JSOU P10-1 Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking Paquette

Terrorist-Insurgent  inking

and Joint Special 

Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures

Laure.Paquette

JSOU.P10-1 September.2010

Joint Special Operations University

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On the cover. Screenshot from a video by German Islamists shows a group 

of them in a terrorist training camp in Pakistan on 3 October 2009. The onehour-long video shows several alleged terrorists of German origin calling 

German Muslims to Holy War. Used with permission of Newscom. 

JSOU P10-1

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2010

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

and Joint Special 

Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures

Laure.Paquette.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point 

Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

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kenneth.poole@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-53-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special 

Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual , March 2009 

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the 

Present as Future , April 2009, Roby C. Barrett 

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent , May 2009, 

John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(16–19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection ,

July 2009, William G. Perry

Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security 

Environment , July 2009, Russell D. Howard 

Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare ,

September 2009, George A. Crawford 

Irregular Warfare: Brazil’s Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas , 

September 2009, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies , 

December 2009, Haider A.H. Mullick

Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens , January 2010 , 

Joseph D. Celeski 

Report of Proceedings, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare 

and the OSS Model (2–4 November 2009) 

U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 

Future , March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach , April 2010, 

Thomas H. Henriksen 

2010 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays , May 2010

USSOCOM Research Topics 2011

Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power , June 2010, James B. Love

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement , 

July 2010, John B. Alexander 

Report of Proceedings, 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(8–11 March 2010)
vii

Contents

Foreword................................................................................ ix

About the Author.................................................................... xi

1. Introduction......................................................................... 1

2. Characteristics of Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking........................ 3

3. Levels of War and Tactics: On the Other Side

of the Looking Glass............................................................11

4. Implications for Planning Doctrine.......................................15

5. Implications for Planning Procedures................................... 21

6. Obstacles to Change........................................................... 31

7. Implications for Training...................................................... 35

8. Conclusion ....................................................................... 37

Appendix: Recommended Readings ...................................... 39

Endnotes................................................................................ 49

ix

Foreword

I

n this insightful essay contrasting terrorist-insurgent thinking and 

current U.S. Joint planning doctrine and practices, the author reminds 

the profession that war is between two or more belligerents and that as 

Clausewitz admonished us, the first and most important thing is to understand the kind of war that you are fighting. From this, all other things 

must flow. In order to understand the kind of war, it is essential to not only 

understand your adversary’s purpose but to understand his thinking and 

how it differs from yours. Only through understanding his thinking can 

you grasp his likely objectives, the concepts and tactics he will use to obtain 

them, and effectively plan to counter his operations and defeat him.

This monograph examines the characteristics of terrorist-insurgent 

thinking and U.S. Joint planning doctrine and practices and concludes that 

the existing U.S. planning framework is inadequate for the terrorist-insurgent threat and challenges the reader to expand his own planning paradigm 

to more fully encompass the implications of terrorist-insurgent thinking in 

the design and planning of U.S. operations. Why this mismatch occurs and 

how the terrorist-insurgent operates outside our cognitive frame of reference 

(for fighting in theaters of war, theaters of operations, areas of operations) 

are two important questions addressed. Equally important is the question 

of what are the implications of this for our own doctrine and practices? 

Focusing on two of the most significant characteristics of terrorist-insurgent 

thinking—changing level of operations and broader range of tactics—the 

author answers these questions and identifies the obstacles that stand in the 

way of the necessary adjustments to our conventional paradigms. In the 

process she again validates Clausewitz by demonstrating that in war the 

enemy exerts as much influence on us as we do on him, and we must find 

a way to counter this influence in order to be successful. 

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., GS-14 

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 

xi

About the Author

Dr. Laure Paquette is Professor 

of Political Science at Lakehead 

University in Thunder Bay, 

Ontario, Canada. She has conducted 

research and been invited to speak in 

over 25 countries, including the United 

States, Israel, France, Australia, Malaysia, 

and Indonesia. Dr. Paquette has held the 

NATO Fellowship, the Japan Foundation 

Fellowship, the Barton Fellowship of the 

Canadian International Institute for Peace 

and Security, and the Chiang Foundation 

of Taiwan. She has lectured on strategy at the National Defense University 

of the People’s Liberation Army in Beijing, the Korean Institute of Defense 

Analysis and the Korean Defense College in Seoul, and the National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo, among many others. 

Specializing in strategy, Dr. Paquette has presented a general theory 

of strategy that focuses on the strategic thinking of the underdog—“the 

strategy of the weak.” The weak don’t like the strong, and the strong often 

find in difficult to understand this simple concept and its implications. Her 

training program includes a diagnostic exercise that can identify people who 

already think like the weak, the underdog, the insurgent, or develop this 

skill set in those who may need it—in war, or anywhere else.

Dr. Paquette has written 13 books—including NATO After 2000, Strategy 

and Ethnic Conflict, Security for the Pacific Century, Bioterrorism and 

Medical and Health Services, and the recently published Counterinsurgency and the Armed Forces—and provided input to the United States Air 

Force on counterinsurgency doctrine. She has served in Canada’s Reserve 

Forces with the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. Dr. Paquette’s Web site 

is at www.lakeheadu.ca/~polisci/index.html, and she maintains a research 

blog at www.paquetteresearch.blogspot.com. She can be reached at laure.

paquette@lakeheadu.ca. 

1

1. Introduction

“I’m an advocate of learning to be an insurgent.” 1

— Russell D. Howard, Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Ret.)

The United States has been deeply committed to a “war on terror” 

since the World Trade Center towers attack on 11 September 2001 

(9/11). Yet, despite extraordinary efforts, commitment of astounding resources, and the loss of many lives, the war goes on. Some argue that 

it is not really a war, but such an argument is spurious and more wishful 

thinking than factual. A conflict exists, whatever the definition may be. If 

law enforcement cannot deal with the level of organized violence, it is war 

whether you call it that or not. We are long past arguments over whether 

it is a “war.” The facts are clear to the reasonably minded. If a group of 

people or actors—political opportunists, even if disguised in religious 

quotes—declares war on you, then war exists. If you commit one of the 

world’s largest and most proficient militaries to combat, it is war. 

It would be much more productive to debate what kind of war we are 

involved in and how we should fight it. Military power cannot alleviate the 

underlying social maladies that motivate many people to support terrorism 

and insurgency, but it can, in theory, create security conditions in which 

social remedies can be applied. Yet, even this result appears to have eluded 

the U.S. for too long. Despite the best efforts of a great military machine, 

terrorists and insurgents continue to retain a high level of strategic initiative—how is this possible? What is needed to help resolve this situation is a 

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking.

and Joint Special.

Operational Planning

Doctrine and Procedures
2

JSOU P10-1

new idea—or more properly stated, what is needed is an old idea renewed. 

Most military professionals recognize Sun Tzu’s “If you know both yourself 

and your enemy, you can win a hundred battles without a single loss,” 2 yet 

few have assessed what it implies for the war on terror. The existing U.S. planning framework fails to account for the uniqueness of the thinking of terrorists and insurgents in the design 

and planning of U.S. operations. 

Why this mismatch occurs and 

how the terrorists and insurgents 

operate within the seams of our 

cognitive frame of reference of fighting in theaters of war, theaters of operations, and areas of operations are half of a prolonged story of terrorist and 

insurgent warfare. The second half of this story and its conclusion will be 

written by how well it is possible to understand the characteristics of the way 

terrorists and insurgents think about warfare—here referred to as terroristinsurgent thinking—and use that knowledge to change our approaches to 

strategy, planning, and tactics. 

The paper that follows is organized in six parts. The first discusses the 

characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking. The second discusses in some 

detail the two characteristics that are the most important to operational 

planning and procedures. The third part discusses the implications for 

planning doctrine. The fourth part discusses the implications for planning 

procedures. The exploration will apply primarily to limited contingency 

operations or crisis response, or multipurpose operations influenced by 

fluid and changing situations.3 The fifth part discusses the obstacles to the 

changes necessary. The sixth part discusses the implications for training. 

This is followed by a brief conclusion. 

The existing U.S. planning framework 

fails to account for the uniqueness of 

terrorist-insurgent thinking...
3

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

2. Characteristics of Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

I

n the nearly ten years following 9/11, the research and literature on the 

terrorist-insurgent has grown exponentially. The 21st century terrorist-insurgent phenomenon has been studied from the perspectives 

of numerous disciplines leading to various categorizations, models, and 

conclusions. 

