IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2015-CT-01760-SCT
BETTY E LOGAN

v. KLAUSSNER FURNITURE CORPORATION d/b/a BRUCE FURNITURE INDUSTRIES AND AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY

OF READING, PA . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/23/2015 TRIBUNAL FROM W HICH APPEALED: MISSISSIPPI W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ROY O. PARKER HALEY W ADE McINGVALE, II ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: AMY LEE TOPIK JOSEPH ANTHONY GERACHE, III NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED - 03/15/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. B e t t y e Logan sustained a com pensable leg injury w hile em p l o y e d a t K l a u s s n e r Furniture Corporation d/b/a B r u c e F urniture I ndustries (“Klaussner”). An Adm inistrative Judge (“AJ”), and the Mississippi W orkers’ Com p ensation Com m i ssion (“Com m ission”),
f ound that L ogan had suf f ered a sixty -percent loss of industrial use to her l e f t lowerextrem i t y , which entitled her to 105 weeks of com pensation s et at $331.06 f or her

“ s cheduled-m em

ber” injury u nder Mississippi Code Section 7 1-3-17(c)(2). Logan appe a l e d , and the Court of Appeals reversed, f inding that the Com m ission a nd the AJ had applied the incorrect part o f

Section 71-3-17 and that either subsection (a) or subsection (c)(25) of the

sta t u t e

– a n d not subsection (c)(2) – applied. Klaussner and the Am erican Casualty
Com pany , the carrier, petitioned this Court f or writ of certiorari. Having granted certiorari, the Court f

inds that the Com m ission and the AJ properly a w arded Logan perm anent-partial disability benef

i ts under S ection 71-3-17(c)(2). A ccordingly , we reverse the judgm ent of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and af f irm the holding of

the AJ and Com m ission.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. This case is bef

ore the Court af

ter a length y p rocedural history , h aving been heard twice by the Court of A ppeals, the Com m i ssion, and an AJ. On October 9, 2003, Logan, then

em ploy e d by K laussner, tripped a nd f ell at work, sustaining a l eg injury

. Logan f iled a petition to controvert with the Com m ission on Decem ber 9, 2004.
L ogan I 1 ¶3. A h e a ring was h eld on August 12, 2010. Logan testif ied that she was w o r k i n g a t Klaussner as a cutter and s p r e a d e r when she tripped on strings of f abric and f

ell. Logan returned to light-duty work i n M ay 2004. Initially , Logan was accom m odated and placed in

a position tearing tags f

r om bundles and placing labels on products. L ogan wa s able to

rem ain seated in this p o s i t i o n . Af ter two weeks, a K laussner p lant m a n ager suggested that

1 Logan v. Klaussner Furniture Corp. , 1 27 S o. 3d 1138, 1140 (Miss. C t. A pp. 2013) ( Logan I ). 2Logan take the b undling job. Logan did not believe that she could perf orm that job, and the bundling j ob paid less than her p revious position. So Logan t ook a voluntary lay of f

. Logan began receiving Social Security disability benef its in May 2005. ¶4. Logan stated that, af t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , s h e h ad trouble c o m pleting daily

activities because of

her injury

and testif ied that she began living with her daughter, Ginnie Graham (“Graham ”). Graham also testif ied that, since L ogan’s accident, she had to take c are of her

m other, as she could n o longer com plete daily activities, such as grocery shopping o r driving long distances. According to Graham , Logan could not sit upright f or m ore than two or three hours bef ore her leg began to swell. ¶5. Extensive m edical r ecords and testim ony were produced at the hearing, which were

sum m arized by

the Court of Appeals:
On the day of the accident, [ Logan] saw Dr. Bruce Longest, who then ref erred her to Dr. Earnest B. Lowe Jr., an orthopedic surgeon.
On October 10, 2003, Logan visited Dr. Lowe. X-ray s revealed that Logan had a f ractured f ibia and a spiral f

r acture of the tibia. Dr. Lowe treated Logan by p u tting a cast on her lef

t leg and f

oot. He noted that h er injury w o u l d l i k e l y take at least three m onths to heal.
On Novem

ber 14, 2003, Logan visited Dr. Kim Stim pson, another orthopedist. Dr. Stim p son recom m e nded that Logan continue t o wear the cast and return in a m on t h

