alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2


                  STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     I, Charles J. Novak, Chief Financial Officer of Integrated Surgical
Systems, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2003 (the "Report"), which this statement accompanies, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and


     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated: August 8, 2003                 /s/ Charles J. Novak
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                          Charles J. Novak
                                          Chief Financial Officer
§ 429.28 What terms and conditions apply to all use authorizations? ( a ) By accepting a use authorization under this part, you agree to comply with and be bound by the following terms and conditions during all construction, operation, maintenance, use, and termination activities: ( 1 ) The grantee agrees to indemnify the United States for, and hold the United States and all of its representatives harmless from, all damages resulting from suits, actions, or claims of any character brought on account of any injury to any person or property arising out of any act, omission, neglect, or misconduct in the manner or method of performing any construction, care, operation, maintenance, supervision, examination, inspection, or other activities of the grantee.
( 2 ) The United States, acting through Reclamation, Department of the Interior, reserves rights to construct, operate, and maintain public works now or hereafter authorized by the Congress without liability for termination of the use authorization or other damage to the grantee's activities or facilities.
( 3 ) Reclamation may, at any time and at no cost or liability to the United States, terminate any use authorization in the event of a natural disaster, a national emergency, a need arising from security requirements, or an immediate and overriding threat to public health and safety.
( 4 ) Reclamation may, at any time and at no cost or liability to the United States, terminate any use authorization for activities other than existing authorized private exclusive recreational or residential use as defined under § 429.2 if Reclamation determines that any of the following apply: ( i ) The use has become incompatible with authorized project purposes, project operations, safety, and security;
( ii ) A higher public use is identified through a public process described at § 429.32(a)(1); or
( iii ) Termination is necessary for operational needs of the project.
( 5 ) Reclamation may, at any time and at no cost or liability to the United States, terminate any use authorization if Reclamation determines that the grantee has failed to use the use authorization for its intended purpose. Further, failure to construct within the timeframe specified in the terms of the use authorization may constitute a presumption of abandonment of the requested use and cause termination of the use authorization.
( 6 ) Reclamation may, at any time and at no cost or liability to the United States, terminate any use authorization if the grantee fails to comply with all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, regulations, ordinances, or terms and conditions of any use authorization, or to obtain any required permits or authorizations.
( b ) The Regional Director may, upon advice of the Solicitor, modify these terms and conditions with respect to the contents of the use authorization to meet local and special conditions.
#### Sing WALL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Lawrence WALL, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 15222, 15223.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 2, 1955.

John R. Parkhill, Tampa, Fla., for appellants.

Vernon W. Evans, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., James L. Guilmartin, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellee. •

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, and DAW-KINS, District Judge.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge.

This opinion relates to separate appeals prosecuted by Sing Wall and Lawrence Wall, from convictions of violating 26 U.S.C.A. § 3294(c), and sentences of one year’s imprisonment. Since the transcripts of record and the specifications of error are practically identical in the two cases, and since they were consolidated for trial in the District Court, it is appropriate to dispose of them in a single opinion.

*159Only two points are relied upon by appellants: that § 3294(c) is unconstitutionally vague, and that the trial court should have granted their motions to tranfer their cases from the Tampa Division to the Jacksonville Division. The first of these points was decided adversely to appellants’ contention in Sulli v. United States, 5 Cir., 213 F.2d 100, and certiorari was recently denied in that case, 348 U.S. 826, 75 S.Ct. 43.

As for the second point, it is precisely the same argument which was made in Ippolito v. United States, 5 Cir., 223 F.2d 154, and Cagnina v. United States, 5 Cir., 223 F.2d 149, and for the reasons stated in the former of these we think appellants’ contentions on this point are equally without merit.