This wealth of information has informed U.S. military planning doctrine 

and procedures in multiple ways, but any changes have been U.S.-centric and 

based on countering terrorist-insurgent actions—not founded in knowing 

how these adversaries think. Consequently, the U.S. military response has 

been largely reactive, and those attempts that have tended to be proactive 

have been slightly off target. In explaining U.S. shortcomings some have 

suggested omnipresence or genius on the part of these global irreconcilables, 

and some have blamed chance. Few of the conjectures as to why this occurs 

are convincing, and many fail to even make the obvious observation that 

planning and operations do not adequately account for terrorist-insurgent 

thinking. Nonetheless these studies, when synthesized, begin to give us a 

good appreciation for the characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking and 

reveal that the terrorist-insurgent mindset—their way of thinking—naturally misaligns with U.S. cultural assumptions and doctrinal preferences. The 

terrorist-insurgent’s success and longevity is, more likely than omnipresence 

or chance, a case of terrorists and insurgents following their natural mental 

precepts with audacity; it exploits the cognitive dissonance between our 

planning doctrine and procedures and the reality created by terrorists and 

insurgents on the ground. In other words, combating terrorist-insurgent 

success requires the U.S. to align its planning doctrine and procedures with 

the demands of the war it is fighting—the one the terrorist-insurgent has 

brought to the door step. All of this starts with understanding the characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking. 

The research fits into four broad categories: game theory; empirical 

analyses, like historical or policy case studies; the study of particular issue, 

like martyr contracts or women suicide bombers; and the application of 

frameworks that were developed for other uses but are now being tried 

out on terrorism and counterterrorism.4 In this last category, one finds 

social network analysis, collective action analysis, and some counterinsur-
4

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gency techniques. Each makes a significant contribution, but fails to realign 

completely American thinking.

Game Theory

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to capture 

behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making 

choices depends on the choices of others. To follow it requires at least collegelevel calculus. While initially developed to analyze competitions in which 

one individual does better at another’s expense (zero sum games), it has 

expanded to include a wide range of situations, in particular war bargaining. However significant in the academic literature, this theory is of little 

interest for our purposes, since the number of users with enough (and fresh 

enough) mathematical background to transpose its contributions to their 

own problems is likely to be very small. Nor is it likely that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will have the time to learn enough calculus to use it in 

the field or before an operation. 

Empirical Analyses

This category includes a wide range of studies, and they have been very 

popular with academics in the U.S. In general, these studies are based on 

the analysis of experience and evidence. Usually, they test hypotheses and 

theories against observations in the real world. To become recognized, 

empirical studies must meet very specific criteria, which results in the exclusion of much that is considered true by practitioners. 

Some studies lead to policy advice, like telling liberal democratic governments what to do and what not to do about internment without trial, coercive 

interrogative techniques, and the use of live ammunition during protests.5

In general, governments are advised to stay the course for the long term, but 

they are rarely advised on how to maintain public support for that policy, 

for example. Empirical studies relevant to terrorism or insurgency occur by 

definition after the fact. They also tend to allow little in the way of generalizing learning from one situation to the next, which limits their usefulness.

Some studies suppose or conclude that U.S. allies in the war on terror 

behave like what we call here weak-side strategists.

6

 That is to say, some allies 

might rush headlong into action, ignoring the consequences of domestic 

opinion failing to support government moves, as in a number of European 

liberal democracies one could name. Or allies might ignore the unintended 
5

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

consequences of their own actions, such as the possibility of violent opposition to the government commitments or the provocation of internal terrorist 

and insurgents threats, such as may be a consideration in Saudi Arabia. These 

studies provide some support for the research presented here.

Other well-known themes in the scholarly literature are less supportive, 

principally the rational-choice theorists.7 Rational choice theory provides 

no opportunity for the intuitive decision-making so crucial to the art of 

strategy, for example. Nor does rational-choice theory take into account 

non-rational beliefs of patriotism or non-rational acts of self-sacrifice, for 

example, observable among U.S. troops. Nor does it take into account political or religious extremism, which are observable in many parts of the world.

Finally there are areas of active research that are not directly relevant to 

the question of understanding and countering terrorist and insurgents, for 

example the literature that researches why liberal democracies are resistant to 

coercion as a means of constraining or provoking action by the government.8

Special Issue Studies

In this category of research, there are a large number of detailed discussions of very specific, very circumscribed questions regarding insurgency 

or terrorism, and there is usually no pattern or overarching theme among 

them. One example is Alimi’s study of collective action.9 Another is the study 

of women as suicide bombers. An article by DeNardo looks at terrorism in 

a positive light now forgotten, with it being a bulwark against tyranny.10

DeNardo nonetheless makes an interesting distinction between terrorism 

and insurgency, the fundamental difference being that terrorism emanates 

from the underground, where insurgency, with activities like looting or 

protesting, happens publicly. Kilcullen applies approaches to counterinsurgency to the global war on terror.11 Also preceding the present work are 

articles that generalize from experiments with college students to military 

applications.12 Although there are significant differences in the choice, the 

amount of information used, the decision strategy employed, and the effect 

of exogenous conditions on decision strategy and choice in international 

relations, those differences are quantitative rather than qualitative. 

The most useful part of this collection of odds and ends lies in the discussion of the role of uncertainty, and the various levels of uncertainty, in 

counterterrorism. Considered here is “the small, secretive nature of terrorist 
6

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plots and the indeterminate nature of the target,” a circumstance to which 

a weak-side strategy would make a significant contribution.13

Existing Frameworks

These studies include perspectives such as social network analysis or psychological theories, which were created to study phenomena other than terrorism 

or insurgency but have been brought to bear on it. For example, the social 

action perspective is a precedent for the present paper, to the extent that it 

applies an existing approach to terrorism. The expansion of thinking called 

for above certainly is in sympathy with Tilly and some of the military literature, who argue that an epistemological expansion is necessary.14 Moreover, 

it is no great leap from the application of social network analysis, which has 

already been used in studies of crime, criminal intelligence, and criminal 

networks, to its application in counterterrorism.15

There are a number of such frameworks, grouped here by discipline for 

the sake of convenience. These disciplines include psychology, ethology, 

anthropology and other social sciences, cognitive theory, and the study of 

biological factors. 

Psychology has considered the issues surrounding terrorism at considerable length. In this area of research, psychoanalysis is the most widely 

recognized theory that addresses the roots of all forms of violence. Freud 

viewed aggression more generally as an innate and instinctual human trait, 

which most should outgrow in the normal course of human development. 

Ethology, a different area of psychology, has been alternately defined as the 

scientific study of animal behavior, especially as it occurs in a natural environment and as the study of human ethos, and its formation. For ethologists, 

aggression arises from a very basic biological need—a fighting instinct that 

has had adaptive value as humans have evolved. 

However, in non-psychological areas of research, such as anthropology 

and other social sciences, research has found significant differences both in 

the nature and level of aggression in different cultures. Here, experimental 

research has demonstrated that aggression can be environmentally manipulated; findings that argue against a universal human instinct. Another theory 

is that of frustration aggression. The basic premise is that aggression is always 

produced by frustration, and that frustration always produces aggression. 

However, research has shown that frustration does not inevitably lead to 

aggression. Social learning theory holds that behavior (e.g., aggression) is 
7

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

learned not only through one’s direct experience, but also through observation of how such contingencies occur in one’s environment. 

Cognitive theory holds that people interact with their environment based 

on how they perceive and interpret it. Perceptions of intent affect aggression. Moreover, there are internal and external factors that can affect one’s 

perceptions of provocation or intent. Biological factors affecting aggression 

are also an important element in a comprehensive biopsychosocial understanding of behavior. Biological studies are rarely conducted on terrorists. 

Researchers have also tried to apply statistical models to explain violence 

and to identify its predictors. This line of inquiry has yielded some positive 

findings on risk factors for violent behavior. Literally hundreds of studies 

in psychology, criminology, sociology, and other behavioral sciences have 

yielded significant risk factors for violence. Unfortunately, they are unlikely 

to be useful predictors. Although terrorism is a type of violence, risk factors 

tend to operate differently at different ages, in different groups, and for 

different—specific—types of violent behavior.16

Military Literature

The military literature is striking for the compatibility found with the 

processes and ideas outlined in later sections of this paper. It also illustrates 

how important the formalization of these ideas actually is. In the military 

literature, there have been several new conceptual frameworks that try to 

help solve problems in operational art.17 Most share some of the objectives 

and techniques outlined below. They also consider the issues of complexity, unpredictability, and lack of information. An excellent example of this 

is Yarger’s review of strategic theory, including its premises.18 He seeks to 

improve the concept of strategy by proposing some characteristics of weakside strategy. Yarger also identifies common traps into which strategists fall. 

