Service Assessment

Central Florida Tornado Outbreak

February 22-23, 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Silver Spring, Maryland
Cover: Aerial view of the Ponderosa RV park in Kissimmee, Florida, showing a narrow path of

nearly total destruction. Three permanent structures in the park (office, laundry, shower/bath

house) provided safe shelter. However, numerous fatalities occurred in this park. Photo courtesy

of Robert Sheets.
Service Assessment

Central Florida Tornado Outbreak

February 22-23, 1998

June 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

William M. Daley, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

D. James Baker, Administrator

National Weather Service

John J. Kelly, Jr., Assistant Administrator
ii

Preface

The devastating tornadoes that struck central Florida the night of February 22-23, 1998,

resulted in a decision by the National Weather Service (NWS) to conduct a Service Assessment. 

Service Assessments and their subsequent reports are used by the NWS to examine the

performance of its offices in providing timely warnings, accurate forecasts and other services to

enable the public to minimize loss of life and property damage.

The findings and recommendations developed by the Service Assessment Team will be

incorporated into the ongoing process of improving NWS products and services to the citizens of

the Nation.

John J. Kelly, Jr.

Assistant Administrator for 

 Weather Services

June 1998
iii

Table of Contents

Page

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Service Assessment Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Event Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Facts, Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
iv

Service Assessment Team

The NWS assembled this Service Assessment Team to analyze the overall warning process

and to evaluate the services provided by the NWS to the state, county and local governments; the

media; and the public in Florida. The team traveled to Florida for the period February 25 - March

2, 1998. Team members collected information and interviewed the Next Generation Weather

Radar (NEXRAD) Weather Service Office (NWSO) Melbourne staff; state, county and local

emergency management personnel; law enforcement; other local officials; the media; and residents

of the impacted areas. Additional information was collected from the Storm Prediction Center

(SPC) and Weather Service Headquarters (WSH). All of the information was then compiled and

evaluated culminating in this report.

The team was comprised of the following individuals:

Lynn P. Maximuk Team Leader, Meteorologist in Charge (MIC), NWSO Pleasant Hill,

Missouri

Donald W. Burgess Chief, Operations Training Branch, Operational Support Facility (OSF),

Norman, Oklahoma

Gary R. Woodall Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM), Meteorological Services

Division, Southern Region Headquarters, Fort Worth, Texas

James B. Lushine WCM, NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office (NWSFO) Miami,

Florida

Patrick J. Slattery Public Affairs Specialist, Central Region Headquarters, Kansas City,

Missouri

Walter G. Peacock, PhD Associate Director for Research, International Hurricane Center, Florida

International University, Miami, Florida

Other valuable contributors include:

William H. Lerner WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

Rainer N. Dombrowsky WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

Joseph T. Schaefer Director, SPC, Norman, Oklahoma

Peter A. Browning Science and Operations Officer (SOO), NWSO Pleasant Hill, Missouri

Linda S. Kremkau Technical Editor, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland
v

Acronyms

AFOS Automated Field Observing System

AWIPS Automated Weather Interactive Processing System

CRS Console Replacement System

CWA County Warning Area

EAS Emergency Alert System

ESATCOM State Satellite Communication System

EST Eastern Standard Time

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAR False Alarm Ratio

HWO Hazardous Weather Outlook

ITWS Integrated Terminal Weather System

MIC Meteorologist in Charge

NEXRAD Next Generation Weather Radar

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NSSL National Severe Storms Laboratory

NWR NOAA Weather Radio

NWS National Weather Service

NWSO NEXRAD Weather Service Office

NWSFO NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office

OSF Operational Support Facility

PC Personal Computer

POD Probability of Detection

PUP Principal User Processor

ROAMS Remote On Air Monitoring System

RPG Radar Product Generator

SOO Science and Operations Officer

SPC Storm Prediction Center

SPS Special Weather Statement

SVS Severe Weather Statement

TDA Tornado Detection Algorithm

TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar

WCM Warning Coordination Meteorologist

WDSS Warning Decision Support System

WSH Weather Service Headquarters

WSR-88D Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler

WISE Warning and Interactive Statement Editor
1

Event Summary

Overview

An outbreak of unusually strong tornadoes in east-central Florida during the late night and

early morning hours of February 22-23, 1998, was the most deadly in the state’s history. 

Between approximately 11 p.m. and 2:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) (EST will be used

throughout this report), seven tornadoes swept through the NWSO Melbourne county warning

area (CWA), killing 42 people and injuring more than 260 others. The previous high tornado

death toll in Florida was 17, which occurred on March 31, 1962, in the Florida Panhandle (Santa

Rosa County). In terms of single-event, weather-related fatalities in Florida, this event ranks as

the ninth greatest in loss of life. The largest number of single-event, weather-related deaths in

Florida occurred during the 1928 hurricane that killed more than 1,842 people near Lake

Okeechobee.

The tornadoes were unusually strong for the area and produced damage estimated in excess

of $100 million. Three of the storms were rated in the F3 category (158-206 mph) on the Fujita

Tornado Intensity Scale (see Appendix A). More than 3,000 structures were damaged and more

than 700 destroyed. This Service Assessment focused on the NWSO Melbourne CWA, although

there were two brief tornado touchdowns in the NWSO Tampa Bay CWA earlier in the evening.

Storm Summary

During the evening of February 22, the atmosphere over east-central Florida was primed for

a devastating severe weather outbreak (Figure 1). A strong upper trough associated with a

stronger-than-normal subtropical jet stream (wind speeds of 140 knots) was approaching the

Florida Peninsula from the west. From a surface low near Mobile, Alabama, a surface cold front

arced southeastward over the Gulf of Mexico, nearing the western Florida coast. A line of

thunderstorms was moving eastward just ahead of the frontal boundary. Afternoon pre-frontal

thunderstorms over southern Georgia and northern Florida had left behind a surface outflow

boundary, stretching from near Daytona Beach on the east coast to northeast of Tampa on the

west coast. The air mass south of the outflow boundary and east of the front was warm, moist,

and very unstable. The formation of a strong, nocturnal, low-level jet (winds greater than 50

knots just 1,000 feet above ground level) was coupled with the subtropical jet further aloft to

produce very strong vertical wind shear over the peninsula.

Three supercell thunderstorms formed as the storm line moved ashore from the Gulf of

Mexico and interacted with the stationary outflow boundary, the instability, and the strong wind

shear. Supercell storms are hazardous because they last for long periods of time, rotate, and are

the parents of many strong and violent tornadoes. As the three supercells quickly moved across

east-central Florida, they produced seven tornadoes in the NWSO Melbourne CWA (Figure 2). 
2

Figure 1. Synoptic Setting, 7 p.m. EST, February 22, 1998.
3

#1 F2 tornado touched down in Volusia County at 10:55 p.m.—1 fatality, 3 injuries.

