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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

SHANA DOTY, individually and on behalf 

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT SECURITY 

SERVICES, a Delaware limited liability 

company, and TELESFORO AVILES, an 

individual, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 20-cv-60972-RKA

Judge Raag Singhal

Magistrate Judge Patrick M. Hunt

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Shana Doty (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury 

Trial against Defendant ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services (“ADT”), based on its intentional 

and negligent tortious acts in providing security services to its customers with remote-viewing 

capabilities, and Defendant Telesforo Aviles (“Aviles”), for using those services to spy on Plaintiff 

and other ADT customers. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and 

her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. In April of 2020, Shana Doty received a terrifying phone call from ADT: the 

technician who had worked on her indoor security camera system, Telesforo Aviles, had granted 

himself remote access, and had used that access an unknown amount of times to spy on her, her 

husband, and her minor son in their most private moments. 

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2. And Ms. Doty was not the only one. She soon found out that hundreds of 

households had experienced the same staggering invasion of privacy over at least a seven-year

period. At fault for this breach of trust: ADT’s unsecure and unmonitored “security” services. 

3. While ADT boasts that it has been protecting people for over 145 years and holds 

itself out as the “#1 in smart home security” it failed to even secure its own systems from massive 

and ongoing intrusions into its customers’ private lives. 

4. ADT failed to provide the security services its customers paid for by leaving large 

vulnerabilities in the ADT Pulse application and, as a result, compromised the safety and security 

of its customers’ homes and family members. The ADT vulnerability allowed any one of its 

technicians to grant themselves (or for them to grant anyone else, for that matter) access to a 

customer’s ADT Pulse application and control every aspect of the customer’s home security 

systems, including surreptitiously opening locks, disarming their system, and viewing and 

downloading security camera footage.

5. Remarkably, just three months before ADT revealed this vulnerability, ADT 

conducted a survey recognizing the “strong consumer expectations” of security that consumers 

had in their smart home products: “With many data privacy and security issues in the news, it’s no 

surprise that 92 percent of respondents feel smart home security companies need to take measures 

to protect customers’ personal data and information.”1 ADT bragged that it was leading the 

industry in establishing “best practices” for the protection of consumer privacy, one of which was 

strict standards for access to data, promising that “[s]ecurity providers will only share audio or 

1 ADT Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Expectations for Smart Home Privacy Protections, ADT

(Jan. 27, 2020), https://investor.adt.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/ADT-SurveyReveals-Strong-Consumer-Expectations-for-Smart-Home-Privacy-Protections/default.aspx

(permanent link available at https://cite.law/RNP5-BT3U). 

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video with first responders with their customers’ prior consent, or as required by law, and will not 

otherwise access a customer’s audio or video without the customer’s knowledge.” 

6. In a frantic effort to mitigate and hide the fact that the vulnerability in its supposedly 

industry-leading smart home security systems permitted an employee to spy on customers, ADT 

began a campaign to call all affected account holders and secure a release and confidentially 

agreement in exchange for a monetary payment representing a fraction of the value of their claims. 

This effort, directed by lawyers but carried out by customer service representatives, failed to 

determine whether individuals were represented by counsel, and attempted to mislead them into 

believing that the release would cover account holders and non-account holders in the household 

alike. 

7. Beyond Aviles, potentially countless other unknown individuals have been 

accessing customers’ ADT Pulse accounts and surreptitiously viewing their camera footage, for 

years, all around the country. 

8. The mental and emotional impact this revelation has had on every person receiving 

these calls from ADT is immeasurable. Moments once believed to be private and inside the sanctity 

of the home are now voyeuristic entertainment for a third party. And worse, those moments could 

have been captured, shared with others, or even posted to the internet. ADT’s failure to protect its 

customers irreparably destroyed their sense of security, safety, intimacy, and well-being.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Shana Doty is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.

10. Defendant ADT, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under 

the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 1501 Yamato Road, Boca 

Raton, Florida 33431.

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11. Defendant Telesforo Aviles is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 

because (i) at least one member of the Class is a citizen of a different state than Defendant ADT, 

(ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and (iii) none 

of the exceptions under that subsection apply in this action.

13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant ADT because Defendant ADT 

conducts business in Florida and has its headquarters in this District. This Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant Aviles because Defendant Aviles conducts business in Florida through 

his employment with Defendant ADT. 

14. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant ADT maintains 

its headquarters and conducts significant business in this District. 

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. ADT Promises Safety and Security to Consumers.

