Strategy for

Homeland Defense

and Civil Support

Department of Defense 

Washington, D.C. 

June 2005 

Table of Contents

i

Table of Contents

Foreword ......................................................................................................................................iii

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................1

Secure the United States from Attack through an Active, Layered Defense .................1

Organizing Construct—Lead, Support, and Enable..........................................................2

Key Objectives of the Strategy ..............................................................................................2

Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.....................................................3

Projected Implications of the Strategy .................................................................................4

I. Context ........................................................................................................................................5

Key Definitions........................................................................................................................5

Standing Guidance from National and Defense Strategies ..............................................6

Security Environment.............................................................................................................7

Organizing for Homeland Defense and Civil Support .....................................................7

Assumptions............................................................................................................................9

II. Active, Layered Defense........................................................................................................10

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives......................................................................................14

Lead.........................................................................................................................................15

Support ...................................................................................................................................18

Enable .....................................................................................................................................19

IV. Core Capabilities...................................................................................................................20

Capabilities for Achieving Maximum Awareness of Threats ........................................20

Capabilities for Deterring, Intercepting, and Defeating Threats at a Safe Distance ...24

Capabilities for Achieving Mission Assurance.................................................................27

Capabilities for CBRNE Consequence Management.......................................................31

Improving US and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Homeland

Security ...................................................................................................................................32

V. Implications of the Strategy..................................................................................................35

Force Structure ......................................................................................................................35

Technology.............................................................................................................................36

Funding ..................................................................................................................................38

Managing Homeland Defense and Civil Support Risks .................................................39

VI. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................40
Table of Contents

ii
Foreword

iii

Foreword

Protecting the United States from direct attack

is the highest priority of the Department of

Defense. The military has traditionally

secured the United States by projecting power

overseas. While our current missions abroad

continue to play a vital role for the security of

our Nation, the terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001 emphasized that we are confronting

fundamentally different challenges from

those faced during the Cold War.  

President George W. Bush activated all

instruments of American power to respond to

the attacks of September 11th, and directed

the United States Government to better

prepare for the reality of the 21st century

threat. Working with Congress, President

Bush established the Department of

Homeland Security to prevent terrorist

attacks in the United States. The Department

of Defense, the traditional vanguard of

America’s security, began transforming as

well. The stand‐up of US Northern Command

was an important first step—created to deter,

prevent, and defeat aggression aimed at the

United States.

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support marks the next significant milestone

in reshaping the Department’s approach to

homeland defense. Building upon the concept

of an active, layered defense outlined in the

National Defense Strategy, the Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support constitutes

the Department’s vision for transforming

homeland defense and civil support

capabilities. It will fundamentally change the

Department’s approach to homeland defense

in an historic and important way.

In the hands of the dedicated men and

women of our military and the civilians who

support them, I am confident the Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support will

improve significantly the Department’s

ability to counter the threats of the

21st century.  

Gordon England

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Foreword

iv
Executive Summary

1

Executive Summary

“The world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned that a threat that gathers on the other side of the

earth can strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It’s an important lesson; one we can never

forget. Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this world. We’re protected by daily

vigilance at home. And we will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad.”

President George W. Bush

September 17, 2002

Protecting the United States homeland from

attack is the highest priority of the Depart‐

ment of Defense (DoD). On September 11,

2001, the world changed dramatically. For the

first time since Pearl Harbor, we experienced

catastrophic, direct attacks against our

territory. This time, however, the foe was not

another nation but terrorists seeking to

undermine America’s political will and

destroy our way of life. As a result, the

United States has become a nation at war, a

war whose length and scope may be

unprecedented.  

We now confront an enemy who will attempt

to engage us not only far from US shores, but

also at home. Terrorists will seek to employ

asymmetric means to penetrate our defenses

and exploit the openness of our society to

their advantage. By attacking our citizens, our

economic institutions, our physical infra‐

structure, and our social fabric, they seek to

destroy American democracy. We dare not

underestimate the devastation that terrorists

seek to bring to Americans at home.  

To defeat 21st century threats, we must think

and act innovatively. Our adversaries

consider US territory an integral part of a

global theater of combat. We must therefore

have a strategy that applies to the domestic

context the key principles that are driving the

transformation of US power projection and

joint expeditionary warfare.  

Secure the United States from

Attack through an Active,

Layered Defense  

Directed by the Strategic Planning Guidance

(March 2004), this Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support focuses on

achieving the Defense Department’s

paramount goal: securing the United States

from direct attack. The Strategy is rooted in

the following:

• Respect for America’s constitutional

principles;  

• Adherence to Presidential and Secretary

of Defense guidance;

• Recognition of terrorist and state‐based

threats to the United States; and

• Commitment to continue transformation

of US military capabilities.

Protecting the United States in the ten‐year

timeframe covered by this Strategy requires

an active, layered defense. This active,

layered defense is global, seamlessly

integrating US capabilities in the forward

regions of the world, the global commons of

space and cyberspace, in the geographic
Executive Summary

2

approaches to US territory, and within the

United States. It is a defense in depth. To be

effective, it requires superior intelligence

collection, fusion, and analysis, calculated

deterrence of enemies, a layered system of

mutually supporting defensive measures that

are neither passive nor ad hoc, and the

capability to mass and focus sufficient

warfighting assets to defeat any attack.  

This active, layered defense employs tactical

defenses in a strategic offense. It maximizes

threat awareness and seizes the initiative

from those who would harm us. In so doing,

it intends to defeat potential challengers

before they threaten the United States at

home.  

Organizing Construct—Lead,

Support, and Enable

Although the active, layered defense extends

across the globe, this Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support focuses primarily

on DoD’s activities in the US homeland and

the approaches to US territory. In those

geographic layers, the Department under‐

takes a range of activities to secure the United

States from direct attack. These generally

divide into the following categories:

• Lead: At the direction of the President or

the Secretary of Defense, the Department

of Defense executes military missions that

dissuade, deter, and defeat attacks upon

the United States, our population, and our

defense critical infrastructure.  

• Support: At the direction of the President

or the Secretary of Defense, the Depart‐

ment of Defense provides support to civil

authorities. This support is part of a

comprehensive national response to

prevent and protect against terrorist

incidents or recover from an attack or

disaster. DoD provides support to a lead

Federal agency when directed by the

President or the Secretary of Defense.

• Enable: The Department of Defense seeks

to improve the homeland defense and

homeland security contributions of our

domestic and international partners and,

in turn, to improve DoD capabilities by

sharing expertise and technology, as

appropriate, across military and civilian

boundaries.

Key Objectives of the Strategy

Within the lead, support, and enable frame‐

work for homeland defense and civil support,

the Department is focused on the following

paramount objectives, listed in order of

priority:

• Achieve maximum awareness of

potential threats. Together with the

Intelligence Community and civil

authorities, DoD works to obtain and

promptly exploit all actionable infor‐

mation needed to protect the United

States. Timely and actionable intelligence,

together with early warning, is the most

critical enabler to protecting the United

States at a safe distance.

• Deter, intercept and defeat threats at a

safe distance. The Department of Defense

will actively work to deter adversaries

from attacking the US homeland. Through

our deterrent posture and capabilities, we

will convince adversaries that threats to

the US homeland risk unacceptable

counteraction by the United States.

Should deterrence fail, we will seek to

intercept and defeat threats at a safe

distance from the United States. When

directed by the President or the Secretary
Executive Summary

3

of Defense, we will also defeat direct

threats within US airspace and on US

territory. In all cases, the Department of

Defense cooperates closely with its

domestic and international partners and

acts in accordance with applicable laws.

• Achieve mission assurance. The Depart‐

ment of Defense performs assigned duties

even under attack or after disruption. We

achieve mission assurance through force

protection, ensuring the security of

defense critical infrastructure, and

executing defense crisis management and

continuity of operations (COOP).  

• Support civil authorities in minimizing

the damage and recovering from

domestic chemical, biological, radio‐

logical, nuclear, or high‐yield explosive

(CBRNE) mass casualty attacks. The

Department of Defense will be prepared

to provide forces and capabilities in

support of domestic CBRNE consequence

management, with an emphasis on

preparing for multiple, simultaneous

mass casualty incidents. DoD’s responses

will be planned, practiced, and carefully

integrated into the national response.

With the exception of a dedicated

command and control element (currently

the Joint Task Force‐Civil Support) and

the Army National Guard Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support

Teams, DoD will rely on dual‐capable

forces for the domestic consequence

management mission. These dual‐capable

forces must be trained, equipped, and

ready to provide timely assistance to civil

authorities in times of domestic CBRNE

catastrophes, programming for this

capability when directed.

• Improve national and international

capabilities for homeland defense and

homeland security. The Department of

Defense is learning from the experiences

of domestic and international partners

and sharing expertise with Federal, state,

local, and tribal authorities, the private

sector, and US allies and friends abroad.

By sharing expertise, we improve the

ability of the Department of Defense to

carry out an active, layered defense.

Capabilities for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support

Consistent with the National Defense

Strategy’s call to develop and sustain key

operational capabilities, the Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support

promotes the development of core capabilities

to achieve its objectives. Prominent capability

themes include:  

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Capabilities. The

Department of Defense requires current

and actionable intelligence identifying

potential threats to US territory. DoD

must also ensure that it can identify and

track suspect traffic approaching the

United States. DoD must conduct

reconnaissance and surveillance to

examine wide areas of the maritime and

air domains and, working with lead

domestic partners and Canada and

Mexico in the land domain, discover

potential threats before they reach the

United States.  

• Information‐Sharing. Together with

domestic and international partners, DoD

will integrate and share information

collected from a wide range of sources.

The events of September 11, 2001 high‐
Executive Summary

4

lighted the need to share information

across Federal agencies and, increasingly,

with state, local, and tribal authorities, the

private sector, and international partners.

• Joint Operational Capabilities for

Homeland Defense. DoD will continue to

transform US military forces to execute

homeland defense missions in the

forward regions, approaches, US home‐

land, and global commons.  

• Interagency and Intergovernmental

Coordination. The Department of Defense

and our domestic and international

partners will continue to cooperate closely

in the execution of homeland defense and

civil support missions.  

When fully realized, this Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support will

transform and improve DoD capabilities in

each of these areas.  

Projected Implications of the

Strategy

In developing this Strategy, the Department

took into account its likely force structure,

resource, and technology implications. Given

scarce resources, this Strategy’s objectives

must be balanced against other priorities

outlined in the National Defense Strategy. As

DoD components implement the strategic

tenets outlined in this document, a more  

precise accounting of the forces, technological

advances, and financial resources it requires

will be needed.  

Because DoD’s forces and resources are finite,

the Strategy recognizes the need to manage

risks in the homeland defense and civil

support mission areas. It therefore prioritizes

DoD’s efforts, focusing on the requirement to

fulfill DoD’s lead responsibilities for home‐

land defense. As a second priority, we will

ensure the Department’s ability to support

civil authorities in recovering from multiple,

catastrophic mass casualty CBRNE incidents

within the United States.  

The Department of Defense will expeditiously

implement the Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support. Fundamentally,

this will require the Department to integrate

strategy, planning, and operational

capabilities for homeland defense and civil

support more fully into DoD processes. The

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support is not a static document. Even as the

Department of Defense implements this

Strategy, it will continue to adapt to changes

in the strategic environment, incorporate

lessons learned from operational experience,

and capitalize on emerging technology and

operational concepts.
I. Context

5

I. Context  

“For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive

totalitarian visions or freedom and equality. That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class,

nation, and race which promised utopia have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened

less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by

catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation,

allies, and friends.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support embodies the core principles arti‐

culated in the US Constitution, the Nation’s

laws, and in Presidential and Secretary of

Defense guidance. It also responds to the

challenges posed by the security environment

over the next decade.  

Key Definitions

Homeland security, as defined in the

National Strategy for Homeland Security, is

“a concerted national effort to prevent

terrorist attacks within the United States,

reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism,

and minimize the damage and recover from

attacks that do occur.” The Department of

Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency

for homeland security. In addition, its

responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to

preventing, preparing for, responding to, and

recovering from a wide range of major

domestic disasters and other emergencies.

