All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis

expressed in this monograph are those of the

roundtable participants. They do not necessarily

reflect official positions or views of the Central

Intelligence Agency or any other US Government

entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents

should be construed as asserting or implying US

Government endorsement of the study’s factual

statements and interpretations.
Central Intelligence Agency

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Roundtable Report

Intelligence and Policy:

The Evolving Relationship

10 November 2003

Georgetown University,

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C.

June 2004

iii

Introduction

As became abundantly clear during a conference sponsored by CIA's Center for the Study

of Intelligence (CSI) in Charlottesville, Virginia, on 10 and 11 September 2003, the

challenges that face the US Intelligence Community in the aftermath of the terrorist attack

on the United States two years earlier are perceived by members of that community as

being far more complex, demanding, and consequential than any they have heretofore

encountered. That conference brought together an experienced group of national security

specialists from the intelligence and policy communities to discuss Intelligence for a New

Era in American Foreign Policy.

Not long after the Charlottesville conference, Dr. James Steiner, CIA’s Officer in

Residence and Associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) of the Edmund

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, coordinated an effort to

answer one of the challenging questions that have arisen in the changed post-9/11 security

environment: how can the Intelligence Community effectively provide "actionable"

intelligence while being mindful of its traditional practice of separating, to the extent

possible, the intelligence and policy functions of national security decisionmaking. The

resulting one-day roundtable conference became for CSI the first in a planned series of

projects on intelligence and policy intended to foster better understanding of the oftenperplexing dynamic between the consumers of intelligence and intelligence professionals.

The roundtable, Where Is the Red Line? Actionable Intelligence vs. Policy Advocacy,

took place on 10 November 2003 at Georgetown University. Instead of using a conference

format, with formal papers and designated commentators, the roundtable was conducted

as a discussion among a relatively small circle of participants, divided about equally

between professional (current or former) intelligence officers and senior intelligence

consumers drawn from the ranks of former policymakers. Ambassador Thomas Pickering,

former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and a former Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence, Richard Kerr, served as cochairmen.

In addition to the cochairmen, participants included:

• Frans Bax, President, CIA University

• Hans Binnendijk, Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National

Defense University; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense

Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, 1999–2001

• Dennis Blair, Admiral, USN (ret.); President, Institute for Defense Analyses; former

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command; former Assistant Director of Central

Intelligence for Military Support
iv

• Christopher Bolan, Colonel, US Army; ISD Associate; former member of the staffs of vice

presidents Gore and Cheney, focusing on Middle East issues

• Chester Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Edmund A.

Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Chairman, US Institute of

Peace; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1981–89

• James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND

Corporation; served in a variety of State Department and White House posts, including

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Ambassador to the European

Union; also served as US special envoy for Afghanistan, for Kosovo, for Bosnia, for Haiti,

and for Somalia

• Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 2001–2003;

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,

1989–93

• Paul Johnson, Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

• Woodrow Kuhns, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

• Douglas MacEachin, staff member, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States (9/11 Commission); Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1993–95; Senior

Research Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,

1995–2000

• John MacGaffin, former Senior Adviser to the Director and Deputy Director, Federal

Bureau of Investigation; former Associate Deputy Director for Operations, CIA

• William Nolte, Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and

Production

• Phyllis Oakley, Chair of the Board, US Committee for the United Nations Population

Fund; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 1997–98; and

Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, 1994–97

• Martin Petersen, Deputy Executive Director, CIA

• Jennifer Sims, Visiting Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence

Coordination, 1994–98; Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of State for

Management and Coordinator for Intelligence Resources and Planning, 1998–2001

• James Steiner, CIA Officer-in-Residence, ISD
v

• Casimir Yost, Marshall Coyne Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Director, ISD

The following summary of roundtable proceedings does not attempt to recapitulate the

discussions in detail. It attempts, rather, to focus on the most salient points made by the

participants as they considered a set of key questions drawn up in advance by the

roundtable sponsors. These questions will be found at the conclusion of the text. Readers

will note that some of the questions were discussed more extensively than others.

Those interested in sampling the tenor of the discussions may refer to the italicized

excerpts contained in each section.

vii

Contents Page

The Policy Community-Intelligence Community Nexus 1

The Intelligence Community Views Its Customers 1

Discussion Excerpts 1

What Policymakers Want From Intelligence 2

Discussion Excerpts 3

The Evolving Role of the Intelligence Community 7

Keeping Up with the Competition 7

Discussion Excerpts 7

Challenges for Analysts 8

Discussion Excerpts 9

Challenges for the DCI 10

Discussion Excerpts 11

The Elusive Red Line 13

Discussion Excerpts 13

Key Questions 17

1

The Policy Community-Intelligence

Community Nexus

The Intelligence Community Views Its

Customers

The observation of a former senior intelligence

officer that, in his experience, intelligence

analysts often knew more about the countries

they followed than they did about the

customers they served led roundtable

participants initially to debate the nature of the

target audience for Intelligence Community

products. One rather expansive definition held

that anyone on the receiving end of an

intelligence product could conceivably make

policy, including, for example, a member of the

armed forces in the field who chose to take

action on the basis of a tactical intelligence

report. Such a recipient, it was suggested,

might, however, more aptly be considered a

policy “implementer” than a policy "maker."

