a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Government Reform, and Chairman, 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats and International 

Relations, House of Representatives

November 2004 RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to 

Better Prepare the 

National Guard for 

Future Overseas and 

Domestic Missions

GAO-05-21
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-21, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Government 

Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives 

November 2004

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Better Prepare the 

National Guard for Future Overseas and 

Domestic Missions 

The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to 

meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but 

some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the 

readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard. To 

deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had 

to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between 

September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed 

over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National 

Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying 

units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the 

critical equipment they need for war. The Army has developed plans, such as 

the Army Campaign Plan, to restructure its forces to better prepare them for 

future missions. However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying 

equipment needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the 

Army is still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does 

not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to deploy 

in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to continue to 

provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 to 5 years. The Air 

National Guard is also adapting to meet new warfighting requirements, but it 

has not been as negatively affected as the Army National Guard because it 

has not been required to sustain the same high level of operations. In 

addition, the Air National Guard generally maintains fully manned and 

equipped units. 

While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also supported the 

nation’s homeland security needs, the Guard’s preparedness to perform 

homeland security missions that may be needed in the future is unknown 

because requirements and readiness standards and measures have not been 

defined. Without this information, policy makers are not in the best position 

to manage the risks to the nation’s homeland security by targeting 

investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that the investments 

are having the desired effect. Since September 11, the Guard has been 

performing several unanticipated homeland missions, such as flying patrols 

over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, states have 

concerns about the preparedness and availability of Guard forces for 

domestic needs and natural disasters while overseas deployments continue 

at a high pace. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a 

comprehensive strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. 

However, DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state 

authorities on the Guard’s role in such missions. Also, the National Guard 

Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard’s homeland security 

capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are at an early stage and will 

require coordination and approval from other stakeholders, such as DOD 

and the states. In the absence of clear homeland security requirements, the 

Guard’s preparedness to perform missions at home cannot be measured to 

determine whether it needs additional assets or training. 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks and the global war on 

terrorism have triggered the largest 

activation of National Guard forces 

since World War II. As of June 

2004, over one-half of the National 

Guard’s 457,000 personnel had 

been activated for overseas 

warfighting or domestic homeland 

security missions in federal and 

state active duty roles. In addition 

to increased usage, the Guard has 

also experienced long deployments 

and high demand for personnel 

with specific skills, such as military 

police. The high pace of operations 

and the Guard’s expanded role 

since September 11 have raised 

concerns about whether the Guard 

is capable of successfully 

performing its multiple missions 

within existing and expected 

resource levels, especially given 

the challenges it faces in meeting 

future requirements. 

GAO was asked to assess the 

extent to which the Guard is: 

(1) adapting to meet warfighting 

requirements in the postSeptember 11 security environment 

and (2) supporting immediate and 

emerging homeland security needs. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense submit a plan 

to Congress on how DOD will 

improve the Army National Guard’s 

structure and readiness for 

overseas operations and to clearly 

define the National Guard’s role in 

homeland security. DOD generally 

agreed with the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6 

National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting 

Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future 

Operations 10 

National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its 

Readiness for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured 20 

Conclusions 28 

Recommendations for Executive Action 30 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 33 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 38 

Figures 

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity 

under Title 10 8 

Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, 

Mobilized, or Deployed for Federal Missions as of 

June 2, 2004 22 

Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or 

Deployed for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004 23 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground Air Radio System 

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Page 1 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

November 10, 2004 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats 

 and International Relations 

House of Representatives 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent launch of the 

global war on terrorism have resulted in the largest activation of National 

Guard forces—both Army and Air—since World War II. Within 1 month of 

the September 11 attacks, the number of Army National Guard members 

activated for federal missions more than quadrupled, from about 5,500 to 

about 23,000. By June 2004, over 50 percent of the National Guard’s nearly 

350,000 Army and 107,000 Air National Guard members had been activated 

for overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping 

operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or homeland missions, such as guarding 

active Air Force bases. These operations have resulted in a high demand 

for Guard members overall and especially for those trained with certain 

skills, such as security personnel and tanker pilots. As a result, National 

Guard personnel have experienced lengthy and repeated deployments 

since the September 11 terrorist attacks. 

The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs federal 

missions under the command of the President and state missions under 

the command of the state’s governor. After September 11, the Guard’s 

duties were expanded to include supporting new homeland missions,1

such as flying combat air patrols over U.S. cities, securing borders, 

providing radar coverage for the continental United States, and protecting 

civilian airports, Air Force bases, and other critical infrastructure. 

Governors also activated the Guard to perform additional missions, such 

 1

 According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 

Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a broad term that encompasses efforts 

to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as 

respond to an attack that might occur. The Department of Defense refers to its 

contributions to the overall homeland security effort as “homeland defense,” and support 

to civil authorities. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

as guarding bridges and nuclear power plants. Guard involvement in state 

missions almost tripled in the year after the attacks, and it has remained 

well above pre-September 11 levels. The Guard spent about 236,000 days 

performing state missions in fiscal year 2001, and that number increased to 

about 645,000 days in fiscal year 2002. State mission involvement 

subsequently declined to almost 433,000 days in fiscal year 2003, more 

than twice the level before September 11.2

 This high pace of operations 

has raised concerns about the National Guard’s ability to perform 

warfighting and homeland missions successfully within its existing 

resources and the challenges it faces in meeting these requirements in the 

future. 

The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which the 

National Guard is (1) adapting to meet current and future overseas 

warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security 

environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland 

security needs.3

 We testified before the Committee on Government Reform 

on April 29, 2004, and provided observations on high Guard usage and the 

challenges the Guard faces in adapting to the demands of the new security 

environment.4

 This report updates information contained in our testimony 

and concludes our work in response to your request. 

To assess the objectives, we analyzed data on National Guard utilization 

and readiness prior to and after September 11, 2001. We interviewed 

officials in the Departments of Defense (DOD), Army, and Air Force and 

the National Guard Bureau and supplemented this information with visits 

to Army and Air Force commands and Army mobilization stations. We 

also developed case studies of recent federal and state National Guard 

operations in four states—Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. We 

selected these states because they represent a mix of geographic areas, 

Army and Air National Guard units with different specialties, and units 

that had been or were expected to be activated for federal and/or state 

 2

 A National Guard official who maintains data on the extent of support to civil authorities 

explained to us that because some state data may not be reported, this figure might 

underestimate the days spent supporting state missions. 

3

 We are conducting a separate effort examining the roles and readiness of the Army 

Reserve. 

4

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges, GAO-04-670T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 29, 2004). 
Page 3 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

missions. In each of these states, we visited the Adjutant General and 

National Guard headquarters, as well as Army and Air National Guard 

units that had been or will be involved in overseas or domestic missions. 

We also reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army Guard’s 

force structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army 

Transformation Roadmap. We conducted our review in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards between April 2003 and 

September 2004 and determined that the data used were sufficiently 

reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review 

are described in further detail in appendix I. 