It is the primary mission of the Department

of Homeland Security to prevent terrorist

attacks within the United States. The

Attorney General leads our Nation’s law

enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and

investigate terrorist activity within the

United States. Accordingly, the Department

of Defense does not have the assigned respon‐

sibility to stop terrorists from coming across

our borders, to stop terrorists from coming

through US ports, or to stop terrorists from

hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United

States (these responsibilities belong to the

Department of Homeland Security). Nor does

DoD have the authority to seek out and arrest

terrorists in the United States (these respon‐

sibilities belong to the Department of Justice).

Homeland defense is the protection of US

sovereignty, territory, domestic population,

and critical defense infrastructure against

external threats and aggression, or other

threats as directed by the President.1 The

Department of Defense is responsible for

homeland defense.

Defense support of civil authorities, often

referred to as civil support, is DoD support,

including Federal military forces, the

Department’s career civilian and contractor

personnel, and DoD agency and component

 

1 Homeland Defense includes missions such as domestic air

defense. The Department recognizes that threats planned or

inspired by “external” actors may materialize internally. The

reference to “external threats” does not limit where or how

attacks could be planned and executed. The Department is

prepared to conduct homeland defense missions whenever

the President, exercising his constitutional authority as

Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions.
I. Context

6

assets, for domestic emergencies and for

designated law enforcement and other

activities. The Department of Defense

provides defense support of civil authorities

when directed to do so by the President or

Secretary of Defense.

Standing Guidance from

National and Defense

Strategies

Directed by the Strategic Planning Guidance

(March 2004), the Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support integrates the

objectives and guidance expressed in the

National Security Strategy, the National  

Strategy for Homeland Security, and the

National Defense Strategy to guide

Department of Defense operations to protect

the US homeland.  

• The National Security Strategy (2002)

expands the scope of US foreign and

security policy to encompass forward‐

reaching preventive activities, including

preemption, against hostile states and

terrorist groups.  

• The National Strategy for Homeland

Security (2002) guides the national effort

to secure the US homeland against

terrorist attacks. It provides a framework

for action at all levels of government that

play a role in homeland security.

National Security Strategy National Security Strategy

National Strategy for

Homeland Security

National Defense Strategy National Defense Strategy Strategy for Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support Civil Support

• Champion aspirations for human dignity

• Strengthen alliances to defeat global 

terrorism and work to prevent attacks on the 

United States and our allies

• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts

• Prevent our enemies from threatening the 

United States, our allies, and our friends with 

WMD

• Expand the circle of development by opening 

societies and building the infrastructure of 

democracy

• Develop agendas for cooperative action with 

other main centers of global power

• Ignite a new era of global economic growth 

through free markets and free trade

• Transform America’s national security 

institutions to meet the challenges and 

opportunities of the 21st century

• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States

• Reduce America’s vulnerabilities to terrorism

• Minimize the damage and recover from the 

attacks that do occur

Strategic Objectives

• Secure the United States from direct 

attack

• Secure strategic access and retain 

global freedom of action

• Strengthen alliances and partnerships

• Establish favorable security conditions

How We Accomplish Our Objective

• Assure allies and friends 

• Dissuade future military competition

• Deter threats and coercion against 

US interests

• If deterrence fails, decisively defeat 

any adversary

Implementation Guidelines

• Active, layered defense

• Continuous transformation

• Capabilities-based approach

• Managing risks

Goal

• Secure the United States from direct 

attack

Implementing Concept

• Active, layered defense

Prioritized Objectives

• Achieve maximum awareness of 

potential threats

• Deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a 

safe distance

• Achieve mission assurance

• Support consequence management for 

CBRNE mass-casualty attacks 

• Improve US and international 

capabilities for homeland defense and 

homeland security

Figure 1: Strategic Underpinnings of the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Strategy 

• The National Defense Strategy (2005)

identifies as its top priority the dissuasion,

deterrence, and defeat of direct threats to

the United States. The Strategy’s imple‐

mentation hinges on an active, layered

defense that is designed to defeat the most

dangerous challenges early and at a safe

distance, before they are allowed to

mature. It directs military leadership to

properly shape, size, and globally posture

to 1) defend the US homeland; 2) operate

in and from the forward regions;
I. Context

7

3) swiftly defeat adversaries and achieve

decisive, enduring results; and 4) conduct

a limited number of lesser contingencies.

In addition to these overarching strategies,

the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support is informed by, and complements,

other key strategic and planning documents.

These include standing National Security and

Homeland Security Presidential Directives,

the National Military Strategy, the National

Military Strategic Plan for the War on

Terrorism, the DoD Homeland Security Joint

Operating Concept, and Military Trans‐

formation: A Strategic Approach (Office of

the Director for Force Transformation).  

Security Environment  

The defining characteristic of the security

environment over the next ten years is the

risk of substantial, diverse, and asymmetric

challenges to the United States, our allies,

and interests. In this context, we are faced

with great uncertainty regarding the specific

character, timing, and sources of potential

attacks. The Strategy for Homeland Defense

and Civil Support aims to mitigate that uncer‐

tainty, addressing the full range of challenges

to the US homeland over the next decade.  

Nation‐state military threats to the United

States will persist throughout the next

decade. Rogue nations, for example, pose

immediate and continuing challenges to the

United States and our allies, friends, and

interests. In addition, we must prepare for the

potential emergence of regional peer

competitors.  

The United States will also face a range of

asymmetric, transnational threats. Of greatest

concern is the availability of weapons of mass

destruction, heretofore the exclusive domain

of nation‐states, to terrorist groups. In the

next ten years, these terrorist groups, poised

to attack the United States and actively

seeking to inflict mass casualties or disrupt

US military operations, represent the most

immediate challenge to the nation’s security.

Transnational terrorist groups view the world

as an integrated, global battlespace in which

to exploit perceived US vulnerabilities,

wherever they may be. This battlespace

includes the US homeland. Terrorists seek to

attack the United States and its centers of

gravity at home and abroad and will use

asymmetric means to achieve their ends, such

as simultaneous, mass casualty attacks. On

September 11, 2001, terrorists demonstrated

both the intent and capability to conduct

complex, geographically dispersed attacks

against the United States and our allies. It is

foreseeable that adversaries will also develop

or otherwise obtain chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, or high‐yield explosives

(CBRNE) capabilities, with the intent of

causing mass panic or catastrophic loss of life.

Although America’s allies and interests

abroad will be the most likely targets of

terrorism in the coming decade, we must also

anticipate enemy attacks aimed at Americans

at home.

Organizing for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support

In light of the importance of homeland

defense and DoD’s contributions to homeland

security, the Secretary of Defense, with the

support of Congress, has improved the

Department’s organization and oversight

structure for homeland defense and civil

support.

• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Defense. As stated in the 2003

National Defense Authorization Act, the
I. Context

8

Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Defense provides overall

supervision of DoD’s homeland defense

activities. The establishment of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Homeland Defense responded to the need

for improved policy guidance to DoD

Components on homeland defense and

civil support issues.

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

coordinates with and assists US Northern

Command, US Pacific Command, the

North American Aerospace Defense

Command, and all other combatant

commands with the strategic direction

and planning for, as well as the execution

of, homeland defense and civil support

missions.

• US Northern Command, headquartered

in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Estab‐

lished in 2002, US Northern Command

(USNORTHCOM) is responsible for

planning, organizing, and executing

homeland defense and civil support

missions within the continental United

States, Alaska, and territorial waters. It

also coordinates security cooperation with

Canada and Mexico. In addition to the

landmasses of the United States, Canada,

and Mexico, US Northern Command’s

area of responsibility includes the coastal

approaches, the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto

Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.  

• US Pacific Command, headquartered in

Honolulu, Hawaii. US Pacific Command

(USPACOM) has homeland defense and

civil support responsibilities for Hawaii

and US territories, possessions, and freely

associated states in the Pacific.2  

• North American Aerospace Defense

Command, headquartered in Colorado

Springs, Colorado. The bi‐national North

American Aerospace Defense Command

(NORAD) is responsible for protecting the

North American airspace over the United

States and Canada. Aerospace warning

and control are the cornerstones of the

NORAD mission.

In addition to these organizations, all other

regional and functional combatant

commands, the Military Departments, and

DoD elements contribute to the protection of

the US homeland from attack.

• Other regional combatant commanders

can promote international cooperation on

homeland defense through exercises and

military‐to‐military contact programs.

Together with the functional combatant

commanders, these regional commanders

can also intercept and defeat adversaries

intent on attacking US territory.  

Of particular note, US Strategic Command

provides significant support to

USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and

NORAD. US Strategic Command is

responsible for planning, integrating, and

coordinating global missile defense

operations and support for missile

defense, including providing warning of

missile attack, across all combatant

 

2 The Pacific territories, possessions, and freely associated

states that are included in the US homeland are: Guam,

American Samoa, and Jarvis Island; the Commonwealth of

Northern Mariana Islands; the Freely Associated States

under the Compacts of Free Association, which include the

Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall

Islands, and the Republic of Palau; and the following US

possessions: Wake Island, Midway Islands, Johnston Island,

Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, Jarvis Island,

and Kingman Reef.  
I. Context

9

commands. US Strategic Command is

further charged with the global missions

to undertake military space operations, to

conduct information operations as well as

computer network operations, and to

integrate and synchronize DoD efforts in

combating weapons of mass destruction.

• The Military Departments organize, train,

and equip US military forces across opera‐

tional domains. The Military Departments

provide the bulk of the DoD capabilities

likely to be requested for civil support.

• Other DoD Components contribute to

homeland defense through intelligence

collection, analysis, and prioritization;

capability assessments; and oversight of

relevant policy, acquisition, logistics,

personnel, readiness, and financial

matters.  

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support will guide all DoD Components

across the full range of homeland defense and

civil support activities.  

Assumptions

This Strategy makes the following key

assumptions:  

• The United States will continue to face

traditional military challenges emanating

from hostile nation‐states. Nation‐state

adversaries will incorporate asymmetric

threats into their broader strategies of

competition and confrontation with the

United States.  

• Terrorists will seek and potentially gain

surreptitious entry into the United States

to conduct mass casualty attacks against

Americans on US soil.

o Terrorists will exploit our

vulnerabilities to create new

methods of attack.

o Terrorists and/or rogue states will

attempt multiple, simultaneous

mass casualty CBRNE attacks

against the US homeland.

o Terrorists will try to shape and

degrade American political will in

order to diminish American

resistance to terrorist ideologies

and agendas.

• Allies and friends will cooperate with the

United States in mutually beneficial

security cooperation arrangements.

• The Department of Homeland Security

and other Federal, state, local, and tribal

authorities will continue to improve their

prevention, preparedness, response, and

recovery capabilities throughout the

decade.

• In the event of major catastrophes, the

President will direct DoD to provide

substantial support to civil authorities.

DoD’s responses will be planned,

practiced, and carefully integrated into

the national response.

• The likelihood of US military operations

overseas will be high throughout the next

ten years.
II. Active, Layered Defense

10

II. Active, Layered Defense

“The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his

plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to

safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

President George W. Bush

June 1, 2002

As set forth in the National Defense Strategy

(2005), the Department of Defense is trans‐

forming its approach to homeland defense

just as it is transforming national defense

capabilities overall. Guiding homeland

defense planning is the concept of an active,

layered defense, predicated on seizing the

initiative from adversaries.  

“Our most important contribution to the security

of the US homeland is our capacity to disrupt and

defeat threats early and at a safe distance, as far

from the US and its partners as possible. Our

ability to identify and defeat threats abroad—

before they can strike—while making critical

contributions to the direct defense of our territory

and population is the sine qua non of our nation’s

security.”

The National Defense Strategy

The United States has multiple points of

vulnerability that adversaries seek to exploit.