#2 F3 tornado touched down in Lake County at 11:37 p.m., entered Orange County at 11:41 p.m., first fatalities

around 11:50 p.m., lifting at midnight—3 fatalities, approximately 70 injuries.

#3 F3 tornado touched down in Seminole County at 12:10 a.m., first fatalities around 12:15 a.m. near Sanford, lifting

at Volusia County at 12:25 a.m.—13 fatalities (12 - Seminole County, 1 - Volusia County), approximately 36

injuries.

#4 F3 tornado touched down in Osceola County at 12:40 a.m., first fatalities at 12:50 a.m. in Kissimmee, crossed

into Orange County at 12:55 a.m., lifting at 1:28 a.m.—25 fatalities, 150+ injuries.

#5 F2 tornado touched down in Volusia County at 12:45 a.m.—no fatalities or injuries.

#6 F1 tornado touched down in Brevard County at 1:38 a.m.—no fatalities or injuries.

#7 F1 tornado touched down in Brevard County at 2:30 a.m. near Port Canaveral—no fatalities or injuries.

Figure 2. Central Florida Tornadoes, February 22-23, 1998.
4

The northern supercell produced two brief tornado touchdowns in rural Sumter County in the

NWSO Tampa Bay CWA shortly before 10 p.m. Later, that supercell produced a stronger

tornado that struck just southwest of Daytona Beach (Volusia County) at 10:55 p.m. This

tornado continued east-northeastward for approximately 8 miles, dissipating in southern Daytona

Beach. Tornado #1 (Figure 2) resulted in one fatality along Route 92 east of Interstate 95, three

injuries, and damage to or destruction of more than 600 structures (F2 category on the Fujita

Tornado Intensity Scale).

The middle supercell produced the first of its tornadoes (#2 on Figure 2) at 11:37 p.m. in

rural eastern Lake County. Tornado #2 was not very destructive until it moved into western

Orange County at 11:41 p.m., severely striking Winter Garden and Ocoee between 11:47 and

11:55 p.m. Tornado #2 (approximately 18 miles long) ended about midnight near the

Orange/Seminole County line. In all, tornado #2 was responsible for three fatalities in Winter

Garden, approximately 70 injuries, and damage to or destruction of about 500 structures (F3

category).

The middle supercell’s next tornado (#3) formed in Seminole County just northeast of

Longwood at 12:10 a.m., February 23. It moved northeast for 14 miles, hitting several

neighborhoods in the southeast portion of Sanford. Tornado #3 dissipated just after crossing the

St. Johns River in Volusia County at about 12:25 a.m. Along the path of tornado #3, there were

13 deaths, 36 injuries, and damage to or destruction of more than 625 structures (F3 category). 

Twelve of the deaths were in Seminole County, and one was along Route 46 in Volusia County.

The last tornado (#5) from the middle supercell struck rural eastern Volusia County about

12:45 a.m., crossing Interstate 95 and damaging only a few structures (F2 category). No

casualties were reported from tornado #5.

The southern supercell produced the longest tornado track of the outbreak (tornado #4). 

The tornado first touched down at 12:40 a.m. in northwest Osceola County just southwest of

Kissimmee and moved northeastward for about 38 miles, dissipating in extreme eastern Orange

County at about 1:28 a.m. The first tornado fatalities occurred at approximately 12:50 a.m. in the

Ponderosa RV Park. The tornado’s touchdown point was approximately 8 miles southeast of

central Florida’s popular area of theme parks, entertainment centers, and hotels/motels. Damage

from tornado #4 was severe in southern, eastern, and northeastern Kissimmee and adjoining rural

areas of Osceola County before the tornado crossed into Orange County (about 4 miles southeast

of Orlando International Airport) at 12:55 a.m. In Orange County, the tornado mostly affected

rural swampy areas, striking few structures except for lakeside neighborhoods on the shores of

Lakes Hart and Mary Jane. Totals for tornado #4, coming mostly from Osceola County, were 25

fatalities, more than 150 injuries, and damage to or destruction of more than 1,000 structures (F3

category).
5

The last tornado (#6) from the southern supercell struck the southwest portion of Titusville

in Brevard County just after 1:38 a.m. No casualties were reported from tornado #6, but more

than 100 structures were damaged or destroyed (F1 category). The short, few-mile skip between

tornado #4 and tornado #6 prevented damage at the Great Outdoors RV Park, one of the largest

in the United States, housing 1,000 recreational vehicle lots.

Tornado #7 occurred at approximately 2:30 a.m. in Brevard County near Port Canaveral. 

The tornado formed over the Banana River and moved east-northeast for about 4 miles, crossing

Port Canaveral and dissipating before reaching the Atlantic Ocean. No casualties were reported

with this storm, but approximately 30 structures were damaged (F1 category).

All of the tornadoes were relatively narrow with a path width of 50-100 yards in most

places. The widest damage areas in the paths of the tornadoes were approximately 200 yards at

the Boggy Creek Shopping Center in Kissimmee, Osceola County, and in the Sanford area,

Seminole County.

Analysis of Performance

This analysis focused on the three supercells that passed through the NWSO Melbourne

CWA between approximately 10:30 p.m. Sunday, February 22, and 2:30 a.m. Monday, February

23.

The potential for severe weather in central Florida Sunday afternoon and evening, February

22, was evident to NWS meteorologists as early as Friday afternoon, February 20. The first alert

to the potential for severe weather late in the weekend was a Special Weather Statement (SPS)

issued by the NWSFO Miami at 2:33 p.m. Friday, after coordination with other NWS offices in

Florida. This severe weather threat information was updated and relayed to media weathercasters

and the emergency management community throughout the weekend.

At 2:45 a.m. Saturday, February 21, the SPC in Norman, Oklahoma, issued the Day 2

Convective Outlook, highlighting the potential for supercell storms and tornadoes moving

through Florida Sunday evening, 45 hours before the tornadoes struck. The 6 a.m. Sunday SPC

Day 1 Convective Outlook upgraded the threat for severe weather in northern and central Florida

to a moderate risk, emphasizing again the threat for supercell storms and tornadoes. Subsequent

Mesoscale Discussions and Watch Status Messages issued Sunday by SPC forecasters stressed

the threat of supercell storms and tornadoes over central and northern Florida. The first tornado

watch (No. 57) for the area was issued at 1:44 p.m., valid from 2:15 p.m. until 9 p.m. At 

8:13 p.m., Tornado Watch No. 58 was issued for central Florida, valid from 9 p.m. to 3 a.m. 

