UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

THE GEO GROUP, INC. and 

GEO TRANSPORT, INC.

Plaintiffs,

v.

NETFLIX, INC.,

Defendant.

CIVIL CASE NO. 9:20-cv-80847-RJS

__________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Although Netflix seeks to drape itself in the First Amendment and claims that its trademark

misappropriation enhances the “realism” of the Netflix Original Series Messiah, there is nothing 

realistic about the show’s demonstrably false and defamatory accusations that The GEO Group, 

Inc. operates and GEO Transport, Inc. services an immigrant detention facility that houses people

in an overcrowded overheated room with a chain-link cage and deprives them of beds, bedding, 

sunshine, recreation, and educational opportunities. To fix the defamatory falsehoods in Messiah,

all Netflix had to do was omit the GEO name and trademarks from episodes featuring an immigrant 

detention facility plagued by conditions that do not exist at GEO facilities. Instead, Netflix scoffs 

that the trademarks it willfully misappropriated are “barely perceptible” and sends a warning shot 

to businesses across America that Netflix feels entitled to exploit their trademarks, destroy their 

goodwill, and misrepresent them with impunity. That is not the law and Netflix’s Motion must be 

denied for two reasons.

First, the defamatory scenes are “of and concerning” GEO Group and GEO Transport 

because repeatedly throughout those scenes, the name “GEO” is explicitly identified on vehicles, 

a sign in the parking lot of the facility, and on the uniforms of guards at the facility, such that those 

who know the Plaintiffs can make out that they are depicted operating and servicing the facility.

Second, Netflix is not entitled to First Amendment protection because it used Plaintiffs’ 

trademarks in order to broadcast defamatory falsehoods about them and to mislead viewers about 

them. Holding otherwise would give billion-dollar entertainment corporations carte blanche to 

destroy the goodwill that trademark protection is intended to protect. As the United States 

Supreme Court has recognized, “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.” Gertz 

v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On behalf of the federal government, The GEO Group, Inc. manages and operates state-ofthe-art immigrant detention facilities, which receive transportation services from its in-house 

transportation subsidiary, GEO Transport, Inc. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 15.1 GEO facilities do not house

people in overcrowded, overheated rooms with chain-link cages, but rather provide beds, bedding, 

air conditioning, recreational spaces like soccer fields and gymnasiums, and educational spaces 

like classrooms and libraries. Id. ¶ 2. 

In seeking to prejudice the Court’s view of GEO, Netflix improperly attaches an OIG 

Report from outside the pleadings in support of its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion and falsely insinuates 

that the report supports Netflix’s defamatory accusations. Mot. at 4. It does not. In reality, the 

OIG Report demonstrates the falsity of Netflix’s accusations. Although OIG conducted 

unannounced inspections of GEO facilities, reviewed their compliance with health, safety, and 

welfare requirements, interviewed detainees, and reviewed documentary evidence, the report does 

not contain any indication that any GEO facilities were housing people in overcrowded overheated 

rooms with chain-link cages or depriving them of beds, recreation, or educational opportunities. 

If such conditions existed at GEO facilities, OIG would have identified them in its report. While 

OIG identified a single GEO facility that did not offer “outdoor recreation,” even that finding 

demonstrates the falsity of Netflix’s claims by documenting that the facility in question offered 

recreation in a gymnasium with a roof that retracted to let in sunshine and fresh air.

GEO has built a reputation and goodwill on its commitment to respecting the human rights 

of detained immigrants in its care, and obtained trademarks in the GEO name and logos to 

1 The Complaint and this brief refer to The GEO Group, Inc. and GEO Transport, Inc. collectively 

as “GEO” because the companies are part of a fully-integrated real estate investment trust that is 

listed on the New York Stock Exchange as “GEO” and because that name appears on both 

companies’ trademarks.

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distinguish GEO and to build and develop GEO’s brand as a company that provides humane 

environments. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 22.