Commerce relies on the flow of goods and

people across the nation’s borders, through

our seaports and airports, and on our streets

and highways. The US free market economy

requires trust in the uninterrupted electronic

movement of financial data and funds

through cyberspace. The symbols of

American heritage—monuments and public

buildings—are a source of national pride and

are open to all. Vast and potentially

vulnerable natural resources provide power

to our homes and food for our tables.  

To safeguard the American way of life and

to secure our freedom we cannot depend on

passive or reactive defenses. A strictly

defensive strategy would involve a potential

curtailment of the American people’s

freedoms and civil liberties. It would be

subject to enemy reconnaissance and

inevitable defeat. By contrast, an active,

layered defense relies on early warning of an

emerging threat in order to quickly deploy

and execute a decisive response. This active

defense is a powerful deterrent, dissuading

adversaries and denying them any benefit

from attacking the US homeland and

imposing costs on those who attempt it.

The United States must keep potential

adversaries off balance by both an effective

defense of US territory and, when necessary,

by projecting power across the globe. We

must seize the initiative from adversaries

and apply all aspects of national power to

deter, intercept, and disrupt attacks against

us and our allies and friends. In short, the

United States must act in ways that an

enemy cannot predict, circumvent, or

overcome. Multiple barriers to attack must be

deployed across the globe—in the forward

regions, in the approaches to the United

States, in the US homeland, and in the global

commons—to create an unpredictable web of
II. Active, Layered Defense

11

land, maritime, and air assets that are arrayed

to detect, deter, and defeat hostile action.

When the United States identifies specific

threats or vulnerabilities, it will strengthen

deterrence through force projection, flexible

deterrent options, heightened alert status, and

tailored strategic communications.  

The Forward Regions. The forward regions

are foreign land areas, sovereign airspace,

and sovereign waters outside the US

homeland. The Department of Defense is a

key contributor to the President’s integrated

national security effort abroad. To respond

quickly to rising threats, the United States

requires timely and actionable intelligence.

Improved human intelligence (HUMINT)

collection, improved intelligence integration

and fusion, improved analysis of terrorist

threats and targets, and improved technical

collection against potential CBRNE weapons

are all critical in this regard. In addition, the

United States must counter and delegitimate

ideological support for terrorist groups,

disrupt their flow of funding, and create an

environment that curtails recruitment. US

military forces must be trained, ready, and

postured to intercept potential enemies,

eliminate enemy sanctuaries, and maintain

regional stability, in conjunction with allies

and friendly states.

The Approaches. The land approaches to the

continental United States are within the

sovereign territory of Canada and Mexico.

These nations, in close cooperation with the

United States, contribute to North American

security through their law enforcement,

defense, and counterterrorism capabilities.  

The waters and airspace geographically

contiguous to the United States are critical

homeland defense battlespaces. In these

approaches, US Northern Command, the

North American Aerospace Defense

Command, and US Pacific Command,

Figure 2: Active, Layered Defense Concept
II. Active, Layered Defense

12

working in concert with other combatant

commands, the Intelligence Community, the

US Coast Guard, and other domestic and

international partners, have the opportunity

to detect, deter, and, if necessary, defeat

threats en route–before they reach the United

States.3 This requires maximum awareness

of threats in the approaches as well as the air

and maritime interception capabilities

necessary to maintain US freedom of action,

secure the rights and obligations of the

United States, and protect the nation at a

safe distance.

The US Homeland. The US homeland

includes the United States, its territories and

possessions, and the Commonwealths and

Compact States of the Pacific. It also includes

the surrounding territorial seas. Among its

responsibilities within US territory, DoD

focuses on the following areas:  

• DoD is responsible for deterring and,

when directed by the President, defeating

direct attacks against the United States.

NORAD is the cornerstone of our

homeland air defense capability. Our air

defense success rests on an integrated

system for air surveillance and defense

against air threats at all altitudes. DoD

also maintains land forces capable of

responding rapidly, when so directed, to

threats against DoD personnel, defense

critical infrastructure, or other domestic

targets. Finally, DoD supports the US

Coast Guard in the exercise of its

maritime authorities under domestic and

international law.

 

3 The US Coast Guard is inherently flexible, as both a military

service and law enforcement agency within the Department

of Homeland Security. The US Coast Guard supports DoD

in its homeland defense role, while DoD supports the Coast

Guard in its homeland security role, across the forward

regions, the global commons, the approaches, and within the

US homeland.

• DoD supports civilian law enforcement

and counterterrorism authorities

consistent with US law. The Attorney

General coordinates the activities of the

law enforcement community to detect,

prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist

attacks against the United States. DoD

support to the Department of Justice and

other domestic law enforcement

authorities includes providing expertise,

intelligence, equipment, and training

facilities to these authorities when so

directed. It can also include the use of US

military forces to support civilian law

enforcement in responding to civil

disturbances, as provided in US law.

• DoD provides critical CBRNE

consequence management capabilities in

support of civil authorities. With few

exceptions, DoD’s consequence

management capabilities are designed for

the wartime protection of the

Department’s personnel and facilities.

Nevertheless, civil authorities are likely to

call upon these capabilities if a domestic

CBRNE catastrophe occurs in the ten‐year

period of this Strategy. DoD must

therefore equip and train these war‐

fighting forces, as necessary, for

domestic CBRNE consequence manage‐

ment. Beyond an already dedicated

command and control element designed

for this purpose, however, DoD will

continue to rely on dual‐capable forces

for domestic consequence management

missions.

The Global Commons. The global commons

consist of international waters and airspace,

space, and cyberspace. America’s ability to

deter threats against the global commons and

to operate from them effectively is critical to

the conduct of all its military missions, from
II. Active, Layered Defense

13

the forward regions to the US homeland. Of

particular note is the importance of space and

cyberspace to US net‐centric capabilities. An

active, layered defense requires a

trustworthy information system, impervious

to disabling digital or physical attacks.

Computer network defense must ensure that

networks can self‐diagnose problems and

build immunity to future attacks. At the same

time, networks must remain operational and

consistently available for the execution of US

military missions.  

An active defense also requires the ability to

detect and defeat threats from space. This

includes the need for capable defenses against

ballistic missiles. Ground facilities that

support US military space systems are

potential targets of attacks, and the

Department will protect them.
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

14

III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

“We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military’s highest priority is to defend

the United States . . . The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The employment of an active, layered defense

across the globe is fundamental to achieving

the Department of Defense’s strategic goal for

homeland defense. That is, we will secure the

United States from direct attack. The

National Defense Strategy emphasizes the

Department of Defense’s role in the forward

regions and the global commons and how

that role is critical to the defense of US

territory. This Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support therefore focuses

particular attention on the US homeland and

its approaches. In these geographic layers,

the Department’s activities to protect the

United States generally fall into one of the

following categories:

• Lead: DoD leads military missions to

deter, prevent, and defeat attacks on the

United States, its population, and its

defense critical infrastructure. This

includes defending the maritime and air

approaches to the United States and

protecting US airspace, territorial seas,

and territory from attacks. The Depart‐

ment is also responsible for protecting

DoD personnel located in US territory.

• Support: At the direction of the President

or the Secretary of Defense, the Depart‐

ment provides defense support of civil

authorities in order to prevent terrorist

incidents or manage the consequences of

an attack or a disaster. Civil authorities

are most likely to request DoD support

where we have unique capabilities to

contribute or when civilian responders are

overwhelmed. DoD’s contributions to the

comprehensive national response effort

can be critical, particularly in the near‐

term, as the Department of Homeland

Security and other agencies strengthen

their preparedness and response

capabilities.  

• Enable: Efforts to share capabilities and

expertise with domestic agencies and

international partners reinforce the

Department’s lead and support activities.

At home, the Department works to

improve civilian capabilities for homeland

security by lending expertise and sharing

relevant technology. For example, DoD is

assisting the Department of Homeland

Security in its efforts to develop intelli‐

gence analytical capabilities. We are also

sharing training and simulation techno‐

logies, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle

technologies for civilian surveillance

along the Nation’s borders. Abroad, the

Department’s security cooperation

initiatives improve collective capabilities

for homeland defense missions through

exercises, information‐sharing agree‐

ments, and formal defense agreements,

such as NORAD.

To fulfill the key strategic goal of protecting

the United States from attack, the Department

of Defense will focus on achieving five key
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

15

objectives directly related to the lead, support,

and enable framework. In order of priority,

these objectives are:

1. Achieve maximum awareness of

potential threats (Lead);

2. Deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a

safe distance from the United States,

and US territories and possessions

(Lead);

3. Achieve mission assurance (Lead);

4. Ensure DoD’s ability to support civil

authorities in domestic CBRNE

consequence management (Support);

and

5. Improve domestic and international

partner capabilities for homeland

defense and homeland security

(Enable).

Figure 3: DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for Protecting the United States from Attack 

Lead

Objective 1: Achieve maximum awareness

of threats

To defend the nation in the 21st century, the

Department requires sufficient forewarning

and immediate situational awareness of

potential attacks. No longer is it sufficient to

track the movement of hostile military aircraft

and warships. In the 21st century threat

environment, transnational terrorists and

rogue states may employ a wide range of

civilian vessels and aircraft as weapons,

engage in cyber attacks, or target civilian

infrastructure to achieve devastating effects.  

To protect the United States in this environ‐

ment, the Department of Defense, in coopera‐

tion with domestic and international partners,

ACTIVITIES OBJECTIVES CORE CAPABILITIES

LEAD Achieve Maximum

Awareness of Threats

• Maintain agile and capable defense intelligence architecture

• Analyze and understand potential threats

• Detect, identify, and track emerging threats in all operational domains

• Ensure shared situational awareness within DoD and with domestic

and foreign partners

Deter, Intercept, and Defeat

Threats at a Safe Distance

• Deter adversaries from attacking the US homeland

• Intercept and defeat national security threats in the maritime and air

approaches and within US territory

Achieve Mission Assurance • Ensure force protection, to include DoD installations, especially against

the threat of CBRNE attacks  

• Prepare and protect defense critical infrastructure

• Ensure preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base

• Prepare to protect designated national critical infrastructure

• Ensure DoD crisis management and continuity preparedness

SUPPORT Support Consequence

Management for CBRNE

Mass Casualty Attacks

• Manage consequences of CBRNE mass casualty attacks

ENABLE Improve National and

International Capabilities for

Homeland Defense and

Homeland Security

• Effective interagency planning and interoperability

• Improved Federal, state, and local partnership capacity and effective

domestic relationships

• Improved international partnership capacity and effective defense‐to‐

defense relationships  
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

16

will seek to achieve maximum awareness of

threats. By so doing, the United States

increases the time available for an effective

operational response. Threat awareness

includes the ability to obtain compre‐

hensive, accurate, timely, and actionable

intelligence and information; exploiting

relevant information; and making it

available to the warfighters, policy makers,

and interagency and international partners

responsible for identifying and responding

to threats.  

An active, layered defense requires infor‐

mation to flow freely regardless of opera‐

tional boundaries. Relevant information may

originate in one or several of the operational

domains—land, maritime, air, cyberspace, or

space. It may originate from an array of

domestic and foreign sources. To achieve

maximum awareness of threats, information

will be posted to DoD’s Global Information

Grid, integrating operational domains and

facilitating information sharing across tradi‐

tional military‐civilian boundaries.

Objective 2: Deter, intercept, and defeat

threats at a safe distance

During the Cold War, the United States

focused on preventing Soviet submarines,

ballistic missiles, and long‐range bombers

from attacking the American homeland.

Although concerns about traditional conven‐

tional and nuclear threats to the US homeland

remain, we recognize that in the next ten

years, adversaries will present a host of new

challenges. They may attempt to use com‐

mercial vessels to transport terrorists or

weapons to the United States. They may

attempt to intrude on US airspace with low‐

altitude aircraft, cruise missiles, and unman‐

ned aerial vehicles. They may attempt to

convert maritime vessels, aircraft, and other

modes of transportation into weapons.

