1

Who Are the Insurgents?

Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq

Summary

• Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent in Iraq is a daunting 

task. Demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels 

themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their 

primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation.

• Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses 

for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: Ba’th Party membership or 

affiliation with Saddam’s regime, adherence to Islam, or tribal interests, values, and 

norms. 

• Secular/ideological, tribal, and moderate Islamist concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive and often are even mutually reinforcing. 

• Many ex-army officers, security force personnel, and Ba’th Party members lost their 

privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated. This fact, 

combined with the perceived humiliation of being forced to live under foreign occupation and, worse still, the prospect of longer-term Shi’i supremacy, led many to take 

up arms. 

• In strictly economic terms, many Sunni Arab tribes suffered following the war. While a 

number of tribes had once earned money through large-scale transborder smuggling, 

such activity has become increasingly dangerous and difficult, as U.S. troops have 

instituted measures to cut off all unregulated cross-border movement. Additionally, 

some tribes that had previously relied on payments from Saddam for “good” behavior 

found no such patronage from the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not 

inclined to buy them off in this manner. 

• By the end of 2003, U.S. military officials noted that some insurgents were attacking 

them to avenge the spilled blood of relatives, whether killed by accident or in guerilla 

attacks. In effect, U.S. success on the battlefield, while deterring some, had on other 

occasions only served to perpetuate the insurgency.

• In the last decade of Saddam’s rule, many young Iraqi men, having realized that the 

Ba’th Party had lost its ideological coherence, turned away from the party’s original 

ideas toward a new set of beliefs. They adopted an alternative ideology, namely, 

www.usip.org

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

SPECIAL REPORT 134 APRIL 2005

ABOUT THE REPORT

“Who Are the Insurgents?” offers insight into the 

breadth of Sunni Arab groups actively participating 

in the insurrection in Iraq and specifically examines 

the three broad categories of insurgents: secular/

ideological, tribal, and Islamist. With the exception 

of the ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists, 

this report finds, many rebels across these 

three classifications share common interests and 

do not sit so comfortably in any one grouping or 

category. This presents specific problems—and 

opportunities—for U.S. and coalition forces that, 

if handled correctly, could eventually lead to a 

rapprochement with some of the insurgents.

The report’s author, Amatzia Baram, is a professor 

of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa, 

Israel. He is a prolific writer and editor of several 

books and dozens of scholarly articles on Saddam 

Hussein and Iraqi politics and history. He testified 

about Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass 

destruction in September 2002 before the House 

Committee on Government Reform, and before the 

House Committee on Armed Services in April 2004. 

He has also consulted about Iraq with senior U.S. 

administration officials. He is a former Senior Fellow 

at the United States Institute of Peace. This report is 

based on a chapter in a book he is currently writing 

about the relationship between 

Islam and the state in modern Iraq.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does 

not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

The Secularists/Ideologues: 

 Ba’this, Saddamists, and Arab Nationalists 3

The Tribes 6

 The Islamists: Moderate and Radical 9

The Islamists: Ultraradical 

Salafis and Wahhabis 12

The Insurgents: Three Vignettes 14

Conclusion 16

Notes 19
2

fundamentalist Islam based essentially on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim 

Brotherhood.

• Many young Iraqi Sunni Arabs were inspired specifically by the work of the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid. On the one hand, al-Rashid demonstrated 

a pragmatic approach to political action, while on the other he very clearly stated 

that eventually jihad with the sword is the way of the true Muslim. 

• The ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis are distinct from Iraq’s moderate and even some 

otherwise radical Islamists. While an accord may eventually be reached between a 

future democratic Iraqi government and moderate and certain radical Islamist groups, 

the beliefs of the Salafis or Wahhabis will never allow for compromise.

• The Iraqi government may be able to substantially reduce the insurgency by appealing 

to the secular, tribal, and non-Salafi Islamist groups through policies that address 

their primary concern: the status of Sunni Arabs in the new Iraq. 

• Such policies should include meaningful participation in the formulation of the permanent constitution, even though Sunni Arab representation in the National Assembly is very low, and political guarantees that oil revenues will be shared equitably, 

that Iranian influence will not be allowed to penetrate into Iraq, that Iraq will not 

become an Islamic republic, and that Sunni and Shi’i Islam will be equally respected 

by the state. Further, steps should be taken to ensure that Sunnis (as well as Kurds, 

Turkomans, and Christians) are not discriminated against in the job market or in the 

choice of infrastructure upgrades.

Introduction

Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent is a daunting task: ready 

demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves 

are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide 

array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations 

for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation. Sunni insurgents generally claim one 

of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment 

violence: secular/ideological, tribal, or Islamist. Further, the Islamists can be divided into 

two camps: moderates and radicals who might one day reach an accord with coalition 

forces and the Iraqi government, and ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists with whom 

a rapprochement will never occur. With the exception of this Salafi and Wahhabi minority, 

core ex-Ba’this—some of whom are wanted for crimes against humanity—and hardened 

criminals, the identity and motivations of most insurgents are elastic and multifaceted. 

It may seem strange that the same person, or even community, may both express 

loyalty to Saddam Hussein as a symbol and hold Islamist beliefs, but this should not 

come as a surprise: Individuals in the Sunni Arab areas commonly call for the institution of strict Islamic rules in one breath while expressing great admiration for Saddam 

in the next. Consider briefly the town of Ramadi, where walls are littered with graffiti 

hailing Saddam Hussein as Iraq’s leader, while rebel leaders there declare: “We have two 

missions in the city. One to defend Ramadi against the Americans...and the other to kill 

anyone who sells alcohol or sex CDs.”1 Likewise, a mix between Saddamism and Islam 

can be found in many other regions, mainly on the upper Tigris, but also in Baghdad and 

the upper Euphrates. For example, painted on the walls of the Sunni Arab neighborhood 

of A’zamiyya in Baghdad one is just as likely to find the words “Long Live Saddam!” as 

“Jihad Is Our Way!”2

This bizarre mix of loyalty to Saddam, whose secular credentials are well known to the 

Iraqis, and to radical non-Salafi Islam may be partially explained by Saddam’s Islamization of regime and party in the last decade of his rule. Even if one questions the sincerity behind his efforts, this movement substantially lowered the walls separating party 

members and traditional nonparty Muslims, even Islamists. Further, after 1993 many party 

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D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, 

D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

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members realized that demonstrating moderate piety would serve their careers. Following the demise of the regime, these party members demonstrated even more piety than 

before: some even grew beards, regularly wore the traditional dishdasha—or sometimes 

even the Muslim Brotherhood–style skullcap—and consistently prayed at mosque.

Another common denominator between traditional Sunni Muslims and Ba’this, or 

non-Ba’thi secular Sunni Arabs, was the privileged status that a large proportion of Sunni 

Arabs enjoyed under Ba’th rule relative to the Shi’i majority and the Kurds. Most Sunnis, 

whatever they thought of the Ba’th Party, were beholden to Saddam and were often connected to the regime through relatives or close friends. At present, only the most radical 

Islamists, such as ideologically pure Wahhabis and extreme Salafis, are likely to express 

strong criticism of the fallen dictator (even though, on an operational level, they are not 

averse to cooperating with Ba’this). Thus, non-Salafi Islamism and Saddamism are not 

mutually exclusive and often are even mutually reinforcing. The same may apply to the 

relations between both non-Salafi Islam and Saddamism, on the one hand, and tribalism, 

on the other. Men with strong tribal connections and bound by tribal interests, values, 

and norms are just as likely to define themselves as Islamists, Saddamists, or, to varying 

degrees, both. Still others define thenselves as “nationalists”.

The Secularists/Ideologues: 

Ba’this, Saddamists, and Arab Nationalists

Ba’th Party members and their dependents, as well as those closely affiliated with the 

Ba’th regime through patron-client networks or service in the state security apparatuses, 

enjoyed certain privileges under Ba’th rule that were lost with the collapse of Saddam’s 

regime. Economic, ideological, social, and power-based secular interests largely motivate 

the insurgents belonging to this group. 

Ba’this long defined themselves as being both pan-Arab nationalists and Iraqi patriots.3

These sentiments—pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiyya) and patriotism (al-wataniyya)—

are now being called upon in the armed struggle against coalition forces and the new Iraq. 

Non–Sunni Arab Iraqis view such nationalistic and patriotic references with some suspicion, believing these calls are designed to further the specific interests of the Sunni Arab 

community to the exclusion of other Iraqi ethnic and religious groups. This stems largely 

from the country’s unique historical course and the sectarian divisions that have long split 

Iraq. Since the country’s formation in 1920–1921, the Sunni Arab population has enjoyed 

more advantages than the country’s Shi’i majority and Kurdish minority in terms of government employment, principally within the powerful security apparatuses. Generally 

speaking, the chances of a young Sunni Arab man finding a well-paying and prestigious 

job in government service, especially in the security apparatus, were better than those of 

his Shi’i Arab equivalent. A pan-Arab ideology that acknowledged the existence of only 

one Arab identity made no allowances for any discussion of a Sunni-Shi’i divide or questions about which group received more government jobs or privileges. With the exception 

of a few individuals, such as Taha Yasin Ramadhan, a fully Arabized Kurd, the Kurds were 

even further distanced than the Shi’a from positions of power and influence.

Adherence to pan-Arab nationalism in the new Iraq, however, has different functions: 

first, it provides a respectable ideological legitimacy to the effort to return the Ba’thi 

regime to power or to return the Sunni Arab community to a position of supremacy 

through other means. This is essentially a sectarian quest to reverse the ascendancy of 

the Shi’a and the Kurds following the war. Adherence to a pan-Arab ideology also holds a 

promise of financial, political, and military support from the Sunni Arab world, especially 

from the Gulf States, who object to any growing Shi’i influence. 