The military literature also includes a wide range of fictional and actual 

case studies, such as E.D. Swinton’s Defense of Duffer’s Drift.

19 There are also 

proposals for applying operational design more systemically, but these explore 

specific questions rather than identifying the steps in a process. Dugan’s 

monograph on strategic intuition, for example, explores the non-rational 

but nonetheless significant contribution made to planning and carrying 

out strategy that is made by what he and Johnston call strategic intuition, 

what Clausewitz called coup d’oeil, what Klein called analogical thinking, 

and what is called here and in extensive previous research the core idea.

20
8

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“Patton was a striking example of strategic intuition by applying examples 

from history through coup d’oeil.” 21 Moreover, without a core idea, strategy 

is bound to fail. Finally, the U.S. Army has proposed a seven-step military 

decision-making model.22

Taylor and Horgan’s research examines the process of terrorist thinking.23 They identify some problems, like the bridging with assumption in 

the absence of sound empirical knowledge. Terrorists share some of the 

characteristics of ordinary people. There is usually a context that facilitates 

the transition to terrorism: the act of terrorism brings the terrorist some 

benefit, if only in his own mind, and terrorism can operate at an individual 

and/or political level.

The profiling of terrorist and insurgent leaders is one of the richer veins 

of military literature. Taking the research discussed above into account, it 

is possible to develop a profile of a terrorist-insurgent leader that includes 

an impressive number of characteristics:

a. Often educated to university level, often in subjects that have terrorist 

applications (science, business) 

b. Often organized planners, with some military training/experience

c. Usually the brains behind operations or targeting and having the 

most detailed knowledge of the workings and intentions

d. Often appear to be law-abiding, in order to remain under the radar

e. Often charismatic, being able to convince and manipulate people, 

and being able to conceptualize and articulate an idea into a mission

f. Truly convinced of the cause

g. Possibly involved in personal risk-taking but usually keeps a certain 

distance to avoid capture and prosecution, and maintain plausible 

deniability24

h. Always thinking about what the strong are about to do

i. Holistic

j. Playing a waiting game

k. Creative

l. Looking at the big picture

m. Constantly scanning his environment for possible threats and for 

possible opportunities

n. Specifically designing each action to suit his strategy
9

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

o. Constantly forecasting for all events and all other actors, and investing in the development of even unlikely scenarios

p. Going to assume s/he will lose any direct confrontation

q. Engaging their own passions or passionate feelings

r. Thinking like a weak-side strategist all the time, not just when there 

is a problem.

While all of these characteristics are significant, it is not practical to try to 

take all of them into account in operational planning doctrine and procedure. 

For these purposes, there are two characteristics that matter most. The next 

section discusses those two characteristics.

11

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

3. Levels of War and Tactics: On the Other Side 

of the Looking Glass

The two main differences in the planning of operations by terrorists 

and insurgents, compared to the operational planning doctrine and 

procedures in the U.S. military are the following: 

a. First, when insurgents or terrorists discuss the level of the operation, 

they use more levels than the three used by the U.S. forces, and each 

of those levels is, so to speak, thinner.25 The most important implication of this characteristic for planning is that terrorists and insurgents 

change levels of operation quickly and easily. The U.S. forces usually 

confine themselves to one level when planning. 

b. Second, the range of tactics used is broader. In many ways it is a disadvantage that insurgents and terrorists do not have the more specialized 

or technologically sophisticated tactics available to the U.S. forces. On 

the other hand, they change their tactics more quickly, and they use 

tactics that would not be allowed by the rules and laws of war. Rules 

and laws of war do not concern them. The range of tactics they will 

consider will therefore be broader. 

There are a number of historical examples of these two characteristics in 

action. The Taliban’s behavior after its military defeat in Afghanistan, for 

example, illustrates the change in level of operations. After its government 

fell, the Taliban changed its methods, and changed them again after the 

arrival of the NATO troops. In Pakistan, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM or 

Army of Mohammed) is an Islamic extremist group formed in early 2000. 

It collected funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets. 

This understandably drew the attention of the government and forced withdrawal of funds from bank accounts in anticipation of asset seizures. (They 

invested them in legal businesses such as commodity trading, real estate, and 

production of consumer goods!)26 In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers eventually 

developed their own newspaper, press, and propaganda section, in addition 

to a political wing, a research and development wing, and an intelligence 

wing. Al Qaeda’s Kalid Shaikh Mohommad introduced the principle of 

losing and learning doctrine: if an al Qaeda operation fails or suffers losses, 
12

JSOU P10-1

it is not considered a strategic loss if the group learns, improves, and vows 

not to repeat its mistake.27

An example of the broader range of tactics, most importantly tactics 

prohibited by the rules and laws of war, can also be found in the Taliban. The 

Taliban in Afghanistan were trading opium, at one point in 2005 moving 

their trade from Helmand to Nimroz when they realized that province was 

more weakly policed.28 The Taliban’s methods came to include assassinations, 

kidnappings, insurgency tactics, suicide bombings, and improvised explosive devices.29 Among the occurrences for each of these are the following: 

a. Assassinations—the death of Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir in 

July 2002; attempts on President Hamid Karzai in September 2002, 

on a vice-presidential candidate in 2004, and on the former governor 

of Badakhshan in October 2007

b. Kidnappings—of groups of foreigners in both July 2007 and October 

2007

c. Insurgency tactics—the recruitment and training on the Pakistan 

border and the repeated ambush of soldiers

d. Suicide bombings—there were sixty-four between January 2005 and 

August 2006

e. Improvised explosive devices—against U.S. and NATO troops, and 

against Afghan military and civilian vehicles, with the number 

steadily increasing.30

The Taliban also quickly developed a symbiotic relationship with the opium 

traders, in order to finance these and other operations.31

In addition, the Taliban exploited Afghanistan’s easily corruptible officials 

and the insecurity of the population.32 They banned opium while in power, 

but quickly turned to it to finance their operations.33

There are also examples of broader tactics in other terrorist and insurgent 

movements. ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna), the Basque separatist group 

founded in 1959, finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and 

extortion. Its political tactics, so to speak, are limited to bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials. Similarly, the Salafist Group for 

Call and Combat (GSPC) is a splinter faction that gained popular support 

in Algeria through its pledge to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria—as 

opposed to the rest of the group who were willing to sacrifice civilians. Later, 

however, the GSPC did attack civilians.34 Other observers have noted the 
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

breadth of tactics: “Today’s international terrorist groups function not as 

tightly structured hierarchies, but rather as shadowy networks that, when 

necessary, strike ad hoc tactical alliances, bridging religious and ideological schisms.” 35

We have seen that these characteristics are found in a number of hostile 

groups. The next section begins the exploration of the implications for 

operational planning doctrine. 

It will be necessary to examine in another section the implications for 

operational planning procedures. Only then will it be possible to consider 

what obstacles exist to learning from terrorist-insurgent thinking. 

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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

4. Implications for Planning Doctrine 

The previous section discussed the two characteristics of terroristinsurgent thinking that are the most important to operational planning and procedures: their use of more levels of operation and 

their broader range of tactics. The present section discusses the implications 

for planning doctrine of these two characteristics, and does so by analyzing 

the major joint publication (JP) doctrinal and planning documents and the 

opportunities they present to more adequately account for terrorist-insurgent 

thinking. These JP documents are: 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

b. JP 3-0, Joint Operations

c. JP 3-05, Doctrine of Joint Special Operations

d. JP 5, Joint Operation Planning.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States is, naturally, a document whose ideas are presented in broad strokes. Opportunities for analysis 

are similarly broad. The first great opportunity for taking into account 

terrorist-insurgent thinking arises from the emphasis on unity of action 

found in JP 1.