Through these and other means, our enemies

will constantly employ asymmetric means to

challenge the security of the United States.

In the maritime approaches, DoD is working

with the Department of Homeland Security to

integrate US maritime defense and to

optimize the mutually supporting capabilities

of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard. As

the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has

stated, “forward deployed naval forces will

network with other assets of the Navy and

the Coast Guard, as well as the intelligence

agencies to identify, track and intercept

threats long before they threaten this

nation.” This will require a level of situational

awareness in the maritime domain similar to

that in the air approaches. The goal, as the

CNO explains, is to “extend the security of

the United States far seaward, taking

advantage of the time and space purchased

by forward deployed assets to protect the US

from impending threats.”  

In the air domain, DoD has primary respon‐

sibility for defending US airspace and

protecting the United States from ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles, and other aerospace

attacks. For North America, this defense is

carried out in partnership with Canada,

through NORAD. In addition, the Depart‐

ment of Defense relies heavily on the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) and the

Department of Homeland Security

(Transportation Security Administration) for

early identification of air threats. As in the

maritime environment, cooperation and

operational coordination with our inter‐

agency partners, as well as our neighbors and

other allies, is critical to protecting the United

States from air threats.
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

17

Within US territory, we face the challenge of

intercepting and defeating enemies deter‐

mined to cause fear, death, and economic

disruption. Although we must not dismiss

traditional foreign military threats, in the

period covered by this Strategy, domestic

employment of the US military in a homeland

defense role will likely come in response to

transnational terrorist, rogue state, or other

threats that exceed the capabilities of

domestic counterterrorism and law

enforcement authorities.

Therefore, the Department must approach the

interception and defeat of threats to US

territory from a joint, interagency, and,

ultimately, intergovernmental perspective.

DoD must not conduct operations in separate

and distinct land, maritime, and air opera‐

tional domains. Over the coming decade, US

Northern Command, the North American

Aerospace Defense Command, and US Pacific

Command will continue to develop mature

homeland defense capabilities in the air, land,

and maritime domains, with appropriate

support provided by other combatant

commands.

Objective 3: Achieve mission assurance

The Department cannot fulfill any of the

Strategy’s key objectives without having the

core capabilities in place to assure mission

success. Mission assurance, the certainty that

DoD components can perform assigned

tasks or duties in accordance with the

intended purpose or plan, is therefore itself

a key objective. The Department of Defense

achieves mission assurance through a range

of programs and efforts that are aimed at

securing DoD warfighting capabilities even

when under attack or after disruption. These

include force protection, the defense critical

infrastructure program, and defense crisis

management and continuity of operations

efforts.  

Force Protection. Force protection is central to

achieving DoD mission assurance. It includes

actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile

actions against DoD personnel (to include

family members), resources, facilities, and

critical information in an all hazards environ‐

ment. Force protection measures can be

defensive in nature, such as those used to

reduce force and installation vulnerability to

terrorist attacks or protect against CBRNE

effects, or offensive, such as those taken to

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. By

conserving the force’s fighting potential so

that they can apply it at the decisive time and

place, force protection ensures the effective

employment of the joint force while

degrading the enemy’s opportunities.

An attack on DoD facilities could directly

affect the Department’s ability to project

power overseas or carry out vital homeland

defense functions. Installation commanders

and facility managers have an inherent

responsibility to protect the forces and

installations under their command. Of parti‐

cular concern is the threat to DoD personnel

and installations posed by domestic CBRNE

attacks.  

CBRNE Preparedness. The Department of

Defense will develop and implement a

comprehensive preparedness plan for CBRNE

attacks. This plan will leverage capabilities

and programs throughout the Department

(e.g. Critical Infrastructure Protection,

Antiterrorism/Force Protection, Project

Guardian) including required intelligence

support. In accordance with DoD responsi‐

bilities in National Biodefense Policy, the

Department is especially attentive to the

unique challenges posed by biological agents.  
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

18

Defense Critical Infrastructure. Related to its

force protection responsibilities for DoD

facilities, the Department of Defense has the

responsibility to assure it has access to defense

critical infrastructure. This is defined as DoD

and non‐DoD cyber and physical assets and

associated infrastructure essential to project

and support military forces worldwide. When

these infrastructures are located on

Department of Defense installations, their

protection is the responsibility of the

installation commander or facility manager.

In some instances, however, critical defense

assets are located at public or private sites

beyond the direct control of DoD. In either

case, the protection of designated defense

critical infrastructure must be assured on a

priority basis.

In some scenarios, assurance of non‐DoD

infrastructures might involve protection

activities, in close coordination with other

Federal, state, local, tribal, or private sector

partners. This could include elements of the

Defense Industrial Base, which is a world‐

wide industrial complex with capabilities to

perform research and development and

design, produce, and maintain military

weapons systems, subsystems, components,

or parts to meet military requirements. These

defense‐related products and services are

essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain

military operations. Moreover, defense critical

infrastructure could also include selected civil

and commercial infrastructures that provide

the power, communications, transportation,

and other utilities that military forces and

DoD support organizations rely on to meet

their operational needs.

In addition, the President or the Secretary of

Defense might direct US military forces to

protect non‐DoD assets of national signifi‐

cance that are so vital to the nation that their

incapacitation could have a debilitating effect

on the security of the United States.

Defense Crisis Management and Continuity

of Operations. During an emergency, the

nation’s leaders, including DoD decision‐

makers, must be able to carry out vital

government functions. The Department must

provide the President and Secretary of

Defense with survivable and enduring

national command and control of DoD

assets and US military forces. DoD also plays

an important supporting role in ensuring

Continuity of Government and Enduring

Constitutional Government in times of crisis.

In the Cold War era, DoD continuity efforts

focused on survival of senior leadership to

prosecute war in the aftermath of a massive

nuclear attack. Today, DoD’s crisis manage‐

ment efforts are broader, responsive to the

full range of potential threats to the nation.

Meeting the Department‘s crisis management

objectives requires ready DoD transportation

assets, capable and survivable remote

operation sites, and advanced communi‐

cations capabilities throughout the DoD

continuity architecture.

Support

Objective 4: Support consequence

management for CBRNE mass‐casualty

attacks

The Department has traditionally supported

civil authorities in a wide variety of domestic

contingencies, usually natural disasters. DoD

typically does so using military forces and

DoD capabilities designed for use in expedi‐

tionary warfighting missions. That support

continues today. For example, unique

national intelligence capabilities located

within the Defense intelligence community

continuously support other US Government
III. Strategic Goal and Key Objectives

19

agencies. Although these traditional types of

defense support of civil authorities are likely

to continue, they are not likely to impede

DoD’s ability to execute other missions

specified in the National Defense Strategy.  

At the high end of the threat spectrum,

however, the 21st century environment has

fundamentally altered the terms under which

Department of Defense assets and capabilities

might be called upon for support. The

potential for multiple, simultaneous,

CBRNE attacks on US territory is real. It is

therefore imperative that the Department of

Defense be prepared to support civilian

responders in responding to such mass

casualty events.

Support to domestic authorities for

consequence management is a core element of

active, layered defense. The Department of

Defense maintains considerable CBRNE

recovery expertise and equipment. When

directed by the President or the Secretary of

Defense, DoD will employ these capabilities

to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security,

the principal Federal official for domestic

incident management, or other domestic

authorities. DoD must be prepared to support

its interagency partners in responding to a

range of CBRNE incidents, including

multiple, simultaneous mass casualty attacks

within the United States.

Enable

Objective 5: Improve national and

international capabilities for homeland

defense and homeland security

The broad range of threats posed by terrorists

and other transnational actors has expanded

our traditional concept of national security. In

the past, the Department of Defense could

largely fulfill its responsibility for protecting

the nation by integrating its activities with the

Department of State and the Intelligence

Community. Today, the expertise and

responsibility for managing security

challenges is much more widely shared

among Federal departments and agencies.

State, local, and tribal authorities, the private

sector, and our allies and friends abroad are

also critical contributors to US national

security.

In such an environment, DoD must unify its

efforts with those of its key interagency

partners and international friends and allies

to ensure the nation’s security. The

Department will promote the integration and

sharing of applicable DoD capabilities,

equipment, and technologies with Federal,

state, local, and tribal authorities and the

private sector. Sharing technology,

capabilities, and expertise strengthens the

nation’s ability to respond to hostile threats

and domestic emergencies. Likewise,

cooperative homeland defense education and

training initiatives will help partners build

capacity for homeland defense and will foster

a common understanding of shared threats

and how best to address them. In turn, DoD

can readily leverage the expertise of other

Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities and

international partners to improve its own

capabilities for counterterrorism, maritime

interception, and other missions critical to an

active, layered defense.
IV. Core Capabilities

20

IV. Core Capabilities

“Some believe that, with the U.S. in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to

transform our armed forces. I believe that quite the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make

changes. The impetus and the urgency added by the events of September 11th powerfully make the case

for action.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

January 31, 2002

The Department of Defense will provide the

homeland defense and civil support capa‐

bilities necessary to support implementation

of the National Security Strategy, the National

Strategy for Homeland Security, and the

National Defense Strategy. Over the next ten

years, DoD will protect the United States

from attack by developing the core capa‐

bilities necessary to achieve each of the key

objectives detailed in Section III.

Capabilities for Achieving

Maximum Awareness of

Threats  

Core Capability: Capable and agile

defense intelligence architecture

Protecting the United States against the full‐

range of 21st century threats requires the US

Intelligence Community to restore its human

intelligence capabilities, reprioritize intelli‐

gence collection to address probable home‐

land defense threats, and continue to invest in

intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance

(ISR) sensor capabilities. In the Cold War, we

knew both the nature of the threat to our

country and the source of that threat. Today,

intelligence and warning must extend beyond

conventional military and strategic nuclear

threats to cover a wide range of other state

and non‐state challenges that may manifest

themselves overseas or at home.  

The Intelligence Community is adjusting to

this changing strategic landscape to meet the

nation’s homeland security needs. The

establishment of a National Intelligence

Director, the National Counterterrorism

Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland

Security’s Information Analysis and Infra‐

structure Protection Directorate, and the

DoD’s Joint Intelligence Task Force for

Combating Terrorism (JITF‐CT) exemplifies

this shift. Executive Orders for strengthened

management of the Intelligence Community

also ensure a more collaborative, compre‐

hensive approach to intelligence support for

national security. While these changes are

taking place, the Department of Defense is

reorienting its intelligence capabilities in line

with the full range of homeland defense

priorities. Specifically, the Department will:

• Focus on integrated collection manage‐

ment of foreign and military information

and its application to homeland defense

and homeland security;  

• Better utilize national intelligence

capabilities to increase early warning and

support prevention, interception, and

disruption of potential threats overseas or

in the approaches to the United States;  
IV. Core Capabilities

21

• Collect homeland defense threat infor‐

mation from relevant private and public

sector sources, consistent with US

constitutional authorities and privacy law;

• Identify capability needs for CBRNE

sensors to meet homeland defense

requirements; and  

• Develop automated tools to improve data

fusion, analysis, and management, to

track systematically large amounts of

data, and to detect, fuse, and analyze

aberrant patterns of activity, consistent

with US privacy protections.

Core Capability: Collect, analyze, and

understand potential threats

Improving our understanding of America’s

foreign enemies—in advance of an attack—is

at the heart of DoD’s efforts to achieve maxi‐

mum awareness of potential threats. In

accordance with the National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism (2002), we are

strengthening DoD’s knowledge of foreign

terrorist networks and the inner workings of

their operations.  

Improved human intelligence, particularly

in the forward regions of the world, is the

single most important factor in under‐

standing terrorist organizations. The

Department of Defense is currently under‐

taking a focused review of DoD human

intelligence capabilities, including reforms to

improve HUMINT career development,

policies, practices, and organizations. DoD

HUMINT operators must have relevant

linguistic skills and cultural understanding as

well as the technical skills needed to provide

high‐quality information to the analysts.  

