U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

99–821PDF 2005

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.–RUSSIA RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 9, 2005

Serial No. 109–12

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

PETER T. KING, New York, Vice Chairman 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

TED POE, Texas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Celeste A. Wallander, Ph.D., Director, Russia and Eurasia 

Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................ 34

The Honorable Dimitri K. Simes, President, The Nixon Center ......................... 40

The Honorable Eugene B. Rumer, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, National Defense University ................................................ 43

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging 

Threats: Prepared statement .............................................................................. 2

The Honorable Curt Weldon: Material submitted for the record ........................ 8

The Honorable Celeste A. Wallander: Prepared statement ................................. 36

The Honorable Dimitri K. Simes: Prepared statement ........................................ 42

The Honorable Eugene B. Rumer: Prepared statement ....................................... 45

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 55

Responses from the Honorable Eugene B. Rumer to questions submitted 

for the record by Members of the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging 

Threats .................................................................................................................. 56

(1)

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.–RUSSIA RELATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:08 p.m. in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on recent developments in the relationship between Russia and the United States. 

There are few bilateral relationships in the world today that are 

as important or as filled with pitfalls as our relationship with Russia. It is a relationship that has produced mutually beneficial results in the all important areas of counterterrorism and securing 

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Russia and the former 

Soviet republics. 

At the same time, there have been growing tensions in the 

United States-Russia relations, primarily on two fronts. First, 

President Putin has moved Russia in the direction of less democracy and fewer civil liberties. Second, in recent years, there is 

strong evidence that Russia is trying to re-exert its influence and 

control over its neighbors, especially Ukraine. 

Furthermore, I am deeply concerned about Russia’s efforts to 

provide assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. On one hand, 

given Russia’s ongoing struggle with Islamic terrorists and their 

close geographic proximity to Iran, I believe it would be contrary 

to Russia’s national interest to have a nuclear-armed Iran. On the 

other hand, given Russia’s recent history of being unable to properly account for or secure its own nuclear, chemical and biological 

material, I am disturbed that Russia would agree to supply Iran 

with nuclear fuel in return for the promise by Iran that it would 

send back the spent fuel to Russia. I am looking forward to listening to the views of today’s witnesses on nuclear fuel supply agreement and the overall Russia-Iran relationship and its potential impact on our relations with Russia. 

Examining the ledger on our relationship with Russia, we see 

areas of progress and other areas where the relationship is deteriorating. This is not good enough. Russia is a proud nation of 144 

million people that spans two continents and 11 time zones. It 

shares borders with 14 countries, including China and North Korea 

in the east and Ukraine and Poland in the west. 

2

Russia can continue to be a strong ally in the war on terrorism 

and in curtailing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We 

also share a common concern regarding the rise of radical Islamic 

fundamentalism. 

For this reason, I want to hear from our panel of experts and get 

their honest assessment of where Russia is going and the steps 

needed for our relationship to get back on track. 

With that, I would defer to my good friend, the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Wexler. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing 

on recent developments in the relationship between Russia and the United States. 

There are few bi-lateral relationships in the world today that are as important 

or as filled with pitfalls as our relationship with Russia. It is a relationship that 

has produced mutually beneficial results in the all-important areas of counter-terrorism and the securing of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Russia and 

the former Soviet republics. 

At the same time, there have been growing tensions in Russia-U.S. relations, primarily on two fronts: First, President Putin has moved Russia in the direction of 

less democracy and fewer civil liberties. Second, in recent years, there is strong evidence that Russia is trying to re-exert its influence and control over its neighbors, 

especially Ukraine. 

Furthermore, I am deeply concerned about Russia’s efforts to provide assistance 

to the Iranian nuclear program. On one hand, given Russia’s on-going struggle with 

Islamic terrorists and their close geographic proximity to Iran, I believe it would be 

contrary to Russia’s national interest to have a nuclear-armed Iran. On the other 

hand, given Russia’s recent history of being unable to properly account for or secure 

its own nuclear, chemical and biological material, I am disturbed that Russia would 

agree to supply Iran with nuclear fuel in return for the promise by Iran that it 

would send back the spent fuel to Russia. I am looking forward to listening to the 

views of today’s witnesses on nuclear fuel supply agreement and the overall RussiaIran relationship and its potential impact on our relations with Russia. 

Examining the ledger of our relationship with Russia, we see areas of progress 

and other areas where the relationship is deteriorating. This is not good enough. 

Russia is a proud nation of 144 million people that spans two continents and eleven 

time zones. It shares borders with 14 countries, including China and North Korea 

in the east and Ukraine and Poland in the West. 

Russia can continue to be a strong ally in the war on terrorism and in curtailing 

the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We also share a common concern regarding the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism. 

For this reason, I want to hear from our panel of experts and get their honest 

assessment of where Russia is going and the steps needed to get our relationship 

back on the right track. 

I will now turn to Mr. Wexler for any opening statement he may wish to make.

Mr. WEXLER. I tell you what, Mr. Chairman, if it is okay with 

you, I have got about a 3-minute statement that I would like to 

give, but I would be happy to wait until after Congressman Weldon 

is done and give it before we start the next panel to save time. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Absolutely. That will be the order then. 

We have an additional witness that both Congressman Wexler 

and I have agreed would be an asset to have before us today. Because it is a late addition, we are going to try to limit it to about 

15 minutes, because of the other witnesses. 

Our witness is a very good personal friend and colleague of mine 

from Pennsylvania, Congressman Curt Weldon. As I mentioned, he 

is from Pennsylvania, representing the 7th District and has just 

3

started his 10th term in Congress as one of my classmates of the 

historic 100th Congress. 

Mr. WEXLER. What was so historic about it? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Curt and I. The fact that Curt and I were elected 

makes it historic. 

Mr. Weldon is Vice Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 

and has an in-depth knowledge of all the issues affecting Russia 

and Russian-American relationships. I appreciate you being here 

today Curt, and we welcome your comments. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wexler, 

both of you for your tireless work in this region of the world, which 

is so important. And thank you for letting me share a few thoughts 

with you. 

I don’t have a written statement so I am just going to speak from 

the heart about my concerns, and you have two outstanding witnesses coming in who will give you, I think, very professional opinions. Mine is an opinion developed through the last 30 years of personal interaction with the former Soviet States. 

I just took my 41st delegation to Moscow as a response to a trip 

I took to Beslan, 2 weeks after the attack on the school. I stood in 

the school with the North Ossetians, the Duma Chairman from 

North Osseti, and the regional leaders; and as a teacher, it was 

probably the most emotional experience I have had since I was at 

the World Trade Center. I went there to show solidarity with the 

Russian people in the fight again terrorism, because they have the 

same common enemy that we have. 

What happened to that school and the 170 children and the 370 

some people that were killed is beyond description, but at the time, 

I committed to them that we would do a joint homeland security 

conference. 

We did that conference a month ago in Moscow. We had 10,000 

Russians attend for 4 days. The Chairman of the Duma Security 

Committee Facility spoke and I invited him to Washington last 

week, where he spoke at a conference at the Convention Center on 

joint homeland security efforts. 

There are many in this city and in this country that are advocating that we move away from Russia. That because of the concerns of the Khodorkovsky case, because of the clamp down on public information and the media, because of some of the reforms that 

perhaps we don’t understand and we don’t like—relative to the way 

the governors are put into office—that we should not deal with 

Russia, because of Russia’s involvement with the Bashir Nuclear 

Reactor in Iran. 

I take the opposite approach. I think now is the time to more aggressively engage with Russia. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I am a very 

strong supporter of our military, as you know, as the Vice Chairman of both the Arms Services and Homeland Security Committees, but I think some of the decisions that we have made over the 

past 13 years, by both Republican and Democrat Administrations 

have put us in the position we are in today. 

4

If I were a Russian, I would wonder what America’s real intentions were, as much as I would wonder what my own leaders are 

doing. 

I mean if I listen to people like Zhirinovsy and Zyuganov, back 

when Russia became a free democracy, they were saying, ‘‘You 

can’t trust America. They are going to bring NATO up to our borders. They are going to abrogate the ABM Treaty. They are going 

to do things without our involvement.’’

Now I supported getting out of the ABM Treaty. I supported expanding NATO, but I think we handled those actions miserably. I 

did not support the way we bombed Serbia, Russia’s closest partner, without explaining to the Russians why they could not play a 

legitimate role in getting Milosevic out, which in the end they had 

to do as a part of the G–8 settlement. We had to bring Russia in 

and they played that role. 

I think back to America sitting back while Yeltsin handpicked 

oligarchs, in some cases with the blessing of the United States, 

that would later rip off the Russian people, steal billions of dollars, 

in some cases with the cooperation of United States financial institutions, like the Bank of New York scandal. Five billion dollars. 

Bank of New York officials indicted because of their cooperation in 

taking Russian money out of Russia. 

Then I look at the Presidents, both Clinton and Bush, promising 

elevating Russia out of the embarrassing Jackson-Vanik limitation. 

We still have not taken action on that. 

So if you are a Russian, you look at the relationship with America and say, ‘‘They don’t really want to be our friend. They really 

don’t respect us.’’ And perhaps that is one of the reasons, in my 

opinion at least, why Putin is taken to closing in the Government 

with those people he trusts the most, which are basically former 

KGB. 

In that regard, in 2001, we submitted this document, which you 

were a signatory to, one-third of the Congress, Lugar, Levin and 

Biden on the front page, one-third of the Congress, to take a new 

approach with Russia—108 recommendations in 11 different areas. 

Unfortunately, on the American side, this document sat on the 

shelf at the White House. The Russians took it seriously. Their 

Academy of Science has embraced us unanimously. On the American side, we didn’t take the steps to embrace a deep relationship 

with Russia, beyond a personal friendship of Putin and Bush. 

Right now, we find ourselves in a difficult situation. 

Khodorkovsky is in jail, even though he didn’t pay his taxes and 

that is a reason, and we are also concerned that it is a political action on the part of Putin, which it obviously is. 

We are concerned about Putin’s other actions, but we also need 

Russia. If you look at the two primary problem areas that we have 

in the world—Iran, the Middle East and North Korea—in each of 

those cases, I would argue that we need Russia to be a partner 

with us. No country has more access to Iran than Russia does. It 

was Russia who supplied the technology to develop and build the 

Bashir Nuclear Power Plant, which right now dramatically scares 

the Israeli’s, because if Iran continues to receive the fuel that Russia has promised and that agreement was signed right after the reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 May 09, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\030905\99821.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

cent summit, then Israel’s concern is that Iran will next produce 

nuclear weapons and I would agree with that assessment. 

I want to say to you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, 2 

years ago the minister of atomic energy from Russia, Rumyantsev, 

and the leading nuclear scientists in Russia, my good friend 

Velikhov, who runs the Kurchatov Institute, told me that they 

could work on an arrangement where the United States and Russia 

would have joint ownership of any fuel going into Bashir. Why 

didn’t we take advantage of that? 

Those are the kind of questions we have to ask. I mean instead 

of that, we have gotten assurances from Russia, but now we have 

Russia supplying energy. So over the past 2 years, what we have 

tried to do with a group of Members of Congress, is establish a new 

relationship into the inner-circle of Putin’s leadership team. It 

would be like dealing with Carl Rove and Andy Card. 

I will leave for the record documents from the International Exchange Group, established by Putin’s Plenipotentiary representative to the Duma and the Federation Council. His name is Alexander Kotenkov. 

That relationship includes on its board the Deputy Director of 

the FSB, the Chairman of the Security Committee of the Federation Council, Aleksei Alexandrov, the Chairman of the Security 

Council of the Duma, Vladimir Vasilyev, and it includes the key 

people who are personally friendly with Putin. 

Through that effort, I have proposed to the Administration that 

we take two of four actions, which I would like to outline briefly 

for you today, that I think can bring Russia back into the fold. 

The first is we need to terminate Jackson-Vanik immediately. 

Every major Jewish group has come out and written me letters: 

National Council of Soviet Jewry, AIPAC, and Jinsa. 

They have all come out, because I am a big supporter of Russia 

Jewry back in the Soviet era and they have written me letters saying, ‘‘It is time to end Jackson-Vanik for Russia, for Ukraine and 

for the other former Soviet States.’’

