J-A22036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PETER FRANCIS PRYOR, JR.

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 914 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001261-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: December 21, 2023

Appellant, Peter Francis Pryor, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his bench trial conviction for persons not to possess firearms and firearms not 

to be carried without a license.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

At 2:53 a.m. on February 26, 2021, police officers 

responded to a report of a domestic incident at 417 

Kingsboro Street in the City of Pittsburgh. Upon arrival,

officers interviewed Kimberly Lee, who reported that she 

and [Appellant] had an argument about money and she 

wanted him to be removed from the residence. [Appellant], 

however, had fled the scene prior to the arrival of the police 

officers. Ms. Lee was advised to obtain a Protection From 

Abuse Order if [Appellant] returned.

At 3:44 a.m. on that same day, police officers responded to 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) and 6106(a)(1).
J-A22036-23

- 2 -

a shotspotter alert at 417 Kingsboro Street for one shot 

fired. Upon arriving at the residence, Ms. Lee advised

officers that [Appellant] had returned to the residence 

where she argued with [Appellant]. Ms. Lee provided 

officers with a physical description of [Appellant] and 

[Appellant] was located nearby at approximately 4:00 am. 

[Appellant] was asked if he had a weapon on him and he 

responded that he did possess a firearm. [Appellant] 

appeared nervous. He was rocking back and forth and he 

turned away from officers as they approached. The officers 

detained [Appellant] and conducted a pat-down of 

[Appellant]. A firearm was recovered from his person and 

there was a round in the chamber. [Appellant] did not 

possess a license to carry a firearm and he was prohibited 

from possessing a firearm due to a prior felony conviction 

for Aggravated Assault. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/1/22, at 2). The Commonwealth charged 

Appellant with persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without a 

license, and possession of drug paraphernalia, in connection with these 

events. 

On January 31, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, 

arguing that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to support his seizure, 

search, and subsequent arrest. The court conducted a hearing on the motion 

on March 10, 2022. The parties stipulated to the facts in the record, and after 

argument the court denied the motion. Appellant then proceeded to a 

stipulated bench trial, wherein the defense conceded that the Commonwealth 

met its burden for both firearm violations. (See N.T. Trial, 3/10/22, at 30). 

The court convicted Appellant of persons not to possess firearms and carrying 

a firearm without a license; it found Appellant not guilty of possession of drug 

paraphernalia. 
J-A22036-23

- 3 -

On June 8, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to 36 to 72 months’ 

imprisonment for persons not to possess a firearm and imposed no further 

penalty for carrying a firearm without a license. On June 16, 2022, Appellant 

filed a timely post-sentence motion. The court denied the motion on July 11, 

2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court subsequently 

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed his statement on August 24, 2022.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err in denying suppression as police 

did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

and/or probable cause when they illegally seized and 

searched [Appellant]?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial 

of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings 

are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal 

conclusions based upon the facts.

Id. at 27 (citation omitted). If appellate review of the suppression court’s 

decision “turns on allegations of legal error,” then the trial court’s legal 
J-A22036-23

- 4 -

conclusions are nonbinding on appeal and subject to plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted).

Appellant argues that police did not have reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigative detention in this case. Appellant contends the 

suppression record contains no information about how many people were 

present when the shot was allegedly fired. Appellant suggests that someone 

else could have fired the gunshot. Appellant emphasizes that Ms. Lee and 

Appellant had only a verbal dispute, and Ms. Lee told police that Appellant did 

not have a gun. Appellant claims there was no evidence that Appellant was 

even at the location where the shot was allegedly fired. Appellant submits 

that vehicular noises, fireworks, or other sounds could have prompted the 

ShotSpotter notification. Appellant avers the record is also silent concerning 

how much time elapsed between when police received the ShotSpotter 

notification and when they located Appellant, and where he was in relation to 

where the shots had been fired. Appellant highlights that there was no 

evidence of him acting nervous when the police approached, or of the area 

being a high-crime area. 