JP 1 recognizes the need for the maximum unity of action. Maximum 

unity of action, in turn, requires maximum interoperability of the various 

components of the forces.36 This maximum interoperability of the components of the armed forces requires unity of command. In practice, however, 

hasn’t unity of command also meant 

centralization of command? Has the 

improved technology of communication, sometimes reaching real-time for 

some components of the forces, meant 

not just better decision making, but 

also more centralized command? And if centralization is a tendency, what 

does this mean for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism planning? Can it 

become a disadvantage or even a danger if the terrorist or insurgent employs 

a diversity of tactics or changes level of operations? 37 There is evidence of 

constant efforts to counter the tendency to centralize command at the 

Has the improved technology of 

communication...meant not just 

better decision making, but also 

more centralized command?
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expense of effectiveness, for example, and these efforts are valuable. Their 

value is enhanced by the dangers presented by terrorist-insurgent thinking. 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations 

In JP 3-0, Joint Operations there are more opportunities for special operations planning to integrate terrorist-insurgent thinking than in JP 1. In fact, 

JP 3-0 presents the special operator with four main opportunities to learn 

from terrorist-insurgent thinking. These arise from: the strategic estimates 

of the theater of action, the consideration of irregular war, cognitive dimension of the information environment, and the consideration of both desired 

and undesired effects of operations.

The first opportunity for integrating terrorist-insurgent thinking presented by JP 3-0, Joint Operations comes from the establishment of the 

strategic estimates of the theater of action. In most situations, the theater 

level of operations is the largest that terrorists or insurgents will use.38 JP 3-0,

Joint Operations outlines the procedures for threat assessment, in the course 

of which the insurgent or terrorist capacity for changing levels and employing more diverse tactics can be integrated by command at all levels. To be 

specific, it is possible to integrate these two characteristics at the following 

points in the process: 

a. When the commander establishes critical intelligence requirements

b. When the protective function is being planned

c. When operation art and design considers risk at the operational level

d. When deciding to terminate an operation.39

The second major opportunity for learning from terrorist and insurgent 

thinking comes with the consideration of irregular war.40 Irregular war 

includes various types of enemies and activities, but it is the category of 

warfare that specifically addresses terrorism and insurgency. When the 

characteristics of weaker opponents are discussed, there is an opportunity 

to include a consideration of the changes in level in operations and diversity 

of tactics. Those characteristics can also inform any discussion of enemies 

who do not engage directly and who use stealth in hit and run engagements.41 Finally, irregular war requires the commander to be particularly 

aware and anticipate subtle shifts in political goals. Including the likelihood 

of changes in levels of operations and the diversity of tactics can help him/

her anticipate the opponents.42
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

In the case of irregular war, the two characteristics of terrorist-insurgent 

thinking also mean that little massing of effects is possible, as mentioned 

in the previous discussion of JP 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the 

United States.

43 Terrorists and insurgents avoid concentrating their assets 

or numbers, since an engagement then could result in too many losses for 

them to survive.44 Combining this with frequent, patternless hit-and-run 

engagements, and adding to it changes in level of operations and diversity 

of tactics means that for each of the following ways to deal with terrorists 

and insurgents, changes in level of operations and more diverse tactics are 

even more important.45 Restraint, in particular, is important in any operation countering terrorism or insurgency.

Of those on offer, the best ways to deal with terrorists and insurgents are: 

a. Maneuverability

b. Economy of force

c. Simplicity, restraint, and concern for legitimacy.

The third opportunity for integrating the fact that insurgents and terrorists change level and use a broader range of tactics comes in the discussion 

of the cognitive dimension of the information environment.46 There are 

repeated references to the intuition and creativity of command in JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. Intuition and creativity are always important characteristics of 

special operators. But as with so much of the previous discussion, they are 

going to be even more significant when dealing with an enemy that changes 

levels of operation and employs a diversity of tactics.47

There are, of course, difficulties in using intuition and creativity in 

practical decisions. However, certain types of decisions can integrate them 

more easily. We can illustrate this by taking the decision to end operations 

as an example: any commander or operator must always consider the right 

point at which to end counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. 

Terrorist and insurgents, however, profit more from short operations and 

therefore seek to end them, and to leave the area of conflict, as quickly as 

possible. In practice, then, this means that there is even more pressure than 

usual for U.S. forces to carry out engagements against an enemy that will 

disperse. The option of moving troops and equipment in and around the 

theater is limited by time constraints. A larger, more specialized or better 

equipped force may be at a disadvantage in some situations. Commanders, 

planners, and special operators would do well to consider that the conclusion 
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of operations may have as an undesired effect on the terrorist or insurgent, 

and whether this signifies in fact better operating conditions for them.48

Taking into account both desired and undesired effects of operations 

when planning is the fourth and last of the opportunities in JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations.49 JP 3-0 states that the enemy has few, larger centers of gravity, 

whereas everything mentioned in this paper so far points to the fact that terrorists and insurgents are likely to have smaller and more numerous centers 

of gravity or a larger number of decisive points of interest.50 To make matters 

more difficult, terrorists and insurgents may shift even more easily among 

these smaller and more numerous centers of gravity than would otherwise 

be the case. Taking this into account is a great opportunity to improve the 

effectiveness of joint operations planning and procedures. 

Overall, then, diversity of tactics and changes in levels of operations can 

be identified as critical capabilities in counteroperations.51 They are essential 

in determining decisive points, as mentioned previously, which in turn will 

make the lines of operation more effective.52 Integrating the possibility of a 

greater range of tactics and rapid changes in levels of operations will improve 

planning and procedures at the following points:

a. When considering the potential for leverage 53

b. In the phasing model, where operations are integrated and synchronized by planners, as proposed by JP 3-0, Joint Operations, considering that terrorist or insurgent actions are more likely to be cyclical, 

rather than linear54

c. In establishing the measures of evaluation and measures of performance.55

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 

In JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, there are two opportunities 

to integrate terrorist and insurgent thinking. First, joint special operation 

planning requires the identification of the nodes of a system and the critical 

factors and decisive points.56 The two differences in terrorist-insurgent thinking, change of levels and the diversity of tactics, have a role in identifying each 

of these. Second, the promotion of the indirect approach present in JP 3-05 is 

a support for integrating terrorist-insurgent thinking, since insurgents and 

terrorists use indirect approaches consistently and universally. The indirect 

approach has an impact throughout the planning process.57
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

There are sections of doctrine in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning that assist 

forces in learning from terrorist-insurgent thinking. For example, given that 

“SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political 

risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from 

friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets,” 58 planners ought to consider how the diversity of tactics 

and the change in operational levels affect their operations. 

In addition, by definition, Special Operators will be more like insurgents 

than regular forces: they will consider or use a broader range of techniques, 

not only in themselves, but “inherently joint.” Although many special operations may be conducted as single-service operations, most are planned 

and executed as joint operations. Special operations routinely require joint 

support and coordination.59 These are two significant advantages.

Doctrinal Publications Taken as a Whole

Considering the major documents as a group in light of the differences in 

level and tactics of insurgents and terrorists, it also becomes clear that the 

huge bulk of the doctrine is about the armed forces, not about the enemy. 

This way of thinking is natural as far as procedures are concerned, and 

certainly common, among large and well-equipped regular forces. Armed 

forces personnel are naturally thinking about what their role and capacities 

are. But the challenges counterinsurgency and counterterrorism present 

also mean there is an opportunity to learn from the enemy, with immediate 

and obvious benefits. Terrorists and insurgents are obsessed with what the

U.S. forces are going to do. A shift in emphasis towards what they may do, 

as opposed to what U.S. forces are capable of doing, may be beneficial. For 

maximum benefit, however, capacity for change of level and more diverse 

tactics should be integrated by command at all levels of operation. 

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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

5. Implications for Planning Procedures 

This section discusses in more detail the two characteristics, change 

in level and diversity of tactics, that are the most important to operational planning and procedures, and it discusses the implications for 

planning procedures. It does so by analyzing two major planning documents: 

a. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

b. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

The remaining two sections of the paper will cover the implications for 

training, and then the obstacles to the changes necessary to make full use 

of this new information about terrorist and insurgent thinking. 

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

The process outlined in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning is commonly referred 

to as JOPP, Joint Operation Planning Process. Here, we will examine four of 

the characteristics of JOPP that give special operators a chance to learn from 

terrorist-insurgent thinking. We will then examine steps in the JOPP process 

in order to identify where these two characteristics can be integrated into 

the planning process. Then, we examine the specific capabilities of special 

versus regular forces, and discuss how this presents opportunities to learn 

from terrorist and insurgent thinking. Finally, we discuss the application 

of the principles of war.