It is time we do that and why we haven’t done that, to me, is 

just mind boggling. It has nothing to do with other trade issues. 

It was simply an initiative put into place, because of the Soviet 

Union’s persecution of Jews. That has ended. 

If we have other trade issues with Russia, deal with them separately, but let’s get rid of Jackson-Vanik. It sends a strong signal 

to Russia that we respect her. 

The second is, expand cooperative threat reduction. Nunn-Lugar 

is not enough. We need to go beyond Nunn-Lugar to get at sites 

that Russia has not been willing to give us access to in the past, 

both biological sites and nuclear sites. 

Through this effort that I just outlined to you—the International 

Exchange Group—I took a delegation of two democrats, Soloman 

Ortiz and Silvestre Reyes, a year ago in August, to Krasnyarsk 26. 

We went into the mountain in Siberia and went down to the site 

of the three largest plutonium-producing reactors. We had no help 

from the State Department, no help from the Energy Department, 

no help from the Defense Department. We did it directly with this 

Russian group that is close to Putin. 

6

We need a new approach to getting access to sites that Russia 

has not been willing to give us access to. Right now in the Pentagon and the State Department, there is a proposal to do two pilot 

programs through the IEG. 

One of them is to access six biological sites, some of which we 

have not been given access to in the past, out of 79 that Russia has 

identified to us. 

We need to proceed and this Committee could help move that 

process along within the State Department. It is a low dollar item. 

The second is—and that is the third initiative that I have in my 

document—expand cooperation with Russia on missile defense. 

When we moved out of the ABM Treaty, I was the author of that 

bill that passed the House. My statements were that we should do 

this only by cooperating with Russia to allay their concerns about 

trying to achieve a strategic superiority over them. 

Do you know that today for the first time, since Russia became 

a free nation, we have no joint missile defense cooperation with 

Russia? That is in spite of President Bush and President Putin 

both saying we want it. What kind of a signal has that sent? 

In fact, a year ago General Ron Kadish, our four-star general in 

charge of missile defense, came to me and he said, ‘‘Congressman 

Weldon, I can’t get the Russians to sit down at the table and work 

out a follow-on.’’

So I said, ‘‘Would you come over with me to Moscow?’’ In May 

of last year, Mr. Chairman, I took General Kadish’s replacement, 

three-star General Obering to Moscow with me. 

Now I shouldn’t have to do this, but because our relationship 

wasn’t strong enough to get that meeting with the Missile Defense 

Agency, I took General Obering and three of his staffers to Starya 

Plashad, which is the equivalent of the West Wing of the White 

House and we sat down with Kotenkov and in walks General 

Baluevsky in a business suit. 

That was the first meeting between our three-star general and 

the guy who is today the Commander-in-Chief of all Western military forces. He was elevated 3 weeks after we left. He is the equivalent of the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs. 

There is something wrong in our relationship when the two 

Presidents get along well, but below that there is nothing. It is hollow. 

The fourth initiative I think is the most exciting. I proposed, and 

this Committee could be a big help here, that we empower our 

President and the Russian President to do something that is similar to the old Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Do you remember 

that in the Clinton era? 

Now the current Administration doesn’t like to talk about GoreChernomyrdin because it is not the in thing to talk about, but I 

think the model is a good model and what I have proposed is that 

we announce and establish a United States-Russian free energy 

trade agreement. 

Russia has tons of energy. We have tons of need. Russia can’t get 

their energy to the marketplace. We have the technology to get it 

to the marketplace and to help them extract it. 

The Russian private energy industry is already investing in 

America. Lukoil, chaired by Alexperov, bought 2,000 Getty gas staVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 May 09, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\030905\99821.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
7

tions. When I was in Moscow in the fall, they cut a deal with Conoco Phillips to buy another 1,800 gas stations. 

So Lukoil now owns 3,800 gas stations in America. They are already investing in our country. Atera, a Russian energy company, 

is based in Jacksonville, Florida, for 12 years. 

What we need is a strategic Presidential-level task force on fossil 

fuel energy cooperation. That also sends a signal to Saudi Arabia 

and the Middle Eastern countries that we have alternative sources 

of energy that we can turn to, and it brings together a strategic relationship on energy that we can benefit from and that Russia can 

benefit from, but it has got to go beyond fossil fuels. 

It has got to include nuclear energy. The peaceful use of nuclear 

power, bringing our energy ministry together with the Russian 

ministry of atomic energy and institutes like Kurchatov, linked up 

with Los Alamos and Sandias and Livermore and they are already 

doing some work, but in a strategic way so that we can do joint 

work on energy initiatives in the nuclear arena. 

If we had that in place, we wouldn’t have to worry about Bashir 

right now. I had conversations last week and I think it is doable 

that we could convince the Russians at this late date to abandon 

Bashir, but we are not going to do it through the current relationship. It is not going to happen. 

If we put together an outline, a vision of a strategic energy relationship, if we take the other three steps I have advocated, expanding cooperative threat reduction, joint missile defense cooperation 

and elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, you have just given 

Putin a political homerun back in Moscow. 

Then there is additional leverage for President Bush to call Putin 

in and say, ‘‘Now Vladimir, I have given you something that perhaps you have not had in the past 12 years. I have given the respect of our people. Now I need your help. 

‘‘I need your help in North Korea. I need your help in Iran and 

I need you to understand that the direction you are taking in going 

against democratic foundation principles is wrong and therefore, 

you need to be sensitive to that and have the leverage that we 

don’t have today with Russia.’’

Finally, North Korea. The ultimate solution for North Korea, because we are never going to go back to the Keto nuclear framework, is going to be to run pipelines from the Russian far east at 

Sakhalin down through North Korea, along the rail corridor into 

South Korea. 

The South Koreans and the Russians will finance it. That will 

give North Korea a non-nuclear source of energy and will give 

them income from all the energy going through their country into 

South Korea and it creates a bond between the two nations. 

This morning I hosted the Chairman of the Security Committee 

and the International Affairs Committee from the Korean Congress 

and both of them agreed. 

So Russia becomes a key asset that we can’t walk away from, 

even though we may be troubled, as I am. We need to be Russia’s 

toughest critic, which I have been, but we need to be her best 

friend and I think now is a time for us to exert that influence and 

it is going to require some bold leadership that sometimes runs 

contrary to common thinking in this city. 

8

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to provide this for 

both of you. 

[Material submitted for the record by Mr. Weldon follows:]

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CURT WELDON, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA


99821a.eps
9


99821b.eps
10


99821c.eps
11


99821d.eps
12


99821e.eps
13


99821f.eps
14


99821g.eps
15


99821h.eps
16


99821i.eps
17


99821j.eps
18


99821k.eps
19


99821l.eps
20


99821m.eps
21

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Curt. Last week Rob and 

I had the opportunity to go to the White House and hear firsthand 

from the President about his recent trip to Europe. A good portion 

of that hour-and-20-minute meeting that we had, did focus on Russia and specifically the relationship with Mr. Putin. 

I would be interested to hear Rob’s comments, because I haven’t 

heard his assessment. After listening to President Bush for 3 plus 

years or so on meetings that he has had with President Putin, I 

got a sense that there was more frustration now than there has 

been in the past. 

Three or four years ago, I got the feeling that President Bush 

was very excited about these two relatively young leaders in the 

world having an opportunity to work together to do great things. 

I now sense some real frustration, that Mr. Putin is getting a lot 

of information that is false and he is accepting it by his so-called 

experts. Based on that, I didn’t feel that President Bush was as encouraged about where we are today as maybe where we were not 

too long ago. And as a result of that, we are not making the 

progress that we should with Russia. 

He also said that as it relates to the issue of democracy; whenever the word democracy would come up, Mr. Putin didn’t want to 

discuss it at all. I won’t say it was a taboo issue, but he wanted 

to get on to other issues where there seemed to be more common 

ground having to do with international terrorism and different 

things like that. 

I would like to get your response to that and also as it relates 

to the suspicion on the part of some of the government officials 

there, if that is true also with the Russian people. 

Mr. WELDON. I think the Russian people love the American people. They want to be friends with us, but I think they are somewhat disappointed and disillusioned. 

I gave you examples of where we have said good things and 

talked a good game, but when it comes time to the substance of 

working together, it has not been there. What we have today is a 

very nice, strong, personal friendship between Bush and Putin, but 

that is not enough. We need to convince the Russian institutions, 

the ministries and the private institutions that are starting up that 

we really want to be friends and partners with Russia. We haven’t 

done a good job of that. 

We, in the Congress, gave the Administration 108 specific recommendations in 11 areas: Agriculture, education, health care, 

science and technology, defense, trade, the environment, et cetera. 

We endorsed them by one-third of the Congress. From the most liberal Democrats: My friends Bernie Sanders and Dennis Kucinich, 

Nancy Pelosi, Jack Murtha, John Spratt; to the most conservative 

Republicans: Henry Hyde, Dick Army, J.C. Watts; all signed the 

document. 

[The document referred to follows:]

22


99821n.eps
23


99821o.eps
24


99821p.eps
25


99821q.eps
26


99821r.eps
27


99821s.eps
28


99821t.eps
29


99821u.eps
30


99821v.eps
31

Mr. WELDON. We didn’t follow through, Mr. Chairman. We put 

the recommendations on a shelf and now we wonder the only thing 

we have is a personal friendship between Bush and Putin and distrust throughout the rest of the system. The relationship with Russia needs to be built from the bottom up and there are a lot of 

great NGO’s doing that. You are going to hear from a couple. They 

are doing great work. They are building institutional relationships 

but from the top. My own feeling is that we have not encouraged 

in-depth relations. In fact, in the case of the Congress, I have a 

personal feeling that we have been discouraged by certain people 

in the Administration from pursuing the kind of ties that we have 

to have and that is really a tragedy. 

I have talked to the President at length about this. I know what 

the President wants. He wants a strong, transparent relationship, 

but for some reason the people around him, especially down 

through the system, just haven’t gotten it. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Rob? 

Mr. WEXLER. The Chairman called me this morning, if he doesn’t 

mind me saying, and suggested that you, Mr. Weldon, come and 

testify. He said that once before you had testified in front of one 

of his Committees and he thought you were the best witness he 

had ever heard. I would tend to agree with him. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. I appreciate that. Coming from you, 

that is a real compliment, and from Elton. 

Mr. WEXLER. What you have to say is more than invaluable. We 

probably should get a tape and just invite the White House and 

anybody else just to come here to watch it. Maybe that should be 

the next meeting, respectfully. 

I share the Chairman’s assertation of what the President said. I 

would offer maybe one or two more observations. 

I don’t often say kind things about the President, but I was remarkably impressed with the manner in which he sized up the situation. Some of the President’s observations of his first meeting 

with President Putin were the people surrounding President Putin. 

They were younger people with bow ties that went to school at the 

London School of Economics and seemed to be genuinely committed 

to reform. 

Now the people that are surrounding President Putin are much 

more likely to be from the old intelligence factions. 

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. 

Mr. WEXLER. As you say, he has closed himself in. The President 

said one of his aims in going to Europe, relating directly to how you 

suggest we engage Russia, was to make certain that at the end of 

the equation with Iran, that it is Iran that is isolated, not America. 

Mr. WELDON. Exactly. 

Mr. WEXLER. The President’s right and there is a real risk that, 

if handled inappropriately, it is going to be America that is isolated, ironically, rather than Iran. 

You mentioned that even at this late date, you believe there is 

an opportunity to engage with Russia so that their interaction with 

the Iranians, at least from our perspective, would be more constructive. 

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. 

32

Mr. WEXLER. Would you be so kind, if you can, to give us greater 

detail as to what you suggest the Administration do? 

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. Two years ago, three years ago we had 

discussions. I gave the 100th anniversary speech at Kurchatov Institute, which is the institute where they developed their nuclear 

weapon. Igor Kurchatov was the founder of the nuclear weapon 100 

years ago. 

