Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Social 

Security, Committee on Ways and Means, 

House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT 

Thursday, June 9, 2005 SOCIAL SECURITY

Coverage of Public 

Employees and Implications 

for Reform 

Statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director 

Education, Workforce, and Income Security 

GAO-05-786T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-786T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barbara D. 

Bovbjerg at (202) 512-7215 or 

bovbjergb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-786T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Social 

Security, Committee on Ways and Means, 

House of Representatives 

June 9, 2005

SOCIAL SECURITY

Coverage of Public Employees and 

Implications for Reform 

Social Security’s provisions regarding public employees are rooted in the 

fact that about one-fourth of them do not pay Social Security taxes on the 

earnings from their government jobs, for various historical reasons. Even 

though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which 

they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social 

Security benefits based on their spouses’ or their own earnings in covered 

employment. 

To address the issues that arise with noncovered public employees, Social 

Security has two provisions—the Government Pension Offset (GPO), which 

affects spouse and survivor benefits, and the Windfall Elimination Provision 

(WEP), which affects retired worker benefits. Both provisions reduce Social 

Security benefits for those who receive noncovered pension benefits. Both 

provisions also depend on having complete and accurate information on 

receipt of such noncovered pension benefits. However, such information is 

not available for many state and local pension plans, even though it is for 

federal pension benefits. As a result, the GPO and the WEP are not applied 

consistently for all noncovered pension recipients. In addition to the 

administrative challenges, these provisions are viewed by some as confusing 

and unfair. 

In recent years, various Social Security reform proposals that would affect 

public employees have been offered. Some proposals specifically address 

the GPO and the WEP and would either revise or eliminate them. Such 

actions, while they may reduce confusion among affected workers, would 

increase the long-range Social Security trust fund deficit and could create 

fairness issues for workers who have contributed to Social Security 

throughout their working lifetimes. Other proposals would make coverage 

mandatory for all state and local government employees. According to 

Social Security actuaries, mandatory coverage would reduce the 75-year 

actuarial deficit by 11 percent. It could also enhance inflation protection, 

pension portability, and dependent benefits for the affected beneficiaries, in 

many cases. However, to maintain the same level of spending for retirement, 

mandating coverage would increase costs for the state and local 

governments that sponsor the plans, and would likely reduce some pension 

benefits. Moreover, the GPO and the WEP would still be needed for many 

years to come even though they would become obsolete in the long run. 

Social Security covers about 96 

percent of all U.S. workers; the vast 

majority of the rest are state, local, 

and federal government employees. 

While these noncovered workers 

do not pay Social Security taxes on 

their government earnings, they 

may still be eligible for Social 

Security benefits. This poses 

difficult issues of fairness, and 

Social Security has provisions that 

attempt to address those issues, 

but critics contend these provisions 

are themselves often unfair. The 

Subcommittee asked GAO to 

discuss Social Security's effects on 

public employees as well as the 

implications of reform proposals. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has previously recommended 

that the Congress consider giving 

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

the authority to collect the 

information that the Social Security 

Administration (SSA) needs on 

government pension income, which 

could perhaps be accomplished 

through a simple modification to a 

single form. GAO continues to 

believe that this important issue 

warrants further consideration by 

the Congress. 
Page 1 GAO-05-786T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss how Social Security affects public 

employees and how reforms may change those effects. Social Security 

covers about 96 percent of all U.S. workers; the vast majority of the rest 

are state, local, and federal government employees. One option for Social 

Security reform is extending coverage to all state and local government 

employees who are not currently covered. While these noncovered 

workers do not pay Social Security taxes on their government earnings, 

they may still be eligible for Social Security benefits. This poses difficult 

issues of fairness, and Social Security has provisions that attempt to 

address those issues. Still, these provisions have been difficult to 

administer. They have also been a source of confusion and frustration for 

the workers they affect. 

I hope I can help clarify and provide some perspective on the complex 

relationship between Social Security and public employees. Today, I will 

discuss Social Security’s coverage of public employees, Social Security’s 

current provisions affecting noncovered public employees, and proposals 

to modify those provisions or make coverage mandatory for all public 

employees. My testimony is based on a body of work we have published 

over the past several years.1

In summary, Social Security does not cover about one-fourth of public 

employees, for various historical reasons. As a result, these employees do 

not pay Social Security taxes on earnings from their noncovered jobs. 

