___________ No. 95-1342

___________ Mary Lou Graham, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Bill Harman, of the Joplin * Police Department; City of * Joplin, Missouri; David * Niebur; Michael Talley, * * Appellees. *

___________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the No. 95-2124 Western District of Missouri.

___________ [UNPUBLISHED] Mary Lou Graham, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Bill Harman, of the Joplin * Police Department; City of * Joplin, Missouri; David Niebur; * Michael Talley, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 26, 1996 Filed: March 5, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

### The Honorab le Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for 1 

### the Western District of Missouri. -2- Mary Lou Graham appeals the district court's order s granting partial 1 summary judgment for defendants in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, entering judgment in favor of defendants following a jury trial on her supplemental state-law claim, and denying her motion for a new trial. We affirm.
During a traffic stop conducted by a Joplin, Missouri police of ficer, Graham produced an ou t-of-state driver's license. When the officer asked Graham her age, she r efused to tell him, and after the officer called for back-up, she asked him if she was free to go and started her car. Th e officer then grabbed Graham's keys out of the ignition, and advised he r that she was under arrest for obstruction. See Joplin, Mo., Code § 26-5 ("[i]t s hall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and willfull y obstruct, resist, or oppose any officer of the c ity . . . in the discharge of any . . . duty. . . . [P]hysical obstruction, . . . failure to full y cooperate, etc., shall be deemed violations of this section").
Graham instituted this action asserting that her arrest was unl awful,
as she did not withhold any information that was not available on he r driver's license, and that the obstruction ordinance was overly broad and thus facially unconstitutional. She also maintained that the Joplin Polic e Departme nt had a policy of unlawful searches and seizures, and ha d insufficiently trained its officers. Finally, G raham contended that after her arrest, she was subjected to an unlawful strip search at the city jail

. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.193.2 (1987) (generally, no person arrested for a non-felonious offense may be strip-searched).

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants o n Graham's section 1983 claims, concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity; rejecting Graham's challenge to the

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validity of the ordinance; and finding insufficient evidence to support he r claim that the police department had a policy of unlawful searches an d seizures, and inadequately trained its officers. The district court denie d summary judgment as t o the strip-search claim, however, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Graham was stripsearched. Following a trial on this claim, the jury returned a verdict fo r defendants. The dist rict court subsequently denied Graham's motion for a
new tr ial, in which she challenged the jury instruction delineatin g Missouri's definition of a strip search. This appeal followed.
Upon our review of the record, we ag ree with the district court that the police officer wa s entitled to qualified immunity, as he had at least arguab le probable cause to arrest Graham for violating the obstructio n ordin ance. See Gorra v. Hanson , 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989). Whe n Gra hamrefused to tell the officer her age, the officer could hav e reasonably believed she was failing to fully cooperate in his effort t o det ermine the validity of her out-of-state license. Given this initia l ref usal to cooperate, Graham's subsequent act in starting her car coul d have caused the officer to reasonably believe that Graham was physically obstructing his duties by attempting to flee before he could issue her a traffic citation. Cf. Lennon v. Miller , 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995) (officers were qualifiedly immune from arrestee's false-arrest claim, as they could have reasonably believed she obstructed governmenta l admini stration by locking herself in automobile and attempting to star t engine with apparent intention of driving away).
We also agree with the district cour t that Graham's challenge to the validity of the obstruction ordinance fails, because the ordinanc e "provide[s] reasonable notice to persons of ordinary intelligence" as to what conduct it prohibits. United States v. J.H .H. , 22 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir. 1994). The record is void of

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any evidence supporting Graham's claim that the police department had a policy of unlawful searches and seizures, and failed to train its officers

. Thus, w e conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment o n Graham's section 1983 claims.

The jury's verdict on Graham's state law strip-search claim wa s likewise proper. Contrary to Graham's contentio n on appeal, the testimony of the police matron who conducted the search indicates that Graham was no t strip-searched, becau se the type of search described did not involve "the removal or rearrangement of . . . clothing . . . so as to permit inspectio n of the genitals, buttocks, anus, breasts, or undergarments." Mo. Rev

. Stat. § 544.193.1(2) (1987). We conclude further that the district court accurately instructed the jury as to what constitutes a strip search b y quoting the above sta tutory definition, adding that it is not unlawful to require the removal o f clothing for safety purposes, cf. State v. Friend , 711 S.W.2d 508, 510 ( Mo. 1986) (en banc) (safety concerns support removal of property from detainees), and omitting only irrelevant provisions of th e strip-search statute. See National Automotive Trading Corp. of China v. Pioneer Trading Co. , 46 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (jury instructions proper where they adequately and su fficiently state generally applicable law). Because the instruction was proper, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Graham's motion for a new trial. See Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l , 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review).
Accordingly, we affirm.

### -5- A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.