The Army and the Air National Guard have been adapting their forces to 

meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 terrorist 

attacks, but some measures taken to meet immediate needs have made 

providing forces for future operations more challenging for the Army 

National Guard. Unlike the Air National Guard, the Army National Guard is 

still organized according to a post-cold war military planning strategy that 

provides it only a portion of the resources needed to perform warfighting 

missions, with the assumption that its units will have sufficient time to 

obtain the additional personnel and equipment before deploying. However, 

recent operations have required that Army National Guard units be fully 

manned and equipped to deploy, sometimes within short time frames. To 

meet warfighting needs, DOD has retrained some Army National Guard 

soldiers and units to perform key functions and changed the missions of 

some units, issuing them new equipment for their new activities.5

 For 

example, to respond to a continuing demand for military police, the Army 

has changed some field artillery units to security forces and retrained over 

7,000 soldiers to perform new duties. In addition, because the Army 

National Guard units do not have all of the resources they need for 

warfighting missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer 

personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to prepare deploying 

units. As of July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 

74,000 personnel transfers, shifting soldiers from one unit to another, to 

meet warfighting needs. Similarly, as of May 2004, it had transferred over 

35,000 pieces of equipment to deploying units. While the Army National 

Guard has provided ready units thus far, the cumulative effect of these 

personnel and equipment transfers is that the readiness of nondeployed 

 5

 We previously reported that forces’ skills are not well matched with the needs of domestic 

military missions. See GAO-04-670T. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

forces has declined, challenging the Army to continue to provide ready 

Guard forces for future missions. The Army has taken steps to begin to 

restructure its active, Guard, and Reserve forces into more versatile units 

to improve its ability to respond to the dynamic security environment, but 

it is still in the process of developing plans for restructuring Army National 

Guard forces. Under preliminary plans, Guard restructuring would not be 

completed until 2010. In addition, current plans do not address how the 

Guard’s equipment will be modernized to make it compatible with active 

Army equipment or provide detailed time frames and costs for converting 

all Guard equipment. Until plans on how the Guard will fit into overall 

Army reorganization plans are finalized and shared with Congress, it is 

uncertain how they will transform the Guard for a new operational role. 

Further, the Army has not reevaluated its resourcing policy for the Army 

National Guard to mitigate the effects of increased usage on its 

nondeployed forces, and current Army funding plans call for continuing to 

maintain nondeployed Army National Guard forces with only a portion of 

the personnel and equipment required for warfighting operations. Like the 

Army National Guard, the Air National Guard has also had to adjust to the 

demands of recent operations and has provided forces to support current 

military operations by extending tours of duty. Although its readiness has 

declined as a result of the high use of personnel and equipment, the Air 

National Guard has not been as negatively affected as the Army National 

Guard because it has not been required to sustain the same high level of 

activations and is funded to maintain more fully manned and equipped 

units. 

While the Army and the Air National Guard have supported the nation’s 

homeland security needs by providing personnel and equipment for 

unanticipated missions, the Guard’s preparedness to perform the 

homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the 

future is unknown because (1) its role in these missions is not defined and 

requirements have not been established and (2) preparedness standards 

and measures have not been developed. Since September 11, the Army 

National Guard has provided security for borders, airports, and other key 

assets, while the Air National Guard has taken on missions such as flying 

air patrols over U.S. cities. The Army and the Air National Guard have 

conducted these missions largely using existing forces and equipment that 

were provided for warfighting missions. However, state officials have 

expressed concern about the Guard’s preparedness to undertake state 

missions, including supporting homeland security missions, given the 

increase in overseas deployments and the shortages of personnel and 

equipment among the remaining Guard units. Moreover, some homeland 

security missions could require training and equipment, such as 
Page 5 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

decontamination training and equipment, that differ from that provided to 

support warfighting missions. Because DOD, specifically the U.S. Northern 

Command and the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense,6

 has not clearly defined what the Guard’s role will be or analyzed 

what personnel, training, and equipment may be required to support 

homeland missions in conjunction with the Department of Homeland 

Security, it is difficult to measure the Guard’s preparedness for potential 

missions. DOD and Congress have taken some actions to strengthen the 

Guard’s homeland capabilities, such as establishing Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Civil Support Teams,7

 to support civil authorities in identifying 

whether chemical and biological events have occurred and the type of 

agent used. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau is implementing pilot 

programs to strengthen other capabilities to respond to weapons of mass 

destruction events and improve critical infrastructure protection. 

However, these pilot programs are in the early stages of implementation 

and were developed by the Guard to respond to pressing needs. They are 

not based on a comprehensive analysis of the full spectrum of the Guard’s 

role and requirements for homeland security missions. Without such a 

comprehensive analysis, DOD and congressional policy makers may not be 

in the best position to assess whether additional investments are needed, 

and Guard personnel may lack the type of training and equipment that 

would facilitate an effective and timely response to future homeland 

security threats. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop and submit a 

strategy to Congress for improving the Army National Guard’s structure 

and readiness and clearly define the Guard’s role in homeland defense and 

providing support to civilian authorities. DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations and cited several actions it is taking to develop a 

strategy that addresses the Army National Guard’s future roles and 

requirements. 

 6

 The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland defense activities and 

supporting civilian authorities when requested. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense assists the Secretary of Defense in providing policy and 

guidance to combatant commanders regarding air, ground, and maritime defense of 

U.S. territories and supporting civilian authorities. 

7

 The Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams are each comprised of 

22 full-time personnel and maintained at the highest preparedness levels so as to respond 

rapidly to support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass destruction. 

Their role is to assist local officials in determining the nature of the attack, provide medical 

and technical advice, and assist with requests for additional support. 
Page 6 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

The National Guard of the United States, which performs both federal and 

state missions, represents about 52 percent of the armed services’ selected 

reserve8

 and consists of approximately 457,000 members: about 350,000 in 

the Army National Guard and about 107,000 in the Air National Guard. 

Overall, the Army National Guard makes up more than one-half of the 

Army’s ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces 

(e.g., military police or transportation units) and has units in more 

than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. 

Air National Guard personnel make up 20 percent of the total Air Force, 

with 88 flying units and 579 mission support units at more than 

170 installations throughout the United States. The majority of Guard 

members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend 

per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some full-time 

personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, training, and 

maintenance tasks. The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity 

responsible for the administration of the National Guard. 

National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three 

different authorities: Title 10 or Title 32 of the United State Code or 

pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. Personnel in a Title 10 

status are federally funded and under federal command and control. 

Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty in their 

status as federal Reserves, either voluntarily or under appropriate 

circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status 

are federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which 

National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal 

mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and 

under state command and control. Under state law, the governor may 

order National Guard soldiers to perform state active duty to respond to 

emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and for other reasons 

authorized by state law. 

 8

 The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the 

United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air 

National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

The selected reserve consists of military members assigned to organized reserve units and 

reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year and 

serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each year. 

Background 
Page 7 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

The Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, 

which take priority over state missions. As we reported in our April 2004 

testimony, the National Guard’s involvement in federal operations has 

increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Three 

days after the attacks, the President, under Title 10, authorized reservists 

to be activated for up to 2 years.9 This authority was subsequently used to 

activate reservists for overseas warfighting and stabilization missions in 

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as 

for domestic missions, such as flying patrols and supporting federal 

civilian agencies in guarding the nation’s borders. As figure 1 illustrates, as 

of May 2004, about 102,800 Army and Air National Guard members—the 

vast majority of whom were Army National Guard members—were on 

active duty. Although both Army and Air National Guard activations 

increased in the aftermath of September 11, the Air National Guard 

activations had declined to pre-September 11 levels by October 2003, while 

Army National Guard activations continued to rise. 

 9

 10 U.S.C. § 12302. 

National Guard Federal 

Missions 
Page 8 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity under Title 10 

a

Army National Guard data represent the number of soldiers mobilized. Air National Guard data 

represent the number of Air National Guard personnel who are mobilized, including those who 

volunteered for duty. 

b

Because Army National Guard data for January 2003 were not available, chart data point was 

estimated based on trend. 

When activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the Posse 

Comitatus Act,10 which prohibits the military from law enforcement 

activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law. 

The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring and 

providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each service’s 

planned use and available resources. While the Army National Guard’s 

structure requires 375,000 personnel to be fully manned, in fiscal year 

2004, the Army National Guard was authorized 350,000 soldiers resulting in 

many units being manned below wartime requirements. Using DOD 

 10 18 U.S.C. § 1385. 

0

Number of activateda guardsmen

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

Sept.