Ba’this long defined themselves 

as being both pan-Arab nationalists and Iraqi patriots. These 

sentiments—al-qawmiyya and

al-wataniyya—are now being 

called upon in the armed struggle against coalition forces.

Non-Salafi Islamism and 

Saddamism are not mutually 

exclusive and often are even 

mutually reinforcing.
4

As for Iraqi patriotism (al-wataniyya al-’iraqiyya) among Sunnis, this, too, may be construed as being self-serving, as it justifies a struggle—under the banner of freeing Iraq 

of all foreign troops and influences—against the new, more representative governmental 

system. A successful representative-based system would grant the Shi’i community more 

power than they have ever had in Iraq, inevitably coming at the expense of the Sunni 

Arab community. All this, of course, does not mean that the ex-Ba’thi Sunni Arab insurgents do not truly believe in their version of pan-Arabism or Iraqi patriotism, as many of 

them genuinely and fiercely believe that only they know how to run the country. 

Many ex–army officers, security force personnel, and Ba’th Party members lost their 

privileged status in the new Iraq and remain bitter, angry, and frustrated. This fact, 

combined with the perceived humiliation of being forced to live under foreign occupation and, worse still, the prospect of longer-term Shi’i supremacy, led many to take up 

arms. Many of these insurgents belong to Saddam’s tribe, albu Nasir, or to tribes that had 

forged close relationships with his. Most of them live in the basin of the Tigris, north 

of Baghdad, in towns like Dhulu’iyyah, Tikrit, Beiji, and Dur. Thus, for example, in the 

village of Buwayr, villagers freely acknowledge that they are still supporters of Saddam. 

Ideological or tribal affinity is not the primary reason they give. Rather, the vivid memory 

that Saddam provided the village with as much electrical power as it needed and dug a 

well for it as far back as 1986 feeds this sentiment; the Americans, on the other hand, 

had done “nothing” for them. But Saddam is also a Sunni Arab like them.

Similarly, even ostensibly Islamist organizations, including, for example, an organization calling itself al-Mujahidin (The Holy War Fighters), often speak in Saddamist 

language. Consider a letter the organization wrote to an Iraqi newspaper in response to 

the publisher’s call for rebels to lay down their arms. The al-Mujahidin rejected this call, 

explaining in secularist terms that they must fight because the occupation “confiscates 

sovereignty and independence, hurts our dignity, humiliates the people, dissipates our 

wealth, and dismembers the homeland.” The invasion was conducted, the letter continues, with the aim of “controlling Iraq’s immense wealth and securing the requirements 

of the Zionist entity.” The United States will be defeated because “power, no matter how 

great, cannot make history if faced with the will . . . of the people.” Only at the beginning 

of this epistle, with the words “In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate,” 

and at the end of the message with a few more such phrases, is there any reference to 

Islam or God. This, in fact, mirrors closely the language Saddam himself used from the 

1980s on.4 The Islamist veneer of this essentially secular group—and many others like 

it—finds its roots in the last decade of Ba’th rule, when some in the party adopted a 

skin-deep form of “Islamism” to gain public legitimacy. 

Interviews with ex–Ba’th officials-turned-insurgents-expose other secular and sectarian motivations for carrying out military operations. Many are no longer admirers or 

supporters of Saddam (if they ever were). Their primary grievance is the loss of lucrative 

jobs that provided both economic security and prestige, and the sense of deep humiliation they feel both as a community and as individuals. Many senior- and midlevel Sunni 

Ba’this believe that only they know how to conduct the affairs of the Iraqi state, and 

that the Shi’a, and particularly the Shi’i clergy, are totally incapable of doing so. In some 

cases there is evidence of a genuine fear for the very existence of the community. An 

interview with a few armed guards at one of Iraq’s most important Sunni mosques, the 

Abu Hanifa mosque, further illustrates the fear of growing Shi’i power. Speaking the day 

Saddam’s capture was announced, one stated bitterly: “We don’t have any future.” They 

insisted they were no longer fighting for the privileges they had enjoyed but, rather, for 

the survival of their community in a Shi’a-dominated state.5

This mind-set can perhaps be more clearly understood if we briefly consider the story 

of Isma’il Muhammad Juwara. Though himself not an insurgent, he is a Sunni and former 

midlevel official in the dreaded Mukhabarat (Iraq’s main internal security apparatus) who 

has suffered greatly since the collapse of Saddam’s regime. Born in 1957 and bred in 

A successful representativebased system would grant the 

Shi’i community more power 

than they have ever had in 

Iraq, inevitably coming at 

the expense of the Sunni 

Arab community.

Many ex–army officers 

lost their privileged status 

in the new Iraq. 

Even ostensibly Islamist 

organizations often speak in 

Saddamist language.

Many senior- and midlevel Sunni 

Ba’this believe that only 

they know how to conduct the 

affairs of the Iraqi state.
5

Dhulu’iyya, a midsize town at the heart of the Sunni Triangle, he joined the Ba’th Party 

before graduating from high school, just as many other members of his extended family 

had. As reported by Major Hussein Mahdi ‘Ubaydi, a local police force commander, “just 

about every family [in Dhulu’iyya] had someone working in security or the army or some 

government job . . . it was normal to join the Ba’th party—it was like a rule.” As such, 

these young men, particularly those working within the country’s security apparatuses, 

were both respected and feared by those whose loyalty they were assigned to check.

Juwara himself spent most of his time in the Shi’i south, monitoring both army personnel and civilians. He enjoyed economic benefits that, especially after 1991, stood in stark 

contrast to the growing poverty of most other Iraqis. For example, when he got married, 

he received a free plot of land and a home-construction loan, which was converted into 

a grant when the second of his nine children was born. Furthermore, he bought cement 

at cost from a government warehouse. He received a government car for work, which he 

could also use for private needs. He received extra food coupons and bought electrical 

appliances at a special supermarket set aside for Mukhabarat families, where goods were 

sold at a discount. Additionally, his family received free health care at Baghdad’s wellstocked al-Rashid Military Hospital. In 2002, he even received permission to take his son 

abroad for special treatment, a highly exceptional privilege. And from time to time, he and 

his colleagues would also receive envelopes full of cash as special bonuses. 

After the fall of the Ba’th regime, he was sacked and his organization was taken apart. 

He was offered no other means of existence except for simple rations and tried to make 

ends meet by selling gasoline on the black market. Further, those who had once feared 

him now treated him with disdain. A clerk at one bank where he held an account called 

him a “dog” when he went to withdraw funds and told him he should go to Saddam to 

ask for his money. However, his newfound misfortune was confounded by his inability to 

understand how being a Ba’thi, something of which he had been extremely proud since 

he was a young man, had become “some sort of disease.” He began to ask himself: “Was 

serving the country some sort of crime? . . . We were on top of the system. We had 

dreams. . . . Now we are the losers. We lost our positions, our status, the [economic] 

security of our families, stability. Curse on the Americans. Curse on them.” Worse still, in 

his mind, were the Shi’a: “These people with turbans are going to run the country. What 

do they know? Iraq needs people like us.”6

Such anger among soldiers and officers may have been ameliorated somewhat had 

they been immediately placed on the coalition’s payroll following the collapse of Saddam’s 

regime, but they were not. Rather, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA), announced in May 2003 that the Iraqi army would be disbanded. No one was to 

receive a salary, pension, or severance pay. This created great frustration and anger among 

the professional soldiers and officers, as opposed to the conscripts, most of whom were 

Shi’a who were drafted against their will. In June the CPA eventually did decide to start 

paying salaries, as well as make severance payments, but this came late and was at first 

done inefficiently, and thus it did not stop the protests.

This author could not verify for certain how many people lost their jobs as a result of 

the de-Ba’thification process announced in May 2003, but Ahmad Chalabi, head of the 

De-Ba’thification Commission, indicated in early 2004 that around 28,000 senior Ba’thists 

had already been removed from public posts. He estimated that an equal number would 

be removed in the future. He demanded the acceleration of the process in order to restore 

“normal life” in Iraq. A CPA spokesman offered lower numbers than Chalabi, saying that 

only 15,000 to 30,000 would be removed. Indeed, in a May 2004 interview with senior 

U.S. administration officials, this author was told that the total number of people actually removed or prevented from entering public positions reached around 30,000, and 

the process of reviewing appeals was completely under way by March 2004. Though deBa’thification was and continues to be a necessity, the process needs to be carried out 

Anger among soldiers and officers may have been ameliorated 

somewhat had they been immediately placed on the coalition’s 

payroll following the collapse of 

Saddam’s regime.
6

selectively; members of the security forces who have committed no criminal acts and have 

been prevented from returning to service should be paid a pension. 

Many ex-Ba’this—believing that they lost the chance of enjoying any form of government status or privilege, and fearful of being discriminated against by a Shi’i-controlled 

state—established a number of underground groups to fight coalition forces and advance 

the Sunnis’ sectarian cause. Most groups assumed secular names, such as al-‘Awda (The 

Return), al-Islah (The Reform), Jabhat al-Muqawama (The Resistance Front), al-Qiyada al-

‘Amma Li-Jaysh al-’Iraq (The General Command of Iraq’s Army), and Munazzamat al-Tahrir 

al-‘Iraqiyya (The Iraqi Liberation Organization). Other ex-Ba’thi groups include Kata’ib 

Salah al-Din (Saladin Phalanx), which operates around Ramadi; Kata’ib al-Mujahidin (The 

Jihad Warriors Phalanx), which operates among the Arab population of the ethnically 

mixed province of Kirkuk; Fida’iyyi Saddam (Saddam’s Martyrs), which took French journalist 

Alexandre Jordanov hostage in April 2004; and, most interestingly, Hizb al-Ba’th al-‘Arabi 

al-Ishtiraki (The Ba’th Arab Socialist Party), which has provided training, weapons, and 

finances to both nationalist and Islamist groups. 