I gave the speech with Kozumi and with Primokov and at that 

meeting, in 2002, I had discussions with Evgeny Velikhov, who is 

the director of Kurchatov and Rumyantsev, the minister of atomic 

energy and I said, ‘‘Look, the direction you are going with Bashir 

is bad. You know I am a big supporter of Israel and their security 

and I share the same concerns Israel has, that if you continue with 

this plan, you will give Iran the capability to develop the nuclear 

weapon that they want. You need to understand that.’’

They said, ‘‘Congressman, we share the concerns of you and your 

country. We are willing to work together.’’ Velikhov proposed, and 

I briefed the Administration when I came back, that we have a 

joint ownership organization, at a minimum. 

That the United States and Russia would jointly own the fuel 

going to Bashir—why that wasn’t followed up on, I have no idea, 

but I can tell you the Russians offered it. 

Now instead, 2 days after the summit occurs, Russia actually 

signs the implementation documentation to provide the fuel for 

Bashir. 

I am not privy to what was agreed to. I assume the Russians 

have agreed to our side that there will be full transparency, but in 

discussions I had last week with the retired general, chairman of 

the Duma Security Committee, with discussions I had in Moscow 

with other senior leaders and the discussions I have had now, I 

still think it is possible that we can turn Russia away from nuclear 

cooperation with Iran. 

All we have got to do is, we can call Iran’s bluff. If Iran really 

wants power, which is what they say they want Bashir for, the 

Russians and Americans together come and say to Iran, ‘‘Look, we 

will give you the same equivalent amount of power for your people 

that Bashir will provide and we are going to shut down the Bashir 

Power Plant.’’

If that is really all Iran wants, which is power for their people, 

then they should not object to that. But we are not going to get 

that kind of an arrangement in the current environment, because 

the structure is not there. 

The trust is not there. The trust is there between the Presidents, 

but below that, it doesn’t exist and that is what is so tragic. 

I mean they want to cooperate on homeland security. You know 

we had the conference over there and 10,000 people came out. We 

had the conference at the convention center and 2,000 people came 

out. 

You know Russia wants to be our friend and partner, but the 

thing they want most—they don’t want our money—they want our 

respect. They want us to respect them. 

You can’t show respect by leaving Jackson-Vanik still in place 8 

years after it went out of rationality. It should have been removed. 

33

You don’t get their respect when you go into Serbia and bomb the 

Serbian people, without Russia’s involvement, because we didn’t 

want to go to the U.N., because you knew Russia would veto a U.N. 

resolution. So we used NATO for the one and only time to offensively invade a non-NATO country, because France and Germany 

were pushing us. And then how do we get Serbia? We brought the 

Russians in and Chernomyrdin had to help us negotiate through 

the G–8 process to final terms to end Milosevic’s reign. 

But Russia was an afterthought. You can’t keep doing that. If we 

are truly going to have Russia as a partner, then we have got to 

treat Russia as a partner, and if our President says we are going 

to do joint missile defense work, then we better do joint missile defense work, not cancel the program last year and not know how to 

restart one. 

Today we have no program. That was canceled by the current 

Administration. It was also canceled in 1995 by the Clinton Administration and Carl Levin and I went to the wall and saved the program. Now it has been canceled a second time. 

So today, in spite of President Bush saying this publicly over and 

over again, we have no joint missile defense cooperation with Russia. That sends a signal to the Russian people. 

It sends a signal to the intelligence people. America really wants 

to be Russia’s friend? I don’t think so. 

Maybe some would say I am trivializing it too much, but I deal 

with the people there and I can tell you the one thing they want, 

Mr. Chairman, is they want our respect. 

They don’t want our money. They don’t need our money. They 

have got energy. If we expect them to listen to us when they move 

away from democracy, then we better have some leverage to convince them that they are going in the wrong direction. 

When Putin makes changes we don’t understand, relative to democracy or clamping down and you know the Khodorkovsky case 

is an embarrassment, but when we hold a hearing on 

Khodorkovsky, why don’t we also say that this guy, who was a 

handpicked oligarchs, made $8 billion in 8 years and didn’t pay his 

fair share of taxes? 

Well because Khodorkovsky can hire former Members of Congress who are high-priced lobbyists, who walk the halls of this Congress, saying he should get special treatment. I know I am stepping 

on some toes right now, but that is the fact and that is what it is. 

All I am saying is, for us to have the respect of Russia, we have 

to show Russia some respect and be tough with them. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Curt, I really appreciate you being here today. I 

look forward to inviting you back. I just hope before you come next 

time you will be better prepared and not equivocate as much. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Curt. We go to our first panel, if they 

would please come forward. 

Before we do that, I have a personal request that if you have a 

cell phone, you would put it on the silent or vibrate mode. The 

Chair would be most appreciative of that because it is a little distracting. I hope that wasn’t my cell phone that went off. 

34

I welcome our witnesses today. Our first witness is Dr. Celeste 

Wallander, who is the Director of the Russia and Eurasian Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Dr. Wallander’s areas of expertise include Russian foreign and 

security policy, international relations with the Eurasia, RussianEuropean relations and the relationship of economics and security 

in Russia and Eurasia. Before joining CSIS, Dr. Wallander was a 

Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Associate 

Professor of Government at Harvard University. She is the founder 

and Executive Director of the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security. Welcome, Doctor. 

Our second witness is Mr. Dimitri K. Simes, who is the President 

of The Nixon Center. Mr. Simes was selected to lead the Center by 

President Nixon. Prior to the establishment of The Nixon Center, 

Mr. Simes serves as the Chairman of the Center of Russian and 

Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace. Mr. Simes also served as Director of the Soviet and East European Research Program and Research Professor of the Soviet 

Studies at Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the 

Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Simes is also a co-publisher of the 

influential foreign affairs magazine, The National Interest. Our third witness is Dr. Eugene B. Rumer, who is the Senior 

Fellow at the Institute of National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. His expertise includes Russia and other 

states of the former Soviet Union. Prior to joining the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, Dr. Rumer served as Visiting Scholar 

at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, member of the 

Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, and 

Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council. 

I welcome all of you today. We are privileged to have you here. 

With that, I would yield to Dr. Wallander. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE A. WALLANDER, 

PH.D., DIRECTOR, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. WALLANDER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Wexler, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you about the 

United States-Russia relationship. The United States-Russia relationship is multidimensional, as we have heard from Congressman 

Weldon so expertly, and Russian foreign policy faces many challenges. As we have seen in the last year, the combination of multidimensional complex challenges has created a number of strains in 

the relationship, which create potential negative effects on the ability of our two countries to cooperate in meeting 21st century 

emerging threats and challenges. Yet despite the strains, both the 

needed potential for United States-Russian cooperation remains 

great. We are all indebted to this Committee for its work to assess 

the relationship in a serious manner in order to support a sensible 

and productive United States engagement with Russia that balances opportunities with realistic analysis. 

Now, Russia has been living with the complex and serious challenges of what we call emerging threats for at least as long as the 

United States, and in many respects its experience has been far 

35

more immediate and tangible. This experience has been filtered, 

however, through the Putin leadership’s broader approach to and 

priorities on foreign policy. In particular, there is something of a 

problematic disjuncture between the leadership’s overall traditionalist great power foreign policy approach and the complex set of 

traditional and emerging security threats that Russia and the 

United States together and individually face. 

Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin, like Russian foreign policy under President Boris Yeltsin before it, involves 

participation in the global economy, in order to stimulate growth. 

But unlike Yeltsin’s foreign policy, which sought global economic 

integration for leverage in changing the domestic political economic 

system, the role of economic growth in Putin’s foreign policy has a 

different immediate primary objective. Economic growth is instrumental to the core objective of establishing Russia as an influential, 

autonomous, and accepted great power. For example, increased appreciation of the power and economic value of energy assets and 

transit corridors have contributed to a greater and more strategic 

focus on Europe and Asia in Russian foreign policy. 

Russia’s interest in international trade and business applies as 

much to its relations with the countries of what Russia continues 

to conceptualize as the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia’s foreign policy strategy by 2005 is internationalist, but it is 

also statist and it is most certainly not liberal. What do I mean by 

that? Well for example, trade is fine, but foreign ownership of Russian oil or gas is not, because international business brings transparency and the primacy of commercial interests into political policy. International summits and modern global media technologies 

are useful, but only if their message is controlled by the Russian 

State. 

Opportunities for great power partnership to address global security and political challenges, such as transnational terrorism, proliferation and trafficking, are part of Russia’s proper status as a 

great power and a member of the U.N. Security Council and the 

G–8. But the international community is not welcomed to offer its 

views on whether Russia’s elections are free and fair. One effect of 

the great power focus of Putin’s internationalist foreign policy has 

been the rise of geo-politics in Russian strategy and priorities. Essentially a 19th century European great power approach to security 

and diplomacy, Putin’s foreign policy is more attuned to the value 

of regional bilateral relationships for security, political and economic value. While trade with any country is important, if it increases Russia’s economic well-being, trade with regional powers, 

such as China and Iran, is all the more important for the political 

relationships it helps to build. While good relations with the United 

States are important as a part of the Russian goal for membership 

in the World Trade Organization, this value of economic growth 

cannot trump Russian understanding of its need for strategic security in Eurasia, for example, Russia’s relations with Ukraine. 

Russia’s approach to the foreign policy challenges of terrorism, 

proliferation, international criminal networks and other aspects of 

emerging threats is therefore geo-political and filtered through the 

leadership’s great power objectives. This means that while Russia’s 

concern about transnational terrorism is genuine, the concern is 

36

not only to prevent 9/11 type or Beslan-type attacks, but also to 

maintain Russia’s prerogatives to act with a high degree of autonomy in regions around its borders and with full autonomy within 

its borders. It means that while Russian leadership has no interest 

in seeing Iran obtain weapons of mass destruction capabilities, it 

does have a very strong interest in both profiting from sales of 

technology to Iran and maintaining strong political relations with 

its leadership. 

In this context, the largest challenge for the United States right 

now is that the Russian leadership sees United States foreign policy in the same lens that it sees its own foreign policy. That is to 

say, the Putin leadership imputes the same geo-political, great 

power framework to American strategic objectives and policy in 

Eurasia as Russia itself has adopted. So that instead of seeing 

United States policy, for example, on Ukraine as part of a U.S. policy to develop democracy, human rights and economic growth as 

part of our attempt to cope with the problem of emerging threats, 

transnational terrorism and non-proliferation, the Russian leadership is convinced that the United States is motivated, by the same 

great power intentions, to constrain and limit Russian power and 

influence within its regions. 

So one of the greatest challenges we face right now is how to cooperate with a Russia that seeks to cooperate with us, but does not 

quite trust us and in fact, increasingly sees American motives and 

policies in a suspicious and negative light. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE A. WALLANDER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to 

speak with you about the U.S.-Russia relationship. The U.S.-Russia relationship is 

multidimensional, and Russian foreign policy faces many challenges. As we have 

seen in the last year, that combination has created a number of strains in the relationship which create potential negative effects on the ability of the two countries 

to cooperate in meeting the 21st century environment of emerging threats. Yet despite the strains, both the need and potential for US-Russian cooperation remains 

great, and it is important to avoid the mistake of extremes: to raise the warning 

cry of a neo-imperialistic Russia on the one extreme, or to candy-coat the real problems on the other. We are all indebted to this committee for its work to assess the 

relationship in a serious manner in order to support a sensible and productive U.S. 

engagement with Russia that balances opportunities with realistic analysis. 

For my contribution to this discussion, I will cover three topics today, First, I 

want to consider briefly the parameters of the 21st century’s emerging threat environment as the U.S. and Russia face it. Second, I want to outline what I believe 

to be the main tendencies in Russian foreign policy as they stand in early 2005 as 

a guide to understanding the Russian leadership’s own priorities and perspectives. 

Third, I will touch upon Russian policy toward Ukraine, Iran, China, and Europe 

as a way to illustrate how the intersection of emerging threats and Russia’s foreign 

policy approach plays out in concrete policy. 

In September 2000, I had the privilege of addressing an ongoing seminar series 

that includes many of Washington’s leading Russia scholars and analysts at the 

Brookings Institution. The topic of my seminar was ‘‘Russia’s Emerging, Imagined, 

and Real Threat Environment.’’ I have yet to publish the paper I wrote for that seminar, but in reviewing it to prepare my testimony for today’s hearing I thought it 

useful to share some of main points I developed in that pre-9/11 discussion because 

I believe they remain relevant to our attempts to understand Russian foreign policy 

today in our post-9/11 environment. 

