65968 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 216 / Thursday, November 6, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

Federal Reserve 

Bank Rate Effective 

Philadelphia ...... 1.25 October 30, 2008. 

Cleveland .......... 1.25 October 29, 2008. 

Richmond ......... 1.25 October 30, 2008. 

Atlanta .............. 1.25 October 31, 2008. 

Chicago ............ 1.25 October 29, 2008. 

St. Louis ........... 1.25 October 30, 2008. 

Minneapolis ...... 1.25 October 30, 2008. 

Kansas City ...... 1.25 October 29, 2008. 

Dallas ................ 1.25 October 30, 2008. 

San Francisco .. 1.25 October 29, 2008. 

(b) Secondary credit. The interest 

rates for secondary credit provided to 

depository institutions under 201.4(b) 

are: 

Federal Reserve 

Bank Rate Effective 

Boston .............. 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

New York .......... 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

Philadelphia ...... 1.75 October 30, 2008. 

Cleveland .......... 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

Richmond ......... 1.75 October 30, 2008. 

Atlanta .............. 1.75 October 31, 2008. 

Chicago ............ 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

St. Louis ........... 1.75 October 30, 2008. 

Minneapolis ...... 1.75 October 30, 2008. 

Kansas City ...... 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

Dallas ................ 1.75 October 30, 2008. 

San Francisco .. 1.75 October 29, 2008. 

* * * * * 

By order of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, November 3, 2008. 

Jennifer J. Johnson, 

Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. E8–26483 Filed 11–5–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6210–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 33, and 35 

[Docket No.: FAA–2007–27310; Amendment 

Nos. 23–59, 25–126, 33–28, and 35–5] 

RIN 2120–AI95 

Airworthiness Standards; Propellers; 

Correction 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; corrections. 

SUMMARY: This document corrects the 

amendment number and a typographical 

error in the final rule published in the 

Federal Register on Friday, October 24, 

2008. The final rule amends the 

airworthiness standards for issuance of 

original and amended type certificates 

for airplane propellers. 

DATES: This amendment becomes 

effective December 23, 2008. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jay 

Turnberg, Engine and Propeller 

Directorate Standards Staff, ANE–110, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 12 

New England Executive Park, 

Burlington, Massachusetts 01803–5299; 

telephone (781) 238–7116; facsimile 

(781) 238–7199, e-mail: 

jay.turnberg@faa.gov. 

Correction 

In the final rule, Airworthiness 

Standards; Propellers, published in the 

Federal Register issue of Friday, 

October 24, 2008, (73 FR 63339) make 

the following corrections: 

1. On page 63339, in the second 

column, the fifth line of the heading, 

‘‘Amendment No. 35–5’’ is corrected to 

read, ‘‘Amendment No. 35–8.’’ 

2. On page 63340, in the third 

column, revise the heading 

‘‘Harmonization with S–P Amendment 

1’’ to read ‘‘Harmonization with CS–P 

Amendment 1’’. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 31, 

2008. 

Pamela Hamilton-Powell, 

Director, Office of Rulemaking. 

[FR Doc. E8–26392 Filed 11–5–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 29 

[Docket No. SW022; Special Conditions No. 

29–022–SC] 

Special Conditions: Eurocopter France 

(ECF) Model EC225LP Helicopter, 

Installation of a Search and Rescue 

(SAR) Automatic Flight Control System 

(AFCS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the ECF Model EC225LP 

helicopter. This helicopter will have 

novel or unusual design features 

associated with installing an optional 

SAR AFCS. The applicable 

airworthiness standards do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety 

requirements for this design feature. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

show a level of safety equivalent to that 

established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is October 30, 2008. 

We must receive your comments by 

December 22, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You must mail or deliver 

two copies of your comments to: Federal 

Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft 

Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ASW– 

111), Docket No. SW022, 2601 Meacham 

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You 

must mark your comments: Docket No. 

SW022. You may inspect comments in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff 

Trang, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

ASW–111, Aircraft Certification Service, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5135; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

has determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable because these 

procedures would significantly delay 

issuance of the design approval and 

thus delivery of the affected aircraft. 

The FAA therefore finds that good cause 

exists for making these special 

conditions effective on issuance. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

about these special conditions. You can 

inspect the docket before and after the 

comment closing date. If you wish to 

review the docket in person, go to the 

address in the ADDRESSES section of this 

document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring additional expense or 

delay. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your comments on these 

special conditions, send us a 

preaddressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 


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Background and Discussion 

On March 27, 2006, ECF applied for 

a change to Type Certificate (TC) No. 