In filming the Netflix Original Series Messiah, Netflix willfully misappropriated the GEO

name and trademarks and used them on vehicles, a parking lot sign, and guard uniforms that 

appeared before and throughout defamatory scenes of an immigrant detention facility where 

people were being housed—day and night—in an overcrowded overheated room with a chain-link 

cage, without beds, sunshine, recreation, or educational opportunities. Id. ¶¶ 1, 27, 29-36. 

Although GEO notified Netflix of the truth about the conditions at GEO facilities and asked Netflix 

to remove the GEO name and trademarks from the show, Netflix refused and continues to make 

the false and defamatory scenes available to millions of people worldwide. Id. ¶¶ 3, 14, 56.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. THE DEFAMATORY SCENES ARE “OF AND CONCERNING” BOTH GEO 

GROUP AND GEO TRANSPORT.

In seeking dismissal of GEO’s defamation claim, Netflix urges the Court to view scenes

out of context and argues that the defamatory scenes are not “of and concerning” GEO. In 

advancing these arguments, Netflix misapprehends the law of defamation in several ways. 

First, Netflix invites this Court to view the scene of a GEO Transport bus at the end of 

episode 3 as an “out-of-context image of a tornado-damaged bus,” Mot. at 92, and argues that some 

of the scenes showing the GEO name “do not even depict how immigrants are housed at a detention 

center,” id. at 7. But as Netflix concedes elsewhere in its Motion, the scenes must be viewed in 

context. Id. at 16. The scene of the GEO Transport bus at the end of episode 3 must be viewed in 

context with the scenes (in the very next episode) of the GEO Transport car parked at an immigrant 

detention facility staffed by guards wearing GEO uniforms where GEO Transport vehicles are 

2 Emphasis added unless otherwise noted.

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expressly authorized to park and where people are being housed—day and night—in an 

overcrowded overheated room with a chain-link cage and without beds, sunshine, recreation, or 

educational opportunities. Viewed in context, those scenes make false accusations against both

GEO Group and GEO Transport. Indeed, Netflix’s argument that the facility in Messiah is “the 

exact type of facility that GEO Transport regularly services,” id. at 17 n.9, proves the point: 

contrary to Netflix’s claim, the facility featured in the episode is not “the exact type of facility that 

GEO Transport regularly services;” rather, GEO Transport services facilities that do not house 

immigrants in overcrowded overheated rooms with chain-link cages, but provide beds, air 

conditioning, recreational spaces, classrooms, and libraries. See Compl. ¶ 2. 

Even if the scenes of GEO Transport vehicles and the immigrant detention facility where 

GEO Transport vehicles are expressly authorized to park were ambiguous such that they could 

convey “only an innocuous meaning” as to GEO Transport (they are not and they do not), it would 

be “for the trier of fact to decide whether the [show] was understood in the defamatory sense.” 

Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (reversing dismissal of defamation 

claim based on ambiguous statement that “may have been intended to convey and perhaps did 

convey only an innocuous meaning”). At this stage, it is only for the Court to determine whether 

the episodes are “reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.” See Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., 

Inc., 269 So. 3d 656, 660-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Pep Boys v. New World Commc’ns of Tampa, 

Inc., 711 So. 2d 1325, 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 

Second, Netflix points out that “the GEO name is, in fact, never uttered once in the 

episodes.” Mot. at 2. But there is no requirement whatsoever that a defamation plaintiff’s name 

be “uttered” to satisfy the “of and concerning” requirement. Courts routinely find that the 

requirement is satisfied when the depiction of the plaintiff is purely visual, even when—unlike 

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here—the plaintiff’s name is not repeatedly and explicitly identified visually. See, e.g., Boyles v. 

