TYRONE WILLIAMS , Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D 15

- 5716

________ _____________________/ Opinion filed April 12, 2016. An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. Mark W. Moseley , Judge

. Tyrone Williams, pro se , Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorn ey General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

LEWIS, J

. Appellant, Tyrone Williams, appeals the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). For the reasons discussed below, we a ffirm the orde r denying relief and certif y conflict with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson v. State , 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).2 A ppellant was convicted of sexual battery by use of force not likely to cause serious personal injury , a second

- degree felon y punishable b y up to fifte en years’ imprisonment. §§ 775.082 (3)(c) ; 794.011(5)(a ), Fla. Stat. (2009)

. A ppellant was sentenced to life imprisonment as a dangerous sexual felony offender (“DSFO”) pursuant to section 794 .0115, Florida Statutes (2009). A pp ellant contends that his life sentence as a DSFO 1 is illegal. He relies on Wilkerson v. State , 143 So. 3d
462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), which held that pursuant to section 794.0115(6), where the minimum mandatory required by section 794.0115 , Florida Statutes (2009), exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by section 775.082 (3)(c), the trial c ourt is limited to imposing a twenty

- five

- year minimum mandatory, and a life sentence is not authorized. However, based upon the plain language of section 794.0115, we di sagree with the Fifth District’s holding in Wilkerson

. See Williams v. State , 121 So. 3d 524, 530 (Fla. 2013) (noting that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of a statute must control and that when a statute is clear, a court need not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent). Section 794.0115 (2) , Florida Statutes (2009), states that a DSFO “must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years impriso nment up to, and including , life imprisonment.” Section 794.0115 (6) mandates that i f the minimum

1 A ppellant does not challenge his DSFO designation.3 mandatory term of section 794.0115 exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by section 775.082 , the minimum mandatory term must be imposed. The plain languag e of the statute makes the DSFO minimum mandatory sentence any term between twenty

- five years and life in prison, as the statute specifically states that the minimum mandatory is “25 years imprisonment up to, and including , life imprisonment .” § 794.0115 (2 ) , Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). There is no restriction on the length of the minimum mandatory that may be imposed, other than that it must be between twenty

- five years and life. Thus, a minimum mandatory life sentence is authorized by section 794 .0115 regardless of the statutory maximum of the crime. This Court has read a similar “25 to life” provision, section 775.087 (2)(a)3., Florida Statutes, to permit the imposition of a life sentence for a second

- degree felony. In Flowers v. State , 69 So. 3d 1042 , 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this Court held that pursuant to the 10

- 20

- life statute, which requires a minimum mandatory term of “ not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison ” when a defendant discharges a firearm and causes great bodily harm or death, the trial court could impose any m inimum mandatory term between twenty

five years and life for a defendant convicted of a second

- degree felony. This C ourt specifically rejected the argument that section 775.087 (2)(a )3. limits the minimum mandatory period to twenty

- five ye ars for a second

- degree felony. Id. This4 Court’s reasoning in Flowers applies to section 794.0115 as well. A ppellant’s minimum mandatory life sentence as a dangerous sexual felony offender is lega l as
it is specifically authorized by section 794.0115

. We recognize that this holding conflicts with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson , and we certify conflict with that decision

. AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED

. THOMAS, J., CONCURS; MAKAR , J., CO NCURS WITH OPINION.5 MAKAR, J. , concurring

. I concur fully, noting that the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson v. State , 143 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cannot stand unless our supreme court revisits and changes course f rom its decision in Mendenhall v. State , 48 So. 3d 740, 750 (Fla. 2010), whose holding our court applied to validate the trial court’s discretionary imposition of a “minimum mandatory life term” in Flowers v. State , 69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) . Reasonable alternative interpretations of the sentencing statutes at issue in these cases exist, resulting in the 4

- 3 decision
in Mendenhall as well as the interpretive conflict between this case and Wilkerson (which did not mention Mendenhall ). Absent r esolution of the conflict, trial judges across Florida will lack uniform guidance on their sentencing discretion resulting in geographically incongruous results as a comparison of this case with Wilkerson demonstrates.