The judgments are

Affirmed.
§ 2091.7-1 Segregative effect and opening: Classifications. ( a ) ( 1 ) Lands classified under the authority of the Recreation and the Public Purposes Act, as amended (43 U.S.C. 869-4), and the Small Tract Act (43 U.S.C. 682a) are segregated from the operation of the public land laws, including the mining laws, but not the mineral leasing laws, the material disposal laws, and the Geothermal Steam Act, except as provided in the notice of realty action.
( 2 ) Lands classified under the authority of the Classification and Multiple Use Act (43 U.S.C. 1411-18) are segregated to the extent described in the notice of classification.
( b ) The segregative effect of the classification described in § 2091.7-1 of this title terminates and the lands are opened under the following procedures: ( 1 ) Recreation and Public Purposes Act classifications; ( i ) Made after the effective date of these regulations terminate and the lands automatically become open at the end of the 18-month period of segregation specified in part 2740 of this title, unless an application is filed;
( ii ) made prior to the effective date of these regulations where the 18-month period of segregation specified in part 2740 of this title is in effect on the effective date of these regulations, expire and the lands automatically become open at the end of the 18-month period of segregation unless an application is filed;
( iii ) made prior to the effective date on these regulations where the 18-month period of segregation has expired prior to the effective date of these regulations, terminate by publication in the Federal Register of an opening order specifying the date and time of opening.
( 2 ) Small Tract Act classifications terminate by publication in the Federal Register of an opening order specifying the date and time of opening.
( 3 ) Classification and Multiple Use Act classification shall be terminated by publication in the Federal Register of an opening order specifying the date and time of opening.
[52 FR 12175, Apr. 15, 1987; 52 FR 36575, Sept. 30, 1987]
#### Felipe AGADO-RIVAS, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-60603.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided March 3, 2006.

Felipe Agado-Rivas, Baytown, TX, pro se.

Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Hipólito Acosta, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Houston, TX, Caryl G. Thompson, *855U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, District Directors Office, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Felipe Agado-Rivas (Agado) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the Board’s) denial of his motion to reconsider its decision finding him removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his prior conviction for possession of cocaine. *See*8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a). Since Agado’s possession-of-cocaine conviction is appropriately classified as an aggravated felony, this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant petition for review. *See United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251*F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir .2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Based on the foregoing, Agado’s petition for review is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
No. 32,660

#### Ed Huffman, Appellee, v. LaRue C. Wilkes, Leon Shanton, Lee Carson and Fred Gasser, *Appellants.*

(57 P. 2d 416)

Opinion denying a rehearing and modifying mandate filed May 9, 1936.

(For original opinion of reversal see *ante,*p . 458, 55 P. 2d 366.)

*Sullivan Lomax,*of Cherryvale, *John Bertenshaw*and *Kirke C. Veeder,*both of Independence, for the appellants.

*C. E. Pile,*of Parsons and *James A. Brady,*of Cherryvale, for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, J.:

Appellee filed a motion for rehearing. This has been duly considered and is denied.

Appellants filed a motion to modify„the mandate so as to direct judgment for defendants in the trial court instead of directing a new trial. They call our attention to the fact that in the opinion as written we did not give sufficient attention to their demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence. They also contend that under the opinion as written, and under the evidence as shown in the abstract, there is nothing left to try. Appellee has answered this motion. The court has considered all the parties have said about it, and has concluded the motion should be sustained. It is not necessary to restate the facts any further than to point out that plaintiff predicated his action on the alleged individual wrongdoing of defendants as distinct from their official misconduct. His evidence as to what took place when he presented his check for payment was set out in full, as abstracted, in the opinion written. A careful review of that discloses that all defendants did in respect to that matter was done in their respective capacities as officers of the bank, and whatever wrong was *790done was a corporate wrong as distinct from an individual one. That being the case, it is no kindness to anyone to require a new trial.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the mandate be modified so as to direct the trial court to enter judgment for defendants.
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4938 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require that online 

contributions to a political organization require a credit verification value. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2022 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mrs. FISCHER, and Mr. HAWLEY) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require 

that online contributions to a political organization require a credit verification value. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Codification of Verified 

5 Values Act’’ or the ‘‘CVV Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4938 IS

1 SEC. 2. CVV REQUIREMENT FOR ONLINE CONTRIBUTIONS 

2 TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 527 of the Internal Rev4 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

5 following new subsection: 

6 ‘‘(m) CVV REQUIREMENT FOR ONLINE CONTRIBU7 TIONS.—An organization shall not be treated as an orga8 nization described in this section unless, in the case of any 

9 Internet credit card contribution accepted by such organi10 zation, the individual or entity making such contribution 

11 is required, at the time such contribution is made, to dis12 close the credit verification value of such credit card.’’. 

13 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

14 this section shall apply to contributions made in taxable 

15 years beginning after the date of the enactment of this 

16 Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
----

Information procedure — Technical rules

(2005/C 259/03)

(Text with EEA relevance)

Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services. (OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37; OJ L 217, 5.8.1998, p. 18).