JOPP has four characteristics that can facilitate integration of the thinking of terrorists and insurgents into the process. First, in JOPP, planners 

and commanders use an adaptive process.60 At any point in their ongoing 

adaptation, it is possible to include information like the two characteristics 

of terrorist-insurgent thinking. The adaptive process also means that the 

more diverse tactics of terrorists and insurgents can be countered at any 

point in the process. Second, JOPP works as much as possible with the levels 

above and below the commander 61 This means that JOPP is already changing levels, and should easily accommodate that characteristic of terroristinsurgent thinking. Third, the increased flexibility of JOPP can be used 

to integrate the effects of terrorists or insurgents changing levels or using 

more diverse tactics.62 There is a caveat, however: although there are assertions that “Joint Operation planning has the inherent flexibility to adjust 

to changing requirements for adaptive plans,” they are not presently likely 
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JSOU P10-1

to be flexible enough to match the nimbleness of insurgents or terrorists.63

Fourth and finally, JOPP is decentralized, so that it more closely resembles 

terrorist-insurgent thinking, but also so that the observations of novel tactics 

or changes of level can be more quickly taken into account.64

The steps of the Joint Operation Planning Process show where it is possible 

to integrate the diversity of tactics and the change in level of operations 

characteristic of terrorists and insurgents. These points are:

a. Mission analysis, more specifically in the development of assumptions—i.e., statements thought to be true in the absence of facts65

b. Analysis of the operational environment, more specifically in analyzing the higher command’s intent and mission, and undesired effects66

c. Development of mission termination criteria67

d. Development of mission success criteria68

e. Course of action analysis

f. Determination of potential decisive points

g. Risk assessments.69

In addition, there are two further opportunities to integrate the thinking 

of terrorists and insurgents. These are even more important than those just 

cited. The first of these is war gaming, the physical and mental equivalent of 

gedankenexperimenten, or thought experiments.70 Integrating the characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking in war gaming means that training 

is available to all participants, with all the benefits that training confers 

for actual operations. The second of these opportunities is in the development of the centerpiece of the operational plan, the concept of operations 

(CONOPS). Again, if the central ideas of the operational plan include the two 

characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking, then they become integrated 

in the entirety of the operation.

Joint special operations have unique characteristics that offer the chance 

to profit from terrorist-insurgent thinking. Joint special operations occur 

when there are SOF drawn from more than one service. These are the types 

of operations that boggle the mind of the lay person—the possibility that 

in situations of high psychological and physical stress and situations of 

extreme danger and unpredictability, armed forces personnel of dramatically 

different services and organization cultures are expected to work together 

as seamlessly as possible, since lives are at stake. 
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

Although it may seem obvious, it bears repeating that special operations 

warfare includes tempo, that is to say a “rapid execution of a mission allows 

SOF to mass combat power at the critical place and time, accomplish the 

mission, withdraw before the adversary can react, and then attack again.” 71

This means both that it is vital for special operators to integrate the way of 

thinking of terrorists and insurgents quickly and easily, since things are 

evolving quickly, and also that these same characteristics contribute to an 

increase in tempo.

The two characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking exacerbate the 

challenge facing SOF in carrying out their mission. To be specific, the challenge will be greater in the following situations:

a. Influencing the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create 

conditions favorable to U.S. strategic aims or objectives

b. Action principally directed at high-value targets of strategic significance, that may be overt, clandestine, or covert

c. Rehearsals of the mission

d. Employment of sophisticated communication systems and means of 

insertion, support, and extraction

e. Discriminating and precise use of force.72

The expectation that SOF should be “task-organized quickly and deployed 

rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations” presents 

a significant advantage in coping with changes in levels of operation and 

diversity of tactics.73 The same can be said of a number of capabilities. These 

include the following:

a. Surveying and assessing local situations and reporting these assessments rapidly

b. Working closely with regional military and civilian authorities and 

populations

c. Organizing people into working teams to help solve local problems.74

Similarly, the special operator’s core activities present certain points 

where the integration of terrorist-insurgent thinking needs more urgency.75

Intelligence is likely to become dated even more quickly that is otherwise 

the case when SOF is engaged in direct action, special reconnaissance, and 

foreign internal defense operations. An argument can be made for other 
24

JSOU P10-1

SOF activities as well. When it comes to types of operations, these are, under 

the heading of direct action:

a. Raids

b. Ambushes

c. Direct assaults

d. Standoff attacks

e. Terminal attack control operations

f. Terminal guidance operations

g. Recovery operations

h. Precision destruction operations

i. Anti-surface operations. 

Under the heading of special reconnaissance, there are:

a. Raids

b. Ambushes

c. Environmental reconnaissance

d. Armed reconnaissance

e. Post-strike reconnaissance

f. Target assessment

g. Threat assessment.76

Under the heading of foreign internal defense, there are:

a. Counterterrorism

b. Psychological operations

c. Civil affairs operations

d. Counterproliferation.77

When it comes to the principles of war, U.S. joint doctrine has nudged the 

historic objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of 

command, security, surprise, and simplicity toward irregular warfare activity by adding “other principles” of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.78

Some of these principles make it easier to integrate the two characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking that we have been discussing. For 

example, special operations are called on more frequently to use much 

smaller measures for the concentration of mass, something that is appropriate for countering the thinking of terrorists and insurgents. A commander 

may simply assume that there will be no concentration of mass.79 Another 
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

example is the enhanced maneuverability of SOF. You do not need to be a 

special operator to realize this is an advantage in coping with an enemy that 

changes levels of operation or uses a broader range of tactics. The same can 

be said of surprise and simplicity. 

On the other hand, a greater diversity of tactics and changes in the level 

of operations make it more difficult to actualize other principles of war and 

strategic concepts. For example, preemption is much more difficult with 

someone who changes tactics and levels of operations. Similarly, dislocation (as explained in B. H. Liddell Hart’s Strategy) is possible, but not as 

significant as in other cases. 

Finally, exploitation also takes on a new meaning, since terrorists and 

insurgents are not conventional enemies: the psychological operations 

are very important, but their aim is to separate the non-combatants from 

supporting the ideological movement of the insurgents and/or terrorists. 

Similarly, initiative is going to be a very important component of operations, 

to respond to the change of operational techniques and change of level.80

JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

In this discussion of the publication JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations 

Task Force Operations, we shall consider the planning principles of special 

operations and the differences between special and regular operations. In 

the second half of this section, we will consider the process of planning of 

criticality, availability, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability, known by the acronym CARVER.

The planning principles of special operations as presented in JP 3-05.1,

Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations neither preclude nor exclude 

integrating the two characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking being 

studied here, the change in levels of operations and the diversity of tactics.81

Implicit in these principles, however, is the fact that there are no second 

chances in this type of operations—they are by definition high-stakes, 

high-risk, and high-cost. This is a characteristic they share with terrorist or 

insurgent operations. They are also similar to terrorist or insurgent operations in that they can range in size, combat intensity, and purpose.82 The 

real question, of course, is whether they can range in level within a single 

operation.

The fact that the planning of operations requires fused intelligence about 

both theater and national assets is a good sign, a hint of greater flexibility 
26

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in scope that is important in itself, but also the first detected in the review 

of doctrine and procedure executed so far. 83 This flexibility is more about 

the way in which operations are conceived than a purely geographical flexibility of location. It has the potential to reduce the surprise that could be 

experienced by forces fighting insurgents or terrorists.

Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical or political risk, operational technique, use of special equipment, modes 

of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on 

detailed operation intelligence and indigenous assets.84 SOF also perform 

two unique types of activities. First, they perform tasks that no other forces 

in the Department of Defense conduct. Second, they perform missions that 

are conducted by Department of Defense forces, but do so to a unique set 

of conditions and standards, normally using equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures not utilized by conventional forces.85 Once again, 

this moves them closer to being able to understand and integrate the greater 

diversity of tactics and the changes in levels of operation than the regular 

forces with which they are working. 

Diversity of tactics and the change in level of operations are of particular 

relevant to the following capabilities of special operations:

a. Special reconnaissance 

b. Direct action 

c. Unconventional warfare 

d. Foreign internal defense 

e. Counterterrorism.86

SOF also have particular capabilities, of which the following offer an 

opportunity to learn from terrorist and insurgent thinking. Those are:

a. Capacity to work closely with local authorities and populations

b. Capacity to assess local situations.87

Finally, there are some realities about special operations that are so well 

known as to have become truisms but bear mention here since they provide 

an opportunity to learn about greater diversity of tactics and changes in 

levels of operations. As a variation of the SOF Truths, the author’s research 

suggests that:

a. Quality is better than quantity.
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

b. SOF cannot be mass-produced.

c. SOF intelligence is often more detailed than most military intelligence.

d. SOF intelligence is more perishable than most military intelligence.

e. SOF intelligence is more broadly gauged than most military intelligence.

f. SOF intelligence is more encompassing than most military intelligence.88

These characteristics are particularly true in the case of missions to 

combat terrorism, to insert SOF, or to extract SOF.