Finally, it is widely believed that foreign jihadists were infiltrating Iraq, mainly through 

Syria. Indeed, in late 2004 U.S. commanders reported that some senior Ba’this who had 

found shelter in Syria were actively providing money to insurgents in Iraq. The most 

prominent among these figures are believed to be Sib’awi Ibrahim Hasan, Saddam’s half 

brother, who was arrested in February 2005, and General Tahir Jalil Habush, ex-chief of 

the Mukhabarat. Such individuals, and even some lower-ranked Ba’this, will never give up 

violence, because they believe that there is no future for them in Iraq save a trial. 

The Tribes

A different, often mutually reinforcing set of motivations for joining the insurrection revolves 

around tribal interests, values, and norms, whether economic, cultural, or political. 

In the Sunni Arab parts of Iraq there are hundreds of small and medium-sized tribes 

and subtribal units, and some ten large tribal federations, the largest of which are the 

Dulaym and the Shammar Jarba. The former is spread between Baghdad and the Jordanian 

and Syrian borders, the latter farther north, in the “Jazira” between the Tigris and Euphrates. Each counts more than one million members. Smaller federations like the Jubbur, 

the ‘Azza, the ‘Ubayd, and the Mushahada are mainly spread along the Tigris north of the 

capital. There are many tribes that do not form parts of federations. The most meaningful 

tribal components, however, are the much smaller units, mainly the fakhdh (a subtribal 

unit numbering a few thousand) and the khams, a five-generation unit responsible for 

blood revenge and for the payment of blood money, or diyyeh. Tribes in the countryside 

of the Shi’i areas usually are smaller and less cohesive. For a combination of immediate 

and historical reasons, some tribes, like the Dulaym, the Zawba’, and the Azza’, are more 

involved in the insurgency than others. 

In strictly economic terms, many Sunni Arab tribes suffered following the war. While a 

number of tribes had once earned money through large-scale transborder smuggling, such 

activity has become increasingly dangerous and difficult, as U.S. troops have instituted 

measures to cut off all unregulated cross-border movement. Additionally, some tribes that 

had previously relied on payments from Saddam for political support and “good” behavior 

found no such patronage from the CPA, nor from the Iraqi Interim Government, which was 

not inclined to buy them off in this manner. Under Saddam, many tribesmen had worked 

as paid border guards. 

Saddam also regarded tribesmen in general, and Sunni Arab ones in particular, as men 

with particularly high motivation in battle. He believed their Arab pedigree guaranteed 

their loyalty in any war against Iran, and their tribal background guaranteed that they 

would not turn their backs to the enemy, because they were bound by the tribal code of 

honor (al-sharaf ). As a result, during the Iraq-Iran War, young tribesmen were promoted 

In the Sunni Arab parts of Iraq 

there are hundreds of small 

and medium-sized tribes and 

subtribal units, and ten large 

tribal federations.

Many ex-Ba’this established 

a number of underground 

groups to fight coalition 

forces and advance the 

Sunni’s sectarian cause.

While a number of tribes had 

once earned money through 

large-scale transborder 

smuggling, such activity 

has become increasingly 

dangerous and difficult.
7

in the armed forces at breakneck speed, filling the ranks of the Mukhabarat. For modestly 

educated country boys this was the fulfillment of a socioeconomic dream, and they were 

staunchly loyal to regime and leader.7 Not surprisingly, as reported by a U.S. journalist 

who spent time in Falluja, “unlike Shi’ites in the south, . . . Sunnis in Falluja had thrived 

on government contracts, smuggling and graft.”8 With the loss of this employment came 

not just financial difficulties but also a loss of status and prestige. Serving within the 

military or internal security apparatuses was not just a job for many tribal men, but a passion. Tribal “warrior” traditions are very strong in Iraq, and the respect and social status 

that accrue from being a guard or soldier are highly valued.

Culturally and socially, the behavior of U.S. and coalition forces toward the Iraqis 

was occasionally insensitive and was perceived by the local population as offensive. This 

insensitivity may be explained by a lack of familiarity with the local language and culture, 

the stress of having one’s life under constant threat, and the difficulty of differentiating 

between combatants and noncombatants. This has led to a steep deterioration in relations 

between U.S. forces and the local population, which was quite hostile to start with. For 

example, consider the humiliation suffered by men handcuffed in front of their families 

and pinned to the ground by the feet of U.S. soldiers. In Bedouin tradition, just exposing

one’s sole is considered an offensive act, as it symbolically suggests that the one who 

does so is stepping on the person to whom it’s exposed. Indeed, in a certain context, 

even stepping on another person’s shadow is regarded as an insult for the same reason. 

Further, while physically stepping on someone’s head or neck is sometimes police practice 

in the United States, in Iraq such an act is a serious offense. 

In other instances, male U.S. soldiers conducted body searches on Iraqi women, also 

a major humiliation that affects the honor (‘irdh) of a family. Even in the Shi’i south, in 

Majar al-Kabir, where initially the population was not hostile to the coalition forces, British troops made mistakes such as entering private homes in search of weapons with dogs, 

which are regarded as unclean animals. They also entered homes in relatively peaceful 

areas without first exhausting diplomatic avenues. The result was a major confrontation 

that led to British and Iraqi casualties. As one insurgent in Falluja told a journalist: 

“America has invaded us and insulted us and so it is legitimate for us to fight. It is our 

honor and our duty.”9

Understandably, the instances that triggered the greatest hostility toward the U.S.-led 

occupation were those in which U.S. soldiers mistakenly opened fire on noncombatants, 

such as in Falluja in April 2003. While monitoring a mass demonstration, U.S. soldiers 

believed Iraqi gunmen were shooting at them from rooftops and decided to open fire, 

killing sixteen innocent demonstrators and wounding dozens. Following such death or 

injury, tribal norms make it imperative to redeem honor by seeking revenge. Otherwise, 

the family and clan of those who were killed or wounded are subject to scorn, a decline 

in social status, and sometimes even aggression from other tribe members. The only way 

of circumventing this cycle of tribal violence is for blood money to be paid. The U.S. Army 

eventually did offer the Iraqi families compensation for these deaths, for injuries, and for 

damage to property. While payment of this blood money led to a lessening of resentment 

and anger, they did not disappear.

Another U.S. military mistake in Ramadi not only resulted in the tragic death of innocents but also put an end to fruitful cooperation between the United States and one of 

the most important families of the Dulaym tribal federation. In April 2003, six U.S. smart 

bombs completely demolished the Kharbit family home. Somewhere between seventeen 

and twenty-two family members died instantly, including women and children. U.S. forces 

wrongly believed that either Saddam Hussein himself or Barzan Tikriti, his half brother, 

was in the house. Shaykh Malik Kharbit, the head of the family and an important shaykh 

of the Dulaym, was killed, too. The Kharbits had cooperated with U.S. officials before 

the war, but after the attack they were not ready for any such further cooperation.10

Whether or not any of the Kharbit’s tribal supporters joined the insurgency in retaliation 

is uncertain, but by the end of 2003, U.S. military officials noted in general terms that 

The behavior of U.S. and coalition forces toward the Iraqis 

was occasionally insensitive 

and was perceived by the local 

population as offensive.

The instances that triggered 

the greatest hostility toward 

the U.S.-led occupation were 

those in which U.S. soldiers 

mistakenly opened fire on 

noncombatants.
8

some insurgents were attacking coalition forces to avenge the spilled blood of relatives, 

whether they had been killed by accident or in earlier guerilla attacks. In effect, U.S. success on the battlefield, while deterring some insurgents, encouraged others to perpetuate 

the insurgency.

In other instances, U.S. forces became entangled in a web of internal tribal political 

machinations and simply became lost in that strange and baffling jungle. A U.S. captain 

reported, for example, that when U.S. troops first came to Falluja, Shaykh Ghazi al-Sami 

al-‘Abd, leader of the area’s largest and most hostile tribe, al bu ‘Isa, hosted them with 

pleasure. However, Shaykh Ghazi had money but no power, while his cousin, Barakat, had 

power but no money. Barakat ultimately forced his rich cousin to fund a group of antiAmerican fighters. Shaykh Ghazi obliged, apparently wary lest he be seen as a coward or 

collaborator with the Americans. But as a good businessman he also took advantage of 

the deteriorating security environment (to which he himself was now contributing) and 

started buying agricultural plots from farmers at reduced prices. In this way, internal tribal 

competition for leadership and greed played a role in pitting tribes against the occupation. Indeed, sensing that the Sunni tribes were bitter about the new reality, Saddam 

himself, while still in hiding, tried to activate the tribal system in defense of the old 

regime. In October 2003, he wrote a letter to tribal leaders urging them to launch a jihad 

against “the hated invaders” and those who cooperated with them.11

All this does not mean that there have been no instances of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between U.S. forces and Iraqi tribes. For example, in the Tikrit area a few tribal 

shaykhs did reach agreements with U.S. commanders. Sabah Mahmud from the Sadah 

tribe explained that his cooperative efforts with the United States stem from practical 

concerns: “The reality is they [the U.S. forces] are here on the ground; the past is dead. 

