nate the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt; in a dd iti on , th e re sid e nti a l sc hed ule s ha ll 3 desig nate in which pa

rent’s home eac h minor child shall reside on given day s of the y ear , including pr ovisions for holiday s, birthday s of fa m i l ymembers, va cations, and other spec ial occa sions, consistent with the criteria of this part. . . .

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 2( 5)

. Whe n fa sh ion ing the re sid e nti a l sc he du le , th e c ou rt is i ns truc te d to take into ac count the fa ctors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-404(b) :

. . . th e c o u r t s h a ll ma

k e r e s id e n ti a l p r o v is io n s f o r e a c h c h il d , c o n s is te n t w ith the child’s deve lop m en t al l ev el an d t h e f am i l y ’s s o ci al an d ec o n o m i c c i rc u m s tance s, which
encour ag e ea ch par ent to maintain a loving , stable, and nurturing relationship wit h the child. The c hild’s resident i al s ch ed u le shall be c onsistent with thi s part. I f the limit ations of § 36-6-406 a re not dispositive of the child’ s re s i d ential sche dule, the 4
c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s:-9-

(1) The pare nt’s ability to instruct, inspire, and enc ourag e the c hild to prepare for a life of se rv ic e , a ndto c omp e te su c c e ssf ull y in the so c ie ty

wh ic h th e c hil d f

a c e s a s a n a du lt; (2) The relative streng th, nature, and stabilityof the c hild’s relati o n ship with each pare nt, including whe ther a pare nt has taken g reater re sponsibili ty for pe rforming pare nting r esponsibiliti es re lating to the daily needs of the child; (3 ) T he wi lli ng ne ss andabil ity of e a c h o f the pa

re nts to fa c ili ta te a nd e nc ou ra g e a c los e a ndc on tin uin g pa

re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e c hil d a nd the oth e r p are nt, consistent with the best interests of the child; (4) Wi l lful ref

usal to attend a c ourt-orde red pa rent e ducation seminar

may be
c on sid e re d b y

the co urt as evid e nc e of that pa re nt’ s la c k o f g oo d f

a ith in the se pr oc e e din g s; (5) The dispositi on of ea ch par ent to provide the c hild with food, clothi ng , medical
car e, educ ation, and other nece ssary

car e; (6) The deg ree to which a pare nt has been the primary car eg iver, de fined a s the pare nt wh o h a s ta

ke n th e g re a te r r e sp on sib ili ty fo r p e rf ormin g pa

re nta l r e sp on sib ili tie s; (7) The love, af

fec tion, and emotional ties exi sting be tween e ach pare nt and the child; (8) The emotional needs and developmenta l level of the c hild; (9) The char acte r and phy sical and emotional fitness of eac h pare nt a s it relates to ea ch pare nt’s ability

to pare nt or the we lfare of the c hild; (10) The chi l d ’s i ntera ction and interr elationships with sibl ings and with significant a du lts , a s w e ll a s t he c hil d’ s in vo lve me nt w ith the c hil d’ s p hy sic a l su rr ou nd ing s, sc ho ol, or oth e r s ig nif

ic a nt a c tiv iti e s; (11) The importance of continuity in the child’s life a nd the leng th of time the child has liv e d ina sta ble , s a tis fa c tory

e nv ir on me nt; (12) Evidence of phy sical or emotional abuse to the child, to the ot her parent or to any other pe rson; (13) The char acte r and be havior of any other pers o n who resides in or fre quents the home of a pare nt and such pe rson’s intera ctions with the child; (14) The rea sonable pre fer ence of the c hild if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or olde r. The court may hear the pre fer ence of a y oung er child upon reque st. The pre fer ence of older children should norma lly

be g iven g reater we ight than those of y oung er c hildren. (15) Ea ch par ent’s employ ment schedule , and the c ourt may make a ccommodations consistent with those schedules; a nd (16) Any other fa ctors dee med re levant by the court.
These f actor s incorporate those set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106, the statute which g uided courts in custody

determinat i ons prior to the par enting plan leg islation. That statute has not been r epea led. The primary conce rn in determinations of a child’s re sidential place ment rema ins the be st i nte re sts of the c hil d, a nd c on sid e ratio n of the fa c tor s u nd e r T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4( b) sti ll
nece ssitates a compa

rative f itness analy sis.A s the tri al c o urt in this c ase c o rrec t l y o b serv ed , d ec i si o ns as t o c usto d y are n o t t o b e m ad e fo r t he p urp o se 5

o f rewarding o r puni shi ng pa rent s fo r past b e h a v io r. Turner v. Turner , 91 9 S.W

. 2 d 34 0 , 34 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 5 ); B a rn h ill v . B a rn h ill , 82 6 S.W

. 2 d 44 3 , 45 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 1 ). T hus, t he f aul t a pa rent be ars fo r t he b reakup of t he
m a rr ia g e is no t re le v a n t f o r th e p u rp o se s o f a c u sto d y d e te rm ina tio n , e x c e p t in so far a s tha t p a re n t’s c o n d u c t b e a rs o n his
o r h e r fit n e ss fo r p a re n ta l re sp o n sib ili ties. See Mi mms v
. Mi mms , 780 S. W

. 2d 739, 745 ( T en n
. Ct

. App. 1989)

. As for any q uest i o ns o f

c haract er and it s effect s o n p arent al fi t ness that a rose fr o m t he m o t her’ s ad ul t ery , and her s ub sequent f ai l u r e t o t es t i f

y t r u t h f u l l y a bou t i t , t h e t r i al cou r t obs er v ed t h at “ t h er e i s n o di r ec t e v i den ce t h at h er i mmor al be h av i or has adve r s el y i mp act ed t he i nf ant ch i l d. ” T he ev i dence d oes not p r epondera t e agai ns t t hat f i ndi ng
. W hi l e t es t i mo ny was el i ci t ed i n a n a t t emp t t o ques t i on M r
. Cum mi ng s ’ char act er on ar gu abl y s i mi l ar conduc t before hi s mar r i age , t her e wa s abs ol u t el y n o c on n ec t i on ma de t o a n y e f fec t on t h e ch i l d.
-10- I n this case, the trial court c onsidered the relative fitness of the pa rties for pa

renta l responsibilities in lig ht of the fa ctors listed above

. The c ourt found that the mother had take n g reater 5 responsibilityfor c aring for the child and there were stronge r emoti onal ties betwe en the c hild and the mother. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404( b)(2) and (7) . On the other hand, the court also found that the fathe r h a d a

str on g e r w ill ing ne ss tha n th e mothe r t o f a c ili ta te a nde nc ou rag e the pa re nt- c hil d relationship between the c hild and the other pa rent. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(b)( 3).

The c ourt conc luded that some fa ctors favor ed the mother and some favor ed the father, but that neither pa rent wa s clea

rly more fit for

primary residential plac ement. The court’s f inal determination to e sta bli sh the six mo nth a lte rn a tin g sc he du le app e ars to b e ba se d o n tw o c on c lus ion s. F ir st, be c aus e of the c hil d’ s y ou ng a g e , “Su c h a short amo un t of tim e ha s p a sse d w hil e the pa rt ie s h a ve be e n p are nts and this g ives the Court littl e conf idence that the evidenc e re soundingly ref lects and pr edicts which pare nt should be the primary residential pa

rent. .

. .” Second, the court c oncluded that joint pare nting obligations and authority would not work and would lead to further litigation. “What is clear is that the par ents are abjec tly

incompatible and a

re not a ble to pare nt jointl y .”