Nevertheless, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on 

their spouses’ or their own earnings in covered employment. Currently, 

Social Security has two provisions to address the resulting fairness issues. 

The Government Pension Offset (GPO) affects spouse and survivor 

benefits, and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) affects retired 

worker benefits. Both provisions reduce Social Security benefits for those 

who receive noncovered pension benefits. However, the Social Security 

Administration (SSA) cannot effectively and fairly apply these provisions 

because it does not have access to complete and accurate information on 

receipt of such noncovered pension benefits. Implementation of some of 

our recommendations has improved the availability and tracking of key 

information for federal retirees, which we estimate will save hundreds of 

 1

See the list of related GAO products at the end of this statement. 
Page 2 GAO-05-786T 

millions of dollars. However, Congressional action is still needed to 

improve access to information on state and local government pensions. 

In recent years, various Social Security reform proposals that would affect 

public employees have been offered. Some proposals specifically address 

the GPO and the WEP and would either revise or eliminate them. While we 

have not analyzed these proposals, we believe it is important to consider 

both the costs and the fairness issues they raise. Still other proposals 

would make coverage mandatory for all state and local government 

employees. According to Social Security actuaries, doing so for all newly 

hired state and local government employees would reduce the 75-year 

actuarial deficit by about 11 percent. It could also enhance inflation 

protection, pension portability, and dependent benefits for the affected 

beneficiaries, in many cases. However, to provide for the same level of 

retirement income, it could increase costs for the state and local 

governments that would sponsor the plans. Moreover, the GPO and the 

WEP would continue to apply for many years to come, even though they 

would become obsolete in the long run. 

Social Security provides retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to 

insured workers and their dependents. Insured workers are eligible for 

reduced benefits at age 62 and full retirement benefits between age 65 and 

67, depending on their year of birth.2

 Social Security retirement benefits 

are based on the worker’s age and career earnings, are fully indexed for 

inflation after retirement, and replace a relatively higher proportion of 

wages for career low-wage earners. Social Security’s primary source of 

revenue is the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 

portion of the payroll tax paid by employers and employees. The OASDI 

payroll tax is 6.2 percent of earnings each for employers and employees, 

up to an established maximum. 

One of Social Security’s most fundamental principles is that benefits 

reflect the earnings on which workers have paid taxes. Social Security 

provides benefits that workers have earned to some degree because of 

their contributions and those of their employers. At the same time, Social 

Security helps ensure that its beneficiaries have adequate incomes and do 

not have to depend on welfare. Toward this end, Social Security’s benefit 

 2

Beginning with those born in 1938, the age at which full benefits are payable will increase 

in gradual steps from age 65 to age 67. 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-05-786T 

provisions redistribute income in a variety of ways—from those with 

higher lifetime earnings to those with lower ones, from those without 

dependents to those with dependents, from single earners and two-earner 

couples to one-earner couples, and from those who don’t live very long to 

those who do. These effects result from the program’s focus on helping 

ensure adequate incomes. Such effects depend to a great degree on the 

universal and compulsory nature of the program. 

According to the Social Security Trustees’ 2005 intermediate, or bestestimate, assumptions, Social Security’s cash flow is expected to turn 

negative in 2017. In addition, all of the accumulated Treasury obligations 

held by the trust funds are expected to be exhausted by 2041. Social 

Security’s long-term financing shortfall stems primarily from the fact that 

people are living longer and having fewer children. As a result, the number 

of workers paying into the system for each beneficiary has been falling 

and is projected to decline from 3.3 today to about 2 by 2030. Reductions 

in promised benefits and/or increases in program revenues will be needed 

to restore the long-term solvency and sustainability of the program. 

About one-fourth of public employees do not pay Social Security taxes on 

the earnings from their government jobs. Historically, Social Security did 

not require coverage of government employment because there was 

concern over the question of the federal government’s right to impose a 

tax on state governments, and some had their own retirement systems. 

However, virtually all other workers are now covered, including the 

remaining three-fourths of public employees. 

The 1935 Social Security Act mandated coverage for most workers in 

commerce and industry, which at that time comprised about 60 percent of 

the workforce. Subsequently, the Congress extended mandatory Social 

Security coverage to most of the excluded groups, including state and 

local employees not covered by a public pension plan. The Congress also 

extended voluntary coverage to state and local employees covered by 

public pension plans. Since 1983, however, public employers have not 

been permitted to withdraw from the program once they are covered. Also 

in 1983, amendments to the Social Security Act extended mandatory 

coverage to newly hired federal workers and to all members of the 

Congress. 