Give the Americans a chance to see what they are going to give us.” Shaykh Mahmud 

al-Nada, meanwhile, leader of Saddam’s albu Nasir tribe in ‘Uja (Saddam’s home village), 

asked the U.S. forces to release Tikriti prisoners. Reportedly, the request was granted and 

the men (or some of them) were released in exchange for the shaykh’s personal honorbound commitment to keep them out of mischief and prevent them from engaging again 

in anti-coalition activities. This was followed by extensive negotiations between the CPA 

and the U.S. Army, on the one hand, and Tikriti tribal shaykhs, on the other. This may 

explain, at least in part, why violence in Saddam’s hometown started to recede in spring 

2004.

In other instances, tribes needed wells, schools, clinics, jobs, clean water, irrigation 

canals and pumps, and sewage and other services, and the coalition forces had the means 

and indeed provided much of this. Agreements were not honored in all such cases, but a 

tribe’s practical interests represent a strong incentive to modify its political behavior. Using 

the traditional pragmatism of the tribes to pacify them was occasionally successful. 

While mistakes were made throughout the Sunni Triangle, especially during the early 

stages of the occupation, the U.S. commanders also made great efforts to positively deal 

with the complicated issues of tribal society. Under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles H. 

Swannack, Jr., the 82nd Airborne in the volatile Anbar governorate endeavored to win 

hearts and minds by addressing the specific economic and political needs of the tribes. 

In Maj. Gen. Swannack’s assessment, as little as 1 percent of the population was actually 

interested in attacking coalition forces. Most of the remaining 99 percent of Iraqis were 

on the fence; they were potential supporters of either the coalition or the insurgency. In 

order to gain the trust of the population, therefore, when conducting military operations, 

the 82nd Airborne has gone to great lengths to target insurgents with surgical precision 

to avoid any unnecessary civilian death or injury. Unfortunately, this effort was only 

partially successful, and some tragic mistakes occurred.

To try to offset negative sentiments the division created a public works program that 

helped stimulate the economy and employ Iraqis—principally young males—so that 

they might be able to provide for their families and ultimately refrain from attacking U.S. 

forces. Additional incentives designed to stop hostile activities in Anbar included the 

In effect, U.S. success on 

the battlefield, while 

deterring some insurgents, 

encouraged others to perpetuate 

the insurgency.

Saddam himself, while still in 

hiding, tried to activate the 

tribal system in defense of the 

old regime.

While mistakes were made 

throughout the Sunni Triangle, 

the U.S. commanders also made 

great efforts to positively deal 

with the complicated issues of 

tribal society.
9

employment of approximately 2,200 Iraqi border police operating in the 82nd Airborne’s 

zone of responsibility. They were tasked with patrolling the western borders and managing 

four crossing points. Thus, for example, the 44,000 religious pilgrims who returned to Iraq 

from Saudi Arabia after the hajj were handled exclusively by these border police, though 

apparently not without some U.S. presence. At the suggestion of one tribal shaykh, much 

of the border security force was made up of tribal Bedouins, who are able to navigate the 

desert at night and spend long stretches there. The division also established seven battalions for the Iraqi Civil Defense, though most of them proved ineffective in the stormy 

confrontations with the insurgents in April–May 2004.

Further, the 82nd Airborne spent $41 million to create jobs, establish a veterans’ 

office, and start a civic-improvement program. During Ramadan, the division paid Iraqis 

to refurbish some 230 mosques and to clean up towns in Anbar province. Refurbishing 

looted clinics was also a major priority. The division also encouraged the Iraqis to run 

the civil affairs of the province, creating a provincial council selected by caucus. An 

earlier council was composed almost entirely of tribal shaykhs, apparently some of them 

very unpopular. The new one was composed of forty-one members, only eight of whom 

were tribal shaykhs, the rest mainly leading professionals. The council met with military 

officials once a month to coordinate their activities. The result of these initiatives was 

that by March 2004, the division was receiving an average of three hundred tips per week 

regarding insurgent activity, compared to twenty per week in August 2003.12

Such efforts were not specific to the 82nd Airborne. From the moment he arrived 

in northern Iraq, Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, 

engaged the tribes and their shaykhs in Mosul (as well as other segments of the population) with good results. Relative to other Sunni Arab towns, the city was pacified. He 

established a representative city council and initiated a large number of projects in 

consultation with it and other community leaders. Opening the border with Syria for commerce, too, helped the city and nearby tribes. His successors continued with the same 

policy, and yet, since November 2004, Mosul has again become an arena of extensive terrorist activity. This regression was largely related to the U.S. offensive in Falluja. Fearing 

for their lives, most of Mosul’s police officers and other security units melted away. The 

steep reduction in U.S. troop numbers there may have also contributed to this deteriorating condition.

Finally, the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison also has not made things 

easier for U.S. forces. The huge exposure given the scandal in Iraq and the Arab world has 

only added fuel to the fire and accentuated the collective hurt felt by Iraqis and Arabs 

at the hands of foreigners. Even had efforts to avoid noncombatant casualties been fully 

successful, deep resentment among the Sunni Arab tribes would have been unavoidable. 

The war deprived them of a relatively advantageous position. Unintended casualties and 

cases of humiliation only fanned preexisting negative sentiments.

The Islamists: Moderate and Radical

No less significant than the secular and tribal motivations among rebels, many young men 

are drawn to insurgency by what they consider to be the teachings of Islam. Where do 

these young Iraqi Islamists come from?

The Setting

In an interview in April 2004, ‘Ayyash al-Kubaysi, a representative of Hay’at al-‘Ulama alMuslimin (The Muslim Ulama Council), offered an explanation for why so many young Iraqi 

men had turned to Islam over the last decade of Ba’th rule. As he put it, during the years 

of the international embargo, young men “were reared in the mosque,” and “the mosque 

embraced them.” According to Kubaysi, despite the oppressive Ba’thi system, there were 

The abuse of Iraqi prisoners 

in Abu Ghraib prison also 

has not made things easier 

for U.S. forces.

No less significant than the 

secular and tribal motivations 

among rebels, many young men 

are drawn to insurgency by what 

they consider to be the teachings of Islam. 

The 82nd Airborne spent 

$41 million to create jobs, 

establish a veterans’ office, 

and start a civic-improvement 

program.
10

some clandestine Islamist organizations in the Sunni community.13 This claim seems 

unsubstantiated, but there is no reason to doubt that the mosques, indeed, served as 

focal points for religiously inclined young men interested in more than just Friday prayer. 

The mosques were the only institution, apart from the tribes, relatively immune to regime 

and party control. They became the natural place for people in search of an alternative 

to the Ba’th to pass their free time. 

During the last decade of Ba’th rule, the regime’s approach to Islamic piety was deeply 

ambivalent. Though the Ba’th Party long defined itself as a secular pan-Arab socialist 

organization, under the Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyyah) instituted in 1993, the 

media as well as the educational system began to put a heavy emphasis on the Islamic 

identity of the country. The regime actively encouraged piety and made great efforts to 

present itself as being pious. This about-face for a relatively secular regime was the result 

of two developments: first, the Ba’th Party lost much of its confidence in its own ideology; 

and second, party and regime sensed that a new zeitgeist was filling the horizon—Islam. 

Saddam knew that large segments of the Iraqi public were “returning” to religion. As a 

result, he decided to jump on the bandwagon. Indeed, he even created a Ba’thi form of 

Islam to regain some of his lost popular support. Ultimately, this enhanced a variety of 

Islamist trends in Iraq, some of them far removed from his initial intent. 

Much like before, any independent Islamic trend separate from state efforts, be it 

among Sunnis or Shi’is, was viewed as a threat. In the Shi’i areas, this meant harsh 

repression and occasional assassinations of overly popular clerics who were perceived as 

threats. In the Sunni areas, imams who crossed an invisible line in their preaching were 

often interrogated and jailed for short periods. Yet these Sunni clerics generally were 

allowed much more freedom of expression than ever before. Further, many young men, 

having realized that the ruling party had lost its ideological coherence, turned away from 

the party’s original ideas toward a new set of beliefs.

By the late 1980s it had become clear that secular pan-Arabism fused with socialist ideas was no longer a source of inspiration for some Ba’th Party activists. Many 

young Sunni Arabs adopted an alternative ideology, namely, fundamentalist Islam based 

essentially on the thought of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. A minority even moved 

toward the more extreme Salafi, and even Wahhabi, interpretation of Islam. The regime 

was reluctant to repress such trends violently, even when it came to Wahhabis, for the 

simple reason that these Iraqi Wahhabis were anti-Saudi: much like the ultraradical 

Islamist opposition in Saudi Arabia, they, too, saw the Saudi regime as deviating from its 

original Wahhabi convictions by succumbing to Western cultural influences and aligning 

itself with the Christian imperialist United States. This anti-Saudi trend served the Iraqi 

regime’s political purposes. Still, the main Islamic shift among the younger generation 

was more moderate. 

The Ideological Inspiration 

One of the more popular Islamist thinkers is the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Ahmad 

al-Rashid. A prolific writer who treads a thin line between preaching nonviolence and 

advocating violence, his books were banned from publication in Iraq under Saddam, but 

they were allowed to be published in Egypt; from there, his books reached Baghdad, 

mostly through Jordan, and inspired many. For young Sunni Arab Iraqis, instigating a 

violent revolution that would destroy the Sunni Arab–controlled Ba’th regime was a nonstarter. This was true for two distinct reasons: first, the Ba’th regime was well entrenched 

and managed to inspire such fear in all parts of society that a violent revolt was almost 

unthinkable; and second, even had such a revolt been successful, toppling the Ba’th 

regime was extremely dangerous, because it would have immediately opened the way for 

Shi’i ascendancy, shattering Sunni predominance. Following the Gulf War of 1991 it was 

difficult enough for the regime to suppress the Shi’i revolt while the Sunni Arab community was united; suppressing another such revolt while the Sunni community was divided 

By the late 1980s secular 

pan-Arabism fused with socialist 

ideas was no longer a source of 

inspiration for some Ba’th 

party activists.