Just a s the tr ia l c ou rt re vie we d the statut ory fa c tor s, the pa re nts ha ve e a c h fo cus ed o n t hose fac tors, arg ued how e ach of them p re v ai l s o n specific fac tors, and asse rted that, c umulatively , the
we ig ht o f the fa c tor s f

a vo rs him or he r a s th e prima

ry re sid e nti a l par e nt. With re g ard to tho se fa c tor s, the evidenc e cle arly

established that the mother was Gr ey ’s primary

car eg iver a nd was
overw helmingly

responsible for

the daily needs of the ch i l d u p u n t i l the trial court established the alternating we ek custody

schedule , which was in place for two months befor e the final hearing. T enn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(2) a nd (6). In addition, the fa ctor of c ontinuity , Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6- 404(11), would ha ve we ighe d in favor of placing primary residential car e with the mother, had the tria l
c ou rt ’s pe nd

e nte lit e ruling not chang ed the e quation. There is als o a b as i s fo r the trial c ourt’s conclusion that the mo t h er ’s conduct during the pendenc y of the c ase, a lthough not evide ncing an attempt to obstruct the father-c hild relationship, indicated less cooper ation with the fathe r as to issues reg arding the child. Althoug h at trial Ms. Cummings still had some rese rvations about Mr. Cummi ng s’ par enting skills and tim e commit ment to his child, she testified that she be lieved he ha s the po te nti a l to be a

g oo d p are nt ande xpre sse d a wi lli ng ne ss t o tr y a pl an th a t w ou ld m or e c los e ly
e qu a lize he r c us tod ia l ti me wi th h is.P ur s uan t t o T enn
. R. Ap p. P

. 36, t hi s cour t may gr ant t he part i es t he r el i ef t o w hi ch t hey ar e e nt i t l ed an d m ay 6

e n te r a n y o rd e r o r ju d g m e n t n e c e ssa ry to p ro v id e tha t re lief. The R eal t y Sho p, Inc. v. R

. R

. W es t m i nst er H ol di ng , Inc. , 7 S .W .3d 5 8 1 , 6 0 8 (T en n. C t . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ). In the i r d i scre t i o n, ap p ell ate c o urts m ay en t er ju d gm en t s wh en t he y reve rse
a tria l c o u rt’s ju d g m e n t a n d m a y a lso re m a n d c a se s w h e n issu e s a re left to b e d e c id e d

. F i r s t Tenn. B an k Na t ’ l A s s ’ n v. H ur d Loc k & M

f g. Co. , 8 1 6 S .W .2 d 3 8 , 4 0 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 1 ).
-11- Ba sed on t he record before us, we c annot conc lude that the evide nce pr eponder ates a g ainst the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionthat th e pa re nts are e qu a lly

fi t. T hat f

ind ing , h owe ver, do es no t ne c e ssa ri ly le a d to the c on c lus ion that th e pa re nti ng plan f

a sh ion e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

is i n th is c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts

. Reg ardle ss of the par ents’ intere st in a custody arr ang ement, the ove rriding responsibility of the court is to approve or

order a par enting plan that promot es t he best intere st and welfa re of the particular child, consistent with the child’s developmenta l level, which promotes a stable relationship with eac h pare nt, and that maintains a c hild’s emotional health and stability

. The c hild who is the subject of this custody dispute was one y ear

old at the t i m e of the trial court’s f inal order here in. Be ca u s e o f t his y oung ag e, the c hild’s developmental leve l is a very important consideration in fashioning a pare nting a

rra ng ement. I n its e arly y ear s, a child’s need f or sta bil ity a ndc on tin uity

is e ve n g re a te r tha n ina n old e r c hil d. Th e e xtre me ly y ou ng c hil d’ s a

bil ity to understand the chang es in its environment and sepa ration fr om a pr i m ar ycar eg iver is limited. The ph a se s o f e arl y

c hil dh oo d d e vel op men t, th e abil ity to f orm st ro ng bo nd s, a ndthe abil ity to t ole rate separ ation from those with w hom the child has bonded are all centr al to the y oung child’s emotional health and w elfa

re. The arr ang ement orde red by the trial court, wher eby this very y oung child resides prima ri ly wi th o ne pa

re nt f or six mo nth s a t a

tim e a nd the n is f

or c e d to un de rg o a

su dd e n a nddr a sti c chang e in that ar

rang ement, does not reflec t appropriate emphasis of the se fa ctors. Ne ither par ent sug g ested such an arr ang ement. When aske d about i t at t rial, both expressed conc erns ba sed upon the child’s ag e and the leng th of time during whi ch one pare nt has only limit ed visitation. W e cannot conclude that the ar

rang ement orde red by

the trial court is in t he child’s be st interest. That holding , howeve r, pre sents this court with a difficult dilemma: whethe r to rema nd for a new pa renting plan or to modify the trial court’s p l an
. After car eful c onsideration, we think the 6 pa re nts sh ou ld h a ve the op po rtun ity to r e a c h a g re e me nt o n a ne w p are nti ng plan b a se d o n th e ir experience s and those of the child in the time since the trial c ourt’s final or der. We unde rstand the tria l court’s be lief that these pa rties could not coope rate in joint decision-making

. Howeve r, we are hopeful that the passag e of time ha s lessened the bitterness of the failed mar riag e and ha s allowed these parties to gr ow as pa

rents whose main conce rn is the welf are of their c hild. I f the pa rents ar e able to rea ch such an a g ree ment, they

s h o u l d s eek approva l of the trial court. I f they are not, they

should ask the court to impose a pare nting plan afte r consideration of eac h pare nt’s proposed plan a n d t h e c u rr ent circ umstances.

I n the interim, howe v er , we d ec l ine to leave the trial court’s plan in place as is. Be cause we have not r ever sed the trial c ourt’s dec ision that the p ar en t s are equally fit, we will not modify

the
awa rd of equal residential time to eac h pare nt. Howeve r, we think the child’s best interest would be
se rv e d, a t th is p oin t, by a re ins ta te me nt o f the arr a ng e me nt e sta bli sh e d inthe tr ia l c ou rt ’s pe nd e nte lit e order that the parties were following prior to the court’s fi n al o rd er, with the amendment sug g ested-12-

by the mothe r. Th a t is, the pa rt ie s sha ll ha ve re sid e nti a l cus tod y of the c hil d on an a lte rn a tin g we e kly basis, and the par e n t w h o d o e s n o t h a v e th e c h il d in a p ar ti c u la r w e e k s h a ll b e e n ti tl e d to o v e r n ig ht
cu s t o d y o n W ed n es d ayev en i n g, fr o m6 : 0 0 p
. m
. u n t i l 9 : 0 0 a. m
. T h u rs d aym o rn i n g.
I n sum, we va cate the trial court’s pare nting plan and reinstate the pe nd e nte lit e arr a ng e me nt, as modified. We re mand this case to the t rial court for a fre sh determination of a perma nent par enting plan that will further

the best intere st of the child, in acc ordanc e with the cur rent c ircumstance s of the child and of the parti es
. As wi t h any perma nent par enting plan dec ision, the parties shall have the opportunity

to propose plans a nd to attempt to ag ree on a plan.

Th is re ma nd is al so ne c e ssi ta te d by ou r re so lut ion of oth e r iss ue s, a nd tho se iss ue s shou ld a lso b e addr essed in the de velopment of the ne w permanent par enting plan. It does not appea r that an
a c tua l pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan h a s b e e n f ile d. Suc h a

plan sh ou ld be fi le d, a nd the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld direc t the parties to subm it a permanent parenting plan t hat m eets the require ments of Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-6-404, is consistent with this opinion, a nd ref lects any further decisions made by the trial court a f t e r r e m a n d

. T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 3 6

- 6

- 40 4; Ho pkins v. Hopk ins , No. M2002-02233-SC-R11-CV, 20 04 WL 21 51 20 0 ( Te nn . Se pt. 27 , 2 00 4) . F urthe r, a s d isc us se d mo re fu lly be low , t he pl an must d e s i g n a t e o n e p ar e n ta s t h e p r i m ar y r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n t , e v e n w h e r e r e s i d e n t i a l t i m e i s s p l i te v e n l y. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 2( 5) ; Hopkins , 2004 WL 2151200, at *3.