Mid–Fla. Television Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (reversing dismissal 

of libel per se claim based on two broadcasts that included a photograph of plaintiff but did not 

identify him by name (and one broadcast that did identify the plaintiff by name)), approved, 467 

So.2d 282 (Fla. 1985); Brown v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 440 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1983) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim based on publication of plaintiff’s photograph but 

not his name); La Luna Enters., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389-391 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 

(applying Florida law and finding that a CBS report was “of and concerning” restaurant even 

though CBS did not name the restaurant but showed footage of it); see also Coton v. Televised 

Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310-11 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (defamation through use 

of plaintiff’s image but not name); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 560, 569-

70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (upholding jury verdict that movie defamed plaintiff corporation even 

though plaintiff corporation was not named in the movie). 

All that is required to satisfy the “of and concerning” requirement is that those who know 

the plaintiffs can make out that they are the ones meant in the defamatory publication. O’Neal v. 

Tribune Co., 176 So. 2d 535, 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). That standard is easily satisfied here, where 

the name “GEO” appears repeatedly before and throughout the defamatory scenes of the

immigrant detention facility staffed by guards wearing uniforms that say “GEO”—first on the side 

of a bus at the end of episode 3 and then in episode 4 on the side of a car parked in the parking lot 

of the facility, which has a sign expressly authorizing “GEO” vehicles to park there. People who 

know the Plaintiffs know that GEO Group operates immigrant detention facilities and that its inhouse transportation subsidiary GEO Transport provides transportation services to those facilities. 

Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. As such, the “of and concerning” requirement is satisfied because those who know

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GEO Group and GEO Transport can make out that they are the ones depicted operating and 

servicing the facility in the show.

The cases Netflix cites do not suggest otherwise. For example, Netflix claims that a 

statement explicitly identifying “Jones Trucking” by name was held to not be “of and concerning” 

Jones Trucking. See Mot. at 18. Netflix is mistaken. Jones Trucking was not the plaintiff in that 

case and there was no determination that the statement explicitly identifying “Jones Trucking” was 

not “of and concerning” Jones Trucking. Rather, the court held that the statement was not “of and 

concerning” Joyce Jones, an individual who was not named anywhere in the defamatory 

publication at issue. See Jones v. Cmty. Newspapers, Inc., No. 05-cv-240, 2006 WL 2507610, at 

*4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2006). Netflix’s citation to McIver v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. is equally 

puzzling. 489 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA1986). That case simply held that a company could 

not bring a defamation action based on a bribery accusation against its president, but reaffirmed 

the settled proposition that a company “may recover for libel just as an individual, where,” as here, 

the “publication prejudices it in the conduct of its trade or business.” Id. 

Third, Netflix argues that the defamatory scenes “make no suggestion or statement that the 

GEO Group, rather than the federal government, is responsible for the conditions in which the 

immigrants are housed,” noting that the show also depicts certain government employees, 

including a DOJ attorney, an immigration judge, and a DHS employee and CIA agent who 

interrogate their target at the GEO facility. Mot. at 18. But this argument ignores the context of 

show itself, which makes clear that the DHS employee and CIA agent do not work at the facility, 

but go to the facility to question their target after learning that he is being held there. Notably, 

when being transferred for interrogation, their target is escorted by two guards wearing GEO 

uniforms—plainly conveying to any reasonable viewer that a GEO facility is being portrayed. 

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Moreover, no reasonable viewer would think that an immigration judge or DOJ attorney are 

responsible for servicing and operating immigration detention facilities or deciding whether to 

equip their housing areas with chain-link cages or beds. But, even if reasonable viewers who are 

not familiar with GEO Group and GEO Transport could possibly make that mistake (they could 

not), that is not the question: the question is whether viewers who know GEO Group and GEO 

Transport—an operator and a servicer of immigrant detention facilities—can make out that they 

are the ones portrayed operating and servicing the immigrant detention facility in the show. 

O’Neal, 176 So. 2d at 548. Moreover, even if the show were ambiguous as to whether GEO Group, 

GEO Transport, and/or the federal government was operating and servicing the immigrant 

detention facility, Netflix’s Motion must be denied because it is “for the trier of fact to decide 

whether the [show] was understood in the defamatory sense.” Perry, 464 So. 2d at 666 (reversing 

dismissal of defamation claim based on ambiguous statement). 