There are other points at which it is important for planners of joint special 

operations to take into account the thinking of terrorists or insurgents. To 

be specific, these are in discussing the:

a. Nature of the target

b. Adversary and friendly situations

c. Environmental characteristics of the operational area.89

At the analysis, planning, and execution phases of a joint special operation, if the diversity of tactics and the change in levels of operation are taken 

into account, then we may expect the following impacts upon any assessment 

of the operational environment:

a. The proportion of unplanned and/or unanticipated targets compared 

to planned/anticipated is likely to be much greater90 because the 

tactics used by insurgents are more diverse than those used by SOF

and because the ease of changing the level of operations means that 

insurgents or terrorists may increase the potential for surprise.

b. In the contingency planning and targeting process, centers of gravity and decision points will be diffuse, rather than concentrated; 

similarly, as stated above, because the tactics used by insurgents are 

more diverse than those used by SOF, so that their decision points will 

be less concentrated than would otherwise be the case; and because 

the ease of changing the level of operations means that insurgents or 

terrorists are less likely to concentrate their assets.

c. It is not certain that centers of gravity would even exist, as discussed 

above, or if they do that they would be greater in number and smaller 

in size.

d. Time-sensitivity will be both generalized and extreme (i.e., the period 

when the target’s accessibility is shorter than usual and the targeting 

process is compressed). 
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JSOU P10-1

e. The intelligence requirements will be unique.91

In contingency planning, the significant of change in level of operations 

and diversity of tactics is magnified for four reasons. First, the change in 

level of operations and the diversity of tactics can only increase uncertainty. 

Second, the change in level of operations and the diversity have a role in the 

feasibility assessment as well as the initial assessment. Third, they should 

figure in the target assessment as well as the prioritization of the information acquisition.92 Fourth and finally, they also have a role in the target 

information package.93

The various consequences of changes in level of operation and a greater 

diversity of tactic combine to increase risk in joint special operations; however, special operators have an advantage over most of the conventional 

military force. For example, in crisis action, the change in level of operations 

and the diversity of tactics reduce the speed with which planning and targeting can occur. As a result, the chances of missing the target increase, or the 

operation may miss altogether.94 The change in level of operations and the 

diversity of tactics have a role in the provision by special operations of input 

into the joint force commander’s orders. When considering other facts or 

under the development of assumptions, in particular status-of-forces and 

available time, the commander may consider whether they are influenced 

by the change in level of operations and the diversity of tactics, or in the 

course of action analysis or war gaming.95

As a result, the analysis of the change in level of operations and the 

diversity of tactics needs to occur at every step of the intelligence gathering and analysis that underpins the planning of operations, and possibly 

emphasized at every step. They are more important for:

a. Psychological operations (i.e., hostile sympathizers, hostile military 

forces for irregular warfare) 

b. Foreign internal defense (i.e., combating insurgents) 

c. Counterterrorism.96

The CARVER Process

We can now consider the CARVER method of target analysis, described in 

Appendix F of JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. The 

steps of this method are: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, 

effect, and recognizability. The CARVER method focuses on the tactical level, 
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

which is where the change in level of operations and the diversity of tactics 

can be observed and dealt with the most effectively. The CARVER method 

also focuses on the critical point—the point at which the components of a 

target should be disabled—again where the change in level and the diversity of tactics matter.97 In CARVER, the analyst must tailor the criteria and 

rating scheme to suit the particular strategic, operational, or tactical situation, which means there is an opportunity to take into account the change 

in level of operations and the diversity of tactics. 

In all, this occurs at three of the six selection factors of CARVER, that 

is to say:

a. Assessment of effect

b. Vulnerability

c. Recognizability. 

This is of greater significance where targets are human or associated with 

humans.

In order to decide whether a target should be attacked, the effects of 

such an attack need to be assessed. These effects may be military, political, 

economic, informational, or psychological, and collateral effects need to 

be taken into account. The change in level of operations and the diversity 

of tactics have a role in this particular assessment, since a change in levels 

can result in very different effects. The same is true of more diverse tactics 

being employed. Where humans are involved, the collateral effects are 

always significant, but when it comes to terrorism and/or insurgency, a small 

impact on human beings has, proportionately, a much greater importance. 

Terrorism, as we know, aims to kill a few but frighten many.

Change of level of operations and diversity of tactics can also affect the 

recognizability of targets. Targets must be identifiable under various weather, 

light, and seasonal conditions, without being confused with other targets or 

target components. Similarly, there must be a distinction between critical 

damage points and stress points in the targets from similar components in 

the surroundings. Quick changes in level of operations and greater diversity of tactics will make this more difficult unless they are expected by the 

special operator. 

With appropriate training or augmentation, operators can recognize 

appropriate computer programs, communications circuits, or similar targets 

of information operations and missions. It is also important to take into 
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account the change in level of operations and the diversity of tactics in 

considering threats—again, more difficult unless the special operator is 

expecting them.98

The change in level of operations and the broader range of tactics are 

also important at several other points: 

a. At the feasibility assessment99

b. At the development of assumptions for the initial assessment of the 

Threat/Target Situation100

c. At the intelligence regarding limiting factors.101

The significance of terrorist-insurgent thinking in the development of 

assumptions has already been discussed in a previous section. In the case 

of CARVER, there are at least “limiting factors” like intelligence; where 

various uncertainties could at least be listed.102 Just as in an operations 

order, there is a place for assumptions, and therefore for uncertainty in 

the description of enemy forces—CARVER even uses the word “likely” to 

describe these forces.103

Uncertainty is always a part of the process, and a diversity of tactics and 

changes in levels of operations make a significant contribution to it. All this 

can be countered if the special operators are expecting these two characteristics. Having examined the support and opportunities to learning from 

terrorists and insurgents in the previous three sections, we can now turn to 

the obstacles to this learning, present in joint special operations planning 

doctrine and procedures.
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6. Obstacles to Change

This paper began with a discussion of the characteristics of terroristinsurgent thinking. The next section discussed in more detail the two characteristics that are the most important to operational planning and procedures. Then the implications for planning doctrine and for 

planning procedures were discussed. This section will discuss the obstacles 

to the changes necessary to take full advantage of the opportunity to learn 

terrorist-insurgent thinking. 

This investigation has identified a number of obstacles to learning from 

terrorist-insurgent thinking in operations planning doctrine and procedures. 

These are: priorities; static planning, including the temptation of intellectual 

tidiness; the difficulty in measuring outcomes; and finally, habitus, established ways of thinking. 

Priorities. The first obstacle to learning from terrorist-insurgent thinking 

as it has been presented here is that of priorities. Although the doctrine 

outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States applies 

to all the armed forces, in practice, special operators may have to assist 

the regular forces with whom they are cooperating in order to progress 

towards a more outside-the-box way of thinking, which is SOF’s bread and 

butter. This is an additional burden to SOF who already have to be at peak 

operational capacity, a burden that commanders would do well to consider 

carefully—is it possible for special operators to know other services so well 

that they can operate smoothly and seamlessly with them? In addition, 

SOF may already be struggling to integrate some of the consequences of 

terrorist-insurgent thinking, characteristics that may be antithetical to the 

values that animate the entire organization, within a force structure that 

is not as quick to change at its enemies. The only reply, of course, is that 

understanding these characteristics may save lives. 

Static Planning. The second obstacle could be called static planning. Despite 

frequent affirmations of the fluidity of the security environment, the fact is 

that the planning remains in practice static and not dynamic. The change 

in level of operations and the broader range of tactics have trouble being 

integrated because they present themselves as always changing and are 

therefore not convenient in the planning phase. To the protestation that 

planners realize they are working in a dynamic environment, it is possible 
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to reply that the changes in level of operations and the broader range of 

tactics represent the most rapid and least expected of all the changes they are 

used to seeing. There is little to be done about the speed with which terrorists and insurgents change their level of operations or their methods, but it 

is possible to train special operators to at least expect them. On the other 

hand, it is a well-known truism that the plan does not survive first contact 

with the enemy. It is possible that changes to plans in ongoing operations 

provide the necessary flexibility, but there will always be limits imposed by 

essential coordination of action of a sophisticated armed force dedicated to 

limiting casualties of all kinds.