B. A LL O C A TIO N O F D E CI S I ON -M AKI NG
As set out earlier, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404 ( a)( 5) re quires that a pe rmane nt pare nting plan:

Allocate de cision-making authority to one (1) or

both parties reg arding the child’s education, health car e, extracur ricular activities, and re ligious upbring ing. T he parties
ma y inc or po rate a n a g re e me nt r e la te d to thec are a ndg ro wth o f the c hil d inthe se sp e c if ie d a re a s, or in o the r a re a s, int o th e ir

plan, c on sis te nt w ith the c ri te ri a in this pa rt

. Reg ardle ss of the allocation of decision making in the parenting plan, the par ties may
a g re e that eith e r pare nt ma y make e me rg e nc y de c isi on s af fe c tin g the he a lth or

sa fe ty of the c hil d;

I n the case before us, the trial court’s f inal order included the f

ollowing pr ovisions in reg ard t o d ec i s i o n -m ak i n g:
Eac h pare nt shall make day -to-day decisions reg arding the ca re of the child while the child is resid ing w ith that parent. Ea ch par ent may make e merg ency

decisions af

fec ting the hea lth or safe ty

of the c hild. W hen Plaintiff is the primary residential parent, he shall have d ecision-making authority reg arding the child’s educ ation, health ca re, extracurricular a ctivities and relig ious upbringing . W h en Defendant is the primary residential pa

rent, she sha ll have dec ision-making a uthority reg arding the child’s education, health car e, extracur ricular activities and re ligious upbring ing and Plaintiff shall have de cision making authority reg arding the child’s education, the Court f inding-13-

that Plaintiff is financially better disposed to provide the c hild with education than Def endant. See T.C.A. 36-6-404( b)(5)

. The trial c ourt’s allocation of decision-making authority with reg ard to e ducation, hea lth care , activities, and relig ious upbringing divides that authority temporally

. This a rra ng ement leads to the possibili ty that the child could have two pediatric ians, two sets of ot her health ca re pr oviders, and two differ ent child ca

re, nursery school, or pre -school plac ements. He may be allowe d to participate in a pa rt ic ula r s po rt or a c tiv ity wh ile in o ne pa

re nt’ s r e sid e nti a l c us tod y , a ndthe n h a ve to s top be c aus e his residential plac ement chang ed. T h i s s i t u ati on does not promote continuity ; nor does it ease the dif fi c ulty a y ou ng c hil d w ill e xpe ri e nc e in m akin g su c h d ra sti c c ha ng e s.
The Ge nera l Assembly

has stated its inten t reg arding the par enting plan leg islation. Of pa rt ic ula r p e rt ine nc e he re , T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 1( a ) p ro vid e s in pa rt :
Parents have the re sponsibili ty to make deci sions and perf orm other pa

renta l duties
nece ssary for the c are and g rowth of their minor children. In any

proce eding betwee n pare nts under this chapte r, the best interests of the child shall be the standa rd by which the court determines a nd allocate s the parties’ pare ntal responsibilities. . . . The g ener al
a sse mbl y fi nd s th e ne e d f

or sta bil ity a ndc on sis te nc y

in c hil dr e n’ s li ve s.
The de cision-making allocation orde red by the trial cour t d o es not promote consistency and is not in t he child’s be st interests. Our reinstatement of the alternating wee k schedule for r esidential p l a c e m e n te x a c e r

b a t e s t h e p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t i n t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d i v i s i o n o f d e c i s i o n
- m ak i n g a u t h o r i t y. We vacate the trial c ourt’s allocation of decision making on issues such as e ducation, extracur ricular activities, hea lth care , etc. Unless and until a new perma nent par enting plan is ag ree d to by the parties and appr oved by

the cour t, or alternatively

order ed by

the court if no ag ree ment is reac hed, the pa rties shall have joint decision-making authority in these area s. I f t he parties cannot a g ree , they shall attempt to r e so lve the iss ue in ac c or da nc e wi th Te nn . Code An n. § 36- 6- 40 4( a )( 7)

. Sin c e the fi na l ord e r i n th is
case , the parties have ha d time to ex perie nce pa renting and to r ecog nize the be nefits to their child of the ir c oo pe ratio n inwo rking tow ardhis be st int e re sts

. Ho pe fu lly , th e ir fu tur e a c tio ns wi ll r e fl e c t th is
rec og nition.

Ms. Cum min g s h a s a lso c ha lle ng e d the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a wa rdof fu ll d e c isi on -m akin g auth ority reg arding the child’s educ ation to Mr

. Cummi ng s. This part of the or der r efe rs to actua l school, not pre- school ca

re and activities which a

re c overe d by

the gene ral statement discussed above . The trial
c ou rt ’s statut ory

re fe re nc e is t o o ne of

the fa c tor s in the pa

re nti ng plan st atu te wh ic h th e c ou rt is direc ted to consider w hen fa shioning or a pproving a re s i d en t i al schedule : “The disposition of eac h pare nt to provide the child with food, clothing , medical c are , education and other ne cessa ry car e.”

T h e w o r d d i s p o s i t i o n , w i t h r e s p e c t t o a m e n t a l s t a t e , m e a n s “ a n a t t i t u d e , p r e v a i l i n g t e n d e n c y, o r in c li nation.” B LACK ’ S LAW D I CT I O N A RY (6 th e d. , 1 99 0) . T he pr oo f d oe s n ot s ho w that Ms

. Cumm in g s is a n y le s s d is p o s e d o r in c li n e d to f u r n is h h e r c h il d w ith a g o o d e d u c a ti o n than is Mr. Cummi ng s. I n her own life, she has shown far more of an inclination towards educ ational ende avors-14-

than h e ha s. She e arn e d a ba c he lor ’s de g re e in fo ur y e ars , taug ht fo r se ve ra l y e ars a t Watkin s, a ndis
no w p ur su ing a ma ste r’ s de g re e
. F or his pa rt , M r. Cum min g s a lso e arn e d a ba c he lor ’s de g re e , b ut i t too k him e le ve n y e ars to do so
. Th e pr oo f sh ow s that Mr

. Cum min g s is inc lined t o p ayto sen d his child to a particular school, not that he is any better disposed to provide the child with an educ ation.

Th e te sti mon y

of the pa rt ie s sh ow s a dif

fe re nc e of op ini on be tw e e n the pa rt ie s a s to the be st school for G rey

to attend when he comes of ag e. Mr. Cummi ng s wants Gre y to g o to David Lipscomb,
a private sc ho ol w he rehe him se lf wa s e du c a te d. Ms. Cum min g s d oe s n ot w a nt Grey to g o to L ips c omb , b ut t o a

pu bli c sc ho ol o r t o a

dif fe re nt p ri vate sc ho ol.

Mr . Cu mmi ng s e xpre sse d a wi lli ng ne ss t o p a y

fo r G re y ’s tui tio n at Lips c omb , a ndis c ur re ntl y in a be tte r f inanc ia l po sit ionthan h is f orme r w if e . The se c ir c ums ta nc e s furnis he d th e fa c tua l pr e mis e fo r the tr ia l ju dg e ’s fi nd ing that “ Pla int if f i s f inanc ia lly bet ter di sp os e d to pr ov ide the c hil d w ith education than Defe ndant.” How ever , financ ial ability is n o t t h e same as disposition, and decisionmakin g auth ority

do e s n ot d e pe ndon the re la tiv e we a lth of the pa re nts

. M s
. C u m m i n gs cit es the c ase of Smith v. Smith, 220 S.W .2d 227, 629 (Tenn.1949) for the p ro p o s ition that in m atters of custody , including que stions of which pare nt is to ex erc ise dec isionm ak i n g au t h o r i t y o v e r

d i f f e r e n ta s p e c t s o f

t h e c h i l d ’ s l i f

e , t h e p ar a m o u n tc o n s i d e r a t i o n m u s tb e a l w a ys the child’s best interest, rathe r than which pare nt is more financ ially capa ble. Sm ith d o es not specific ally