In sum, Netflix falsely accused GEO Group and GEO Transport of operating and servicing 

facilities that detain immigrants in overcrowded overheated rooms with chain-link cages and 

deprive them of beds, bedding, sunshine, recreation, and educational opportunities. Those

accusations are plainly defamatory per se as to both companies because, considered alone without 

innuendo, they “tend[] to harm the reputation of [Plaintiffs] by lowering [them] in the estimation 

of the community” or “expos[e them] to hatred, ridicule, or contempt or injure[] [their] business 

or reputation . . . .” Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1108–09 (Fla. 2008); Perry, 

464 So.2d at 666 (“[A] publication is libelous per se if, when considered alone without innuendo, 

it tends to subject a person to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace, or tends to injure 

him in his trade or profession[.]”); see also Diamond Ranch Acad., Inc. v. Filer, No. 14-cv-751, 

2016 WL 633351, at *19 (D. Utah Feb. 17, 2016) (accusation that operator of residential youth 

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treatment facility had engaged in abusive treatment was defamatory per se); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 

693 F. Supp. 2d 442, 480-89 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (implication that school headmaster failed to report 

abuse and neglect was defamatory per se).

II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT ENTITLE ENTERTAINMENT 

CORPORATIONS TO MISAPPROPRIATE BUSINESSES’ TRADEMARKS IN 

ORDER TO DEFAME THEM AND MISLEAD CONSUMERS.

Our legal system protects trademarks because “a party has a valuable interest in the good 

will of his trade or business, and in the trademarks adopted to maintain and extend it.” Hanover 

Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). As Justice Holmes observed nearly a 

century ago, a trademark “deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but that is easily 

destroyed, and therefore should be protected with corresponding care.” A. Bourjois & Co. v. 

Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923). In seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ trademark claims, Netflix 

asks this Court to accept a radical and unprecedented proposition that billion-dollar entertainment 

corporations are entitled to misappropriate others’ trademarks in order to defame them to a global 

audience and destroy the very goodwill that trademark protection is intended to protect. That 

argument is meritless and must be rejected. 

A. Netflix’s Misappropriation of GEO’s Trademarks is Not Artistically 

Relevant to Messiah.

Invoking the Rogers test to seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state and federal trademark claims, 

Netflix argues that it its willful misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ trademarks is artistically relevant 

because it enhances the “realism” of Messiah. Mot. at 12. This argument fails because there is 

nothing “realistic” about defamatory falsehoods. That is the problem with Netflix’s conduct, and 

that is what distinguishes this case from every single one of the cases Netflix cites. See, e.g.,

Vallejo v. Narcos Prods., LLC, No. 18-cv-23462, 2019 WL 5884513, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 

2019) (no allegation by Pablo Escobar’s mistress that the depiction of her in the television show 

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Narcos was false or defamatory); Valencia v. Universal City Studios LLC, No. 14-cv-528, 2014 

WL 7240526, at *8 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (no allegation that the movie Honey—about a fictional Bronxbased Latina hip hop dancer named Honey Daniels—had defamed a Bronx-based Latina hip hop 

dancer who used the stage name Honey Rockwell); VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 

No. 15-cv-1729, 2015 WL 5000102, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015), aff’d, 699 F. App’x 667 

(9th Cir. 2017) (no allegation that use of company’s trademark on video game race car livery 

defamed the company); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 

172, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (no allegation that The Hangover’s depiction of fake Louis Vuitton bag 

or character’s comedic reference to his “Lewis Vuitton” bag had defamed Louis Vuitton); 

Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distribution, Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1192 (9th Cir. 

2017) (no allegation that the show Empire defamed the real-life Empire record label).