Pursuing this line, a roundtable participant

thought that "decisionmaker" might be a more

useful definition in that a customer could well

be a "policymaker" at one point and a “policy

implementer" at another point. Moreover, the

speaker suggested, as an intelligence

consumer moved along this spectrum, the

nature of his dialogue with analysts would

change, as would the products they provided

in response.

Other participants preferred a more restrictive

definition that excluded tactical-level

consumers and focused on consumers at the

policy level. These consumers would certainly

include the president, the cabinet, the cabinet

deputies, and those holding assistant

secretary-level positions in the various

departments. Speakers then suggested that

key consumers might also include officials

given special, high-level assignments; key

cabinet and congressional staff members; and

those heading delegations to important

negotiations.

A former senior intelligence officer cautioned

against trying to arrive at too precise a

definition of a policymaker, arguing that

identifying the audience and matching product

and audience are part of the intelligence

professional's job. Further to that observation,

a speaker noted that the number of officials

who see themselves as having a role to play in

the policy process has increased, as has the

number of agencies they represent, both of

which increase the demands levied on the

resources available to the Intelligence

Community.

Discussion Excerpts

By intelligence, you could mean one of two

things: you could mean information obtained

clandestinely, or you could mean any product

of the Intelligence Community. I assume you

mean the latter, since a lot of the Intelligence

Community products are derived from overtly

obtained material.

***

Some intelligence providers are also players—

verification has been one, covert action is

another. Any intelligence operation overseas

has some policy significance.

***

When you add covert action to the mix and try

to figure out who is the policy implementer or

not . . . is the CIA officer in the field with

Masood an implementer or a collector? The

answer is: "Yes."

***

This notion that policymakers can do

intelligence as well as the Intelligence

Community is flat bullshit. There's too much

information. The volume is so great that any

policymaker who believes that he can look at

that and come up with good answers is a fool.

And you ought not to provide them with

intelligence anyway. But the problem is that

the Intelligence Community hasn't recognized

that as well. Shame on us if we can't do better

In a sense, you

could start off by

making the

assumption that

it is inevitable

that, if the

machinery works

well, intelligence

shapes policy.

. . . I would be

much happier

with competent

policymakers

who know a lot

about the subject

they’re dealing

with, but know

enough to know

that they won’t

ever know as

much as a really

good intelligence

analyst.
2

than policymakers. We can get more

information out of what we're collecting; we're

just not doing it.

***

In the last two administrations I had experience

with, we spent a lot of our time trying to figure

out how the people coming in functioned—

what their biases and their interests were. I

mean, we spent a lot of time on intelligence

focused on the principal players, and it was

worth every minute of it.

What Policymakers Want From Intelligence

Roundtable participants recognized that

policymakers desire both substantive and

bureaucratic support from the Intelligence

Community. On the substantive side, they want

reliable information on new developments and

on matters with which they are unfamiliar. They

also want intelligence to inform their

decisionmaking by describing the choices

available to an adversary or an opposing

negotiator and explaining how and why one

choice or another might be preferred. On the

bureaucratic side, they want intelligence to

give them an edge in policy deliberations.

Several speakers spoke admiringly of senior

policymakers who developed a close

relationship with their opposite numbers in

intelligence in order to give themselves an

advantage over bureaucratic rivals.

Participants with an intelligence background

observed that the policymakers they have

served have had quite different approaches to

the Intelligence Community and different styles

in dealing with their analytical interlocutors. For

example, some have begun by professing little

use for intelligence and much confidence in

their own knowledge and ability to make policy

decisions. Others have appeared awestruck by

the intelligence products they were offered.

These contrasting attitudes, it was noted, have

generally reached a "crossover" point at which

a rough balance in approaches was achieved.

A speaker with experience in both policy and

intelligence positions commented that most

policymakers failed to make efficient use of the

capabilities of the Intelligence Community,

relying on analysts to think up the questions

they should want answered. Other participants

added a caveat, however. In their view, even

when policymakers actively solicit input from

the Intelligence Community, intelligence

officers must be wary of responding to the

questions in their own terms. These

participants argued that, if necessary, analysts

should recast the questions to make sure that

their analyses are not compromised by a

partisan agenda and that the issues that

should be addressed are addressed.

Several participants raised the question of bias

and its role in causing intelligence failures. The

discussion focused on several aspects. On the

one hand, intelligence producers can be

responsible for failures through erroneous

assumptions or personal prejudice.

Consumers, on the other hand, often cause

failures through reluctance to accept

intelligence they don't want to hear.

Continuing on this theme, participants

recognized the practically limitless volume of

information, both classified and unclassified,

that is now available to policymakers. This,

they added, has led many policymakers to

conclude that they can do their own analysis.

Several speakers noted that, although many

policymakers could point to some prior foreign

policy experience, this approach could be

harmful because it prevents the policymaker

from taking advantage of the knowledge that

years of study affords analysts.

There was agreement among participants that,

despite its expense and inefficiency, having

more than one intelligence agency competing

for the consumer's attention has generally

We can get more

informationoutof

what we're

collecting; we're

just not doing it.
3

served the country well. Several speakers

added that they would not be troubled by

additional competition—one example being

boutiques created for a specific purpose by

individual policymakers—so long as all

producers were subject to the same rules. A

former policymaker pointed out that the US

model of an intelligence system differed from

those of several key allies, which are either

more restrictive or more freewheeling.