37

The premise of my paper was that in September 2000, Russia faced many of the 

‘‘emerging threats’’ that American analysts were beginning to warn of, as well as 

a set of traditional threat that interacted with and complicated its ability to cope 

with the emerging threat problem. Further complicating the challenge, Russia’s 

leadership was preoccupied with a set of what I called ‘‘imaginary threats,’’ thus undermining its ability to cope with the true traditional and emerging threats it faced, 

as well as undermining its ability to cooperate with the US. 

What are ‘‘emerging threats’’? Emerging threats are even those beyond the postCold War shift we now think we have come to grips with, at least in accepting a 

new environment exists. The post-Cold War shift was one from traditional threats 

of conflict among states to local, regional and internal conflicts—the ethnic and religious conflicts that plagued the 1990s. Although different from Cold War security 

problems, these conflicts were merely variations on the traditional form, in that 

they are carried out by means of conventional methods and munitions—small arms, 

artillery, munitions, tanks, aircraft,—all of the apparatus of the modern industrial 

age turned from east-west confrontation to intra-state wars and communal grievances. Emerging threats are qualitatively different. They are a product of globalization 

and post-industrial technology—primarily the technology of the information age, the 

global reach of transportation, and of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of 

mass destruction. Several factors intersect to create the potential for emerging 

threats. The technology of information age creates wealth and advanced defenses, 

but it also creates vulnerability. American dependence on computers—if not for 

every aspect of modern life, then for critical aspects such as electricity, finances, 

health industry, transportation—creates a vulnerability that could be exploited to 

cause great damage to the country and its citizens. Globalization creates multiple 

links and openness that could allow those vulnerabilities to be exploited, via the 

Internet, and other vital links that serve information technology. Global transportation creates global trade, but it also creates global networks for transporting 

weapons and individuals who can use them. Biotechnology creates the potential for 

lethal infections that can kill or even only incapacitate thousands in just days, and 

bioengineering creates the possibility that the old constraint on using such weapons—that the perpetrators would themselves be infected before they could deliver 

the weapons—could be lifted by bioengineering individuals to make them immune. 

Globalization creates transnational networks of knowledge that can spread WMD 

technology. And of course, technology and global networks intersect to produce international terrorism, international criminal groups, and trafficking in drugs and persons. In September 2000, I noted, nearly all of these are in the realm of potential 

threats that the US worries about. Nearly all of them in contrast, I argued in 2000, 

have already hit Russia in some form or another. By September 2000, Russia had 

already suffered terrorist attacks in its cities through apartment bombings, hostage 

taking, and assaults on civilians. A year before 9/11 in the United States, Russia 

was already suffering the methods of and vulnerability to emerging threats scenario, 

in which non-state agents choose not to fight regular military forces, and instead 

take their battle directly to society. 

In late 2000, Russia was already suffering from the effects of international criminal networks, largely through its borders with regions in the Caucasus and Central 

Asia. The threat manifested itself primarily in drug trafficking, but also in the 

growth of criminal trafficking of young women and girls from Russia as well as its 

neighbors. At the time, the primary problem was the failed state of Afghanistan: 

the lack of effective government and the prevalence of corrupt and even criminal 

governments was a clear threat for Russia even before Americans were faced with 

how the failed state of Afghanistan could emerge as a threat to U.S. security. Although part of Russia itself, Chechnya clearly embodied the same key aspects of a 

failed state which made it a potential (and now actual) locus for transnational 

terroism, with the potential for even worse connections to criminal networks which 

might be exploited to transport illicit goods, including WMD. In September 2000, 

then Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov called for pulling Russia out of the 

CIS visa-free travel system because of the need to control border access to protect 

Russia from the emerging threat of trafficking and criminal networks. 

In September 2000, I noted, Russia also faced the greatest global disease aspect 

of the 21st century emerging threat environment, HIV/AIDS. By 2000, Russia had 

among the highest rates of HIV infection in the world, going from tens of cases of 

AIDS in the early 90s to tens of thousands. As of early 2005, Russia has over 

305,000 officially registered cases, with best professional estimates that the actual 

number of infected Russians at 1 million. In an environment where poor health and 

low fertility rates are already causing Russia to lose nearly 1 million people per 

38

year, with predictions that the Russian population may fall from 145 million to 

below 100 million by 2050, health demographics themselves are a threat to Russian 

security and prosperity. 

And in late 2000, Russia had already suffered the severely de-stabilizing effects 

of the economic dimensions of globalization in the 1998 economic crash rooted in 

Russia’s participation in and vulnerability to global monetary and debt markets. Although Russia’s own government was responsible for the poor policies which undermined the value of the ruble, the actual channels of vulnerability were international 

and global, and were a result of the leadership’s decision to pursue integration via 

globalization. Although the Russia economy is doing much better today largely because of high global energy prices and in some respects is less vulnerable because 

of reserves and a large stabilization fund built up over the years, Russia remains 

extremely vulnerable to shifts in the global economy because of its dependence on 

energy exports. And as the U.S. learned after September 2001 itself, the performance of global markets is linked to terrorism, fears of proliferation, and other military aspects of the emerging threats environment. 

The conclusion to take away from this brief overview is that Russia has been living with the complex and serious challenges of the ‘‘emerging threats’’ environment 

for at least as long as the United States, and in many respects its experience has 

been far more immediate and tangible. However, it is also important to understand 

that how this reality has affected Russian foreign policy has been filtered through 

the Putin leadership’s broader approach to and priorities on foreign policy. In particular, there is a very problematic disjuncture between the leadership’s overall traditionalist great power foreign policy approach and the complex set of traditional 

and emerging security threats it—and the United States—faces. 

Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin, like Russian foreign policy 

under President Boris Yeltsin before it, involves participation in the global economy 

in order to stimulate growth. Unlike Yeltsin’s foreign policy, however, which sought 

global economic integration for leverage in reforming the domestic political economic 

system, the role of economic growth in Putin’s foreign policy has a different immediate primary objective. Economic growth and international integration as a means 

to Russian development and national security and well-being remain the core of foreign policy, but the Russian government is no longer as vulnerable as it had been. 

However, economic interests do not stand alone in defining Russian foreign and security policy: they stand alongside strategic interests in how Russia defines its security and status, that is, Russia as an influential, autonomous, and accepted great 

power. 

The enmeshing of this core economic and strategic national interest is perfectly 

expressed in phrases from Putin’s May 26, 2004 ‘‘state of the Union’’ address to the 

Russian Federal Assembly: ‘‘Now, for the first time in a long time, Russia is politically and economically stable. It is also independent, both financially and in international affairs, and this is a good result in itself.’’ ‘‘We want high living standards 

and a safe, free and comfortable life for the country . . . We want to strengthen 

Russia’s place in the world.’’ ‘‘We must grow faster than the rest of the world if we 

want to take the lead within today’s complex rules of global competition. We must 

be ahead of other countries in our growth rate, in the quality of our goods and services and level of our education, science, and culture. This is a question of our economic survival. It is a question of ensuring that Russia takes its deserved place in 

these changing international conditions.’’

That is, Russia’s is not a foreign policy driven by economic growth for economic 

growth’s sake. This is a foreign policy driven by economic growth for the sake of 

power, autonomy, and global position. Economic interests do not drive Russian foreign policy. They are extremely important to Russian foreign policy. Russian interests in expanding its energy exports explains its relations with Europe, its increasing interest in CIS neighbors, its attention to Japan and China, its commercial relations with Iran, its concerted efforts to nurture and increase commercial arms sales 

(which amounted to over $5.5 billion in 2003). Foreign trade, particularly in the energy sector, in very much in the commercial and economic interests of its business 

people, and through general gowth in the economy, its citizens. 

What this meant for foreign policy was a change in tone, direction, mode, and tactics. The US remains important, but it is not all encompassing. More importantly, 

US preferences and criticism matter far less to a Putin government that can pay 

its own bills and count on domestic support. The reduced focus on the US, and the 

increased appreciation of the power and economic value of energy assets and transit 

corridors, contributed to a greater, and more strategic, focus on Europe, Asia, and 

the newly independent countries on Russia’s borders. Russia’s interest in international trade and business is not limited to interest and activity in the west, but 

39

applies as much to relations with the countries of what Russia continues to conceptualize as the Commonwealth of Independent States. 

Russia’s foreign policy strategy by 2005, therefore, is internationalist, but it is 

also statist, and most certainly not liberal. Rising trade is fine, foreign ownership 

of Russian oil or gas is not, because the globalization of international business 

brings transparency and the primacy of commercial interests to policy. International 

summits and modern global media technologies are useful benefits of the 

globalization of technology and communication, but only if their message is controlled by the Russian state. Opportunities for great power partnership to address 

global security and political challenges such as transnational terrorism, proliferation, and trafficking are part of Russia’s proper status as a great power member of 

the UN Security Council and the G8, but the international community is not welcome to offer its views on whether Russia’s elections are free and fair, or to play 

any role in the resolution of conflicts in the countries of the former Soviet Union. 

High profile international conferences involving leading western scholars and policy 

figures are welcome in Russia, but Russian NGOs and civil society groups are suspect if they receive funding from international foundations. 

The result is a foreign policy that is active but not expansionist, sensitive to asserting prerogatives but cautious in exerting Russia’s still quite limited power. Most 

importantly, it is a foreign policy based on a strategy of growth through international trade, but with the increasing role of the state in controlling the economy, 

society, and globalization’s influences. 

One effect of the great power focus of Putin’s internationalist foreign policy has 

been the rise of geopolitics in Russian strategy and priorities. As essentially a 19th 

century European great power approach to security and diplomacy, Putin’s foreign 

policy is more attuned to the value of regional bilateral relationships for their security, political, and economic value. While trade with any country is important if it 

increases Russian economic well-being, trade with regional powers such as China 

and Iran is all the more important for the political relationships it helps to build. 

While good relations with the United States is important as part of the Russian goal 

for membership in the World Trade Organization and the economic benefits membership brings, economic growth cannot trump Russian understanding of its need 

for strategic stability and security in Eurasia. Expecting Russia, for example, to 

trade close economic and political ties with Central Asia or Ukraine for WTO membership is fruitless, because both are high priority components of Russia’s strategy 

for re-building and reinforcing itself as a great power. 

Therefore, to understand Russian foreign policy in 2005 it is necessary to understand both the great power concerns and methods that form the overall objectives 

and strategy, as well as Russia’s tangible experience with what is truly not merely 

a 21st century emerging threat environment, but a real world immediate threat environment. The Russian leadership understands and responds to 21st century 

threats in a great power and geopolitical framework in which the re-establishment 

of Russian power through economic growth and political relationships is paramount. 

Specifically, Russia’s approach to the foreign policy challenges of terrorism, proliferation, international criminal networks, and other aspects of the ‘‘emerging 

threats’’ environment is geopolitical and filtered through the leadership’s great 

power objective. This means that while Russia’s concern about transnational terrorism is genuine, the concern is not only to prevent 9/11-type or Beslan-type attacks, but also to maintain its prerogatives to act with a high degree of autonomy 

in regions around its borders, not to mention with full autonomy within its borders. 

It means that while the Russian leadership has no interest in seeing countries like 

North Korea or Iran obtain or expand their WMD capabilities, it does have a very 

strong interest in both profiting from sales of technology to Iran and maintaining 

strong political relations with its leadership given the multiple political and security 

challenges in the region. It means that while Russia has little to gain from China’s 

rise as a military power with potential designs on Russian territory or with the capacity to counterbalance Russian influence in Asia, it does have a very strong interest in selling energy and arms to the Chinese leadership, and in joining with China 

to try to balance U.S. influence in Asia and to insist that the U.S. live within the 

rules and constraints of international law. 

In this context, the Russian leadership has unfortunately increasingly seen U.S. 

policies as part of the problem it faces in its objectives to establish itself as a great 

power with geopolitical advantages in an environment that looks highly threatening. 