2001

Month and year

2002 2003

6,166

96,657

2004

Nov. Jan. Mar. May July Sept. Nov. Jan.b Mar. May July Sept. Nov. Jan. May Mar.

Army

Source: GAO analysis of Army and Air National Guard data.

Air Force
Page 9 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

planning guidance, Army National Guard units are provided varying levels 

of resources according to the priority assigned to their warfighting 

missions. Because much of the Army National Guard was expected to be 

used as a follow-on force in the event of an extended conflict, many of its 

units were structured with fewer personnel and lesser amounts of 

equipment than they would need to deploy, with the assumption that there 

would be time to supply additional personnel, equipment, and training 

before these units would be needed. For example, Army National Guard 

divisions, which include over 117,000 soldiers and provide the majority of 

the combat capability in the Army National Guard, are supplied with 65 to 

74 percent of their required personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their 

required equipment, and are less ready for their missions. This approach to 

managing limited resources is referred to as “tiered readiness.” In contrast, 

the Air National Guard was integrated into the Air Force’s operational 

force and maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active 

component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard to 

be ready to deploy on short notice. 

Since September 11, Guard members have also been activated for missions 

under the authority of state governors in both Title 32 and state active duty 

statuses. Title 32 status is generally used to train National Guard units and 

personnel to perform their federal mission. National Guard personnel also 

may perform operational (nontraining) missions in Title 32 status when 

authorized by federal statute. 11 According to DOD, after September 11, the 

Guard performed other operational (nontraining) duties such as providing 

airport security in Title 32 status in response to presidential direction. 

National Guard personnel in Title 32 status have also provided support for 

events such as the G-8 Summit and the Democratic and Republican 

National Conventions. Also, National Guard personnel have served in a 

state active duty status in response to natural disasters. 

Additionally, the National Guard performs state missions under the 

command and control of the governor, with costs for these missions 

borne by the state. Guard missions typically performed in this status 

include providing assistance in response to natural disasters such as 

fires and storms that have not been declared federal disasters. 

 11 Examples include counterdrug support (32 U.S.C. § 112) and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Civil Support Teams (10 U.S.C. § 12310(c)). 

National Guard State 

Missions 
Page 10 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Since September 11, governors have increasingly used this authority to 

activate Guard members to protect key assets in the states. 

Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have 

been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current warfighting 

requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge the Army 

National Guard’s efforts to provide ready forces for future operations. 

While the Army National Guard has met new warfighting requirements by 

retraining some units to acquire in-demand skills, tailoring others to 

provide particular capabilities, changing unit missions in some cases, and 

transferring personnel and equipment to meet combatant commander 

needs, these adaptations have reduced the readiness12 of its nondeployed 

units, in turn challenging the Army National Guard to prepare for future 

operations. The Army recognizes the need to restructure its active, 

Reserve, and Guard forces to respond more effectively to the new global 

security environment and is in the process of developing plans to make its 

forces more modular. However, its plans for restructuring Army National 

Guard forces are not finalized and do not provide detailed information on 

time frames for restructuring all the Guard’s units, whether the Guard’s 

equipment will be compatible with that of active units, or the costs of 

implementing these plans. The Air National Guard has also adapted to 

meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not been as 

negatively affected because it has not experienced continued high usage 

as the Army National Guard has and because its units are more fully 

equipped and manned for war. 

The Army National Guard has been adapting to the demands of current 

warfighting requirements but faces future challenges in providing ready 

forces for future operations. The recent increased and expanded use of 

the National Guard illustrates the shift from the post-cold war military 

planning strategy, in which much of the Guard represented a force to 

follow the active military in the event of extended conflict, to an 

operational force similar to the Air National Guard. Using this strategy, the 

Army has generally maintained most Army National Guard units at lower 

 12 Readiness is generally defined as a measure of DOD’s ability to provide the capabilities 

needed to execute the mission specified in the National Military Strategy. At the unit level, 

readiness refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions and Air Force wings, to 

provide capabilities required by the combatant commands. Details of DOD readiness data 

are classified. 

National Guard 

Has Been Adapting 

to Meet Current 

Warfighting 

Requirements, but 

Readiness Challenges 

Remain for Future 

Operations 

Army National Guard 

Adaptation to Warfighting 

Requirements Reduced 

Readiness of Nondeployed 

Units 
Page 11 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

readiness levels under the assumption that additional personnel and 

equipment would be provided prior to deployment. While the Army 

National Guard’s adaptations since September 11 were intended to make 

deploying units more useful for current operations, these adaptations have 

caused the overall readiness of nondeployed Guard units to decline, which 

may hamper the Guard’s ability to meet the requirements of future 

warfighting operations overseas, particularly in Iraq. 

To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent 

operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army 

National Guard’s personnel since September 11. In June 2004, Army 

National Guard activations peaked with almost 81,000 Army National 

Guard members—more than one-quarter of the Army National Guard’s 

force—activated for overseas military operations such as in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Personnel with certain skills have been in particularly high 

demand. For example, as of June 2004, 95 percent of military police units 

had deployed, with 23 percent having deployed more than once, and at 

least 50 percent of units with specialties such as transportation, aviation, 

medical, and special operations had been activated. 

To alleviate the stress on these forces, the Army has retrained personnel in 

units with less needed skills, such as field artillery, to provide skills in 

higher demand. For example, the Army recently changed the mission of 

27 artillery units and retrained over 7,000 personnel to meet the need for 

additional military police and security forces. Some of these soldiers have 

already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy security. 

The Army has also adapted Guard units to meet the specific requirements 

of current overseas missions by tailoring units for particular purposes. 

In some cases, the Army took personnel with key capabilities from 

existing units and created new, smaller units whose personnel had 

skills specifically tailored to provide the capabilities required by the 

combatant commander. For example, the Army extracted 55 soldiers 

with military police skills from an armored battalion of about 600 soldiers 

to perform a security mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. More than 

35,000 Army National Guard soldiers—almost one-fifth of all soldiers 

utilized—deployed in these newly created, tailored units to support 

recent military operations. Over one-half of these tailored units (about 

57 percent) were small, containing 10 or fewer soldiers. In addition to 

extracting key capabilities, tailored units have also been used to address 

personnel shortages in deploying units. 

Army Has Retrained Some 

Guard Units and Made 

Other Adjustments 
Page 12 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

The Army has also changed the mission, organization, and tactics of some 

deploying units, issuing them new or different equipment and adding 

personnel to meet combatant commander requirements. For example, the 

30th Infantry (Mechanized), an enhanced separate brigade13 that deployed 

to Iraq in the spring of 2004, was directed to deploy as a motorized brigade 

combat team with humvees instead of with all of its assigned heavytracked equipment such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks. To 

accomplish this change, the unit required an infusion of personnel because 

“light” units require more personnel than “heavy” units. In addition, the 

unit underwent additional training on operating and maintaining the newly 

issued equipment. This unit was operating in Iraq in its new, lighter 

configuration at the time of this report. 

To ready deploying units, the Army National Guard had to transfer 

personnel from nondeploying units, but in doing so, it has degraded their 

readiness. This, in turn, challenges the Guard’s efforts to provide ready 

forces for future operations. To be ready to deploy, units need to have a 

sufficient number of soldiers who are qualified to deploy. According to the 

tiered-readiness policy, many National Guard units do not have all the 

qualified soldiers they need to be ready for their missions. However, in 

recent operations, the Army’s deployment goal for Guard combat units has 

been to be fully manned and for unit personnel to be fully qualified for 

their positions. To meet the requirements for units fully manned with 

qualified personnel, the Guard transferred qualified soldiers from 

nondeployed units. By July 2004, the National Guard had initiated over 

74,000 personnel transfers to meet the combatant commander’s needs. 