H4EU to install an optional SAR AFCS 

in the Model EC225LP helicopter. The 

Model EC225LP is a transport category 

helicopter certified to Category A 

requirements when configured for more 

than nine passengers and Category A or 

B requirements when configured for 

nine or less passengers. This helicopter 

is also certified for instrument flight 

under the requirements of Appendix B 

of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29–47. 

The use of dedicated AFCS upper 

modes, in which a fully coupled 

autopilot provides operational SAR 

profiles, is needed for SAR operations 

conducted over water in offshore areas 

clear of obstructions. The SAR modes 

enable the helicopter to fly fully 

coupled maneuvers, to include 

predefined search patterns during cruise 

flight, and to transition from cruise 

flight to a stabilized hover and 

departure (transition from hover to 

cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also 

includes an auxiliary crew control that 

allows another crewmember (such as a 

hoist operator) to have limited authority 

to control the helicopter’s longitudinal 

and lateral position during hover 

operations. 

Flight operations conducted over 

water at night may have an extremely 

limited visual horizon with little visual 

reference to the surface even when 

conducted under Visual Meteorological 

Conditions (VMC). Consequently, the 

certification requirements for SAR 

modes are considered equivalent to 

operating under Instrument 

Meteorological Conditions (IMC). While 

Appendix B to 14 CFR part 29 

prescribes airworthiness criteria for 

instrument flight, it does not consider 

operations below instrument flight 

minimum speed (VMINI), whereas the 

SAR modes allow for coupled 

operations at low speed, all-azimuth 

flight to zero airspeed (hover). 

Since SAR operations have 

traditionally been a public use mission, 

the use of SAR modes in civil 

operations requires special 

airworthiness standards (special 

conditions) to ensure that a level of 

safety consistent with Category A and 

Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) 

certification is maintained. In this 

regard, 14 CFR part 29 lacks adequate 

airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR 

mode certification to include flight 

characteristics, performance, and 

installed equipment and systems. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, ECF must show 

the EC225LP, as changed, continues to 

meet the applicable provisions of the 

rules incorporated by reference in TC 

No. H4EU or the applicable regulations 

in effect on the date of application for 

the change. The regulations 

incorporated by reference in the TC are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in H4EU are 

as follows: 

a. 14 CFR 21.29. 

b. 14 CFR part 29 Amendments 29–1 

to 29–25; plus § 29.785 through 

Amendment 29–28; plus §§ 29.963, 

29.967, 29.973, 29.975 through 

Amendment 29–34; plus §§ 29.25, 

29.865 through Amendment 29–42; plus 

§§ 29.1, 29.2, 29.49, 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 

29.59, 29.60, 29.61, 29.62, 29.64, 29.65, 

29.67, 29.73, 29.75, 29.77, 29.79, 29.81, 

29.83, 29.85, 29.87, 29.307, 29.337, 

29.351, 29.361, 29.391, 29.395, 29.397, 

29.401, 29.403, 29.413, 29.427, 29.501, 

29.519, 29.547, 29.549, 29.561(c), 

29.561(d), 29.563, 29.602, 29.610, 

29.613, 29.621, 29.625, 29.629, 29.631, 

29.663, 29.674, 29.727, 29.755, 29.775, 

29.783, 29.787, 29.803, 29.805, 29.807, 

29.809, 29.811, 29.855, 29.861, 29.901, 

29.903, 29.908, 29.917, 29.923, 29.927, 

29.954, 29.961, 29.965, 29.969, 29.971, 

29.991, 29.997, 29.999, 29.1001, 

29.1011, 29.1019, 29.1027, 29.1041, 

29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047, 29.1093, 

29.1125, 29.1141, 29.1143, 29.1163, 

29.1181, 29.1189, 29.1193, 29.1305, 

29.1309, 29.1323, 29.1329, 29.1337, 

29.1351, 29.1359, 29.1415, 29.1521, 

29.1549, 29.1557, 29.1587, A29, B29, 

C29, D29 through Amendment 29–47; 

plus 29.1317 through Amendment 29– 

49. 

c. 14 CFR part 36 Amendment 21 

(ICAO Annex 16, Volume 1, Chapter 8). 

d. Equivalent Safety Findings: 

(1) TC2899RD–R–F–01; § 29.1303(j), 

Vne aural warning. 

(2) TC2899RD–R–F–02; 

§ 29.1545(b)(4), Airspeed indicators 

markings. 