The same former policymaker reminded

participants of the commonly held view that

intelligence analysts almost always tend

toward pessimism in their appraisals because

they are more likely to be criticized for failing to

predict an untoward event than for making a

call that turns out to be wrong. Policymakers,

on the other hand, tend to be optimists.

Occasionally, however, when they are reluctant

to take action on some issue, policymakers are

happy to receive a pessimistic assessment.

Such conjunctures, he noted, work against

policy change and discourage innovative

thinking.

A speaker commented on the difficulty

analysts encounter in gaining acceptance for

scenarios with non-linear outcomes. This

prompted another participant to lament that

war gaming, which sometimes produced such

results by bringing analysts and policymakers

together in structured exercises, had fallen into

disuse in recent years.

Discussion Excerpts

But one of the things I observed is that some

administrations came in saying, “Intelligence

can't help me at all. I don't like it. I don't trust it.

I am not confident in it. I have my own way of

thinking about problems, thank you very much.

We'll take your stuff, but don't expect a great

deal of interaction.” Another group came in

saying, “This is an omnipotent group...

[it]knows everything. I can hardly wait to

embrace 'em.” All of them changed their views.

The ones that were skeptical when they came

in became increasingly dependent or, at least,

reliant on it. The ones that loved it at the

beginning began to say, “Is that all you can do

for me?” So you cross somewhere in the center

....

***

The goals of a player in a bureaucratic warfare

game are, first, control. Second, power. And

power comes from expertise; so you need

intelligence to win battles that are about

expertise, and you need intelligence to be able

to be effective with the foreigner as well.

Thirdly, to achieve your goals, whatever those

goals might be, to exploit those opportunities,

to carry out that policy. And fourth on my list is

to support the national interest. These are in

descending order.

***

In the policy formulation process, people can

act very tactically as they're trying to grab a

role in doing policy. Policymakers, on any given

issue, aren't necessarily a static set. They are

competing to get into the policy domain, and

they want intelligence to support them in the

tactical process of getting an “in” on an issue.

***

Quite often, policymakers do not want

intelligence on a problem they do not want to

hear; or they've already heard the answer, and

they don't like it.

***

Policymakers, fundamentally, are doers,

particularly early in an administration. They

tend to have strong personalities. They come

in with an agenda, and, often, they think they

come in with a mandate. And, therefore, I think

. . . power comes

from expertise;

so you need

intelligence to

win battles that

are about

expertise . . .
4

what they are looking for from intelligence,

particularly early on, is information that helps

them push that agenda.

***

I think the intelligence suppliers have to

understand that policymakers have an agenda.

They have both a bureaucratic one, and they

have, perhaps, a substantive agenda.

Bureaucratically, they're trying to enhance their

own position in a kind of zero-sum game vis-àvis everyone else in the same sphere.

Substantively, they probably have a set of

objectives they're committed to trying to

achieve. And that means that they will respond

to some kinds of intelligence differently than

others—that they will respond better to

intelligence that enhances either their position

or their chances of achieving their substantive

objective and that they will at least regard more

skeptically intelligence which has the opposite

effect.

***

Probably you'll go back and find most

intelligence failures are not because of lack of

information, but because of assumptions and

predictions that were based on biases.

***

A colleague once used weather forecasting as

opposed to predicting: “I've got high pressure,

so much temperature. If nothing changes, and

if my assumption about this is correct, this is

where the thing's going to come out.” But, if I sit

down and say, “This is how they think, this is

what they'll do, and, therefore, this is the

outcome”—that's the recipe for disaster.

***

But the terms of reference [of a National

Intelligence Estimate] were defined not by the

Agency, but by the requester . . . in my view a

very dangerous process, and a thing that had

been resisted, at least in my experience, for as

long as I could remember. And that is, when

the Hill asked for an estimate, or the

policymaker asked for an estimate, that's fine.

But recast the terms of the estimate in terms

that you wish to address.

***

When someone sits at a desk at the NSC and

sees all of the raw take, does that mean that

that policymaker doesn't have to rely on the

Intelligence Community as much as he or she

would have a decade ago or two decades ago,

and does that make it easier for the

policymaker to say, “I don't need the intel

community; I'm going to have my own analysts

sitting here taking a look at this and reaching

our own conclusions, and, therefore, I can cut

out the intel community?”

***

If somebody wants to create his own little

intelligence cell, fine. But, subject it to the

same competition that the rest of us have to go

through. But what the problem is,

organizations are created. They're not

subjected to the kinds of competition and

transparency [as the rest of us].

***

By and large, my experience is that almost all

the analytical agencies have the same stuff,

and, so, then I think what good decisionmakers

value is our different opinions. I mean, the best

part of NIEs used to be the footnotes.

***

There's an interesting distinction between the

American intelligence system and the British

intelligence system . . . and the German. The

American, in principle, is open and competitive.