NWSO Melbourne forecasters were well aware of the severe weather threat and issued

several products to alert their customers. A Hazardous Weather Outlook (HWO) was issued by

the office at 4:08 p.m. Saturday, February 21, mentioning the potential for damaging winds,

isolated tornadoes, hail and heavy rain on Sunday. The 5:25 a.m. Sunday, February 22, HWO
6

reinforced the threat for tornadoes during the afternoon and evening hours. An updated HWO

was issued at 11:55 a.m. Sunday, headlining a “SIGNIFICANT THREAT OF DAMAGING

THUNDERSTORM WINDS...HAIL...AND TORNADOES THIS AFTERNOON AND

EVENING.” At this point, the on-duty personnel began to assess the staffing requirements for

later in the day and contacted off-duty staff to line up additional resources when the severe

weather developed.

During the afternoon hours, severe storms moved through the NWSO Melbourne CWA. 

These storms produced wind damage and a weak tornado. Another updated HWO was issued at

10:40 p.m. Sunday, February 22, in time for the evening television newscasts, highlighting that

“ANOTHER ROUND OF SEVERE WEATHER IS EXPECTED.” This product was intended

to heighten the level of awareness and contained the following paragraphs:

“EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES ARE URGED TO COORDINATE WITH THE LOCAL NATIONAL

WEATHER SERVICE. THIS IS A DANGEROUS SITUATION! SPOTTERS ARE

ENCOURAGED TO KEEP AN EYE TO THE SKY AND RELAY ALL INFORMATION

BACK TO THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE.”

“AREA RESIDENTS SHOULD BE READY TO REACT QUICKLY IF A TORNADO

WARNING IS ISSUED FOR THEIR AREA. REMAIN INFORMED OF THE LATEST

WEATHER SITUATION FOR YOUR COUNTY BY LISTENING TO NOAA

WEATHER RADIO OR OTHER LOCAL NEWS MEDIA.” 

Interviews with local weathercasters, the emergency management community and the general

public indicated that these SPC and NWSO products heightened awareness of the threat before

the storms moved into the area. The updated HWO products were very effective, especially the

product issued just before the 11 p.m. newscast.

Between 9:45 p.m., February 22, and 3:16 a.m., February 23, NWSO Melbourne issued 14

tornado warnings. In addition, flash flood warnings, special marine warnings, local airport

advisories, numerous statements and hourly short-term forecasts were issued. Appendix B

contains a listing of products issued by the office and significant storm reports. The Melbourne

forecasters were well aware of the meteorological situation and the high threat of tornadoes with

the supercells. As a result, all of the warnings issued during this time period were tornado

warnings. All seven of the confirmed tornadoes during this time period were in areas covered by

Tornado Watch No. 58 and were preceded by tornado warnings. The average warning lead time

before a tornado occurred in a warned county was 15 minutes, ranging from 3 minutes for

tornado #7 in Brevard County near Port Canaveral, to 33 minutes for tornado #1, touching down

in Volusia County near Daytona Beach. In areas where fatalities occurred, the average warning

lead time before the initial fatality was 23 minutes, ranging from 10 minutes for tornado #2 in

Winter Garden and tornado #3 in Volusia County along Route 46, to 33 minutes for tornado #1

near Daytona Beach.
7

All available observation and analysis tools were used by the Melbourne forecasters. 

Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) radar data and storm spotter reports were

the primary data used in the warning decision process. In addition to the WSR-88D Principal

User Processor (PUP) workstation displays and baseline guidance algorithms, the NWSO had

access to the National Severe Storms Laboratory’s (NSSL) Warning Decision Support System

(WDSS) with its enhanced display capabilities and experimental guidance algorithms. WDSS

displays and algorithm outputs provided forecasters with excellent radar data displays that could

be used quickly and interpreted easily. The Warning and Interactive Statement Editor-II (WISEII) warning preparation software (running on a personal computer [PC]) was used to prepare and

disseminate the warning messages. The staff switched to generator power for the office and radar

during the afternoon hours, well before thunderstorms moved into the area. This ensured minimal

disruption in case of a lightning strike or power outage.

Storm spotters played a vital role during the severe weather event. Melbourne staff alerted

amateur radio operators to the threat of severe weather well in advance, and a radio operator was

in the Melbourne NWSO throughout the event. Radio communication was established with all of

the impacted counties during the evening. Eyewitness reports were received in the office almost

simultaneously with tornado damage in several instances. The first eyewitness report via amateur

radio was received at 11:50 p.m., February 22, as a deadly tornado struck the Winter Garden

area. Within a minute of receipt, this report was disseminated in a Severe Weather Statement

(SVS). This report also confirmed the threat and prompted issuance of a tornado warning for

Seminole County at 11:56 p.m. In addition to gathering storm reports into the office, the radio

operators also were able to provide warning and statement information from the Melbourne office

to emergency management officials and other radio operators in the impacted areas. All of the

Melbourne staff interviewed during the assessment had high praise for the amateur radio

operator’s contributions to the office.

Due to the perceived seriousness of the tornado threat Sunday evening, February 22, the

Melbourne staff took the extraordinary step of calling the emergency management or

communications centers in the threatened counties of the office’s CWA prior to the onset of the

storms. Station logs indicate contact with all of the affected counties, alerting them to the

potential for severe storms. In Volusia County, the Melbourne staff contacted the sheriff’s

dispatcher at 10:33 p.m. and stayed on the phone, at her request, for several minutes giving scan

by scan updates on the radar data. Shortly after hanging up, this dispatcher called the NWSO at

11:08 p.m. to report the 10:55 p.m. tornado touchdown near Daytona Beach. The additional

advanced notice through these phone contacts was cited by some emergency management officials

as allowing them to be better prepared for the recovery efforts after the storms hit.

All indications are that NWSO Melbourne provided an excellent warning service to its

CWA. The media, county and local government agencies, safety force and emergency

management personnel all acknowledged that the outlook, watch and warning information

provided by the NWS allowed them to be better prepared to respond to this situation. They were

especially appreciative of the advance notice in the HWO the day before the event took place. All

of the television stations in Orlando provided excellent weather coverage during the 11 p.m.

newscast and interrupted programming throughout the event to provide warnings and updates. 
8

Several residents impacted by the tornadoes commented that they were made aware of the threat

of tornadoes by viewing the television news coverage. A tornado watch and tornado warnings

were issued by the NWS prior to the beginning of all of the tornadoes. No outdoor warning

sirens systems were in place in the affected areas to further alert residents to the tornado threat.

Four problem areas in the warning system were identified during the assessment.