15. ADT is a home security company that touts its longstanding expertise in security 

and claims to have been providing security services since the 19th century. According to ADT, it 

has “been helping protect homes longer than any other company in the business.” ADT provides 

residential security systems and monitoring plans that purportedly “protect what matters most in 

your life.” In short, ADT promises that it is “fully committed to your security.”2

2 ADT Services | In-Home Consultation, Installation, Repairs, Customer Support, 

https://www.adt.com/services (last visited July 15, 2020).

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16. ADT markets and sells a comprehensive security system package that includes the 

hardware necessary to operate a home security system, the monitoring services that detect home 

intrusions and alert the police, and the security system installation.

17. ADT offers various tiers of its home security systems at different price points. The 

basic tier, for example, features security monitoring equipment with 24/7 alarm monitoring while 

the highest tier home security package includes various convenience and home automation 

features. 

18. One of the highest tier home security packages is ADT Pulse. ADT Pulse allows 

consumers to “check on your home - even if you’re away” by giving them remote access to 

control their home security system from a mobile application or a web browser portal. 

Specifically, consumers can arm and disarm their home security systems, remotely lock and 

unlock doors, view live camera footage, and control various smart home devices like a 

thermostat and lights. See Figure 1, showing a screenshot of ADT’s marketing materials for ADT 

Pulse.3

3 ADT Pulse® | Official ADT Smart Home Automation System, 

https://www.adt.com/pulse (last visited July 15, 2020).

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(Figure 1.)

19. Consumers must purchase various smart devices from ADT to reap the benefits of 

the ADT Pulse service and all the advertised remote accessibility features. ADT touts that its smart 

home features are not only more convenient to consumers, but they provide “smarter security.” 

For example, ADT claims that the purchase of its smart locks for use with the ADT Pulse system 

will result in a “whole new level of security and convenience...” as shown in Figure 2. 

(Figure 2.)

20. Most importantly, ADT encourages consumers to purchase video cameras for both 

outdoors and indoors uses to “keep an eye on the things you value most.”4 The indoor cameras, 

according to ADT, are specifically intended to “check in on your kids” and can be set up to stream 

and capture video clips of events “like when your kids get home from school.”5

21. Consumers use the ADT Pulse mobile application to “check any or all of your ADT 

home security cameras” and to “look in on your family and your pets any time with live-streaming 

4 Wireless Home Security Cameras & Video Surveillance Cameras | ADT, 

https://www.adt.com/security-cameras (last visited July 15, 2020).

5 Shop ADT® Indoor Home Security Cameras | ADT, https://www.adt.com/indoorsecurity-camera (last visited May 7, 2020).

Case 0:20-cv-60972-AHS Document 47 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/16/2020 Page 6 of 36
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video.” Furthermore, consumers are able view stored video clips from their security cameras on 

their phones via the ADT Pulse mobile application.6

22. To use the ADT Pulse smart home features—like remotely viewing security camera 

footage, disarming a security system, or unlocking smart locks—consumers must login into the 

ADT Pulse mobile application or the ADT Pulse web browser portal by using their username and 

password. Anyone with valid login credentials, like a family member, can access and control the 

security system remotely. 

23. For the ADT Pulse system to function correctly, an ADT technician needs to 

perform the system installation and configuration.

24. Each new security system installation comes with a “worry-free professional 

installation” where “highly-trained ADT technicians will set-up your ADT security system so you 

don’t have to.”7 ADT technicians will also test the security system and assist the consumer in 

connecting their smart phone to the ADT security system for use with ADT Pulse, as shown in 

Figure 3. 

6 Supra note 3.

7 ADT® | Compare Home Security System Packages | 2020, https://www.adt.com/compare 

(last visited July 15, 2020)

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(Figure 3.)

25. ADT further promotes its security services by stating that its technicians are what 

sets them apart from the competitors in being able to earn its customers’ trust and protect the most 

important people in their lives. According to its website: “Our people are dedicated to taking care 

of the people and property you value most in your life. Our customers trust us to help protect those 

things that cannot be replaced.” See Figure 4, showing a screenshot from ADT’s website.8

8 Why ADT has the Best Home Security and Customer Service | ADT, 

https://www.adt.com/security-benefits (last visited May 7, 2020).

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(Figure 4.)

26. Moreover, ADT knows precisely how important the security of smart home devices 

is to consumers. ADT went out of its way to commission a survey of more than 1,200 consumers 

in December 2019, and found that 92% of consumers felt that “smart home security companies 

[like ADT] need to take measures to protect customers’ personal data and information.” And ADT 

went so far as to issue a press release dedicated to saying it was doing just that, in order to “maintain 

consumer trust and promote responsible data privacy practices within the industry.” 