Notifications of draft national technical rules received by the Commission

The Commission draws attention to the judgement delivered on 30 April 1996 in the ‘CIA Security’ case (C-194/94 — ECR I, p. 2201), in which the Court of Justice ruled that Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 98/34/EC (formerly 83/189/EEC) are to be interpreted as meaning that individuals may rely on them before national courts which must decline to apply a national technical regulation which has not been notified in accordance with the Directive.

This judgement confirms the Commission's communication of 1 October 1986 (OJ C 245, 1.10.1986, p. 4).

Accordingly, breach of the obligation to notify renders the technical regulations concerned inapplicable, and consequently unenforceable against individuals.

For more information on the notification procedure, please write to:

Also consult the website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/tris/

If you require any further information on these notifications, please contact the national departments listed below:

LIST OF NATIONAL DEPARTMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF DIRECTIVE 98/34/EC

BELGIUM

CZECH REPUBLIC

DENMARK

GERMANY

ESTONIA

GREECE

SPAIN

FRANCE

IRELAND

ITALY

CYPRUS

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

LUXEMBOURG

HUNGARY

MALTA

NETHERLANDS

AUSTRIA

POLAND

PORTUGAL

SLOVENIA

SLOVAKIA

FINLAND

SWEDEN

UNITED KINGDOM

EFTA - ESA

TURKEY

----

(1)  Year — registration number — Member State of origin.

(2)  Period during which the draft may not be adopted.

(3)  No standstill period since the Commission accepts the grounds of urgent adoption invoked by the notifying Member State.

(4)  No standstill period since the measure concerns technical specifications or other requirements or rules on services linked to fiscal or financial measures, pursuant to the third indent of the second paragraph of Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34/EC.

(5)  Information procedure closed.

----
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Lucy Wightman, Respondent, against Westfall Manufacturing Company et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

All concur.
#### Reeves *v.*The State.

November 15, 1910.

Indictment for murder. _ Before Judge Freeman.. Coweta superior court.- June 15, 1910.

*W. C. Wright,*for plaintiif in error. *II.*A. *Hall, attorney-general,*and *J. R. Terrell, solicitor-general,*contra.

Fish, C. J.

1. On the trial of Paul Eeeves, jointly indicted with Will Bowers, for the alleged murder of‘Burrell Fav.or, the court instructed the jury as follows: “If there was a common design and purpose existing-between persons to do an unlawful act, any one of such persons would be responsible for any act done by another member in furtherance of this common purpose, as well as for all the consequences which would naturally or necessarily result from any act done by any member of the party in pursuance of the common unlawful enterprise. So, you look to the evidence in this ease. Was there a common intent, a common purpose, existing- between Will Bowers and Paul Eeeves to kill Solicitor Dix? Look at the evidence to see whether or not that is true. The defendant insists it is not true. If you believe from the evidence . . that it was the common purpose, shared in by both of them, by Will Bowers and the defendant on trial, Paul Eeeves, to kill Solicitor Dix — that they both shared in the felonious design and purpose to kill Solicitor Dix, and that Will Bowers, in pursuance of-such-common purpose, while endeavoring to shoot and kill Solicitor Dix, shot and killed Burrell Favor, and you further find that the defendant, Paul Eeeves, .was present, and in pursuance of a common purpose and design to do so, shared by himself and Will Bowers, was aiding Will Bowers in seeking- to kill and murder Solicitor Dix, and under such circumstances Will Bowers -shot and killed Burrell Favor when attempting to shoot and kill .Solicitor Dix, though not intending- to kill Burrell Favor, and you find that Will Bowers is guilty of murder in killing Bufrell Favor, then the defendant on trial . . , would be guilty of murder as principal in the second degree, and you should so find, if you believe these facts to exist.” *Held, (a)*that such instruction correctly-stated a sound legal proposition *(Handley*v. *State,*115 *Ga.*584 (41 S. E. 992) ; Jennings *v.*Com., 16 S. W. 348 (13 Ky. L. R. 79) ; Wharton on Homicide (3d ed. Bowlby), §§ 418, 425, 427, 428, 429); *(i)*that it was applicable to the evidence submitted by the State; and (c) that it did not express or intimate an opinion of the court that a common design existed between Bowers and Eeeves to kill Dix, and that Bowers in furtherance of such design, shared in by Beeves, while attempting to execute it, shot and killed Fayor instead of Dix, and that Be'eves was present, aiding and abetting Bowers in sp doing.