While the Eleventh Circuit has applied the Rogers test to a case where the trademarked 

content was “needed for a realistic portrayal” of historic events, Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New 

Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2012), it has never authorized entertainment 

corporations to destroy businesses’ goodwill by misappropriating their trademarks to present 

unrealistic, false, and defamatory depictions of them. Indeed, Netflix does not cite a single case 

from any jurisdiction in which a court applied the Rogers test and dismissed a company’s 

trademark claims where the complaint stated a claim for defamation that was based on the use of 

the company’s trademarks. No such cases appear to exist. 

Where, as here, a trademark is used to paint an inaccurate and offensive picture of the 

trademark’s associations, it is not artistically relevant and is not entitled to First Amendment 

protection under the Rogers test. See Parks v. LaFace Recs., 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(applying the Rogers test and reversing grant of summary judgment to musical group OutKast that 

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had titled a song “Rosa Parks” because “[i]n lyrics that are laced with profanity and in a ‘hook’ or 

chorus that is pure egomania, many reasonable people could find that this is a song that is 

clearly antithetical to the qualities identified with Rosa Parks.”) (emphasis in original). Netflix’s 

uses of Plaintiffs’ trademarks have no artistic relevance and are not protected by the First 

Amendment because they undermine the realism of Messiah by falsely portraying Plaintiffs.

“[T]here is no constitutional value in [Netflix’s] false statements of fact.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.

Moreover, in applying the Rogers test, “the appropriate question to ask is: Did [Netflix]

have a genuine artistic motive for using [GEO’s] mark[s] . . . ?” Stouffer v. Nat’l Geographic 

Partners, LLC, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1179 (D. Colo. 2019) (emphasis added). Although Netflix 

offers self-serving say-so that it misappropriated GEO’s trademarks because they have “artistic 

relevance” to Messiah, its own admissions rebut this assertion. As Netflix concedes, 

“[i]mmigration policy and treatment of immigrants is hardly a focus of the plot.” Mot. at 5. This 

admission—coupled with Netflix’s assertions that the trademarks it willfully misappropriated are 

“imperceptible,” “fleeting,” “flickering glimpses,” “barely legible,” and of the “blink-and-you’llmiss-them” nature—rebut Netflix’s assertion that it misappropriated those trademarks because 

they had artistic relevance to the show. Mot. at 1, 3, 12. Only discovery will reveal Netflix’s true 

intentions. At this stage, the Complaint alleges that “[b]ecause Netflix researched GEO during the 

process of producing Messiah, it was aware that the use of the GEO Trademarks did not further a 

goal of realism or serve any purpose other than to harm GEO’s good will and reputation.” Compl.

¶ 46. The Court’s task “is not to accept without question whatever purpose [Netflix] may now 

claim they had in” misappropriating GEO’s trademarks; rather, whether the trademarks have any 

artistic relevance “must be resolved by a finder of fact following an evidentiary hearing and not 

by a judge as a matter of law upon [a] limited record submitted in support of a motion for summary 

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judgment.” Parks, 329 F.3d at 454, 459. All the more so at the motion to dismiss phase, where 

there has been no opportunity for discovery into Netflix’s true motives and the well-pled 

allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiffs. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). 

B. Netflix Explicitly Misled Consumers

Even if Netflix’s false representation of GEO through the willful misappropriation of 

GEO’s trademarks enhanced the goal of “realism” in Messiah (it does not), Netflix’s Rogers

defense would still fail because the Complaint alleges that Netflix explicitly misled consumers as 

to GEO’s approval or authorization of the use of its trademarks. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 

994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). Contrary to Netflix’s assertion that “Plaintiffs do not allege . . . that 

Netflix has explicitly misle[]d any consumer about the source or content of Messiah.” Mot. at 13-

14. GEO has alleged exactly that: 

49. Netflix’s misuse of the GEO Trademarks in connection with the facility featured 

in Messiah has confused and deceived the public into believing that the featured 

facility is a real GEO Facility or is associated with or sanctioned by GEO—all to 

the damage and detriment of GEO’s reputation, goodwill, and profits. 