Instead of viewing U.S. perspectives on the non-traditional nature of the ‘‘emerging 

threats’’ of transnational terrorism in Eurasia and the problem of proliferation as 

a genuine 21st century perspective, the Putin leadership views it through a geopolitical and traditional 19th century great power perspective and imputes that perspective to what, in the Russian view, must be the true basis for U.S. policies and 

40

actions. In this perspective, the establishment of U.S. political-military relationships 

in Eurasia, for example, is rooted not in an effort to respond to transnational terrorist and criminal networks that can intersect as well with proliferation 

vulnerabilities. Russian leaders assume a great power and geopolitical framework 

in U.S. policy, so instead they see the net of U.S. relationships in Eurasia as a form 

of neo-containment meant to restrict Russian power and influence. 

Similarly, Russia’s response to U.S. involvement in transatlantic efforts to support 

free and fair presidential elections in Ukraine in fall 2004 was related to its assumption that the stakes were geopolitical and related to its relative status as a 

great power, rather than accepting that U.S. policy was genuinely motivated by the 

U.S. belief that the establishment of democracies throughout Europe and Eurasia 

serves the long-term goal of undermining the sources of emerging threats—weak, 

corrupt, and failed states. There are other important reasons for Russia’s self-defeating and failed policy on Ukraine in late 2004—not least the closed and non-democratic nature of its political system—but in thinking about future U.S.-Russian 

interactions in Europe and Eurasia it is most important to understand (if not to 

agree with or condone) the Russian leadership’s suspicions that the U.S. is primarily 

motivated by a great power strategy meant to enfeeble and constraint Russia in its 

own backyard. 

This might seem a gloomy analysis, but in closing, it is instructive to keep in 

mind that Russia’s relations with Europe remain strong and offer some indications 

for how the U.S. can productively cooperate with Russia in areas of importance to 

U.S. security interests while remaining true to its own objectives and strategies. European leaders have—with considerable ups and downs in their own relations with 

Putin’s Russia to be sure—continued to pursue economic trade, investment, and engagement, while holding as firmly as the United States to principled policies which 

place the importance of international law, respect for sovereignty, democracy, and 

human rights at the center of their foreign policies. The United States needs to find 

a balance in its policies of holding to principles of the importance of democracy in 

Europe and Eurasia with the practical engagement in global economic growth and 

security cooperation with the Putin leadership. The United States needs to think 

in terms of a long term commitment and strategy in its Russia policy, and avoid 

the cycles of excessive optimism through rose-colored glasses to lows of bitter recrimination and failure to appreciate Russia’s challenges and limitations. Like the 

Europeans, the United States needs to more consistently see Russia as a work in 

progress in which we continue to have a very large stake.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Wallander. 

Mr. Simes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIMITRI K. SIMES, 

PRESIDENT, THE NIXON CENTER 

Mr. SIMES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Wexler. It is really a pleasure and a privilege to be here and while 

I assume that there will be disagreements around this table, I have 

to say that I am proud to be with my two colleagues and I am very 

grateful for you putting together a balanced panel, because frankly 

when I was watching an exercise in the Senate, where United 

States-Russian relations were discussed, I was more than a little 

concerned that it was, to put it mildly, a little one-sided. 

The relationship with Russia is a difficult and complex one and 

I don’t know how to put a simple label on it. Perhaps it is impossible, except to say it is an important relationship. If you look at 

United States foreign policy interests, while Russia is no longer a 

super power, Russia is playing an important role in many areas essential to United States interests and to U.S. fundamental security. 

If you are talking about the war against terror, look at Afghanistan. We are not just talking about Afghanistan, we are talking 

about Russian cooperation back in 2001 and 2002. Few people 

know that Russia actually was a rather cooperative citizen in Afghanistan during its recent elections, that Moscow still has strong 

41

influence among the Northern Alliance, the Tajiks and Uzbeks, and 

if they wanted to cause trouble, they probably could. They didn’t. 

In the case of information exchanges on terrorism, I hear from 

the CIA and the FBI that the Russians could do much better, but 

their cooperation still is fundamentally superior to what we ever 

experienced, not only with the Soviet Union, but also with Russia 

in the past. It involves intercept of, among other things, ground 

missiles by the FBI with Russia cooperation, which our enemies 

wanted to bring from Central Asia to attack targets inside the 

United States, not unimportant. 

If you are talking about non-proliferation, the Russians have a 

limited influence over North Korea and they could do more to support American objectives, but they are basically cooperative. On 

Iran, the Russians, in my view, can and should be urged to do 

much more, but they have changed their position. They became 

more cooperative. They demand back their spent fuel. They insist 

on other safeguards. Congressman Weldon mentioned his discussions in Moscow. I have had many discussions there too, including 

with Alexander Rumyantsev, who is now director of the atomic energy agency. It is interesting how his position has evolved, from essentially saying that the Iranians have a peaceful program to admitting that the Iranians have lied to the Russians, among others, 

that the program probably has military ambitions, nuclear weapons 

ambitions, and that it is important to work with the United States 

and the Europeans to retard this program at a minimum and better to stop it all together. Again, I am not applauding the Russian 

effort, but I am saying that the effort is still there and that it is 

a useful one. 

On the Middle East, they did not do what they were asked to do 

on Iraq. But they are not creating any problems for the United 

States in Iraq and, in the case of Syria, they have just called for 

a complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This again is not unimportant. If you look at the United Nations for international legitimacy, if for no other reason than because it makes it easier to get 

cooperation from the Europeans, we need the support of the Security Council. And the Russians have veto power there. If we want 

to have credibility with the Iranians when we talk about U.N. 

sanctions, we need at a minimum for the Russians to tell the Iranians that they cannot count on an automatic Russian veto. Otherwise we would have much less leverage. 

I think that the Bush Administration has it essentially right in 

the relationship with Russia. The right balance between interests 

and principles, between being pragmatic and being realistic, between pushing the Russians as much as possible on democracy 

methods, but also appreciating that our leverage is limited and 

sometimes if you push too much, without any leverage, you might 

get a lot of unintended consequences. 

Let me finish with this very simple point, where I commend the 

relationship with Russia. Back at the end of the Reagan Administration, the very able U.S. Ambassador in Russia, Jack Matlock, 

suggested dialogue with the Russians on a settlement in Afghanistan to establish a coalition government, primarily Mujihadin, but 

with some form of communist participation in the name of stability 

and depriving Muslim fundamentalists of the leading role. 

42

Again in 2000, Mr. Putin, as Prime Minister, not President yet, 

suggested dialogue with the United States about supporting the 

Northern Alliance against the Taliban and putting more pressure 

on bin Laden to try to get him out of Afghanistan all together. Because of other U.S. priorities at that time, none of these things 

were done. If these things were done, whether they would have 

been sufficient to prevent September 11, I do not know. But I am 

sorry we did not try. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIMITRI K. SIMES, PRESIDENT, THE

NIXON CENTER

The United States should be guided by both American interests and American 

principles in its relations with Russia.

• U.S. interests should take into account that while Russia is no longer a superpower, it remains an important state. Russia can affect America’s success in 

the war on terrorism and in combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, our access to energy supplies at reasonable prices, and stability in 

Eurasia, where Russia is still an influential presence.

• American principles require a commitment to democracy in Russia. At a minimum, we must avoid actions that could support the Russian government’s 

authoritarian tendencies.

• In the long run, there is no discrepancy between U.S. interests and values 

in dealing with Russia. However, on a tactical level, there may be tension between competing objectives. The United States may need to make difficult 

choices to avoid unintended but real damage to our security and prosperity.

• More broadly, we must remember that while U.S. leverage over Russia is not 

insignificant, it is limited. Russia’s recent economic growth—primarily due to 

high oil revenues—means that Moscow no longer relies on foreign credits and 

is even paying its obligations ahead of schedule. This makes it more difficult 

to influence Russian conduct at home than it was during the Yeltsin era, 

when Russia depended on massive international aid.

So far, the Bush Administration has been able to find the right balance between 

pursuing essential American interests and expressing its concern over Russian domestic developments.

• Russian behavior has been far from ideal in the area of counter-terrorism and 

non-proliferation; nevertheless, it has certainly had some useful results for 

the United States.

— Russia acquiesced to U.S. military bases in Central Asia and provided 

unprecedented intelligence cooperation during the war in Afghanistan.

— Russia demanded the return of spent nuclear fuel from Iran.

— Russia has been basically supportive of U.S. pressure on North Korea 

as well as other non-proliferation initiatives.

— President Putin promised President Bush in Bratislava that Russia 

would give greater access to its nuclear facilities.

— Most recently, Russia has joined the United States in demanding Syrian 

withdrawal from Lebanon.

• It would be a gross overstatement to say that Russian foreign policy is in 

lock-step with U.S. foreign policy. But it would also be irresponsible to ignore 

what the Bush Administration has been able to get from the Putin government as a result of its engagement with Russia.

Russia’s relations with its neighbors combine post-imperial nostalgia with a dose 

of pragmatism about the limits of what Russia can accomplish.

• In Ukraine, Russia clearly went much too far in trying to influence the electoral process to support the official candidate. But Moscow’s bark was worse 

than its bite. The Russian government did not attempt to mobilize millions 

of ethnic Russians to create a fifth column and has not encouraged separatism. Once President Yushchenko emerged as the clear winner, Moscow 

made an effort to rebuild bridges.

43

• The Bush Administration was absolutely right to resist Russian meddling in 

Ukrainian affairs—and was successful. But the administration was equally 

right not to overstate its case or to allow Ukraine to define the rest of the 

U.S.-Russian relationship.

In terms of Russian domestic policy, there are clear authoritarian tendencies. But 

first, it should be remembered that there was no real democracy under Boris 

Yeltsin. To the extent that there was more political freedom under Yeltsin, it was 

a result of the weakness of his corrupt and inept rule rather than any democratic 

institutions or procedures or the rule of law.

• It is also important to see the nuances in the Russian domestic situation. 

While there were political motives behind the prosecution of Mikhail 

Khodorkovsky, beyond his and a few other isolated cases, there are not really 

any Soviet-style political prisoners in Russia. Freedom of assembly remains 

intact with relatively few restrictions. And while the two national TV channels represent the state, one can see frequent criticism of specific government 

policies even there. Other channels have more flexibility in their coverage and 

have recently questioned Putin’s own actions. The press in Moscow is free and 

regularly attacks the government and President Putin personally in ways 

that would be very unusual in the mainstream American media.

• On the negative side, corruption remains pervasive, there is no visible 

progress in establishing an independent judiciary, a pro-government party 

dominates the parliament and has made it a rubber-stamp body, and the 

Kremlin manipulates domestic politics with so-called ‘‘administrative resources’’ and money in ways that are incompatible with genuinely democratic 

rule.

• Finally, one complication in pressuring Russia on democracy is that the most 

viable opposition today seems to be nationalist and communist in orientation. 

Liberal parties do not have much of a following. More broadly, because of the 

Clinton Administration’s embrace of the undemocratic Yeltsin regime and 

perceived U.S. support for radical and even brutal economic reforms of the 

1990s that were rejected by the vast majority of the Russian people, the Russian public is not inclined to accept U.S. guidance on democracy today.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Simes. 

Dr. Rumer. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE B. RUMER, PH.D., 

SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC 

STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. RUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my privilege to be 

here today and I thank you for this opportunity to express my 

views on this very important relationship on our foreign policy 

agenda. I also thank Mr. Wexler for being here and allowing me 

this opportunity as well. 

I need to say that as a civilian employee of the Department of 

Defense, I speak here strictly in my personal capacity and what I 

am saying here does not represent any official position. 

The beauty and I guess the problem with being last is that everything has been said, but not by all. I think in the future, indeed 

Mr. Chairman, you can safely dispense with other witnesses and 

confine this hearing to listening to Mr. Weldon. I subscribe to a lot 

of what he said. I think that he points to a lot of very serious problems, as well as potentially very promising solutions in this relationship. 

I will be very brief and telegraphic in my remarks and confine 

myself to two big choices that I think we are facing in this debate 

about Russia and I should also say that it is very refreshing to 

have a debate about Russia and Russia policy in this town, because 

for a lot of years we simply took Russia for granted. It would either 

come along or it didn’t really matter much. 