One of the more popular Iraqi 

Islamist thinkers is the 

Muslim Brother Muhammad 

Ahmad al-Rashid.
11

would have been impossible. Furthermore, some of the young Sunni Arab Islamists were 

the children of Ba’thi officials or even security officers.

But how to spread the word? Al-Rashid explains that to introduce Islamic change in 

society, written texts are not the most important factor, but, rather, the human touch is. 

Islamic law, he contends, cannot change society by itself unless there is deep conviction 

in the hearts of the people.14 The initial response of the true Muslims, he continues, is 

to proselytize peacefully: begin organizational and educational activities to expand the 

ranks of true Muslims and deepen their Islamic education and conviction. However, by 

essentially branding the character of most existing states in the Islamic world as jahiliyyah—as returning to the state of the pre-Islamic pagan Arabs—the author is not only 

delegitimizing the present governments but, by implication, accusing them of being 

guilty of apostasy (ahl al-Riddah). According to Islamic tradition, apostates should be 

killed. This is not explicitly stated in the text, because it would mean an immediate and 

deadly confrontation with all the ruling regimes in the Arab world. Yet any person with a 

basic Islamic education would understand the implication. More directly, he writes: “We 

shall battle the parties of atheism today and the governments of infidelity with our [organizational and educational] actions before we fight them with our . . . weapons.”15

Further, in a section dedicated to jihad, al-Rashid is very clear that eventually jihad is 

the way of the true Muslim. He is not speaking of the Sufi concept of jihad al-nafs (“jihad 

of the soul”), designed to improve one’s personality, but, rather, he makes it clear that 

he means jihad with the sword. For him, the highest degree of jihad in Islam is when 

a “Muslim will fight with desire, enthusiasm, and love for sacrifice, hoping for death for 

Allah, happy for it and rushing towards it (multadhdhan bihi, musta’jilan lahu).” Trying 

to describe the ideal jihad warrior, whom the Prophet dubbed “al-jahid al-mujahid,” the 

author points out that this is “a man . . . attracted to the battle, whether [in the way 

of] rejecting the oppressive [ruler] or fighting in the battlefield against the infidels.” AlRashid continues, quoting the Prophet: “I wish that I [could be] killed for the sake of God, 

then be revived, then killed, then be revived then killed, then be revived then killed.”16

On the other hand, however, al-Rashid warns his readers not to rush immediately to 

their deaths; he cautions that a jihad warrior should be rational and calculating. Quoting 

Hasan al-Banna, he writes: “He who showed patience together with me until the seed 

grows . . . will be rewarded by God for this.”17 Al-Rashid points out that previous callers for Islamic rule made the mistake of threatening the rulers while only having a weak 

power base. As a result, the rulers easily suppressed them and their message. “The da’wa

[call to Islam],” says al-Rashid, “will progress according to balanced phases.”18 The Iraqi 

youth, al-Rashid suggests in his writings, suffer from disorientation as a result of their 

tendency to mix secular Arab nationalism with Islam. As a result, their Islam is weak, but 

they are not, however, inclined toward atheism.

Al-Rashid’s books allowed young Iraqis to remain politically inactive in a regime that 

threatened their lives if they crossed a certain line, while providing them with a sense of 

value and mission. Further, his words set for them short-term goals that they could fulfill, 

according to their own judgment, without too much risk. But now, since the elimination 

of the Ba’th regime, legal Islamist activity both in the Shi’i south and the Sunni center 

has mushroomed in a way unprecedented in Iraqi history; the field has opened for formerly private radical Islamist thought to be voiced strongly and publicly. Further, young 

Sunni Arab Islamists could easily interpret what they read in the works of al-Rashid and 

others as encouraging them to spring to full-fledged jihad. With Saddam gone, the risk 

has greatly reduced, and the reward—returning the Sunni Arab community to hegemony 

under the banner of Islam—is tantalizing. 

While reading such scholarly Islamist books was typical for the intellectually inclined 

young Islamists, many others who were attracted to Islam and who spent much time in 

the mosques were less educated and less intellectually inclined. But they, too, had sources 

of external religious inspiration. These young men listened to Islamist video and audiocassettes coming from across the border. In particular, popular Islamist preachers in Syria and 

Al-Rashid explains that to 

introduce Islamic change in 

society, written texts are not 

the most important factor, but, 

rather, the human touch is.

Al-Rashid is very clear that 

eventually jihad is the way 

of the true Muslim. He is not 

speaking of the Sufi concept 

of jihad al-nafs (“jihad of the 

soul”), but, rather, jihad with 

the sword.

Al-Rashid’s books allowed young 

Iraqis to remain politically inactive while providing them with 

a sense of value and mission.
12

Jordan have often been referenced in interviews with young Iraqi Islamist fighters. The 

trickle of such cassettes before the war became a deluge after it. Now they can be purchased risk-free in the marketplace. People who did not have money to buy videos would 

rent them for a small fee and watch them in small groups. In this respect, Iraqi Islamists 

in 2003–2004 have followed in the footsteps of Iranian Islamists on the eve of the Islamic 

Revolution, who eagerly listened to recordings of Khomeini, then exiled in France.

While the Sunnis certainly have increased religious freedoms today, one question 

remains: why be drawn to the mosque and nowhere else? The answer is simple: under 

the Ba’th regime all non-Ba’thi social and political institutions and civil-society cells 

except the mosque were wiped out, and tribes have never had large or deeply institutionalized places of mass assembly that could compete with the mosques. Now that the 

party’s centers are no more, people looking for guidance and identity in this unnerving 

post-Ba’th environment have discovered it not only in such books and tapes but also in 

their mosques. Imams and khatibs (preachers) offer this guidance freely and with great 

enthusiasm, as the new situation in Iraq has raised their social status and political power 

by leaps and bounds.

The Islamists: Ultraradical Salafis and Wahhabis

The most radical Islamist fanatics are the Salafis, or, as they self-proclaim, “those who 

follow in the footsteps of the Muslim forefathers.” The Salafis are deeply influenced by the 

most extreme interpretation of Islam as presented by Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian Muslim 

Brother who was hanged by Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser in 1966. They saw the secular Ba’th 

regime as a return to jahiliyya, the pre-Islamic era of barbarism and paganism, and, much 

like Sayyid Qutb, believed it was their duty to use violence to remove such a secular regime 

from power. Some of these Salafis are also Wahhabis, followers of the purist teachings of 

the eighteenth-century Arabian ideologue Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Much like the 

Salafis, they accuse all Arab regimes of being too friendly with the West and borrowing 

from it too many cultural elements. As apostates, these regimes deserve to be destroyed. 

The Wahhabis are also strongly opposed to Sufi Islam. And while not all the Salafis are 

theologically anti-Shi’i, all the Wahhabis are, because they see Shi’a as idol-worshippers. 

Movements in which Salafis and Wahhabis are paramount include Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad 

fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, a group led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi; Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna; Jama’at 

al-Salafiyya al-Mujahida; Ansar al-Islam, a principally Kurdish organization; and the Black 

Banner and al-Faruq Brigades.

While many young tribal insurgents often see themselves as both nationalists and 

pious Muslims, and thus are likely to move freely between the three identities and groupings noted above, the identity and worldview of the ultraradical Islamists are far more 

fixed and rigid. Thus, while many insurgents might one day lay down their weapons and 

become integrated into the new state system, this does not apply to the Salafis and Wahhabis. For them, the only options are victory, death, prison, and the continuation of the 

armed struggle. 

Despite the Faith Campaign initiated by Saddam, Salafi criticism against his Ba’th 

regime remained potent until the day he was removed from power. To the Salafis, the 

Ba’this were nonbelievers. Their objection to the new order in Iraq, however, is far more 

profound, and thus even cooperation with ex-Ba’this is now seen as legitimate. Much 

like Osama bin Laden, they revile a Christian presence in the Islamic homeland. Western 

“promiscuous” values, support for Israel, and democracy in Iraq that will elevate the Shi’i 

community are all seen as threats. While a sizable group within the Salafi-Wahhabi camp 

consists of non-Iraqi Arab Islamists who roam the world in search of jihad, native Iraqis 

represent the majority.

One example of an Iraqi who rose through the ranks of al-Zarqawi’s movement to a 

position of leadership may illustrate the challenge Salafis present to the new Iraq.19 ‘Umar 

Iraqi Islamists in 2003-2004 

have followed in the footsteps 

of Iranian Islamists on the eve 

of the Islamic Revolution.

Now that the party’s centers 

are no more, people looking for 

guidance in this unnerving 

post-Ba’th environment have 

discovered it in their mosques.

The most radical Islamist 

fanatics are the Salafis, or, as 

they self-proclaim, “those who 

follow in the footsteps of the 

Muslim forefathers.”

To the Salafis and Wahhabis, 

the only options are victory, 

death, prison, and the continuation of the armed struggle.