in v o l ve educ ational dec ision-making, but we ag ree that money should not be the de te rm ini ng fa c tor

in a llo c a tin g pa

re nta l r e sp on sib ili tie s.
The de cision of wher e and how a child should be educated is g ener ally left to the par ents, and courts ar e re luctant to interfe re in issues so fundame ntal to the rig ht to rea r a child. Howeve r, whe re pa re nts div or c e a nd are un able to ag re e on the be st sc ho ol fo r the ir c hil d, c ou rt s may ha ve to b e c ome involved. I n essenc e, that is what the tria l court d id here : choose a school. When making such a decision, howe ver, c ourts must avoid eng ag ing in pr esumptions unsupported by proof in the rec ord. The de cision must be made base d on the best i ntere sts of individual child whose education is at iss ue.
Th e re is n o pr oo f that a tte nd a nc e a t a ny pa rt ic ula r s c ho ol, or

e ve n a ny pa rt ic ula r t ype of sc ho ol, will serve Gr ey ’s best i ntere sts to a gre ater extent that any other school, and it does not seem likely that
a ny su c h p ro of

c a n b e pr od uc e d at su c h a n e arl y po int in thi s c hil d’ s lif

e
. Whil e we re c og nize that it is the g oa l of

the pa re nti ng plan le g isl a tio n to wo rk ou t a s many

de ta ils a s p os sib le in o rd e r t o a vo id future c onflicts, in view of the f acts of this ca se, involving a one-y ear -old child, we c annot ag ree that the child’s best intere sts are se rved by the allocation of sole decision-making a u thority reg arding education to the father at this poi nt. Many things can chang e in these parties’ li ves before G rey rea ches
sc ho ol a g e . M or e imp orta ntl y , G re y hi ms elf will h a ve g ro wn a ndde ve lop e d; h is s kil ls, apti tud e s, interests, emotional health, social proclivities, and his nee ds in an educ ational environme nt will be
mor e ide nti fi able . H is b e st i nte re sts ma y the n b e be tte r de te rm ine d, ho pe fu lly by his pa re nts ; if no t, by the c ou rt

.In G r ay , t he C o urt al so hel d t hat i t i s i m p rop er t o co m p are i nco m es of bo t h p arent s und er t he G ui d el i nes. T he 7
t r i al cour t ha d cons i dere d each par ent ’ s i ncome, cal cul at ed t he amo un t eac h woul d be re qui r ed t o pay for t wo chi l dren
un der t he G ui del i nes , det er mi ned t hat t he f at her ’ s mo nt hl y obl i gat i on ex cee ded t he mo t her ’ s b y $ 73 7 per mo nt h, devi at ed down wa r d f

r om t h at a mou n t ba s ed on t h e f ac t t h e f at h er w as t h e r es i den t i al pa r en t for g r ea t er t h an t h e s t an dar d v i s i t at i on
s et out i n t he G ui del i nes , and s et t he f at her ’ s s uppo r t ob l i gat i on at $60 0 per mont h, al t houg h t he f at her was des i gn at ed as t he p ri m ary res i d ent i al pa rent

. 78 S.W

. 3 d at 88 2

. T he Sup rem e C o urt al so hel d t hat t he aut ho ri t y t o de vi at e f rom t he G ui del i nes amount d o es no t i ncl ude t he aut hor i t y t o re
- al i gn t he ob l i gor an d ob l i gee
. “ [ T ] he i ncome of t he ob l i gee shoul d not b e co nsi d ered in t he cal cul at i o n of o r as a reas o n fo r devi at i o n f rom t he gui d el i nes i n de t erm i ni ng t he supp o rt
awar d amo un t

. ” G r ay , 78 S.W

. 3 d at 88 4 , quo t i ng T enn. C o m p
. R

. & R egs. 12 4 0

- 2

- 4

- . 0 3 (2).
-15- We reve rse the trial court’s a war d o f s o l e decision-making authority reg arding the child’s
e du c a tio n to the fa

the r a nddir e c t th a t th e ne w p e rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan a ssi g n th a t r e sp on sib ili ty to the pa re nts joi ntl y , u nle ss the pa re nts su bmi t an a g re e d p are nti ng plan p ro vid ing oth e rw ise that is approve d by

the court. Ag ain, the plan should provide f or re solution of any

future disa g ree ment over this iss ue in ac cordance w ith Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(a) (7).
C. C HI L D S UP P ORT
I n its final order, the trial c ourt established the c hild support obligations of the pa rents base d up on e a c h pa

re nt’ s te nu re a s the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt ande a c h p are nt’ s in c ome us ing the Chi ld S u p p o rt Gu i d el i n es
. Du ri n g t h e t i m e M s
. C u m m i n gs i s t h e p ri m ar y re s i d en t i al p ar en t , M r. C u m m i n gs is t o p a y he r $ 11 00 pe r m on th. Du ri ng the tim e Mr. Cum min g s is the re sid e nti a l pa re nt, Ms. Cummi ng s is to pay

him $489 per month.

Both p arties challeng e the tria l court’s c hild support awar d, essentially asserting that the amount of support was based upon an incorrec t determination of the income of e ach pa rent. How ever , a re cent de cision by

the Tenne ssee Supre me Court, decide d afte r the e ntry of the tri al co u rt ’s order he re in, c a lls the a wa

rdint o q ue sti on on oth e r g ro un ds

. I n Hopkins , 20 04 W L 21 51 20 0, the Cou rt de te rm ine d th a t, e ve n w he re re sid e nti a l ti me is divided equally

betwee n the par ents, the court m u s t d esig nate one of the pa rents as the primary
r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t. “ T e n n e s s e e ’ s s tatu te s r e q u ir e b o tha r e s id e n ti a l s c h edule, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404( b) (2001) , and the de signation of a primary residential pa

rent, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6- 402(5).” Id . at *3

. Whil e a ff ir min g the int e rm e diate app e llate c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e pa re nts should equally

share residential time, the Court vac at ed t he lower court’s a war d of child support be caus e th e cou rt

ha d f a ile d to de sig nate a

prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, a ndthe e lig ibi lit y

fo r c hil d support is based on such a desig nation.

The Court re lied on its previous holding in Gray v . Gray , 78 S.W .3d 881, 884 (Tenn. 2002) that child support cannot be awa rded to the pare nt w ho is not the primary residential pare nt. The court a lso re je c te d th e fathe r’ s a

rg ume nts that wh e re re sid e nti a l pl a c e me nt i s e ve nly div ide d, e ith e r ( 1) bo th pa re nts ’ i nc ome s sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d, or (2 ) n e ith e r p are nt s ho uldbe ob lig a te d to pay su pp ort. 7A g a in w e p o int o u t at the ti m e o f i ts fi n a l o rd e r, the c o u rt d id no t ha v e the b e n e fit o f t h e S u p re m e C o u rt’s 8 ho l d i ng and anal y si s i n H opki ns
.

A s the C o urt noted i n H opki ns , t he gu i del i nes cons i der t he act ual phy s i cal cu s t od y , r ega r dl es s of t he l abel 9

a ssig n e d to the c u sto d y a rr a n g e m e n t. -16- I n the c ase be fore us, the trial court made an a lternating desig nation of ea ch par ent as the primary resid e n ti a l p ar e n t f o r s ix m o n th s a t a

ti me
. Wh il e th a t d e s ig n a ti o n a c c u r a te ly r e f le c te d the actua l situation arising fr om the court’s r esidential schedule , we conclude that the Supreme Court’s h o l d i n gs and analy sis in Gray and Hopkins prec lude the desig nation of both pare nts as the primary residential pa

rent, e ven on an a lternati n g b as is. As the Court pointed out, the desig nation has conseque nces w ith reg ard to other state and f

eder al statutes that require desig nation of one pa rent a s the primary

custodian. Hopkins , 20 04 WL 21 51 20 0, a t *3 n. 3; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-410. We think the Supreme Court has interpre ted the Child S u pport Guidelines and the pare nting plan leg islation as requiring the desig natio n of only one par ent as the primary residential pa

rent a nd as prohibiting the de signation of both parents a s such. Consequently , we must vac ate the trial court’s a lternating desig nation of both pare nts as the primary residential pa

rent a nd the court’s awa

rd of c hild support based on that rotati n g status. On 8
rema nd, t h e t ri al court should desig nate e ither Ms. Cummings or Mr. Cummings a s the primary
re sid e nti a l pa

re nt andc a lc ulate the a mou nt o f s up po rt , if a ny , d ue to the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.

“ Pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt d e fi ne d a s “ the pa

re nt wi th w ho m th e c hil d r e sid e s mo re than f if ty perc ent (50%) of the time.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 402(4). In an ar rang ement whe re e ach pa rent ha s a n e xac tly

e qu a l a mou nt o f r e sid e nti a l pl a c e me nt t ime , n e ith e r p arent actua lly me e ts this definition. Howeve r, even though there may be no primary residential pa

rent in fa ct, the law r equire s 9 the desig nation of one pare nt a s the primary residential pare nt, r eg ardle ss of the statutory definition. The Supreme Court d i d n o t p ro vide g uidance in Hopkins on the fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d in desig nating one par ent as the primary residential pa

rent whe re ne ither par ent has re sidential custody of the c hil d m o re t h an 50% of the time. B y the time a trial c ourt has re ache d the conc lusion that equally share d residential time is in the chil d ’s b es t i ntere sts, it wil l have a lrea dy considere d all the statut ory c ri te ri a re le va nt to pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l cus tod y , s uc h a s c on tin uity , p are nt- c hil d atta c hme nt, ability and willingness to pr ovide for the child’s needs, e tc. Afte r considering thosefac tors, the court
w i l l h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a tt h e p ar e n t s s h o u l d s h ar e r e s i d e n t i a l t i m e e q u a l l y, i.e. , that neither pa rent sh ou ld h a ve re sid e nti a l pl a c e me nt f or mor e than 5 0% of

the tim e . Co ns e qu e ntl y , w he n th e c ou rt mus t by la w d e sig nate a

prima ry re sid e nti al pare nt af

te r h a vin g de te rm ine d th a t ne ith e r p are nt s ho uld , in fa c t, b e the prima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, the statut ory fa c tor s ha ve lit tle re le va nc e . O the rw ise , w e wo uld be re qu ir ing the c ou rt

to r e -e va luate the sa me fa c tor s.
Howeve r, the de signation of primary residential pa

rent ha s a pra ctical a nd immediate ef fec t of the child’s rig ht to support and, there fore , on the child’s best interests. There fore , when de signating a primary residential pa

rent in a situation wher e all the other rele vant fa ctors lead t o eq u al l yshare d residential time, we think the trial court should consider the fac t that only the primary

residential pa

rentW e no te tha t t h e fath e r’s P ra ye r fo r R e lief d id no t co n ta in a re q u e st fo r a n y su c h inj u n c tio n
. 10

-17- is e nti tle d to re c e ive su pp ort. “ Chi ld s up po rt pa y me nts are fo r the be ne fi t of the c hil d, a ndbo th p are nts have a duty to support their m inor children.” Hopkins , 2004 WL 2151200, at *2, citing Gallaher v. Gallaher , 104 S.W .3d 455, 461 (Tenn. 2003). One of the major g oals of the Child Support Guidelines is:

To e ns ur e that whe n pare nts liv e se pa rate ly , the e c on omi c imp a c t on the c hil d( re n) is minimi zed and to the extent that either par ent enjoy s a hig her stand ar d o f l iving, the child(re n) shar e(s) in that highe r standar d. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.02 ( 2)(e ). Consequently , when one pare nt’s income is g reater than the other’s, the child should not be disadvantag ed by

a dete rmination that deprives the child of support that would help him or her sha re in that pare nt’s economic a dvantag e. All oth er fa ctors being e qual, we think this consideration milit ates in fa vor of desig nating the pare nt with lower income, w hen the diff ere nce is e noug h to affe ct t h e c h i l d ’ s s t a n d ar d o f

l i v i n g , a s t h e p r i m ar y r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n tw h e n r e s i d e n t i a l t i m e i s s h ar e d e q u a l l y. Of c ourse, the other pare nt’s support obligation may be reduc ed beca use of the g reater than standa rd tim e he or she h a s r e sid e nti a l c us tod y of the c hil d, a ndthe c ou rt s sh ou ld m ake a c a se -b y -c a se determination of the amount of support due

. Hopkins , 2 00 4 WL 21 51 20 0, a t *3 ; Gray , 78 S.W .3d at 884; Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( 2)(b)

. Be cause it is i mportant that the child her ein not be deprived of the bene fit of support during the time it may

take f or a ne w par enting plan to the deve loped, appr oved, or or dere d, and base d upon t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n gs o n ch i l d s u p p o rt , d u ri n g t h e i n t er i m u n t i l a n ew p l an i s i n ef fe ct M s
. C u m m i n gs shall be desig nated as the prim ary residential parent. Ba sed upon the t rial court’s calc ulations of Mr. Cummi ng s’ support obligation under the Guide lines, and deviating downward f rom that amount due to the e xten de d ti me Gr e y wi ll b e in M r. Cum min g s’ ph y sic a l c us tod y , Mr

. Cum min g s sh a ll pay to M s. Cummi ng s child support in the amount of $500 per month until a new pare nting plan se tting support is entere d.

IV. T HE I NJ UNCT I ON
The trial c ourt’s final or der in cl u d es an injunction to preve nt Ms. Cum mings fr om residing outside Wi lliamson Count y “abse nt the express consent of Plaintiff [Mr. Cummi ng s] or the Court.” 10 We can f i n d n o basis in law for the trial court’ s injunction preventing an adult citizen from living wher e she may

choose.

To the e xten t th e c ou rt ba se d th e inj un c tio n o n s ome c on c e rnabo ut the mothe r r e loc a tin g wi th the child, that situat i o n i s g overne d by statute. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-6-108. See Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W. 3d20 3, 20 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Helton v. He lton , No. M2002-02792-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 63 47 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . Jan ua ry 13 , 2 00 4) (n o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) . T he statut eO ne probl em t hat t he t r i al cour t en count er ed i n di vi di ng t he propert y i n t hi s cas e wa s t hat t he wi fe’ s proposed 11 di vi s i on of

hous ehol d f

ur ni t ur e a nd f

ur ni s hi ng s s ubmi t t ed t o t he t r i al co ur t d i d not make a di s t i nct i on bet ween mar i t al p ro p e rty a n d he r se p a ra te p ro p e rty. -18- is n ot d e sig ne d to gi ve the c ou rt s the a uth ority to dic ta te wh e re div or c e d p are nts mus t li ve , b ut o nly to protect the visitation rig hts of non-custodial pare nts in situations wher e the custodial pare nt wishes to relocate to another

state or more than 100 miles from the re sidence of the non-c ustodial parent.

There is no proposed re location in the ca se bef ore us a nd n o n o t i ce that would trig g er the
c ou rt ’s inv olv e me nt i n t hat de c isi on . E ve n in tho se situatio ns inv olv ing a pr op os e d r e loc a tio n to another state, the statute doe s not bar re location, but mere ly set s out a proc edure that the custodial pare nt must follow in order to obtain the court’s permission to move with the child.

W e a c c o r d i n g l y v a c a t e t h e i n j u n c t i o n b e c a u s e i ti s b e yo n d t h e c o u r t ’ s a u t h o r i t y.
V. P ROP E RT Y I SS U ES
Ms. Cum min g s c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis tr ibu tio n o f the pa rt ie s’ pr op e rt y

on tw o g ro un ds

. F ir st, sh e arg ue s th a t th e c ou rt a wa rded pro perty

that w a s h e r s e pa

rate pr op e rt y

to M r. Cum min g s. Seco n d , s h e ar g u e s th a t th e tria l c o u r t’ s a w ar d o f ma r it a l p r o p e r ty w a s in e q u it ab le a n d that the allocation of ma

rital debt wa s inequitable.