(3) TC2899RD–R–F–03; § 29.1549(b), 

Powerplant instruments markings. 

(4) TC2899RD–R–F–05; § 29.173, 175, 

Static Longitudinal Stability. 

(5) TC2899RD–R–F–06; 14 CFR part 

29, Appendix B, paragraph IV; IFR 

Static Longitudinal Stability—Airspeed 

stability. 

(6) TC2899RD–R–A–01; 

§ 29.807(d)(2), Ditching emergency exits 

for passengers. 

(7) TC2899RD–R–P–01; § 29.923(a)(2), 

Rotor drive system and control 

mechanism tests. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness standards and special 

conditions, the ECF Model EC225LP 

must comply with the fuel vent and 

exhaust emission requirements of 14 

CFR part 34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness standards (i.e., 

14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate 

or appropriate safety requirements for 

the ECF Model EC225LP helicopter 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under 14 CFR 21.16. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the TC for that model 

be amended later to include any other 

model that incorporates the same novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same TC be modified to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The ECF Model EC225LP helicopter 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: 

The SAR system is composed of a 

navigation computer with SAR modes, 

an AFCS that provides coupled SAR 

functions, hoist operator control, a 

hover speed reference system, and two 

radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled 

SAR functions include: 

a. Hover hold at selected height above 

the surface. 

b. Ground speed hold. 

c. Transition down and hover to a 

waypoint under guidance from the 

navigation computer. 

d. SAR pattern, transition down, and 

hover near a target over which the 

helicopter has flown. 

e. Transition up, climb, and capture a 

cruise height. 

f. Capture and track SAR search 

patterns generated by the navigation 

computer. 

g. Monitor the preselected hover 

height with automatic increase in 

collective if the aircraft height drops 

below the safety height. 

These SAR modes are intended to be 

used over large bodies of water in areas 

clear of obstructions. Further, use of the 

modes that transition down from cruise 

to hover will include operation at 

airspeeds below VMINI. 

The SAR system only entails 

navigation, flight control, and coupled 

AFCS operation of the helicopter. The 


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system does not include the additional 

equipment that may be required for over 

water flight or external loads to meet 

other operational requirements. 

Applicability 

These special conditions apply to the 

ECF Model EC225LP helicopters. 

Should ECF apply at a later date for a 

change to the TC to include another 

model incorporating the same novel or 

unusual design feature, these special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well under the provisions of § 21.101(d). 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of helicopter. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

Normally, in adopting special 

conditions, we provide notice and an 

opportunity for comment before issuing 

the final special conditions. However, 

because the delivery date of the ECF 

Model EC225LP helicopter is imminent, 

we find that it is impracticable to 

provide prior notice because a delay 

would be contrary to the public interest. 

Therefore, good cause exists to make 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

■ The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the type certification 

basis for Eurocopter France EC225LP 

model helicopters when the optional 

Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic 

Flight Control System (AFCS) is 

installed: 

In addition to the part 29 certification 

requirements for Category A and 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B), the following additional 

requirements must be met for 

certification of the SAR AFCS: 

(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled 

SAR flight modes must provide: 

(1) Safe and controlled flight in three 

axes (lateral and longitudinal position/ 

speed and height/vertical speed) at all 

airspeeds from instrument flight 

minimum speed (VMINI) to a hover. 

(2) Automatic transition to the 

helicopter instrument flight (Appendix 

B) envelope. 

(3) A Go-Around mode that safely 

disengages any other coupled mode in 

case of an aborted approach to a hover 

or SAR system failure. 

(4) A means to prevent unintended 

flight below a safe minimum height. 

(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. 

To support the integrity of the SAR 

modes, the following system 

architecture is required: 

(1) A system for limiting the engine 

power demanded by the AFCS when 

any of the automatic piloting modes are 

engaged, so FADEC power limitations, 

such as torque and temperature, are not 

exceeded. 

(2) A system providing the aircraft 

height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the 

instrument panel in a position 

acceptable to the FAA that will make it 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at his station. 

(3) A system providing the pilotselected heading at a location on the 

instrument panel in a position 

acceptable to the FAA that will make it 

plainly visible to and usable by any 

pilot at his station. 

(4) A system providing to any pilot 

the pilot-selected longitudinal and 

lateral ground speeds used by the AFCS 

in the flight envelope where airspeed 

indications become unreliable. 

(5) A system providing wind speed 

and wind direction when automatic 

piloting modes are engaged or 

transitioning from one mode to another. 

