a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

June 2005 DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

Issues Need to 

Be Addressed in 

Managing and Funding 

Base Operations and 

Facilities Support

GAO-05-556
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-556.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-556, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee 

on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

June 2005

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE 

Issues Need to Be Addressed in 

Managing and Funding Base Operations 

and Facilities Support 

Congress has designated increased funding for BOS programs in recent 

years, sometimes more than requested, but because those amounts were 

often less than the cost of BOS services provided at installations, hundreds 

of millions of dollars designated for S/RM and other purposes were 

redesignated by the military services to pay for BOS. As GAO has previously 

reported, such funding movements while permissible are disruptive to the 

orderly provision of services, contribute to the degradation of many 

installation facilities, and can adversely affect the quality of life and morale 

of military personnel. The problem appears to be greatest in the Army. 

Further, in fiscal year 2004, U.S. military installations faced additional 

pressures in managing available BOS and S/RM funding as the services 

redesignated varying amounts of these funds to help pay for the Global War 

on Terrorism. Similar problems are reportedly occurring in fiscal year 2005. 

While difficult to quantify, installation officials at the locations GAO visited 

voiced concerns about the potential for these conditions to adversely affect 

operations and readiness in the future. Moreover, such movements of funds 

add considerable uncertainty regarding actual BOS requirements and the 

extent of underfunding. 

The ability of DOD and its components to forecast BOS funding 

requirements has been hindered by the lack of a common terminology across

the military services in defining BOS functions as well as the lack of a 

mature analytic process for developing credible and consistent requirements 

comparable to the model developed for facilities sustainment. The lack of 

common definitions among the services, particularly where one service 

resides as a tenant on an installation operated by another service, can lead to 

differing expectations for installation services, and it obscures a full 

understanding of the funding required for BOS services. Because the military 

services have often based future requirements estimates largely on prior 

expenditures, they do not necessarily know if BOS services were provided at 

appropriate levels. DOD and the military services have a strategic plan for 

installations and have multiple actions under way to address these problems, 

but they have not synchronized varying time frames for accomplishing 

related tasks. Until these problems are resolved, DOD will not have the 

management and oversight framework in place for identifying total BOS 

requirements, providing Congress with a clear basis for making funding 

decisions, and ensuring adequate delivery of services. 

While the Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized installation management 

agencies can potentially create efficiencies and improve the management of 

the facilities through streamlining and consolidation, implementation of 

these plans has so far met with mixed results in quality and level of support 

provided to activities and installations. Until more experience yields 

perspective on their efforts to address the issues identified in this report, 

GAO is not in a position to determine whether the approach should be 

adopted by the other services. 

Concerns have surfaced in 

Congress and various media 

regarding the adequacy of funding 

for base operations support (BOS) 

functions of military installations 

as well as the quality and level of 

support being provided. As 

requested, this report addresses 

(1) the historical funding trends for 

BOS as contrasted with funding for 

facilities sustainment, restoration 

and modernization (S/RM); (2) how 

effectively the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and the military 

services have been able to forecast 

BOS requirements and funding 

needs; and (3) how the Army’s and 

Navy’s reorganizations for 

managing installations have 

affected support services, and 

whether the Air Force and Marine 

Corps could benefit from similar 

reorganizations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense revise the 

department’s previously issued 

installations strategic plan to 

resolve long-standing 

inconsistencies among the military 

services’ definitions of BOS 

functions and help expedite 

development and consistent 

application of an analytically sound 

model for determining BOS 

requirements. 

DOD agreed with the 

recommendations and indicated 

that actions were under way or 

planned to implement them. 
Page i GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

While Historical Trends Show an Increase in BOS Funding, 

the Services Have Redesignated Other Funds to Meet 

BOS Services 12

Accurate Forecasts of BOS Requirements and Funding Needs Have 

Been Hampered by Several Factors 18

Centralized Installation Management Has Many Benefits, but More 

Perspective Is Needed Before It Can Be Fully Evaluated 27

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36

Appendix II: BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services 39

Appendix III: Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure 44

Appendix IV: Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and S/RM 

Activities 49

Appendix V: Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding Trends 56

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense 64

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

Related GAO Products 67
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figures Figure 1: Army BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 13

Figure 2: Army S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 15

Figure 3: Army BOS Functions and Activities 40

Figure 4: Navy BOS Functions and Activities 41

Figure 5: Marine Corps BOS Functions and Activities 42

Figure 6: Air Force BOS Functions and Activities 43

Figure 7: Army Installation Management Agency Organization 44

Figure 8: Army Installation Management Agency Locations 45

Figure 9: CNI Organization 47

Figure 10: CNI Locations 48

Figure 11: Navy BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 56

Figure 12: Navy S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 58

Figure 13: Marine Corps BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 59

Figure 14: Marine Corps S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 60

Figure 15: Air Force BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 62

Figure 16: Air Force S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04 63

Abbreviations

BOS base operations support

CNI Commander, Navy Installations

DOD Department of Defense

IMA Installation Management Agency

O&M operation and maintenance

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

S/RM sustainment, restoration and modernization

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Page 1 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 15, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Joel Hefley

Chairman

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) manages nearly 517,000 buildings and 

structures (replacement value of $650 billion) and over 46,000 square miles 

of real estate at its bases and installations worldwide. At the same time, 

DOD recognizes that it maintains infrastructure in excess of its needs,1

 and 

that it faces challenges in allocating sufficient funds to maintain this 

infrastructure and supporting other base operating needs. We have 

previously reported on the impact resulting from such underfunding, 

including the deterioration of facilities, and its negative effects on the 

quality of life for those living and working at the installations and on their 

ability to accomplish their mission activities.2

 More recently, you and 

others have expressed concerns about the adequacy of funding for overall 

base operations and whether funds were being moved to meet other 

pressing needs, leaving shortfalls in base operating accounts.

Operation and maintenance (O&M) funding is the primary category of 

funds used to keep military installations running and the facilities in good 

working order. Within O&M funding, there are distinct functional areas, 

including (1) base operations support (BOS)—a term used to describe a

1

 Retaining and underutilizing installations and facilities result in inefficiencies and 

additional costs for base services and programs. Congress authorized a base realignment 

and closure round in 2005 to deal with this issue.

2

 See the following reports: GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding 

Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities, 

GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2003); Defense Infrastructure: Changes in 

Funding Priorities and Management Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce 

Costs of Guard and Reserve Facilities, GAO-03-516 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); 

Defense Budget: Real Property Maintenance and Base Operations Fund Movements, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-101 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2000); and Defense Management: Army 

Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and 

Doctrine Command, GAO-03-214 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2003).
Page 2 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

collection of day-to-day programs, activities, and services needed to keep 

the bases and installations running;3

 (2) facilities sustainment, restoration 

and modernization (S/RM)—the recurring maintenance and repairs needed 

to keep facilities in good working order and in up-to-date condition; and 

(3) mission support—the goods and services needed to prepare for and 

conduct combat and peacetime missions, including training and weapons 

systems maintenance.

For fiscal year 2004 O&M activities, Congress appropriated about 

$83.5 billion for active duty forces and about $14.3 billion for reserve and 

national guard forces, excluding DOD-wide and miscellaneous O&M 

activities.4

 Within the O&M appropriations, conference report data show 

that Congress designated5

 $14 billion for BOS, $5.5 billion for facilities 

sustainment, and $78.3 billion for mission and other support. These 

designations were based on the sum of a set of defined program elements 

or activity groups and subactivity groups supporting the appropriation bill’s 

conference report, and are not binding unless they are incorporated 

directly or by reference into an appropriation act or other statute. Thus, 

DOD and its components have considerable flexibility in using O&M funds 

and can redesignate funds among activity and subactivity groups in various 

ways. Accordingly, it is important to note that amounts designated in the

3

 BOS is a term that derives from the “base operations” program area (which includes 

installation transportation, supply, information management, food services, legal and 

accounting services, and so forth) to which the military services have added other program 

areas including family and quality of life programs, force protection, environmental 

compliance and conservation programs, communications services, and grounds 

maintenance, as well as other facilities services such as utilities, leases, and custodial 

services, which OSD has referred to as real property services. Thus, in practice BOS is a 

collection of many diverse programs, activities, and services. Beginning with fiscal year 

2006 O&M budget submissions, OSD has started referring to real property services as 

“facilities operations” and to other base support programs as “installations services.” 

Collectively, installation services and facilities operations will be known as DOD’s 

“installations support” functional area.

4

 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87 (2003). Congress 

appropriated an additional $16.2 billion for DOD-wide and miscellaneous O&M activities.

5

 We use the terms “congressionally designated,” “congressional designation,” or variations 

of these terms throughout to refer to amounts set forth at the budget activity, activity group, 

and subactivity group level in an appropriation bill’s conference report. These 

recommended amounts are not binding unless they are also incorporated directly or by 

reference into an appropriation act or other statute.
Page 3 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

services’ accounting records for O&M functional areas, such as BOS, 

do not perfectly coincide with these congressional designations. 

For example, according to historical data provided by the military services, 

fiscal year 2004 O&M funds designated for BOS services totaled 

$15.6 billion, about $1.6 billion more than data supporting the conference 

report showed as being designated for BOS at the beginning of the fiscal 

year. Service officials attributed the variance to their accounting for the 

BOS services provided at their respective installations—the number and 

names of which are different and expanded from the BOS subactivity 

groups used for the conference report—and to funding redesignations that 

occur during the year. Accordingly, this report uses the congressional 

designations as adjusted by the services’ accounting and redesignations of 

O&M funds for BOS and S/RM to depict funding trends.

Until recently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military 

services have, for the most part, carried out installation management 

functions at the local level, where installation commanders have set 

priorities and regularly moved funds among BOS, S/RM, and mission 

support accounts to pay for services and programs at their respective 

installations. Increasingly, however, some of military services are moving to 

centralize the management of these activities, with the expectation that 

such efforts would help mitigate previous problems of funds intended for 

installation management being redesignated to other purposes.

This report addresses (1) the historical funding trends for BOS functions, 

as contrasted with funding for S/RM; (2) how effectively DOD and the 

military services have been able to forecast BOS requirements and funding 

needs; and (3) how the Army’s and the Navy’s reorganizations for managing 

installations have affected the quality and level of support provided to 

individual activities and installations, and whether the Air Force and 

Marine Corps would benefit from similar reorganizations.

To address these questions, we met with officials in DOD’s Office of 

Installations and Environment and with Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps headquarters officials and collected and analyzed historical funding 

data. We obtained data on historic funding levels from fiscal years 2001 

through 2004 from the military services based on their categorization of 

BOS functions, but we concentrated our analysis principally on fiscal year 

2004, the most recent year for which obligation data were available. To 

ensure consistency in analyzing funding trends from one year to the next, 

the historical data provided by the services and used in this report do not
Page 4 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

include congressional adjustments of a one-time nature or supplemental 

appropriations for O&M that Congress provided during a particular fiscal 

year for such things as hurricane damage cleanup and repairs or for the 

Global War on Terrorism.6

 We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this review in indicating broad trends and 

comparisons between identified requirements, budget requests, designated 

funding amounts, and subsequent obligations of funds for BOS and S/RM 

functions. However, various data limitations are noted throughout the 

report, such as differences between conference committee designations for 

BOS funding and amounts categorized by the services. We obtained 

information on the roles that OSD and the military services play in the 

overall base operations process, requirements determination, budgeting, 

and installations management. We visited two Air Force bases; two Marine 

Corps bases; three Army bases; six Navy bases; the Army’s Installation 

Management Agency’s (IMA) Headquarters and Southwest and Northeast 

regions; and the Commander, Navy Installations (CNI) Command’s 

Headquarters and South and Southwest regions. We performed our work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from 

April 2004 through April 2005. More details on our scope and methodology 

are presented in appendix I.

Results in Brief Congress has designated increased funding for BOS in recent years, 

sometimes more than requested, but because the approved increases are 

often less than the cost of BOS services provided at military installations 

(particularly the Army’s), hundreds of millions of dollars designated for 

S/RM and other purposes have been redesignated to meet BOS needs. In 

some respects this is a reversal of a trend we saw a few years ago, where 

BOS funds were more likely to be redesignated to fund facilities 

maintenance and mission training needs. We found similar though less 

pronounced funding redesignations in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps data. Each service faced problems because funds were moved 

among BOS and S/RM accounts during the year. Further, in fiscal year 2004, 

U.S. military installations faced additional pressures in managing available 

6

 For example, the S/RM-adjusted congressional designations and the obligations we used in 

our analyses for the Navy did not include $168 million in fiscal year 2003 congressional 

adjustments to upgrade the Navy’s facilities to meet antiterrorism and force protection 

standards (such as vehicle inspection shelters, pop-up barriers, fencing and gate 

improvements, and so forth) or $223 million in supplemental appropriations for hurricane 

damage and repairs, and the fiscal year 2004 amounts did not include supplemental amounts 

for the Global War on Terrorism.
Page 5 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

BOS and S/RM funding as the services redesignated varying amounts of 

O&M funds that would have been designated for BOS and S/RM to help 

instead pay for the Global War on Terrorism. At the end of fiscal year 2004, 

installations received additional funds to help offset shortfalls endured 

during the year. The timing made it difficult for the installations to execute 

many of their BOS and S/RM activities efficiently and effectively, however, 

and it resulted in the Army underexecuting its S/RM funding designations 

by $882 million in fiscal year 2004. Various indicators suggest that similar 

funding redesignations are occurring in fiscal year 2005. Such problems 

adversely affect efforts to maintain facilities and provide base support 

services. Although these actions are disruptive to planned maintenance and 

support programs and have the potential to adversely affect quality of life 

and morale, it typically is difficult to determine any immediate impact they 

may have on readiness. At the installations we visited, however, officials 

often voiced concerns about the potential impact on operations and 

readiness in the future should these conditions continue. At the same time, 

such movements of funds add considerable uncertainty regarding amounts 

required and the degree to which BOS services may be underfunded.