44

There is a silver lining to the difficult choices we are facing today 

and the debate really is between two schools of thought, two positions. One school of thought advocates a new policy, if you wish, 

of neo-containment and confrontation with Russia. The other school 

represents proponents of a more cooperative and integrative position, vis-a-vis Russia. Proponents of the containment and confrontation viewpoint to the recent and rather unfortunate experience of Russian involvement in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, in Georgia during the Rose Revolution in Abkhazia, where 

Russia continues to patronize a breakway regime; problems with 

media and other issues, as well as Chechnya, that my colleagues 

on this panel have alluded to, and other issues. 

The facts really are not in dispute. Ironically, I would say that 

proponents of the cooperative approach point to the very same 

facts. The fact that Russian policy in Georgia, Russian policy in 

Abkhazia, Russian policy most recently in Ukraine, and just a few 

days ago in Moldova of heavy interference and meddling, of attempts to impose Russian control on these former Soviet and now 

independent States has really backfired. 

I think it is high time for foreign policy reassessment in Russia, 

but not necessarily in Washington. Our policy has worked and our 

policy for the last 15 years—really since the late Gorbachev era—

has been one of engagement, wherever possible, cooperation, wherever possible, and clear communication. I take that last point back. 

Not always clear, but always insistent on our principles. Core principles where it really mattered. 

I think we have a lot to show for that policy, even though a lot 

of people would focus on what is missing from the glass. If you look 

at two rounds of NATO enlargement; if you look at one round of 

EU enlargement, including three Baltic nations and former Soviet 

occupied nations; if you look at long-term United States presence 

in Central Asia; if you look at U.S. active security relationships in 

the Caucasus, South Caucasus; and if you look at Russia’s changing positions on Iran and North Korea, all of these are significant 

accomplishments that we can put on the balance sheet, on the positive side of the ledger, thanks to what really has been the long 

view, the long view built on the premise that Russia’s transformation domestically, and Russia’s integration internationally, is 

going to be a difficult generational process and I think we cannot 

afford to lose sight of that fact. It is a policy and it is a vision that 

has been embraced by first Bush, first and second Clinton Administrations and now first and second second Bush Administrations. I 

think that is the way to go. I clearly place myself in the cooperative 

integrative camp. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point that proponents of the confrontationist school, call it school of neo-containment, do not really articulate, in my view, a vision that is practical. 

Sitting where I sit, working for the Department of Defense, advising the Department of Defense, I think in terms of practical initiatives and practical policies. Just think for a moment, Mr. Chairman, what would a policy of neo-containment mean for us and cooperative threat reduction: An encirclement of Russia, not with cooperative Partnership for Peace relationships that we have in Georgia and Ukraine and elsewhere, but with a new ring of many cliVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 May 09, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\030905\99821.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
45

ents intended as sort of beachheads around Russia’s periphery; isolation of Russia in the international arena; and an end to six-party 

discussions about the Korean peninsula. It would certainly put an 

end to our cooperation or constructive discussions on Iran. It would 

put an end to NATO-Russia and on and on and on. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Russia is not a totalitarian society. 

It is not a dictatorship. It is a country that is in the middle of a 

very difficult and a long-term transition. I think we need to keep 

that in mind and take the long view that others have taken in the 

last 15 years. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rumer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EUGENE B. RUMER,1 PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

In 2005, two decades after a little-known Communist Party functionary named 

Mikhail Gorbachev was selected to the leadership of the Soviet Union, Russia presents an elusive target for students of its foreign policy and domestic affairs, both 

critics, of whom there are growing numbers, and admirers, whose ranks have been 

dwindling lately. True to the old adage, Russia is neither as strong as its sheer size 

and geopolitical heft suggest, nor as weak as it appears relative to other continental 

giants—China and Europe. No longer capable of projecting its power far beyond its 

borders as it aspired to do a generation ago, Russia remains the critical variable 

on the map of Eurasia position on the balance sheet of partners vs. adversaries can 

make or break most, if not all U.S. design on the continent. 

Is Russian Democracy Dying? Any discussion of modern day Russia inevitably 

turns to the country’s uncertain domestic political situation and what many observers, both Russian and foreign, have lamented as retreat from democracy. Critics 

point to greater consolidation of government control over major media outlets, 

marginalization of democratically-oriented political parties, use of law enforcements 

against Kremlin political opponents and abolition of gubernatorial elections as signs 

of Russia’s abandonment of democracy and possible return to its undemocratic past. 

Major human rights organizations have been critical of Russia’s internal developments; Freedom House, a highly regarded human rights advocacy and monitor of 

freedom worldwide considers Russia as ‘‘not free’’ with the overall rating of 6, with 

7 being the least free. 

The facts cited by these human rights organizations are not in dispute. The Russian government directly or indirectly controls major media outlets. The most biting 

programs mocking leading Russian politicians, including presidents Boris Yeltsin 

and Vladimir Putin can no longer be seen on Russian TV. 

However, contemporary Russian media, although more restrained than during the 

1990’s, is a far cry from what it was during the Soviet era or from what is implied 

in the short phrase ‘‘retreat from democracy.’’ Russian newspapers, sold freely and 

available on the Internet, are full of diverse opinions; public opinion polls are freely 

disseminated; news reports ranging from Kremlin infighting to developments in Iraq 

are published in print and electronic media. 

Russian media are certainly not as free-wheeling as they were during the 1990’s. 

But any claim of Russian retreat from democracy ignores the fact that Russia in 

the 1990’s was not a democracy either. Does increased control of the media by the 

Russian government represent a bigger blow to democracy in Russia than ownership 

or control of major TV and print outlets by powerful businessmen who did not shy 

away from editorial interference when their business or political interests so required? Who bears greater responsibility for many Russians’ cynical attitudes toward freedom of the press-President Vladimir Putin who has sought to consolidate 

his control over major media, or those oligarchs who used their media holdings as 

a tool of their business and political pursuits? 

The issue of freedom in Russia too deserves a more nuanced consideration. There 

is little doubt that a number of steps by the Kremlin toward greater centralization 

of power and authority in the hands of the federal government is at odds with its 

stated commitment to greater democracy and open society. But does Russia deserve 

its ‘‘Not Free’’ rating in 2005 more than it did in 1996, when it held a rather unfair 

and unbalanced presidential election? Or 1994 and 1995, when it waged a brutal 

war in Chechnya? Or in 1993, when the Yeltsin government shelled the parliament 

46

building in an effort to resolve a constitutional crisis? During all those years, Russia 

was rated as ‘‘Partially Free.’’

The notion that Russian democracy is dead or dying ignores widespread grassroots unrest triggered in recent months by the Russian government’s unpopular social welfare reforms. People have been organizing and marching in the streets to 

protest government policies. After months of protests that have confronted the Russian government with a crisis like no other in recent years, Russian democracy is 

no less alive than it was when Boris Yeltsin was reelected to his second term in 

an election that was anything but fair. 

Rumors of Russian democracy’s demise are not only premature, but ignore the impact of such factors as the ever-expanding access to the Internet in many Russian 

cities in towns; cell phone use; ability to travel abroad; ability by foreigners to travel 

deep into the Russian heartland. Russia is no longer cut off from the outside world 

by the Iron Curtain. All this is having impact in many, often immeasurable ways—

from the emergence of hundreds of civic organizations at the grass-roots level to academic debates about globalization and its impact on Russia, to the emergence of new 

independent candidates in the 2008 election to succeed—or challenge, whatever the 

case may be—President Vladimir Putin. None of these phenomena promise quick 

change, but they are signs that changes are taking place. 

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, it was universally recognized that Russian democracy-building would be a difficult and ambitious generational project. 15 

years into that project one thing is clear: the future of Russian democracy will remain uncertain for a long time to come. Any judgment about its quality or condition 

at this point is premature and inaccurate at best. 

Is Russia Moving toward Authoritarianism? As a corollary to debates about Russian democracy, students of Russian domestic politics have raised the question of 

whether Russia is moving toward a more authoritarian system of government. 

Surface signs have definitely pointed in the direction of a system that places 

greater power and authority, as well as greater control over resources, into the 

hands of the federal executive at the expense of regional governors, legislature and 

even courts. This has manifested itself in the reform of the Federation Council, 

which diminished the power and authority of popularly elected governors, reform, 

which was followed by subsequent elimination of gubernatorial elections altogether. 

This was further manifested in the emergence of the pro-Kremlin ‘‘party of power’’ 

and the federal government’s domination of the Duma with its help, marginalization 

of other political parties and proliferation of electoral techniques that while certainly not invented in Russia and imported into Russian political life well before 

Vladimir Putin’s tenure, were put to frequent and widespread use in multiple election campaigns on his watch. Other manifestations of authoritarian tendencies in 

Russian domestic affairs have taken the form of attempts by the Kremlin to establish greater control over the business community and its role in the nation’s political 

life. 

However, this trend, which began soon after President Putin’s rise to the presidency of Russia, has progressed against the background of disasters and setbacks 

that have highlighted the shortcomings and failures of the Russian government and 

its inability to act in a crisis, respond to new challenges and cope with their aftermath. The Kursk submarine disaster, the failure to put an end to the war in 

Chechnya, the growing threat of domestic terrorism, the hostage dramas in Moscow 

and Beslan, and most recently the political and social crisis triggered by the welfare 

reform, have brought to light the fact that far from being authoritarian, the Russian 

state is dangerously close to being chaotic. 

To the people of Russia this comes as no surprise. Public opinion polls consistently 

demonstrate low confidence on the part of the Russian people in their government’s 

ability to perform the most basic functions—protect the nation’s wealth, sovereignty 

and territorial integrity; provide for the poor and the weak; and protect citizens 

against crime and violence. 

An authoritarian system may be the goal pursued by President Vladimir Putin 

and his political advisors. Having concentrated a great deal of decision-making authority and resources under its control, the Kremlin should be omnipotent. Yet, real 

power, the ability to formulate and execute policies, to produce results, to deal with 

crises and their aftermath, to effect change-all that so far has proven elusive to the 

degree that various branches of the Russian government and the country’s far-flung 

provinces appear out of control, driven not by a vision of national interest and will 

imposed from the center, but narrow, parochial concerns or corporate interests of 

local elites. In December 2004, two percent of participants in a public opinion survey 

feared introduction of a ‘‘dictatorship based on force;’’ 15 percent feared anarchy and 

government incompetence; and 16 percent feared the breakup of Russia. 

47

What Is to Be Done about Russian Democracy? How should the United States 

react to developments in Russia? As policy experts and leaders on both sides of the 

Atlantic debate policy toward Russia, calls to expel Russia from G–8 have been 

heard with increased frequency. The most frequently cited reason for it is that Russia does not deserve a seat at the table of the world’s most advanced industrialized 

democracies, especially in the light of its retreat from democracy in recent years. 

Indeed, on the one hand, the state and direction of Russia’s democratic transformation is uncertain. Russian democracy is not of the same variety as that of the 

United States, Great Britain or Germany. That is not subject to serious debate. 

But on the other hand, to many observers of Russian democracy inside and outside of Russia, the notion that Russia should be kicked out of G–8 now is just as 

counterintuitive as the notion that Russia belonged among the cre`me de la cre`me 

of industrialized democracies in the 1990’s, when it gradually became accepted there 

as a full member of that select group. 

Russian acceptance into G–8 was based on the principle, embraced by several U.S. 

Administrations of both political parties, that Russia’s integration into major international institutions would secure Russia’s constructive posture abroad and promote 

positive change at home. In shaping relations between Russia and the G–7, the 

leaders on both sides of the Atlantic and Japan took the long view of Russia’s transformation. Excluding Russia from that group now would mark a departure from that 

view, ignore important developments in Russia and abandon the vision the West put 

in place as the foundation of its relations with Russia at the end of the Cold War—

a vision of Russia integrated into the Atlantic and Pacific economic, political and 

security structures—and abandon it prematurely with the most adverse consequences for both Russia and its G–8 partners themselves. 

How should the United States then respond to developments in Russia?—As a 

constructive observer and partner who is fully aware of the complexity of the task 

ahead, of the national sensitivities and peculiarities due to Russia’s historical and 

cultural preferences and traditions; as an interlocutor who understands that his own 

record of engagement on this issue has at times lacked consistency and impartiality; 

and, of course, as a candid critic in those instances where he feels his core interests 

and principles are at stake. 