. H e a lso advised her to continue o n n on-weight-bearing status. On January 9, 2004, Dr. Stim p son r ecom m ended a f

racture brace t o r e p l a ce the cast. Dr. Stim

pson f ound that Logan would be unable to return to work f rom January 20, 2004, through March 20, 2004. Logan visited Dr. Stim

pson again on March 26, 2004. A lthough the f racture was he a l i n g , L o gan had som e lower-extrem ity edem a in her f o ot below the f racture base. Dr. Stim

pson recom m ended the rem o val of the f racture b race, range-of -m otion exercises f

o r her knee and ankle, and progressive w eight

3bearing on her right leg. H e f urther opined that Logan was u nable to return to work f rom March 26, 2004, through May 26, 2004.
In an April 23, 2004 visit, Dr. Stim p s o n n o t e d t hat Logan continued to have pain and swelling in her lef t l eg. His report stated: “ This appears to be som e neuralgia a n d i s m ost l ikely secondary to her f racture brace that was applied quite t i ghtly as we noticed a t her l a st visit.” At this t im e, Logan was am bulatory but st i l l walked with a l im p and had signif

icant weakness. Dr. Stim p son returned L ogan to lim ited-work duty , which he suggested s h ould be sitting work only , f

r om April 24, 2004, until May 30, 2004. He later extended the recom m endation f

rom May 25, 2004, until July 25, 2004. During this tim e, Logan was not perm itted to work m ore than two hours at a tim e and could not lif t or push m ore than ten pounds.

. . . At Logan’s last appointm ent w i th Dr. Stim p son, she continued to have problem s with her leg, which Dr. Stim pson noted was consistent with a nterior tibial nerve i njury

. Dr. Stim pson f ound that Logan’s r ecovery was not within what would n o rm ally be expected. He recom m ended that L ogan continue her work restrictions, but o p i n ed that L ogan would be at m axim um m edical im p rovem ent (MMI) by

October 2004.
Dr. Stim pson then ref

erred Logan to Cornerstone Rehabilitation to undergo an MMI evaluation and a f

u nctional capacity evalua t i o n ( F C E )

. O n S eptem ber 22, 200 4 , David Brick, an occupational therapist, conducted the FCE. He f ound the r e w a s no p hy sical o r f unctional reason that L ogan could not perf orm the light-duty work required by

Klaussner. Hill Rehabilitation Services also perf orm ed an FCE o n Logan since Logan had attended Hill Rehabilitation Services f or phy sical therapy

. S he was discharged f rom phy sical therapy o n Septem ber 7, 200 4

. H o w e v e r, she returned to Hill Rehabilitation Services f or an FCE on Feb r uary 2 8, 2005. The therapist perf orm ing the e valuation f

ound that Logan still had p roblem s with her l eg; theref ore, she was only suited f or sedentary positions where she was allowed to sit constantly

and elevate her lef

t leg. Logan f i rst saw Dr. Rom m el Childress, a n orthopedic surgeon, on August 1, 2006. He ordered m agnetic resonance im a g i n g (MRI) tests on her hip and knee. On Logan’s August 21, 2007 visit, Dr. Childress h ad reviewed the MRIs and f ound that Logan had a tear in the m edial m eniscus. He recom m ended that she use a c ane or crutch and suggested som e exerc i s e s f or her knee. Dr.

4Childress advised Logan that she w ould need surgery to repair the tear but that

this could be done on an elective basis.
Per her e mp l o y e r ’s request, Logan visited Dr. C ooper Terry on February 9, 2009. At the ti me , L o g a n still had c om plaints regarding h er k

nee. Dr. T erry opined that the knee pain and m eniscal tear were related to Logan’s work injury . He also recom m e nded a lef t knee arthroscopy