First, even though advance watch and warning information was available and a severe

weather education effort has existed in the CWA, numerous residents failed to receive or respond

properly to the warnings and approaching weather. The problem was made worse by the timing

of the event. The tornadoes struck at a time when many of the residents had already gone to bed

and had turned off commercial television and radio. Interviews with more than 50 residents in the

path of the storms revealed that only one person knew of and had the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio (NWR). That person did not have a

warning alarm receiver nor did he use it as the primary source of weather information.

Second, the Orlando NWR transmitter was off the air for a time most likely due to a power

interruption near the transmitter location. Since the transmitter is outside of the listening range of

the Melbourne NWSO and no Remote On Air Monitoring System (ROAMS) is in place, it took

several minutes before the transmitter problem was identified and the broadcast put back on the

air. During the outage, it appears that two tornado warnings and multiple SVSs were not

broadcast over the air and into the Emergency Alert System (EAS).

Third, for some tornado warnings, there was a delay of up to 8 minutes from issuance time

to the broadcast of warnings on the NWR.

Fourth, there was a communications line problem between the WSR-88D and the WDSS. 

The wideband line that delivered data to the WDSS failed at approximately 11:05 p.m., February

22, and could not be restarted through routine procedures. Because of the importance of the

WDSS output, the Radar Product Generator (RPG) was brought down at about 11:30 p.m. and

rebooted/restarted. This cleared the problem and data were restarted to the PUP and WDSS at

approximately 11:45 p.m. During the time when the RPG was down, the PUP was operational

and dialed into the WSR-88D radars at Tampa and Jacksonville as required to support warning

operations. The staff also had access to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Orlando

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data through a display in the Melbourne office.

These areas are addressed in more detail in the facts, findings and recommendations section

of this report.
9

Extensive damage to mobile homes and recreational vehicles at the Ponderosa RV Park

in Kissimmee, Florida. Main office building on extreme right of photograph received

minor roof damage. Photograph courtesy of Lynn Maximuk.

Nearly total devastation occurred in a narrow corridor through Ponderosa RV Park in

Kissimmee, Florida. Multiple fatalities occurred at this location. Photograph courtesy

of Robert Sheets.
10

Aerial view of damage to homes in Lakeside subdivision in Kissimmee, Florida. The

tornado moved from the upper right to the lower left, narrowly missing a school. 

Photograph courtesy of Robert Sheets.

While there was significant structural damage to a block home in the Lakeside

subdivision in Kissimmee, Florida, no fatalities occurred in this area. Photograph

courtesy of Lynn Maximuk.
11

Facts, Findings and Recommendations

Observations

FACT 1: The NWSFO Melbourne used WSR-88D data as the primary tool

for examining storm structure and issuing warnings. Each of the

three supercell thunderstorms that produced the tornado outbreak

were easily observable on the radar displays, producing well-defined

velocity signatures and occasional reflectivity signatures.

FACT 2: Confirmation of massive destruction, injuries, and fatalities via

information from storm spotters (Ham radio) and emergency

managers was sought out and received by the Melbourne

forecasters. This information influenced warning decisions and was

relayed to customers in warning and statement messages. This

helped to reinforce the seriousness of the tornado threat. Ground

truth information is an important companion to radar information in

tornado warning situations.

Finding A: In addition to the PUP workstation displays and baseline guidance

algorithms, the NWSFO had access to NSSL’s WDSS with its

enhanced displays and experimental guidance algorithms. WDSS

displays and algorithm outputs provided forecasters with

considerably better information that could be more quickly and

easily interpreted. For volume scans when tornadoes were

occurring, the experimental NSSL Tornado Detection Algorithm

(TDA) produced detections 100 percent of the time. This can be

compared to the baseline TVS Algorithm which produced detections

22 percent of the time.

Recommendation A1: The NWS System for Convective Analysis and Nowcasting Program

should continue its plan to integrate full WDSS capability into the

design of future NWS Automated Weather Interactive Processing

System (AWIPS) software.

Recommendation A2: The AWIPS Program Office should continue its plan to integrate

limited WDSS capability into a near-future AWIPS software build.

Recommendation A3: The OSF should continue its plans to incorporate TDA into its next

software build (Build 10; due in the summer of 1998).
12

Finding B: The Melbourne NWSO staff proficiently used the many weather data

analysis and display systems available in its operations area:

# WDSS (with Radar Utilities and Doppler Radar Streams); 

# Lightning Imaging Sensor and Data Application Demonstration; 

# Lightning Detection and Ranging;

# National Lightning Detection Network;

# PUP;

# Meteorological Interactive Data Display System;

# WISE-II;

# Skew T/Hodograph Analysis and Research Program;

# Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS);

# Automated Field Observing System (AFOS);

# two PCs running miscellaneous software; and

# the Science Applications Computer.

However, operation and management of such a wide array of

systems was time consuming and subject to possible error or

misinterpretation. Integration of outputs from the various

analysis/display systems would facilitate ease in interpretation and

decision making.

Recommendation B: The NWS should continue deployment of AWIPS as rapidly as

possible to provide integrated workstations that meet the needs of

forecasters in stressful warning situations.

Guidance

FACT 3: The Melbourne NWSO alerted people in east-central Florida about

the possible consequences of El Niño-enhanced severe weather as

early as October 1997. This information was posted on the office’s

“Home page” (http://sunmlb.nws.fit.edu/mlbnino.html) and

presented by the Melbourne MIC at a state of Florida-sponsored “El

Niño Summit” in Tallahassee on December 15, 1997. Two

subsequent messages were posted on the NWSO Melbourne Home

page informing persons in east-central Florida about the hazards of

El Niño-spawned severe weather.

FACT 4: Guidance products from the SPC forecast the threat of significant

severe weather in Florida as early as 45 hours in advance. The Day

2 Severe Thunderstorm Outlook issued at 2:45 a.m. Saturday,

February 21, placed the area in a Slight Risk Area. The Outlook

stated that conditions were “MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO
13

SUPPORT SUPERCELLS/TORNADOES.” The Day 1 Convective

Outlook updated at 6:59 a.m. Sunday, February 22, upgraded the

risk over the area from Slight to Moderate. The Outlook stated that

“ISOLATED SUPERCELLS COULD DEVELOP...AND A FEW

TORNADOES WILL BE POSSIBLE.”

FACT 5: Forecast model guidance packages were available and used by the

forecasters. The packages were in good agreement in forecasting

severe weather conditions in the area as early as 48 hours in

advance.