Russia and Her Neighbors. Russia’s pattern of behavior toward her neighbors has 

been the other major area of recent criticism of Russian international behavior. Russian meddling in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova has generated further calls for expelling Russia from G–8 and a more confrontational stance toward Russia on the 

part of its G–8 partners in the international arena. 

Once again, the facts are not in dispute. Russian heavy-handed interference in its 

neighbors’ affairs is well documented. However, this is an area where once again 

Russian behavior is more apt to be interpreted as a sign of weakness, rather than 

strength. 

The public record of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s ‘‘Orange Revolution,’’ Georgia’s ‘‘Rose Revolution,’’ recent elections in Moldova and breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia suggest suggests that Russian influence in the former provinces 

of the Soviet Union is on the wane. Russia appears to be so unpopular and its interference so heavy-handed that it often produces the opposite effect from what is presumably intended. The results of recent elections in Moldova suggest that a candidate could be well served by Russian interference against him, for such interference is likely to help one’s credentials as an independent-minded leader. 

However, in areas other than politics, Russia plays an important and at times 

positive role. This may not be the result of its deliberate policies, but Russia, especially as its coffers swell from the flood of petrodollars, remains an important market for excess labor and goods from some of the neighboring countries, where access 

to Russian market is a matter of critically important remittances, export revenues 

and as a result social stability and even survival in some of the poorest areas. It 

is these flows of goods, people, services and money, often undetected or overlooked 

by the policy community, that comprise many ties that continue to bind Russia to 

its neighbors. 

Perhaps, the biggest problem that Russia poses in relation to its neighbors is in 

the area of the so-called ‘‘frozen conflicts’’—in Abkhazia, Moldova, South Ossetia and 

Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian involvement with a number of these breakaway regimes is a long-standing irritant in Moscow’s relations with some of its neighbors, 

the United States and other countries. 

The dilemma facing U.S. policymakers in this area is whether to confront Russia 

more forcefully or stay the course of patient, albeit unproductive dialogue. The balance of arguments appears to favor dialogue, though one that needs to be intensified 

if we are to achieve our stated objective of ‘‘unfreezing’’ these conflicts. 

48

Additional arguments favoring dialogue include changes in Russian attitudes toward these conflicts. Increasingly, Russian interlocutors have acknowledged that developments in the South Caucasus have an impact on the situation in the North 

Caucasus, where Russian authorities face a growing prospect of destabilization. 

Some Russian analysts have begun to come to terms with the realization that they 

lack the capabilities to address the problem of security and stability in the Caucasus 

alone and that they will need to deal with other parties involved in the region, especially as the United States and Europe carry on with greater involvement there. 

The discussion of ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ is bound to come to the fore of the trans-Atlantic agenda for one more reason: the final status of Kosovo. As Europe and the 

United States approach that thorny issue, as the option of independence for Kosovo 

looms large in discussions on both sides of the Atlantic, the Abkhaz, the Ossetians 

and others will ask: if independence is OK for Kosovo, why not for us? It is equally 

likely to be an issue of considerable importance for Russia, which will be torn between its preference for client-regimes in Abkhazia and Ossetia and its fear that 

Kosovo’s independence may be the harbinger of the international community’s attitudes toward Chechnya. A preventive dialogue with Russia on this subject is essential to avoid a crisis in relations over this issue. 

Chechnya. One of the thorniest problems on the U.S.-Russian agenda will have 

to be discussed as well. Long treated as a major human rights concern for the 

United States, this issue has acquired new dimensions—sovereignty vs. self-determination in the context of Kosovo, as discussed in preceding paragraphs; regional 

stability and security because of spillover into the South Caucasus; and 

counterterrorism in the aftermath of hostage-takings in Moscow and Beslan, as well 

as other terrorist incidents. Recognizing the complex and multi-faceted nature of the 

problem is the first step toward addressing our respective concerns. 

Demands and ultimatums, as well as criticism of Russian crisis response, as was 

the case in the aftermath of Beslan, can only lead to Russian intransigence on this 

issue. There are no certain answers or solutions to this problem in advance. However, recognizing Russian sensitivities in times of national tragedies such as Beslan, 

being honest and realistic about our own ability to advise and to help in very difficult circumstances is the first step toward honest dialogue, possibly shared interests and even solutions. 

Iran. In looking at Russia in the context of Iran’s WMD ambitions, there is both 

good news and bad: Russia is neither the problem nor is it the solution. On the one 

hand, Presidents Putin and Bush have jointly stated that Iran should not be allowed 

to obtain a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, Russia continues to provide equipment for Iranians’ nuclear energy program. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Iran’s program represents a major export opportunity 

for its nuclear industry that has few domestic or international markets. It perceives 

Iran as a major political player in the region; an Islamic country that has been 

largely deferential to Russian interests in the past; and a key partner in the Gulf 

region. 

For the Russians, the Iranian issue is not high enough on their list of the most 

pressing security concerns. While Moscow would prefer the status quo and considers 

the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran to be an unwelcome one, the threat it would 

pose is not so great as to move the Russian Government to jeopardize other Russian 

interests in Iran in order to resolve this issue. At the same time, Moscow would not 

want to be cut out of any scheme to solve the issue put together by Europe and 

the United States. 

Russian officials and analyst understand that it is an important issue for the 

international community, one that is high on the agenda of its (Russia’s) principal 

interlocutors—the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France. Russian 

policymakers would most likely view their involvement in solving the Iranian nuclear crisis as a great power prerogative, as well as a function of their interests in 

that country. 

When discussing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russian analysts appear to be more 

concerned about a US intervention than about Iran’s ambitions as such. US intervention, they fear, would jeopardize Russian commercial interests; complicate relations with the United States, Israel, and others; cause further regional destabilization; and set off other ripple effects that Russia may be ill-equipped to handle. Some 

in Russia view the Iranian nuclear program as chiefly aimed at the U.S. and therefore a positive in countering growing U.S. ‘‘adventurism.’’

That is not to say that Russia is cavalier about Iranian intentions; they continue 

to monitor Tehran’s behavior for signs of greater ambition and possible mischief. 

Generally though, while Russia might object to solutions that rely on use of force, 

it is unlikely to become a true obstacle to U.S. policy in the region. It is unlikely 

49

that Russia will ever become a major player in dealing with an Iranian nuclear program and would probably be more reactive than proactive. 

At the same time, Russia could play a useful role in the general framework of 

the international community’s response to the crisis. In doing so, Russia is more 

likely to use the international legal framework than adopt position that could leave 

senior policymakers vulnerable to domestic charges of caving in to U.S. pressure. 

For example, Russia’s agreement with Iran on spent nuclear fuel ran against U.S. 

policy preferences, but instead emphasized compliance with Russian obligations 

under the NPT Treaty. Perhaps, one collateral benefit of the agreement is that it 

underscores the point that Iran does not need to develop its own full nuclear fuel 

cycle. 

Russian behavior in the run up to OIF could be indicative of Russian behavior 

in a future crisis involving Iran. Unwilling to jeopardize its bilateral relations with 

the United States or Europe, Russia would likely adopt a ‘‘wait-and-see’’ attitude 

and watch the debate unfold among allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia 

would likely shy away from a leadership position in that debate, leaving that role 

to others, while insisting on keeping the tensions confined to the UN–NPT framework, which would give it a major decision-making role, shield its equities vis a vis 

the United States and Europe, as well as maximize its leverage vis a vis Iran and 

neutralize domestic anti-U.S. sentiments. 

Summing up. U.S.-Russian relations are neither as bad as critics charge, nor as 

good as optimists hope they can be. It is indeed a relationship that has fallen far 

short of its potential. At the same time, it is a relationship that has avoided many 

very real downturns and certainly avoided the worst. For the United States, it remains a relationship that could facilitate enormously U.S. pursuit of its geopolitical 

and strategic objectives—stability and peace in Europe, balanced relations with 

China, global war on terror, counterproliferation and energy security. It is a relationship that if it turns sour and adversarial, could seriously complicate U.S. pursuit of these objectives and the prosecution of the war on terror in Eurasia, as well 

as elsewhere in the world. It is a relationship that was founded at the end of the 

Cold War on the realization that the road ahead would be long, difficult and involve 

change that would be nothing short of generational. It is also a relationship that 

has paid off in a number of key areas—NATO and EU enlargement, Cooperative 

Threat Reduction, cooperation in the war on terror, etc. It has paid off for the 

United States through perseverance and adherence to the long view. There is little 

in the balance of Russia’s domestic trends or international behavior to warrant a 

fundamental reassessment of U.S. commitment to that relationship, let alone a radical departure from it. 

And while on the subject of radical departures, anyone considering a fundamental 

change in this relationship ought to consider the implications and costs of the alternative—a policy of neo-containment of Russia. They would be enormous, ranging 

from the added burden of military encirclement of Russia to political, involving a 

new rift in trans-Atlantic relations, for such a radical turnaround is unlikely to be 

endorsed by Europe. To paraphrase an old-fashioned Soviet phrase, the correlation 

of factors favors staying the course.

1The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. 

Government.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Rumer. 

Dr. Wallander, how helpful or unhelpful would you assess Russia 

dealing with the problems of nuclear development, North Korea 

and Iran? 

Ms. WALLANDER. I would agree with Dimitri Simes that it is 

clear that Russia hasn’t done as much as it could on North Korea, 

but then again Russia is not the country with the most leverage 

on North Korea and it is hard to put a finger on failures of a mission or a commission in that case. 

I would also agree with his assessment on Iran that Russia’s policy has evolved, in cooperation primarily with the European allies, 

to be more engaged and more, shall we say, hard-headed about the 

Iranian leadership’s intentions and to be more skeptical about 

them. And has actually been for the last year or so rather constructively engaged in a more European approach to the solution, which 

50

creates certain differences with the United States, which continues 

to favor a different approach than our European allies and Russia 

on Iran. 

I think that—on the recent Russian decision to conclude the 

agreement with Iran on nuclear fuel cycle—it has been known for 

some time that this has been in discussion. It has been known for 

some time that this was the preferred option of the Russian leadership. 

It is regrettable that the Russian leadership went ahead, before 

some of the issues regarding to IAEA inspection and issues of 

international law and controls on the Iranian nuclear complex were 

resolved and in that sense, Russia probably was not as constructive 

and cooperative and engaged as it should have been. 

But I don’t think the door is shut, I would agree. I would disagree slightly with some of the comments made earlier that this 

can be dealt with. 

I think that in fact the Russian leadership is pretty committed 

to selling nuclear technology and engaging in a long-term commercial relationship in the nuclear area with Iran, but that doesn’t 

mean that that can’t be managed in a way that addressed American proliferation concerns. 

It is just we have to be patient and we have to take these concerns seriously. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. To switch to a little different topic, Dr. 

Wallander, in your opinion the differences in United States-Russia 

over Ukraine, their future orientation, do you see that poses a serious problem as it relates to United States-Russia relationship? 

Ms. WALLANDER. I think it is a problem, because it has created 

an atmosphere of competition, mistrust and confrontation. I actually don’t think it is a fundamental problem, because I don’t think 

there was a fundamental confrontation over Ukraine in American 

and Russian policy. 

I think there were a series of misinterpretations and missteps 

and then a cycle of escalating anger and counter accusations 

through the late summer and in the fall of 2004. This very significant mismanagement of foreign policy process on the Russian side, 

having to do with the closed nature of the decisionmaking structure 

that President Putin has unfortunately saddled himself with, to his 

own detriment. So I think that there is a way to walk away from 

that experience and to figure out how the United States and Russia 

can focus on win-win situations in Russia’s neighborhood. I think 

they genuinely are there, but it is going to take an awful lot of effort to be willing to have to take a change away from the kind of 

neo-containment arguments that Dr. Rumer referred to, which I 

think are highly counterproductive. 

I was just in Moscow and St. Petersburg the week before last. I 

was surprised at the number of intelligent, well-educated Russians 

who truly believe that the United States was out to wrest Ukraine 

away from Russia, to Russia’s detriment. 

So I think we have got a lot of work to do to convince Russia that 

is not the basis for our policy in Ukraine. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Simes, your assessment? 

Mr. SIMES. Well, on Ukraine I essentially agree with Dr. 

Wallander. Let me say first that in my view, Russian interference 

51

in Ukraine was blatant, inappropriate and counterproductive for 

Russia. 

Second, I don’t believe it was carefully planned or implemented. 

I think Dr. Rumer wrote about that in one of his op-ed pieces in 

The Washington Post. 

There was no Russian fifth column in Ukraine. There was no attempt to encourage Ukrainian separatists and indeed, as Dr. 

Wallander said, unfortunately there was an action-reaction process. 

I think a lot of people living in Washington do not quite realize 

the scale of United States NGO involvement in Kiev, which was intended to promote democracy, but clearly focused on supporting one 

particular candidate. The Russians did not quite see the distinction 

between their inappropriate actions and what NGOs funded by the 

U.S. Government were doing. 

It is fortunate the Bush Administration persisted. The Bush Administration, with the Europeans together have prevailed, but they 

were right not to turn it into the United States-Russian confrontation. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Rob? 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. I would ask that you respond or explain 

a couple of thoughts. I was in Ukraine roughly 3 weeks ago and 

one of the things I heard that I thought was illuminating was the 

basic theme: Don’t hold us—meaning Ukraine—hostage to the 

American-Russian relationship, as we—meaning Ukrainians—seek 

EU membership, or whatever status they will seek, as we discuss 

what our role, if any, will be with NATO. Don’t hold us hostage to 

your relationship with Russia. I would be curious if you would comment about that. 

Secondly, explain to me what seems to be a dichotomy, if you 

could, with the manner in which President Putin approached President Bush in two respects. I think maybe the line that President 

Putin said that was most memorable was Russia has made its own 

choice in favor of democracy, at the mini-summit. Is that just public relations or how does that, in fact, fit with the ever-growing stifling of political dissent and an independent media? 

The Chairman referenced the meeting that was had at the White 

House a week or 2 ago, if I understand the President correctly and 

if I understand the news articles correctly, President Bush and 

President Putin entered into some kind of understanding. President Bush seemed satisfied that he had constructively engaged 

with President Putin to reach that conclusion. How does that then 

square with the actions of the last 2 or 3 weeks? 

Ms. WALLANDER. I will do my best on those three points. On the 

first point, on Ukraine—and I appreciate the opportunity, because 

CSIS was one of the NGOs involved in democracy promotion efforts 

in Ukraine and so I know quite well that many Russians don’t believe that the NGO efforts were on the side or the purpose was to 

promote truly free and fair elections. I have done my best to convince them that from all the conversations I was in, both in Washington and in Kyiv throughout 2004, the focus of discussions about 

these efforts of these NGOs was on process, was on training election monitors and so on, and was not in support of one candidate 

or another. And I was in many discussions where it was discussed 

52

that in fact the Government’s candidate could well win, based on 

some of the opinion polls. 

That is a hard case to make right now in the current atmosphere, but I think it is important and it is important to get back 

to answering, Congressman Wexler, your question. I think that is 

exactly right that the United States risks casting its Ukraine policy 

either too much in a Russia context or not enough in a Russia context. 

What do I mean by that? We risk doing things in our relationship with Ukraine in order to cope with Russia, such as fast track 

membership on NATO. Fast track membership, well we can’t do 

anything about the EU, but in a broader foreign policy context, the 

EU. Fast track membership on WTO. 

That would be a problem for two reasons: One is it would be unfair to the Ukrainians. We have to take the Ukrainians seriously. 

They showed themselves to be a serious country with a serious 

commitment to their own political process and society, and we have 

to treat them as they deserve as a serious country that can live up 

to the membership criteria necessary to become a member of NATO 

and should, that can live up to this same criteria we hold Russia 

to, to be a member of the WTO. 

We should treat Ukraine as its own country in its own right and 

by the same token, yes, we should not hold back on Ukrainian 

membership in NATO, if and when it qualifies in order to somehow, in some misguided way, try to prop up our relationship with 

Russia. 

So we have to, again as Dr. Rumer mentioned, we have to find 

a balance between extremes and it is not that hard. We have the 

principles there. We have the track record on how to bring countries into NATO, how to bring them into the WTO and we ought 

to treat Ukraine as a country that deserves that respect. 

On the dichotomy on democracy, I don’t have a simple answer for 

you about whether President Putin really means it when he says 

Russia has chosen its path to democracy, but I will answer in a 

slightly different vein. 

I think that the word democracy is really problematic in our relationship with Russia, partly because of the 1990s. Democracy to 

Russians means instability, it means the 1998 economic crisis, it 

means fall of GNP of 50 percent in the post-Soviet period, it means 

corruption, it means unfair privatization, it means all kinds of 

problems that they face in the 1990s. 

I prefer to talk about what makes up a democracy specifically. 

Free media, rule of law, independent judiciary, free and fair elections, independent parties, active civil society, competent NGOs. 

To me that is what a democracy is, all those things. And then 

when we talk with the Russian Government and also with Russian 

society, we ought to be talking about those specific aspects of what 

makes up a democracy and I think we will find it a much more successful basis for engagement. Excuse me for going on so long, but 

you asked a multi-faceted set of questions. 

Mr. SIMES. Let me say a couple of words about democracy. I am 

not impressed with the commitment of President Putin’s Government to democracy. I don’t think that President Putin is insincere, 

53

when he talks about democracy, but I think his definition of democracy is quite different from ours. 

I also think, as Dr. Wallander said quite correctly, that Russians 

are a product of not only their experience with democracy in the 

1990s, but also Russian history, tradition, and beliefs, which really 

conditions them not to view democracy in the same light. And they 

believe that their country is in a very different stage of development. They are interested in American opinions, among other reasons because they understand that the United States is the only 

super power and they want to have a good relationship with the 

United States. 

So we do have leverage, but we have to be very careful not to 

overstate our case. Sadly, when we talk about a Russian totalitarian society, a new gulag, you have to understand we will lose 

credibility. 

The second thing is that we have to be realistic about our leverage, about what we can accomplish. We should not overreach. 

Finally, we should remember the Russian political spectrum 

today. If you look at the so-called democrats, the liberals, Mr. 

Chairman, Congressman Wexler, they did very poorly during last 

elections. This was not primarily because of government manipulation, but because according to every public opinion poll, they were 

not popular. 

I know leaders of these parties. They were on the record, both 

publicly and privately, admitting that they were not and are not 

popular. 

My concern is that if we push too hard and if we are too ‘‘fundamentalist’’ in our pro-democracy commitment, we may get some 

very dangerous people on top in Russian politics. We should be 

aware of that. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I guess you heard the buzzer, which means we 

have a vote on the Floor, but we still have enough time to each ask 

one more question. It sounds like there is a series of votes. 

Dr. Rumer, can you give me your assessment of what Russia’s 

upgrading of its strategic offensive nuclear forces, if you feel that 

poses any kind of a heightened threat to the United States? That 

is kind of your area, isn’t it? 

Mr. RUMER. Not really, Mr. Chairman, because you know I think 

that requires the kind of specialized knowledge and access that 

probably I currently don’t have and probably is not appropriate for 

this format. 

But in general terms, I would say that I don’t lose sleep over 

Russian declarations that they have a new super secret, super powerful missile. That is not the issue. 

I am more concerned about loss of control, about unauthorized 

use, about Russian early warning capabilities and this is based on 

my reading of just unclassified media reports that appear in the 

Russian press about the condition of the Russian military. That 

worries me. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Rob, do you have anything you want to conclude 

with before we have to vote? 

Mr. WEXLER. Just quickly. Congressman Weldon talked about 

the need to satisfy Jackson-Vanik as to Russia. Do you have any 

concerns that the order in which we were to do it, assuming we 

54

were to do it, in relationship to Ukraine, should it be done together? Does Russia need to be first? What if Ukraine was first? 

Do you have any thoughts? 

Mr. SIMES. I would say something about this very briefly, because I actually am both a beneficiary of and minor contributor to 

the Jackson-Vanik commitment. I am a beneficiary because without it I would not have been able to leave the Soviet Union. I made 

a contribution because at a moment when the amendment was in 

doubt and at the request of Senator Jackson and Richard Perle, I 

went to Andrei Sakharov, who issued a very strong appeal in support of the amendment. 

I agree with Congressman Weldon. The time for this amendment 

has passed and when this amendment is linked to matters which 

have nothing to do with Jewish immigration, any other immigration, we only lose our credibility in Russia. 

Having said that, I don’t particularly believe that it would be a 

big problem if we give Ukraine relief from the amendment first. I 

think it would actually be a reminder to the Russians that they are 

not making as much progress on democracy as we want to see. 

On the other hand, if we decide to demonize Russia and try to 

exclude it from the G–8, that would be a different problem all together. 

I was against bringing Russia into G–8. From the standpoint of 

their democracy and economic development they were not supposed 

to be there. If we tried to remove them now, it would do serious 

damage to our ability to cooperate on other matters and could isolate the United States from the Europeans. 

Ms. WALLANDER. Both because you have to go and because I completely agree with what Dimitri is saying, I will just say I completely agree with him. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I want to thank all three witnesses and I want 

to again thank Congressman Weldon. I will personally thank him, 

I think he is an excellent witness as well. 

I would just like to, in close, make reference to Dr. Rumer, who 

mentioned that you thought it was a good idea that there was 

maybe a little more attention given to the issue of Russia by this 

Committee. I can assure you that it is my intent to make sure that 

we do the proper amount of hearings on this issue, because I can’t 

think of many issues that are more important to this Committee 

than the role that Russia plays in the whole region. 

I thank all of you, Dr. Wallander, Mr. Simes, Dr. Rumer, for 

being here today. I wish we could go on longer, but you know how 

the process works around here. When the bells ring, we run. I 

thank you all very much for being here today. 

The Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:17 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing. Given the highly anticipated mini-summit that took place between President Bush and President Putin in 

Slovakia, it is evident we are at a critical juncture in US-Russian relations. 

Despite President Putin’s statement in Bratislava that ‘‘Russia has made its own 

choice in favor of democracy,’’ I am troubled by Russia’s policies that have stifled 

dissenting political and economic voices as well as the independent media. I was encouraged by President Bush’s decision to confront Mr. Putin and state unequivocally 

that America will not remain silent as Russian democracy backslides. 

It is essential that the Bush Administration remain steadfast in promoting Russian political, economic and legal reform. Steps must be taken to assist those who 

are building Russia’s ‘‘infrastructure of democracy’’ by increasing aid to NGO’s, election monitors and independent media groups. Also, it would be prudent for the 

United States and the international community to focus on the 2008 Presidential 

election as a benchmark to determine Russia’s democratic progress. 

America and Russia must build a new policy of ‘‘open and constructive dialogue’’ 

and focus on the difficult issues that pose grave security threats to America and our 

allies; including Russia’s continued support for the construction of Iranian nuclear 

reactors, the transfer of missile technology to Tehran, new weapons sales to Syria 

as well as Russia’s unwelcome interference in the evolution of democracy in 

Ukraine, Georgia and other Soviet successor states. 

An early test of Russian willingness to address American and international concerns will be whether President Putin follows through on his agreement with President Bush that Iran not become a nuclear threat. I remain skeptical of President 

Putin’s intentions given Moscow’s track record and the March 7 signing of a Russian-Iranian nuclear fuel agreement, paving the way for Iran to get its first reactor 

up and running. 

The Bush-Putin meeting in Bratislava did produce some positive results especially 

in the areas of energy and economic cooperation as well as countering the threat 

of nuclear terrorism including an agreement to speed up bilateral efforts to secure 

more of Russia’s nuclear materials. It is critical that Presidents Bush and Putin conclude an agreement that leads to the disposal of Russian weapons grade plutonium 

and secures vulnerable weapons material. 

Despite the significant differences between us and the Russians, it is in our interest to engage Moscow and continue to express in unequivocal terms to the Russian 

people that America wants a fruitful partnership, one built on the principles of democracy, security and economic prosperity. 

56


99821w.eps
57


99821x.eps
58

Æ


99821y.eps