That is, everybody has access to all the

information. Each of the agencies can come to

its own conclusions. They are not forced to a

If somebody

wants to create

his own little

intelligence cell,

fine. But, subject

it to the same

competition that

the rest of us

have to go

through.
5

common conclusion, and they can brief those

conclusions to anybody they want. The British

system is open, but coordinated. That is,

intelligence agencies aren't permitted to brief

their conclusions to policymakers except

through the Joint Intelligence Committee,

which is chaired by a policymaker and which

comes to a coordinated judgment, and only that

coordinated judgment goes to the

policymakers. And [there's] the German

system, which is neither transparent nor

coordinated; in which the intelligence agencies

secretly pass such information as they choose

to such policymakers as they wish.

***

But one of the things that, it seemed to me,

rescued us a number of times was a deep,

deep understanding of the facts and the issues

at a level of detail where you could go into a

room and defend your argument. I do have the

impression right now that we go into rooms

unarmed to deal with serious critics who know

a lot.

***

I think policymakers and decisionmakers can

fancy that they are, in fact, better than the

intelligence analysts because they get the

same data. The only thing they don’t have is 30

years’ worth of looking at this country and what

that does in the brain cells in the back of the

brain, which it doesn’t if you’ve been doing

other things for 30 years.

But one of the

things that . . .

rescued us a

number of times

was a deep, deep

understanding of

the facts and the

issues at a level

of detail where

you could go into

a room and

defend your

argument.

7

The Evolving Role of the

Intelligence Community

Keeping Up with the Competition

Participants recognized that there has been a

marked change in the role of intelligence since

the end of the Cold War. Until the 1990s, the

Intelligence Community virtually "owned"

information on the USSR and the communist

world, the principal strategic challenge facing

the United States and its allies, because most

of that information was acquired clandestinely

or technically. Developments of the past 15

years have vastly increased the amount of

information available to policymakers,

however, and have deprived the Intelligence

Community of its dominant position. A speaker

added that the volume of available information

is growing steadily as a result of the current

emphasis on collection.

Several participants saw problems in the

increasing focus of intelligence producers on

current intelligence and policy support at the

expense of basic research. In their view, while

the Intelligence Community does a good job of

providing policymakers with current

intelligence, this shift in emphasis has

produced a lack of analytic depth that all too

often makes intelligence products little or no

better than what most reasonably

sophisticated policymakers can provide for

themselves. The problem is made more acute

in that a large percentage of the intelligence

workforce is relatively new on the job.

Other speakers, arguing that policymakers

perforce focus on events of the moment and

are able to peruse only a relatively small

amount of the information available to them,

advocated efforts by analysts to take

advantage of their ability to concentrate on a

richer store of information to look for ways to

give policymakers products that provide

needed context for the intelligence reports that

cross their desks. Carrying the argument a

step further, another speaker commented on

the importance of analysts' having sufficient

knowledge of their fields, as well as an

understanding of the way in which policies are

developed, so as to be able to give

policymakers intelligence analyses they may

not even realize they need.

Another participant, a former high-level

intelligence officer, contended that the

Intelligence Community's efforts to maintain

analytical relevance should include a

requirement for systematic critiques of

Community products. In addition, the inclusion

of policymakers in such critiques would make it

more likely that the needs of the policy

community were taken into account. This

observation provided a counterpoint to an

earlier suggestion that, to the extent possible,

policymakers should include intelligence

officers in their meetings, so that policy

community concerns and needs might be

conveyed to their colleagues more accurately

and expeditiously.

Discussion Excerpts

I think there is a fundamental change in the

role of intelligence since the end of the Cold

War, where intelligence provided the bulk of

the knowledge and information on the strategic

problem. And it was secret. It was

clandestinely acquired, or technically acquired,

and, therefore, intelligence essentially owned

that information. Today, there is no ownership

of information by the Intelligence Community.

***

The Intelligence Community really [is] focused

on current intelligence, on policy support. It

does very little research. It has very little

understanding below the level of the

policymaker and, in my view, on many issues.

I think that, in some ways, these two groups

are reinforcing each other's worst habits.

***

Today, there is no

ownership of

information by

the Intelligence

Community.

[Intelligence] has

very little

understanding

below the level of

the policymaker

and, in my view,

on many issues. I

think that, in

some ways,

[intelligence and

policymakers]

are reinforcing

each other's

worst habits.
8

If you focus on current intelligence, that's about

ten percent of the information available to the

Intelligence Community. The Intelligence

Community is really the only one in town that

has the time to look at the other 90 percent and

find the things that don't stick out to the current

intelligence officer or the policymaker the first

time around. In fact, my observation is that

policymakers often know more than the

intelligence officers, particularly the senior

ones, because they've been on the telephone

to the King of Tut or to the president of Wa. And

they talk to people all the time. They talk to the

President; they know what the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense know, and

intelligence officers don't have any real access

to that sort of knowledge. The fact is that most

policymakers are starving for new knowledge.

And if it's good, if it's new, I don't care how

skeptical they are, you can sell it to them.

***

Your average analyst today, and certainly one

working terrorism, is probably seeing in the

tenths of what's available. Furthermore, we're

pouring so much money into collection

systems and very little into the exploitation of

that collection, that the problem is getting

bigger. We've got to put more money into the

analytic side and balance the collection, or

we're just going to be another opinion.