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, reflects an important barrier to the flexibility of scope and range of tactics in the very nature 

of the armed force, large, specialized, with routine, regular decision-making; 

and with its governance by a liberal democracy with a free media. Liberal 

democracies, although acknowledged as being the best political system available, also brings with it a slow and unwieldy decision-making process that 

results not in the optimal outcome but with the outcome agreeable to the 

greatest number. While this political scientist is not proposing abandoning 

liberal democracy as a political system, or to argue that ‘Mussolini made 

the trains run on time,’ it is important to recognize some of its inherent 

limitations.

How then does a planner do his or her job? The greatest temptation in 

planning is undeniably the desire for intellectual tidiness, for being able to slot 

neatly means and ends. “Joint operational planning uses measurable desired 

effect to relate higher-level objectives 

and effects to component mission and 

tasks.” 104 The biggest trap, however, is 

in thinking that everyone else in the 

theater of operations thinks like the 

planners do. Legitimacy of government 

is a good example. The reading of JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations 

points to one of the mistakes commonly made with respect to legitimacy: 

it is tempting and easy to assume that the government of a foreign country 

usually enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In post-colonial or 

post-authoritarian states, or in states with ethnic dissent, that is not always 

the case. And there is always the possibility that the population is suspicious 

The biggest trap, however, is in 

thinking that everyone else in 

the theater of operations thinks 

like the planners do.
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

of its government on a particular issue, such as the handling of the economy, 

although overall the population trusts the government. 

Measuring Outcomes. The third obstacle could be called the impossibility of measured outcomes. The problem here is that the desired effects are 

not necessarily measurable, especially not in a fast-moving situation. The 

commander, in his process of continuous assessment, can take special note 

of the possibility of the change in levels and range of tactics. The question, 

then, becomes how nimble that continuous assessment can be.105 In addition, the change in level of operations and the broader range of tactics have 

a place in operation art and operation design,106 especially since operational 

design is intrinsic to Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP).107 That also 

means that the two points of interest here, of broader tactics and greater 

level of action, are intrinsic to JOPP. 

Habitus. The fourth obstacle is habitus. Habitus is the system of durable, 

transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a 

particular class of conditions of existence.108 Military personnel of all levels 

are likely to have a strong habitus. Indeed, the entire system of military 

training is designed to instil the ability to function under conditions of stress 

unknown to the civilian—reflex action under the threat or actuality of death 

or grievous harm to oneself or people one has worked with on a ongoing 

basis. But habitus could, like the tacit dimension postulated by psychologists, be one of the forces that strategy can tap. Habitus can be founded in 

intuition, and intuition is important to underdog strategic thinking.109 But 

if habitus is neither conscious nor explicit, it is not possible to implement 

what is useful and set aside what is restrictive. The way out is through the 

use of thin-slicing, or the ability of the unconscious to find patterns in situations and behaviour based on very narrow slices of experience.110 Habitus is 

distinct from intuition—which is essential to the art of strategy, a positive 

capacity to structure personal knowledge in such manner that it is possible 

to master and apply developed knowledge but remain open to generating 

new knowledge.111

Until this obstacle is resolved, there can be no question that the integration of the change in level of operation and the greater diversity of tactics 

poses a serious challenge to the usual thinking of military commanders. 

If they have managed to retain their creativity and nimbleness of mind to 
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a greater extent than their peers, they are confronted with a system that is 

complex and not easy to shift. To incorporate the possibility of rapid change 

of level of operations and use of a broader range of tactics into planning and 

verification during execution is critical, but it is not enough.112 Operational 

art needs to apply and should apply to rank and trade levels other than those 

who develop strategies or plan campaigns and major operations. It could 

take the form of a small change to the day-to-day thinking that incorporates 

the change in level of operations and the broader range of tactics. 113 

Could such a small change make a difference? One example is provided 

by the introduction of the idea of centers of gravity.114 “Center of gravity is 

the set of characteristics, capabilities and sources of power from which a 

system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to 

act.” 115 But for a terrorist or an insurgent, it will be diffuse and not concentrated, so you need to learn to identify the nodes differently. But all center 

of gravity nodes are by definition areas that are decisive.

The concept of depth in operations is not useful in planning insurgent 

or terrorist counter-operations, since their forces are diffuse rather than 

concentrated.116 Counter-operations lack leverage since there are few, if 

any, decisive points, and they can be difficult to identify. The doctrine of 

the U.S. forces hints at difficulties in coping with the differences between a 

conventional enemy and a terrorist or insurgent enemy. For example, “in 

actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particulars 

state ends and another begins.” 117 Be it a state of war or a state of military 

operations other than war, the lack of discrete circumstances is a difficulty 

for a planning process that is discrete between war and military operations 

other than war.
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

7. Implications for Training

This paper began with a discussion of the characteristics of terroristinsurgent thinking. The following section discussed in more detail the characteristics that are the most important to operational planning and procedures. The previous sections discussed the implications 

for planning doctrine and procedures. Then obstacles to the change were 

discussed. This section covers the implications for training. 

As stated in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to investigate 

whether the doctrine governing joint special operations allows for two 

particular new ideas, and if so, where. The conclusion is very clear: while the 

support given to the introduction of these new ideas is limited, the obstacles 

are comparatively easily overcome, and both the doctrine and procedures of 

operations planning are rich in opportunities to more adequately account 

for terrorist-insurgent thinking, although most of the opportunities are at 

the operational level. 

Russ Howard has advocated graduate studies for junior officers in SOF, 

given the complex security environment.118 Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard’s 

advice is excellent, but it may not be enough. This graduate training should, 

among other things, include analogous reasoning, which is described below, 

to its curriculum so students may have a fighting chance of being able to 

cope with the change in level of operations and the diversity of tactics. 

How do we transfer some of the characteristics of insurgent thinking to 

SOF? All of the differences in the way terrorists and insurgents think are 

summed up by the core idea, which was introduced in section 1. The core 

idea forces the use of more than the rational way most of us are taught in 

school. It calls on experience, judgment, intuition and everything else that 

has been learned in the past. 

We can also start by encouraging analogous thinking. There has been an 

increase in the use of analogous thinking in recent years, among scientists 

with some surprising collaborators. For example, “In one of the more unlikely 

collaborations of modern medicine, Britain’s largest children’s hospital has 

revamped its patient hand-off techniques by copying the choreographed pit 

stops of Italy’s Formula One Ferrari racing team. The hospital project has 

been in place for two years and has already helped reduce the number of 

mishaps.” 119 Physicians in the U.S. have also sought out unusual collaborators: “A growing number of health care providers are trying to learn from 
36

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aviation accidents and, more specifically, from what the airlines have done 

to prevent them. In the last five years, several major hospitals have hired 

professional pilots to train their critical-care staff members on how to apply 

aviation safety principles to their work...it is well established that, like 

airplane crashes, the majority of adverse events in health care are the result 

of human error, particularly failures in communication, leadership and 

decision-making.” 120 There is also structurally analogous thinking in other 

areas of science. For example, “In a trial for a company with a high speed 

robotic assembly line, it took the algorithm for the waggle dance of bees 

identifying nectar location (developed by Cardiff University’s Manufacturing 

Engineering Centre) just a few days to identify the most efficient way to run 

the machines, much faster than a more conventional program.121 But there 

have been structurally analogous thinking in the military sphere, going 

back to the Duke of Wellington’s ‘A mosquito attack, not a cannon attack,” 

Churchill’s “We shall attack the underbelly of Europe,” and Patton’s flashes 

of insight.122 The study of emergency responders using intuitive methods of 

decision-making, including military people, is also established.123

It is possible to prepare operators by the use of thin-slicing, or the ability of the unconscious to find patterns in situations and behaviour based 

on very narrow slices of experience.124 Indeed, this author has developed 

extensive training methods in this area.125 As a first step, however, it would 

be enough for planners, commanders or operators to ask themselves, at each 

of the points identified in sections 4 and 5, two simple questions. First, what 

difference would it make if the enemy subdivided the levels of operation 

into several sub-levels, and then in the course of action suddenly expanded 

or contracted the level of their operations? Second, what difference would 

it make to the course of action if the enemy suddenly used different tactics 

than expected, tactics that our side would not use for humanitarian, legal, 

or ethical reasons?

