Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Science and 

Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation, United States Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, May 18, 2005 SPACE SHUTTLE 

Status of NASA’s Efforts to 

Address Workforce Issues 

Related to the Space 

Shuttle’s Retirement 

Statement of Allen Li, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-05-718T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-718T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 

512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-718T, a testimony 

before the Senate Subcommittee on 

Science and Space, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate 

May 18, 2005 

SPACE SHUTTLE

Status of NASA’s Efforts to Address 

Workforce Issues Related to the Space 

Shuttle’s Retirement 

While NASA recognizes the importance of sustaining a critically skilled 

workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has made limited progress 

toward developing a detailed long-term strategy to do so. At the time of our 

March 2005 review, the Space Shuttle Program had identified lessons learned 

from the retirement of comparable programs, and United Space Alliance—

NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle operations—had begun to 

prepare for the impact of the space shuttle’s retirement on its workforce. 

However, timely action to address workforce issues is critical given their 

potential impact on NASA-wide goals. Significant delays in implementing a 

strategy to sustain the space shuttle workforce would likely lead to larger 

problems, such as overstretched funding and failure to meet NASA program 

schedules. NASA and United Space Alliance acknowledge that sustaining 

their workforces will be difficult, particularly if a career path beyond the 

space shuttle’s retirement is not apparent. Fiscal challenges facing the 

federal government also make it unclear whether funding for retention tools, 

such as bonuses, will be available. 

Our March 2005 report identified several factors that have hampered the 

Space Shuttle Program’s workforce planning efforts. For example, the 

program’s near-term focus on returning the space shuttle safely to flight has 

delayed other efforts that will help the program determine its workforce 

requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs. Program 

officials also noted that due to uncertainties in implementing the President’s 

vision for space exploration, requirements on which to base workforce 

planning efforts have yet to be defined. Despite these factors, our work on 

strategic workforce planning has shown that even when faced with 

uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as scenario planning, 

to better position themselves to meet future workforce requirements. 

Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has 

publicly recognized, at its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human 

capital management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for 

the agency as it progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle. 

Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA’s Space Shuttle 

The National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s (NASA) 

space shuttle program is key to 

implementing the President’s vision 

for space exploration, which calls 

for completing the assembly of the 

International Space Station (ISS) 

by the end of the decade. Currently, 

the space shuttle, which is to be 

retired after ISS assembly is 

completed, is the only launch 

system capable of transporting ISS 

components. To meet the goals of 

the President’s vision and satisfy 

ISS’s international partners, NASA 

is examining alternative launch 

vehicles and ISS configurations. 

Retiring the space shuttle and, in 

the larger context, implementing 

the President’s vision, will require 

NASA to rely on its most important 

asset—its workforce. Because 

maintaining a skilled workforce 

through retirement will be 

challenging, GAO was asked to 

discuss the actions NASA has taken 

to sustain a skilled space shuttle 

workforce and the challenges it 

faces in doing so—findings 

reported on in March 2005 (see 

GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions 

Needed to Better Position NASA to 

Sustain Its Workforce through 

Retirement, GAO-05-230). 

What GAO Recommends

In its March 2005 report, GAO 

recommended that NASA take 

steps aimed at sustaining a 

critically skilled space shuttle 

workforce through retirement. 

NASA concurred with the 

recommendation. 
Page 1 GAO-05-718T 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) is positioning itself to sustain the critically 

skilled space shuttle workforce through the retirement of the Space 

Shuttle Program. NASA is in the midst of one of the most challenging 

periods in its history. It must demonstrate that the space shuttle can safely 

fly again, begin the process of retiring its largest program, and at the same 

time prepare for the uncertain future of space exploration. These 

challenges are further exacerbated by the complex task of maintaining the 

right workforce to support the space shuttle program while ensuring that 

the skills needed for future programs are not lost. Over the next several 

years, thousands of NASA civil service and contractor employees who 

support the Space Shuttle Program will be impacted by decisions made 

about the remaining life of the program and implementation of exploration 

goals. These include decisions about the final number of space shuttle 

flights and about future programs, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle 

(CEV). As requested, my testimony today will discuss the actions that 

NASA is taking to position itself to sustain its critically skilled space 

shuttle workforce and the challenges that the agency faces in doing so—

issues we reported on to Senators Inouye and McCain in March 2005.1

In summary, we found that NASA had made limited progress in its 

planning efforts for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through the 

program’s retirement. At the time of our March 2005 report, the Space 

Shuttle Program had taken preliminary steps, including identifying the 

lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, such as the 

Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program. Further NASA’s prime contractor for 

space shuttle operations—United Space Alliance (USA)—had taken some 

initial steps to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle’s retirement on 

its own workforce. However, its progress depends on NASA making 

decisions that impact contractor requirements through the remainder of 

the program. Timely action to address workforce issues, however, is 

critical given the potential impact that they could have on NASA-wide 

goals. Unaddressed, such issues would likely lead to schedule delays and 

overstretched funding for both the Space Shuttle Program and the agency. 