There are a number of reasons that Army National Guard units may not 

have all of the personnel they need to deploy for their warfighting 

missions. First, the Army National Guard is not funded to fully man all 

its units to deployment standards. Second, some soldiers assigned to a 

unit may not have completed required training.14 As of May 2004, over 

 13 Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers and are the Army 

National Guard’s highest priority combat units. These 15 brigades receive specialized 

training and higher priority than other National Guard units for personnel and resources 

during peacetime. Once called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy 

overseas within 90 days. 

14 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of 

Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and 

Military Personnel: DOD Needs To Address Long-Term Reserve Force Availability and 

Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 15, 2004). 

Personnel Transfers into 

Deploying Units Have 

Degraded Personnel Readiness 

for Future Operations 
Page 13 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

71,000 Army National Guard soldiers were not fully trained for their 

positions. Finally, soldiers may be unable to deploy overseas for personal 

reasons, such as medical or dental problems, family issues, or legal 

difficulties. As of June 2004, there were over 9,000 soldiers in the Army 

National Guard who were identified as nondeployable. When two of the 

Army National Guard’s enhanced separate brigades, some of its most 

ready units, were activated for rotation to Iraq in 2003, only 74 percent of 

their required personnel were qualified for their assigned positions and 

deployable, leaving a shortfall of over 2,100 soldiers that had to be filled 

from other units. 

To minimize transfers of qualified soldiers from other units, the Army 

Guard ordered 700 untrained soldiers between April and June 2004 to 

report for training so they could become fully qualified in their positions 

before their units were activated for overseas operations. However, the 

Guard has not been able to address all of its shortfalls in this manner. 

For example, the Army National Guard is preparing a combat division 

headquarters and a number of its support units for deployment to Iraq in 

2005. When the 42nd Infantry Division was alerted,15 it lacked 783 qualified 

personnel—about 18 percent of the total personnel required—to meet 

deployment requirements. As of June 2004, the National Guard was only 

able to fill 415 of these positions through transfers of personnel from other 

units, leaving 368 positions unfilled. Army National Guard officials expect 

that the active Army will have to find personnel to address these shortfalls. 

According to National Guard officials, additional soldiers with medical, 

dental, legal, or family issues may be identified as nondeployable after 

they are mobilized, so the number of personnel needed may rise. 

As overseas operations continue, it is becoming increasingly challenging 

for the Army National Guard to ready units because the number of soldiers 

who have not been deployed and are available for future deployments has 

decreased and the practice of transferring qualified personnel to deploying 

units has degraded readiness of nondeployed units. Our analysis of the 

decline in Army National Guard readiness between September 2001 and 

April 2004 showed that the most frequently cited reasons for the decline in 

personnel readiness of nondeployed units were that personnel were 

already deployed or not available for deployment. Of the almost 

162,000 soldiers who are available for future deployments, almost 36,000 

 15 DOD has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a minimum of 30 days written 

notification, referred to as “alert,” before they are mobilized for active duty. 
Page 14 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

are in nondeployable units that provide maintenance, medical, and legal 

support to the Army National Guard. Approximately 9,000 additional 

soldiers have medical or other conditions that prevent deployment, and 

about 28,000 soldiers will need required training before they will be 

available for deployment. This leaves approximately 89,000 soldiers who 

are currently available to deploy for overseas operations. Because DOD 

expects the high pace of operations to continue for the next 3 to 5 years 

and estimates that operations will require 100,000 to 150,000 National 

Guard and reserve personnel each year, the Army National Guard will 

likely have to alert and mobilize personnel who have been previously 

deployed. 

Because the combatant commander has required Army National Guard 

units to have modern, capable, and compatible equipment for recent 

operations, the Army National Guard adapted its units and transferred 

equipment to deploying units from nondeploying units. However, this 

adaptation has made equipping units for future operations more 

challenging. The Army equips units according to when it expects them to 

be needed in combat; thus, the “first to fight” units are given the priority 

for modern equipment. Based on post-cold war plans, it was assumed that 

most Army National Guard units would follow active units and that there 

would be sufficient time to provide them with the equipment they need for 

their missions before they deployed. However, when National Guard units 

were alerted for recent operations, they generally did not have sufficient 

amounts of equipment or equipment that was modern enough to be 

compatible with active units and to meet combatant commander 

requirements. 

For recent operations, the Army National Guard has had to fill the 

shortages of equipment among deploying units by transferring equipment 

from nondeploying units. National Guard data showed that in order to 

ready units deploying to support operations in Iraq between September 

2002 and May 2004, the National Guard transferred over 18,000 night vision 

goggles, 1,700 chemical monitors, 900 wheeled vehicles, 700 radios, and 

500 machine guns, among other items, from nondeploying units. As a 

result, by June 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 

35,000 pieces of equipment and had critical shortages16of about 480 

different types of items, including machine guns and heavy trucks. In total, 

 16 A critical shortage is defined as having five or less of an item in the total Army National 

Guard inventory. 

Equipment Transfers to 

Deploying Units Have 

Degraded Equipment 

Readiness for Future 

Operations 
Page 15 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

the Army National Guard’s nondeployed force lacks 33 percent of its 

essential items17 and, as of June 2004, its stocks had been depleted to the 

point where it had to request that the Army provide about 13,000 pieces of 

equipment for its deploying units. 

Equipment shortages were worsened when the combatant commander 

and the National Guard Bureau barred Army National Guard units from 

deploying with items that were incompatible with active Army equipment 

or that could not be supported with spare parts in the area of operations. 

For example, Army National Guard units equipped with 20 to 30-year-old 

radios were barred from taking them to the Iraqi area of operations 

because they cannot communicate with the Single Channel Ground Air 

Radio System (SINCGARS) used by other Army units. Likewise, some of 

the older rifles the Guard uses for training have been barred because they 

use different ammunition than those of the active Army units. Moreover, 

Guard units alerted for the earlier deployments were not equipped with 

the most modern body armor and night vision goggles that the combatant 

commander subsequently required for deploying units. After units were 

identified for mobilization and deployment, the Army took some steps to 

augment existing Guard equipment using supplemental wartime funding. 

Our analysis of DOD data showed that the equipment readiness of 

nondeployed units has continued to decline and, as overseas operations 

continue, it has become increasingly challenging for the National Guard to 

ready deploying units to meet warfighting requirements. As reported by 

the National Guard,18 87 percent of the 1,527 reporting units in fiscal year 

2001 met their peacetime equipment readiness goals, which are often 

lower than wartime requirements. By fiscal year 2002, only 71 percent of 

the nondeployed reporting units met their peacetime equipment goals. 

The report attributed this decrease in readiness posture to equipment 

shortages and transfers among nondeployed units to fill shortages in 

other units. 

 17 Essential items are defined as a unit’s principal weapon/mission systems and equipment 

that are critical to accomplishment of primary mission tasks and critical mission support 

items. 

18 Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for 

Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C.: February 2002) and National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington, D.C.: February 2003). 
Page 16 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Initially, the Guard managed these transfers so that nondeploying units 

shared the burden of providing resources to deploying units and could 

remain at their planned readiness levels. However, this became 

increasingly difficult as the number of activations mounted, and, in 

November 2003, the Director of the Army National Guard issued a 

memorandum to the states directing them to transfer equipment to 

deploying units regardless of the impact on the readiness of remaining 

units. 

The Army and the National Guard have recognized that the 

post-September 11 security environment requires changes to the Guard’s 

structure and an improvement in its readiness posture. However, in the 

near term, the Army National Guard will have difficulty improving its 

readiness for projected operations over the next 3 to 5 years under current 

plans, which assume the Guard will be funded at peacetime readiness 

levels. Over the longer term, DOD, the Army, and the National Guard have 

initiated, but not completed, several restructuring efforts, including 

moving some positions with high-demand skills out of the Guard and into 

the active force, creating new standardized modular units that are flexible 

to respond to combatant commander needs, and establishing predictable 

deployments for units. To improve readiness, the Army National Guard 

seeks to increase the amount of full-time support and qualified personnel 

in its units. However, these measures will require additional funding. At 

this time, it is not clear whether these planned actions will fully address 

the difficulties the Army National Guard has experienced in supplying the 

numbers and types of fully ready forces needed for the global war on 

terrorism. 