27. The greatest concern that consumers had, revealed by ADT’s survey, was 

“hacking.” In response to those concerns, ADT boasted that it was leading the industry in creating 

a “Consumer Privacy Initiative,” to create “clear guiding principles and best practices” for how 

security providers “manage consumer data and protect their privacy.” Those principles included 

“Privacy by Design,” promising to “embed[]” privacy “in all areas of the security industry,” which 

“begins with the design of the products used to help protect and connect customers.” They also 

included, specifically, “Handling of Audio and Video,” claiming that security providers would 

share audio or video only with prior consent and would otherwise never “access a customer’s audio 

or video without the customer’s knowledge.”9

II. ADT Failed to Detect a Seven-Year-Long Breach of its Systems That, at the Very Least, 

Resulted in an ADT Employee Improperly Accessing Customers’ Accounts.

28. Unfortunately for all of ADT’s Pulse customers, a vulnerability in the Pulse security 

system completely obliterates all of ADT’s promises of security and protection. 

9 ADT Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Expectations for Smart Home Privacy Protections, ADT (Jan. 

27, 2020), https://investor.adt.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/ADT-SurveyReveals-Strong-Consumer-Expectations-for-Smart-Home-Privacy-Protections/default.aspx

(permanent link available at https://cite.law/RNP5-BT3U).

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29. On or around April 23, 2020, ADT began to contact some of its customers to inform 

them that a vulnerability in the ADT Pulse system had allowed unauthorized users to access 

customers’ ADT Pulse accounts as if they were a regular user. In other words, an unauthorized 

user could remotely arm and disarm security systems, access smart home devices, and view and 

download security camera footage, including footage from indoor cameras designed to, among 

other things, protect their children. 

30. In fact, ADT’s investigation revealed that at least one ADT employee in the DallasFort Worth, Texas area, named Telesforo Aviles, had access to more than 200 different customers’ 

ADT Pulse accounts for the last seven years. According to an ADT spokesperson, Aviles was able 

to add—and, in fact, did add—his own personal email address to customers’ accounts, allowing

him to remotely login to a customer’s account using his own unauthorized credentials.

31. This type of access could only occur because ADT failed to implement adequate 

procedures that would prevent non-household members from adding non-household email 

addresses. Similarly, ADT failed to monitor consumers’ accounts and promptly alert them anytime 

a new email was added to their accounts. Countless checks could have been in place to prevent or 

at least stop this conduct. Instead, this breach came to light only by luck and happenstance: a 

customer, reporting a technical issue, inadvertently revealed the unwanted third-party access. But 

for that event, ADT would be unaware of this invasive conduct and it would continue unabated to 

this day (and likely expanding to new households).

32. As such, countless other ADT technicians and/or employees could have taken 

advantage of ADT’s lax security and granted themselves unfettered access to other customer 

accounts—entirely unbeknownst to both the customer and to ADT.

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33. Although ADT claims it has implemented procedures to prevent similar incidents 

in the future, it is already too late for an unknown number of consumers whose accounts and 

security camera footage have already been accessed and potentially exploited. 

III. ADT Harmed its Customers by Concealing its Deficient Data Security Practices.

34. ADT’s customers have already suffered significant and lasting harm as a result of 

its misconduct.

35. As ADT’s own survey revealed, consumers place value in data privacy and 

security, and they consider issues of privacy and security when making purchasing decisions. In 

fact, it is widely accepted that consumers are willing to pay higher prices to do business with 

merchants that better protect their privacy and information—especially security companies. ADT 

knows this, which is why it went to the trouble of commissioning a survey and issuing a press 

release claiming that its security related to this very issue was sound. 

36. In addition to ADT’s own study, a number of studies have found that U.S. 

consumers consider security when purchasing goods and services, and that over 50% of consumers 

would consider paying more to work with a company with better security.10 Likewise, studies have 

shown that over 70% of U.S. consumers will provide less personally identifiable information to 

organizations that suffer a data breach.11

37. Consumer technology markets have likewise demonstrated that consumers value 

their privacy and security and incorporate data security practices into their purchases. For example, 

companies have begun providing consumers with “cloaking services” that allow them to browse 

10 Beyond the Bottom Line: The Real Cost of Data Breaches, FireEye, 

https://tinyurl.com/ycvtd2fl (last visited July 15, 2020).