***

The sheer volume of information, the sheer

growth of consumers, the pressure to do it

quickly, has driven research out of the market.

Challenges for Analysts

The discussion of how the analytical

community should most effectively package

and deliver its product to the policy community

led to an exchange on the content of those

products. There was ready agreement that one

of the major developments since the terrorist

attacks of September 2001 is that the standard

for analytic success has changed dramatically

from that of the Cold War, when the question of

whether or not intelligence was performing well

against the Soviet target lacked practical

relevance for most Americans. Now, on the

other hand, in the war against terrorism, public

expectations of intelligence have become

unreasonably high—as one speaker put it, "like

expecting the FBI to stop bank robberies

before they occur."

Not surprisingly, there was also general

agreement that analysts must strive to avoid

both strict reportage and outright advocacy of

personal points-of-view. Drawing on his

extensive experience supporting US

delegations, one speaker argued that analytic

advocacy had to be distinguished from analytic

advice, in which the service that intelligence

performs is to describe alternatives and their

potential consequences, including those that

point out flaws in positions policymakers

favored and those that present the least bad of

a series of bad choices. Another speaker

cautioned that analysts should not dwell on

personal perceptions of the correctness or

incorrectness of policy decisions, noting that

such fixations occasionally cause higher-ups

to "jerk" the system in order to redirect its focus

toward the current situation and its actual

alternatives. (He added that some might find

that such a directed shift in emphasis

constitutes "politicization.")

Further to this discussion, participants

commented on the contrast between military

practice—where subordinates are expected to

argue their points-of-view vigorously until a

decision is made, after which they are

expected to give full support to that decision—

and that of intelligence, where the fact that a

policy decision has been made does not

require analysts to cut their analyses to that

cloth. It was noted that their insistence on

"speaking truth to power”—mentioned by a

number of observers as a long-time

Directorate of Intelligence cultural trait—has

The sheer volume

of information,

the sheer growth

of consumers,

the pressure to

do it quickly, has

driven research

out of the market.
9

frequently caused analysts to be regarded as

less than welcome guests at the tables where

policy is debated.

Several participants wondered if this culture of

speaking forthrightly extended to internal

Agency deliberations on such matters, for

example, as covert action. In response, several

speakers argued that an independent stance

was not only possible but a necessary aspect

of analytic "checks and balances," even if the

critiquing process led to in-house clashes. A

former senior intelligence officer reminded

participants that the failed Bay of Pigs

operation of 1961 had been one from which the

analytic side of the house had been completely

excluded.

Discussion Excerpts

A former senior intelligence officer: It's seldom

that the Intelligence [Community] looks for

policy opportunity. I mean, looks at the good

side. I mean, it doesn't say, "Boy, here's

something that's really interesting that you

could do."

A former senior policymaker: Well, that's not

your day or night job yet. It's somebody else's.

***

I think where we want to be is in that middle

ground between the Sherman Kent school,

which basically dominated the estimative

process up until 1973, and where we've come

since then. Sherman Kent's view was that it

was important for the estimative process pretty

much to be detached from policy and to be

highly objective. So, [by] making sure that the

intelligence community had an ivory tower to

do that basic research, you would be providing

something the policymaker couldn't get in his

busy day. But the downfall of that was that what

estimates were produced weren't relevant

enough from the view of the policymaker, so

we went in another direction. And I think it

sounds like what we're saying is that we need

to find that middle ground and perhaps get

back into the system more of the strategic,

long-term, basic research that Sherman Kent

advocated for so many years.

***

I have yet to find the question that a

policymaker would like answered that one

analyst can answer. Either it's too general, or

it's too detailed. We need to rethink the way we

put our analysts together, so that they can

better respond to the information and the

questions they are receiving.

***

But there's a difference, which is that the

Intelligence Community is supposed to

continue to criticize after the decision has been

made, which is more difficult to do. [That] puts

them in a very different position from the

military. They're not supposed to salute and

say, "Yes, sir." They're supposed to tell him he

doesn't have any clothes on every day.

***

Part of our job is to tell the emperor he has no

clothes. But, once the emperor's in the stew

pot, you're not doing him any good saying over

and over again, "You've got no clothes." . . .

Start thinking about what we need to be paying

attention to [in order] to achieve whatever the

goal was at the end of the day. And if you're an

intelligence analyst and you can't get off the

issue of whether this is a good or bad decision,

it's really, really tough. At that point, senior

officials in the Agency have to kind of jerk the

whole system and get them to focus on the

other thing. And then, what does that look like

to the analyst down below? That's

politicization.

***

We need to

rethink the way

we put our

analysts

together, so that

they can better

respond to the

information and

the questions

they are

receiving.

Once the

emperor's in the

stew pot, you're

not doing him any

good saying over

and over again,

"You've got no

clothes."
10

There's been no fundamental change in the DI

personality. This contrariness is still there, and,

I think, it's something we encourage. It does

come down more to core values. And you do

hear in the Kent School and CIA University the

imperative of speaking truth to power . . . .

***

I have found, at least, that the counter often, in

the covert area, was the DDI's willingness to

strike an independent stance, independent of

the covert action, and assess it. . . . If you want

to have real problems, send the covert action

people off by themselves. We've had that, you

know. We had the Bay of Pigs, where there

was no DI involvement.