SSA estimates that in 2004 nearly 5 million state and local government 

employees, excluding students and election workers, are not covered by 

Social Security. In addition, about three-quarters of a million federal 

About One-Fourth of 

Public Employees Are 

Not Covered by Social 

Security 
Page 4 GAO-05-786T 

employees hired before 1984 are also not covered. Seven 

states—California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, 

and Texas—account for 71 percent of the noncovered payroll. 

Most full-time public employees participate in defined benefit pension 

plans. Minimum retirement ages for full benefits vary. However, many 

state and local employees can retire with full benefits at age 55 with 30 

years of service. Retirement benefits also vary, but they are usually based 

on a specified benefit rate for each year of service and the member’s final 

average salary over a specified time period, usually 3 years. For example, 

plans with a 2 percent rate replace 60 percent of a member’s final average 

salary after 30 years of service. In addition to retirement benefits, 

members generally have a survivor annuity option and disability benefits, 

and many receive some cost-of-living increases after retirement. In 

addition, in recent years, the number of defined contribution plans, such 

as 401(k) plans and the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees, has 

been growing, and such plans are becoming a relatively more common 

way for employers to offer pension plans; public employers are no 

exception to this trend. 

Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on 

which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for 

Social Security benefits based on their spouses’ or their own earnings in 

covered employment. SSA estimates that nearly all noncovered state and 

local employees become entitled to Social Security as workers, spouses, 

or dependents. However, their noncovered status complicates the 

program’s ability to target benefits in the ways it is intended to do. 

To address the fairness issues that arise with noncovered public 

employees, Social Security has two provisions—the Government Pension 

Offset, to address spouse and survivor benefits, and the Windfall 

Elimination Provision, to address retired worker benefits. Both provisions 

depend on having complete and accurate information that has proven 

difficult to get. Also, both provisions are a source of confusion and 

frustration for public employees and retirees. 

Under the GPO provision, enacted in 1977, SSA must reduce Social 

Security benefits for those receiving noncovered government pensions 

when their entitlement to Social Security is based on another person’s 

(usually a spouse’s) Social Security coverage. Their Social Security 

benefits are to be reduced by two-thirds of the amount of their 

government pension. Under the WEP, enacted in 1983, SSA must use a 

Current Provisions 

Seek Fairness but 

Pose Administrative 

Challenges 
Page 5 GAO-05-786T 

modified formula to calculate the Social Security benefits people earn 

when they have had a limited career in covered employment. This formula 

reduces the amount of payable benefits. 

Regarding the GPO, spouse and survivor benefits were intended to provide 

some Social Security protection to spouses with limited working careers. 

The GPO provision reduces spouse and survivor benefits to persons who 

do not meet this limited working career criterion because they worked 

long enough in noncovered employment to earn their own pension. 

Regarding the WEP, the Congress was concerned that the design of the 

Social Security benefit formula provided unintended windfall benefits to 

workers who had spent most of their careers in noncovered employment. 

The formula replaces a higher portion of preretirement Social Security 

covered earnings when people have low average lifetime earnings than it 

does when people have higher average lifetime earnings. People who work 

exclusively, or have lengthy careers, in noncovered employment appear on 

SSA’s earnings records as having no covered earnings or a low average of 

covered lifetime earnings. As a result, people with this type of earnings 

history benefit from the advantage given to people with low average 

lifetime earnings when in fact their total (covered plus noncovered) 

lifetime earnings were higher than they appear to be for purposes of 

calculating Social Security benefits. 

Both the GPO and the WEP apply only to those beneficiaries who receive 

pensions from noncovered employment. To administer these provisions, 

SSA needs to know whether beneficiaries receive such noncovered 

pensions. However, SSA cannot apply these provisions effectively and 

fairly because it lacks this information, according to our past work.3

 In 

response to our recommendation, SSA performed additional computer 

matches with the Office of Personnel Management to get noncovered 

pension data for federal retirees. These computer matches detected 

payment errors; we estimate that correcting these errors will generate 

hundreds of millions of dollars in savings.4

 However, SSA still lacks the 

 3

See GAO, Social Security: Better Payment Controls for Benefit Reduction Provisions 

Could Save Millions, GAO/HEHS-98-76 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 1998). 