Warnings/Predictions (Includes Watches, Statements and Warnings)

FACT 6: The potential for severe weather in central Florida was advertised

well in advance. At 2:33 p.m. Friday, February 20, after

coordination with other Florida NWSOs, including Melbourne, the

Miami NWSFO issued a “Special Weather Statement” (SPS),

alerting people that a strong weather system would affect Florida

late in the weekend.

FACT 7: The head of the Florida Department of Emergency Management

stated that one of the most valuable services the NWS can provide

to the emergency management community is awareness of the threat

of hazardous weather with the greatest lead time possible. The

Orange County Emergency Manager and Winter Garden City

Manager stated that they were alerted to the possibility of severe

weather in this instance 2 to 3 days in advance.

FACT 8: Prior to the development of the three supercells and during their

traverse across the peninsula, the Melbourne NWSO issued timely

outlooks, short-term forecasts, and statements that highlighted the

development and evolution of the outbreak. In particular, an East

Central Florida Hazardous Weather Outlook issued at 10:40 p.m.

contained a banner that mentioned “ANOTHER ROUND OF

SEVERE WEATHER IS EXPECTED!” It also read in part

“...MOISTURE AND ...SHEAR HAVE PRIMED THE

ENVIRONMENT FOR THE POTENTIAL FOR TORNADOES.” 

It issued a call for emergency managers and spotters to coordinate

with the NWS office and said, “THIS IS A DANGEROUS

SITUATION.” The product was very timely since it was issued

when information from it could be included in local television 11

p.m. news and weathercasts, a major source for public information.
14

FACT 9: The Melbourne NWSO issued very accurate and timely tornado

warnings. During the outbreak, the NWSO issued 14 tornado

warnings for 15 counties (some were new warnings for previously

warned counties). Those warnings had a Probability of Detection

(POD) of 1.0 and a False Alarm Ratio (FAR) of .31, both statistics

much higher than national averages. On a county by county basis,

the average lead time before tornado touchdown was 15 minutes

(range from 3 to 33 minutes). Average lead time before fatalities in

each of the four counties experiencing fatalities was even higher—at

23 minutes (range from 10 to 33 minutes). The 1997 national POD

was .59, while the 1997 national FAR was .78.

Finding C: The SPC issued Tornado Watch No. 58 at 8:13 p.m. on February

22, valid from 9 p.m. until 2 a.m. for central Florida. This watch

well covered the area and time period of the tornado outbreak. 

Tornado Watch No. 58 immediately followed Tornado Watch No.

57, which had been issued for the same area from 2:15 p.m. until 9

p.m. These watches followed several tornado watches for

peninsular Florida in the days and weeks preceding the outbreak.

Recommendation C: The SPC is concerned that persons included in tornado watches for

extended periods of time (13 consecutive hours on February 22-23)

or several days in close proximity might become desensitized to the

threats for which the watches are issued. How much “watch” is too

much? Careful study of public response to continuous watches

needs to be performed.

Service Coordination

Internal

FACT 10: The potential for severe weather in the CWA on Sunday was

discussed by the NWSO forecasters early in the day. Plans for

additional staffing were developed. The on-duty personnel called

off-duty staff to determine availability should severe weather

develop. The SOO checked with the office three times during the

day to keep abreast of the situation. This early planning allowed for

adequate staffing resources during the event.

FACT 11: The NWSO Melbourne forecaster called the SPC Lead Forecaster at

6:10 p.m. to coordinate the possibility of severe weather the

remainder of the night. Around 8 p.m., the SPC Lead Forecaster
15

contacted the Melbourne NWSO (as well as Tampa, Jacksonville

and Miami) to discuss the need for another tornado watch after

Watch No. 57 expired. The SPC forecaster was concerned about

the area being under a Tornado Watch since 2:15 p.m., but all

offices agreed that a new Tornado Watch (No. 58) should be issued. 

The coordination between the SPC and the NWSOs/NWSFO

worked well.

FACT 12: The NWSO Melbourne forecasters contacted NWSOs Tampa and

Jacksonville to exchange storm report and radar information

throughout the event. The Melbourne NWSO dialed into the Tampa

WSR-88D to view storms from a different angle.

FACT 13: The NWSO Melbourne staff communication seemed adequate. All

staff on duty during the event felt that they were informed of what

was going on and clearly understood their roles and responsibilities.

External

FACT 14: A long-term relationship between the NWS and local media

weathercasters led to a very good working relationship between the

media, in general, and the NWS. The media broadcast NWS

information immediately and stressed the importance of messages to

listeners and viewers. Some of the media weathercasters stayed on

the air live for long periods of time relaying warnings, statements

and radar information to viewers.

FACT 15: The NWSO Melbourne forecasters began as early as Friday,

February 20, to emphasize the potential of the approaching storm in

outlooks and routine forecasts. This potential was stressed to media

and emergency management agencies, which relayed that

information to the public, warning residents to be prepared to take

necessary actions to protect themselves from severe weather.

FACT 16: Early on Sunday, February 22, the NWSO Melbourne forecasters

discussed the potential for severe weather in the CWA with local

amateur radio storm spotter groups. An amateur radio operator

came into the office before the onset of severe weather, and

operators remained on-station throughout the event. Their presence

provided a nearly continuous flow of information to and from the

office to spotter groups and emergency management personnel.
16

Finding D: Due to the unusually high threat of tornadic activity, the NWSO

Melbourne forecasters took the time to call emergency managers or

sheriffs’ offices in the affected counties prior to the onset of tornado

activity. Some of the conversations with these offices were detailed

and lengthy. The direct phone contact allowed forecasters to impart

the seriousness of the threat and provide detailed information on the

location of the severe storms. Several of the emergency managers

and sheriffs’ offices noted that this contact undoubtedly enabled

them to respond to the storm damage areas more quickly. While

telephone contacts of this nature are extremely effective during

large-scale severe weather events, there may be insufficient

resources to guarantee this service consistently. Telephone, or other

localized direct contacts, are encouraged to the extent possible

within NWS office staffing resources available.

Recommendation D: The potential limitations of this type of contact due to high activity

levels, or minimal staffing, should be made clear to emergency

management and safety forces personnel. WCMs should work to

ensure that existing mass communication systems are identified and

fully utilized and work with local emergency management personnel

to develop new or enhanced mass communication systems.

Dissemination

FACT 17: The NWSO Melbourne’s AFOS dissemination system functioned

well during the event. Warning and statement messages were

prepared utilizing the WISE-II software on the LAN and transmitted

through AFOS communications without a problem.

FACT 18: According to emergency management and safety forces personnel

and interviewed members of the public, local television

weathercasters did a good job of relaying NWS warnings and

augmenting them with radar and storm report information. 