Appellant claims the police stopped him based solely on his possession 

of a concealed firearm. Appellant contends that the only evidence of record 

was that, at the officer’s prompting, Appellant gave his name and confirmed 

he had a firearm. Appellant maintains the officer then patted him down for 
J-A22036-23

- 5 -

officer safety and recovered a gun in Appellant’s coat pocket. Relying on 

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 652 Pa. 353, 208 A.3d 916 (2019), cert. denied, 

___ U.S. ____, 140 S.Ct. 645, 205 L.Ed.2d 410 (2019), Appellant argues that 

mere possession of a concealed firearm in public does not provide reasonable 

suspicion for police to conduct an investigative detention. Appellant concludes 

police conducted an illegal investigative detention in the absence of 

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity, and this 

Court must grant relief. We disagree.

This Court has explained: 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

protect citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures, 

including those entailing only a brief detention.” 

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 56, 757 A.2d 

884, 888 (2000). Specifically, police officers may not 

conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless one of 

several recognized exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. 

Blair, [575 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. 1990)]. If a 

defendant’s detention violates the Fourth Amendment, then 

any evidence seized during that stop must be excluded as 

fruit of an unlawful detention. Id.

Commonwealth v. Mattis, 252 A.3d 650, 654 (Pa.Super. 2021).

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general 

classifications:

The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or 

request for information) which need not be supported by 

any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to 

stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” 

must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a 

suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not 

involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the 
J-A22036-23

- 6 -

functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally an arrest or 

“custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 712, 785 

A.2d 89 (2001)).

An “investigative detention” is interchangeably labeled as a “stop and 

frisk” or a “Terry[2] stop.” Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119 

(Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

An investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter, 

constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the 

protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. To institute an investigative detention, an 

officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a 

finding that based on the available facts, a person of 

reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was 

appropriate.

* * *

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led 

him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that 

criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped 

was involved in that activity.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). “In determining whether police had reasonable suspicion 

____________________________________________

2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
J-A22036-23

- 7 -

to initiate an investigative detention, ‘the fundamental inquiry is an objective 

one, namely, whether the facts available to police at the moment of the 

intrusion warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action 

taken was appropriate.’” Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 

1248 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ____, 268 A.3d 1071 (2021) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa.Super. 2001)). 

Demonstrating reasonable suspicion requires that the detaining officer 

“articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 

or hunch.” Id. (citation omitted).

In Hicks, supra, our Supreme Court held that “conduct in which 

hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians are licensed to engage lawfully” is, 

on its own, “an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 

is afoot.” Hicks, supra at 400, 208 A.3d at 945. However, behavior 

indicative of the presence of a firearm contributes to the totality of the 

circumstances in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion to 

investigate further. Id. at 939-40.

Instantly, the parties stipulated at the suppression hearing to the facts 

of record which included the affidavit of probable cause, the preliminary 

hearing transcript, and the description of the body camera footage from 
J-A22036-23

- 8 -

Appellant’s suppression motion.

3

 The affidavit of probable cause explains that 

Officer Michael Mahich responded to a ShotSpotter alert at 3:44 a.m. Officer 

Mahich was aware that earlier that morning, at approximately 3:00 a.m., 

police responded to a “verbal domestic” call at the same location where the 

caller, Ms. Lee, stated that Appellant was arguing with her about money. 

When Officer Mahich arrived on the scene after the ShotSpotter alert, he made 

contact with Ms. Lee, who told him that Appellant returned to the home to 

argue with her. Ms. Lee provided a description of Appellant and suggested 

that it was likely he would still be in the area. Officer Mahich stated that at 

approximately 4:00 a.m., he located a male matching the description given 

by Ms. Lee in close proximity to the residence. Officer Mahich described what 

occurred next in the affidavit of probable cause as follows:

I asked the male if his name was Peter, in which he 

acknowledged. I asked Peter[, Appellant,] if he had a gun 

on his persons, in which he acknowledged that he did. 