***

We're putting analysts much closer to

operators, both on covert action and operations

in an effort to get smarter operations and

smarter covert action . . . . The risk, of course,

is that you begin to blur these lines. And are you

somehow co-opting the analytic function? One

reason why we've succeeded . . . in not doing

that is we've maintained the analytic units

separate from those units with analysts in them

that are doing the support to operations,

support to covert action.

Challenges for the DCI

Presidents Clinton and Bush charged DCI

Tenet with carrying out an active and visible

role within the framework of the Middle East

peace process and the war on terror.

Roundtable participants were divided as to the

advisability of DCIs assuming this kind of

responsibility. Among the reservations

expressed were that such involvement took

valuable time from the DCI's statutory duties

as manager of the Intelligence Community and

that it created the risk that the Intelligence

Community's objectivity on that issue would

be—or might appear to be—compromised.

In another area touching on DCI

responsibilities, there was an extended

discussion as to whether there were new

realities in the post-9/11 world that might

necessitate a reordering of responsibilities

within the Intelligence Community. Should the

FBI, for example, be divided into an entity with

domestic counterintelligence responsibilities

and another dedicated to its traditional law

enforcement function? This question,

although hardly new, has become more salient

during the past several years because

distinctions between foreign and domestic

intelligence have become increasingly blurred

and previous conflicts among agencies,

particularly the FBI and the CIA, over the uses

of intelligence have become better known.

While recognizing the need to address these

problems, several participants expressed

concern that attempted institutional fixes for

Intelligence Community problems, such as

reorganizations or creating new agencies,

would simply further complicate an already

complex picture and permit new, probably

unforeseen, dangers to arise. One speaker

mentioned that there had been renewed

discussion on the advisability of creating the

position of Director of National Intelligence with

genuine authority over all the Community

agencies and the entire Community budget,

but several other panelists argued the risks to

analytic objectivity and diversity of opinion if a

central authority were established.

Roundtable participants agreed that the

likelihood of another terrorist attack within the

United States was substantial, especially

during the run-up to the national election in

November 2004. Several foresaw that, in that

event, the Intelligence Community might

become an easy target of political partisans

looking for a scapegoat. This would be all the

more likely if a case could be made that a

successful attack had been the result of an

Intelligence Community failure to correct

defects that had been pointed out earlier. The

only way to prevent such scapegoating, they

There's been no

fundamental

change in the DI

personality. This

contrariness is

still there, and, I

think, it's

something we

encourage.

We're putting

analysts much

closer to

operators, both

on covert action

and operations in

an effort to get

smarter

operations and

smarter covert

action.
11

agreed, would be for a senior administration

official to make clear to the Congress and the

public that there are limits to what the

Intelligence Community can do to foil terrorist

attacks.

Continuing the discussion of a possible second

foreign terrorist attack on the United States, a

participant commented that the Patriot Act had

improved the chances of heading off an

attempt but expressed concern that the new

authorities granted by the act might tend to

infringe on civil liberties. A speaker suggested

that not enough had yet been done by federal

intelligence and law enforcement agencies to

support "first providers" throughout the

country. Another participant commented that

this could become one of the responsibilities of

the new Terrorism Threat Information Center

(TTIC) but that questions still remained as to

whether the center would focus on analysis or

dissemination.

Discussion Excerpts

If the Director of Central Intelligence is

responsible for implementing some aspect of

the policy, whether he's implementing it overtly

or covertly doesn't really make too much

difference; he becomes almost axiomatically a

proponent of the policy he's implementing . . . .

Assuming he does believe in what he's doing,

it becomes much less likely that the

Intelligence Community will provide a unified

product saying that whatever we're doing is a

bad idea . . . . You just have to accept that, and

it's a question of educating the consumers

about what to expect from a bureaucratic

arrangement that has those elements to it. This

gets to a broader question, which is, is the

Intelligence Community supposed to be

supporting policy, or is it essentially an

adversarial function in which it is supposed to

be finding weaknesses and vulnerabilities?

***

I'd like us to clarify if the Agency was looking for

covert action jobs to do. I would say that they

showed about the same degree of enthusiasm

as the Joint Chiefs did for any military action,

certainly in the last four years of the Clinton

administration when I was directly involved.

And you probably know that the Chiefs' answer

to any military proposal from the State

Department was, "Four divisions, four hundred

days, four hundred billion dollars."

***

What we've got now is the pressure to be

perfect, and what we've got in the Patriot Act

[are] some tools that allow us to up our

chances of performing against that standard.

But there's a trade-off, and . . . to the degree

that you move it [sic] in one direction, you

improve your chances of preventing another

9/11 . . . at the risk of personal liberties and

privacy and potential for abuse. You move it

[sic] in the other direction you improve those

guarantees, but you open yourself here.