Presentations ranged from crawls to warning map overlays to live

interruptions of programming. Feedback from interviews indicate

that the live interruptions of programming were the most effective

for relaying information and confirming the threat. In addition,

several interviewees stated that they tuned to The Weather Channel

on their cable system to receive watch and warning information once

they were aware of the severe weather threat.
17

FACT 19: Emergency management agencies and safety forces utilized multiple

methods for receiving severe weather information. These methods

include: NOAA Weather Wire Service, Emergency Management

Weather Information Network, private sector vendors, Internet,

pagers, ESATCOM (state satellite communication system), and

NWR. These systems functioned properly during the event, with the

exception of the NWR (see Finding F below).

FACT 20: The Service Assessment Team was unable to locate any outdoor

warning siren systems in the impact areas.

FACT 21: The NWSO Melbourne NWR operators effectively utilized the

Warning Alarm Tone when broadcasting SVSs that contained

specific information about tornado locations and projected paths. 

This technique enhanced the dissemination of critical information.

Finding E: According to broadcast media, the EAS functioned during the event. 

Local broadcast stations monitor the NWR and/or the LP1 station

(WDBO) for EAS activations. Station logs from WXXL-FM radio

showed that EAS activations from NWR were received about a

minute after they were transmitted. The LP1 station (WDBO)

captures the NWR activation, then manually relays the broadcast

through the EAS. To expedite dissemination when messages are

relayed, they are keyed to all counties in the EAS area. Stations

primarily monitoring WDBO commented that there was a delay in

the EAS activations and that having all warnings keyed to all

counties in the service area was problematic.

Recommendation E: The local EAS committee should review operating and monitoring

procedures to ensure timely activation during weather emergencies. 

The Melbourne WCM should work to ensure that broadcast media

receivers are properly tuned and programmed to receive NWS

warning products.

Finding F: The Orlando NWR transmitter was off the air for several minutes

during the Orange/Seminole County tornadoes. The transmitter was

apparently knocked off the air at approximately 11:39 p.m.,

February 22, due to a power outage or fluctuation. The transmitter

site is in the vicinity of the Winter Garden tornado. The outage was

not discovered by the NWSO Melbourne staff until reported by

amateur radio storm spotters in the area at approximately 11:50 p.m. 

The outage report was relayed to the NWR operator shortly after

midnight, at which time he immediately took corrective actions to

return the broadcast to the air. He remotely switched transmitters at
18

the site, and the broadcast returned to the air on low power at 12:04

a.m., February 23. During the outage, before the NWR operator

was aware of the outage, two tornado warnings and two SVSs were

programmed on the NWR console. None of these products were

disseminated via the Orlando NWR during the outage. The

messages were in the program cycle after the broadcast resumed,

however, the warning alarm and the Weather Radio Specific Area

Message Encoding tones were not retransmitted. NWS offices need

capability to monitor on-air NWR broadcasts at remote transmitter

locations. This system should contain a feature to alert the

programming office when the broadcast goes off the air. Such a

system, ROAMS, is being evaluated on some NWR transmitters.

Recommendation F: The NWS should proceed with deployment of a functional ROAMStype system as quickly as possible.

Finding G: Broadcast of tornado warnings on NWR took an average of 4.2

minutes from the time of warning issuance, ranging from 2 to 8

minutes. There are multiple variables which could lead to a delay in

NWR transmission, including available staff, delay in getting warning

information to the broadcaster, broadcast methods and location of

NWR programming consoles. Interviews with staff indicated that

during this event the staff waited for a hard copy of the warning

message, then took the message to the NWR broadcaster, who

recorded the warning message before activating the warning tones

and broadcasting the recorded message. This procedure has several

potentials for delay, including the need to wait for printed copy. The

remote broadcast console location led to delay in getting information

to the NWR broadcaster. Also, recording the messages before

activation of warning tones and broadcast added time to

dissemination. Deployment of the NWR Console Replacement

System (CRS) is underway, and this system provides capabilities for

broadcast of warning messages with minimal delay. These

capabilities include: simplified operator procedures for manual

broadcast of warning tones and recorded or live voice messages; and

the ability to automatically broadcast warning tones and synthesized

voice messages of warning text simultaneously on multiple

transmitters immediately upon receipt of warning text.

Recommendation G: The NWS should evaluate the NWR warning broadcast

methodologies employed at field offices and develop more efficient

means to provide quicker broadcast of warning messages. Until the

CRS is fully deployed and utilized, the NWS offices should consider
19

interim methods for reducing the lag time in the broadcast of

warning messages.

Finding H: While emergency management agencies and the media were aware

of and utilized NWR to receive information and warnings, the survey

team encountered only one person who owned or used an NWR

receiver. Most people interviewed had no, or limited, knowledge of

the NWR broadcasts and warning alarm features. Due to the time of

this tornado outbreak when many people were in bed sleeping, the

warning alarm feature of the NWR had great potential to reduce the

number of deaths and injuries.

Recommendation H: The NWS should work with the emergency management

community, NWR receiver manufacturers, and the media to renew

efforts in developing a comprehensive public education effort with

respect to NWR alerting capabilities.

Finding I: Some cable viewers watching “out-of-region” stations did not have

access to warning information since some local cable providers

either do not have or do not use all-channel override capabilities.

Recommendation I: NWS offices should coordinate with cable providers to educate them

on the life-saving potential of all-channel override.

Finding J: A number of people impacted by the tornadoes said they felt

outdoor warning sirens would have improved their ability to be

alerted to the storms, especially those in recreational vehicles and

manufactured housing units. Some out-of-state visitors stated that

they took no protective action, even though they were aware of

warnings for their county because they expected outdoor sirens to

alert them to imminent danger.

Recommendation J: The NWS should work with local governmental and emergency

response officials to explore several methods of communicating

warning information to the general public.

Response

FACT 22: The day of the week and time of occurrence (Sunday around

midnight) made people more vulnerable to death and injury, as most

were at home and many were asleep or in bed, not watching

television or listening to commercial radio.
20

FACT 23: Of the 42 tornado fatalities, 40 were in recreational vehicles, mobile

homes or manufactured housing; one was in an automobile; and one

was in a permanent framed structure.

FACT 24: There was wide variation among the interviewees regarding the

perceived amount of warning lead time received; however, most

households were aware that threatening weather was in their area

and that a tornado watch was in effect. Some people received

warning that a tornado was heading their way several minutes before

impact, while others were seemingly less informed. Still others who

were asleep had no idea that a threat existed until being awakened

by debris hitting their homes or accommodations.

FACT 25: Residents of permanent homes who were interviewed stated that

even if they received little or no advanced warning for the tornadoes,

they generally took proper safety actions, moving to lower floors

and interior rooms or hallways.