DOD and the military services’ ability to forecast BOS requirements and 

funding needs has been hindered by the lack of a common terminology 

across the military services in defining BOS functions, as well as by the 

lack of a mature analytic process for developing BOS requirements 

comparable to that developed for facilities sustainment requirements. Lack 

of common definitions among the services, particularly where one service 

resides as a tenant on an installation operated by another service, can lead 

to differing expectations for services, and it obscures a full understanding 

of the funding that is required for BOS services. Each service has 

historically developed its own BOS requirements and funding needs subject 

to its own definition of BOS and the types and levels of services it deems 

necessary. Until recently, each has relied heavily on previous expenditures 

as the basis for stating future requirements. But while the military services 

can tell Congress how much was spent in an area in the past, they do not 

necessarily know whether BOS services were provided at appropriate 

levels or how much it should cost to provide them in the future. Until such 

problems are resolved, DOD will not have the management and oversight 

framework in place that it needs for identifying total BOS requirements and 

ensuring adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint environment. 

Various efforts are under way, either within the military services or led 

by OSD, to strengthen their respective abilities to forecast future 

requirements. OSD and the services recognize, however, that additional 

efforts are needed. Within the past year they have started working to 
Page 6 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

develop common definitions, standards, and performance metrics. 

However, as they are still in the early stages of developing these initiatives, 

time frames for accomplishing many of the specific actions under way or 

planned have either not been established or vary among working groups. 

This creates uncertainty about the accuracy of time frames being reported 

for completing the respective tasks and raises questions about how well 

coordinated and integrated these efforts will be. Improvements in these 

areas will be important to ensuring consistency in identifying the base 

operations services expected to be provided, particularly where multiple 

military services with varying support needs are located on individual 

military installations, and in providing Congress with a clear basis for 

making funding decisions.

While many officials view the Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized 

installation management agencies as having the potential to create 

efficiencies and improve the management of the facilities through 

streamlining and consolidation, implementation of these plans has to date 

met with mixed results in the quality and level of support provided to 

activities and installations. A common concern voiced by individuals at the 

installations we visited was that the centralized management efforts had 

not sufficiently recognized the diverse needs of the installations’ many 

tenants who require quick reaction in the face of changing circumstances. 

Navy and Army officials acknowledge such problems as growing pains 

associated with implementing the new approach and indicated that they 

are working to address them. Nevertheless, until more experience is gained 

from efforts to address the issues identified in this report, we are not in a 

position to recommend one approach over the other. Using a more 

decentralized facilities management approach at the time of our review, the 

Air Force and Marine Corps were emphasizing selective consolidation and 

efficiency measures to improve operations and achieve savings.

We are making recommendations in this report for DOD to update its 

strategic plan and to include specific actions and establish time frames to, 

first, resolve long-standing inconsistencies among the definitions of BOS 

services and, second, help expedite the development and implementation 

of an analytically sound and consistently applied model for determining 

BOS requirements. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed 

with our recommendations and indicated that actions were under way or 

planned to implement them.
Page 7 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Background DOD manages nearly 517,000 buildings and structures (replacement value 

of $650 billion) and over 46,000 square miles of real estate at its bases 

and installations worldwide. These facilities must be properly maintained 

or they are subject to premature deterioration. At these bases and 

installations, DOD prepares for and conducts combat and peacetime 

missions, including training and weapons systems maintenance. Doing 

so requires significant amounts of BOS services, such as information 

management; systems operations and maintenance; facilities engineering; 

transportation; utilities; environmental, safety, and health services; 

housing; food services; morale, welfare, and recreation services; security 

and fire services; and disaster preparedness.

Funding for O&M O&M funds finance the costs of operating and maintaining military 

operations for active and reserve components, including related support 

activities of DOD, but excluding military personnel costs. Included are 

pay for civilians, services for maintenance of equipment and facilities, 

fuel, supplies, and spare parts for weapons and equipment. Funding 

requirements are influenced by many factors, including force structure 

levels, such as the number of aircraft squadrons and Army and Marine 

Corps divisions; installations; military personnel strength and deployments; 

rates of operational activity; and the quantity and complexity of equipment 

such as aircraft, ships, missiles, and tanks in operation. For fiscal year 

2004, Congress appropriated $114 billion for O&M activities.7

 DOD uses 

distinct activities and accounting structures to manage O&M budgeting and 

funding for functional areas such as the following:

• BOS—a term that derives from the “base operations” program area 

(which includes installation transportation, supply, information 

management, food services, legal and accounting services, and so forth) 

to which the military services have added other program areas including 

family and quality of life programs, force protection, environmental 

compliance and conservation programs, communications services, and 

grounds maintenance, as well as other facilities services such as

7

 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87 (2003). This 

amount, and the amounts we used in our historical funding trend analyses for this report, 

does not include supplemental appropriations for O&M that Congress provided for such 

things as the Global War on Terrorism.
Page 8 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

utilities, leases, and custodial services, which OSD has referred to 

as real property services.8

 Thus, in practice BOS is not a single, 

well-defined program area but a collection of many diverse programs, 

activities, and services. The different BOS functions and activities used 

by the military services are shown in appendix II.

• S/RM—the maintenance and repairs needed to keep facilities in good 

working order and in up-to-date condition. Sustainment funds cover 

expenses for all recurring maintenance costs and contracts, as well as 

for major repairs of nonstructural facility components (for example, 

replacing the roof or repairing the air conditioning system) that are 

expected to occur during a facility’s life cycle. In addition to facilities 

sustainment, O&M funds are sometimes used for facilities restoration 

and modernization. Restoration includes repair and replacement work 

needed to restore facilities damaged by inadequate sustainment, 

excessive age, natural disaster, fire, accident, or other causes. 

Modernization includes altering or modernizing facilities to meet new or 

higher standards, accommodate new functions, or replace structural 

components.

• Mission support—the goods and services needed to prepare for and 

conduct combat and peacetime missions, including training and 

weapons systems maintenance. O&M funds are used by the armed 

forces and defense agencies to prepare for and conduct combat and 

peacetime missions. For example, DOD uses O&M funds to increase 

combat proficiency through flying and ground training operations; to 

acquire fuel, support equipment, and spare parts for training operations; 

to pay supporting civilian personnel; and to purchase supplies, 

equipment, and service contracts for the repair of weapons and 

weapons systems.

According to historical data provided by the military services, fiscal year 

2004 O&M funds designated for BOS services totaled $15.6 billion, about 

$1.6 billion more than data supporting the conference report showed as 

being designated for BOS at the beginning of the fiscal year. Service 

8

 Beginning with fiscal year 2006 O&M activities, DOD refers to base operations, family and 

quality of life programs, force protection, environmental compliance and conservation 

programs, communications services, food services, grounds maintenance, and so forth as 

“installations services” and to real property services (utilities, leases, custodial services, 

snow plowing, and the like) as “facilities operations.” Collectively, installations services and 

facilities operations will be known as DOD’s “installations support” functional area.
Page 9 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

officials attributed the variance to their accounting for the BOS services 

provided at their respective installations—the number and names of which 

are different and expanded from the BOS subactivity groups used for the 

conference report—and to funding redesignations that occur during the 

year. Accordingly, this report uses the congressional designations as 

adjusted by the services’ accounting and redesignations of O&M funds for 

BOS and S/RM to depict funding trends. Further, to better project trend 

data consistently, the historical data provided by the services included in 

this report do not include congressional adjustments of a one-time nature 

or supplemental appropriations for O&M that Congress provided during a 

particular fiscal year for such things as hurricane damage cleanup and 

repairs or for the Global War on Terrorism.

Services’ Organizational 

Structures for Managing 

Installations

Until recent years, the military services had, for the most part, carried out 

installation management functions at the local level, where the installation 

commanders received O&M funding for various subactivities and set 

priorities among competing demands. They also had the flexibility to 

make trade-offs in the face of funding limitations, shifting funds among 

subactivities’ competing priorities, and to meet unanticipated demands. We 

have previously reported on the movement of funds from BOS to alleviate 

shortfalls in S/RM, and we have also reported instances where funds 

intended for maintaining facilities had to be used to support base 

operations or to cover other mission costs. However, such movements of 

funds often raised or aggravated concerns about the adequacy of funding 

for each of these areas or about how efficiently and effectively programs 

were executed during the year.

The Army and the Navy have recently taken steps to reorganize and 

centralize their installation management activities. One of the expectations 

established in setting up these centralized activities was that they would 

curtail or prevent the movement of funds from facilities and base 

operations to other priorities and create greater stability in the execution 

of those activities. IMA was activated on October 1, 2002, providing 

consolidated management of Army installations worldwide. The services 

managed by IMA include engineering, information technology, resource 

management, and other installation support activities. The agency’s 

objective is to standardize installation management services, providing 

consistent and equitable facilities and services via common standards. IMA 

is made up of seven regional offices, four in the continental United States 

and three overseas. To establish IMA, the Department of the Army worked 

with its major commands to identify the activities, personnel, and 
Page 10 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

resources that provided facilities and base operations support. These 

service activities and the associated workforce were then organizationally 

realigned from the major commands and their installation commanders to 

establish IMA. Under the reorganization, IMA headquarters assumed 

control of the BOS and S/RM budgets in fiscal year 2004 and determined the 

funding for these programs and activities.

CNI was activated October 1, 2003, and is responsible for Navy-wide 

installation management. Its mission is to provide uniform program, policy, 

and funding management, along with oversight of shore installation 

support. Prior to the activation of CNI, management of its base operations 

support activities was conducted at regional levels. With the activation of 

CNI, shore installation management and the personnel associated with 

those functions were organizationally realigned under CNI’s control. CNI is 

made up of 16 regions, 10 in the continental United States and 6 overseas. 

Consolidation of the management of services provided at the regional and 

installation levels was intended to reduce base operating support costs 

through the elimination of unnecessary management layers, duplicative 

overhead and redundant functions. The Army and Navy reorganizational 

management structures are discussed further in appendix III.

The Marine Corps, because it is small, has always been somewhat centrally 

managed, but it generally leaves to the individual base commanders the 

decisions about the level of BOS services required and issues regarding 

quality of life at an installation. The Air Force has integrated BOS and 

installations management into its mission programs and continues to 

manage in a decentralized manner, using Air Force-level guidance. In the 

Air Force, major commands are actively engaged with subordinate 

commanders in the funding and management of Air Force installations.

Strategic Plan for 

Installations

We have cited the need for and DOD has in recent years developed a 

facilities strategic plan to guide future facilities efforts. Our February 2003 

report9

 noted that DOD’s strategic plan for facilities had weaknesses that 

included a lack of comprehensive information on specific actions, time 

frames, assigned responsibilities, and resources—the elements of a 

well-developed strategic plan—that are required to meet the plan’s vision.

9 GAO-03-274.
Page 11 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

In September 2004, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment released the department’s updated Defense Installations 

Strategic Plan, which outlines a set of initiatives with some milestones to 

sustain, restore, and modernize installation assets.10 The vision set forth in 

the plan is to have installation assets and services, including BOS, available 

when and where needed, with the joint capabilities and capacities 

necessary to support DOD missions effectively and efficiently.

Prior GAO Reports Since 1997, we have identified DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk 

area. We have completed a number of reviews in which we identified 

numerous examples of the services’ moving O&M funds out of accounts 

congressionally designated to support one functional area and into another 

to meet competing needs. We examined the impacts on areas such as 

facilities maintenance and BOS—areas that were already considered to be 

underfunded against projected needs. For example, our February 2000 

report compared the funding amounts that Congress had designated for 

DOD’s O&M subactivities, including BOS and S/RM, with DOD’s obligations 

for those same subactivities, and we showed that DOD consistently 

obligated a different amount from what Congress had designated.11 In 

February 2003, we reported that O&M funds designated for facilities 

sustainment were reduced or held back at the service headquarters, major 

command, and installation levels to cover more pressing needs or emerging 

requirements.12 As a result of these holdbacks and movements, we 

concluded that the amounts of funds spent on facilities maintenance and 

repairs were not sufficient to reverse the trend of facility deterioration. Our 

February 2003 report also noted the shifting of funds from one O&M 

functional account to resolve funding shortfalls in another. For example, it 

noted the difficulty that redesignating facilities sustainment funds to other 

purposes makes for installations in implementing rational facilities 

sustainment plans.

10 U.S. Department of Defense, 2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2004).

11 GAO, Defense Budget: DOD Should Further Improve Visibility and Accountability of 

O&M Fund Movements, GAO/NSIAD-00-18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2000).

12 GAO-03-274.
Page 12 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

While Historical Trends 

Show an Increase 

in BOS Funding, 

the Services Have 

Redesignated Other 

Funds to Meet 

BOS Services

Congress has designated increased funding for BOS in recent years, 

sometimes more than requested, but often to amounts that were lower than 

the cost of BOS services provided at installations, particularly in the Army. 

This has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars originally designated 

for facilities maintenance being redesignated by the services to meet BOS 

needs. As a result, the Army has faced problems in executing planned 

programs effectively. Supplemental funding may be made available to 

installations late in the fiscal year, as occurred in fiscal year 2004, making it 

difficult for an installation to execute many of its BOS and S/RM activities 

promptly and efficiently.13 For example, base services may be reduced and 

routine maintenance and repair of facilities may be deferred. (App. IV 

highlights some key impacts of funding shortfalls and redesignations on 

BOS and S/RM activities and locations we visited.) Such problems 

adversely affect efforts to maintain facilities, provide base support 

services, and conduct mission training, but the overall impact is often 

difficult to gauge in the short term. We found similar, though less 

pronounced, funding redesignations in the Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Air Force.

Army Funding Trends Available data show differences between the amounts the Army projected 

as required for BOS and the amounts included in budget requests, the 

congressionally designated amounts as adjusted by the Army, and the 

amounts that were actually obligated for each fiscal year from 2001 

through 2004. Congress gave the Army increasing funds for BOS in some 

fiscal years, but these funds were less than the amounts projected by the 

Army as being required and less than the amounts that were actually 

obligated. As shown in figure 1, fiscal year 2004 data showed a spike in 

projected requirements due at least in part to the Army’s use of a model 

that projected requirements at a higher level of service than was previously 

used in projecting budget requirements. Obligations were higher than funds 

initially provided, with funds being moved to BOS from other accounts, 

such as S/RM, to permit this increase.14 At the same time, funding 

turbulence across BOS and facility sustainment accounts was exacerbated 

13 End-of-year obligations provided by the services include funding that was restored near 

the end of the fiscal year. This masks the degree of turbulence affecting programs and 

delivery of services during the fiscal year.

14 Army efforts to improve its projection of budget requirements are discussed more fully in 

a subsequent section of this report.
Page 13 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

in fiscal year 2004 as the Army withheld funds that otherwise would have 

been designated to fund BOS and S/RM, to help pay for the Global War on 

Terrorism, although some funding was restored toward the end of the 

fiscal year. Such turbulence occurring during the year makes it difficult to 

execute planned programs effectively and, as noted later, resulted in the 

Army’s underexecuting its S/RM program in fiscal year 2004.

Figure 1: Army BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) As discussed in a later section of this report, Army officials indicated they are taking steps to 

improve their requirements determination process for BOS funding. 

(3) Obligations exceeded adjusted congressionally designated amounts as a result of authorized 

internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed below, the Army moved S/RM funds 

into the BOS account.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Army

Amount obligated
Page 14 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

The data show that BOS funding provided by Congress increased in fiscal 

year 2002, remained stable in fiscal year 2003, and declined in fiscal year 

2004. They also show that BOS obligations increased, particularly in 2003 

and 2004, and that the Army routinely obligates more for BOS services than 

adjusted congressionally designated amounts, through redesignations of 

funds from other accounts. For example, in fiscal year 2004, the Army’s 

request for BOS funding—$5.756 billion—was about 65 percent of the 

amount it projected as being needed to provide traditional levels of BOS 

services. According to Army officials, while congressionally designated 

amounts as adjusted by the Army—$6.009 billion—were somewhat more 

than they requested, during the year they nevertheless had to reduce BOS 

programs because they did not have sufficient funds to pay for traditional 

levels of BOS services since they had to temporarily move some BOS funds 

to pay for the Global War on Terrorism. To what extent the Army’s actual 

needs increased over prior years is difficult to fully gauge because, 

according to Army officials, the requirements model used for fiscal year 

2004 budget requests reflected improved information on the resources 

needed to provide BOS programs and services compared to what they had 

used in prior years. At the same time, because many BOS programs 

involved bills that must be paid in a timely manner (such as utilities and 

contracts), during the year the Army moved $882 million from S/RM 

accounts and $816 million from other O&M accounts and used 

supplemental funding for the Global War on Terrorism to cover its essential 

bills and BOS services (total amount obligated was $7.707 billion).

In contrast with BOS requirements, S/RM trend data show that S/RM 

requirements and President’s budget requests have remained relatively 

constant since fiscal year 2002. Army officials attributed this consistency to 

improved facilities sustainment requirements forecasts achieved by using 

DOD’s facilities sustainment model and a cost factors handbook, both of 

which were developed for this purpose in recent years.15 However, as 

shown by figure 2, the Army has consistently requested fewer funding 

dollars for S/RM services than it had internally projected as being needed to 

provide levels of S/RM services projected by the model. Furthermore, the 

Army obligated fewer funding dollars for S/RM activities than adjusted 

congressionally designated amounts in the last 3 years.

15 This model, developed by DOD in 1999, estimates the annual sustainment cost 

requirement, adjusted for area costs, for each service and defense agency, based on the 

number, type, location, and size of total inventory of facilities. The cost factors handbook 

uses commercial benchmark costs to determine the annual cost per square foot (or similar 

unit of measure) to sustain each facility type. 
Page 15 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 2: Army S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Army officials indicated they had improved S/RM requirements forecasts by using the DOD facilities 

sustainment model developed in 1999.

(3) Obligations were less than congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Army, as a result 

of authorized internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed below, the Army 

moved S/RM funds into the BOS account.

According to Army officials, the difference between the amounts 

designated for S/RM services and the amounts obligated is made up of 

funds moved from S/RM activities and redesignated to BOS activities to pay 

for “must pay bills” (such as utilities and, increasingly, obtaining services 

from contractors). This indicates a continuation of the historic trend of 

funds being moved among various O&M subaccounts during the year, but a 

reversal of a trend we saw a few years ago where BOS funds were more 

likely to be redesignated to fund facilities maintenance and other needs. 

S/RM services were also affected by the Army’s withholding O&M funds 

that otherwise would have been designated to fund BOS and S/RM, to help 

pay for the Global War on Terrorism. Similar problems reportedly are 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Army

Amount obligated
Page 16 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

occurring in fiscal year 2005. The Army ultimately was able to provide 

additional funds to installations late in the fiscal year ($100 million in 

August 2004 and another $100 million on September 30, 2004), as 

supplemental funding was made available to cover warfighting costs, but 

Army officials told us that the timing made it difficult for the installations to 

execute many of their BOS and S/RM activities promptly and efficiently. We 

noted that this resulted in the Army’s underexecuting its S/RM program by 

$882 million in fiscal year 2004. As we have previously reported, such 

problems adversely affect efforts to maintain facilities and provide base 

support services. End-of-year figures shown in figures 1 and 2 mask 

somewhat the level of turbulence that occurred during the year as funds 

moved between accounts. Similar masking occurred in BOS and S/RM 

accounts in the other military services.

Other Military Services 

Have Faced Similar Though 

Less Pronounced Problems

BOS and S/RM funding trends and problems identified in the Army also 

occurred in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force but were less 

pronounced. Nevertheless, each of these services faced similar challenges 

in its ability to execute planned programs effectively as a result of its 

moving of funds among accounts. For example, we found the following:

• Congress gave the Navy increased funding for BOS during some years, 

though we found a smaller difference here than for the Army between 

identified requirements and funding. The difference between the Navy’s 

obligations and its funding also appears to be smaller than that for the 

Army, but the Navy’s obligations for BOS still were greater than were its 

congressionally designated amounts for BOS as adjusted by the Navy. 

Navy officials said the difference between these adjusted 

congressionally designated amounts and the amounts obligated is made 

up of funds redesignated from S/RM activities to BOS activities to pay 

essential BOS bills such as utilities and, increasingly, obtaining 

contactor services.

• Navy S/RM funding trend data show a spike in congressionally 

designated amounts adjusted by the Navy and in obligations for fiscal 

year 2003. According to Navy officials, 2003 was simply a well-funded 

year for Navy shore facilities. However, in fiscal year 2004, S/RM 

services were negatively affected by the Navy’s withholding of O&M 

funds otherwise intended to fund BOS and S/RM to help pay for the 

Global War on Terrorism. (Similar problems reportedly are occurring in 

fiscal year 2005.) The Navy obligated fewer funding dollars for S/RM 

activities in fiscal year 2004 than were initially designated. Although the 
Page 17 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Navy also received supplemental funding for the Global War on 

Terrorism for BOS and S/RM activities, such turbulence occurring 

during the year makes it difficult to execute planned programs 

effectively and resulted in the Navy’s underexecuting its S/RM program 

by $393 million in fiscal year 2004.

• The trend data for BOS obligations present a more mixed picture for 

the Marine Corps. For half of the period (2 of 4 years), its obligations 

were greater than both congressionally designated amounts, as adjusted 

by the Marine Corps, and projected requirements. For example, in 

fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps’ BOS obligations of $1.164 billion 

were $54 million more than its designated funding ($1.110 billion), 

representing a movement of funds from other accounts to support 

BOS activities.

• S/RM trend data show that the Marine Corps obligated more funding 

than adjusted congressionally designated amounts in fiscal years 2001 

and 2003, and it obligated less funding than adjusted congressionally 

designated amounts in fiscal year 2004. Marine Corps officials said the 

differences were due to funds being moved and redesignated among 

BOS and S/RM accounts.

• Data were not readily available to provide a trend for the Air Force’s 

projected BOS requirements.16 Funding trend data for BOS services and 

programs within the Air Force show that budgetary requests, funding, 

and BOS obligations remained more closely aligned than was the case 

for the other services in most years. Nevertheless, some differences do 

exist among budget requests, funding, and obligations.

• Air Force trend data for S/RM activities during fiscal years 2001 through 

2004 show that obligations were greater than funding or budget requests 

in each of the 4 years. According to Air Force officials, BOS and other 

O&M activities’ funds were redesignated by installation commanders in 

fiscal year 2004 to supplement S/RM funds.

16 Although the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were able to provide information on 

requirements, Air Force officials indicated that to do so would require extraordinary efforts 

to accumulate data from individual installations and commands, and they did not view such 

unrefined requirements data as necessarily representative of true requirements.
Page 18 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Additional details on funding trends for the Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Air Force are included in appendix V.

Accurate Forecasts of 

BOS Requirements and 

Funding Needs Have 

Been Hampered by 

Several Factors

DOD and the military services’ ability to forecast BOS requirements and 

funding shortfalls have been hindered by the lack of a common terminology 

across the services for defining BOS functions, as well as by their lack of a 

mature analytic process for developing BOS requirements comparable to 

the one developed for facilities sustainment requirements. The lack of 

common definitions for BOS services among the military services impairs 

the development of a complete picture of total BOS requirements across 

the military services, and it can lead to differing expectations where 

multiple military services are colocated on a single installation. 

Historically, each service has developed its own BOS requirements and 

funding needs, based on previous expenditure levels and subject to its own 

definition of BOS and the types and levels of services it has deemed 

necessary to provide. Various efforts are under way to improve BOS 

management and strengthen the ability of DOD and its components to 

forecast future requirements, provide Congress with a clearer basis for 

making funding decisions, and ensure adequate delivery of services, but 

OSD and the services recognize that more are needed.

Lack of Common 

Definitions of BOS 

Functions and Services 

Leads to Different 

Expectations

In completing this review we found that what constitutes BOS functions 

and services varies among the military services, thus contributing to the 

existence of different expectations for the levels of BOS services being 

provided.17 Also, this variation has carried over into the support 

agreements and reimbursement practices used by the different commands 

and military services located at the installations. In visiting various military 

installations we found a variety of instances where the lack of a common 

definition of BOS functions and services was problematic, most often 

where multiple commands and military services were colocated at a single 

installation.

For example, the Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas, is host to 

non-Navy tenants, including the Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, 

and an Army Depot. Coast Guard officials said that they enjoy numerous 

benefits by being at the base, including no rent payments and better 

17 This makes it difficult to determine the totality of BOS requirements across DOD.
Page 19 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

security, housing, child care, and fitness centers—better conditions than 

they had experienced before moving onto the base. Despite the benefits 

afforded by their service agreement with the Navy base, Coast Guard 

officials expressed concern over decreasing levels of BOS services, 

including reductions that negatively impact their mission. For example, 

Coast Guard officials said they cannot always meet their 30-minute launch 

requirement for nighttime air missions because the base has cut back on 

operating hours, keeping the airfield open only during the day. Therefore, 

Coast Guard officials said, when performing after-hours missions, the flight 

crew must get out of their aircraft, stop traffic, and manually unlock and 

open a gate to access the runway. This process sometimes makes it 

impossible for the Coast Guard to meet its 30-minute launch requirement. 

In addition, Coast Guard officials said they could never be certain that 

runway lights would be on when they needed to land late at night or 

whether the tower would answer, and they are unable to conduct training 

at the base at night, when the airfield is closed. Corpus Christi Army Depot, 

another of the Naval Air Station’s tenants, also has a service agreement 

with the base that identifies which services are to be provided by the Navy 

at no cost and which services the Army Depot must pay for (through 

reimbursements to the Navy). Army Depot officials told us that they were 

incurring increasing costs but receiving reduced BOS services from the 

Navy. Corpus Christi officials said they had no choice but to reduce 

services because they did not have the BOS and S/RM funds needed to 

maintain the levels of services they had provided in the past.

Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, houses multiple Air Force missions 

across multiple commands and also hosts the Navy as a tenant activity 

on the base. An Air Force official from a command other than the one 

responsible for managing the base told us that its support agreement, 

signed in 1996, did not clearly specify the quantity or quality of services the 

base would provide and that the base did not have enough money to 

provide all of the needed services. As a result, the tenant said it spends 

from $55,000 to $75,000 a year on BOS services from its O&M mission 

accounts and works personnel extended hours to meet some needs. We 

found that the Navy tenant has an interagency support agreement with the 

Air Force, regarding which services the Air Force is to provide at no cost 

(such as food services), which services the Navy will reimburse the Air 

Force for (such as utilities), and which services the Air Force will not 

provide due to the uniqueness of different approaches and governing 

regulations between the military services (such as legal support 

personnel). The Air Force at Tinker has contracted with the private sector 

for much of its BOS, and the Navy shares in the cost of that contract, in 
Page 20 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

accordance with its interagency support agreement. While Navy officials 

stated that overall the BOS services provided by the Air Force were 

adequate, they nonetheless expressed concern about limitations in some 

base support services, which forced them to pay separately for some BOS 

services, such as security and education, out of other O&M funds. Navy 

officials also expressed concern that some expected BOS services were 

being scaled back; for example, mail service pickup and delivery were 

reduced from twice to once per day, and fire department inspections and 

repair and replacements of fire extinguishers were postponed. Navy 

officials expressed further concern about service reductions in the 

facilities sustainment area, compromising preventive maintenance and 

contributing to further deterioration of the facilities.

According to Tinker Air Force Base officials, they do not have sufficient 

funds to provide all BOS and S/RM services at the levels or timing desired 

by their tenants, and they have worked to gain efficiencies in their 

programs and have scaled back some programs that are not mission 

critical. For example, they said that they can only replace carpet once every 

10 years; thus, if a tenant’s carpet is worn out in 8 or 9 years, the tenant 

must either wait 1 or 2 years or use other funds to pay for new carpet. 

Tinker officials conceded that there is not as much money available for 

preventive maintenance as they would like, but they believe that the base 

has done a good job of fixing things when they break. They acknowledged 

that the tenants might think things do not get fixed fast enough, but stated 

that the base and its contractor are in full compliance with Air Force 

standards for performing such services. In addition, they are negotiating 

revisions to their support agreements to help clarify which BOS and S/RM 

services the tenants should pay for and which services should be the 

responsibilities of the base.

We found similar concerns at the other installations we visited, particularly 

those with multiple commands represented on a single base or with one 

service residing as a tenant at an installation operated by another service. 

The potential magnitude of the problem of differing expectations is 

significant, as the Army alone has about 1,200 agreements with the other 

military services to provide BOS services and about 250 agreements with 

other agencies for this purpose. As DOD increasingly emphasizes jointness 

and potentially joint basing, problems such as those noted above are likely 

to increase in the absence of clearer delineation of BOS service 

requirements and common definitions of BOS functions.
Page 21 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Requirements and Funding 

Needs Have Historically 

Been Service Driven and 

Based on Previous 

Expenditure Levels

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment oversees the procedures that the military services use to 

develop BOS requirements and funding needs, but each service has 

historically developed its own BOS requirements and funding needs subject 

to its own definition of BOS and the types and levels of services it deems 

necessary to provide. Unlike the facilities sustainment area, in which DOD 

has developed a model useful for forecasting funding requirements, for 

BOS the services have had few institutional-level requirements-forecasting 

tools. Until recently, they have relied heavily on previous expenditures as 

the basis for stating their future requirements. But while the services can 

tell Congress how much was spent in an area in the past, they do not 

necessarily know whether these services were provided at appropriate 

levels or how much it would or should cost to provide them in the future. 

DOD and the services have recognized this as a problem and have various 

initiatives under way to better develop and calculate BOS requirements and 

funding needs, similar to what they have done in the facilities sustainment 

area.

As noted earlier, DOD has taken steps to improve its identification of the 

funding required to maintain its facilities. For example, as we previously 

reported, in 1999 DOD issued its first defense facilities cost factors 

handbook. Based on the guidelines in the handbook, DOD divides defense 

facilities into approximately 400 categories and uses commercial 

benchmark costs to determine the annual cost per square foot (or similar 

unit of measure) to sustain each facility type. The purpose of the handbook 

was to standardize the methods by which the services would determine the 

sustainment costs of their facilities and to establish a minimum 

sustainment funding level for facilities. Likewise, in 1999, DOD developed 

the facilities sustainment model, which estimates the annual sustainment 

cost requirement, adjusted for area costs, for each service and defense 

agency, based on the number, type, location, and size of its total inventory 

of facilities. Because of competing priorities, the services have not always 

funded sustainment at 100 percent of requirements identified using these 

tools, and we have reported instances where percentages of funding 

reaching individual installations varied. Nonetheless, these tools offer a 

superior basis for identifying requirements than existed previously. Similar 

tools have not been developed for forecasting requirements in the BOS 

area, although OSD and individual services are taking some steps to 

improve forecasting BOS requirements.
Page 22 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Until recently, the Army relied heavily on historical expenditures as the 

basis for stating its future BOS requirements. In the mid-1990s, the Army 

developed a model that forecasts its BOS requirements based on regression 

cost-estimating relationships derived using historical data, demographics, 

pacing measures, and quality factors. According to Army officials, they 

continually work to improve the model and to update the information used 

in it. They indicated that since the model currently reflects all the resources 

needed to provide BOS programs and services at the highest standards 

without any shortcomings, the Army does not expect to fully fund its 

requirements and is working instead to ensure that the necessary and 

affordable services are provided. Army officials told us that they are now 

working to develop common level of support models that they will use to 

provide definitive guidance, performance standards, and performance 

measures for the uniform delivery of various BOS services at an affordable 

support level across Army installations worldwide. The Army is evaluating 

95 categories of services and plans to implement its common level of 

support models incrementally, beginning in fiscal year 2005, as it completes 

its evaluations of selected service categories. For example, the Army 

analyzed the various activities that constitute recreation services—

exercise programs, libraries, movie theaters, and sporting events—and 

solicited the users’ priorities. It then determined which activities need no 

longer be provided18 and developed common standards that it plans to 

apply to remaining recreation services at each installation.

The Navy is also moving away from historical expenditures as the basis for 

stating its future BOS requirements. In fiscal year 2004, the Navy 

centralized its installations management and began costing out its BOS 

services based on a selection of service capability options ranging from 

1 (most) to 4 (least). According to Navy officials, by providing a range of 

service levels and funding requirements associated with those levels for 

various BOS services, decision makers can see what risks they face with 

selecting given levels of funding. In an effort to reasonably balance the 

levels of services provided against risk and affordability, Navy officials said 

that no capability level 1 or 4 options were selected in implementing fiscal 

year 2004 BOS programs and services. Instead, BOS programs and services 

specifically tied to air and port operations, utilities, and some recreational 

services at remote overseas locations were to be funded at level 2. All other 

BOS programs and services—including such things as environmental 

18 According to an Army official, the Army’s intention is to fully fund fewer services as 

opposed to partially funding a larger number of services as it has done in the past.
Page 23 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

compliance, public safety, and human resources—were to be funded at 

level 3. However, officials at Navy bases we visited told us that there were 

not enough funds available to the installations in fiscal year 2004 to provide 

services even at the reduced levels and that they were experiencing 

degradation in the quality of some services, which in some cases had gone 

to level 4. For example, Navy officials at Corpus Christi said that although 

fire protection was to be funded at level 3 in fiscal year 2004, they received 

only 82 percent of the funding needed to provide that level of service, 

resulting in the actual service level provided being level 4. Navy officials 

stated that the level of fire protection at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi is 

in full compliance with DOD and Navy requirements.

The Marine Corps also has had few institutional-level tools for forecasting 

requirements and, for the most part, has relied on historical expenditures 

as the basis for stating its future BOS requirements. Marine Corps officials 

told us that some BOS programs have performance requirements, such as 

response times and minimum staffing necessary for their fire protection 

and emergency response teams to effectively and safely operate during 

emergencies. By utilizing the performance requirements and their metrics, 

they can evaluate their response times to forecast staffing requirements to 

operate a fire department, which in turn drives the program’s funding 

requirement. Although based primarily on the previous year’s execution 

amounts, Marine Corps officials told us that most Marine Corps BOS 

programs and services are executed as required by the base commanders, 

who have many competing needs, many of which vary annually. For 

example, if the installation has a heavy snow year, the commander may 

reduce the requirement to cut the grass to stay within budget.

The Air Force has historically based its BOS requirements on the average 

of the previous 4-year obligations, with programmatic adjustments as 

necessary. However, beginning with the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, 

Air Force officials told us that BOS requirements for the active Air Force 

major command installations were derived from a BOS cost projection 

formula that used multiple linear regression analysis involving BOS 

personnel, plant replacement value, and contractor manpower 

equivalents.19 The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard BOS

19 Air Force officials told us that requirements data for fiscal years 2001 through 2004 

(the years that we used in our funding analyses) would have to be accumulated from data 

from individual installations and commands, and they did not view such unrefined 

requirements data as necessarily representative of true requirements.
Page 24 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

requirements are still based on the 4-year average method. Air Force 

officials said that their major commands are actively engaged with 

subordinate commanders in the funding and management of BOS services 

and programs at their installations.

OSD Has Launched Some 

Initiatives to Improve 

BOS Management and 

Enhance Requirements 

Determinations

In addition to the military services’ efforts to address BOS, OSD has 

recognized BOS management as a problem and, in March 2004, the 

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment designated the improvement of BOS management as a 

priority. According to office officials, DOD’s and the military services’ 

ability to forecast BOS requirements and funding needs has been hindered 

by the lack of a common terminology across the military services for 

defining BOS functions and the lack of common definitions impairs the 

development of a complete picture of total BOS requirements and can lead 

to differing expectations for services where multiple military services are 

collocated on a single installation. Office officials explained that BOS is 

not a single program but instead comprises many diverse functions 

and activities—the Army has identified 95 different categories of BOS 

functions, the Navy has identified 124 categories, and so forth. The 

different BOS functions and activities used by the military services are 

shown in appendix II. Recognizing that definitions of BOS functions varied 

among the military services, officials in the Office of the Under Secretary 

told us that they are working with the services to (1) develop a common 

definition of BOS services and programs between the military services, 

(2) improve the tracking of BOS funding, (3) model BOS requirements, and 

(4) measure performance. Accomplishments through March 2005 include 

updating the Defense Installations Strategic Plan to articulate the need to 

define common standards and metrics, using commercial benchmarks as a 

starting point to define and model each subfunction of facilities operations 

(utilities, leases, custodial services, snow plowing, and the like) and 

establishing cross-service working groups to examine definitions and 

budget structures. Officials with the Office of the Under Secretary said that 

common definitions and standards would be developed incrementally, a 

process that could take several years for full development and 

implementation.
Page 25 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

In a related effort, in late 2004 a separate Senior Joint Basing Group20 that 

was created to address installation management issues at joint bases began 

efforts to resolve long-standing challenges involving support agreements 

where one service is a tenant on an installation operated by another 

service. Key enablers to this effort are common definitions and DOD-wide 

standards, metrics, and reimbursement and costing rules for BOS services 

and programs between the military services. This group has its own set of 

time frames for resolving the long-standing inconsistencies among the 

definitions of BOS services. Specifically, a Senior Joint Basing Group 

official told us that by the end of 2005, the four military services expect to 

have a common set of BOS services and programs to use in support 

agreements at joint bases. It appears that a difference between OSD and 

the group is that OSD focuses on developing common definitions of BOS 

services for use in benchmarking funding requirements for future-year 

programming and budgeting purposes at the DOD component level, while 

the Senior Joint Basing Group focuses on developing common definitions 

of BOS services for use in executing the programs and services at the 

installation level in a joint environment. Also, DOD has attempted to gain 

managerial control and better oversight of facilities and installations by 

establishing an Installations Capabilities Council (formerly called the 

Installations Policy Board). The council, chaired by the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, serves as the 

coordinator and integrator of all installation tasks and activities. 

Collectively, these initiatives offer an overall vision for resolving the 

long-standing inconsistencies in the definitions of BOS services and the 

development of analytically based requirements. Even so, we found that 

time frames for completing BOS tasks were being reported differently by 

different groups which raise questions about how well these efforts will be 

coordinated, synchronized, and integrated.

20 The Senior Joint Basing Group, an initiative of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, is made up of senior officials from the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Marine Corps. Its purpose is to enhance joint basing and to more efficiently use 

joint assets. In late 2004, the group began addressing installation support agreements and 

the development of common definitions and standards for services such as child care, 

galleys, and grounds maintenance at joint bases, using the facilities sustainment model as an 

archetype. In addition, the group seeks ideas to achieve economies of scale for services that 

are in proximity to one another.
Page 26 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Regarding DOD’s efforts in modeling BOS requirements, the same official 

with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment expressed doubt regarding whether there could be a 

single BOS model because BOS, as it currently exists, has too many diverse 

activities to model (see app. II). Also, because various BOS functions are 

managed by various offices in DOD21 this official told us there is no single 

focal point, and therefore, it is likely that a suite of BOS tools will evolve. It 

will take some time to fully develop them and each office in DOD may 

ultimately run its own model or metric. As a starting point, the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment is 

developing a facilities operation model that will capture all the functions 

related to facilities (utilities, fire protection, grounds maintenance, and so 

forth). The requirements in this model will be driven by the facilities 

inventory, commercial benchmarks, and local factors, including weather 

and labor rates. The office has been building the cost factors for a few 

months and simultaneously preparing the model. A prototype facilities 

operations model, tested on March 31, 2005, is being validated and targeted 

for implementation in fiscal year 2008. Next, the office expects to address 

those installation services that are not related to facilities. These functions 

include transportation, supply, and information management. There will 

likely be a model or metric for each of these functions, such as a 

“transportation activities model” or a “human resources management 

metric.” An official in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Installations and Environment told us that a transportation activities 

model may be very much like the facilities sustainment model, except that 

instead of being based on an inventory of facilities, it could be based on an 

inventory of vehicles. The human resources management metric may be 

like the facilities recapitalization metric, except that instead of being based 

on a facilities inventory, it may be based on an inventory of people. The 

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program 

Analysis and Evaluation will likely act as overseers of the whole process. 

Specific time frames for developing the installations services models have 

not been established.

21 For example, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) manages human 

resources; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict) manages physical security and force protection; the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) manages community services; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Networks and Information Integration) manages base communications.
Page 27 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Centralized Installation 

Management Has Many 

Benefits, but More 

Perspective Is Needed 

Before It Can Be 

Fully Evaluated

The Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized installation management 

agencies has resulted some operating efficiencies, according to many 

officials at installations we visited, but their efforts to date have met with 

mixed results in terms of the quality, level of support, and flexibility needed 

to quickly respond to changing needs. A common concern was that the 

centralized management efforts had not sufficiently recognized the diverse 

needs of the installations’ many tenants who require quick reaction in the 

face of changing circumstances. The centralized management approach 

seeks efficiencies, and Army and Navy officials acknowledged the growing 

pains associated with implementing the new approach. The Air Force and 

Marine Corps, using a more decentralized facilities management approach 

at the time of our review, also reported having achieved selective 

consolidations and efficiency measures to improve operations and achieve 

savings. Until more experience is gained under existing centralized 

approaches, with opportunities to address issues identified herein, it is 

difficult to recommend expanding the concept to the other military 

services.

Army’s and Navy’s 

Centralized Management 

Approaches Seek 

Efficiencies

The Army’s IMA implements a centralized and streamlined installations 

management concept that oversees all base operations and S/RM funds 

for Army installations and supervises seven regional management centers 

worldwide that are responsible for 10 to 30 installations each. IMA is 

designed to bring together all BOS services to ensure optimal care, 

support, and training of the Army’s fighting force at a standard level across 

installations. Key objectives of the organizational structure include ending 

the movement of funds among BOS, S/RM, and mission accounts by major 

commands and implementing consistent standards across the Army for 

designating these funds. IMA is also pursuing opportunities for increased 

efficiencies and decreased expenditures at its installations. IMA 

established a productivity improvement review process to identify and 

implement hard savings and performance enhancements.

During our visits to IMA-managed installations, we observed firsthand the 

emphasis being placed on cost efficiencies and decreased expenditures at 

the installations. Typical efficiency actions completed or under way 

included consolidations of contracts and services. Officials at IMA’s 

Southwest Region told us that one benefit was the ability to look across 

multiple major commands and then realize benefits through consolidations 

or other efficiencies. For example, common phone services at three of the 

region’s installations, each previously managed by a different major 
Page 28 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

command, ranged from about $54 per month to more than $100 per month 

per employee. Officials said they were in the process of combining the 

three contracts into a single contract with reduced rates.

The Navy’s installation management agency is an organizational concept 

that through centralized management of its installations, is intended to 

permit mission commanders to focus their energies on their respective 

mission accomplishment. According to CNI officials, consolidating 

eight offices into a single office responsible for installation planning, 

programming, budgeting, and resource execution enabled CNI to realize an 

immediate benefit. Through this consolidating and streamlining event, the 

Navy increased its visibility over installation management and resources 

and gained an ability to allocate resources between functional programs, 

regions, and installations to better support the overall Navy. As the single 

responsible office, advocate, and point of contact for Navy installations, 

CNI is pursuing, among other things, opportunities for increased 

efficiencies and decreased expenditures at its installations.

During our visits to CNI-managed installations, we observed firsthand the 

emphasis being placed on cost efficiencies and decreased expenditures at 

the installations. Typical efficiency actions completed or under way 

included eliminating the installation-level management structure and in its 

place installing a regionalized management structure for such activities as 

housing management, contracting, supply, business and administrative 

management, maintenance, and warehousing. Officials at CNI’s Southwest 

Region told us that consolidated and centralized management would 

eliminate 2,175 civilian personnel positions in the region. The officials had 

also consolidated more than 50 contracts into 12. Similarly, officials at 

CNI’s South Region told us that regionalized management would generate 

$43 million of savings and cost avoidances throughout the region over 

5 years by eliminating installation-level management and by consolidating 

contracts and services.

Growing Pains in 

Implementing Army’s and 

Navy’s Centralized 

Management Approaches

Officials at the Army and Navy installations we visited expressed concerns 

regarding the reduced levels of BOS and S/RM services they were receiving, 

but they did not always distinguish between changes brought about by a 

new management structure and changes necessitated by funding shortfalls 

and the need to move funding to warfighting priorities. The most critical 

issue involved the different major commands’ mission and support needs. 

Officials at the Army and Navy installations we visited contended that a 

“one-size-fits-all” approach was not working well; they expressed concern 
Page 29 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

that although air and ground operations and various training missions each 

required a different level of BOS, they did not perceive that difference 

always being recognized by the centralized management agencies. Officials 

from commands on Navy bases stated that CNI needed to step back and 

identify service levels appropriate for their customers’ needs and recognize 

changes in operations (such as increases in the sailor population), and 

then fund to those levels. Officials from major commands claimed that 

a disconnect existed between their mission needs for BOS and CNI’s 

perspective and that in their judgment CNI should not be responsible for 

determining the relative priorities of various mission activities’ BOS needs. 

For example, Navy Mine Warfare Command officials told us that in fiscal 

year 2004 they had to spend $327,000 of O&M mission funds for BOS 

services because the command no longer received BOS funds and CNI 

either delayed funding or did not pay for the services out of its BOS funds.

Citing growing pains associated with the centralization of installation 

management above the installation level, installation officials raised 

concerns about staffing levels, cited delays in obtaining funding guidance, 

and articulated concerns with IMA’s ability to quickly respond to shifting 

needs. For example, during fiscal year 2004, IMA opted not to redesignate 

available S/RM funds to meet an emerging funding need in BOS activities. 

At Fort Eustis, an installation affected by IMA’s decision, officials told us 

that the installation commander had the flexibility to move funds where 

needed before the creation of IMA, and the installation commander would 

have done so this year but doing so would have caused significant facilities 

maintenance work to be deferred. These officials explained that because 

IMA directed installations to use existing S/RM funds for maintaining 

facilities while BOS funds were depleted, Fort Eustis and other 

installations had to request an additional $200 million of BOS funds from 

IMA headquarters. They did not receive these funds until the end of the 

fiscal year.

In visiting various military installations we found instances where a lack of 

clarity existed concerning who or what source was responsible for funding 

select base support functions—installation tenants and their O&M funding 

or the installation’s O&M funding. Furthermore, we found many cases 

where delays in funding from the installation management agency 

prompted an installation’s tenants to fund BOS services from mission 

funds. For example, installations in IMA’s Southwest Region and their 

tenants could not agree on who should pay for such services as the 

following: information management services and specialized information 

technology equipment (such as cell phones and pagers), dedicated 
Page 30 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

administrative use vehicles, long-distance phone service, postage, 

dedicated copiers, hazardous waste disposal, and tactical equipment 

maintenance.

Officials with major command organizations at Naval Base San Diego and 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi said that under CNI they are seeing the 

closing of automobile hobby shops, libraries, swimming pools, and other 

recreational activities. The officials said they were concerned that the 

reduction or elimination of base services would encourage military 

personnel to spend more time away from the bases and in less-controlled 

or less-desirable places. In addition, officials said mission operations have 

been affected by funding shortages. For example, at Naval Base San Diego, 

tugboat operating hours were cut back and the number of tugboats being 

used was reduced from six boats to four boats, at CNI’s direction. Although 

this action saved money on fuel operations and overtime pay, once San 

Diego’s port operations demonstrated that they could not meet mission 

requirements with fewer tugs, CNI authorized that an additional tugboat 

be returned to service. Navy officials stated that some facility closures 

(e.g., auto hobby shops) are due to lack of interest and are offset by facility 

openings (e.g., cyber cafes).

Finally, officials at various installations expressed concern that they 

were not receiving sufficient facilities sustainment funding to maintain 

their facilities at levels they had expected relative to DOD’s facilities 

sustainment model, which was congressionally funded at 94 percent of 

the facilities sustainment requirement in fiscal year 2004. For example, 

Naval Station Ingleside, Texas, provided documentation showing that 

facilities sustainment funds available to it were only 62 percent of its 

facilities sustainment requirement under the model. An official at another 

installation claimed facilities sustainment funding to be as low as 

45 percent of their facilities sustainment requirements under the model. 

As we have previously reported, such funding shortfalls adversely affect 

efforts to maintain facilities and provide base support services. DOD 

officials stated that the facilities sustainment model is a macro 

programming tool that establishes an average annual investment across 

entire defense components for categories of facilities over the life of those 

facilities and, therefore, the actual requirement for a single facility or small 

set of facilities can be expected to vary across sets of facilities or 

installations and from year to year. They stated that when the sustainment 

program is funded at 94 percent of requirements, they would not expect 

every installation and every facility to be funded at 94 percent of its 

individual requirement. We recognize that facilities sustainment funding 
Page 31 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

levels at individual installations may vary from overall funding levels in a 

given year, depending upon where the facilities are in the sustainment 

cycle. However, this view was not widely recognized at the installations we 

visited, particularly when an installation’s sustainment funding was 

significantly less than overall sustainment funding levels. Military barracks 

and housing repairs were frequently delayed due to lack of S/RM funding, 

according to installation officials, and the following problems have been 

typical: leaking roofs; peeling painting; worn carpet; lack of hot water in the 

showers; energy inefficient windows; cracked sinks in bathrooms; broken 

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems; and molded ceilings 

and walls. Although funding shortfalls have been disruptive to planned 

maintenance and support programs and have potentially caused adverse 

effects on quality of life and morale, it is difficult to measure any direct 

impact they may have on readiness. Officials with major command 

operations at the installations we visited often voiced concerns about the 

potential impact on operations and readiness in the future, should these 

conditions continue. They were particularly concerned with the cumulative 

impact of continually working military personnel extra hours and 

weekends to make up for the lack of funding in S/RM and BOS programs.

Army IMA and Navy CNI installation management officials we contacted 

viewed these concerns and problems as being temporary in nature and 

attributable to organizational growing pains and, to some extent, to 

personnel’s resistance to the changing the role of the installation 

commander. They told us that while having consistent levels of services 

from one installation to the next was their goal, they have made exceptions 

when warranted. The officials also pointed to factors outside their 

control—including unforeseen contract increases, cost of war 

assessments, replacing military personnel with civilians, and funding 

shortfalls—that either delayed or masked the real impact of their efforts.

Marine Corps and Air Force 

Report Having Achieved 

Efficiencies without 

Centralization

Marine Corps officials said that the Marine Corps’ BOS and S/RM activities 

have always been somewhat centrally managed, but they generally defer to 

the individual installation commanders the decisions about the level of 

BOS services required and issues regarding quality of life at installations. 

Marine Corps officials also emphasized eliminating inefficiencies in the 

areas of installation management and achieving success without changing 

the organizational structure used to manage installations. The Marine 

Corps uses five broad activities to manage its O&M appropriations—Pacific 

forces, Atlantic forces, reserve forces, logistics, and other activities—and 
Page 32 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

BOS is a crosscutting program blended into several subactivity groups 

across these activities.

Without the centralized installations management structure being used by 

the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps has been able to achieve cost savings 

and efficiencies. For example, during our visits to Marine Corps bases 

Camp Pendleton and Miramar Air Station in California, we found that in 

recent years increased management emphasis had been placed on 

regionalizing and consolidating resources to reduce costs. For example, 

Camp Pendleton is the site of several of the logistical functions for Marine 

Corps bases in the region (such as 29 Palms and Miramar), including a 

regional contracting office, a regional motor pool, and a central supply 

center. According to officials at Camp Pendleton, the regional approach has 

already produced savings of more than $1.5 million dollars, and additional 

regionalization efforts are being pursued.

The Air Force has integrated BOS and installations management into its 

mission activities and continues to manage in a decentralized manner, 

using Air Force-level guidance. The Air Force views centralized installation 

management as less flexible in providing BOS services than base-level 

organizations and less responsive to the urgency and priorities of the bases’ 

requirements. Air Force major commands are actively engaged with 

subordinate commanders in the funding and management of Air Force 

installations. The Air Force uses four broad activities to manage its O&M 

appropriations—operating forces (air, combat, and space); mobilization; 

training and recruiting; and administration and servicewide operations 

(logistics, security, international support, and other servicewide 

operations). BOS is a crosscutting program blended into several subactivity 

groups across these activities.

Without using a centralized installations management structure 

comparable to those being used by the Army and Navy, the Air Force has 

succeeded in achieving some cost savings and efficiencies. For example, 

officials at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, said they saved $190,000 a year 

by consolidating a packaging process at the base’s hazardous waste 

accumulation facility and were pursuing additional savings by 

consolidating and standardizing such services as cell phone contracts, 

printers and copy machines, and garbage pickup. In addition, the base had 

an active employee self-help program that performed a lot of activities after 

hours, including painting walls and buildings, standardizing workstations, 

and internal training.
Page 33 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Insufficient Basis for 

Expanding Centralized 

Management Concept 

at This Time

At each of the military installations we visited, we observed reductions in 

BOS and S/RM services related to funding constraints. (App. IV highlights 

some key impacts of funding shortfalls and redesignations on BOS and 

S/RM activities and locations we visited.) BOS services that were being 

scaled back or eliminated at the various installations we visited included 

the numbers of rescue and firefighter operations; port and airfield 

operating hours and accessibility; and recreational and leisure facilities. 

We also observed the impacts of delayed maintenance on facilities, 

including deterioration of buildings (leaking roofs and ceilings, energy 

inefficient windows, and broken stairwells and fire escapes); breakdown of 

equipment (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning and boilers); cracked 

pavement at airfields; damaged storm drains and sewer lines; and reduced 

structural upgrades and replacements (painting, carpet, and furniture). We 

also observed reductions in other O&M funded activities (medical and 

emergency services). However, there are many unresolved questions 

regarding the centralized management agencies’ culpability for the 

reductions in the levels of BOS and S/RM services that were being provided 

at these installations.

As noted above, various Army and Navy installation officials cited growing 

pains associated with the centralization of installation management, 

including adequacy of funding, services provided, and ability to quickly 

respond to shifting needs. At the same time, we recognize that a centralized 

approach does offer opportunities to obtain economies and efficiencies in 

providing services that may be difficult to attain otherwise. Nevertheless, 

until more experience is gained under the existing centralized approaches, 

with opportunities to address concerns identified to date, we are not in a 

position to endorse expanding the concept to the other services at this 

time.

Conclusions DOD’s Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

and Environment and the services have acknowledged a lack of common 

definitions for BOS and standards for BOS services, along with related 

difficulties in identifying analytically based BOS funding requirements. 

Until these problems are resolved, DOD will not have the management and 

oversight framework in place that it needs for identifying total BOS 

requirements, providing Congress with a clear basis for making funding 

decisions, and ensuring adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint 

environment. Action is needed to expedite development and consistent 

implementation of an analytically sound and consistently applied model for 
Page 34 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

determining BOS requirements comparable to the approach used in 

defining facilities sustainment requirements. Until this is done, 

uncertainties will remain concerning actual requirements, and S/RM and 

other O&M funding will likely continue to be redesignated to fund BOS 

costs rather than used for its intended purpose. Furthermore, as we have 

previously reported and continue to note in this report, DOD’s installations 

and facilities have been insufficiently maintained and recapitalized for 

several years, a problem that is exacerbated when S/RM funds are 

redesignated to cover BOS programs and services. Thus, the adverse 

effects on BOS programs and facility maintenance efforts attributable to 

moving funds among these activities can also negatively affect quality of 

life, morale, and readiness should these conditions continue. Because DOD 

is still in the early stages of developing its BOS initiatives, time frames for 

accomplishing many of the specific actions under way or planned have 

either not been established or have not been synchronized among the 

working groups addressing them.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To better synchronize the efforts and milestones of the various groups 

working to improve the management and funding of BOS activities, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense update DOD’s Defense 

Installations Strategic Plan to include specific actions and establish time 

frames first, to resolve long-standing inconsistencies among the definitions 

of BOS services and, second, to help expedite the development and 

implementation of an analytically sound and consistently applied model for 

determining BOS requirements.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Installations and Environment concurred with our 

recommendations and indicated that actions were under way or planned 

to implement them. He noted that our draft report did not properly 

differentiate sustainment programs from restoration and modernization 

programs. As suggested, we revised our report to make clearer this 

distinction. In addition, he commented that our draft report implied that 

each installation should receive funding to match the overall sustainment 

rate every year. We did not intend to imply that each installation’s 

sustainment funding should match exactly the overall rate each year and 

we clarified our report accordingly. While we recognize that sustainment 

funding at individual installations may vary somewhat from year to year, 

we also note that it is often significantly less than one might expect given 
Page 35 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

the difference between projected overall levels of funding and what is 

actually experienced at the installation level. For example, one installation 

we visited received funding for only 45 percent of its sustainment 

requirement.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix VI. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and members; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the 

Army, Air Force, and Navy; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

The report is also available at no charge on GAO’s Web Site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Barry W. Holman, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 36 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine the historical funding trends for base operations support 

(BOS) as contrasted with funding for facilities sustainment, restoration 

and modernization (S/RM), we reviewed financial data, such as budget 

requests, congressionally designated amounts as adjusted, and obligations 

for fiscal years 2001 through 2004 that we obtained from the Army, Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. We compared funding requirements, 

budget requests, adjusted congressionally designated amounts, and 

obligations across the services to identify historical trends for BOS and 

how it compared with funding for S/RM from the operation and 

maintenance (O&M) appropriation. We determined how actual funding for 

BOS and S/RM compared with the projected funding requirements 

identified by individual military services. We discussed the differences we 

found with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 

the services to obtain a more thorough understanding of BOS and S/RM 

funding.

For our historical analyses and for purposes of achieving consistency in the 

analyses, we used data provided by each of the military services. In doing 

so, we recognize that the funding amounts designated in the services’ 

accounting records for O&M functional areas such as BOS do not coincide 

perfectly with the congressional conference report designations1

 that were 

based on a set of defined but nonetheless diverse program elements and 

subactivity groups among the services. Service officials attributed the 

variance to their accounting for the BOS services provided at their 

respective installations—the number and names of which are different and 

expanded from the BOS subactivity groups used for the conference 

report—and to funding redesignations that occur during the year. 

Accordingly, this report uses the congressional designations as adjusted by 

the services’ accounting and redesignations of O&M funds for BOS and 

S/RM to depict funding trends. (The Department of Defense (DOD) is 

currently seeking to restructure these accounts with improved tracking 

mechanisms.)

Also, to project trend data more consistently, the historical data provided 

by the services and included in this report do not include congressional 

adjustments of a one-time nature or supplemental appropriations for O&M 

1

 For example, according to historical data provided by the military services, fiscal year 2004 

O&M funding designated for BOS services totaled $15.6 billion, about $1.6 billion more than 

Office of the Secretary of Defense data showed as being designated for BOS at the beginning 

of the fiscal year.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

that Congress provided during a particular fiscal year for such things as 

hurricane damage cleanup and repairs or for the Global War on Terrorism. 

We did not otherwise independently determine the reliability of the 

reported financial information. To determine the impact the funding trends 

had on the levels of BOS and S/RM services being provided to individual 

activities and installations, we visited and met with officials and viewed the 

condition of facilities firsthand at 13 installations across the country: 

Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; Naval 

Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas; Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas; Naval 

Station Ingleside, Texas; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Fort Monroe, Virginia; 

Fort Eustis, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California; 

Miramar Air Station, California; Naval Base San Diego, California; Naval 

Base Coronado, California; and Naval Base Point Loma, California. In 

addition, we obtained a briefing from officials with the Naval Air Station 

Joint Reserve Base at Carswell Field, Fort Worth, Texas. We also 

interviewed these officials by telephone. We selected these installations 

because they represent a range of BOS programs, missions, major 

commands, and geographic locations. We recognize that the conditions we 

observed at these 13 installations may not represent conditions at other 

DOD installations, and we did not attempt to project the results of our 

visits to all military installations.

To evaluate how DOD and the military services forecast BOS requirements 

and funding needs, we reviewed OSD, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corp information pertaining to base operations requirements and funding 

and their roles in the overall base operations process. We reviewed the 

processes, planning documents, and proposals that DOD and the services 

use to forecast their needs. We interviewed officials from DOD’s Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and 

Senior Joint Basing Group. To determine the services’ definition of BOS, we 

interviewed OSD officials and representatives from each of the services 

and asked them to provide their working definition of BOS as used to 

determine BOS funding requests.

To determine extent to which the Army and Navy reorganizations for 

managing installations have affected the quality and level of support 

provided to individual activities and installations and whether the Marine 

Corps and Air Force would benefit from similar reorganizations, we 

reviewed the guidance, procedures, and practices from the Army and Navy 

that specifically address reorganization, including comparisons to prereorganization data. We interviewed officials from the U.S. Army 

Installation Management Agency (IMA); IMA Southwest Region; IMA 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Northeast Region; Commander, Navy Installations (CNI) Command; CNI 

Region South; and CNI Region Southwest. We discussed the processes used 

in the incipient formation of centralized installation management 

organizations. We discussed the effects these changes have had on the 

planning and implementation of base operations support services as well as 

on the personnel and quality of life at the local level. We contrasted these 

data with information obtained from Marine Corps and Air Force officials.

We conducted our review from April 2004 through April 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 39 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix II

BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services ApendxiI

Each of the military services has a different approach to BOS and uses 

somewhat differing categories and definitions of services included in BOS. 

For example, the Army has identified 95 different categories of BOS 

functions, and the Navy has identified 124 different categories of BOS 

functions. For each service, BOS is a complex group of programs that 

support base operations and quality of life. The Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment designated the 

improvement of BOS management as a priority and has announced plans to 

develop a common definition of BOS services and programs.

BOS Functions and 

Activities Used by the 

Army

The Army categorizes BOS under nine major service areas. Within these 

broad service areas are 38 specific functions, and within these functions, 

the Army provides 95 different BOS services. The BOS functions and 

activities used by the Army are shown in figure 3.
Appendix II

BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services

Page 40 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Army BOS Functions and Activities

Dental

Contracting

Contracting

administration

Financial

management

Management

analysis

Emergency

services

Environmental

services

Preventive

medicine

Veterinary

medicine

Other

engineering

services

Real property

management

Housing

management 

Medical

Food

services 

Laundry/

dry cleaning

Facilities

maintenance

management

Materiel

maintenance

Transportation

services

Supply

operations

Force

protection

Installation

intel/security Administrative

services

Information

technology

management

and planning

Communication

systems and

systems 

support 

Visual 

information

systems

Morale,

welfare, and

recreation

Education

Retail

services 

Military

personnel

support 

Civilian

personnel

management

Safety and

occupational

health

Installation

management

Inspector

general 

Public affairs

Chaplain

Staff judge

advocate

Provost

marshall

Supply

management

95 services within 9 major service areas and 38 functions

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Health

services

Resource

management Engineering

Personnel

and

community

Information

technology Logistics Operations Commandand staff Acquisition
Appendix II

BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services

Page 41 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

BOS Functions and 

Activities Used by the Navy

The Navy categorizes BOS under operating forces support, community 

support, and base support programs. Within these general categories, nine 

major service areas are broken down into 29 functions. These functions are 

broken down further to include 124 BOS services such as food service 

contracts, recreation, and so forth. The BOS functions and activities used 

by the Navy are shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Navy BOS Functions and Activities

Note: Sustainment, restoration, and modernization are included under the base support functional 

area to recognize the close interrelationship that exists between them. For example, sustainment funds 

may be used to fix a leaking roof in a building that houses a BOS activity.

Operating forces support Base support

Aviation

support

Port 

services

Other port

operations Supply

Morale,

welfare, and

recreation

Child

development

Galley

Fleet and

family support 

Other

community 

support

Airfield

operations

Bachelor

quarters

operations

Family

housing Utilities

Facility

management 

Base

support

Facility

services 

Disaster

preparation

Federal fire

Force

protection 

Safety

Command

Resource

management

Information

technology

services

Military

personnel

services

Pollution

prevention

Conservation

Compliance

Air

operations 

Personnel

support Housing Facility

support

Public

safety

Command

and staff

Operations

support

Sustainment,

restoration, 

and 

modernization

124 services within 9 major service areas and 29 functions

Other 

operations

support

Environmental

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

Port

operations 

Community support
Appendix II

BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services

Page 42 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

BOS Functions and 

Activities Used by the 

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps categorizes its BOS functions and activities under seven 

major service areas. Within these broad service areas are 37 BOS services. 

The BOS functions and activities used by the Marine Corps are shown in 

figure 5.

Figure 5: Marine Corps BOS Functions and Activities

Facilities

and land

management

Logistics

support 

Command and

staff support 

Provide voice Provide military

training 

Provide utilities

Develop physical

wellness

Provide personal

support services

37 services within 7 major service areas

Manage

safety

programs 

Provide legal

support 

Provide

transportation 

Provide

environmental

services Provide lodging

services

Provide

information and

referral services

Provide

security

Provide fire

protection and 

emergency 

services 

Provide data

services

Provide supply

services 

Provide

procurement

services 

Provide food

services Provide

range

management 

Provide housing

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data.

Provide real 

property and land 

management 

services

Provide facilities

services

Sustain, restore, 

and modernize 

facilities

Develop 

family

readiness

Provide 

recreational

opportunities

Provide 

retail/resale 

goods and 

services

Provide

personal and

professional

development

Provide 

command 

support

Manage 

community 

relations

Provide 

religious 

support

Manage

financial

resources

Manage 

business 

practices

Provide 

personnel 

support

Provide

ground

electronic

maintenance

Provide

civilian

training

Provide 

aviation

operation 

support

Provide

simulation

support 

Provide

visual

information

Community

services

Security

and safety

Training and

operations 

support

Information

technology 
Appendix II

BOS Functions and Activities Used by the 

Military Services

Page 43 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

BOS Functions and 

Activities Used by the 

Air Force

The Air Force provides BOS functions and services within its four broad 

mission areas—operating forces, mobilization, training and recruiting, and 

administration and servicewide activities. Within these mission areas are 11 

functional areas. These functional areas are the framework for 63 BOS 

services. The BOS functions and activities used by the Air Force are shown 

in figure 6.

Figure 6: Air Force BOS Functions and Activities

Operating forces Mobilization Training and

recruiting

Recruiting,

other training, 

and

education 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

Administration

and servicewide

activities

63 services within 4 major operational areas and 11 functions. Base operation support

functions are incorporated in the 63 services.

Air

operations

Basic skills

and

advanced

training

Service-wide

activities

Logistics

operations

Security

operations

Support to

other nations

Accession

training

Mobility

operations

Combat

related

Space

operations
Page 44 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix III

Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure ApendxiI

Army Installation 

Management Agency

Prior to the establishment of IMA, 15 major commands managed base 

operations for the Army. IMA was created on October 1, 2002, to attain 

efficiencies from consolidating BOS services for the Army worldwide. 

As shown in figure 7, the activities, personnel, and services for base 

operations previously associated with the major commands were realigned 

under one organization with the establishment of IMA.

Figure 7: Army Installation Management Agency Organization

14 installations 16 installations 30 installations 48 installations 2 installations

1 installation 1 installation 6 installations 2 installations 3 installations 8 installations 2 installations

Before IMA:

48 installations 2 installations

Board of Directors With IMA: Department of the Army

Assistant Chief of Staff

Installation Management

NW SW NE SE

Headquarters IMA

Europe Korea Pacific

15 Military

Headquarters 

1 Military

Headquarters 

180 installations

1 installation

Source: Army.

Department of

the Army
Appendix III

Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure

Page 45 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Management decisions and funding designations now flow through IMA 

headquarters and its seven regional offices, four in the continental United 

States and three overseas, directly to installations for execution. IMA’s 

intent with this structure is to support and enable mission commanders, 

achieve regional efficiencies, and provide consistent and equitable facilities 

and services with common standards. According to IMA officials, seven 

regions is the right size for efficient management; however, they said they 

would revisit their organizational structure following the outcome of the 

2005 round of base realignment and closure. Figure 8 shows IMA’s current 

locations.

Figure 8: Army Installation Management Agency Locations

Fort Sill 

Fort Bliss Fort Hood

Fort Polk

Pine Bluff Ars 

McAlester

AAP

Red River AD

Lone Star AAP

Camp Stanley

Storage Actv 

Louisiana AAP 

Fort Sam Houston 

Corpus Christi AD

Presidio of Monterey

Fort Irwin

Yuma Proving Ground 

Fort 

Hauchuca

Riverbank AAP

Sierra Army 

Depot

Hawthorne AD

Fort Hunter Liggett (USAR)

Parks RFTA (USAR) 

Natick R & D Ctr 

Devens RFTA

(USAR) 

Fort Gordon

Fort Jackson

Mississippi 

AAP

Fort McPherson

Fort Stewart

Ft. Gillem

Fort 

Benning

Fort Rucker

Fort Bragg

MOT Sunny Point

Northeast

Southwest

Fort Shafter 

Schofield 

Barracks

Fort Wainwright 

Fort 

Richardson

Ft. Greely

Pacific

Tokyo/Yokohama

Akizuki/Kure

Zama/Sagamihara

Okinawa

Redstone 

Arsenal

Anniston

AD

Holston AAP

Fort Campbell

Fort Knox

Milan

AAP

Blue Grass AD

Region HQs / 

Director Locations

NE: Ft Monroe

SE: Ft McPherson

NW: Rock Island Ars 

SW: Ft Sam Houston

Europe: Heidelberg

Pacific: Ft Shafter

Korea: Yongsan 

Detroit Ars

USAG Selfridge

Lima Army

Tank Plt 

Fort McCoy (USAR)

Fort Leonard Wood

Fort Riley

Fort Leavenworth

Iowa AAP

Kansas AAP

Lake City

AAP 

Dugway Proving

Ground 

Pueblo Depot

Fort Carson Tooele AD

Deseret Chem Depot

Fort Lewis 

Yakima Training

Center

Umatilla 

Chem Depot

Rock Island 

Arsenal

USAG Miami 

Ft Buchanan, PR

Fort Belvoir

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Fort Story

Fort Lee

Fort Eustis

Fort Monroe

Ft. AP Hill

Radford AAP

Letterkenny

Carlisle Barracks 

Fort McNair

Ft. Meade

Fort Myer 

Walter Reed

Ft Detrick AD

Tobyhanna Army Depot

Adelphi Lab Ctr.

Scranton AAP

Northwest

Fort Drum

Fort Monmouth

Picatinny Arsenal

Watervliet Ars

Ft. Hamilton

Fort Dix

(USAR)

West Point

Overseas: Europe

Korea

Source: Army.

White Sands Missile 

Testing Center

Hunter Army 

Airfield

Southeast
Appendix III

Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure

Page 46 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Commander, Navy 

Installations

A key event leading to the creation of CNI occurred in 1998 when the Navy 

consolidated or “regionalized” installation management functions. 

Regionalization was done to reduce BOS costs through the elimination of 

unnecessary management layers, duplicative overhead, and redundant 

functions. In conjunction with regionalization, the Navy reduced the 

number of its major claimants involved in the installation management 

business from 18 to 8. To further reduce costs the Navy stood up CNI in 

October 2003, further consolidating the Navy’s installation management 

business under a single claimant. The CNI organization is shown in figure 9.
Appendix III

Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure

Page 47 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 9: CNI Organization

Note : Special assistants include Force Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Safety, Command Master 

Chief, Chief Information Officer, Public Affairs Officer, General Counsel, Chaplain, and Comptroller.

OPNAV : Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

SECNAV: Secretary of the Navy

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense

N4: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics

Commander, CNI

Special Assistants:

Note 1

Business management

CONUS desk

Europe desk

SW Asia desk

Customers

OPNAV SECNAV OSD

Base 

support

Advise

Chief of Naval Operations

Deputies

Community 

support 

Assessments

Regional commanders and

Echelon II customers

Air operations

Supply

Environmental

Personnel support

Port operations

Operations support

Housing

Public safety/Anti-terrorism

and force protection

Facility services/investment

 Planning/real estate

Human resources

Command and staff

Chiefs of Staff

Pacific desk

Customer advocacy

N4

Flag staff

Operating Forces 

support 

Source: Navy.
Appendix III

Army and Navy Base Operations Support 

Management Structure

Page 48 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

As shown in figure 10, CNI is organized into 16 regions, 10 in the 

continental United States and 6 overseas. At the time of this report there 

was discussion regarding the possibility of further consolidating CNI’s 

regional structure. According to CNI officials, maintaining 16 regions may 

be more than is ultimately needed for the most efficient management 

structure; however, they said any decision to consolidate further would 

depend on the outcome of the 2005 round of base realignment and closure.

Figure 10: CNI Locations

Source: Navy.

Commander,

Navy Forces 

Central

Commander,

Navy Forces 

Europe 

Commander,

Fleet Forces 

Command 

Navy Region

Hawaii

Naval forces

Korea

Japan

Guam

Commander,

Pacific Fleet 

Southwest

Asia

Europe

Singapore

Regional commanders

Navy Region

Mid-atlantic

Naval District

Washington

Navy Region

Southeast

Navy Region

South

Navy Region

Navy Region North Central

Southwest

Navy Region

Gulf Coast

CNI

16 regions and 98 installations

Navy Region

Northwest Navy Region

Midwest Navy Region

Northeast
Page 49 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities ApendxiIV

At each of the military installations we visited, we observed reductions in 

BOS and S/RM services related to funding constraints. BOS services that 

were being scaled back or eliminated at the various installations that we 

visited included the numbers of rescue and firefighter operations, airfield 

and port operating hours and accessibility, and recreational and leisure 

facilities. We also observed the impacts of delayed maintenance on 

facilities, including deterioration of buildings (leaking roofs and ceilings, 

energy inefficient windows, and broken stairwells and fire escapes); 

breakdown of equipment (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning and 

boilers); cracked pavement at airfields; damaged storm drains and sewer 

lines; and reduced structural upgrades and replacements (painting, carpet, 

and furniture). We also observed reductions in other O&M funded activities 

(medical and emergency services).

Observations at Army 

Installations

Fort Eustis, Virginia Created in 1918, Fort Eustis is the home of the U.S. Army Transportation 

Corps and the Transportation Corps Regiment. At Fort Eustis and its 

satellite installation, Fort Story, officers and enlisted soldiers receive 

education and on-the-job training in all modes of transportation, aviation 

maintenance, logistics, and deployment doctrine and research. Officials 

told us that BOS funding shortfalls at Eustis have had some indirect 

impacts on training. For example, reductions in dining hall support may be 

a contributing factor to long lines in dining facilities, potentially causing 

soldiers to be tardy for training classes.

We found indications of Fort Eustis’s barracks needing repairs. Mold and 

deteriorating stairwells were an issue in the older barracks. Delayed 

barracks renovations include adding nonskid tracking to the stairwells 

and replacing cracked sinks in the bathrooms. Officials also said that 

Fort Eustis has deteriorated fencing, road paving, and heating and air 

conditioning for training facilities. Officials also showed us mission 

facilities with repair needs that have not been completed due to funding 

issues. At Fort Eustis’s third port, concrete is crumbling and the repair of 

airfield hangar doors, roofs, and heating and air conditioning systems and 

routine maintenance of training facilities have yet to be completed.
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 50 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Public works officials at Fort Eustis also told us about storm drains that 

have been damaged and clogged by tree roots. They have similar problems 

with their sewer lines.

Fort Monroe, Virginia Fort Monroe is located in the city of Hampton, Virginia, and is headquarters 

of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, which supports the Army’s 

fighting forces through the development of doctrine and equipment 

requirements and training for combat. We observed a training facility that 

had extensive termite damage; to keep the facility in use, support beams 

had been added to the flooring to prevent it from caving in. Fort Monroe 

also closed several fire escapes due to eroding of the structures; had rusted 

and peeling metal staircases; and had heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning systems that need to be overhauled.

At the installation’s marina, we also saw evidence of delayed repairs due to 

funding constraints. The foundation of the facility had rust and cracks 

caused by high tides, and pieces of the building were falling off. According 

to installation officials, the marina repairs, estimated to cost at least 

$300,000, have been backlogged for 3 to 4 years.

Fort Sam Houston, Texas In 1876, the Army began to move its facilities to the present site of Fort Sam 

Houston. Today, Fort Sam Houston is headquarters for various activities 

including the Army Medical Command, Fifth U.S. Army, U.S. Army South, 

and Brooke Army Medical Center. We observed some buildings and roads 

in need of repairs. We obtained information showing that, due to funding 

shortages in the BOS area, S/RM funds for painting projects, electrical 

repairs, and other preventive maintenance were being redesignated to pay 

for BOS services.

Observations at Navy 

Installations

Naval Air Station Corpus 

Christi, Texas

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi started its first flight training on 

May 5, 1941. Its general command assignment is still pilot training, as 

headquarters for the Chief of Naval Air Training. However, recent cutbacks 

in BOS services reportedly constrained airfield operations, leading to 
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 51 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

overdue repairs and reduced hours of operation. A Coast Guard tenant 

representative told us about several airfield conditions that need repair. 

For example, we were told that deteriorating power systems were prone to 

failure, and when the power goes off, security gates have to be opened 

manually to access runways. Aged and unreliable hangar doors also 

delayed some launches. We were told that the naval base has been closing 

its field operations at night to reduce operational costs. As a result, Coast 

Guard tenants are uncertain whether runway lights will come on when 

their aircraft are landing late at night or whether the tower will answer 

their calls. Lastly, Corpus Christi Air officials said that they could not afford 

to pay for the required number of on duty firefighters at the airfield. To 

prevent the cancellation of training efforts and other air operations, the 

airfield operated under a safety waiver whereby no manned fire truck had 

to be present on the landing strip.

Funding shortages also reportedly caused cutbacks in services at the Naval 

Hospital at Corpus Christi. Officials told us that due to decreased O&M 

funding, the hospital now operates as a clinic in terms of the level of 

services it is able to provide and that it refers some patients to other 

hospitals. Other reductions in services attributed to cost-saving measures 

at Corpus Christi included reducing pool hours from 42 to 20 hours per 

week (saving $50,000 for the year) and closing the enlisted members club at 

the installation. Base officials said it is less desirable for military personnel 

to go off base for entertainment and leisure services.

Due to the lack of S/RM funding, base officials identified some barracks 

that were in poor condition. Officials showed us buildings with leaking 

roofs and water damage and mold. For example, a mold problem at one 

newly constructed housing facility was attributed to a design defect 

involving the placement of air conditioning vents, and officials estimated it 

would cost $1.6 million, which they did not have, to correct the problem.

Naval Base Coronado, 

California

Established in 1917, Naval Base Coronado comprises two main units: the 

Naval Air Station North Island and Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. 

North Island itself plays host to 23 squadrons and 80 additional tenant 

commands. Officials from tenant organizations told us that the number 

of fire fighters had been reduced due to BOS funding constraints. 

Specifically, they said that there are supposed to be a total of 10 firefighters 

on duty—6 for fire response to facilities and housing areas and 4 for the 

airfield—but the number of firefighters on duty is being reduced to 4. 

Officials said that when the firefighters have to respond to a structural fire 
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 52 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

on base, the airfield would be without fire protection and would have to 

shut down. Navy officials stated that the level of fire protection at Naval 

Base Coronado is in full compliance with DOD and Navy requirements.

Officials said that because they have not had the amounts of S/RM funds 

needed to perform sufficient levels of maintenance and repairs, they have 

the following conditions at their facilities: frayed carpeting and rotted 

wood in barracks, broken water pipes, balcony railings with corrosion, 

cracked shower doors, poor shower drainage, and mold.

Naval Air Station Kingsville, 

Texas

Naval Air Station Kingsville was commissioned in July 1942, and its primary 

mission is to train tactical jet pilots. Officials told us that several safety and 

security projects supporting this mission were eliminated due to lack of 

funding. For example, there is no longer an emergency response team on 

base. Therefore, if an accident occurs during a training operation, the base 

has to rely on emergency response from the local community. Also, as a 

result of limited O&M funding, there were no dentists at the dental clinic 

and no emergency services available at the medical clinic.

Naval Base San Diego, 

California

Naval Base San Diego was established on February 23, 1922, as a 

destroyer base and later was named a naval repair base. Today, the base 

provides a wide range of both direct and indirect fleet support, including 

waterfront operations, security, supply, civil engineering, and many other 

administrative and leisure functions. Officials cited tugboat support as an 

example of a support program that has been scaled back due to the lack of 

BOS-designated funding. They said that the base had scaled back its 

number of operating tugs from six to four, but port officials could not meet 

mission requirements with fewer tugs. The number of tugs was 

subsequently increased to five. In other cost-saving initiatives, San Diego 

has recently scaled back its transportation service and uses vans instead of 

buses, has reduced the number of firefighters on duty, and is considering 

closing its driving range and officer’s club. The library has also been closed, 

and due to mold problems, the child development center has been closed.

Naval Base Point Loma, 

California

On October 1, 1998, six installations were consolidated as Naval Base Point 

Loma. Point Loma provides support services for submarines in the U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. In carrying out its mission to provide quality of life services 

for the operating forces, Point Loma is also the site of the Navy Alcohol 
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 53 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Rehabilitation Center. We found examples of reductions in several leisure 

and recreational services due to BOS funding shortages in fiscal year 2004. 

For example, Point Loma has closed two libraries and an auto body shop, 

and is considering the possibility of closing a chapel. Also closed are the 

outdoor equipment rental facility and the leisure travel office.

We also found several unattended maintenance issues at Point Loma. For 

instance, due to reduced maintenance, some barracks needed painting and 

new carpet. Installation officials complained about brown water in the 

drains of older barracks as well as leaking roofs. They also told us that 

windows are not energy efficient, which drives up energy costs, and that 

several parking lots needed to be repaved.

Naval Station Ingleside, 

Texas

Naval Station Ingleside is one of three south Texas installations in Naval 

Region South. Ingleside’s mission is to provide logistics and base support 

services to 41 commands—including 21 ships and 3,900 personnel—that 

make up the Mine Warfare forces. As a result of budget constraints 

experienced in fiscal year 2004, Ingleside officials told us they had to 

reduce port operations working hours from 24 hours a day, 7 days per 

week, to 12 hours per day, 5 days per week; reduce overtime for personnel 

involved ship movements in port by 30 percent; and reduce personnel 

involved in various BOS programs.

Observations at Marine 

Corps Installations

Marine Corps Air Station 

Miramar, California

On October 1, 1997, Naval Air Station Miramar was renamed Miramar 

Marine Corps Air Station as a part of a DOD realignment. Marine Corps Air 

Stations El Toro and Tustin were closed and their assets moved to Miramar 

by the end of 1999. Miramar is home for eight Hornet jet squadrons, four 

Super Stallion helicopter squadrons, one KC-130 transport and refueling 

squadron, and nine station support aircraft.

Several unexpected expenses affected the BOS funding needs at Miramar 

during fiscal year 2004. Although electricity rates increased by more than 

70 percent, there was no corresponding increase in BOS funding to cover 

these unanticipated increases. To offset some of the costs, Miramar and 
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 54 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

other Marine Corps installations increased tenant rates for utility services 

and obtained $2.3 million in supplemental funding. In an effort to stop 

programs from moving mission operations funds to pay for BOS programs, 

the installation reduced services of less essential, non-mission-related 

projects, such as furniture and carpet replacement.

Camp Pendleton, California Camp Pendleton was established in September 1942. Camp Pendleton is an 

amphibious training facility and offers a wide array of training facilities, 

including firing ranges, landing beaches, parachute drop zones, and mock 

urban warfare towns. But in providing this training support, Pendleton 

anticipates a shortfall in BOS funding for fiscal year 2005. For example, 

utilities’ costs are projected to be higher than the budgeted amount. 

Disaster preparedness may also be constrained because quantities of gas 

masks and advanced emergency communications systems have also not 

been funded.

Other programs at Camp Pendleton have also been delayed due to funding 

constraints. Base officials told us that some construction projects have 

been funded, but the new infrastructure creates an additional demand for 

BOS services that the installations are fiscally unable to provide. For 

example, Marine Corps Headquarters has $750,000 of military construction 

money to build permanent latrine facilities. However, the installation 

cannot afford to install plumbing on that side of the base nor does it have 

the money to furnish, service, or maintain the new facility. Officials told us 

that several new vehicles have been purchased, but no additional funding 

has been provided to cover the associated costs of new maintenance tools, 

garages, or fuel. In addition, there is a backlog in providing new furniture 

because funding was being used to cover other BOS expenses.

Observations at Air 

Force Installations

Randolph Air Force Base, 

Texas

Randolph Air Force Base was dedicated on June 20, 1930 as a flying 

training base and continues that mission today. More specifically, the 

installation is one of the few bases that does instructor pilot training, and it 

is also home to Joint Undergraduate Navigator and Electronic Warfare 

Officer Training. To cut costs at the installation, Randolph has implemented 
Appendix IV

Impact of Funding Constraints on BOS and 

S/RM Activities

Page 55 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

some changes to BOS services such as custodial and dining hall support. 

For instance, Randolph increased waste container sizes and reduced the 

number of waste collections to once per week, performed custodial 

services after hours when they could be done in less time by avoiding the 

presence of workers, and cut the dining hall budget.

Shortfalls in S/RM funding have also led to the deferring of routine facilities 

maintenance at Randolph. Officials told us about reports of rusted drinking 

water pipes, oil in one of the water wells, and mold and water damage from 

leaking water pipes.

Tinker Air Force Base, 

Oklahoma

Tinker Air Force Base was established on April 8, 1941, as a maintenance 

and repair depot. Today, Tinker’s largest organization is the Oklahoma City 

Air Logistics Center, one of three depot repair centers in the Air Force 

Materiel Command. Tinker is also home to seven major Department of 

Defense, Air Force, and Navy activities with critical national defense 

missions. These activities include the 552nd Air Control Wing (which 

flies the E-3 Sentry aircraft and is part of the Air Force’s Air Combat 

Command mobile strike force); the Navy’s Strategic Communications 

Wing ONE (a one of a kind unit in the Navy that provides a vital, 

secure communications link to the submerged fleet of ballistic missile 

submarines); and the 507th Air Refueling Wing (an Air Force Reserve 

flying unit).

Tinker has contracted with the private sector for much of its BOS and has 

reported selective consolidations and efficiency measures to improve 

BOS operations and achieve savings. For instance, mail service pickup 

and delivery were reduced from twice to once per day, fire department 

inspections and repair and replacements of fire extinguishers were 

postponed, and worn carpet was not being replaced.
Page 56 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends ApendxiV

Navy Funding Trends Available Navy data show differences between amounts the Navy projected 

as required for BOS and amounts included in budget requests, designated, 

and actually obligated each fiscal year from 2001 through 2004 (see fig. 11). 

As it did for the Army, Congress gave the Navy increasing funding for BOS 

in some years, but we found a smaller difference between identified 

requirements and funding here than in the Army.

Figure 11: Navy BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes:

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Navy officials indicated they had not had models for projecting requirements during these 

budget years but, as discussed in an earlier section of this report, are taking steps to improve their 

requirements determination process for BOS funding.

(3) Obligations exceeded adjusted congressionally designated amounts as a result of authorized 

internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed below, the Navy moved S/RM funds 

into the BOS account.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Navy

Amount obligated

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 57 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

The difference between the Navy’s congressionally designated funding and 

obligations also appears to be smaller than that for the Army, but the Navy’s 

obligations for BOS still were greater than its congressionally designated 

amounts for BOS as adjusted by the Navy. For example, in fiscal year 2004, 

the Navy’s BOS obligations—$3.427 billion—were more than its BOS 

funding—$3.217 billion. As in the Army, Navy officials said the difference 

between the congressionally designated amounts for BOS services, as 

adjusted by the Navy, and the amounts obligated is made up of funds 

moved from S/RM activities to BOS activities to pay “must pay bills” such 

as utilities and, increasingly, to obtain contactor services. This also 

indicates a continuation of the historic trend of funds being moved among 

various O&M subaccounts during the year. Navy installation officials also 

reported instances of funds being withheld during the year and being 

redesignated to support warfighting needs. More specifically, we were told 

that the Navy withheld $300 million in O&M funds, including $199 million 

that otherwise would have been designated to fund BOS and $101 million 

to fund S/RM, to help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. Navy officials 

told us that during the year they had to scale back and cut BOS programs 

and move $504 million from S/RM to pay for essential BOS services until 

supplemental funding became available and they could move funds back 

to S/RM.

Navy S/RM funding trend data displayed in figure 12 show a spike in 

congressionally designated amounts adjusted by the Navy and 

obligations in fiscal year 2003. According to Navy officials, 2003 was 

simply a better-funded year for Navy shore facilities infrastructure than 

other years. However, in fiscal year 2004, S/RM services were affected by 

the Navy’s withholding of O&M funds during the year, that otherwise would 

have been designated to fund BOS and facilities sustainment, to instead 

help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. Similar problems are reportedly 

occurring in fiscal year 2005. The Navy obligated fewer funding dollars for 

facilities sustainment activities in fiscal year 2004 than were initially 

designated. Although the Navy also received supplemental funding for the 

Global War on Terrorism for BOS and facilities sustainment activities, such 

turbulence occurring during the year makes it difficult to execute planned 

programs effectively and resulted in the Navy’s underexecuting its facilities 

sustainment program by $393 million in fiscal year 2004. As we have 

previously reported, such problems adversely affect efforts to maintain 

facilities and provide base support services.
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 58 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 12: Navy S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Navy officials indicated they had improved S/RM requirements forecasts by using the DOD facilities 

sustainment model developed in 1999.

(3) Obligations were different from congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Navy, as a 

result of authorized internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed above, during 

fiscal year 2004 the Navy moved S/RM funds into the BOS account.

Marine Corp Funding 

Trends

Available data show some differences between amounts the Marine Corps 

projected as required for BOS and amounts included in budget requests, 

amounts designated, and amounts actually obligated each fiscal year from 

2001 through 2004, with some increase in projected requirements, requests 

and funding occurring in recent years (see fig. 13).

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Navy

Amount obligated

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 59 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 13: Marine Corps BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes:

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Marine Corps officials indicated they had not had models for projecting requirements during these 

budget years but, as discussed in an earlier section of this report, are taking steps to improve their 

requirements determination process for BOS funding.

(3) Obligations fell short of congressionally designated amounts, as adjusted by the Marine Corps, for 

fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and exceeded adjusted congressionally designated amounts in fiscal years 

2001 and 2004 as a result of authorized internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as 

discussed below, the Marine Corps moved S/RM funds into the BOS account.

The trend data present more of a mixed picture for the Marine Corps in 

terms of obligations when contrasted with data for the other military 

services. In 2 of 4 years the Marine Corps’ obligations were greater than 

congressionally designated amounts, as adjusted by the Marine Corps, as 

well as projected requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2004, the Marine 

Corps’ BOS obligations of $1.164 billion were $54 million more than its 

designated funding ($1.110 billion), representing a movement of funds from 

other accounts to support BOS activities.

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Marine Corps

Amount obligated

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 60 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

S/RM trend data show that the Marine Corps obligated more funding than 

adjusted congressionally designated amounts in fiscal years 2001 and 2003, 

and it obligated less funding than adjusted congressionally designated 

amounts in fiscal year 2004. Marine Corps officials said the differences 

were due to funds being moved and redesignated among BOS and S/RM 

accounts (see fig. 14).

Figure 14: Marine Corps S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Marine Corps officials indicated they had improved S/RM requirements forecasts in fiscal year 

2004 by using DOD’s facilities sustainment model.

(3) Obligations were different from congressionally designated amounts as adjusted by the Marine 

Corps, as a result of authorized internal adjustments among accounts. For example, during fiscal year 

2004 the Marine Corps moved S/RM funds into the BOS account.

As shown by figure 14, in fiscal year 2004, adjusted congressionally 

designated amounts were about 98 percent of the projected S/RM 

requirement. However, the Marine Corps underexecuted its S/RM program 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Dollars in millions

2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data.

Requirements

President’s budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Marine Corps

Amount obligated
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 61 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

by $59.2 million in fiscal year 2004. This underexecution occurred because, 

as noted above, the Marine Corps redesignated millions of dollars of S/RM 

funds to cover the difference between designated BOS funding and BOS 

obligations.

Air Force Funding Trends Data were not readily available to provide a trend in the Air Force’s 

projected BOS requirements.1

 Funding trend data for BOS services and 

programs within the Air Force show that budgetary requests, designated 

funding, and BOS obligations remained more closely aligned than was 

the case for the other services in most years. Nevertheless, some 

differences do exist between budget requests, designated funding, and 

obligations. As shown by figure 15, only in fiscal year 2004 were BOS 

obligations—$4.896 billion—less than the congressionally designated 

amounts, as adjusted by the Air Force—$5.260 billion. This indicates that 

BOS funds were being redesignated to meet other needs in that year, but 

funds from other O&M accounts were redesignated to BOS in earlier years. 

Air Force headquarters officials told us that rather than being headquarters 

directed, the Air Force relied on its major commands to redesignate BOS 

and S/RM funds as needed for the Global War on Terrorism and to decide 

which BOS programs and services would be scaled back.

1

 Although the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were able to provide information on 

requirements, Air Force officials indicated that to do so would require extraordinary efforts 

to accumulate data from individual installations and commands, and they did not view such 

unrefined requirements data as necessarily representative of true requirements.
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 62 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 15: Air Force BOS Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Air Force officials indicated they had not had models for projecting requirements during these 

budget years but, as discussed in an earlier section of this report, are taking steps to improve their 

requirements determination process for BOS funding.

(3) Obligations were different from congressionally designated amounts, as adjusted by the Air Force, 

as a result of authorized internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed below, the 

Air Force moved BOS funds into the S/RM account.

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

President's budget

Congressionally designated amounts, adjusted by the Air Force

Amount obligated

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

2001 2002 2003 2004
Appendix V

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Funding 

Trends

Page 63 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Air Force trend data for S/RM activities during fiscal years 2001 through 

2004 show that obligations were greater than designated funding or budget 

requests in each of the 4 years. According to Air Force officials, BOS funds 

were redesignated by installation commanders in fiscal year 2004 to 

supplement S/RM funds. Since both BOS and S/RM obligations exceeded 

their funding designations in fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003, this would 

suggest that funds were redesignated to these areas from other O&M 

activities in those years (see fig. 16).

Figure 16: Air Force S/RM Funding, Fiscal Years 2001-04

Notes: 

(1) Dollars are in constant fiscal year 2004 dollars.

(2) Obligations exceeded adjusted congressionally designated amounts as a result of authorized 

internal adjustments among accounts. For example, as discussed above, in fiscal year 2004, the Air 

Force moved BOS funds into the S/RM account.

Dollars in millions

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: Air Force

President's budget

Congressionally designated amounts

Amount obligated
Page 64 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 65 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Note: Page numbers in the 

draft report may differ from 

those in this report.
Page 66 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Barry W. Holman (202) 512-5581 

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Latasha Brown, Erica Haley, 

Mark Little, Erica Miles, Tanisha Stewart, Roger Tomlinson, Cheryl 

Weissman, and Michael Zola made key contributions to this report.
Page 67 GAO-05-556 Defense Infrastructure

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Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2004.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management 

Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and 

Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and 

Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military 

Facilities. GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

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Defense Budget: Real Property Maintenance and Base Operations Fund 

Movements. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-101. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2000.

Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base 

Operations Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: 

February 29, 2000.

Defense Budget: DOD Should Further Improve Visibility and 

Accountability of O&M Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-18. 

Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2000.

DOD Budget: Budgeting for Operation and Maintenance Activities. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-222. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1997.

Depot Maintenance: Some Funds Intended for Maintenance Are Used for 

Other Purposes. GAO/NSIAD-95-124. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 1995.

Army Training: One-Third of 1993 and 1994 Budgeted Funds Were Used 

for Other Purposes. GAO/NSIAD-95-71. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 1995.

(350535)
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