It is obvious from considering the syllabus of major planning courses that 

it would be a small matter to add material on the characteristics of terrorist 

-insurgent thinking to the curriculum. The problem would be of time- and 

content- management: those courses are already very compressed. The 

alternative could simply be to distribute this paper widely, so that special 

operators may at least be alerted to the possibilities of being blind-sided by 

known and common ways of thinking of terrorists and insurgents. 
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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

8. Conclusion

The results of the present investigation support looking further into 

the other characteristics of terrorist-insurgent thinking. These characteristics include the following:

a. The terrorist or insurgent is always thinking about what the strong 

are about to do. 

b. The terrorist or insurgent is holistic.

c. The terrorist or insurgent plays a waiting game. 

d. The terrorist or insurgent is creative. 

e. The terrorist or insurgent sees the big picture. 

f. The terrorist or insurgent is constantly scanning his environment for 

possible threats and for possible opportunities. 

g. The terrorist or insurgent specifically designs each action to suit his 

strategy. 

h. The terrorist or insurgent is constantly forecasting for all events and all 

other actors, and invests in the development of even unlikely scenarios. 

i. The terrorist or insurgent assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation. 

j. The terrorist or insurgent’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged.

k. Thinking like a terrorist or insurgent is not just for when there is a 

problem. 

It is the hope of this author that asking questions about terrorist-insurgent 

thinking might actually prevent death, injury, or some other cost of war 

that might otherwise have occurred.

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Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

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Endnotes

1. Brig Gen (Ret.) Russell Howard, Director, Center for Counterterrorism, Fletcher 

School of Diplomacy, 22 February 2008 by personal communication.

2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Tr. S.B. Griffiths), 

last sentence of Chapter 3.

3. Department of Defense, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), xii.

4. Some of the categories come from B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler’s “Political 

Economy of Transnational Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:2 (April 

2005), 171-182.

5. Tom Parker, “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally 

Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose,” 

(19:2, June 2007), 155-179.

6. Daniel Byman, “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism,” in Journal of Strategic 

Studies 29:5 (October 2006), 767-811; Gregory Miller, “Confronting Terrorisms: 

Group Motivation and Successful State Policies,”, in Terrorism and Political Violence 

19:3 (September 2007), 331-350

7. Martha Crenshaw, “Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior As A Product of Strategic 

Choice,” in Howard and Sawyer, ibid., 54. 

8. Max Abrahms, “Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists,” Security 

Studies 16:2 (April 2007), 223-253.

9. Eitan Y. Alimi, “Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective 

for Understanding the Tanzim,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), 263-283.

10. James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 229.

11. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28:4 

(August 2005), 597-617.

12. Alex Mintz, Steven B. Redd, and Arnold Vedlitz, “Can We Generalize from Student 

Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:5 (October 2006), 757-776.

13. Paul R. Pillar, “Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda,” Washington Quarterly 27 (Summer 

2004): 3, 101-113, 102.

14. Charles Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press), 2003.

15. Stuart Koschade, “Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications 

to Counterterrorism and Intelligence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), 

559-575.

16. Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Miami: University of South Florida, 2004), 

p. 9.

17. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-50-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design

(Washington: Department of Defense, 2008), 59 p.; A Concept for Countering 
50

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Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach (U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting 

Laboratory: Quantico: 2006).

18. Harry R. Yargar, “Strategic theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big 

Strategy,” Letort Papers (February 2006).

19. E.D. Swinton, “Defense of Duffer’s Drift,” Infantry J ournal (1905).

20. For Klein, Johnston, Paquette, and others, see references given below.

21. William Dugan, Coup d’Oeil, Strategic Intuition in Army Planning (Washington: 

U.S. Government, November 2005), 59 pages, p. 5.

22. FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations (Department of the Army: Washington, 

1997).

23. Max Taylor and John Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist,” Terrorism and Political Violence 

18 (2006), 585-601.

24. Graeme Steven and Rohan Guanaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2004).

25. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-59.

26. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).

27. Graeme Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism (Santa Barbara: ABCCLIO, 2004), p. 163.

28. Andrew North, “Losing the War on Afghan Drugs,” BBC News, 12 April 2005.

29. Scott Baldauf and Faye Bowers, “Afghan Riddled with Drug Ties,” Christian Science 

Monitor, May 13, 2005.

30. “IED, A Weapon’s Profile,” Defense Update: An International Online Defense Magazine (2004) 3, updated 23 August 2006.

31. Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds 

Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). 

32. Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds 

Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007). 

33. Unofficial comments by international staff working in the region, April 2007, cited 

in Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How It Funds 

Taliban Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5:9 (May 10, 2007).

34. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 2nd edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006).

35. BBC Transcript (www.newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/2751019.htm) of Al-Jazeera’s 

broadcast of Bin Laden’s audio message, 11 February 2003.

36. Department of Defense, JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 

(20 March 2009), xiii.
51

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

37. Department of Defense, JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, (20 

March 2009), xv.

38. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), xi.

39. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), xvi, xviii, and 

xix.

40. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), I-6.

41. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), I-6.

42. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), A-1.

43. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2005), I-7ss.

44. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), A-2.

45. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), A-3, 4.

46. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), II-22.

47. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, (18 February 2008), IV-3.

48. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-4.

49. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-8.

50. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-10.

51. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-11.

52. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-12.

53. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-17.

54. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-30.

55. Department of Defense, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (18 February 2008), IV-33.

56. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), xv.

57. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), IV-18.

58. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-2.

59. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-2.

60. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), I-11.

61. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), I-11.

62. See Section C of Chapter III. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), III-1ss and I-11.

63. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), I-12.

64. See Section C of Chapter III. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), III-1ss and I-11.

65. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-21.

66. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-22.
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67. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-27.

68. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-27.

69. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-30.

70. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-31.

71. Department of Defense, JP 3.05Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-8

72. Department of Defense, JP 3.05Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-5.

73. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), II-3.

74. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), II-4.

75. The SOF Core Activities are: Direct Action; Special Reconnaissance; Unconventional Warfare; Foreign Internal Defense; Civil Affairs Operations; Counterterrorism; Psychological Operations; Information Operations; Counterproliferation 

of Weapons of Mass Destruction ; Security Force Assistance ; Counterinsurgency 

Operations; and Activities Specified by the President or SECDEF. United States 

Special Operations Command Fact Book, p. 7, accessed 21 March 2010, www.

socom.mil/SOCOMHome/newspub/pubs/Documents/FactBook.pdf.

76. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), II-4.

77. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), II-4.

78. Department of Defense, JP 3.0, Joint Operations (17 September 2006, w/ Ch 1 13 

February 2008), p II-2. 

79. Department of Defense, JP 3.05Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-5.

80. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-8

81. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), xiii-xiv.

82. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations 

(26 April 2007), xiv.

83. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations 

(26 April 2007), xiv.

84. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), I-2.
53

Paquette: Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking

85. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), I-3, 4.

86. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), I-2.

87. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), I-3, 4.

88. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), II-9.

89. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-11.

90. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-11.

91. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-15.

92. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-20.

93. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-21.

94. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations 

(26 April 2007), IV-22ss.

95. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), IV-28, section e.

96. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), Appendix F.

97. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), F-2.

98. Annexes A (section III) and B (Section IV) to appendix G. and Appendix G’s Annex 

A, the third section Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task 

Force Operations (26 April 2007).

99. Appendix K, Special Operations Feasibility Assessment Department of Defense, 

JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations (26 April 2007)

100. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), K-1, para 2.b.b; and para d, section II.

101. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), L-2, section V.

102. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), Appendices N and O; O-4.

103. Department of Defense, JP 3-05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

(26 April 2007), P.s-a-2.

104. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), xv.
54

JSOU P10-1

105. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), xvi.

106. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), xvii.

107. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), xvii.

108. Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88.

109. Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris: Anthropos, 1974).

110. Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998).

111. Hilary Austen Johnson, “Artistry for the Strategist,” Journal of Business Strategy 

(2007), 28:4 (13-21.

112. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), 

III-55.

113. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), IV-1.

114. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), IV-1.

115. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), IV-8.

116. Department of Defense, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006), IV-24.

117. Department of Defense, JP 3.05 Doctrine of Joint Special Operations (17 December 

2003), I-3. 

118. Russell D. Howard, “Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security 

Environment,” JSOU Report, 6 July 2009.

119. Gautam Naik “Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop,” Wall Street 

Journal, November 14, 2006, p.1

120. Kate Murphy, “What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety,” New York 

Times, October 31, 2006, 1.

121. “The Waggle Dance” New Scientist, 25 November 2006, 56. 

122. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).

123. Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998).

124. Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998).

125. Laure Paquette, “Beyond the Cookie Cutter: Can SOF Learn to Think Like Terrorists,” University of Manitoba Center for Defense and Security Studies: Bison Papers 

(forthcoming.)