Finding K: Some people in recreational vehicle parks stated that they received

NWS warnings. However, they took no protective action because

they were unaware of their location in relation to the warned areas.

Recommendation K: Due to the large number of visitors and seasonal residents in high

tourist areas, the NWS should work with local emergency

management, state, county and city officials, and the private sector

to encourage and assist in the development of information that can

be provided to new arrivals, or posted at recreational vehicle parks,

campgrounds, and hotels, motels and resorts.

Finding L: While there was extensive destruction to recreational vehicles and

mobile homes in one recreational vehicle park, three permanent

buildings suffered only minor damage. Several park residents

escaped serious injury by taking shelter in these buildings. Many

out-of-state visitors stated that they made no effort to seek adequate

shelter because they did not know where that shelter could be found.

Recommendation L: The NWS should work with Federal, state, county, and city officials

to develop policies promoting the creation, or identification, of “safe

refuge” structures, or areas, within highly vulnerable neighborhoods,

such as recreational vehicle parks and mobile home parks. 

Information about these locations should be provided upon check-in,

and safe locations should be clearly identified.
21

Preparedness

FACT 26: The Melbourne NWSO staff had prepared, both internally and

externally, for a significant winter severe weather season, possibly

enhanced by the presence of El Niño and an unusually strong subtropical jet stream over the Gulf of Mexico and Florida. Special

studies of potential severe weather occurrence and its meaning for

east-central Florida were developed and shared with the media, the

preparedness community and the public. The staff prepared

internally by developing specialized tornado warning guidance for

Florida (in part based on general tornado warning guidance prepared

by the OSF and NSSL). Training modules and review exercises

were placed on the local intranet, and all forecasters studied the

information prior to the beginning of significant severe weather

episodes in January. The staff was well trained and well drilled on

severe weather operations.

FACT 27: The Melbourne NWSO has an active outreach program, and the

staff has a good working relationship with emergency management

officials and the media in the CWA. An annual Florida Hazardous

Weather Awareness Week is held as a cooperative effort among the

NWS and state, county and local governments. An activity during

that week is a statewide tornado drill. In 1998, the awareness week

was February 22-28 with the statewide drill occurring February 25. 

Three of the four counties in which deaths and injuries occurred had

received at least one formal spotter training session within the past

year.

Finding M: Fewer than half of the people interviewed by the Service Assessment

Team had a pre-defined family action plan to be used in the event of

a tornado. Statements indicated that public preparedness planning in

the area revolves more around the threat of hurricanes than the

threat of tornadoes/severe weather. A tornado drill earlier in the

year is recommended for central and south Florida.

Recommendation M: The NWS should work with concerned national, state, county and

local agencies to discover ways to increase public awareness of lifesaving actions to be taken during tornadoes.
22

System/Infrastructure

Finding N: One problem occurred with the WSR-88D communications lines. 

The wideband line that delivered data to Radar Interface Data

Distribution System/WDSS (WIDEBAND 3) failed at approximately

11:05 p.m. Sunday, February 22, and could not be restarted with

simple RPG commands. Because of the importance of WDSS

output to the office severe weather operations, the RPG was

brought down at about 11:30 p.m. and rebooted/restarted. This

cleared the problem, and data were restarted to the PUP and WDSS

at approximately 11:45 p.m. During the time when the RPG was

down, the PUP was up and dial-ins to WSR-88Ds at Tampa and

Jacksonville were accomplished. In addition, forecasters had access

to the FAA’s ITWS system with input from the Orlando-area

TDWR and ASR9 radars. The Melbourne staff advised the Service

Assessment Team that the WIDEBAND 3 line has failed during

other severe weather episodes and is considered a “chronic”

problem. Although the Melbourne staff used resourcefulness in

solving the communications line problem, and there is no evidence

that severe/tornadic events were missed during the RPG reboot, the

potential for missed warnings is large during a data outage—as long

as 15 minutes in a critical weather situation.

Recommendation N1: The OSF should continue to search for ways to prevent

WIDEBAND 3 problems for those sites where that communications

link is installed and in operational use.

Recommendation N2: The NWS and the entire NEXRAD Program should continue the

NEXRAD Product Improvement initiative.

Finding O: As part of an FAA radar development project, the Melbourne

NWSO had available a display of FAA radar data (TDWR and

ASR9) from Orlando-area radars. In addition to near-range

reflectivity and velocity data, algorithm output (Tornado Detection

and Gust Front) was available to the forecasters as guidance

information. This radar display proved valuable as a back-up to the

WSR-88D during the time when the RPG was down for a

restart/reboot. Consideration should be given to the use of

appropriate FAA radar data as back-up to the WSR-88D in the

event of radar outages. Although not a consideration in the current

case, FAA radar data might also be used in areas where WSR-88D

radars have beam blockage or some other sampling limitation that

prevents full cover of the CWA.
23

Recommendation O: The NWS should continue its study into the use of FAA radar data

in NWS offices.
24

Substantial damage to the Boggy Creek Shopping Center on the east side of Kissimmee,

Florida. Photograph courtesy of Robert Sheets.

Several apartment buildings were damaged in the Country Garden Apartment complex

in Winter Garden, Florida. Photograph courtesy of Robert Sheets.
A-1

Appendix A

Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale

The Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale is a scale of wind damage intensity which wind speeds are

inferred from an analysis of wind damage.

Category Definition and Effect

F0 Gale tornado (40-72 mph): Light damage. Some damage to chimneys; break

branches off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees; damage sign boards.

F1 Moderate tornado (73-112 mph): Moderate damage. The lower limit is the

beginning of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile homes

pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos pushed off the roads.

F2 Significant tornado (113-157 mph): Considerable damage. Roofs torn off

frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees

snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated.

F3 Severe tornado (158-206 mph): Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn

off well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted;

heavy cars lifted off ground and thrown.

F4 Devastating tornado (207-260 mph): Devastating damage. Well-constructed

houses leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off some distance; cars

thrown and large missiles generated.

F5 Incredible tornado (261-318 mph): Incredible damage. Strong frame houses

lifted off foundations and carried considerable distance to disintegrate;

automobile-sized missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 yards; trees

debarked; steel-reinforced structures badly damaged; incredible phenomena

will occur.
B-1

Appendix B

Central Florida Tornado Outbreak

February 22-23, 1998

Chronological Log

VALID TIME PRODUCT COUNTIES NWR LOG EAS LOG REMARKS

EST TYPE AFFECTED TIME TIME

2100-0300 SEL8 ALL 2031 2033 TOR WATCH

#58

2130-2230 TORTBW SUMTER 2136 ?