4

SSA performed the first such match in 1999 and advised that it will be done on a recurring 

basis in the future. SSA identified about 14,600 people whose benefits should have been 

calculated using WEP’s modified formula. We estimate that detecting these payment errors 

will generate $207.9 million in lifetime benefit reduction for this cohort. We further 

estimate each year’s match will generate about $57 million in lifetime benefit reductions for 

each new cohort. 
Page 6 GAO-05-786T 

information it needs for state and local governments and therefore it 

cannot apply the GPO and the WEP for state and local government 

employees to the same degree that it does for federal employees. The 

resulting disparity in the application of these two provisions is yet another 

source of unfairness in the final outcome. 

In our testimony before this committee in May 2003,5

 we recommended 

that the Congress consider giving the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the 

authority to collect the information that SSA needs on government 

pension income, which could perhaps be accomplished through a simple 

modification to a single form. Earlier versions of the Social Security 

Protection Act of 20046

 contained such a provision, but this provision was 

not included when the final version of the bill, was approved and signed 

into law. 

In recent years, various Social Security reform proposals that would affect 

public employees have been offered. Some proposals specifically address 

the GPO and the WEP and would either revise or eliminate them. Still 

other proposals would make coverage mandatory for all state and local 

government employees. 

The GPO and the WEP have been a source of confusion and frustration for 

the more than 6 million workers and 1.1 million beneficiaries they affect. 

Critics of the measures contend that they are basically inaccurate and 

often unfair. For example, some opponents of the WEP argue that the 

formula adjustment is an arbitrary and inaccurate way to estimate the 

value of the windfall and causes a relatively larger benefit reduction for 

lower-paid workers. In the case of the GPO, critics contend that the twothirds reduction is imprecise and could be based on a more rigorous 

formula. A variety of proposals have been offered to either revise or 

eliminate the GPO or the WEP. While we have not studied these proposals 

in detail, I would like to offer a few observations to keep in mind as you 

consider them. 

 5

GAO, Social Security: Issues Relating to Noncoverage of Public Employees, GAO-03-710T

(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003). 

6

Pub. L. No. 108-203. 

Some Reform 

Proposals Would 

Affect Public 

Employees 

Some Proposals Focus on 

the GPO or the WEP 
Page 7 GAO-05-786T 

First, repealing these provisions would be costly in an environment where 

the Social Security trust funds already face long-term solvency issues. 

According to the most recent estimates from SSA eliminating the GPO 

entirely would cost $32 billion over 10 years and cost 0.06 percent of 

taxable payroll, which would increase the long-range deficit by about 

3 percent. Similarly, eliminating the WEP would cost nearly $30 billion and 

increase Social Security’s long-range deficit by 3 percent. 

Second, in thinking about the fairness of the provisions and whether or not 

to repeal them, it is important to consider both the affected public 

employees and all other workers and beneficiaries who pay Social 

Security taxes. For example, SSA has described the GPO as a way to treat 

spouses with noncovered pensions in a fashion similar to how it treats 

dually entitled spouses, who qualify for Social Security benefits on both 

their own work records and their spouses’. In such cases, spouses may not 

receive both the benefits earned as a worker and the full spousal benefit; 

rather they receive the higher amount of the two. If the GPO were 

eliminated or reduced for spouses who had paid little or no Social Security 

taxes on their lifetime earnings, it might be reasonable to ask whether the 

same should be done for dually entitled spouses who have paid Social 

Security on all their earnings. Otherwise, such couples would be worse off 

than couples that were no longer subject to the GPO. And far more 

spouses are subject to the dual entitlement offset than to the GPO; as a 

result, the costs of eliminating the dual entitlement offset would be 

commensurately greater. 

Making coverage mandatory for all state and local government employees 

has been proposed to help address the program’s financing problems. 

According to Social Security actuaries, doing so for all newly hired state 

and local government employees would reduce the 75-year actuarial 

deficit by about 11 percent.7

 Covering all the remaining workers increases 

revenues relatively quickly and improves solvency for some time, since 

most of the newly covered workers would not receive benefits for many 

years. In the long run, however, benefit payments would increase as the 

newly covered workers started to collect benefits. Overall, this change 

would still represent a net gain for solvency, although it would be small. 