[Appellant] stated it was in his front right jacket pocket. 

____________________________________________

3 On appeal, the parties disagree about which evidence was before the trial 

court at the suppression hearing. At the outset, we agree with Appellant that 

“[i]n appeals from suppression orders, our scope of review is limited to the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Caple, 

121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 177, 179 A.3d 7 

(2018) (citing In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 151-52, 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89

(2013)). However, here, rather than limiting the suppression court to 

testimony introduced at the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the 

facts of record. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/10/22, at 2-3). Thus, the trial court 

properly considered all evidence in the record of this case when ruling on the 

suppression motion which included, inter alia, the affidavit of probable cause, 

the preliminary hearing transcript, and the description of the body camera 

footage from Appellant’s suppression motion (the actual body camera footage 

is not in the certified record), when ruling on the suppression motion. 
J-A22036-23

- 9 -

[Appellant] appeared to be extremely nervous, rocking back 

and forth and beginning to turn away from me upon my 

approach. I ordered [Appellant] to keep his hands out and 

not reach for anything. Due to [Appellant] matching the 

description provided from [Ms.] Lee, the proximity of the 

shots fired notification, and [Appellant] acknowledging that 

he was carrying a firearm, I detained [Appellant] at 

approximately 0400 hours. I recovered a chrome handgun... 

from [Appellant’s] front right jacket pocket.... [Appellant] 

stated that he did not have a concealed carry permit. 

Appellant was placed in custody at 0419 hours.

(Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/27/21, at 2).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its findings as 

follows:

This [c]ourt believes the officers possessed the requisite 

reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat-down of 

[Appellant]. At the time of the search, police officers were 

aware that [Appellant] was a participant in two domestic 

incidents, less than an hour apart, at a residence where a 

gunshot was reported at the time of the second incident. 

Police officers believed that [Appellant] was a participant in 

the domestic incident. Because there was a report of a 

gunshot being fired at the residence, the police officers’

belief that [Appellant] was armed and dangerous was 

reasonable. This belief was confirmed when [Appellant]

admitted that he possessed the firearm. These facts 

establish a reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] may be 

armed and dangerous at the time of the pat-down search. 

The search was, therefore, proper and the denial of 

[Appellant’s] suppression motion should be affirmed.

(Trial Court Opinion at 6).

Upon review, we agree with the trial court that the facts available to the 

officers at the time of the investigative detention were sufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion. Although Appellant is correct that, without more, his 

possession of a concealed firearm did not establish reasonable suspicion for 
J-A22036-23

- 10 -

an investigative detention, the totality of the circumstances in this case 

provided enough additional factors to give the officers reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot. See Hicks, supra; Jones, supra. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress.4 See Williams, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 12/21/2023

____________________________________________

4

In a footnote in his appellate brief, Appellant makes the alternative argument 

that the interaction at issue was a custodial detention lacking probable cause. 

(See Appellant’s Brief at 13 n.3). Nevertheless, Appellant did not assert this 

alternative theory at the suppression hearing, as Appellant’s argument 

focused solely on whether the officers had reasonable suspicion for an 

investigative detention. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/10/22, at 1-20). Furthermore, 

in Appellant’s motion to suppress, he only argues that “[o]fficers did not have 

reasonable suspicion to support [his] seizure and subsequent arrest.” (Motion 

to Suppress, filed 1/31/22, at 6). Appellant did not specifically argue that the 

interaction was a custodial detention for which the officers lacked probable 

cause. (See id.). Therefore, Appellant failed to preserve this alternative 

theory of relief for review. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 

265, 285 n.25 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), appeal denied, 643 Pa. 190, 173 

A.3d 268 (2017) (holding that appellant failed to preserve argument which 

was not raised in suppression motion or before trial court at suppression 

hearing).