In addition, we will develop a cadre of

specialized terrorism intelligence analysts

within the Defense intelligence community

and deploy a number of these analysts to

interagency centers for homeland defense and

counterterrorism analysis and operations. The

Department will maintain significant counter‐

terrorism collection and analytical capability

to support military activities overseas and in

the approaches to the United States.

National agencies within the Department,

such as the National Security Agency and the

National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency, will

continue to provide their unique capabilities

in support of the national homeland security

mission in accordance with applicable laws

and regulations. The Department will also

maintain an analytical capability to identify

threats to defense critical infrastructure.  

Core Capability: Detection,

identification, and tracking of emerging

threats in all operational domains

We face challenges in our ability to detect,

identify, and track objects in all operational

environments. Every day, thousands of US

and foreign vessels and aircraft approach and

depart North American ports and airports,

and many times that number of individuals

and vehicles cross our borders. For the

Department of Defense, these challenges are

especially pertinent in the air and maritime

domains, where the military plays a much

more substantial role.

To detect and track anticipated air and

maritime threats effectively, the United

States must have capabilities to cue, surveil,

identify, engage, and assess potential threats

in real time. Detection and tracking

capabilities must be all‐weather, around‐the‐

clock, and effective against moving targets.

The United States must also have the ability

to detect CBRNE threats emanating from any

operating environment. This requires a
IV. Core Capabilities

22

comprehensive, all‐domain CBRNE

detection architecture, from collection to

dissemination.

The maritime domain is multi‐jurisdictional,

with various US agencies responsible for

tracking vessels from their departure at

foreign ports to their arrival in the United

States. Recognizing the potential vulnerability

this situation creates, DoD is working closely

with interagency partners, especially the

Department of Homeland Security, to finalize

a unified concept for maritime domain

awareness (MDA)—the effective under‐

standing of anything associated with the

global maritime domain that could affect the

security, safety, economy, or environment of

the United States. The purpose of MDA is to

facilitate timely, accurate decision‐making.

Based on the emerging MDA concept and

related efforts that will result from the

implementation of National Security

Presidential Directive‐41/Homeland Security

Presidential Directive‐13: National Maritime

Security, the Department of Defense will

work with interagency partners to develop a

comprehensive capability to detect threats as

far forward of the US homeland as possible,

ideally before threat vessels depart foreign

ports. DoD will ensure persistent wide‐area

surveillance and reconnaissance of the US

maritime approaches, layered and periodi‐

cally varied in such a manner that an

adversary cannot predict or evade obser‐

vation. The nation will benefit from the

Department of Homeland Security’s work to

institute worldwide cargo and crew reliability

mechanisms. DoD, in concert with the

Department of Homeland Security, will

receive and share data from improved

identification systems for small commercial

and other vessels, just as it has done for

maritime vessels of over 300 gross tons that

are on international voyages.  

Achieving threat awareness in the air

operational domain presents similar

challenges. Throughout the Cold War, the

Department of Defense focused on main‐

taining awareness of external threats that

entered US airspace from overseas. The

attacks on September 11, 2001, however,

originated in US airspace and highlighted

weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and

interagency air defense coordination.

Adversaries might maintain low altitude

flight profiles, employ stealth and other

defense countermeasures, or engage in

deception to challenge US air defenses.  

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,

DoD has coordinated with interagency

partners to improve significantly the air

defense of the United States. DoD has

worked with the Federal Aviation Admini‐

stration to integrate domestic radar coverage

and has conducted Operation Noble Eagle air

patrols to protect designated US cities and

critical assets. We have placed particular

emphasis on implementing a robust air

defense capability for the National Capital

Region, using both air and ground air defense

forces.

The Department of Defense will continue to

work with domestic and international

partners to develop a persistent, wide‐area

surveillance and reconnaissance capability

for the airspace within US borders, as well

as over the nation’s approaches. This

capability could require the development of

advanced technology sensors to detect and

track low‐altitude air vehicles across a wide

geographic area. DoD is investigating various

technologies that could provide an over‐the‐

horizon engagement capability to detect
IV. Core Capabilities

23

enemy threats in the approaches or over US

territory. The United States and our allies

must also integrate sensor and intelligence

data to identify hostile air vehicles by

observing their performance characteristics,

suspicious activities, or other attributes. These

capabilities in the air domain will provide

timely threat detection, extending the depth

of air defenses and the time for response,

thereby providing multiple engagement

opportunities to defeat identified threats.

Core Capability: Shared situational

awareness within DoD and with

domestic and foreign partners  

Shared situational awareness is defined as a

common perception of the environment and

its implications. All domestic and foreign

partners within the homeland defense

mission space require situational awareness

for three reasons: to identify threats as early

and as distant from US borders as possible; to

provide ample time for an optimal course of

action; and to allow for a flexible operational

response. From the March 2003 Homeland

Security Information Sharing Memorandum

of Agreement, to the aggressive and unprece‐

dented information sharing underway at the

NCTC, the US Government continues to

make great strides in overcoming obstacles to

shared situational awareness.

During the Cold War, the Department of

Defense sought shared situational awareness

with the Department of State, the Intelligence

Community, and allied nations to deter and

defeat threats posed by the Soviet Union and

other nations. At the same time, the American

law enforcement community worked with its

international counterparts to thwart

international drug cartels and worldwide

crime syndicates.

Today, transnational terrorists have blurred

the traditional distinction between national

security and international law enforcement.

Together with the development of other

security threats, this expanded national

security challenge necessitates an unprece‐

dented degree of shared situational

awareness among Federal agencies, with

state, local, tribal, and private entities, and

between the United States and its key

foreign partners.  

As a first step, the Department of Defense

must provide seamless connectivity and

timely, accurate, and trusted information to

all DoD Components—any time, any place—

to achieve maximum awareness of potential

attacks against the United States. The

Department will therefore ensure that DoD’s

information infrastructure provides an

integrated, interoperable worldwide network

of information technology products and

management services. This will allow users

across DoD to process information and move

it to warfighters, policymakers, and support

personnel on demand. Network connectivity

must be flexible enough to support global

operations while allowing for local require‐

ments and innovation. It must also create a

real‐time link among sensors, decision

makers, and warfighters to facilitate the

rapid engagement of enemy targets.  

Beyond building an integrated information

infrastructure, DoD must also populate that

network with accurate, timely, and actionable

data. Today, information relevant to pro‐

tecting the United States is widely dispersed.

The Department, in concert with the intelli‐

gence and law enforcement communities and

foreign partners, will build on the great

strides already made to diminish existing

cultural, technological, and bureaucratic

obstacles to information sharing. The
IV. Core Capabilities

24

Intelligence Community and Department of

Defense will drive improved information

sharing within a “need to share” context. The

resulting information exchange, commonly

referred to as “horizontal integration of

intelligence,” will provide analysts across the

US Government and partner nations with

timely and accurate all‐source information,

vastly improving the creation of a coherent

and fully integrated threat picture. Such an

expansion in information sharing requires

appropriate safeguards to ensure that DoD

intelligence components rigorously apply

laws that protect Americans’ civil liberties

and privacy.

Capabilities for Deterring,

Intercepting, and Defeating

Threats at a Safe Distance

Core Capability: Deter adversaries from

attacking the US homeland.

DoD’s efforts to secure the United States from

direct attack are intrinsically linked to the

concept of deterrence. The objective of deter‐

rence is to convince potential adversaries that

threatening courses of action will result in

outcomes decisively worse than they could

achieve through other, non‐threatening,

means.

Just as the range of potential adversaries of

the United States varies, so, too, do the most

effective means of deterrence. Generally,

however, our deterrent is enabled by global

situational awareness, effective command and

control, military presence abroad, the

strength and agility of US military forces,

strong domestic and international cooper‐

ation and sustained global influence, and a

coherent national strategic communications

campaign. Information operations, influence

operations, control of the operational

domains, conventional and nuclear global

strike capabilities, and active and passive

defense measures all contribute significantly

to deterring threats to the US homeland.

Core Capability: Interception and defeat

of national security threats in the

maritime and air approaches and within

US territory

Maritime Operational Domain. The United

States must be able to detect terrorists on the

high seas armed with weapons of mass

destruction. Accordingly, we will fully

integrate our surface, subsurface, air, and

surveillance assets, focus them forward, and

identify, track and intercept threats at a safe

distance from the US. In so doing, we will

work with our domestic and international

partners and take action consistent with

applicable law.

Improving our ability to intercept enemies in

the maritime domain requires an integrated

system of overlapping defenses—both

adaptable and flexible—to frustrate enemy

observation and avoid predictability. This

begins in the forward regions with improved

surveillance capability, increased HUMINT

collection, and strengthened international

partnerships through programs like the

Container Security Initiative and Proliferation

Security Initiative. To maximize maritime

domain awareness, successive layers of

surveillance must be fully coordinated with

the operational activity of our forward

deployed forces.

DoD has established standing orders for con‐

ducting maritime homeland defense and

maritime interception operations. Given this

guidance, geographic combatant commanders

will include interception exercises in their
IV. Core Capabilities

25

security cooperation plans and conduct such

exercises on a periodic basis. The US Navy

and US Coast Guard will conduct routine and

frequent maritime interception exercises to

ensure a high state of readiness.

To intercept and defeat transnational threats,

the Department of Defense and Department

of Homeland Security must have a predeter‐

mined process for ensuring rapid, effective

US Coast Guard support to the US Navy and

vice versa. Although DoD has the lead role in

defending the United States from direct

maritime attack, we recognize and support

the US Coast Guard’s responsibilities for

maritime law enforcement and homeland

security. Together with the US Coast Guard,

we must strengthen the security in our ports

and littorals, expanding maritime defense

capabilities further seaward.  

The United States must have a concept of

operations for the active, layered maritime

defense of the US homeland. Such a concept

will require naval forces be responsive to

US Northern Command, consistent with

maritime mission requirements, and will

require that Navy forces be placed under

periodic command and control of US

Northern Command as appropriate. DoD

will also consider the use of US Naval

Reserve forces to undertake unique roles in

maritime homeland defense. In addition, the

US Navy should assess how forces currently

used in support of Operation Noble Eagle,

together with available coastal patrol craft

and future Naval and Joint capabilities, such

as the Navy’s littoral combat ship, might be

used to execute maritime homeland defense

missions.

Air Operational Domain. The Department of

Defense will defeat air threats to the United

States, such as ballistic and cruise missiles

and attacking military aircraft. DoD must also

be prepared to intercept non‐traditional air

threats, even when the intent to harm the

United States is uncertain, as initially

occurred on September 11, 2001. These threats

could include commercial or chartered

aircraft, general aviation, ultralight airplanes,

unmanned aerial vehicles, radio controlled

aircraft, or even balloons. Early detection and

successful interception of these types of

potential threats requires very close

cooperation with DoD’s interagency partners.  

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of

Defense, through Operation Noble Eagle,

has conducted air patrols to protect major

US population centers, critical infra‐

structure, and other sites. Working with our

interagency partners, DoD will continue

these patrols to intercept air threats to the

US homeland as long as required.

The Department of Defense will continue to

improve the air‐to‐air and ground‐to‐air

capabilities and associated forces necessary

to intercept and defeat all domestic air

threats. For air patrol missions, DoD will use

more capable aircraft as they are fielded and

explore the potential for employing

unmanned combat air vehicles. DoD is also

upgrading ground‐based air defense assets

with improved detection and targeting

capabilities.

The Department of Defense will devote

significant attention to defending US

territory against cruise missile attacks.

Defense against cruise missiles poses unique

challenges, given that their low altitude and

small size make them more difficult to

identify and track than traditional air threats.

The Department of Defense is developing

integrated capabilities to defend against

cruise missiles, as well as other types of
IV. Core Capabilities

26

unmanned aerial vehicles. As an interim step,

DoD is developing a deployable air and

cruise missile defense capability to protect

designated areas. This capability aims to

integrate Service tactical air defense assets,

the NORAD air defense system, interagency

information sources, and advanced tech‐

nology sensors. Future air and cruise missile

defense assets will be fully interoperable,

increase the size of the defended area, and

engage threats at increased range.