 7

SSA uses a period of 75 years for evaluating the program’s long-term actuarial status to 

obtain the full range of financial commitments that will be incurred on behalf of current 

program participants. 

Mandatory Coverage Has 

Been Proposed 
Page 8 GAO-05-786T 

In addition to considering solvency effects, the inclusion of mandatory 

coverage in a comprehensive reform package would need to be grounded 

in other considerations. In recommending that mandatory coverage be 

included in the reform proposals, the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory 

Council stated that mandatory coverage is basically “an issue of fairness.” 

Its report noted that “an effective Social Security program helps to reduce 

public costs for relief and assistance, which, in turn, means lower general 

taxes. There is an element of unfairness in a situation where practically all 

contribute to Social Security, while a few benefit both directly and 

indirectly but are excused from contributing to the program.” 

Moreover, mandatory coverage could improve benefits for the affected 

beneficiaries, but it could also increase pension costs for the state and 

local governments that would sponsor the plans. The effects on public 

employees and employers would depend on how states and localities 

changed their noncovered pension plans to conform with mandatory 

coverage. For example, Social Security offers automatic inflation 

protection, full benefit portability, and dependent benefits, which are not 

available in many public pension plans. Creating new pension plans that 

kept all the existing benefit provisions but added these new ones would 

increase the cost of the total package. Under this scenario, costs could 

increase by as much as 11 percent of payroll, depending on the benefit 

packages of the new plans. Alternatively, states and localities that wanted 

to maintain level spending for retirement would likely need to reduce 

some pension benefits. Additionally, states and localities could require 

several years to design, legislate, and implement changes to current 

pension plans. Mandating Social Security coverage for state and local 

employees could also elicit a constitutional challenge. Finally, mandatory 

coverage would not immediately address the issues and concerns 

regarding the GPO and the WEP. If left unchanged, these provisions would 

continue to apply for many years to come for existing employees and 

beneficiaries. Still, in the long run, mandatory coverage would make these 

provisions obsolete. 

In conclusion, there are no easy answers to the difficulties of equalizing 

Social Security’s treatment of covered and noncovered workers. Any 

reductions in the GPO or the WEP would ultimately come at the expense 

of other Social Security beneficiaries and taxpayers. Mandating universal 

coverage would promise eventual elimination of the GPO and the WEP but 

at potentially significant cost to affected state and local governments, and 

even so the GPO and the WEP would continue to apply for some years to 

come, unless they were repealed. 

Conclusions 
Page 9 GAO-05-786T 

Whatever the decision, it will be important to administer the program 

effectively and equitably. The GPO and the WEP have proven difficult to 

administer because they depend on complete and accurate reporting of 

government pension income, which is not currently achieved. The 

resulting disparity in the application of these two provisions is yet another 

source of unfairness in the final outcome. We therefore take this 

opportunity to bring the matter back to your attention for further 

consideration. 

To facilitate complete and accurate reporting of government pension 

income, the Congress should consider giving IRS the authority to collect 

this information, which could perhaps be accomplished through a simple 

modification to a single form. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, I would be happy to respond 

to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have. 

For information regarding this testimony, please contact Barbara D. 

Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues, on 

(202) 512-7215. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony 

include Daniel Bertoni, Ken Stockbridge, and Michael Collins. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

GAO Contributions 

and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 10 GAO-05-786T 

Social Security Reform: Answers to Key Questions. GAO-05-193SP. 

Washington, D.C.: May 2005. 

Social Security: Issues Relating to Noncoverage of Public Employees. 

GAO-03-710T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003. 

Social Security: Congress Should Consider Revising the Government 

Pension Offset “Loophole.” GAO-03-498T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2003. 

Social Security Administration: Revision to the Government Pension 

Offset Exemption Should Be Considered. GAO-02-950. Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 15, 2002. 

Social Security Reform: Experience of the Alternate Plans in Texas. 

GAO/HEHS-99-31, Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999. 

Social Security: Implications of Extending Mandatory Coverage to State 

and Local Employees. GAO/HEHS-98-196. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 1998. 

Social Security: Better Payment Controls for Benefit Reduction 

Provisions Could Save Millions. GAO/HEHS-98-76. Washington, D.C.: 

April 30, 1998. 

Federal Workforce: Effects of Public Pension Offset on Social Security 

Benefits of Federal Retirees. GAO/GGD-88-73. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 

1988. 

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