2145-2250 TORMLB LAKE 2147 2148 NO TOR-BGNG

OF DAYTONA

TOR CELL

2158 SVSMLB LAKE 2200 2202 EAS TONED

2210 SVSMLB LAKE 2213 2214 EAS TONED

2222-2315 TORMLB VOLUSIA 2225 2226 W OF

DAYTONA TOR

2233-0000 FFSMLB LAKE VOLUSIA 2238 ? URB FLOOD

ADVISORY

2240 SPSMLB ALL NA NA WATCH

UPDATE-EM

ALERT

2241 SVSMLB LAKE VOLUSIA 2243 2244 EAS TONED

STRONG

WORDS-TRNG

TO DAB

2245-2330 TAPMLB DAB NA NA LCL AIRPORT

ADVISORY

2249-0050 SMWMLB FLAGLER BCH- NA NA SPCL MARINE

MOSQUITO WARNING

LAGOON
B-2

VALID TIME PRODUCT COUNTIES NWR LOG EAS LOG REMARKS

EST TYPE AFFECTED TIME TIME

2255 TORNADO HIT VOLUSIA TCHDWN SW

DAB APPROX

1ST DEATH

2259 SVSMLB LAKE VOLUSIA 2301 2303 EAS TONED

MNTN TOR

2308 SVSMLB VOLUSIA 2310 2311 TOR MVG

THRU DAB

2320-0005 TORMLB VOLUSIA 2321 2323 REISSUE FOR

CNTY 5 MIN

AFT 2222

WRNG

EXPIRED

2327-0030 TORMLB LAKE 2330 2333 BGNG OF 2ND

CELL

2337 TORNADO HIT LAKE 1ST TCHDWN

SW OF WNTR

GRDN

2337-0040 TORMLB WRN ORANGE 2339 NO RECORD MNTND WNTR

GRDN-PSBL

TOR CLRMT

2339 APPROX ORLANDO EAS LOGS

NWR OFF AIR SHOW NO

RCPT

2341 TORNADO HIT ORANGE CROSSED

COUNTY LN

2346 SVSMLB LAKE ORANGE 2350 NO RECORD NR WNTR

VOLUSIA GRDN-WRNG

UPDATE

2347 TORNADO ORANGE TOR IN AREA

WINTER OF DEATHS

GARDEN

2348 LSRMLB VOLUSIA TOR

RPRTS

2350 NWR REPORTED

REPORTED ON EVE SHIFT

OFF AIR BY LOG

HAMS
B-3

VALID TIME PRODUCT COUNTIES NWR LOG EAS LOG REMARKS

EST TYPE AFFECTED TIME TIME

2351 SVSMLB ORANGE 2357 NO RECORD SPOTTER RPT

FM WNTR

GRDN

2356-0055 TORMLB SEMINOLE 0003 NO RECORD CONT WNTR

GRDN TOR

MNTND

LONGWOOD

0004 NWR SWITCHED

OPERATOR XMTRS AND

NOTIFIED IT CAME

MCO NWR BACK UP

OFF AIR

0000-0045 TORTBW POLK 0005 0006 NO REPORTS

0010 TORNADO HIT SEMINOLE FIRST

TOUCHDOWN

IN COUNTY

0011 SVSMLB LAKE ORANGE 0015 NO RECORD MNTND

SEMINOLE LONGWOOD

AND RPRTS

0014-0115 TORMLB VOLUSIA 0021 0023 MOVG OUT OF

SANFORD

0015 TORNADO SEMINOLE FIRST

SANFORD DEATHS IN

COUNTY

0021-0330 FFWMLB VOLUSIA 0027 NO RECORD FLOOD RPRTS

0022-0120 TORMLB NORTHERN 0025 0028 MNTND

OSCEOLA KISSIMMEE

0024 TORNADO HIT VOLUSIA TOR ENTERED

COUNTY

0029-0230 TAPMLB MCO NA NA LOCAL

AIRPORT

ADVISORY
B-4

VALID TIME PRODUCT COUNTIES NWR LOG EAS LOG REMARKS

EST TYPE AFFECTED TIME TIME

0037 SVSMLB ORANGE 0056 NO RECORD SVRL RPRTS

SEMINOLE

VOLUSIA

OSCEOLA

0040 TORNADO HIT OSCEOLA 1ST TCHDWN

SW OF

KISSIMMEE 

0040-0340 FFWMLB SEMINOLE 0048 NO RECORD PSBL

ORANGE FLOODING

0045 TORNADO HIT VOLUSIA RURAL I-95

0040-0125 TORMLB ORANGE 0045 0046 XTND ERLYR

WRNG

KISSIMMEE

TOR MOVG TO

ORANGE CNTY

0053 SVSMLB SEMINOLE 0056 NO RECORD WRNG UPDATE

VOLUSIA

OSCEOLA

ORANGE

0055 TORNADO HIT ORANGE KISSIMMEE

TOR MOVD

INTO COUNTY

0108 SVSMLB VOLUSIA 0111 NO RECORD WRNG UPDATE

OSCEOLA

ORANGE

0119-0220 TORMLB ORANGE 0127 0125 EXTND ERLYR

OSCEOLA WRNGS

0123-0225 TORMLB BREVARD 0130 0129 WRNG FOR

KISSIMMEE

TOR NR XMAS

0138 TORNADO HIT BREVARD NR OUTDOOR

WORLD WEST

OF I-5
B-5

VALID TIME PRODUCT COUNTIES NWR LOG EAS LOG REMARKS

EST TYPE AFFECTED TIME TIME

0134 SVSMLB BREVARD 0137 NA UPDATE

MNTND

TITUSVILLE

0150 SVSMLB BREVARD 0153 NA WATCH/WRNG

UPDATE

0201 FFSMLB BREVARD 0205 NA URB FLOOD

STMNT

0225 SVSMLB BREVARD 0228 NA XPIRE

ORANGE

OSCEOLA,

BREVARD WL

BE EXTND

0227-0315 TORMLB BREVARD 0230 0230 MERRITT

ISLAND

0230 TORNADO HIT BREVARD BANANA RVR

PORT

CANAVERAL

0246 SVSMLB BREVARD 0248 NA WRNG UPDATE

0253 SNWMLB FLAGLER TO 0255 NA SPCL MARINE

MELBOURNE WARNING

0304-0400 TORMLB OSCEOLA 0307 0308 NO RPRTS

0313 SVSMLB OSCEOLA 0315 NA WRNG UPDATE

0316-0415 TORMLB BREVARD 0321 0321 NO RPRTS

0334 FFSMLB BREVARD 0338 NA

0401 SVSMLB OSCEOLA 0406 NA WRNGS

BREVARD EXPIRED