The Guard may be challenged in the near term to deploy units and sustain 

the high pace of operations required by the global war on terrorism with 

its current resources. While the costs of activated Army National Guard 

units in wartime are borne by the active Army with funds provided 

through supplemental appropriations, for recent operations the Guard has 

had to ready its forces for mobilization using its existing resources. The 

Army National Guard received $175 million in supplemental funding in 

fiscal year 2003, for personnel and operation and maintenance, but it did 

not receive additional fiscal year 2004 funding to ready nondeployed units 

so they can train and gain proficiency before they are mobilized. In fiscal 

year 2004, $111 million was reprogrammed from Army National Guard 

personnel to Army National Guard operation and maintenance 

appropriation accounts to support requirements for units before they were 

mobilized. These funds were available because mobilized Army National 

Plans to Restructure 

Army National Guard 

Are Not Fully Developed 

or Funded and May 

Not Address Future 

Readiness Challenges 
Page 17 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Guard personnel are paid by the active Army military personnel 

appropriation. The 2005 President’s budget submission and long-term 

funding plan are still based on the tiered-readiness approach. Because the 

Army is in the process of developing a new budget and long-term funding 

plan, it is not clear at this time whether future budget submissions will 

include funding to support increased readiness levels. 

For the long term, DOD and the Army are changing some units’ missions 

to increase the availability of certain high-demand Army National Guard 

units, such as military police and transportation units. They have also 

taken steps to rebalance skills among the active and reserve forces to 

decrease the burden of repeated deployments on reserve personnel who 

have skills that are in great demand. To make more efficient use of its 

forces, DOD is also planning to move military personnel out of positions 

involving duties that can be performed by civilians or contractors and into 

high-demand specialties, as well as taking advantage of technological 

advances to reduce personnel needs. However, these initiatives are in the 

early stages of implementation and the extent to which they will alleviate 

the strain on Army National Guard forces due to the continuing high pace 

of operations is uncertain. 

In April 2004, the Army published The Army Campaign Plan that sets out 

some specific objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to be 

taken to plan and execute ongoing operations and transform forces for the 

future. A key element of the Army’s plan to transform its forces, including 

National Guard units, is to restructure into “modular” units that can be 

tailored to the specific needs of combatant commanders in future 

operations. After restructuring, the Army National Guard expects to have 

34 smaller, lighter brigades instead of its current 38 brigades.19 Current 

plans call for converting Army National Guard units as they return from 

overseas operations into brigades that share a common basic organization 

with their active counterparts by 2010. Further, the Army has a goal of 

restructuring its forces so that units will be authorized the qualified 

personnel they require. However, the Army’s current plans do not 

completely address how the Guard’s equipment will be modernized to 

make it compatible with active Army equipment or include a detailed 

schedule and funding needs for restructuring all Guard units, including 

support units. 

 19 This includes the Army National Guard’s 15 enhanced separate brigades, 2 separate 

brigades, and 21 brigades in its 8 divisions. 
Page 18 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

In addition, one of the Army National Guard’s initiatives to improve 

readiness by increasing the amount of full-time support personnel within 

its units is still based on its tiered-readiness model, which resources some 

Guard units well below requirements. With this initiative, the Army 

National Guard plans to increase the percentage of full-time personnel 

gradually to about 71 percent of the personnel it needs by 2012. Full-time 

Guard members enhance unit readiness by performing tasks such as 

monitoring soldiers’ readiness, recruiting and training personnel, and 

maintaining aircraft, supplies, and equipment. However, for fiscal year 

2003, the Army National Guard was only funded for 59 percent of the 

full-time personnel it needs to be fully manned, as compared to the Air 

National Guard, which is staffed at 100 percent of its required full-time 

support personnel. Without sufficient full-time personnel, these tasks, 

which are critical to unit readiness, suffer. 

The Army National Guard also has plans to increase the number of 

qualified personnel in each unit by spreading its soldiers over fewer, in 

some cases smaller, units. According to Army National Guard officials, 

using this strategy could increase the number of qualified personnel to an 

estimated 85 percent of unit requirements. However, Army deployment 

goals for combat units are for 100 percent of deploying soldiers to be 

qualified in their positions. Therefore, the Guard will likely still need to 

transfer personnel when units are called to deploy. 

To avoid overtaxing the force and improve deployment predictability, the 

Army has developed a proposal to establish a rotational deployment cycle 

for its Army National Guard units that would meet the Secretary of 

Defense’s goal of no more than one deployment every 6 years. In 

conjunction with this proposal, preliminary Army plans propose equipping 

Guard units that are 4 to 5 years away from an expected deployment well 

below wartime readiness standards. However, this model may be difficult 

to achieve while the high pace of operations continues. 

The Air National Guard, like the Army National Guard, has also adapted to 

meet new warfighting requirements since September 11. It made several 

adjustments to accommodate the higher pace of operations, including 

extending tours of duty for some Guard personnel, calling up others 

earlier than expected, and recently extending its rotational cycle to 

lengthen the amount of time personnel are available for deployment. 

However, the demands of ongoing operations have not been as detrimental 

to the Air National Guard for two reasons. First, along with the Air Force 

Reserve, the Air National Guard is funded to maintain readiness levels 

Air National Guard 

Efforts to Adapt to New 

Warfighting Requirements 

Facilitated by Its Structure 

and Funding at 

High-Readiness Levels 
Page 19 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

similar to that of the active Air Force and is expected to be able to deploy 

within 72 hours. Second, the Air National Guard has not been required to 

sustain the same high level of activations as the Army National Guard. 

Air National Guard activations declined to pre-September 11 levels of 

about 10,000 by October 2003, and have since declined to about 6,000, 

while the Army National Guard’s activations have continued to rise. 

Between 2001 and 2003, the Air National Guard unit readiness declined as 

a result of its high utilization of personnel and equipment, but Congress 

provided additional funding to stabilize Air National Guard readiness. 

To meet increased personnel requirements during the initial phases of 

current operations, Air National Guard officials activated and deployed 

personnel earlier than planned under their standard rotational deployment 

cycle.20 In January 2003, Air Force officials said that over 320 personnel, 

including some Air National Guard members, deployed about 45 days 

earlier than usual. In addition, the Air Force also disrupted the normal 

rotation cycle by extending tour lengths to meet increased requirements. 

Air Force officials extended the duty tours of selected Air National Guard 

personnel from the usual 90 days up to 179 days. For example, during the 

preparation phase for Operation Iraqi Freedom the Air Force extended 

the tours of almost 2,400 personnel, including some Air National Guard 

personnel. To accommodate ongoing operational requirements, in 

June 2004, the Air Force announced that most Air National Guard 

personnel scheduled to deploy in future cycles would spend 120 days in 

the deployment phase of their cycle. To accommodate the increased tour 

lengths, the new rotational cycle will be 20 months in length, and Guard 

personnel will train for 16 months and be eligible for deployment for 

4 months. 

Overall, Air National Guard unit readiness has declined since 

September 2001 due to the increased demands for people and usage of 

equipment. Our analysis of DOD data showed that commanders attributed 

this decline in readiness primarily to personnel and equipment shortages, 

damaged or inoperative equipment, and incomplete training. In addition, 

Air National Guard officials in states we visited told us that meeting 

current operational demands has resulted in fewer aircraft available to be 

used for training at home and increased maintenance requirements on 

 20 The Air Force divides its forces into 10 groups, each containing a mix of active, 

Guard, and reserve forces, and until June 2004, operated on a 15-month rotational cycle. 