Some of these Salafis are also 

Wahhabis. Much like the Salafis, 

they accuse all Arab regimes of 

being too friendly with the West 

and borrowing from it too many 

cultural elements.
13

Husayn Hadid, an Iraqi electrician in his thirties whose religious fervor drew suspicion 

from Saddam Hussein’s agents long before U.S. forces invaded Iraq, is regarded by many 

who fought the Americans in Falluja as the main leader among the local fighters. “Inside 

Falluja, ‘Umar was the leader. Even Abu Mus’ab [al-Zarqawi] couldn’t say no to him,” said 

a mufti who sat on the council that directed the insurgents in Falluja and is now hiding 

in Baghdad. “If Abu Mus’ab didn’t cultivate the support of ‘Umar, he never would’ve been 

allowed to stay in Falluja.” 

From an early age, Hadid was known as a Salafi who stood out even in conservative 

Falluja, known as Iraq’s “city of a hundred mosques.” Long before U.S. forces became his 

target, Hadid took potshots at Saddam’s regime, highly unusual among Sunni Arabs. As a 

teenager, Hadid picked fights and “made people uneasy,” noted his uncle, Abu Muhammad 

Hadid, who lives on the family’s tribal lands on the outskirts of Falluja. His first outlaw 

act was shooting a policeman in the leg, a scandal that was settled in tribal courts with 

Hadid’s family paying compensation to the officer. In the early 1990s Hadid was excited 

about the regime’s shift to Islam. Hadid and an older friend campaigned against “sins” 

they saw in their city, Falluja, threatening owners of beauty parlors and music stores. In 

the mid-1990s, Hadid terrified townspeople by blowing up Falluja’s only cinema. A sign 

of the age was that the Ba’th regime relented, and the cinema never reopened. Ba’th 

Party security forces eventually stormed his friend’s house and killed him. Hadid, then in 

his twenties, decided he would avenge his death. “That day was the seed of everything 

going on with Umar today,” said a former Falluja police officer who participated in the 

raid on the friend’s home.

Hadid allegedly helped murder a senior official of Saddam’s Ba’th Party in Falluja and 

then disappeared. Saddam’s government tried him in absentia and sentenced him to 

death by hanging. Hadid returned to Falluja after the fall of Saddam’s regime. He opened 

an electrician’s stand in a marketplace and resumed his pious life. When the men of Falluja decided to take up arms against U.S. forces, Hadid quickly assembled a small army. 

They started modestly, firing rocket-propelled grenades at U.S. convoys and perfecting 

their crude, homemade bombs, but grew to heroic status after U.S. troops broke off efforts 

to occupy Falluja in April 2004. Hadid became a local icon. His name was spray-painted 

on walls, and recruits lined up to join the fight. Around that same time, Hadid became 

friendly with al-Zarqawi, taking command of a Tawhid and Jihad offshoot of about 1,500 

men known as the Black Banners Brigade. He protected al-Zarqawi from being thrown out 

by the locals or being turned in for the $25 million ransom offered by U.S. officials for 

his capture. Even though Hadid’s religious views were more extremist than those of most 

in Falluja, what mattered to them was that he was from the local tribe of albu Mahamdeh 

and a son of the city. Further, he was seen as a freedom fighter against the Christian 

invaders and, perhaps more importantly, as a champion of Sunni interests against perceived Shi’i and Kurdish encroachment. 

After the U.S. decision in April to break off its attacks in Falluja, Hadid and other 

leaders decided to form a united front to govern the city. The resulting body was the 

Mujahidin Shura, an eighteen-member council made up of Islamists, nationalists, and 

former Ba’this. Each cell took a territory to protect. Hadid assumed control of Jolan, 

known as the district in Falluja where the most radical insurgents and terrorists, many of 

them non-Iraqis, took shelter. Though he was tied to al-Zarqawi, whose movement conducted a campaign of beheadings and large-scale bombings of Iraqi civilians, the people 

of Falluja could not admit to themselves, let alone to others, that Hadid was as bad as 

al-Zarqawi, whose atrocities turned many people against him. “I asked ‘Umar once how 

he could hold himself together when he slaughtered another human being,” said one of 

Hadid’s cousins. “He laughed and swore he’d never personally beheaded a hostage. He 

said he chose men who don’t have hearts to do the actual killing. He said it’s a battle, so 

everything is permissible.”

While a sizable group within the 

Salafi-Wahhabi camp consists 

of non-Iraqi Arab Islamists who 

roam the world in search of 

jihad, native Iraqis represent 

the majority.

‘Umar Husayn Hadid is 

regarded by many who fought 

the Americans in Falluja as 

the main leader among the 

local fighters.

Hadid protected al-Zarqawi 

from being thrown out by the 

locals or being turned in for the 

$25 million ransom offered by 

U.S. officials for his capture.

Hadid was seen as a freedom 

fighter against the Christian 

invaders and as a champion of 

Sunni interests against perceived 

Shi’i and Kurdish encroachment. 
14

Hadid’s admirers remained completely silent over his organization’s murderous antiShi’i terrorism. It should be remembered that in a letter from al-Zarqawi to Osama bin 

Laden intercepted in 2003, al-Zarqawi reported his plan to kill Shi’a to bring about a 

Shi’i-Sunni confrontation. Soon afterward, in March 2003, hundreds of Shi’i pilgrims 

were slaughtered on ‘Ashura day in Karbala and Baghdad’s Kazimayn. Even by his own 

tribe, Hadid is believed to be responsible for the brutal murder and mutilation in Falluja 

of six Shi’i drivers who belonged to the Janani subtribal unit of the Rabi’a tribal federation. When the Shi’i religious leaders were reluctant to act, the tribal system kicked in. 

The Rabi’a threatened that they would avenge the spilled blood of their tribesmen.20 

Indeed, the Ba’th regime tolerated, albeit with great difficulty, the Iraqi Salafis and Wahhabis because a massive crackdown would have triggered tribal feuds and weakened the 

regime’s power base. 

 After Falluja fell in November 2004, Hadid escaped, shedding his anonymity. He 

wanted to make a name for himself, no lesser a name than that of his boss, al-Zarqawi. 

In mid-December 2004, his organization kidnapped one of the Baghdad-based journalists of the Saudi-financed al-Sharq al-Awsat and demanded that the newspaper publish 

a sympathetic article about Hadid. If it did not, they threatened, the newspaper’s headquarters would be blown up. Al-Sharq al-Awsat responded by withdrawing its team from 

Iraq altogether.

There is no way that the Salafis can be dissuaded from continuing their terrorist activities. To please them any future government would need to be both viciously against the 

United States and rabidly for Taliban-style Islam. But in the case of Salafis with tribal 

roots like Hadid, their tribes may play a role in limiting the damage they can do. Already 

some tribes hurt by the extremists’ campaign of murder and mayhem have threatened the 

perpetrators’ tribes with revenge. The latter may soon rethink the protection they afford 

their marauding members. 

The Insurgents: Three Vignettes 

While Ba’thism/Saddamism, tribalism, and Islamism all serve as primary identity-based 

catalysts for Sunni Arab insurrection in today’s Iraq, tactical military cooperation among 

the three categories is widespread and, as noted above, any given non-Salafi rebel may 

identify with one, two, or all of these causes. Some brief case studies of insurgency in 

Iraq may help illustrate this point and fully convey the complicated mix of motivations 

among Iraqi rebels.

The Intellectual Islamist

Ahmad Hasan Ibrahim, killed fighting U.S. forces, offers a fairly typical portrait of a young 

Islamist fighter. He was an engineering student who was married and owned his own 

home. His father was an upper-middle-class merchant who had prospered under the Ba’th 

regime. In late 2001, while studying at university, Ahmad became increasingly religious. 

While the family typically prayed at home, he went to the mosque. He read the Qu’ran 

compulsively and fasted every Monday and Thursday, telling his family he was trying to 

avoid temptation. He used to curse his uncle for listening to songs on television, even 

though his uncle was also religious. (Ahmad’s objection to music implies an inclination 

toward Wahhabism.) Further, he hated Saddam Hussein. The family feared this would get 

him into trouble with the authorities but, unlike Falluja’s Hadid, he practiced precaution 

and did not challenge the regime openly. During the war, Ahmad initially joined a local 

group that protected property against looters but eventually turned his ire on the Americans. Stated a cleric at the local Shahid Bashar Qalandar mosque: “A Muslim does not 

accept a foreigner and a non-believer to rule over him.” After his death, even his mother 

There is no way that the Salafis 

can be dissuaded from continuing their terrorist activities.

Ba’thism/Saddamism, tribalism, and Islamism all serve as 

primary identity-based catalysts 

for Sunni Arab insurrection in 

today’s Iraq.

Stated a cleric at the Shahid 

Bashar Qalandar mosque: 

“A Muslim does not accept a 

foreigner and a non-believer 

to rule over him.”
15

expressed pride in his actions, though she did this in secular terms: “He raised our heads, 

he defended his country and honor.”21

A Group of Jihadists from Khaldiya

The five members of a squad that attacked U.S. troops in early September 2003 and paid 

for it with their lives were less intellectual than Ahmad but no less enthusiastic. They 

lived in Khaldiya, a small town on the Euphrates, west of Baghdad. They hailed from 

different families and tribes but “were united by the resurgent piety that followed the 

collapse of Hussein’s government.” All five were devotees of Mahmud al-Aghasi, a militant 

Syrian preacher who conveniently refrains from criticizing his own secular government 

and whose video cassettes are often on sale near Sunni mosques. The group’s leader, 

thirty-one-year-old Hussein al-Fahdawi, reportedly declared before dying: “Today we have 

sacrificed ourselves to defend our honor and pride . . . we have sacrificed our souls for 

the sake of Islam, to get rid of the monkeys, pigs, Jews and Christians.”