(6) A system that monitors for flight 

guidance deviations and failures, 

coupled with an appropriate and 

unmistakable alerting function for the 

flight crew, unless it is shown that a 

deviation or failure does not create a 

hazard. 

(7) An alerting system that provides 

unmistakable visual or aural alerts, or 

both, to the flight crew under any of the 

following conditions: 

(i) When the stored or pilot-selected 

minimum safety height is reached. 

(ii) When a SAR mode system 

malfunction occurs. 

For normal transitions from one SAR 

mode to another, a single visual or aural 

alert may suffice. For a SAR mode 

malfunction or a mode having a timecritical component, the crew alerting 

system must activate early enough to 

allow the crew to take timely and 

appropriate action. The alerting means 

must be designed to alert the crew in 

order to minimize crew errors that could 

create an additional hazard. 

(8) The SAR system hoist operator 

control is considered a flight control 

and must comply with the following: 

(i) The hoist operator control must be 

designed and located to provide for 

convenient operation and to prevent 

confusion and inadvertent operation. 

(ii) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable by the hoist operator 

control throughout the range of that 

control. 

(iii) The hoist operator control may 

not interfere with the safe operation of 

the helicopter. Pilot and copilot flight 

controls must be able to smoothly 

override the control authority of the 

hoist operator control, without 

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength, and without the danger of 

exceeding any other limitation because 

of the override. 

(9) The reliability of the AFCS must 

be related to the effects of its failure. 

The occurrence of any failure condition 

that would prevent continued safe flight 

and landing must be extremely 

improbable. For any failure condition of 

the AFCS which is not shown to be 

extremely improbable: 

(i) The helicopter must be safely 

controllable and capable of continued 

safe flight without exceptional piloting 

skill, alertness, or strength. Additional 

unrelated probable failures affecting the 

control system must be evaluated. 

(ii) The AFCS must be designed so 

that it cannot create a hazardous 

deviation in the flight path or produce 

hazardous loads on the helicopter 

during normal operation or in the event 

of a malfunction or failure, assuming 

corrective action begins within an 

appropriate period of time. Where 

multiple systems are installed, 

subsequent malfunction conditions 

must be evaluated in sequence unless 

their occurrence is shown to be 

improbable. 

(10) A functional hazard assessment 

(FHA) and a system safety assessment 

must be prepared and consider the 

catastrophic failure conditions 

associated with SAR operations. For 

SAR catastrophic failure conditions, 

changes may be required to the 

following: 

(i) System architecture. 

(ii) Software and complex electronic 

hardware design assurance levels. 

(iii) HIRF test levels. 

(iv) Instructions for continued 

airworthiness. 

The assessments must consider all the 

systems required for SAR operations to 

include the AFCS, all associated AFCS 

sensors (e.g., radio altimeter), and 

primary flight displays. Electrical and 

electronic systems with SAR 

catastrophic failure conditions (e.g., 

AFCS) must comply with the 

§ 29.1317(a)(4) High Intensity Radiated 

Field (HIRF) requirements. 

(c) SAR Mode Performance 

Requirements. (1) The SAR modes must 

be demonstrated in the requested flight 


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envelope for the following minimum 

sea-state and wind conditions: 

(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 

meters (8.2 feet), considering both short 

and long swells. 

(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 

knots for all other azimuths. 

(2) The selected hover height and 

hover velocity must be captured (to 

include the transition from one captured 

mode to another captured mode) 

accurately and smoothly and not exhibit 

any significant overshoot or oscillation. 

(3) For any single failure or any 

combination of failures of the AFCS that 

is not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the Minimum Use Height 

(MUH) must result in a loss of height 

that is no greater than half of the MUH 

with a minimum margin of 15 feet above 

the surface. 

(4) The SAR mode system must be 

usable up to the maximum certified 

gross weight of the aircraft or to the 

lower of the following weights: 

(i) Maximum emergency flotation 

weight. 

(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground 

Effect (OGE) weight. 

(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight. 

(d) Flight Characteristics. (1) The 

basic aircraft must meet all the part 29 

airworthiness criteria for helicopter 

instrument flight (Appendix B). 

(2) For SAR mode coupled flight 

below VMINI, at the maximum 

demonstrated winds, the helicopter 

must be able to maintain any required 

flight condition and make a smooth 

transition from any flight condition to 

any other flight condition without 

requiring exceptional piloting skill, 

alertness, or strength, and without 

danger of exceeding the limit load 

factor. This requirement also includes 

aircraft control through the hoist 

operator’s control. 