...

69. Netflix’s use of the GEO Trademarks on goods and services that are confusingly 

similar to those offered by GEO is likely to cause confusion among consumers 

and potential consumers as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval of 

goods and services sold by Netflix in connection with their infringing trademarks. 

...

81. Defendant’s use of the GEO Trademarks constitutes a false designation of 

origin, a false or misleading description of a fact, or a false or misleading 

representation of fact that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception in 

violation of Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A)(1)(a). 

82. Netflix has adopted and is using the GEO Trademarks in a manner that is likely 

to cause confusion, and is causing confusion, mistake, and deception among the 

general public as to the origin and affiliation of Netflix with GEO. 

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83. Netflix is likely to deceive the public into believing that the references to the 

GEO Trademarks in episodes 3 and 4 of the series Messiah originate from, are 

associated with, or are otherwise authorized by GEO, all to the damage and 

detriment of GEO’s reputation, goodwill, and profits. 

Compl. ¶¶ 49, 69, 81–83. Although Netflix asserts otherwise, the use of a trademark can be 

explicitly misleading without an affirmative statement of plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement. 

See Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018). The Gordon court reasoned 

an affirmative statement is not necessary when “the use of a mark alone may explicitly mislead 

consumers about a product’s source if consumers would ordinarily identify the source by the mark 

itself.” Id. Although Netflix invokes the disclaimer in the credits of the show, the disclaimer is 

irrelevant because, although it says that “characters and events” are fictitious, it says nothing about 

the companies and facilities depicted, and it does nothing to negate the false impression that GEO 

authorized the repeated use of its trademarks. 

Further, relevant considerations include “the degree to which [Netflix] use[d] the mark in 

the same way as [Plaintiffs]” and “the extent to which [Netflix] has added [its] own expressive 

content to the work beyond the mark itself.” Id. at 270–271. In this case, Netflix used GEO’s 

trademarks just as GEO uses them—the same image, the same design, placed on the sides of 

vehicles where GEO Transport places them and at an immigration detention facility on guard 

uniforms precisely how and where GEO Group places them. Compl. ¶ 29. Given that Netflix used 

GEO’s trademarks in the same way that GEO uses them, and did so repeatedly in two different 

episodes, it is entirely plausible to infer that members of the public believed that Netflix’s use of 

GEO’s trademarks was authorized by GEO. Netflix’s Rogers defense to Plaintiffs’ state and 

federal trademark claims therefore fails. See MGFB Props., Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 19-cv-257, 

2019 WL 8096508, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss based on Rogers 

defense where complaint alleged, among other things, that defendants’ use of plaintiff’s name was 

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likely to cause confusion about the source of the show); see also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1273 n.1 (at 

the motion to dismiss stage, “all-well pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable 

inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”)

CONCLUSION

Businesses have the right not to have their own trademarks willfully misappropriated and 

weaponized to misrepresent them and destroy the goodwill their trademarks were intended to 

protect. Netflix’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

Dated: September 18, 2020 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Shannon B. Timmann

Shannon B. Timmann, Esq. (Fl. Bar. No. 98810)

Megan L. Meier, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice), Va. Bar 

No. 887220

CLARE LOCKE LLP

10 Prince Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Telephone: (202) 628-7400

Email: megan@clarelocke.com

Email: shannon@clarelocke.com

Barry F. Irwin, P.C. (Pro Hac Vice), Ill. Bar No. 

6211213

Manon L. Burns (Pro Hac Vice), Ill. Bar No. 

6329495

Irwin IP LLC

222 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 2350

Chicago, IL 60606

Phone: 312.667.6080

Email: birwin@irwinip.com

Email: mburns@irwinip.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 

by CM/ECF, on September 18, 2020, on all counsel of record.

 /s/ Shannon B. Timmann

Shannon B. Timmann

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