***

I think that, looking for institutional fixes, one

has to be rather careful and recognize that, in

fixing one problem, you're going to create

another problem. In other words, by shifting

organizational boundaries, you'll better handle

this issue, but you'll create other things that'll

fall between cracks that previously were quite

well handled, because you've simply moved

those boundaries. But there are always going

to be boundaries. If the problem that you're

addressing is sufficiently consequential, then it

probably does make sense. So, if you're trying

to prevent another 9/11-type catastrophe, then

creating a Department of Homeland Security

. . . is a defensible response, even though it

creates a lot of other lacunae in which

problems will develop, because there's no

longer somebody who's focusing most of his

attention on taking care of those problems.

And, similarly, I'm sufficiently persuaded by the

logic of it to suggest that you need a domestic

Is the Intelligence

Community

supposed to be

supporting

policy, or is it

essentially an

adversarial

function in which

it is supposed to

be finding

weaknesses and

vulnerabilities?
12

intelligence agency if your object is to prevent

attacks, not prosecute the perpetrators. If your

priority attention is to that, the tension between

the two functions is sufficient to argue that the

two shouldn't be in the same agency.

***

One of the things it seems to me is likely to

happen out of all this is a strengthening of the

DCI authorities and perhaps a movement

toward . . . trying the DNI [Director of National

Intelligence] kind of theory. Well, one of the

serious questions is whether that addresses in

any fundamental way the real problems that

we've been describing. It's not obvious to me

that it does.

***

One of the notions behind TTIC was to be a

sort of a mechanism to get information at the

national level down to first responders . . . . And

there's a real debate within our own house over

what the nature of that commission really is at

the end of the day: whether it's basically an

integrator and disseminator of information or

whether it's an originator of original source

things. It used to be that what was really

important was providing and serving the

president. Now it's clear that a great deal of

what the mission is is the dissemination of

actionable intelligence, not just to the

Pentagon, but down to the guy who's making

the traffic stop in Winslow, Arizona. And we're

not trained, we're not equipped, we're not in

hand for that mission.

***

We are now subject to terrorist attacks that are

designed to disrupt and manipulate our

internal political process. I believe there is a

real risk that terrorist groups will try to exploit

our election season . . . . This is something

we've never faced before—an external nonstate actor or set of actors trying to influence

our political processes.

***

I'm still convinced that the biggest set of

potential failures doesn't have to do with

overlap; it has to do with underlap, that is,

failures to meet the exigencies and demands of

the intelligence requirements for the policy

process and, quite simply, on the other side,

failure to meet the exigencies and demands of

what's the best selection of policy options in

the national interest, broadly looked at, which

is constantly, obviously, under stress. At the

presidential level, its reelection on the one

hand and, secondly, coming up with a policy

that serves the national interest but also that

doesn't hurt in being reelected . . . .

***

I would agree with you that the expectation has

changed since 9/11. And somehow we have

built up this myth that we know we have the

best intelligence in the world, but that we can't

know everything. And I think at some point

there is going to have to be some sort of, well,

probably not a speech, but something to talk to

the American public, maybe in the political

process, about what intelligence can do and

what it can't do, to this point of leveling with the

American public.

A great deal of

the mission is

dissemination of

actionable

intelligence, not

just to the

Pentagon, but to

the guy making

the traffic stop in

Winslow,

Arizona. And

we're not trained,

we're not

equipped, we're

not in hand for

that mission.
13

The Elusive Red Line

During the discussion of the more active and

public role assigned to DCI Tenet by

Presidents Clinton and Bush, a participant

asked if, as a practical matter, this new tasking

meant that DCIs are no longer subject to the

"red line," the customary demarcation between

the intelligence and policy functions. Although

opinion on this issue was divided, no

participant took the position that these new

responsibilities were necessarily

inappropriate. In fact, there was general

agreement that the idea of a red line is

somewhat artificial, especially in the new

circumstances since 9/11, and that efforts to

impose rigid rules on the intelligence-policy

dialogue are likely to prove frustrating.

One roundtable participant favored a flexible

approach that recognized that the active

involvement of intelligence in a "good" policy

initiative would improve the results. (Left

unsaid was the obverse of this proposition: that

the results of a "bad" policy would presumably

be worsened by intelligence involvement.)

Another participant commented that he found

recently documented derelictions of both

policymakers and intelligence organizations

and their mutual failures to communicate far

more troubling than transgressions of a red

line that, for him, was difficult to define. A third

speaker saw a loss of competition and

transparency as more dangerous for the

Intelligence Community than red line issues.

One participant with both policy and

intelligence experience provided an example

of a kind of "reverse" red line. While he had no

objection to policymakers' "intelligent

questioning" of analytic judgments, he strongly

criticized efforts by policymakers to "bowl over"

analysts by using data selectively.

Roundtable participants inclined more toward

approaching red line issues as a matter both of

principles and of checks and balances. With

respect to the former, for example, several

participants noted that assisting a policymaker

to realize a policy objective might well also

promote the political objectives of the

policymaker or his political party. A strict

interpretation of the red line concept might

preclude such assistance, the speakers noted,

but they insisted that taking this political reality

into account did not necessarily mean that an

intelligence officer's judgments would be

compromised. With respect to checks and

balances, participants developed a substantial

list of actors (including Congress, the media,

the public, and academics) and institutional

factors (such as organizational structures and

internal bureaucratic disputes) that serve most

of the time to force policy and intelligence to

hew to their accepted roles.