The 15-month cycle included a 90-day period when a unit was eligible for deployment. 
Page 20 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

aircraft being used in current operations. However, Air National Guard 

officials told us that equipment readiness rates have remained steady 

during fiscal year 2004, and they attributed this stabilization to 

supplemental funding of $20 million in fiscal 2003 and $214 million in 

fiscal year 2004 for operation and maintenance activities. 

While Army and Air National Guard forces have, thus far, supported the 

nation’s homeland security needs, the Guard’s preparedness to perform 

homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the 

future cannot be measured because its role in these missions is not 

defined, requirements have not been identified, and standards have not 

been developed against which to measure preparedness. Since September 

11, the Guard has performed a number of missions, including flying patrols 

over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, state and 

National Guard officials voiced concerns about preparedness and 

availability of Guard forces as overseas deployments continue at a high 

pace. Even though plans and requirements for the homeland missions the 

Guard will support are not fully developed, DOD and the National Guard 

Bureau have taken some actions to address potential needs. 

Since September 11, Army and Air National Guard forces have supported a 

range of homeland security missions, primarily with the equipment DOD 

has provided for their federal missions. For example, Army National 

Guard units helped guard the nation’s borders and airports in the 

aftermath of September 11, and they continue to guard key assets such 

as nuclear power plants. Also, the Army National Guard is currently 

providing security at U.S. military installations, including about 5,500 Army 

National Guard soldiers guarding Air Force bases in the United States as 

of June 2004. Similarly, Air National Guard units continue to fly patrol 

missions over the United States. 

We performed case studies in four states to examine how the Guard has 

supported new homeland security missions. In all four states we visited 

(New Jersey, Oregon, Georgia, and Texas), Guard officials reported that 

their units supported homeland tasks for both state governors and federal 

authorities. The following are examples of how the Army National Guard 

has supported homeland missions since September 11: 

• The New Jersey Army National Guard provided security for bridges, 

tunnels, and nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and 

continues to provide security at two nuclear power plants. 

National Guard Has 

Supported Homeland 

Security Needs, 

but Its Readiness 

for Future Homeland 

Missions Is Not 

Measured 

Guard Forces Have 

Supported Homeland 

Security Missions, but 

States Have Concerns 

about Readiness for 

Future Missions 
Page 21 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

• The Oregon Army National Guard provided security at federal 

installations, such as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Lewis, 

Washington, in 2002 and 2003. 

• The Texas Army National Guard performed border security, assisting 

U.S. Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002, and provided 

security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from 

October 2001 to October 2002. 

• The Georgia Army National Guard provided airport security almost 

immediately after September 11 and was still guarding Army bases and Air 

Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003. 

The Air National Guard has also been called on to perform new missions, 

such as air patrols and providing radar coverage for the continental United 

States. Air National Guard units in the states we visited played key roles in 

homeland defense missions. For example: 

• The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located near 

major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and 

Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying patrols over 

these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th had flown 1,458 air 

patrol missions. 

• The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 patrol missions over 

New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001 and March 

2002. Since September 11, the unit has also flown patrols over Houston, 

the Gulf Coast, and in support of special events such as the Super Bowl 

and the Winter Olympics. 

Despite the Guard’s response to homeland needs, officials in all of the 

states we visited expressed concerns about their Guards’ preparedness for 

homeland security missions, especially given the high level of National 

Guard deployments to operations outside of the United States. As figure 2 

illustrates, at the beginning of June 2004, one-half of the 50 states and 

4 territories had more than 40 percent of their Army National Guard forces 

alerted, mobilized, or deployed for federal missions. Montana and Idaho 

both had high numbers of soldiers alerted, mobilized, or deployed with 

80 percent and 96 percent, respectively.21

 21 Since the data in figure 2 were reported, forces in several other states, including Hawaii, 

Nevada, and South Carolina, have been alerted or mobilized. Deployed forces from other 

states have also returned home. 
Page 22 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized, or Deployed for Federal Missions as of June 2, 2004 

Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data.

59

39

30

21

36

32

29

38

80

81

42

35

47

53

27

38

53

30

46

56

75 42 29

27

42

42

43

46

54 34

46

43

47

50

43

31

35

32

48 44

24 V.I.

16 Hawaii

27 Guam 2 states = 80 to 100 percent utilized

3 states = 60 to 79 percent utilized

22 states = 40 to 59 percent utilized

24 states or territories = 20 to 39 percent utilized

3 states or territories = 0 to 19 percent utilized

30 P.R.

96

64

29 Conn.

59 N.J.

28 Del.

18 Md.

29 D.C.

47 R.I.

78 N.H.

34 Mass.

13 Vt.
Page 23 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of Air National Guard personnel who 

volunteered or were mobilized or deployed as of the end of May 2004. In 

contrast to the Army National Guard, only two states, New Hampshire and 

Nevada, had more than 20 percent of their Air National Guard mobilized or 

deployed, while 43 of the 54 states and territories had less than 10 percent 

of their Air National Guard activated. 

Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or Deployed for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004 

26 N.H.

3 Mass.

0 Conn.

4 N.J.

3 Md.

0 D.C.

0 V.I.

8 R.I.

Source: GAO analysis of Air National Guard data.

8 Vt.

0 Hawaii

0 Guam 0 states or territories = 80 to 100 percent utilized

0 states or territories = 60 to 79 percent utilized

0 states or territories = 40 to 59 percent utilized

2 states = 20 to 39 percent utilized

52 states or territories = 0 to 19 percent utilized

2 P.R.

16 6

4

7

1

4

23

6

12

4

5

3

9

2

1

4

11

5

14

18

1

0

3 5 5

2

12

3

5 5

8

9

5

2

9

1

10

11

2 4

14

19 Del.
Page 24 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Some Guard officials also expressed concerns that their states’ Guards had 

not received additional federal funding to support homeland security 

missions, even as homeland security missions are continuing and as the 

homeland security advisory system threat level has risen. While the states 

have funded some homeland security activities, such as guarding critical 

infrastructure, and purchased some equipment, such as decontamination 

equipment, officials said that homeland security requirements must 

compete with other needs in limited state budgets. Furthermore, state 

officials said that the Guard is not generally eligible for funding from the 

Department of Homeland Security because its grants are limited to “first 

responders,” such as police or firefighters. Officials in all four states we 

visited raised concerns about their Guards’ readiness for homeland 

security and other state missions. For example: 

• New Jersey Guard units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in 

December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment, 

such as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical 

protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some 

essential equipment for its Guard forces during this time on an emergency 

basis. At the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to deploy large 

numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was determining how it 

would respond to another terrorist threat with almost 60 percent of its 

forces unavailable. 

• Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International Economic 

Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations, known as the G-8 Summit, in June 

2004, increased Georgia’s security missions such as aerial reconnaissance 

and surveillance, at a time when its Army National Guard aviation units 

were deployed overseas. National Guard units from 12 other states 

participated. The state also received federal funds for the G-8 Summit, 

which reimbursed the state for costs of activating Guard personnel. In 

addition, recognizing the Guard’s unique role in homeland security, active 

component forces were commanded by a National Guard general for this 

operation—a new arrangement designed to provide unity of command for 

homeland missions that defense officials stated might serve as a model for 

the future.22

• In 2002, the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army National 

Guard soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a 

 22 The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act authorized National Guard officers in 

Title 32 status to retain that status if called to active duty under Title 10. This arrangement 

requires agreement between the President and the governor to be in effect and allows a 

National Guard officer to command federal as well as National Guard troops in state status. 
Page 25 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

century. Oregon officials said that because many of the state’s Guard 

forces and equipment were deployed and the state had only limited 

engineering capability left, it would not be able to provide the same level 

of support to civilian authorities if similar circumstances were to occur. 