Ms. Cumm ings is cor

rec t, of course , in asserting that separ ate pr operty is not subject to divis ion
or dis tr ibu tio n. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( a )( 1) ; Brock v . Brock , 9 41 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 96 ); Cutsinger v. Cutsi nger , 917 S.W .2d 238, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). The g ener al rules for de termining whether

property is separate or marital are found in statute. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 4- 12 1( b) (1 ) & -1 21 (b )( 2) . Pr op e rty ow ne d b y

a pa rt y be fo re marria g e is g e ne ra lly c la ssi fi e d a s se pa rate property and re mains with the orig inal owner . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b)

. On appe al, Ms. Cummi ng s asserts that the pr oof showed that prior to the m arriag e she owned household furnishing s, while Mr. Cummings owne d none. She particula rly disputes the awa

rd to Mr. 11 Cum min g s o f h a lf

the dis he s, sil ve rw are a nd c oo kw are
. On app e a l, M r. Cum min g s d oe s n ot d isp ute the ow ne rs hip of

the se ite ms andvo lun te e re d to re turn th e dis he s, sil ve rw are , a ndc oo kw are that Ms

. Cummi ng s owned prior

to the marria g e. We ag ree that they should be restore d to her.

I n a dd iti on , M s. Cum min g s ass ert s th e she ow ne d p ie c e s o f b aby fu rn itu re that are famil y heirlooms and that the pa

rties wer e using for Gre y
. Consequently , she objects to the trial court’s or der that:
All of the minor child’s furnishings, toy s and cl o t h i ng curr ently at the marital residenc e shall re main there as the prope rty of the c hild. Onl y t h at which Pl aintiff
a g re e s may

g o w ithDe fe nd a nt s ha ll g o w ith De fe nd a nt.-19-

Th e pr oo f s ho ws that f

urnis hin g s u se d f

or Gr e y inc lud e a n a nti qu e c ri b a ndc ha ng ing ta ble that belong ed to Ms. Cummi ng s’ fa milybefor e the mar riag e. Mr. Cummings stipulated on appea l that he had no obje ction to the mother re g aining possession of above items after Gre y no longe r had
ne e d o f the m. H ow e ve r, sin c e the se are the wi fe ’s se pa rate pr op e rt y , n ot the c hil d’s , th eysh ou ld ha ve be e n a wa

rd e d to he r a s h e r se pa

rate pr op e rt y , an d she is en tit le d to re g a in pos se ssi on of the se ite ms i mme diate ly

if sh e wi sh e s.
Ms. Cum min g s’ se c on d a rg ume nt r e g ard ing pr op e rt y is that the div isi on of mari ta l pr op e rt y was inequitable . She has provided a table re flec ting the trial court’s a war d of var i o u s p i ec es of property and the va luation giv en t h ose piec es by the parties. She first arg ues that the a ppare nt division i s misleading be cause the court included two piece s of prope rty that neither pa rty owned. The fir st is a 1967 Camaro which Ms. Cummings testified, without contra diction, belong ed to her pare nts. T h e s e c o n d is a n in v e s tm e n t a c c o u n t th a t s h e s tate d w a s n o t h e r s b u t w a s a n a s s e t of her de c e a se d fat her’ s estate . Wh e n th e tot a l va lue a ssi g ne d to tho se tw o it e ms b y Ms. Cum min g s is dedu ct ed , M s
. Cummi ng s values the pr operty awa rded to he r at $19,250 a nd that awa rded to Mr. Cummi ng s at $17,350.

The trial c ourt is char g ed with equitably dividing, distribut i n g, o r as signing the marital pr op e rty in “p ro po rt ion s as the c ou rt de e ms jus t.” Te nn . Code An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( a )( 1) ; J oll y v . J oll y , 130 S.W .3d 783, 785 (Tenn. 2004) . The c ourt is to consider all re levant fa ctors in its distribut ion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( c) (listi ng the fa ctors to be c onsidered) . The c ourt may consider any other fa ctors nec essary

in det er m i ning the equities betwe en the pa rties, Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-4- 12 1( c )( 11 ), e xce pt that di vis io n of mar ital p ro pe rt y is t o b e ma de wi tho ut r e g ardto m ari ta l f ault

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(a )(1)

. The c ourt’s distribut i o n o f p roperty “is not achie ved by

a mec hanica l application of the statuto ry fa ct o rs , but rather by considering and we ighing the most releva nt fac tors in light of the unique fa cts of the c ase.” Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 859 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p. 1988). An
e qu ita b l e d i s tr i b u t i o n i s n o tn e c e s s ar i l y a n e q u a l o n e , a n d a

d i v i s i o n i s n o tr e n d e r e d i n e qu itable simplybeca

use it is not precisely

equal. Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W

. 2 d 8 23, 832 (Tenn. 1996) ; Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W. 2d 22 0, 23 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; W or d v . W or d , 937 S.W .2d 931, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

B e c aus e div idi ng a mari ta l est a te is a pr oc e ss g uid e d b y c on sid e ri ng a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s, in light of the facts of a particular case , a trial c ourt has a g reat deal of discr etion conce rning the manner in which it divides marital property

. J oll y , 1 30 S.W. 3da t 78 5; Fl an ne ry v . Flan ne ry , 121 S.W .3d 64 7, 65 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Smith v . S mi th , 9 84 S.W. 2d60 6, 60 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) . A pp e llate courts ordina

rily defe r to the t rial court’s decision unl ess i t is inconsistent with the fac tors in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4- 121(c) or is not supporte d by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. J

oll y , 130 S.W .3d at 785-86.F o r all o u r ca lc u la tio n s, w e h a v e u se d the ind ivid u a l figu re s fro m the w ife’s tab le , b u t ha v e a rr ive d a t t o ta ls 12 d iff e re n t f ro m tho se us e d b y M s. C u m m ing s in h e r b rie f.
-20- Ba sed on our r eview of

the re cord, w e cannot conclude that the evidenc e pre ponderates a g a in s t th e tria l c o u r t’ s d iv is io n o r th a t th e d ivision is in c o n s is te n t w ith th e r e le v a n t f a c to r s
. We aff irm the court’ s division of marital property as equitable

. Ms. Cum min g s a lso c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a llo c a tio n of mari ta l de bt a s ine qu ita ble in light of the rele vant fa ctors: (1) w hich party incurre d the debt, (2) the purpose of the debt, (3) which party benef itted from incurring the debt, and (4) which party is be tter able to r epay the debt. Al

for d
v . A lfo rd , 12 0 S.W. 3d 81 0, 81 4 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; King v. King , 986 S.W .2d 216, 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 98 ); Mo nd

e lli v . H owa rd , 780 S.W .2d 769, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) . She arg ues that most of the debt incur

red du ri n g t h e m arriag e wa s for the be nefit of the f amily , that both parties ther efor e be ne fi tte d f

ro m it , a ndthat Mr . Cu mmi ng s is be tte r a ble to p a y the de bts

. Al l de bts inc ur

re d b y e ith e r or bo th sp ou se s du ri ng the c ou rs e of the marria g e up to the date of the fina l divorce h ea ri n g ar e marital debts. Al for d , 1 2 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t8 1 3

. L i k e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y, marital debt is subject to equitable distribution. Id . Application of the f our fac t o rs l isted above insures a fair a llocation and prote ction of one spouse from the pe rsonal excesses of the other. Id . at 814.