Both NASA and USA have acknowledged that sustaining their workforces 

will be difficult as the space shuttle nears retirement, particularly if a 

 1

GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce 

through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005). 
Page 2 GAO-05-718T 

career path beyond the space shuttle’s retirement is not apparent to their 

employees. In addition, the federal government is facing fiscal challenges. 

Such challenges call into question whether funding for tools, such as 

retention bonuses, will be available for the agency to use to aid in 

retaining the space shuttle workforce. 

In our report we identified several factors that have hampered the Space 

Shuttle Program’s planning efforts. For example, because of the program’s 

near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight, other efforts that 

will ultimately aid in determining workforce requirements, such as 

assessing hardware and facility needs, are being delayed. In addition, 

program officials indicated that they face uncertainties regarding the 

implementation of future aspects of the President’s vision for space 

exploration (Vision) and have yet to define requirements on which 

workforce planning efforts would be based. Despite these factors, our 

prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that, even when 

faced with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as 

scenario planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce 

requirements. 

In our March 2005 report, we recommended that the agency begin 

identifying the Space Shuttle Program’s future workforce needs based 

upon various future scenarios the program could face. The program can 

use the information provided by scenario planning to develop strategies 

for meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred 

with our recommendation, and NASA’s Assistant Associate Administrator 

for the Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the 

recommendation. Since we issued our report and made our 

recommendation, NASA has taken action and publicly recognized, through 

its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human capital management 

and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it 

progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle. 

On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space 

exploration for NASA. Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring the 

space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station 

(ISS), planned for the end of the decade. In addition, NASA plans to begin 

developing a new manned exploration vehicle, or CEV, to replace the 

space shuttle and return humans to the moon as early as 2015, but no later 

than 2020, in preparation for more ambitious future missions. As this 

Subcommittee is aware, NASA’s Administrator has recently expressed his 

desire to accelerate the CEV development to eliminate the gap between 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-05-718T 

the end of the Space Shuttle Program, currently scheduled for 2010, and 

the first manned operational flight of the CEV, currently scheduled for 

2014. If the CEV development cannot be accelerated, NASA will not be 

able to launch astronauts into space for several years and will likely have 

to rely on Russia for transportation to and from the ISS. A 1996 “Balance 

Agreement” between NASA and the Russian space agency, obligated 

Russia to provide 11 Soyuz spacecraft for crew rotation of U.S. and Russia 

crews. After April 2006, this agreement will be fulfilled and Russia no 

longer must allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. 

Russian officials have indicated that they will no longer provide crew 

return services to NASA at no cost at that time. However, NASA may face 

challenges to compensating Russia for seats on its Soyuzes after the 

agreement is fulfilled due to restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act.2

The space shuttle, NASA’s largest individual program,3

 is an essential 

element of NASA’s ability to implement the Vision because it is the only 

launch system presently capable of transporting the remaining 

components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA projects 

that it will need to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the next 5 to 6 

years to complete assembly of and provide logistical support to the ISS. 

However, NASA is currently examining alternative ISS configurations to 

meet the goals of the Vision and satisfy NASA’s international partners, 

while requiring as few space shuttle flights as possible to complete 

assembly. 

Prior to retiring the space shuttle, NASA will need to first return the space 

shuttle safely to flight4

 and execute whatever number of remaining 

missions are needed to complete assembly of and provide support for the 

ISS. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of closing out or 

 2

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). The Iran Nonproliferation Act bans the 

United States from making extraordinary payments to Russia in connection with the 

International Space Station, unless the President determines, among other things, that 

Russia demonstrated a commitment to prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and 

technology that could materially contribute to developing nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems. 

3

The Space Shuttle Program accounted for 27 percent of NASA’s fiscal year 2005 budget 

request. 

4

To return the space shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two flights, which are intended to 

test and evaluate new procedures for flight safety implemented as a result of the Space 

Shuttle Columbia accident. The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July 

31, 2005. 
Page 4 GAO-05-718T 

transitioning its space shuttle assets that are no longer needed to support 

the program —such as its workforce, hardware, and facilities—to other 

NASA programs. The process of closing out or transitioning the program’s 

assets will extend well beyond the space shuttle’s final flight (see fig. 1). 

a

The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July 31, 2005. 

Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the 

Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most 

important asset—its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of 

about 2,000 civil service5

 and 15,600 contractor6 personnel, including a 

 5

Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-time equivalent is a measure of 

staff hours equal to those of an employee who works 40 hours per week in 1 year; 

therefore, the actual number of employees who work part-time or full-time on the Shuttle 

Program is greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging the number of civil 

service employees over fiscal year 2004. 
Page 5 GAO-05-718T 

large number of engineers and scientists. While each of the NASA centers 

support the Space Shuttle Program to some degree, the vast majority of 

this workforce is located at three of NASA’s Space Operations Centers: 

Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight 

Center. Data provided by NASA shows that approximately one quarter of 

the workforce at its Space Operations centers is 51 years or older and 

about 33 percent will be eligible for retirement by fiscal year 2012.7

The space shuttle workforce and NASA’s human capital management have 

been the subject of many GAO8

 and other reviews9 in the past that have 

highlighted various challenges to maintaining NASA’s science and 

engineering workforce. In addition, over the past few years, GAO and 

others in the federal government have underscored the importance of 

 6

The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor employees over fiscal 

year 2004. This number includes data from NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle 

operations, United Space Alliance, and other NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, 

established in 1996 as a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate 

NASA’s various Space Shuttle Program contracts under a single entity, and its 

approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting the space shuttle’s ground 

and flight operations under the Space Flight Operations Contract. The remaining 

contractor personnel are associated with other space shuttle components, such as its 

propulsion systems. 

7

Data provided by NASA is as of September 30, 2004. GAO did not perform a reliability 

assessment of the data. 

8

GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention, 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000) and GAO, Space Shuttle: Human 

Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued Attention, 

GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2000). 

9

Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington, D.C.: August 

2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for 2001 (Washington, D.C.: March 

2002); Behavioral Sciences Technology, Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational 

Culture Change at NASA (Ojai, Calif.: March 15, 2004). 
Page 6 GAO-05-718T 

human capital management and strategic workforce planning.10 In 

response to an increased governmentwide focus on strategic human 

capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human 

capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide 

strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to assist 

in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and receiving additional 

human capital flexibilities.11

NASA has made only limited progress toward developing a detailed longterm strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle’s 

retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in place a 

strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space 

shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps to do so. For 

example, the program identified lessons-learned from the retirement of 

programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV 

Rocket Program. Among other things, the lessons learned reports highlight 

the practices used by other programs when making personnel decisions, 

such as the importance of developing transition strategies and early 

retention planning. 

Other efforts have been initiated or are planned; examples include the 

following: 

 10GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001); GAO, 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, HighRisk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); GAO, Performance 

Accountability Series--Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A 

Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001); GAO, Major 

Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95

(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program 

Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, D.C.: 

January 2001); and GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003); 

GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003); GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital 

Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); and GAO, Human Capital: 

A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 1, 2000). See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005. 

11Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-201) amends title 5, 

United States Code, by inserting a new chapter 98 in that title, which provides new 

authorities to NASA. On March 26, 2004, NASA submitted a written workforce plan for 

using its new authorities to Congress. 

Progress toward 

Developing a Strategy 

to Sustain the Space 

Shuttle Workforce Is 

Limited 
Page 7 GAO-05-718T 

• contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration to 

assist it in planning for the space shuttle’s retirement and transitioning 

to future programs and 

• began devising an acquisition strategy for updating propulsion system 

prime contracts at MSFC to take into account the Vision’s goal of 

retiring the space shuttle following completion of the ISS. 

NASA’s prime contractor for space shuttle operations, USA, has also taken 

some preliminary steps, but its progress with these efforts depends on 

NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the 

remainder of the program. For example, USA has begun to define its 

critical skills needs to continue supporting the Space Shuttle Program, 

devised a communication plan, contracted with a human capital 

consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce; and 

continued to monitor indicators of employee morale and workforce 

stability. Contractor officials said that further efforts to prepare for the 

space shuttle’s retirement and its impact on their workforce are on hold 

until NASA first makes decisions that impact the space shuttle’s remaining 

number of flights and thus the time frames for retiring the program and 

transitioning its assets. 

Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a 

critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program’s retirement 

is important given the impact that workforce problems could have on 

NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if the Space Shuttle 

Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary workforce, NASAwide goals, such as implementing the Vision and proceeding with space 

exploration activities, could be impacted. For example, workforce 

problems could lead to a delay in flight certification for the space shuttle, 

which could result in a delay to the program’s overall flight schedule, thus 

compromising the goal of completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In 

addition, officials said that space exploration activities could slip as much 

as 1 year for each year that the space shuttle’s operations are extended 

because NASA’s progress with these activities relies on funding and assets 

that are expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle Program to 

other NASA programs. 

NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in sustaining 

the critically skilled space shuttle workforce. These challenges include the 

following: 

The Potential Impact of 

Workforce Problems and 

Other Challenges the 

Space Shuttle Program 

Faces Highlight the Need 

for Workforce Planning 
Page 8 GAO-05-718T 

• Retaining the current workforce. Because many in the current 

workforce will want to participate in or will be needed to support 

future phases of implementing the Vision, it may be difficult to retain 

them in the Space Shuttle Program. In addition, it may be difficult to 

provide certain employees with a transition path from the Space 

Shuttle Program to future programs following retirement. 