2. There was no merit in the ground of the motion for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence for the same reasons as stated in *Bowers*v. *State,*ante, 310 (69 S. E. 536), headnote 1.

3. The verdict was supported by the evidence, and the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
§ 47.40 How must properties be described? The description of properties involved in a land exchange must be either: ( a ) Based upon a survey completed in accordance with the Public Land Survey System laws and standards of the United States; or
( b ) If Public Land Survey System laws and standards cannot be applied, based upon a survey that both: ( 1 ) Uses other means prescribed or allowed by applicable law; and
( 2 ) Clearly describes the property and allows it to be easily located.
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 15-3224

_____________

MAIDEN CREEK ASSOCIATES, L.P.; 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF MAIDENCREEK TOWNSHIP, 

 Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; 

SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; 

ADMINISTRATOR FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION;

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

_____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civil No. 5-15-cv-00242)

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

____________

Argued: April 5, 2016

____________

Before: FISHER, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges

ORDER AMENDING OPINION

(Opinion Filed: May 19, 2016)

____________

It appearing that counsel for appellant Maiden Creek Associates, L.P., was 

incorrectly identified as Marc B. Kaplan rather than Marc B. Kaplin on the listing of 

counsel for the opinion filed on May 19. 2016;
At the direction of the Court, it is hereby O R D E R E D that the opinion is 

amended as follows: 

Marc B. Kaplin, Esq. (Argued)

Daniel R. Utain, Esq.

Kaplin, Stewart, Meloff, Reiter & Stein

910 Harvest Drive

P.O. Box 3037

Blue Bell, PA 19422

Counsel for Maiden Creek Associates, L.P.

For the Court,

Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk

Date: May 20, 2015
4)

J3UR~~AU OF REcr~XM1vrIoN

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

C

JUL 2 a 1976

Xeinorandt~.m

To: Rcgional Director, I’N, NP,LC, UC, SI1, till, Lii

rrom: Commissioner

Subject: •Uater Resources--Use and Management

~y our faxogram dated January 13, 1975, you wcretequestcd to comment

~on a proposed departmental policy statement “Watei Resources: Use and

I~anagement” as published in the Federal Recisrer un December 27, 1974.

That statemcnt was subsequently revised .and on Au~;usr 21, 1975,

Deputy Assistant Secretary Waldon - Land aKd Water Resources signed

the revised notice which was published in the Federal Re2isCer on

August 27, 1975, for :eview and comment. By our mcmoranouza of

S~ptcmber 22, 1975, we reauesred comments on the ::evised policy

~tice. The general tonsensus of the comments re:eived is that the

reauof Reclamation is essentially complying wi;h the Department’ ~

~1 of adequately ma’iaging those natural resources for w~iich it is

?onsjble. *

informally advised the Assistant Secretary’s o~fice that, with our

‘policy and practice of examining each water and land resources devel6~ment project very carefully to assure water conservati~n and water

‘quality protection ji. all of our natural resources allocation programs,

it -is unlikely that a policy statement is necessary. In view of our

normal planning reoort and environmental impact statement procC55CS,

~n additional water management procedures report would appear to be

duplicative.

The Assistant Secretaiy — Land and Water .Resourccs has agreed that the

~urcau, as required undcr existing law and under established procedures,

is accomplishing those a~tions’nccessary toachieve beneficial use of

its vater rcsources. In view of that, thc Assistant Secretary does not

plan to publish guidelinds to implement the policy.. however, in our

Continuing effort to conserve and manage the water and land resources

‘which wa2 OrC responcibie, we must continuc to observe certain policy

guidelines, including the following:

1. The quantity of water allocated to a particular purpose should be no

~norc than ~.anbe put to henefizial u~o for iki t intended pLIrpo~e , raking

~to aCcilunt good sound water management practices.

•• • , .‘ b

~•4q~~ ~S

v.
2. tReturn flQws from resource development should be properly managed opcir~um use of that resource.

3. Water rights should be applied for under State procedures as a

matter of comity and cooperation with the affected States pursuant

to sectd.on 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act.

4. AU viable alternatives should be considered before making a

specific allocation of the water resources.

5. Interested State, local, and other Federal agencies are to be

fully informed of proposed resource development programs and the

various alternatives considered before making the resource allocations.

Sgd G. G. STAMM

4