The trial c ourt order ed Mr. Cummings to pay the Sear s debt and o n e- h al f t h e B ank of Americ a debt, f

or a total of $6,054. I t or dere d Ms. Cumming s to pay four cre dit card de bts and the other ha lf of the B ank of A merica debt, for a total of $15,343. Ms. Cummi ng s had the c redit ca rds befor e the mar

riag e and ow ed bala nces on the m at that time of approx imately $4,563. Subtracting 12 those balanc es, Ms. Cummings was or dere d to pay $10,780 of the debt incurre d during the marriag e. Thus, out of the total debt incurr ed during the marriag e, $16,834, the husba nd was orde red to pay 36% and the wife w as assig ned 64%.

Ms. Cumm ings doe s not object to being assig ned the debt she had acc umulated bef ore the marria g e. Instead, she a

rgues that a lthough the c redit ca rds wer e in her

name, the c harg es made during the marriag e we re f or the family

. The evidenc e supports that arg ument. She also arg ues that her inc ome is much smaller than her former husband’s, and the evidenc e also supports that position. At the time of the pa

rties m et , Ms. Cumm ings w as working and Mr. Cummings wa s not. At her husband’s re quest, Ms. Cummi ng s g ave up he r employ ment afte r the birth of the ir child. When the marria g e beg an deteriorating , she beg an wor king pa rt time. Meanwhile, Mr . Cummi ng s had starte d
a bu sin e ss andwo rk e d in du striou sly to m ake it s uc c e ssf

ul. We ag ree that the debt incur red d u ri n g the marriag e should be more equitably divided. Howeve r, we do not a g ree that Mr. Cummings should be assig ned all but one a ccount, a s sugg ested by Ms. Cumm ings. We think an e qual divisio n wo u l d b e equitable under the fac ts of this case. Th e re fo re , w e mod if

y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a llo c a tio n o f m ari ta l de bt. Mr . Cu mmi ng s sh a ll b e re sp on sib le fo r the $4 ,7 54 de bt t o Se ars a nd $1 ,3 00 of the B a nk of Am e ri c a de bt, a s o rd e re d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

.T hi s f i gu r e wa s ar r i ved a t by ca l cul at i ng t he t ot al i ndebt ednes s ( $2 1, 39 7), s ubt r act i ng t he premar i t al bal anc es 13 ($4 , 5 6 3 ), s ub t ract i ng t he b al ance o n one a cco unt that the wif e d o es not request t hat t he husband ass um e ($6 0 2 ), divi d i ng t he net j oi nt debt i n h al f ( $8 , 11 6 each ) , an d s ubt r act i ng f r om t he hu s band’ s hal f t he amo un t s he was pre vi ous l y order ed to p a y. -21- I n addition , he shall pay to Ms. Cum mings $2,062 to equa liz e the de bt incurre d during the marria g e. 13

VI. A TTOR N EY ’ S FE ES
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d M s. Cum min g s to pay he r f orme r h us ba nd$1 1, 00 0 for a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, expenses, and costs as a

sanction for

her pe rjury

in the first hea

ring

. Ge n er al l y , an award of

attorney ’s fe es in divorce case s is considered a limonyor spousal
s u p p o r t , g e n e r a l l y c h ar a c t e r i z e d a s a l i m o n y in solido

. Y ount v. Y ount , 91 S.W .3d 777, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Miller v. Miller , 81 S.W.3 d 7 71 , 7 75 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; W ilder v. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d 892, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Courts are a uthorized to award “s u i t ab l e support and maintenanc e of e ither spous e b y t h e other spouse . . . ac cording to the nature of the c ase and the circ umstances of

the parties. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann § 36-5-101( a)( 1).

B e c aus e a tto rn e y ’s fe e s are c on sid e re d a lim on y or sp ou sa l su pp ort, a n a wa rd of su c h fe e s is subject to the same f

actor s that must be considere d in the awa rd of any other type of a limony

. Y ount , 91 S.W. 3da t 78 3; Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W. 2d 17 5, 18 1 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 7) . The re fo re , a ll rele vant fa ctors, including those listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(d)( 1), ar e to be c onsidered and balanc ed in a de termination of whe ther to aw ard attorney ’s fe es. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741, 751 (Tenn. 2000) ; Kin c aid v . Ki nc aid , 912 S.W .2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). See a l s o R obertson v. Robe rtson , 7 6 S. W.3 d 3 37 , 3 38 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 682-83 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1998).

Am on g the fa c tor s r e le va nt t o a n a wa rdof a lim on y , th e two con sid e re d to be the mos t important are the disadvanta g ed spouse’ s need and the obligor spouse’s ability

to pay

. Robertson , 76 S.W. 3da t 34 2; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 730 (Tenn. 2001) ; Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995) . As with othe r forms of spousal support, the need of the spouse re questing the award of attorney ’s fees i s the single most im portant fa ctor; the most important fac tors are the
rea l need of the disadvantag ed spouse, a de monstrated fina ncial inability to obtain counsel, and the ability of t he obli g or spous e to pay
. Miller , 8 1 S. W.3 d at 77 5; W ilder , 66 S.W. 3da t 89 5; W atte rs , 22 S.W. 3d

a t 82 1; Cra nfo rd , 772 S.W .2d at 50. Consequently , a spouse with ade quate pr operty and income is g ener ally

not entitled to an awa

rd of a dditional alimonyto compensate for attorney ’s fe es and expenses, depe nding on a ll releva nt fac tors. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d at 895; Koj a v . Ko ja , 42 S.W .3d 94 , 9 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Umstot v. Umstot , 9 68 S.W .2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Houghland v. Houghland , 8 44 S.W. 2d61 9, 62 3- 24 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Li n d s ey , 9 76 S.W .2d at 181. The primary focus is on whether the reque sting spouse has the ability to pay his or her ow n fee s; and, if not, whether

the other spouse has the re source s to do so.-22-

Trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is neede d and, if so, its nature, amount and dur ation. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W

. 3 d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) . An awa rd of attorne y ’s fe es as a limony , like an aw ard of other support, is considere d to be within the sound discretion of the trial court. Loyd v. Loyd , 8 60 S.W. 2d40 9, 41 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 3) ; W allace v. W allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 110-11 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1987). Consequently , such an a war d will not be
reve rsed on a

ppeal if that discretion is not abused. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d at 411 (citi n g S torey , 835 S.W. 2da t 59 7) ; Y

ount , 9 1 S. W.3 d at 78 3; El lio t v . E lli ot, 825 S.W .2d 87, 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A t ri a l c ou rt abu se s it s d is c re tio n o nly wh e n it app lie s a n in c or

re c t le g a l st a nd ard , o r r e a c he s a d ec i s i o n wh i ch i s aga i n s tl o gi c o r r ea s o n i n g o rt h at ca u s es an i n j u s t i ce t o t h e p ar t y

co m p l ai n i n g. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d at 85.

Whil e fault is one of many fac tors that may

be conside red in setting spousal support, Tenn. Cod e An n. § 36-5 -101 (d )( 1) (k ), ou r c ou rt s h a ve g e ne ra lly dis app ro ve d o f the us e of a lim on y a s a wea pon to punish a g uiltyspouse. Anderton , 9 88 S.W. 2da t 68 2; Duncan v . Duncan, 686 S.W .2d 56 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 4) . “ I t is we ll s e ttl e d tha t whil e fa ult is a fa c tor

to b e c on sid e re d, it m us t not be applied in a punitive manne r ag ainst a g uilt y p ar t y i n determining the a war d of alimony .” W ilder , 6 6 S. W.3 d at 89 5. Sin c e mari ta l f a ult ma y be c on sid e re d ina n a wa rdof a lim on y , it

ma y a lso be considere d in an awa

rd of attorney ’s fees as al i m o ny
. Inman v . Inman , 811 S.W .2d 870, 874 (T e nn . 1 99 1) ; Y

ount , 91 S.W .3d at 783. Howeve r, m arital fault alone is not sufficie nt to just ify an awa rd of attorney ’s fe es in the absence of a demonstrated need for the alimony