. Logan had the surgery on July 18, 2009. As of Septem ber 23, 2009, Dr. Terry deem ed Logan to have reached M MI. He a ssessed a 4% lef t-lo w er-extrem ity im

pairm ent and gave her no perm anent work restrictions. Logan I , 127 So. 3d at 1139-1141. ¶6. Two vocational-rehabilitation experts testif ied at the hearing a s well. L ogan’s expert, C. Lam ar Crocker, opined that Logan had a one-hundred-percent l oss in the labor m arket. Contrastingly , Klaussner’s expert, Jennif er Oubre, opined that L ogan had transf erable skills and rem ained em

ploy able, and that she could work in c ustom er service o r as a receptionist. Oubre never m et with Logan, but based her opinion on Logan’s m edical records. ¶7. On July 2 9 , 2 0 1 1 , the AJ entered an order, f inding Logan had not s uf f ered “any industrial loss of use of her lef t lower extrem ity because of her work-connected i njuries[ .]” The A J f urther stated: “Although [ Logan] h as a p erm anent m edical im p airm ent of 4% to her lef t lower extrem ity , a prepond e r a n c e of the evidence does not s upport a f i nding that she sustained any industrial loss of use of her lef t lower extrem ity because of the work-connected im p airm en t

. ” L o g a n then f iled a petition f

or r eview bef

ore the f u ll Com m ission, and on February 6, 2012, the f

ull Com m i ssion af

f irm ed the AJ’s order. ¶8. Logan a

ppealed the decision of the AJ a n d C o mmi s s i o n . T h e C o u rt o f Appeals characterized the sole i ssue on a p p e a l as whether the A J ’s and C om m ission’s f inding was supported by s ubstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals held that “[ t ] he lay testim ony ,
5vocational ex p e r ts, and m edical evidence establish that Logan has suf f ered a perm anent partial or total disability [ ,]” and, “at the very least, Logan should have been a s sessed a loss of wage-earning c apacity .” Id. at 1143. The Court of Appeals reversed and rem anded “f or a determ ination of

the appropriate award of com pensation.” Id. Logan II

2 ¶9. On rem and, the AJ issued an am ended opi n i o n i n l i g h t o f t h e Court of Appeals’ d e c i s i o n a n d the evidence presented at the f irst hearing. The AJ f

ound that L ogan h a d suf f e red a sixty -percen t loss of industrial use to her lef t lower extrem ity , entitling her to
perm anent-partial disability benef its in the a m ount of $ 3 3 1

. 06 f o r a period o f 105 weeks. The AJ h eld that a f

inding of a perm anent-total loss (one hundred p ercent) of industrial use
to h er lef t lower extrem i ty would be contrary to the m edical evidence. In s uppo r t , t h e AJ relied on the testim o ny of two phy sicians – Dr. Stim pson and Dr. Ter r y

– who opined that Logan could return to som e f orm of work. On October 23, 2015, the Com m ission af f irm ed the decision of the A J, f

inding that Logan had the ability to return to em ploy m ent at least at a sedentary

level based on the m edical and vocational evidence. Logan again appealed. ¶10. Logan argued that she was entitled to the m axim um allowable am ount of

perm anentt o t al disability com

pensation instead of the lower am ount awarded by the AJ and the
Com m i ssion. The Court of Appeals again reversed and rem anded, this tim e on the basis of the Com m ission’s alleged “erroneous application of law” with respect to Mississippi Code

2 L o g a n v. K la u ssn er F

u rn itu re C

o rp . , N o . 2 0 1 5 -WC -0 1 7 6 0 -C O A , 2 0 1 6 WL 9 4 5 4 4 4 0 (M iss. C t. A p p . N o v . 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 ), cert. g r a n ted , 2 2 9 S o . 3 d 7 1 1 (M iss. 2 0 1 7 ) ( L o g a n II ). 6Section 71-3-17. The m ajority of the Court of

Appeals held that either Section 71-3-17(a)

or Section 71-3-17(c)(25), instead of Section 71-3-17(c)(2), applied because Logan’s injury

was “perm anent” and resulted in a loss of wage-earning capacity

. Klaussner and Am erican Casualty Com pany petitioned this Court f

or writ of certiorari, which we granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11. It is well-settled law in this State that the Com m ission is the ultim ate f inder of f act in

wo rkers’ com

pensation cases, and where substantial credible evidence supports the
Com m i ssion’s d ecision, then, a bsent an error o f l aw, the d ecision m ust stand without judicial interf erence. Sm ith v. Jackson Cons t r. Co. , 607 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Miss. 1992). In other words, the “Com m ission’s f indings of f