The discussion led to a consensus that the

Intelligence Community must recognize the risk

of staying close to the policy community but that

the potential gains from keeping them in

proximity provide ample justification for doing

so. In the end, because of the ambiguities they

had identified during the day, roundtable

participants preferred to see the red line as a

more neutral shade, such as gray, and as a line

within the intelligence-policy relationship and

not between the two.

Discussion Excerpts

That, at least, raises for me the question of

whether there is a red line if it comes to the

DCI, or whether we're talking about exceptions

at the top and, then, everyone else has to work

according to certain rules.

***

I think that intelligence officers too easily want

to blame the policymaker for their problems.

I'm not saying the policymaking process is

even logical, let alone perfect, but I think that

many of the problems that we face as

intelligence officers we've got to deal with . . .

ourselves and accept the reality that the policy

world is out there, and we have to interact with

There was

general

agreement that

the idea of a red

line is somewhat

artificial, especially in the new

circumstances

since 9/11.

I think that

intelligence

officers too easily

want to blame the

policymaker for

their problems.
14

it . . . . We've got to solve many of our own

problems, and they have nothing whatsoever

to do with red lines or with the policy process.

***

But the idea that intelligence can ignore the

political atmosphere in which it's being

delivered is, again, a Panglossian affliction.

***

We were not the least bit reticent in saying,

"You go this way, you're going to have a wreck."

But it wasn't a case we were saying the policy

was good or bad. That was supposed to come

from somewhere else. And I think it's not a

matter of a red line; it's just that there were

different jobs.

***

From the discussion, I get the impression that

the failures of the intelligence side and the

failures on the policymaking side, and maybe

some of their inability to communicate, are

perhaps more serious than the transgressions

of a red line, which is hard for us to define at the

present time.

***

If we ever take away the transparency and

competition, then that will be a lot more

dangerous than any red line issue. I don't

mean transparency giving away secrets; I

mean everybody's opinion . . . any wacko

wants to come in is fine as long as you've got

to go up to the plate just like the rest of us.

***

You could say that, in administrations that tend

to look at cooperation and hearing all views,

the red line problem is real. In administrations

that don't care to hear all views and [tend] not

[to] listen to a different set of approaches and

attitudes, it isn't the red line problem that's

most important.

***

In President Clinton's administration, there

was an effort to reach out and coordinate and

make sure everybody's views were heard, [to

reach out] to the academic community to make

sure that competing views and assessments

were brought into the equation as [the]

decisionmaking process was moving on . . . .

there was a concerted effort at that kind of

consensus building.

***

The other problem that we have . . . is the

problem of the Intelligence Community being

coopted by the policy community and that

distorting the process to the point that it yields

counterproductive results. And perhaps here

the . . . answer is a more sophisticated

understanding on the part of the Congress and

the American people of how these institutions

operate and what their limitations are and the

recognition that the Intelligence Community

will occasionally be coopted by the policy

community, as a result of which its findings and

conclusions will be less reliable and simply

accept that as a consequence of the necessity

of the two to interrelate on a fairly intense

basis.

***

In the end, the person you elect as president is

going to have to determine a lot of this. And,

like a lot of other things in this country, there's

no organization chart. There may be a set of

rules in the Constitution and elsewhere, but I

don't think there's an easy way to say, "Here's

the red line. Thou shalt not cross."

***

I get the

impression that

the failures of the

intelligence side

and the failures

on the policymaking side, and

maybe some of

their inability to

communicate,

are perhaps more

serious than the

transgressions of

a red line.
15

First Speaker: That red line is certainly not a

bright one, and it might not even, who knows, it

may not even be red. You know, it kind of may

be some other shade.

Second Speaker: Yellow or amber.

Third Speaker: Probably gray.

Voice from the audience: Probably gray, right.

***

If we were still living in the world of September

10, I think there would have been quite a

spirited debate on the nature of the red line,

where the red line is today. But, as we found

out quickly in the afternoon, in many ways,

we've moved beyond that. And it may come

back to the fundamental issue that we're at

war.

17

Key Questions

What do policymakers want from intelligence?

Consider the full spectrum covering raw

intelligence/finished intelligence including

analysis/multiple policy options and

implications/policy advice/policy advocacy?

What factors determine the extent to which

policymakers expect a greater/lesser role for

intelligence in the policy process? For

example, is the expectation dependent on

whether the policy issue concerns a denied

area (closed society or no regular diplomatic

contact)? How about issues that involve

extensive covert action (Afghanistan)?

How do policymakers deal with unwanted

policy advice from the Intelligence

Community? Ignore it? Set up a separate

intelligence shop? Stop inviting intelligence

officers to policy deliberations? What happens

when intelligence officers refuse to give policy

advice?

How do senior intelligence officers see their

role along the spectrum from information

provider to adviser to advocate in policy

formulation and implementation?

How does this role change when covert action

transforms the DCI into a force provider/

commander?

What criteria should govern future decisions

on crossing the red line between intelligence

and policy? Is there now or should there even

be a red line when homeland security is

involved?

Should a new "red line" be established?

Where should it be? Should intelligence

officers assume a primary role for formulating

policy? Should they make policy suggestions?

Should there be a distinction between the two?

How does a policy role for intelligence officers

affect their objectivity?