DoD will also continue to work with

interagency partners to develop a common air

surveillance picture that will improve our

ability to identify and, ultimately, defeat

enemy targets. An improved capability is

required to detect and track potential air

threats within the United States. The current

radars maintained by the Federal Aviation

Administration to track air traffic within the

United States are aging, with high main‐

tenance costs, poor reliability, and reduced

capability to track emerging threats. The

nation will need to develop an advanced

capability to replace the current generation

of radars to improve tracking and

identification of low‐altitude threats.  

Land Operational Domain. The Department

of Defense will be prepared to detect, deter

and defeat direct, land‐based attacks

conducted by hostile nations against the

United States. When directed by the

President, the Department will execute land‐

based military operations to detect, deter, and

defeat foreign terrorist attacks within the

United States. To achieve these mission

requirements, we must work closely with our

neighbors, establish seamless relationships

and organizational structures with

interagency partners, and be prepared to

respond with military forces on our own soil

quickly, responsively, and in a manner that is

well coordinated with civilian law

enforcement agencies.  

Historically, the United States relied almost

exclusively on forward deployed forces to

confront and defeat nation‐state adversaries

overseas. Although military power projection

remains crucial, transnational terrorism has

significantly reduced the effectiveness of this

singular approach. Now and in the future, we

must be prepared in every part of the globe—

most especially the US homeland—to deter,

prevent, and defeat terrorist or other

asymmetric threats.  

The employment of military forces to

conduct missions on US territory is

constrained by law and historic public

policy. It is the primary mission of the

Department of Homeland Security to

prevent terrorist attacks within the United

States. The Attorney General leads our

Nation’s law enforcement effort to detect,

prevent, and investigate terrorist activity

within the United States. The scope of

DoD’s role in preventing terrorist attacks

within the US land domain is defined by the

President’s constitutional authority as

Commander in Chief and limited by

statutory authority related to military

support of civilian law enforcement.

Domestic security is primarily a civilian law

enforcement function.  

The following three‐tiered approach provides

the parameters under which the military

would likely operate:

Tier 1: Local and Federal law

enforcement. When directed by the

President or the Secretary of Defense,

DoD will provide appropriate defense

assets in support of domestic law

enforcement authority, normally in

support of a lead Federal agency such as
IV. Core Capabilities

27

the FBI. Under these circumstances,

military forces and assets will remain

under the command and control of DoD.

Tier 2: National Guard forces not on

Federal Active Duty. When directed by

the Governor or appropriate state

authority, National Guard forces and

assets in state active duty status can

respond quickly to perform homeland

defense and homeland security activities

within US territory.  

Newly expanded authorities under

Title 32 of US Code—and the National

Guard’s on‐going transformation—

provide Governors and state authorities

with the authority to use flexible,

responsive National Guard units for a

limited period to perform homeland

defense activities, when approved by the

Secretary of Defense. For example,

National Guard forces may, when the

Secretary of Defense determines that

doing so is both necessary and appro‐

priate, provide security for critical infra‐

structure and support civilian law

enforcement agencies in responding to

terrorist acts.

Tier 3: US military forces responding to

Presidential direction. If circumstances

warrant, the President or the Secretary of

Defense may direct military forces and

assets to intercept and defeat threats on

US territory. When conducting land

defense missions on US territory, DoD

does so as a core, warfighting mission,

fulfilling the Commander in Chief’s

Constitutional obligation to defend the

nation. To fulfill this responsibility, DoD

will ensure the availability of appro‐

priately sized, trained, equipped, and

ready forces. Currently, this capability is

provided by quick reaction forces (QRFs)

and rapid reaction forces (RRFs).

Capabilities for Achieving

Mission Assurance  

Core Capability: Ensure Force Protection

As previously noted, force protection is that

set of measures taken to prevent or mitigate

hostile actions against Department of Defense

personnel (to include family members),

resources, facilities, and critical information.

The Department of Defense has institutiona‐

lized force protection as a core capability

across the Services to lessen the adverse

effects of incidents, whether man‐made or

natural, on key infrastructure within DoD

installations and facilities.  

CBRNE Preparedness. Although force

protection is an all‐hazards concept, the

Department is particularly concerned about

the threat that adversary use of CBRNE poses

to DoD personnel and installations.

Improving DoD’s capabilities for mitigating

and, if necessary, operating in a CBRNE‐

contaminated environment will require

progress in detecting and identifying threats

(sense), providing early warning (shape),

protecting forces and installations (shield),

and ensuring the ability to operate in a

contaminated environment (sustain). DoD’s

Joint Chemical and Biological Defense

Program is focused on developing and

fielding technologies to mitigate, and if

necessary, to allow forces to operate in,

CBRNE contaminated environments.

Sense. DoD currently has a range of

capabilities to detect, identify, and

quantify airborne, waterborne, and other

hazards. Needed improvements include

advanced standoff and point detection
IV. Core Capabilities

28

capabilities for chemical and biological

threats. DoD is also working to develop

and field standoff detection capabilities

for explosives. Advances in standoff

detection capability will improve the

Department’s ability to detect nuclear

devices as well as weapons using

explosives to disperse chemical,

biological, and radioactive materials.

Finally, the Department is improving

medical surveillance capabilities both on

installations and within surrounding

communities to provide early detection

and identification of CBRNE events in the

workforce.

Shape. DoD characterizes CBRNE attacks

by assimilating information drawn from

sensors, hazard prediction models, and

elsewhere to inform commanders of

impending or approaching threats. The

Department is improving on early CBRNE

threat characterization by developing an

integrated concept of operations for

sensing, reporting, and warning of

CBRNE attacks, and ensuring

compatibility with national‐level CBRNE

sensor architectures, such as the

Department of Homeland Security’s

BIOWATCH program.  

Shield. The Department will continue to

provide force protection in advance of a

potential CBRNE attack, whether overseas

or at domestic installations. Already, more

than 850,000 US military personnel have

been vaccinated against anthrax; more

than 730,000 are vaccinated against

smallpox. The Department is now

focusing on the development of vaccines

and other capabilities that can address

new and emerging biological and

chemical threats. This includes significant

research on technologies for improved

chemical and biological agent detection

and personal and collective protection

equipment. DoD is also preparing to field

capabilities that protect US forces from

chemical agents that can be absorbed

through the skin.  

Lastly, the Department is deepening and

expanding collaboration on biodefense

research with the Department of Home‐

land Security and the Department of

Health and Human Services. This

includes significant new investments by

these civilian agencies and the creation of

a new research consortium. The

construction of a National Interagency

Biodefense Campus, collocated with the

US Army Medical Research Institute of

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), will

significantly facilitate civil‐military

cooperation in this area. A revitalized and

recapitalized USAMRIID, along with

major Department of Homeland Security

and Department of Health and Human

Services investments, will provide DoD

and the nation with added research

capacity, additional biopharmaceutical

development, increased testing and

evaluation of potential biodefense medical

products, and large surge lab capacity for

bioterrorism incident response.

Sustain. DoD must be able to sustain

operations during and after a CBRNE

attack in the United States. Medical

therapeutics that allow DoD personnel to

continue mission‐essential tasks in a

CBRNE environment are of highest

priority. DoD will also expand pilot

programs for CBRNE installation

preparedness to protect DoD personnel

and facilities in the event of an attack. In

addition to providing improved CBRNE

defense capabilities at 200 critical
IV. Core Capabilities

29

installations in the United States and

abroad through the Guardian Program,

DoD will improve its capability to protect

all installations through updated doctrine

and guidance. The Department will

examine an aggressive expansion of force

protection and related programs to

increase both the level of protection and

the number of DoD installations it covers.  

Core Capability: Preparedness and

protection of defense critical

infrastructure

Because resources are constrained, uniform

protection of all defense critical infrastructure

is not possible. The Department must

prioritize the protection of assets based on

their criticality to executing the National

Defense Strategy and seek to minimize the

vulnerability of critical assets in accordance

with integrated risk management approach.

To this end, the Department will devise a

strategy to:

• Identify infrastructure critical to the

accomplishment of DoD missions, based

on a mission area analysis.  

• Assess the potential effect of a loss or

degradation of critical infrastructure on

DoD operations to determine specific

vulnerabilities, especially from terrorist

attack.  

• Manage the risk of loss, degradation, or

disruption of critical assets through

remediation or mitigation efforts, such as

changes in tactics, techniques, and pro‐

cedures; minimizing single points of

service; and creating appropriate

redundancies, where feasible.

• Protect infrastructure at the direction of

the President or the Secretary of Defense

where the nature of the threat exceeds the

capabilities of an asset owner and civilian

law enforcement is insufficient.

• Enable real‐time incident management

operations by integrating current threat

data and relevant critical infrastructure

requirements.  

The Military Departments, Defense Agencies,

and other DoD components are now imple‐

menting the Protective Risk Management

Strategy through modifications to their

programs and budgets.  

Core Capability: Preparedness of the

Defense Industrial Base

The National Strategy for the Physical

Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key

Assets (2003) notes that, without the

important contributions of the private

sector, DoD cannot effectively execute core

defense missions. Private industry manu‐

factures and provides the majority of the

equipment, materials, services, and weapons

for the US armed forces. The President

recently designated DoD as the Sector‐

Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial

Base (DIB). In this role, DoD is responsible

for national infrastructure protection

activities for critical defense industries as set

forth in Homeland Security Presidential

Directive‐7.

To assure that mission critical supplies and

services are available, DoD contracts are

being modified to ensure that protective

measures are in place at key facilities and that

DoD can assess the security of the DIB. In

addition, the Defense Logistics Agency and

other DoD contracting activities are revising

the contract process to ensure that civilian

defense contractors are able to operate for the

duration of a national emergency. Defense

contractors must be able to maintain
IV. Core Capabilities

30

adequate response times, ensure supply and

labor availability, and provide direct logistic

support in times of crisis. DoD program

managers will be held accountable for

ensuring the protection of supporting

infrastructure, including key suppliers. DoD

base and installation commanders, and those

who contract for non‐DoD infrastructure

services and assets, will monitor assurance

activities through compliance with contract

language that clearly identifies reliable

service availability, priority of restoration,

and asset protection.

Core Capability: Preparedness to protect

designated national critical

infrastructure

The Department has historically focused on

preventing unauthorized personnel from

gaining access to DoD installations and

protecting those installations from traditional

military attacks. In the post‐September 11,

2001 era, DoD is expanding the traditional

concept of critical asset protection to include

protection from acts of transnational

terrorism. Countering terrorist reconnais‐

sance activity is central to the successful

defense of critical infrastructure.  

As outlined in the National Strategy for the

Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures

and Key Assets (2003), DoD bears responsi‐

bility for protecting its own assets, infra‐

structure, and personnel. At the Department’s

request, domestic law enforcement may

protect DoD facilities.  

For non‐DoD infrastructure, including private

and public assets that are critical to the

execution of the National Defense Strategy,

DoD’s protection role is more limited. The

initial responsibility for protection of non‐

DoD infrastructure rests with asset owners.

Civilian law enforcement authorities augment

and reinforce the efforts of asset owners,

creating a second tier of protection.

Should protection requirements exceed the

capabilities of asset owners and civilian law

enforcement, state authorities provide an

additional layer of defense. In addition to a

Governor’s authority to employ National

Guard forces in a state active duty status,

recent changes to Title 32 of the US Code may

provide an additional, expeditious means to

use National Guard forces under the control

of the Governor, with the approval of the

Secretary of Defense, using Federal funding

to perform homeland defense activities.  

To achieve critical infrastructure protection

in the most serious situations, the Depart‐

ment of Defense maintains trained and

ready combat forces for homeland defense

missions.  