• All of the Texas Guard’s aviation assets that would be needed to fight fires 

and all of the state’s military police were deployed at the time of our visit. 

However, Texas officials said that the state had been able to meet their 

homeland security needs, even at the height of its Guard’s overseas 

deployments, because its largest Army National Guard unit had not been 

fully deployed and, as a large state, it had ample state emergency response 

capability. 

States are developing plans and examining resources currently available 

to them to address homeland security needs. For example, each state is 

developing a plan for protecting its infrastructure sites. Additionally, most 

states have entered into mutual assistance agreements that may provide 

them access to another state’s National Guard forces in times of need. 

These agreements, known as Emergency Management Assistance 

Compacts, are typically used to facilitate access to additional forces for 

natural disaster response. However, it is not clear whether these 

arrangements will always meet the states’ needs for forces or capabilities 

for homeland security because, under Emergency Management Assistance 

Compacts, states can withhold their forces if they are needed in their 

home state. This situation occurred in one of our case study states. 

According to state officials, New Jersey has faced an elevated terrorist 

threat due to specific threats against the state as well as its proximity to 

New York City. The officials said they requested access to another state’s 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team on three occasions prior 

to 2004. On two occasions, the request was not granted because officials in 

the team’s home state determined that it was needed at home. When New 

Jersey made a third request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist 

threat, access was approved. 
Page 26 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and the Northern Command are charged with leading DOD’s efforts in 

homeland defense, and while they have taken some actions, they have not 

completed developing requirements or preparedness standards and 

measures for the homeland missions in which the National Guard is 

expected to participate. DOD plans to publish a comprehensive strategy 

for the homeland defense.23 Until the strategy is finalized, the Northern 

Command will not be able to complete its planning to identify the full 

range of forces and resources needed for the homeland missions it may 

lead or civil support missions in which active or reserve forces should be 

prepared to assist federal or state civilian authorities. Without this 

information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage risks to 

the nation’s homeland security by targeting investments to the highest 

priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired 

effect. 

While the Guard has traditionally undertaken a wide variety of missions 

for states, it is organized, trained, and equipped to perform a warfighting 

mission. DOD measures the readiness of its forces for combat missions 

by identifying the personnel and equipment required to successfully 

undertake the mission and assessing the extent to which units have the 

resources they need. Typically, Guard forces are expected to perform civil 

support missions with either the resources supplied for their warfighting 

missions or the equipment supplied by the state. Guard officials said that 

units have supported state missions with capabilities such as aviation, 

military police, medical, and others, as needs have arisen. 

However, in the post-September 11 environment, Guard forces may be 

expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting or 

traditional state missions and may require different equipment, training, 

and specialized capabilities than they currently possess. Homeland 

missions, such as providing large-scale critical infrastructure protection or 

responding to weapons of mass destruction events in the United States, 

could differ substantially from conditions expected on the battlefield or 

from more traditional state missions, such as responding to natural 

disasters or civil disturbances. For example, New Jersey units that 

responded to a terrorist threat alert in December 2003 reported that they 

 23 We previously reported on the Northern Command’s activities in a classified report. 

GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern Command’s 

Mission but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-622C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

DOD Lacks Plans and 

Requirements to Measure 

Preparedness for 

Homeland Missions 

but Is Taking Some 

Actions to Prepare 
Page 27 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

lacked some essential equipment such as humvees, night vision 

equipment, cold weather gear, chemical protective suits, and nerve agent 

antidote. In addition, state officials said that other items, such as pepper 

spray, which are not routinely supplied to all types of units for their 

warfighting mission, might be useful for potential homeland missions 

involving crowd control. New Jersey subsequently paid for some essential 

equipment for its forces during this time on an emergency basis. Until the 

requirements for personnel and equipment are better defined, DOD cannot 

measure how prepared Guard forces are for the missions they may be 

called to undertake. To finalize its plans, the Northern Command will have 

to coordinate with federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security, and state emergency management offices to ascertain their needs 

for Guard support. Furthermore, it will have to balance the needs for 

National Guard forces at home and overseas. 

Since 1999, DOD has maintained full-time Guard forces in Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are dedicated to homeland 

security missions. These teams are comprised of 22 full-time personnel 

and are maintained at the highest readiness levels and can respond rapidly 

to support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass 

destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in determining the nature 

of the attack, provide medical and technical advice, and help to identify 

follow-on federal and state assets that might be needed. Congress has 

authorized at least one team for each state and territory. Currently, 

32 teams are fully operational, with the remaining 23 estimated to be 

operational by 2007. These teams are federally funded and trained but 

perform their mission under the command and control of the state 

governor. 

The National Guard Bureau has proposed some additional initiatives that 

are in varied stages of implementation, which are intended to further 

prepare states for meeting homeland security needs. For example, the 

National Guard Bureau has: 

• Set up a pilot program in April 2004 in 6 states (California, Colorado, 

Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) to jointly assess with 

state officials critical infrastructure protection policy, tactics, procedures, 

and implementation. 

• Established a regional task force to provide the capability for 12 states 

to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event. These Guard forces 

are designed to locate and extract victims from a contaminated 

environment, perform mass casualty/patient decontamination, and 

provide medical triage and treatment in response to one of these events. 
Page 28 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

The 12 participating states are New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 

West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, Florida, Texas, Colorado, California, 

Washington, and Hawaii. 

• Proposed an initiative to distribute Guard personnel with key capabilities, 

including aviation, military police, engineering, transportation, medical, 

chemical, and ordnance, to each state and territory. When stationing 

personnel with these capabilities in a state or territory is not possible, the 

National Guard Bureau will try to maintain all capabilities within the 

geographical region. 

• Developed a proposal for rotational deployment of Guard forces that 

would enable each state to retain 50 percent of its Guard in the state to 

respond to homeland security missions and to support civil authorities, 

while 25 percent of the state’s forces deploy, and 25 percent prepare for 

future deployments. 

While these initiatives would provide enhanced capability for homeland 

security in the National Guard, they will require coordination with the 

Army and the Air Force as well as with the states, and they might face 

implementation challenges. For example, the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau has developed a proposal to station a mix of forces with skills 

useful for state missions within each state and presented the proposal to 

state governors. However, the Army, the Air Force, Congress, and others 

are also involved in making such decisions. Similarly, implementing the 

National Guard’s proposal to retain 50 percent of a state’s Guard at 

home for homeland security and civil support missions has not been 

implemented and could be difficult to achieve during periods of 

high-military operations. Officials from the U.S. Army Forces Command, 

the Army command that selects Army Guard personnel for federal 

activation, said that while they try to minimize the impact of federal 

mobilizations on the states, this becomes more and more difficult as the 

level of federal activations increases. 

The September 11 terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have 

placed new demands for ready forces on the National Guard—especially 

the Army National Guard—for overseas, homeland security, and homeland 

defense operations. At the same time, it is apparent that the Army National 

Guard’s structure as a follow-on force to the active Army is not consistent 

with its current use as an operational force. The current demands for large 

numbers of fully manned and equipped forces to support overseas 

operations have forced the Guard to transfer personnel and equipment 

from nondeploying units to deploying units, degrading the readiness of the 

nondeployed units. This continued decline in readiness of nondeployed 

Conclusions 
Page 29 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

units hinders the Army National Guard’s ability to continue to provide the 

ready forces in the short term that DOD estimates will be needed to meet 

operational needs over the next 3 to 5 years. However, DOD’s current 

budget continues to fund the Guard at peacetime levels, and it is not clear 

whether future budgets will include funding to improve readiness. In the 

longer term, while DOD is reevaluating its strategy for the new security 

environment, it is important for it to decide what the role of the National 

Guard will be in the 21st century. This decision is important because it 

will determine the missions for which the Guard will have to prepare, 

the number and types of units it will need, and how much personnel, 

equipment, and training it should be provided. Furthermore, until DOD 

establishes the Guard’s role in the post-September 11 environment and 

develops a strategy to prepare its forces to meet new demands, it cannot 

be sure that it is best managing risks by investing its resources to target 

the highest priority needs and Congress, in turn, will not have detailed 

information on which to base funding and policy decisions. Continuing to 

structure and fund the Guard under current policy will result in continued 

personnel transfers and readiness declines for its units that may hamper 

its ability to sustain much needed Guard involvement in the global war on 

terrorism over the long term. 