 

• Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. Because 

USA was established specifically to perform ground and flight 

operations for the Space Shuttle Program, its future following the 

space shuttle’s retirement is uncertain. Contractor officials stated that 

a lack of long-term job security would cause difficulties in recruiting 

and retaining employees to continue supporting the space shuttle as it 

nears retirement. In addition, steps that the contractor may have to 

take to retain its workforce, such as paying retention bonuses, are 

likely to require funding above normal levels. 

• Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of 

retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will have 

to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that will 

put pressure on discretionary spending—such as investments in space 

programs—and require NASA to do more with fewer resources. 

While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning for 

the program’s retirement, its development of a detailed long-term strategy 

to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several factors: 

• Near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight. Since the 

Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has been focused on its 

near-term goal of returning the space shuttle safely to flight. While this 

focus is understandable given the importance of the space shuttle’s role 

in completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the delay of efforts to 

determine future workforce needs. 

• Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. While the 

Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of retiring 

the program by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program lacks 

well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce 

planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final 

configuration of the ISS, the final number of flights for the space 

shuttle, how ISS operations will be supported after the space shuttle is 

retired, or the type of vehicle that will be used for space exploration. 

These determinations are important because they impact decisions 

Several Factors Have 

Impeded Workforce 

Planning Efforts 
Page 9 GAO-05-718T 

about the transition of space shuttle assets. Lacking this information, 

NASA officials have said that their ability to progress with detailed 

long-term workforce planning is limited. 

Despite these uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program could follow a 

strategic human capital management approach to plan for sustaining its 

critically skilled workforce. Studies by several organizations, including 

GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the public and 

private sectors follow a strategic human capital management approach, 

even when faced with an uncertain future environment. 

In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better 

positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle workforce 

through retirement. In particular, we recommended that the agency begin 

identifying the Space Shuttle Program’s future workforce needs based 

upon various future scenarios the program could face. Scenario planning 

can allow the agency to progress with workforce planning, even when 

faced with uncertainties such as those surrounding the final number of 

space shuttle flights, the final configuration of the ISS and the vehicle that 

will be developed for exploration. The program can use the information 

provided by scenario planning to develop strategies for meeting the needs 

of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred with our 

recommendation, and NASA’s Assistant Associate Administrator for the 

Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the recommendation. 

Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has 

taken action and publicly recognized that human capital management and 

critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it moves 

toward retiring the space shuttle. This recognition was most apparent at 

NASA’s Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March 2005. As part 

of the Summit process, NASA instituted panel teams to examine the Space 

Shuttle Program’s mission execution and transition needs from various 

perspectives and make recommendations aimed at ensuring that the 

program will execute its remaining missions safely as it transitions to 

supporting emerging exploration mission needs. The reports that resulted 

from these examinations are closely linked by a common theme—the 

importance of human capital management and critical skills retention to 

ensure success. In their reports, the panel teams highlighted similar 

challenges to those that we highlighted in our report. The panels made 

various recommendations to the Space Flight Leadership Council on steps 

that the program should take now to address human capital concerns. 

These recommendations included developing and implementing a critical 

skills retention plan, developing a communication plan to ensure the 

Despite Uncertainties, 

NASA Could Follow a 

Strategic Human Capital 

Management Approach 
Page 10 GAO-05-718T 

workforce is informed, and developing a detailed budget that includes 

funding for human capital retention and reductions, as well as establishing 

an agencywide team to integrate human capital planning efforts. 

There is no question that NASA faces a challenging time ahead. Key 

decisions have to be made regarding final configuration and support of the 

ISS, the number of shuttle flights needed for those tasks, and the timing 

for development of future programs, such as the CEV—all in a constrained 

funding environment. In addition, any schedule slip in the completion of 

the construction of the ISS or in the CEV falling short of its accelerated 

initial availability (as soon as possible after space shuttle retirement) may 

extend the time the space shuttle is needed. But whatever decisions are 

made and courses of action taken, the need for sustaining a critically 

skilled workforce is paramount to the success of these programs. Despite 

a limited focus on human capital management in the past, NASA now 

acknowledges that it faces significant challenges in sustaining a critically 

skilled workforce and has taken steps to address these issues. We are 

encouraged by these actions and the fact that human capital management 

and critical skills retention was given such prominent attention throughout 

the recent Integrated Space Operations Summit process. The fact that our 

findings and conclusions were echoed by the panel teams established to 

support the Integrated Space Operations Summit is a persuasive reason for 

NASA leadership to begin addressing these human capital issues early and 

aggressively. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li at 

(202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Alison Heafitz, Jim Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley, Karen 

Sloan, and T.J Thomson. 

Conclusions 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(120459) 
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