Core Capability: Defense crisis

management and DoD continuity

preparedness

The Department’s crisis management and

continuity of operations programs are central

to mission assurance. DoD must provide

capabilities necessary to support senior

leadership decision‐making and military

command and control and to perform

essential DoD functions to support national‐

level crisis managers. DoD is working to

strengthen its information management and

communications capabilities to support senior

leadership in crises. It is also improving the

survivability and flexibility of military

command and control capabilities.  

A significant element of mission assurance is

continuity of operations—maintaining the

ability to carry out DoD mission essential

functions in the event of a national emergency
IV. Core Capabilities

31

or terrorist attack. Fulfilling this objective in

the current security environment necessitates

new and innovative approaches, such as

improving policies for personnel dispersion,

leveraging information technology to

improve crisis coordination, and improving

relocation facilities. The Department recently

conducted a zero‐based assessment of DoD

continuity capabilities. The results of this

assessment detail numerous capability

improvements that the Department can

pursue to ensure the continuity of DoD

operations in times of crisis. It will transform

DoD’s approach to continuity operations

from a Cold War‐oriented concept to one

better suited to the terrorist threat.

Capabilities for CBRNE

Consequence Management  

Core Capability: Consequence

management assistance for domestic

CBRNE mass casualty attacks  

The Department of Defense must be able to

conduct major operations in a CBRNE

environment. US military forces organize,

train, and equip to operate in contaminated

environments, as well as manage the

consequences of CBRNE incidents, on a level

unmatched by any other single domestic

agency or international partner. If directed by

the President or the Secretary of Defense,

the Department of Defense must be

prepared to use these capabilities to assist

interagency partners in the aftermath of

domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

DoD’s CBRNE capabilities include specialized

agent detection, identification, and dispersion

modeling systems as well as casualty

extraction and mass decontamination

abilities. DoD can also provide significant

support to domestic consequence

management by providing emergency

medical support, such as equipment, mobile

hospitals, aeromedical evacuation, medical

personnel, engineering support, and

mortuary services.

Not all domestic CBRNE incidents will

necessitate a Federal response; many

scenarios may be well within the capa‐

bilities of state and local responders. Those

incidents that do require a US Government

response will be coordinated by a lead

Federal agency. In most catastrophic

scenarios, DoD will be called upon to provide

support to the Department of Homeland

Security or another Federal agency. The

Department will work closely with

interagency partners—through the National

Response Plan and the National Incident

Management System—to ensure proficiency

and interoperability in responding to

multiple CBRNE incidents.

The Department will ensure that dedicated

CBRNE civil support capabilities are sized,

trained, equipped, and ready for the domestic

consequence management mission. Dedicated

domestic CBRNE command and control is

provided by the Joint Task Force‐Civil

Support. In addition, the National Guard

WMD Civil Support Teams can operate under

Federal control in times of crisis, when

directed to do so by the President or Secretary

of Defense. DoD is currently examining the

augmentation of WMD Civil Support Teams

with National Guard and other military

capabilities and forces that are task‐organized

for this mission.  

DoD will also identify, train, and equip an

additional, discrete number of military forces

for the potential requirements associated with

multiple, simultaneous CBRNE attacks within

the United States. These forces will be dual‐
IV. Core Capabilities

32

mission in nature—these warfighters and

support elements will not be dedicated to the

civil support role but they will nevertheless

be ready to perform domestic consequence

management missions when required.4

Lastly, the Department will ensure that other

elements of the Total Force—currently sized

and shaped primarily for overseas missions—

are identified, exercised, and ready to support

CBRNE consequence management as

necessary. This capability will provide added

utility for overseas deployments or domestic

missions. Within this Total Force context,

DoD’s effectiveness in responding to

domestic CBRNE contingencies will be

greatly improved through adjustments to

Active and Reserve Component training,

procedures that allow for faster mobilization

of National Guard and Reserve Forces, and

improved command relationships that make

optimal use of the Reserve Component. This

includes leveraging the National Guard’s

proposed Joint Force Headquarters‐State

organizations.  

 

4 Among existing dual‐use DoD assets are the US Marine

Corps Chemical‐Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF);

the US Army Technical Escort Unit; the US Army Chemical

Biological Rapid Response Team; the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency’s Consequence Management Advisory

Team; the US Army 52nd Ordinance Group; the US Navy

Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit; the US Naval

Medical Research Center; the US Navy Defense Technical

Response Group; the US Air Force Radiation Assessment

Team; and the US Air Force Technical Application Center.  

Improving US and

International Capabilities for

Homeland Defense and

Homeland Security  

Core Capability: Interagency planning

and interoperability

Recognizing the critical importance of

interoperability, DoD will share training,

planning, and other appropriate resources

with interagency partners to standardize

operational concepts, develop technology

requirements, and coordinate budget plan‐

ning for homeland missions. Interagency

efforts must focus on closing any remaining

seams in air, land, maritime, cyberspace and

space operational domains and must improve

national preparedness and incident manage‐

ment efforts. Development of a coordinated

training and exercise program is an essential

step toward greater cooperation in executing

homeland defense and civil support missions.

Active DoD participation in the interagency

process improves planning and

interoperability and will ensure that

procedures for supporting civil authorities

are consistent with the framework for

domestic incident response outlined in the

National Response Plan and the National

Incident Management System.  

Core Capability: Improved Federal, state,

and local partnership capacity and

effective domestic relationships

The Department of Defense has identified

three tenets to improve defense support of

civil authorities:  

• Augment civil capabilities with DoD

expertise where necessary;  
IV. Core Capabilities

33

• Ensure the seamless operational integra‐

tion of defense support capabilities with

those of the civil sector;

• Assist in the civil sector’s development

and procurement of new technologies and

equipment.  

Within this civil support framework, the

Department will actively seek to identify

opportunities for cooperation with the civil

sector. Several initiatives to strengthen

civilian capabilities are already underway.

Examples include:

• DoD assistance to the Department of

Homeland Security to develop CBRNE

victim rescue capabilities, similar to those

of the US Marine Corps’ Chemical

Biological Incident Response Force.

• Joint DoD and Department of Homeland

Security research and development on,

and civilian acquisition of unmanned

aerial vehicles for law enforcement and

ground surveillance systems for border

security.  

• DoD efforts through the Interagency

Counter Man‐Portable Air Defense

System (MANPADS) Task Force to help

develop an attack prevention and

recovery plan, provide technical advice

and analysis to the Department of

Homeland Security regarding MANPADS

countermeasures, and operational

assistance to stem the proliferation of

MANPADS overseas.

In compliance with Section 1401 of the

National Defense Authorization Act for

FY 2003, DoD will continue efforts to transfer

competencies between DoD and the civil

sector—through technology transfer and

sharing DoDʹs “lessons learned” from

applicable exercises and program manage‐

ment. Such collaboration can increase the

overall effectiveness of national capabilities

and potentially reduce other agencies’

dependencies on limited DoD assets.  

To succeed, the Department will need a

systematic approach to ensure close

coordination with the Department of

Homeland Security and other interagency,

state, and local partners, specifically:

• Facilitating the Department of Homeland

Security’s efforts to identify and provide

appropriate defense technologies to state

and local first responders;

• Nurturing new collaborative research,

development, experimentation, test and

acquisition opportunities with the Depart‐

ment of Homeland Security, while

avoiding duplication of effort in these

areas; and  

• Ensuring the smooth transition of

appropriate missions, technologies, and

capabilities to the civil sector.

Complementing these activities will be a

long‐term effort with our Federal partners to

identify specific, frequently requested DoD

capabilities for possible transition to the civil

sector.  

Core Capability: Improved international

partnership capacity and effective

defense‐to‐defense relationships

Because it is the Department’s first priority,

homeland defense must be a central,

carefully considered element of our defense

relationships with key allies and friends

abroad. The United States fosters strong

defense relationships worldwide for many

reasons of national security interest. Two

such reasons are to strengthen allied military

contributions to collective defense and to
IV. Core Capabilities

34

improve US capabilities through exposure to

partners’ expertise. Thus, DoD has an active

security cooperation program that encourages

mutual improvements to support coalition

operations and to ensure interoperability.

Clearly, our homeland defense will be

substantially strengthened through the

cooperation and assistance of allies. In turn,

our allies can better protect their homelands if

we help them build capacity for homeland

defense and civil support. We will strengthen

DoD’s emphasis in security cooperation on

homeland defense and civil support, with

particular focus on improved information

sharing in defense‐to‐defense interactions.

Our North American neighbors, Canada and

Mexico, are vital to the protection of the US

homeland and the continent. The Department

also places special emphasis on cooperative

homeland defense efforts with friendly

nations in the Pacific and the Caribbean and

with our NATO allies.

The primary mechanism for US‐Canadian

cooperation on homeland defense is the

North American Aerospace Defense

Command. Dedicated to the defense of US

and Canadian airspace, NORAD has evolved

from a Cold War institution to an agile 21st

century counterterrorism capability reflecting

an integrated, flexible bi‐national approach to

air defense. Over the next decade, the Depart‐

ment of Defense, in conjunction with the

Department of State and the Department of

Homeland Security, and working with our

Canadian partners, will strengthen the

NORAD concept by identifying mechanisms

for sharing information across the air,

maritime, and land operational domains—

with shared awareness of the North American

maritime domain as the first priority.

Given the importance of Mexico to US

homeland defense, US‐Mexican counter‐

terrorism cooperation is essential. The

Department will work with the Department

of Homeland Security, the Department of

State, and Mexico to anticipate and plan for

crisis coordination and consequence

management following a terrorist attack.

Cooperation with Mexico on law enforcement

and immigration issues is substantial,

especially in counternarcotics and border

control operations. Defense cooperation

requires similar emphasis and must be

pursued with due respect for the Mexican

government’s policy goals and legal

constraints. Traditional security assistance

tools are pivotal in developing mutually

beneficial defense capabilities and

arrangements.

Just as defense of the US homeland begins

well beyond our geographic boundaries, so

too must our cooperative efforts to improve

that defense. The expansion of information

and intelligence sharing with foreign partners

is critical to the success of this Strategy.

Friendly and allied nations often possess

significant information relating to terrorism,

smuggling, and other US concerns.  

Beyond the information realm, some nations

have significant expertise to share with the

United States in combating terrorism and

other mission areas related to homeland

defense. The United States likewise has much

to gain in increasing the homeland defense

capabilities of friendly nations. The

Department will therefore expand combined

education, exercise, training, and

experimentation initiatives related to

homeland defense.
V. Implications of the Strategy

35

V. Implications of the Strategy

“The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces.”

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support requires adjustments in DoD forces

and capabilities, resource allocation, and

technology development. Securing the US

homeland is the first among many priorities

outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

Given resource constraints, this Strategy’s

objectives must be balanced against the

Department’s other requirements.

Force Structure

This Strategy reflects a Total Force approach

to homeland defense missions,

incorporating the capabilities of Active

Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces

that will be trained and equipped primarily

for warfighting missions in the forward

regions and approaches. Forces must also be

prepared to conduct the full spectrum of

domestic civil support missions when

directed by the President or the Secretary of

Defense to do so.  

To execute this diverse range of missions

effectively, DoD must ensure the Total Force,

both reserve and active components, is:

• Timely in response and readily accessible.

Homeland defense and civil support

missions require a rapid response, often

measured in hours, not days.  

• Trained and equipped to achieve the

highest degree of readiness in a broad

array of mission sets.  

• Transformed to meet terrorist challenges.

Timely, trained, and equipped forces

must be agile and interoperable, taking

advantage of networked capabilities.

Focused Reliance upon the Reserve

Component  

Homeland defense and civil support are Total

Force responsibilities. However, the nation

needs to focus particular attention on better

using the competencies of National Guard

and Reserve Component organizations. The

National Guard is particularly well suited for

civil support missions. As with other Reserve

components, the National Guard is forward

deployed in 3,200 communities through the

nation. In addition, it is readily accessible in

State Active Duty and Title 32 status,

routinely exercised with local law enforce‐

ment, first responders, and the remainder of

the Total Force, and experienced in

supporting neighboring communities in times

of crisis. In addition, Reserve forces currently

provide many key homeland defense and

civil support capabilities, including intelli‐

gence, military police, medical expertise, and

chemical decontamination. The most

promising areas for employment of the

National Guard and Reserve forces are:

• Air and Missile Defense, including

surveillance and manning of ground‐

based defense systems.