At the same time that the Guard’s overseas missions have increased—

reducing the personnel and equipment available for state missions—

homeland security needs have also increased. However, DOD has not fully 

defined what role the National Guard will have in the homeland missions 

DOD will lead or support and how it will balance this role with its 

increased participation in overseas operations. Absent a clearly defined 

role for all its homeland missions, the Guard cannot identify requirements 

for successfully executing this role and the standards and measures it will 

use to assess preparedness for all its homeland missions. Until it has these 

standards and measures, DOD does not have the means to determine 

whether the Guard is prepared to meet homeland security needs with its 

current structure and assets. As such, policy makers are not in the best 

position to manage the risks to the nation’s homeland security by targeting 

investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that they are having 

the desired effect. 
Page 30 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the 

Army National Guard’s needs for the global war on terrorism, including 

the Army National Guard’s anticipated role, missions, and requirements 

for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The 

near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in 

readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard’s plans to 

provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over the 

next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include 

• an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the readiness 

of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas and 

domestic missions and 

• a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of 

nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding 

for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable levels 

of risk. 

The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans to 

restructure and provide the Guard resources—personnel, equipment, and 

training—consistent with its 21st century role, including 

• how the Army National Guard will be restructured to support future 

missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces and 

• the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources 

needed to achieve compatibility with active forces and the appropriate 

level of readiness for their missions. 

As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern 

Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense 

and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for 

Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command, 

Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the 

Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate 

officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to take the following 

four actions: 

• Establish the full range of the National Guard’s homeland missions, 

including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian 

authorities. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 31 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

• Identify the National Guard’s capabilities to perform these missions and 

any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to perform 

these missions successfully. 

• Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment, and 

training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time frames for 

implementing the plan, and identifies required funding. 

• Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland 

security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be 

systematically measured and accurately reported. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 

comments on a draft of this report. The department generally agreed with 

our recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement them. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop and 

submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard’s 

short- and long-term needs for the global war on terrorism, including the 

Army National Guard’s role, missions, and requirements for personnel and 

equipment, and its plans to manage the risk associated with the declining 

readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces. In its comments, 

DOD said that the Army has conducted the recommended analysis, 

developed a plan as outlined in the Army Campaign Plan, and 

communicated its plan to numerous members of Congress. We agree 

that the Army Campaign Plan is a significant step in planning to address 

National Guard readiness problems because it identifies goals and 

objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to plan for transforming 

its forces. However, we believe the Army Campaign Plan does not fully 

meet the intent of our recommendation because it lacks specificity about 

how the Army will address the readiness of nondeployed Army National 

Guard forces in the near term, how all Guard units will be converted to the 

modular design, or how the Guard’s equipment will be modernized to 

make it compatible with active Army equipment. Furthermore, DOD has 

not identified the funding needed for restructuring all Guard units, 

including support units. Therefore, we believe the Army should develop 

more detailed plans to fully implement our recommendation. In its 

comments, DOD said that the Army agrees that it should continue its 

analysis to identify and minimize readiness impacts to the current force. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of the 

National Guard’s homeland missions, to identify the capabilities needed to 

perform those missions and develop a plan to address any shortfalls, and 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 32 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

to establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard’s homeland 

security missions. However, in its comments, DOD said it would take a 

different approach to accomplishing the tasks than we recommended. 

Rather than having the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense take the 

lead in all four areas as we recommended, DOD said that the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, working in close coordination, should take the 

lead in implementing the actions we recommended. We believe the 

approach DOD proposes meets the intent of our recommendation, and we 

have modified the wording of our recommendation to reflect the proposed 

change in organizational responsibilities. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of 

Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We 

will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

We interviewed officials in the Army National Guard, the Air National 

Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of the Army 

and Department of the Air Force headquarters. We supplemented this 

information with visits to several Department of Defense (DOD) offices, 

including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Joint 

Force Headquarters, Homeland Security. We also developed case 

studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in 

four states—Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. The states were 

chosen to represent a mix of geographic areas, Air and Army National 

Guard units with different specialties, and units that had been or expected 

to be activated for state or federal missions. In each state we visited the 

Adjutant General and offices within the Joint National Guard 

headquarters. We also interviewed leaders from a field artillery battalion, 

an armor battalion, two enhanced brigades, an air control wing, an airlift 

wing, an air-refueling wing, and three fighter wings. 

To examine the National Guard’s warfighting requirements in this 

post-September 11, 2001 security environment, we obtained and analyzed 

data on state and federal activations of the Army and the Air National 

Guard before and after September 11, 2001. We supplemented this with 

interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials from the four case 

study states and from the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Forces 

Command, First Air Force, and the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command 

and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center. To examine the ways in 

which the National Guard has adapted for its new missions, we 

interviewed officials in the four case study states and officials at Army 

mobilization stations at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort 

Dix, New Jersey, and at the First and Fifth Continental United States 

Armies. To identify Guard usage trends and stressed capabilities, we 

analyzed DOD’s personnel tempo database, Army National Guard and Air 

National Guard data on the types of units mobilized, and information from 

the Army National Guard on the transformation of field artillery and other 

support units into military police and security force units. We obtained 

information on personnel and equipment transfers from the National 

Guard Bureau and information on equipment shortages from DOD 

publications and reports. We reviewed equipment data, interviewed data 

sources, and obtained information on data collection methods and internal 

control measures applied to the data. We determined the equipment data 

were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We also reviewed documents 

on planned changes to the Army Guard’s force structure, such as the Army 

Campaign Plan and the Army Transformation Roadmap. We also discussed 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 34 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

personnel, training, and equipment issues with unit, state, Guard Bureau, 

and mobilization station officials and force providers. 

To assess the National Guard’s emerging homeland security needs, in each 

of the four case study states we interviewed Guard homeland security 

officials and leaders from Army and Air National Guard units with recent 

homeland security experience. We also met with officials from the 

National Guard Bureau (Homeland Defense), the Department of the Army, 

three Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, the Air Combat 

Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, the Army 

Forces Command, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs (Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities) (now part 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)), the Joint 

Director of Military Support, and the Joint Task Force, Civil Support. 

We also obtained information from the U.S. Joint Forces Command 

and reviewed unclassified, publicly available documents from the 

U.S. Northern Command. In addition, we reviewed the National Guard’s 

role in rotation plans for future operations. We identified the challenges 

facing DOD, the states, and Congress in organizing and equipping the 

Guard for both overseas and homeland security missions based upon 

our analysis of the Guard’s current status and discussions with National 

Guard officials. 

We conducted our review between April 2003 and September 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our 

objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they 

ensured their own data accuracy and reviewed their data collection 

methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control 

measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when 

applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and 

reliability. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 38 GAO-05-21 Reserve Forces 

Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 

Margaret G. Morgan (202) 512-8975 

In addition to the persons named above Suzanne Wren, Barbara Gannon, 

James Lewis, Tina Morgan, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern Saavedra, 

Alissa Czyz, Kenneth Patton, Jennifer Popovic, and Jay Smale also made 

major contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

(350546) 
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