. W ilder , 66 S.W .3d at8 9 5 , ci t i n g Fisher v. Fisher , 648 S.W .2d 244, 247 (Tenn. 1983) (“w hile fault is a fa ctor to be considere d, it must not be applied in a punitive m an n er ag ainst a g uiltyparty in determining the
awa rd of a limony ”). While a trial c ourt could prope rly consider the relative fault of the pa rties for the bre akup of the marria g e in awa rding fee s, “a spouse with adequate prope rty and income is not entitled to an award of additional alimony to compensate for attorney ’s fe es and e x penses.” Lindsey , 9 7 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t1 8 1

. A t t o r n e y’ s f e e s i n a d i v o r c e c a s e a

r e n o ta w ar d e d o n a

“ p r e v a i l i n g p ar t y” t h e o r y. The marital fault of a pa

rty alone, without consideration of the financ ial need and ability to pay of the parties, is not a sufficient ba sis for the aw ard of attorney ’s fe es.
I n the ca se bef

ore us, Mr. Cumming s did not demonstrate a f inancial ne ed for

the awa rd of
s p o u s al s u p p o rt o r at t o rn ey ’s fe es
. T h e fi n an ci al s i t u at i o n s o f th e pa rt i es at t h e e n d o f t h e m arri age ma de Ms. Cum min g s th e e c on omi c a lly dis a dv a nta g e d s po us e . T he tr ia l c ou rt he re in didno t ba se its award of

attorney ’s fe es on the fa ctors of ne ed or a bilityto pay ; nor did it a wa rd fe es to Mr. Cummi ng s on the basis of any finding of marital f

ault on the part of Ms. Cummi ng s. I nstead, the court orde red Ms. Cummings to pay her former husband’s l eg al fe es as a sanction for

her c onduct in this l itigation.

P e r j u r y i s a n o f

f e n s e a g a i n s tt h e c o u r t s t h a ts h o u l d b e n e i t h e r c o n d o n e d n o r t ak e n l i g h t l y. I t “offe nds the basic principles underlying our judicial sy stem.” W

ilder v. W ilder , 863 S.W .2d 707, 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 9 2 ). Perjury is the type of c onduct that may justify a denia l of relief

in a d i v o rc e ca s e under

the doctrine of uncle an hands. Cha sta in v . Ch as tai n , 5 5 9 S. W. 2 d 9 3 3 , 935 (Tenn. 1977) . I t does not, howeve r, re quire such de nial, and the f acts a nd circ u m s t an ces of eac h situation must be examined. W ilder , 863 S.W .2d at 713. The tria l court’s a war d of the husband’ s attorney ’s fe es her ein i s not a denial of relief t o the wife . Rather, a s the court state d, it is puni shmentFo r examp l e, M s. C unni ngham co ul d face cri m i nal p rosecut i o n or co nt em p t pro ceed i ngs. Fal se t est i m o ny 14

ca n a l so aff

ec t t he t rial co urt’ s asse ssm en t o f cre d i b i l i t y as t o o t he r t esti m o ny. T he t rial co urt here i n m ad e n o ad ve rse
c re d ib ili ty f

ind ing s w ith re g a rd to the w ife’s o the r te stim o n y, m u c h o f wh ic h w a s u n c o n te ste d in a n y e v e n t. -23- for he r fa lse testimon y
. An award of f ees a g ainst a party

who has c ommitt ed per

jury during the litigation is an allowa

ble punishment. W

ilson v. W ilson , 58 S.W .3d 718, 729 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). I n a dd iti on , c ou rt s a lso re ta in a uth ority to p un ish or

sa nc tio n p e rj ury

by oth e r m e a ns a ndre me die s. 14

Whe re the sa nc tio n im

po se d inu re s to the fi na nc ia l be ne fi t of the oth e r p art y , w e be lie ve a ll the circ umstances must be considere d and the sanction should ha ve some relation to the harm caused the ot her party by the perjury

. I n the ca se bef ore us, it was Ms. Cummings’ sw orn denia ls of adultery that constituted her false testim ony
. Only afte r her partne r i n that adultery testified in contra diction to those denials did she admit the t rue f acts a nd ag ree to stipul ate to Mr. Cummings be ing a war ded the div or c e on the g ro un d o f a du lte ry . M r. Cum min g s w a s f or c e d to incu r c os ts ande xpe ns e s in eff orts to disprove his wife’ s false de nials that he would not have incurre d if she had be en truthful in this l itigation fr om the outset. Some of those costs relate to the retention of a private investig ator and the pr epar ation of a la boratory report, obtaining telephone records, and taking the deposition of Mr . T ho mps on , in c lud ing a tto rn ey tim e , r e po rt e r f e e s a ndtr a ns c ri pti on c os ts. Re qu ir ing Ms. Cummi ng s to pay

these a dditional costs caused by her f alse testimony

is reasona

ble, related to curing the harm cause d the other pa rty , and we ll within t he court’s discretion.

Ho we v er , t h es e e x p en s es d o n o tco n s t i t u t e a l l t h e a t t o rn ey ’s fe es i n cu rr ed b y M r. C u m m i n gs in this litigation. As this opinion demonstrates, the parties lit igated a number of issues relate d to the dissoluti on of their mar

riag e. These issue w ould have r equire d attorney time in prepar ation and trial reg ardle ss of Ms. Cummi ng s’ initial denia ls, just as they did after her stipulation, acknow ledg ement of w r o n g d o i n g , a n d ap o l o g y t o t h e c o u r t

. A s t o t h o s e f e e s , t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s ap p lic a ble to attorney ’s fe e aw ards in divorc e ca ses should be the fa ctors g uiding the decision. As stated e arlier , Mr. Cummings has not demonstrated his inabilityto pay his ow n attorney ’s fe es and his nee d to have tho se fe e s p a id b y his fo rm e r wif e
. Simi larl y , th e wi fe ’s abil ity to p a y the m, a s w e ll a s h e r o wn fe e s, is less than the husband’s.

Acc ording ly , we a ffirm that portion of the t ri al court’s awar d of attorne y ’s fe es to Mr. Cum min g s f

or tho se fe e s a nde xpe ns e s r e la te d to or c a us e d b y Ms

. Cu mm in gs ’ d e nia l, i n th is litigation, of a dultery . This court is unable to ac curately identify those cha rg es and ex penses f

rom the records submitted to the trial court. Consequently , we must rema nd for c alculation of the appropriate amount. Ex cept for those fee s in the amount determined, eac h party shall be re quired to p a y his or he r o wn a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
VII. C ONCL US I ON
We vacate the perma nent pare nting plan order ed by the trial court and re mand for a doption of a ne w permanent par enting plan addr essing the re sidential schedule, de signation of primary
r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n t , e s t ab l i s h m e n to f c h i l d s u p p o r t , a n d a l l o c a t i o n o f d e c i s i o n
- m ak i n g au t h o r i t y. Pending approva l or orde r of a new plan: ( 1) the pa

rties shall ea ch have primary residential c ustody-24-

of their c hild on a weekly basis with midweek overnig ht visitation for the nonr esidential par ent; (2) the father shall pay

child support of $500 per month; (3) the parties shall have joint dec ision-making
auth ority re g ard ing e du c a tio n, he a lth c a r e , a c ti v i ti e s , an d

r e l i g i o u s u p b ri ng ing . T he inj un c tio n a g a ins t the mother lea ving the county is vacated. The distribution of marital property is a ffirme d, and the
a llo c a tio n o f m ari ta l de bt i s mo dif ie d a s sp e c if

ie d. Th e a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is m od if ie d to on ly that amount related t o disproving the wife’ s false testimony , which amount should be ca lculated by th e tria l c o u r t o n r e man d

. We r e man d th is c a s e to th e Ch a n c e r y Co u r t o f Wi ll iams o n County for furth e r p r o c e e d in g s c o n s is te n t w ith th is o p in io n
. T h e c o s ts o n ap p e a l ar e ta xe d e q u a ll yto the Ap pe lla nt, Pe pp e r C umm ing s, a ndthe Ap pe lle e , Ch ri sto ph e r C umm ing s.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE