" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 106TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

106–730

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE RECENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY FAILURES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY DEMONSTRATE THAT SECURITY POLICY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES WITHIN

THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REMAIN INADEQUATE, THAT THE INDIVIDUALS

RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH POLICY AND PROCEDURES

MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE, AND THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION MUST

BE TAKEN TO CORRECT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES

R E P O R T

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

H. Res. 534

JULY 12, 2000.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be

printed
(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman

BOB STUMP, Arizona

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio

HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JAMES TALENT, Missouri

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

JIM RYUN, Kansas

BOB RILEY, Alabama

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

MARY BONO, California

JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

STEVEN KUYKENDALL, California

DONALD SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

OWEN PICKETT, Virginia

LANE EVANS, Illinois

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

TOM ALLEN, Maine

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

JIM TURNER, Texas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

MIKE THOMPSON, California

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

ROBERT S. RANGEL, Staff Director
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Purpose and Background ........................................................................................ 1

Legislative History .................................................................................................. 3

Committee Position ................................................................................................. 3

Oversight Findings .................................................................................................. 3

Record Vote .............................................................................................................. 3

79–006

106TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 106–730

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT

THE RECENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY FAILURES AT LOS ALAMOS

NATIONAL LABORATORY DEMONSTRATE THAT SECURITY POLICY AND

SECURITY PROCEDURES WITHIN THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION REMAIN INADEQUATE, THAT THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH POLICY AND PROCEDURES MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE, AND THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION

MUST BE TAKEN TO CORRECT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES

JULY 12, 2000.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. SPENCE, from the Committee on Armed Services,

submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany H. Res. 534]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the

resolution (H. Res. 534) expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the recent nuclear weapons security failures at

Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrate that security policy

and security procedures within the National Nuclear Security Administration remain inadequate, that the individuals responsible

for such policy and procedures must be held accountable for their

performance, and that immediate action must be taken to correct

security deficiencies, having considered the same, report favorably

thereon without amendment and recommend that the resolution do

pass.

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The purpose of H. Res. 534 is to express the sense of the House

of Representatives that the security policies and procedures within

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) remain inadequate, that the individuals responsible for these policies and

procedures must be held accountable for their performance, and

that immediate action must be taken to correct security deficiencies

affecting the safeguarding of classified nuclear weapons information.
2

In response to a long history of security and management problems, Congress established the National Nuclear Security Administration by title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65). That Act established the

NNSA as a semi-autonomous administration within the Department of Energy (DOE) with responsibility for the management of

the Nation’s nuclear security programs. The NNSA was formally

established on March 1, 2000. In advance of the confirmation by

the Senate of an Administrator of the National Nuclear Security

Administration, the Secretary of Energy opted to fulfill the additional functions and duties of the NNSA Administrator. The Secretary also appointed the Director of the Office of Security and

Emergency Operations of the Department of Energy, who is

charged with the responsibility to establish security policy for DOE

generally, to serve simultaneously as the Chief of Defense Nuclear

Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration, who is

charged with responsibility for executing security policy for the

NNSA specifically.

The committee notes that over the course of the past year, the

management of the Department of Energy has repeatedly asserted

that security throughout the Department and the national laboratory system had been greatly improved. In May 1999, the Secretary

of Energy stated that the ‘‘safeguards of national secrets have been

dramatically strengthened and improved.’’ On March 2, 2000, the

Secretary told the committee in a public hearing that ‘‘we’ve

reached a point where we have very strong security procedures,’’

and ‘‘[t]here’s no longer a culture of lax security. That has ended.’’

With regard to security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the

committee notes that the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance of the Department of Energy reviewed security

practices at that laboratory in September 1999. That review awarded the laboratory an overall rating of ‘‘satisfactory,’’ the highest

rating possible, and commended the laboratory’s security operations as ‘‘first class.’’

In light of the repeated assurances by the management of the

Department of Energy and the Department’s assessment of the security procedures at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the safeguarding of classified nuclear weapons information, the committee

was deeply troubled to learn on June 9, 2000, that two computer

hard drives containing a large quantity of classified nuclear weapons information were missing from the vault in which they were

stored at a secure facility at the laboratory.

In response to that breach of security, the committee held an

open hearing and a classified briefing on June 14, 2000, and June

22, 2000, respectively, to assess the policies and procedures for the

protection of classified nuclear weapons information within the national laboratory system. The committee notes with concern that no

inventory of secret restricted data was maintained at Los Alamos

National Laboratory; that the Department of Energy was unaware

of how many NNSA personnel have uncontrolled access to classified nuclear weapons material in the vaults at Los Alamos National Laboratory and that no logs were maintained to account for

access to such information; and that routine security procedures to

change combinations to, or access lists for, the vaults were not updated as required by established DOE security procedures.
3

The committee notes again the June 1999 conclusion of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that DOE suffers from

a culture of low regard for security and the conclusion of the Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization of

the Committee on Armed Services in February 2000 that the implementation plan prepared by the Department to establish the NNSA

was inadequate.

The committee believes that the protection of nuclear weapons

information is a critical responsibility for all those with access to

that information, and that the compromise of the data on the hard

drives, if confirmed, would constitute a clear and present danger to

the United States and its allies.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H. Res. 534 was introduced on June 27, 2000 and referred to the

Committee on Armed Services.

On June 28, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services held a

markup session to consider H. Res. 534. The committee adopted the

resolution by a voice vote. The resolution was reported favorably by

a voice vote.

COMMITTEE POSITION

On June 28, 2000, the Committee on Armed Services, a quorum

being present, approved H. Res. 534 by a voice vote.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, this legislation results from hearings

and other oversight activities conducted by the committee pursuant

to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.

With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional

Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not include any new

spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for any increase

or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures.

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the committee has not received a report

from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject matter of H. Res. 534.

RECORD VOTE

In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the committee notes that no roll call

votes were taken with respect to H. Res. 534.

The committee ordered H. Res. 534 reported to the House with

a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a quorum being

present.

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