(3) For SAR modes at airspeeds below 

VMINI, the following requirements of 

Appendix B to part 29 must be met and 

will be used as an extension to the IFR 

certification envelope of the basic 

aircraft: 

(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph IV of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: 

The requirements of paragraph V of 

Appendix B are not applicable. 

(iii) Dynamic Stability: The 

requirements of paragraph VI of 

Appendix B are replaced with the 

following two paragraphs: 

(A) Any oscillation must be damped, 

and any aperiodic response must not 

double in amplitude in less than 10 

seconds. This requirement must also be 

met with degraded upper mode(s) of the 

AFCS. An ‘‘upper mode’’ is a mode that 

utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to 

provide an operational SAR profile. 

(B) After any speed deviation of 5 

knots, the return to the initial automatic 

hold condition must occur without 

oscillation within 10 seconds or less. 

(4) With any of the upper mode(s) of 

the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be 

able to manually recover the aircraft and 

transition to the normal (Appendix B) 

IFR flight profile envelope without 

exceptional skill, alertness, or strength. 

(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) 

Performance Information. (1) The 

following performance information 

must be provided in the Rotorcraft 

Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS): 

(i) OEI performance information and 

emergency procedures, providing the 

maximum weight that will provide a 

minimum clearance of 15 feet above the 

surface, following failure of the critical 

engine in a hover. The maximum weight 

must be presented as a function of the 

hover height for the temperature and 

pressure altitude range requested for 

certification. The effects of wind must 

be reflected in the hover performance 

information. 

(ii) Hover OGE performance with the 

critical engine inoperative for OEI 

continuous and time-limited power 

ratings for those weights, altitudes, and 

temperatures for which certification is 

requested. 

These OEI performance requirements 

do not replace performance 

requirements that may be needed to 

comply with the airworthiness or 

operational standards (§ 29.865 or 14 

CFR part 133) for external loads or 

human external cargo. 

(f) RFMS. (1) The RFMS must contain, 

at a minimum: 

(i) Limitations necessary for safe 

operation of the SAR system to include: 

(A) Minimum crew requirements. 

(B) Maximum SAR weight. 

(C) Engagement criteria for each of the 

SAR modes to include MUH. 

(ii) Normal and emergency procedures 

for operation of the SAR system (to 

include operation of the hoist operator 

control), with AFCS failure modes, 

AFCS degraded modes, and engine 

failures. 

(iii) Performance information: 

(A) OEI performance and height-loss. 

(B) Hover OGE performance 

information, utilizing OEI continuous 

and time-limited power ratings. 

(C) The maximum wind envelope 

demonstrated in flight test. 

(g) Flight Demonstration. (1) Before 

approval of the SAR system, an 

acceptable flight demonstration of all 

the coupled SAR modes is required. 

(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe 

operations during coupled maneuvers. 

The demonstration of fail-safe 

operations must include a pilot 

workload assessment associated with 

manually flying the aircraft to an 

altitude greater than 200 feet above the 

surface and an airspeed of at least the 

best rate of climb airspeed (Vy). 

(3) For any failure condition of the 

SAR system not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the pilot must be able to 

make a smooth transition from one 

flight mode to another without 

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(4) A failure condition that is not 

shown to be extremely improbable must 

be demonstrated by analysis, ground 

testing, or flight testing. For failures 

demonstrated in flight, the following 

normal pilot recognition and recovery 

times are acceptable (normal pilot 

recognition time is the time that it takes 

an average pilot to recognize that a 

failure has occurred): 

(i) Transition (Cruise-to-Hover/Hoverto-Cruise) and Hover: Normal pilot 

recognition plus 1 second. 

(ii) Cruise: Normal pilot recognition 

plus 3 seconds. 

(5) All AFCS malfunctions must 

include evaluation at the low-speed and 

high-power flight conditions typical of 

SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS 

hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory 

malfunctions, particularly in yaw, 

require evaluation. AFCS malfunction 

testing must include a single or a 

combination of failures (e.g., erroneous 

data from and loss of the radio altimeter, 

attitude, heading, and altitude sensors) 

which are not shown to be extremely 

improbable. 

(6) The flight demonstration must 

include the following environmental 

conditions: 

(i) Swell into wind. 

(ii) Swell and wind from different 

directions. 

(iii) Cross swell. 

(iv) Swell of different lengths (short 

and long swell). 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 30, 

2008. 

Mark R. Schilling, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–26462 Filed 11–5–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


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