act are e ntitled to substantial def eren c e when challenged on appeal to the judiciary .” Raytheon Aerospace Support Servs. v. Miller , 861
So. 2 d 330, 335 (Miss. 2003) (citing V a nce v. Twin River Hom es, I n c . , 641 So. 2d 1176,
1180 (Miss. 1994)). Even i f there i s conf licting ev i d e n c e , t h e reviewing court is not to determ ine where the preponderance lies because “it is p resum ed that the Com m ission as trier of f act has previously determ ined which evide n c e i s credible and which evidence is not.”
Miller , 861 So. 2d at 335 (citation om i tted). “The Com m ission’s decision will b e reversed only i f it is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricio u s , or i s based on

an erroneous application of the law.” L ovett v. D elta Reg’l Med. Ctr . , 157 So. 3d 88, 89 (Miss. 2015) (citation o m itted). The f indings of the Com mi s s ion should be reversed “only in r ather extraordinary cases.” Miller , 8 61 So. 2d a t 335 (quoting Hale v. Ruleville Care Ctr. , 687 So. 2d 1221, 1224-45 (Miss. 1997)).

7DISCUSSION

¶12. I n L o g a n I

, the Court of Appeals held that “ evidence e s tablish[ ed] that L o g a n h a s suf f e red a p e r m a n e n t partial or total disability ,” a n d that court rem anded the case “to the
Com m i ssion f

or a determ ination of the a ppropriate award of com

pensation” in light of that holding. Logan I

, 127 So. 3d a t 1143 (em

phasis added). Following that court’s instructions

on rem a n d, the Com m ission f ound that Logan had established a sixty

- percent i ndustrial loss of use to her lef

t leg, af ter f inding she h ad f

ailed to prove a total loss of wage-earning capacity and perm anent total disability

. Logan was awarded 1 05 weeks of com pensation f

or her perm anent-partial, scheduled-m em ber injury

. ¶13. In Logan II

, the Court of Appeals im properly held that either Section 71-3-17(a) or S e c tion 71-3-17(c)(25) a

pplied in this scheduled-m em b er case, n ot S ection 71-3-17(c)(2 ) , which the Com m i ssion properly applie d. P erm anent-partial disability com p ensation is governed by

Section 71-3-17(c), which reads:
In case o f disability partial in character but perm a nent in quality , the com pensation shall b e sixty -six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the average weekly wag e s o f the injured em ploy ee, subject to the m axim um lim itations as t o weekly benef its as s et up in this chapter, which shall be p aid f ollowing com

pensation f

or tem porary total d isability paid in a ccordance with paragraph (b) of

this section, and shall be paid to the em p loy ee. . . . Miss. C ode Ann. § 7 1

- 3

- 1 7 ( c) (Rev. 2011) (em phasis added). A claim ant m ay be

co mp e n s ated f

or a leg injury under the perm anent-partial statute f or a m axim

um of 175 weeks. See Miss. Code Ann. § 7 1

- 3

- 1 7 ( c )(2). Under this statute, subsections (c)(1) thru (c)(24) control in c ases of perm anent-partial d isability involving the loss or loss of use o f a scheduled m em

ber, such as a leg, and other specif ied injuries.

8¶14. The Com m ission specif ically f ound that Logan did not sustain a total loss of wageearning capacity , and its f inding was supported by s ubstantial evidence. The Commi s s i o n correctly a warded benef

its under the schedule, Section 71-3-17(c) ( 2), because subsection (c)(25) does not apply to scheduled-m em ber cases. Nor does subsection ( a ) a p p l y , as the injury was not perm anent total. Subsection ( c)(2) c ontrols this case, as this case involved a
perm anent-partial disability to Logan’s leg.
CONCLUSION ¶15. The Com m issio n ’ s d e c i s i o n i s c o n s i s tent with the law governing benef its f or a
perm anent-partial disability a nd is supported by substantial evidence. Theref o re, we reverse the judgm ent of the Court of Appeals and r e i n s t a te and af f i rm the j udgm ent of the
Com m i ssion. ¶16. T H E J UDGMENT OF T HE COURT O F APPEALS I S R E V E R S E D . T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E M I S S I S S I P P I W O R K E R S ’ C O M P E N S A T I O N C O M M I S S I O N IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., KING, C OLEMAN, MAX WELL, B E A M AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

9