Al-Fahdawi was born into a family of fourteen. Manager of a small construction crew, 

he studied Islam with the town’s elder cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Salih, never missing the 

obligatory five daily prayers. In fact, he often traveled all the way to the mosque to 

perform them, firing workers for not doing the same. During Ramadan, he refused to talk 

to people he suspected of having cheated on their fast. After the war, he would not talk 

to those he suspected of looting. He was not married, which at his age was unusual. He 

recruited his jihad team from people he encountered through his job. This was not a difficult task, as relatives recalled that all the town’s men became more pious after the war. 

The group enjoyed listening to Qu’ranic recitations and began attending Friday prayers at 

Khaldiya’s grand mosque. 

One of the smaller Khaldiya mosques, the Nur mosque, served as a rallying point for 

radical Islamists. Murals of al-Aqsa and the slogan “Jerusalem, we are coming!” adorned 

its walls. The thirty-three-year-old local shaykh, ‘Alam Sabbar, explained that it is legitimate to fight the Americans because they are infidels. When al-Fahdawi’s corpse was 

brought home, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Salih told his family not to wash off the dust from the body, 

as normally required by Islamic tradition, because the dust of jihad was considered purifying and sanctifying. In a later interview, however, the shaykh declined to call Fahdawi 

a martyr (shahid), explaining that this was up to God’s judgment, and even described 

the men as reckless, stating it was too early to take up arms against the occupation: “It 

is not time for jihad.”22 Whatever his true view, the central role of the Sunni clerics in 

post-Ba’th Iraq cannot be ignored.

Ba’this turned Moderate Islamists

A group of Sunni insurgents with a nationalist and pro-Ba’th orientation interviewed in 

al-Mansur district of Baghdad and in the mixed city of Baquba, northeast of Baghdad, 

seemed to have largely comprised ex–army officers and young men angered by the killing 

and detainment of people during the U.S. search for Saddam Hussein. Within the group, 

there were also non-Iraqi Arabs and some bearing the tattoo of a winged heart, the 

logo of the Saddam Feda’iyyin, Uday Hussein’s private militia. The cell commander was a 

Jordanian who had arrived in Iraq before the war, intending to stop the Americans from 

conquering the entire Middle East. The cell received instructions from a committee consisting mainly of clerics based in Diyala, northeast of Baghdad, that controlled some one 

hundred fighters. They were supported by private donations and money sent from Syria.

One of the interviewees, a nineteen-year-old who called himself “Abu Muhammad,” 

clearly admired Saddam Hussein but defined the cell’s views as “a mix of Islam and 

pan-Arabism.” All of those interviewed opposed suicide bombings, saying they were not 

terrorists and did not undertake such missions, though they said they do recite Qu’ranic 

verses before their operations. Abu Muhammad said he had family in Tikrit, including 

The group’s leader reportedly 

declared before dying: “Today 

we have sacrificed our souls for 

the sake of Islam, to get rid of 

the monkeys, pigs, Jews and 

Christians.”

The shaykh explained that it 

is legitimate to fight the 

Americans because they 

are infidels.

All of those interviewed opposed 

suicide bombings, saying they 

were not terrorists, though they 

said they do recite Qu’ranic 

verses before their operations.
16

senior army officers. He claimed to lead a group of twenty people. Fearing informers, he 

recruited only family members and close friends. Group members were adamant that once 

the United States was driven out of Iraq, the collaborators would be killed. Further, the 

group ferociously rejected any notion of returning expatriates leading Iraq and promised 

to kill them if they achieved leadership positions. They would accept only a leader who 

had “suffered like us, who was with the people” during the wars and sanctions. They 

did not mention any suffering at the hands of the Ba’th regime. After all, they and their 

families were the regime.

Conclusion

While secular/ideological, tribal, and Islamist motivations drive the insurgency, practically 

speaking, Sunni Arab insurgents may be divided into two categories: those who are candidates for a rapprochement with the Iraqi government, and those who are not. Insurgents 

in the latter category include the ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists, ex-Ba’this who 

have either committed crimes against humanity or are otherwise convinced there is no 

place for them in the new system, and hardened ordinary criminals. The former category 

includes all other secular/ideological, tribal, and Islamist groups. The question remains: 

what can be done to drive a wedge between these two categories and find a political 

solution with the insurgents with whom an accord might be reached? 

To begin, the Iraqi government should initiate a media campaign that fully illustrates 

the profound religious differences between the Salafis and the more moderate Sunni 

Muslims and Sufis. For example, when Falluja was under the control of the ultraradical 

insurgents, the dress code they demanded was very close to that ordered by the Taliban, 

and far stricter than the usual conservative dress code of this religious town. Smoking 

cigarettes was strictly prohibited, and any connection to alcohol was punishable by public 

flogging. Further, Western films, makeup, and hairstyles were also forbidden.23 This is a 

way of living that would be completely foreign to—and unwanted by—most Iraqis.

Government media can also highlight the strong reservations many insurgents have 

about the atrocities committed by al-Zarqawi and some Iraqi Salafis. For example, “Abu 

Barra,” a commander of the Allahu Akbar Battalions, a group of native Fallujan insurgents, 

insisted that the locals were attacking only U.S. military targets, not anyone or anything 

else. “The others,” Barra said, “are Arab Salafis who claim that any Iraqi or Muslim not 

willing to carry arms [against the U.S. and Iraqi government] is an infidel. They are the 

crux of our ailment. Most of them are Saudis, Syrians and North Africans . . . It is the 

Zarqawis and . . . Salafi group who are going to lead Falluja, Samarra, Baqubah, Mosul and 

even some parts of Baghdad to disaster and death.” “Abu Abd Allah” al-Dulaymi, military 

commander of the First Army of Mohammad, added: “He [Zarqawi] is mentally deranged, 

has distorted the image of the resistance and defamed it. I believe his end is near.”24

The majority of Falluja’s citizens were caught between the coalition and the more radical 

mujahidin, local and foreign alike. The citizens’ misery must be alleviated quickly, and 

the recovery shown to the Iraqi public, but insurgents must also be fully exposed for the 

suffering they have caused to Iraqi civilians.

The government must persuade ordinary Fallujans, in exchange for a commitment to 

protect their lives, to speak openly and clearly to the Iraqi and Arab media about what 

they experienced from April to November 2004 under “the Islamic Republic of Falluja.” 

Their descriptions of summary public executions, public flogging, torture chambers, and 

all other atrocities would help expose the ultraradicals for what they are: brutal killers. 

To be sure, the interviewees would also criticize U.S. forces and the largely Shi’i National 

Guard units who helped conquer Falluja, but this would only add credibility to their criticism of the insurgents. Another element of extremist policies and beliefs that should be 

Sunni Arab insurgents may 

be divided into two categories: 

those who are candidates for 

a rapprochement with the 

Iraqi government, and those 

who are not.

The Iraqi government should 

initiate a media campaign that 

fully illustrates the profound 

religious differences between 

the Salafis and the more moderate Sunni Muslims and Sufis.
17

fully exposed is the Wahhabis’ anti-Sufi and anti-Shi’i attitudes. Most Sunnis, much like 

their Shi’i countrymen, abhor the prospect of a Sunni-Shi’i civil war. 

While changing public opinion through media is important, are there any tangible 

steps that can be taken to persuade less radical Iraqi insurgents to lay down their arms? 

What I have tried to demonstrate is that all these insurgent groups have one main concern: the place of the Sunni Arab community within the new Iraq. The groups that are the 

most likely candidates to cease all military operations are those that currently object to 

attacks against Iraqis, even those working with coalition forces, and the Iraqi economy. 

The same groups also generally object to the taking of foreign hostages. There are also 

political clerics respected by many insurgents with similar views. For example, the leadership of the (legal) Muslim ‘Ulama Committee and the Iraqi Islamic Party are more or less 

hostile to the coalition and the Iraqi government, having even issued fatwas against 

participation in the elections. However, these clerics mostly have an Iraqi orientation, 

not a broader Salafi one. Following the success of the elections they are reevaluating 

their position.

When it comes to addressing specific concerns, what may satisfy the moderate 

Islamists are guarantees that Iraq will not become an Islamic republic but that Islam will 

play an important role in the new Iraq. In fact, this concern has already been addressed 

by the interim constitution—and will likely also be addressed by the permanent constitution. At the same time, though, most Sunni Arabs (as well as many Shi’a) are not interested in an Islamic republic. If the principle of autonomy, or federalism, is adopted for the 

whole country—and not just for the Kurds—it will be possible for each autonomous zone 

to adopt some of its own laws, thus somewhat calibrating the degree to which Islamic 

rules are imposed. Still, imposing Islamic law and Islamist dress codes in Iraq—as Shi’i 

fundamentalists have already done in Basra—will enrage the more secular elements of 

the population. Some insurgents who would otherwise be inclined to lay down their arms 

will keep fighting, and peaceful citizens will leave the country. Also, it is essential that 

the Shi’i and Sunni interpretations of Islamic history and law—even the most minor differences—are treated by the state educational and legal systems on an equal footing. 

Another concern of the moderate Islamists is that the United States and the coalition 

forces will stay in Iraq indefinitely. Many other Iraqis, who accept the coalition troops at 

present as a necessary evil, share this concern. Both the Iraqi government and U.S. leaders currently hold that coalition troops will stay as long as needed. Indeed, this is crucial 

to avoid defections to the antigovernment camp. However, they should also regularly 

emphasize that coalition troops will be withdrawn to desert bases or out of the country 

as soon as the country is pacified or as soon as an elected Iraqi government asks them 

to leave. Finally, there is a need to make greater efforts to win over the non-Salafi Sunni 

clerics. In today’s Iraq, a preacher’s sermon can have far more impact than any television 

or radio broadcast. 