• Maritime Security, including Naval

Reserve augmentation of active
V. Implications of the Strategy

36

component and Coast Guard capabilities

for intelligence and surveillance, critical

infrastructure protection, port security,

and maritime intercept operations. The

Naval Reserve should continue to

transform to meet 21st century terrorist

threats, with an emphasis on interdicting

the maritime transport of CBRNE to the

United States.

• Land defense, including missions

requiring Quick Reaction Forces/Rapid

Reaction Forces. Reserve forces, including

the National Guard, Army Reserve, and

Marine Corps Reserve, are capable of

serving in reaction force roles when

sufficiently trained and resourced. For

example, the Army is considering

whether to use existing National Guard

force structure to form modular reaction

forces, an initiative that could provide

additional capabilities for domestic land

defense.  

• CBRNE response, including capabilities

for detection, extraction, decontamination,

and medical care. Army Reserve chemical

companies can provide significant

capabilities for CBRNE assessment as well

as extraction and decontamination of

mass casualties. The National Guard

WMD Civil Support Teams, which will

be located in all states and territories and

the District of Columbia, can be

federalized, if required. The National

Guard Chemical‐Biological‐

Radiological‐High Explosives Enhanced

Force Packages (NGCERFPs)—task‐

organized from existing force structure—

also could provide CBRNE response

capabilities. The Reserve Component can

also offer significant assistance with

security, engineering, transportation,

communications, medical response, and

many other CBRNE response needs. The

effective employment of National Guard

forces in state, Title 32, or Title 10 status

could increase the availability of other

US military forces for overseas

deployments.

• Critical Infrastructure Protection,

including the performance of compre‐

hensive assessments of critical infra‐

structure sites and utilization of Reserve

component forces for quick reaction

requirements, when sufficiently trained

and resourced, and local security at key

defense and non‐defense critical

infrastructure sites, when directed.

Technology

Implementation of the Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Civil Support may require

several new technological investments. Three

areas of particular interest for further

exploration are advanced information and

communications technology, new generations

of sensors, and non‐lethal capabilities.  

Advanced Information and

Communications Technology

Technological and organizational improve‐

ments for homeland security and homeland

defense will benefit from focused investment

in advanced information technology,

especially to prevent, intercept, and respond

to terrorist activity. Whether the objective is

improved maritime domain awareness and

operations, interception of weapons of mass

destruction, response to chemical or

biological attacks, or continuity of operations

and government, improvement in infor‐

mation technology is critical to addressing

current capability shortfalls. Advanced

modeling and simulation techniques for
V. Implications of the Strategy

37

threat identification, pattern analysis, risk

assessment, dependency analysis, and

cost/benefit calculus are critical for

addressing issues of data sharing, security,

and interoperability. Without these tools, the

return on investments in other areas, such as

improved sensors, detectors, command and

control, and human intelligence collection

and analysis, will be insufficient.  

Equally pivotal are potential advances in

communications technologies, particularly

those supporting ground‐mobile and airborne

communications. DoD must reduce the size

and power requirements of mobile

communications systems and be able to

shield them against electromagnetic effects.

Sensors

New generations of sensors and sensor

platforms will improve threat awareness by

helping to close current gaps over much of

the maritime domain and in domestic air‐

space, particularly at low altitudes. Shared

sensor technology could also play an impor‐

tant role in improving border surveillance by

civilian agencies.  

The placement of sensors on high altitude

platforms, including new generations of

unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, and

aerostats, could allow sustained surveillance

of wide areas of the earth’s surface. These

sensors could also strengthen defenses

against low‐flying cruise missiles. Some new

ground sensors are expected to have an over

the horizon capability with applications for

homeland defense and homeland security

missions.

New sensor technologies could also have

utility for: maritime defense, including the

non‐acoustic detection of underwater

vehicles, objects, and swimmers; remote

detection of concealed CBRNE weapons

aboard ships; and mapping the location and

extent of contamination should adversaries

use these weapons. Finally, DoD must fully

integrate its sensors and others on which it

relies with information networks to

coordinate their use and rapidly distribute

information.

Non‐Lethal Capabilities

As the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001,

made it clear, we may be required to defeat

attacks in major civilian population centers.

Non‐lethal capabilities hold some promise as

an effective alternative to deadly force. The

Department will therefore examine the

potential operational employment of non‐

lethal weapons for homeland defense

missions, particularly those where civilian

loss of life can be effectively minimized.  

Non‐lethal technologies with potential

application to homeland defense missions

include:  

• Counter‐personnel technology, used to

deny entry into a particular area,

temporarily incapacitate individuals or

groups, and clear facilities, structures, and

areas.

• Counter‐material technology, to disable,

neutralize, or deny an area to vehicles,

vessels, and aircraft, or disable particular

items of equipment.

• Counter‐capability technology, to disable

or neutralize facilities, systems, and

CBRNE.

The Department will expand basic research

into the physiological effects of non‐lethal

weapons. The Department will also identify

opportunities to share appropriate non‐lethal
V. Implications of the Strategy

38

capabilities with domestic law enforcement

agencies, consistent with applicable law.  

Rapid Prototyping of Emerging

Capabilities

Advanced Concept Technology Demon‐

strations (ACTDs) are a key DoD vehicle for

rapidly fielding promising technologies. The

objectives of an ACTD are to conduct

meaningful demonstrations of the capability,

develop and test concepts of operations to

optimize military effectiveness, and, if

warranted, prepare to transition the capability

into acquisition without loss of momentum.

Currently, there are over 25 ACTDs with

relevance to homeland defense and homeland

security such as the Homeland Security/

Homeland Defense Command and Control

Advanced Concept Technology Demon‐

stration. The Department will ensure that

requirements for homeland defense and civil

support are properly addressed in the ACTD

process. The Department will continue

working with the Department of Homeland

Security and other domestic and international

partners to encourage their participation in

ACTDs as appropriate. DoD will also

continue to leverage innovative capabilities

arising from private sector initiatives, many

of which are fostered through the

interagency Technical Support Working

Group (TSWG).

Funding

Proper funding and budget oversight for

homeland defense and CBRNE consequence

management missions is vital. Currently, the

Department accounts for homeland defense

activities through a variety of disparate

programs and funding lines in every Military

Department and combatant command and

numerous initiatives under the purview of

the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Funding for homeland defense is not

accounted for consistently.

Funding Implications

In developing planning and programming

guidance to implement the Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support, DoD

must assess the fiscal implications of attaining

and sustaining requisite core capabilities.

Determining the relative costs and benefits of

each of the following areas merit immediate

attention:

• Expanding communications

infrastructure and improving DoD’s

ability to share vital information while

protecting the integrity of the Global

Information Grid;  

• Improving intelligence assets to improve

overall threat awareness across all

domains;

• Developing and procuring advanced

technologies to maximize awareness of

potential threats;  

• Developing the capabilities needed to

effectively conduct an active, layered

maritime defense against transnational

threats, including CBRNE attacks;

• Implementing DoD’s Defense Critical

Infrastructure Protection responsibilities;

• Furthering investments in the research,

testing, and fielding of non‐lethal

weapons capabilities;

• Providing support for DoD continuity of

operations in the event of a national

emergency or catastrophe; and

• Transforming the Reserve component for

homeland defense and civil support

missions.
V. Implications of the Strategy

39

In the course of implementing this Strategy,

the Department must not take on

responsibilities and costs for homeland

security missions better addressed by other

Federal, state, local, or tribal authorities.

This will require close cooperation with the

Department of Homeland Security and other

interagency partners.

Managing Homeland Defense

and Civil Support Risks

The Department’s risk management strategy

acknowledges the importance of an active,

layered homeland defense. An active, layered

defense integrates homeland defense and

forward operations conceptually and

operationally. Therefore, the Department will

assess homeland defense and civil support

mission risks in the context of all of the

requirements outlined in the National

Defense Strategy.  

The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support places a premium on the

Department’s primary responsibility for

protecting the US homeland from attack. A

second priority is to meet DoD’s most

challenging civil support mission—CBRNE

consequence management. Specifically, the

Strategy’s risk management approach is as

follows:

Lead. The Department’s key lead objectives

are to achieve maximum awareness of threats,

deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a safe

distance, and achieve mission assurance. DoD

must not accept undue risk in its active

defense of the US homeland from direct air,

land, or maritime threats. The capability and

readiness of US forces to intercept and defeat

these threats must be assured. Further,

because the most critical element of

successfully defeating threats to the US

homeland is shared situational awareness, the

Department will focus special attention in this

area. DoD accepts some operational risk in

achieving mission assurance.

Support. Transnational terrorists have a

demonstrated intent to acquire weapons of

mass destruction and exploit US vulnera‐

bilities to employ such weapons against

potential domestic targets. Accordingly, the

Department will reduce risk by improving its

consequence management capabilities for

responding to multiple, simultaneous CBRNE

mass casualty attacks in the United States.

DoD will maintain a ready, capable, and

agile command and control structure, along

with competently trained forces, to assist

civilian authorities with catastrophic

incident response. However, with the

exception of a dedicated command and

control element (currently the Joint Task

Force‐Civil Support) and the National

Guard’s WMD Civil Support Teams, DoD

will continue to rely on dual‐capable forces

for consequence management and other

defense support of civil authorities. The

Department minimizes the risk that dual‐

capable forces may be assigned to other high

priority missions by deconflicting overseas

and domestic force requirements wherever

possible.  

Enable. The Department aims to decrease

long‐term risk by improving the capabilities

of our interagency and international

partners. DoD accepts some risk in achieving

the “Enable” objective to address other more

immediate “Lead” and “Support” objectives.
VI. Conclusion

40

VI. Conclusion

“The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we

will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail.”

President George W. Bush

October 7, 2001

The United States faces ruthless enemies who

seek to break our will by exploiting America’s

fundamental freedoms. Our adversaries are

eager to employ violence against Americans

at home. In this environment, the Department

of Defense’s paramount goal will continue to

be the defense of the US homeland from

direct attack.  

A new kind of enemy requires a new concept

for defending the US homeland. The terrorist

enemy now considers the US homeland a

preeminent part of the global theater of

combat, and so must we. We cannot depend

on passive or reactive defenses but must seize

the initiative from adversaries.

The active, layered defense articulated in this

Strategy seamlessly integrates US capabilities

in the forward regions of the world, the

global commons, the geographic approaches

to the US territory, and within the United

States. Whether in a leading, supporting, or

enabling role, the Department of Defense,

guided by this Strategy and consistent with

US law, will work with an intense focus to

protect the US homeland and the American

people.

When fully realized, this Strategy will trans‐

form the Department’s homeland defense and

civil support capabilities. The nation will have

effective intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance capabilities for homeland

defense; and information will be widely

shared with relevant decision‐makers. The

Department will execute homeland defense

missions with well‐trained and responsive

forces that use improved technology and

operational concepts to eliminate seams

between the maritime, air, and land domains.

Additionally, the Department will achieve

unity of effort with our interagency and

international partners in executing home‐

land defense and civil support missions.

The effectiveness of any strategy is ultimately

in the hands of those charged with its

implementation. The Department of Defense

will carefully consider the potential

implications of this Strategy for force

structure, technology, and funding. It will

also continually reevaluate the Strategy,

adapting it as needed for the dynamic inter‐

national environment and changing US policy

and capabilities.  

The Department of Defense must change its

conceptual approach to homeland defense.

The Department can no longer think in terms

of the “home” game and the “away” game.

There is only one game. The Strategy for

Homeland Defense and Civil Support is a

significant step toward this strategic

transformation. Defending the US

homeland—our people, property, and

freedom—is our most fundamental duty.

Failure is not an option.