When it comes to the specific interests of the Saddamists and Ba’thists, not much 

more can be done other than expediting the work of the vetting committees, thus allowing more ex-Ba’this to enter public service. This reintegration is not risk free and many 

oppose it, but strict security measures should help. As for tribes, the present policy of 

assisting the rural areas with services and employing tribe members as police officers in 

their hometowns and as border guards should be continued if they prove reliable. Further, 

attempts must be made to resume ties with tribal chiefs. These chiefs proved to be the 

most responsible and pragmatic leaders in provincial towns such as Samarra, Tikrit, and 

even Falluja. In most cases they compared favorably to the clerics, conducting negotiations with the government and coalition forces despite death threats. In Tikrit these 

talks succeeded in keeping the peace. In Samarra and Falluja they failed. It is important, 

though, to differentiate between corrupt would-be tribal shaykhs and genuine community 

leaders. 

Most Sunnis, much like their 

Shi’i countrymen, abhor 

the prospect of a Sunni-Shi’i 

civil war. 

The groups that are the most 

likely candidates to cease all 

military operations are those 

that currently object to attacks 

against Iraqis.

What may satisfy the moderate 

Islamists are guarantees that 

Iraq will not become an Islamic 

republic but that Islam will 

play an important role in the 

new Iraq.

Coalition troops will be withdrawn to desert bases or out of 

the country as soon as the country is pacified or as soon as an 

elected Iraqi government asks 

them to leave.
18

While the elections have provided a legitimate government in the eyes of nearly all 

Shi’a and Kurds, in large areas of the Sunni Triangle, holding safe and fair elections was 

impossible. As a result, the elected government is illegitimate to most Sunnis.25 The way 

to overcome this problem would be for the new government to make sure that influential 

Sunni Arab leaders participate in the committees in charge of developing the permanent 

constitution. Even though they cannot control the insurgents, their high-profile participation in such consultations would deliver an important message. Eventually, the Shi’i 

politicians who won in a big way will have to show real generosity and offer the Sunni 

Arab community a deal they cannot turn down. Further, government ministry positions 

should be fully open to young Sunni men and women with the right qualifications. However, the various security institutions present a special problem, as some of the atrocities 

committed by the Salafis against the police and national guardsmen could not have been 

planned without inside information. While Sunni Arabs should certainly not be excluded 

from these organizations, the various security organs must be monitored very closely. 

Another way to minimize Sunni Arab concerns about their future in the new Iraq is to 

emphasize that oil revenues are the property of the nation as a whole, with an Alaskastyle addition. Establishing a national oil authority where all governorates are equally 

represented may be an institutional way of addressing this issue. To counter widespread 

suspicions of corruption and discrimination, this sector must have complete transparency. 

Further, the Iraqi government must overtly and covertly assure the Sunni community 

that—good neighborliness notwithstanding— Iranian penetration, into Iraq will not 

be tolerated. It must establish an internal security branch dedicated solely to combating infiltration. Ideally, Sunni Arab intelligence officers after passing a rigorous vetting 

process, would work directly on Iran with Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds loyal to the new Iraq. The 

elected Iraqi government should also make every effort to persuade important Sunni and 

Shi’i clerics, tribal shaykhs, politicians, intellectuals, professionals, and businessmen to 

meet and issue joint communiqués calling for an end to hostilities and warning against 

intercommunal bloodshed. 

Finally, there is an urgent need to upgrade the country’s infrastructure, to encourage 

the entrepreneurial class, and to substantially reduce unemployment in Iraq. The new 

government will be living on borrowed time. It must be transparent to prevent corruption and, crucially, to demonstrate that it can build more than the terrorists can destroy. 

Ensuring a steady supply of electric power is especially important, as it is necessary for 

potable water, sewage, job opportunities, and illuminated streets. By December 2004, 

nearly two years after Saddam’s downfall, Iraq was producing only 4,100 megawatts of 

electric power, a little below pre-war levels and about half of the country’s fast-growing 

domestic demand. This is the time to make a strategic decision to both partially privatize 

and decentralize the production of electric power. 

In terms of sabotage to infrastructure and crime, Baghdad and Basra are worst off. To 

help offset these attacks to the central system, the government could provide neighborhoods—through loans and subsidies—backup generators capable of serving 500 families 

each. Purchasing 2,500 one-megawatt generators would cost around $1 billion, with 

spare parts and other hardware costing an additional $500 million. These generators 

would kick in the moment the central system shut down. Further, they would be very difficult to sabotage because they do not require a high-voltage grid and the neighborhoods 

themselves would be responsible for their operation and protection. This would empower 

the people and give them a sense of control over their lives. Such a measure, which aligns 

well with Iraq’s tradition of strong neighborhoods (mahallat), may even help turn the 

tide against the insurgents inside their own West Baghdad strongholds. With at least $17 

billion annually in oil revenues, the resources are available for such an initiative. U.S. 

and Japanese companies could provide the generators within a few months and, without 

placing their own personnel at risk, could tutor Iraqi technicians in neighboring countries. 

The elected government is 

illegitimate to most Sunnis.

Another way to minimize Sunni 

Arab concerns about their future 

in the new Iraq is to emphasize 

that oil revenues are the property 

of the nation as a whole, with 

an Alaska-style addition.

There is an urgent need to 

upgrade the country’s 

infrastructure, to encourage 

the entrepreneurial class, 

and to substantially reduce 

unemployment in Iraq.

This is the time to make a 

strategic decision to both 

partially privatize and 

decentralize the production 

of electric power.
19

Coalition forces would help escort the generators to their destinations. The rest would be 

up to the Iraqis themselves. 

Notes

1. Akeel Hussein and Nicholas Pelham, “Rebels’ Writ Runs Large across the Troublesome Sunni Triangle,” Financial Times, July 30, 2004, http://ft.com/. 

2. Anthony Shadid, “In New Iraq, Sunnis Fear a Green Future,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 

December 22, 2003. 

3. See Amatzia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thi Iraq (London: MacMillan, 1991).

4. Al-Ittijah al-Akhar [The Other Tendency] (Baghdad), March 13, 2004, FBIS March 14, 2004.

5. Anthony Shadid, “In New Iraq, Sunnis Fear a Green Future,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 

December 22, 2003.

6. Daniel Williams reporting from Dhulu’iya, Iraq, Washington Post Foreign Service, January 13, 

2004. 

7. For details see Amatzia Baram, “Neo Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Husayn’s Tribal Policies 1991–96,” 

International Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997), 1–31; Amatzia Baram, Building toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn’s Strategy for Survival (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

8. Rajiv Chandrasekaram, Washington Post, October 17, 2004.

9. Observer (London), January 11, 2004.

10. Based on telephone conversations with Paul McGough, chief correspondent in Iraq for the Sydney 

Morning Herald, July 24, 2004, and Deborah Amos’ National Public Radio program “All Things Considered” 

on August 2, 2004. 

11. Agence France-Presse from Tikrit, October 18, 2003.

12. Based on a presentation by Gen. Swannack at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 

30, 2004. See also WINEP’s Policywatch No. 884, July 20, 2004.

13. Interview by Muhammad al-Baqali, Al-Quds al-Arabi, April 23, 2004, FBIS-NES, April 23, 2004.

14. Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid, Al-Masar: Ihya’ Fiqh al-Da’wa [Resurrecting the Call’s Jurisprudence 

or Comprehension] (The Fifth Book, Cairo: Dar al-Bashir lil-Thaqafa wal-‘Ulum, 1999), 16.

15. Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid, Al-Masar: Ihya’ Fiqh al-Da’wa (The Fifth Book, Cairo: Dar al-Bashir 

lil-Thaqafa wal-‘Ulum, 1999), 9. See also his earlier book, Al-‘Awa’iq [The Obstacles], Ihya’ fiqh al-Da’wa, 

No. 2 (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risala, 1997). This volume is dedicated mainly to theology. The same author 

also published Al-Muntalaq [The Point of Departure] No. 1 in the same series.

16. Al-Rashid (pp. 67–68) provides the source for this prophetic saying as Sahih al-Bukhari, one of 

the canonical collections of the Prophet’s traditions.

17. Muhammad Ahmad al-Rashid, Al-Masar: Ihya’ Fiqh al-Da’wa (The Fifth Book, Cairo: Dar al-Bashir 

lil-Thaqafa wal-‘Ulum, 1999), 67–68.

18. Ibid., 69, 71.

19. Most of the profile provided here is based on a report by Hannah Allam, “Fallujah’s Real Boss: 

Omar the Electrician,” in Knight Ridder newspapers, November 22, 2004.

20. See an excellent account from Baghdad by Tish Durkin, National Journal Group, Inc., October 

16, 2004.

21. Mariam Fam, Associated Press from Mosul, November 7, 2003.

22. Anthony Shadid from Khaldiyyah, Washington Post, September 21, 2003.

23. Nir Rosen, “Home Rule,” New Yorker, July 5, 2004, 50–51. And a personal interview with Rosen 

in Washington, DC, May 22, 2004.

24. Karl Vick, Washington Post, October 13, 2004.

25. See, for example, Hamza Hendawi, “Iraqi Vote May Not Resolve Sunni Dilemma,” Associated 

Press, January 31, 2005; “Disgruntled Sunnis Could Thwart Iraq Constitution,” Reuters from Amman, 

February 1, 2005; David Axe, “On the Sunni Side from the Besieged Sunni Triangle: The Glowing Portrait 

of the Iraqi Election Doesn’t Hold,” Salon, February 1, 2005, http://www.salon.com. 
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Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.