11 Id.

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the internet anonymously for a fee. Likewise, companies now offer services that, in exchange for 

a monthly fee, will offer online services designed to protect data privacy.

38. Because of the value consumers place on data privacy and security, services with 

better security practices command higher prices than those without. Indeed, if consumers did not 

value their data security and privacy, profit-seeking corporations (like ADT) would have no reason 

to tout their privacy and security credentials to current and prospective customers.

39. These value propositions reflect the fact that consumers view companies that 

promise to adequately secure customer data as being far more useful—and valuable—than those 

with substandard protections.

40. As a result, a security service with substandard data security and privacy protections 

is less useful and less valuable than a product or service using adequate security protocols, and is, 

in reality, a different service entirely. Or, in other words, not a security company at all.

41. Stated simply, had consumers—like Plaintiff Doty—known the truth about ADT’s 

data security practices—e.g., that ADT did not adequately protect her family’s security—they 

would not have purchased ADT’s security services.

FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF DOTY

42. Ms. Doty has been a long-time ADT security customer. In approximately 2014, Ms. 

Doty upgraded her account to the ADT Pulse system which included installing security cameras 

inside her home. ADT represented to Ms. Doty that this upgrade would enhance her personal 

security.

43. Indeed, Ms. Doty relied on ADT’s representations, including both representations 

by ADT employees and ADT’s representations on its website, about the ADT Pulse system’s 

safety and security. 

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44. Shortly thereafter, Aviles installed the ADT Pulse system, which included an indoor 

security camera with a wide-angle view that provided a visual of a bathroom, entryway, family 

room and dining space, stairs, and into the master bedroom.

45. On April 23, 2020, a phone call from ADT destroyed whatever security and safety 

ADT’s security system promised. An ADT “Concierge Representative” called Ms. Doty to explain 

that one of its technicians (who they did not name) had gained access to her account and therefore 

had access to her camera, potentially viewing her, her husband, and their minor son, for an 

unknown amount of time. ADT claimed it was unknown how many times he accessed their camera. 

46. In an email later that day, ADT Concierge Representative Wayne Walker described 

it as “a difficult message to hear.” Difficult is, of course, woefully inadequate to truly describe 

Plaintiff’s loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

47. Based upon the camera’s wide-angle lens and placement, an ADT employee had an 

opportunity to watch at least the following events:

a. Ms. Doty, her husband, and her minor son nude;

b. Ms. Doty, her husband, and her minor son in various states of undress;

c. Ms. Doty, her husband, and her minor son getting ready for bed;

d. Moments of physical intimacy; and 

e. Private and confidential moments and conversations.

48. Immediately after the call, Ms. Doty disabled the ADT camera in her home. Ms. 

Doty expended significant time and money addressing the current and future consequences of the 

exposure enabled by ADT, including, but not limited to, disabling ADT security hardware and 

researching additional surveillance and security devices and services.

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49. Prior to April 23, 2020, Ms. Doty never received any call, text, email, or notification 

of any kind informing her that another user was added to her ADT Pulse account or that a user 

(aside from her) accessed her ADT Pulse account.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

50. Class Definition: Plaintiff Shana Doty brings this action on behalf of herself and a 

class of similarly situated individuals, as well as a sub-class of those individuals, defined as 

follows:

Class: All ADT Pulse customers in the United States whose security systems were 

remotely accessed by an employee or agent of Defendant ADT without authorization from 

the customer. 

Sub-Class: All ADT Pulse customers in the United States whose security systems were 

remotely accessed by Telesforo Aviles without authorization from the customer.

The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this 

action and the members of their family; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, 

successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling 

interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons who properly 

execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this 

matter have been finally adjudicated by a court of law on the merits; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and 

Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such 

excluded persons.

51. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not 

available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class 

likely consist of hundreds of individuals. Members of the Class can be easily identified through 

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Defendant ADT’s records. The Sub-Class consists of more than two hundred households, and 

members of the Sub-Class have already been identified by Defendant ADT. 

52. Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of 

Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions 

that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are 

not limited to the following:

a. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes a breach of contract;

b. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligence;

c. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes gross negligence; 

d. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act;

e. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion; 

f. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Computer Fraud 

and Abuse Act; 

g. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; 

h. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct entitles the Class to privacy monitoring; and

i. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligent hiring, supervision, and 

retention. 

There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other 

members of the Sub-Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect 

individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to 

the following:

a. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intrusion upon seclusion; 

b. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes a violation of the Computer 

Fraud and Abuse Act; and

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c. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.

53. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of other members of the Class and SubClass, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class and Sub-Class sustained damages arising out 

of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct.

54. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and 

protect the interests of the Class and Sub-Class and has retained counsel competent and 

experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class or 

Sub-Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff.

55. Predominance and Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class 

certification because Class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all parties is impracticable. The 

damages suffered by the individual members of the Class and Sub-Class will likely be relatively 

small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation 

necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual 

members of the Class and Sub-Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even 

if members of the Class and Sub-Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not 

be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense 

to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By 

contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of 

single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. 

Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

Breach of Contract 

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(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

56. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

57. Plaintiff Doty and the Class members entered into a valid and enforceable 

agreement with Defendant ADT to install a security system and agreed to pay money for such 

services. Plaintiff Doty’s contract is attached as Exhibit 1.

58. In a section titled “Services to be Provided,” the contract listed “Standard Monthly 

Service, Burglary,” “Safewatch Cellguard,” “Extended Limited Warranty/Quality Service Plan 

(QSP),” and, under the “Other” section, “Pulse.” In a section titled “Equipment to be Installed,” 

the contract lists security equipment, including a camera. ADT also agreed to provide equipment, 

including a camera. Ex. 1 at 2. 

59. Beyond this, the contract does not include any terms describing the function or 

features of the services provided by ADT. The remainder of the form contract is self-serving (and 

unenforceable) terms limiting ADT’s liability or any responsibility to the consumer. 

60. In the absence of an express term describing ADT’s provided services, a material 

and clearly contemplated implied covenant in the agreement existed between Defendant ADT and 

Plaintiff (and the putative Class) to provide a security system that was suitable for its advertised 

purpose and to not contain design flaws that render it and/or access to it vulnerable to unauthorized 

intrusion resulting in the compromise of user safety and security.

61. Indeed, as ADT’s own survey recognized, consumers expect security companies 

that provide smart home products, like ADT, to take reasonable measures to protect personal data 

and information, and ADT says it provides those measures. The contract does not discuss these 

measures because it is so clearly within the contemplation of the Parties that it is deemed 

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unnecessary to express. The core purpose of the contract is to provide security services designed 

to keep customers safe and their private lives private. 

62. A meeting of the minds occurred, and Plaintiff Doty and the Class fully performed 

their obligations under the contracts.

63. Defendant ADT breached the contract with Plaintiff Doty and Class members by 

failing to acknowledge the inherent vulnerability in the ADT Pulse system and the ability of a third 

party to access the security system and various connected security devices including door locks 

and cameras. 

64. Plaintiff Doty and Class members would not have paid for ADT’s security system 

had they known of these vulnerabilities, but rather would have chosen one of the numerous 

alternatives that were available to them and which did not present a hidden safety risk.

65. ADT’s failure to fulfill its promises resulted in Plaintiff Doty and Class members 

receiving services that were of less value than they paid for. Stated otherwise, because Plaintiff 

Doty and Class members paid for privacy protections that they did not receive—even though such 

protections were a material part of their contracts with the ADT—they did not receive the full 

benefit of the bargain. As a result of ADT’s breach, Plaintiff Doty and the Class suffered damages 

in the amount of the difference between the price they paid for ADT’s services as promised and 

the actual, diminished value of its security services.

66. As a direct and proximate result of ADT’s breach of their contracts with Plaintiff 

Doty and Class members, Plaintiff Doty and Class members have also suffered and will suffer 

injury, including, but not limited to: the cost of replacement security devices; the cost of additional 

surveillance and protective devices and services; and time spent monitoring and addressing the 

current and future consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT.

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

Negligence

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)

67. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

68. Defendant ADT had full knowledge of the purpose for which its security cameras 

were being used and the sensitivity of the people and things the cameras were designed to secure 

and protect—that which “matters most” to their clients. ADT also knew the types of harm that 

Plaintiff and the members of the Class could and would suffer if the integrity of the security system 

was compromised.

69. ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that all ADT security 

systems were secure, safe to use, and inviolable by unauthorized parties. This duty includes, among 

other things, ensuring that reasonable and proper protocols and safeguards are in place so that 

consumers’ security cameras are not easily compromised by unauthorized users. 

70. Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent 

contractors, was negligent in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing 

technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that its employees could 

make and did make themselves authorized users gaining unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s ADT 

Pulse account, thereby allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken of Plaintiff 

in her home.

71. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims 

of any inadequate security practices and procedures. ADT knew of or should have known of the 

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inherent risks of allowing ADT cameras to be set up and used without adequate security protocols 

and safeguards. 

72. Defendant ADT further knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious 

recordings of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked, engaging in consensual 

intimate activity, and having private conversations in a private home; (3) the recordings were taken 

without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal private and 

personal things about Plaintiff which ADT and Aviles had no right or authorization to view, use, 

disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and occasions constitutes a 

substantial violation of Plaintiff’s right of privacy.

73. Beyond ordinary negligence, Defendant ADT was grossly negligent because the 

acts and omissions of Defendant ADT and its employee and agents were more than momentary

thoughtlessness or inadvertence. Rather the conduct, when viewed objectively from the standpoint 

of Defendant ADT at the time of these events, involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the 

probability and magnitude of the potential harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant ADT had 

subjective knowledge of the risk of employees gaining unauthorized access to clients’ cameras, 

but failed to disclose to Plaintiff the vulnerability of their monitoring systems and the ability of 

ADT employees to monitor and observe their home without their consent, and acted with conscious 

indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of their clients.

74. ADT’s own actions and inactions created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and 

the members of the Class. ADT’s misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to sell 

security systems with sufficiently robust security protocols to prevent unauthorized users from 

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gaining access to the cameras, and failing to inform Plaintiff and the members of the Class when 

unknown individuals added their email addresses to customer accounts. 

75. ADT was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and the 

members of the Class and had a duty to do so.

76. ADT, through its actions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the members 

of the Class by failing to ensure their cameras and set up procedures were sufficiently robust to 

protect against unauthorized use. 

77. But for ADT’s wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and the 

members of the Class, Plaintiff and the members of the Class would not have used or purchased a 

product that is so readily compromised. 

78. As a result of ADT’s negligence, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have 

suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injury including, but not limited to: the cost of 

replacement cameras; the cost of additional surveillance and protective devices and services; the 

time spent monitoring and addressing the current and future consequences of the exposure enabled 

by ADT; and the necessity to engage legal counsel and incur attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

79. Further, because ADT’s acts and omissions resulted from gross negligence, 

exemplary damages should be awarded against ADT in an amount to be determined by the jury in 

this case. Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded without limitation, as set forth in Tex. 

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(c).

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class against Defendant ADT) 

80. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

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81. Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are “[c]onsumer[s]” as defined in Tex. Bus. & Com. 

Code Ann. § 17.45(4) because they are individuals. 

82. Plaintiff and the Sub-Class engaged with Defendant in “[t]rade” or “commerce” as 

those terms are defined in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.45(6) because ADT offers for sale, 

sells, and/or leases goods and services (or otherwise articles, commodities, or other things of value) 

to consumers, including selling or leasing security products to Plaintiff and the Sub-Class, and 

providing related security services, including the Pulse application, to Plaintiff and the Sub-Class, 

in exchange for monetary payments. 

83. ADT engaged in false, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices in trade or 

commerce in violation of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46. 

84. ADT failed to disclose the fact that the smart home security services that it provided 

had material vulnerabilities, and that ADT had not taken reasonable measures to secure those 

services, in violation of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46(b)(24). ADT knew that consumers 

valued and expected that their smart home security devices would be secure and free from 

intrusion. At the same time, ADT knew that was not taking reasonable measures, if any, to ensure 

that its smart home security devices, including the Pulse application, were actually secure. ADT 

failed to disclose these facts in order to induce consumers, including Plaintiff Doty and the SubClass, to continue purchasing its services, which they would not have done had this information 

been disclosed—as ADT knew from its survey of consumers in January 2020. 

85. Plaintiff Doty would not have continued to purchase ADT services had she known 

of the vulnerabilities in the Pulse application. Nor would she have continued to purchase ADT 

services had she known that ADT was not taking reasonable measures to secure its smart home 

devices. 

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86. ADT’s course of conduct was unconscionable in violation of Tex. Bus. & Com. 

Code Ann. § 17.50. ADT’s core business is the widespread distribution of products and services 

to be used within consumers’ homes to provide safety, security, and peace of mind. But while 

doing so, ADT acted with flagrant disregard for prudent and fair business practices—as ADT itself 

declared them in its January 2020 press release—that permitted ADT’s technician, and potentially 

countless other technicians or employees, to grant themselves unfettered access to its customers’ 

homes. 

87. Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class have also suffered and will continue to suffer 

economic damages, including, but not limited to: the cost of replacement security devices; the cost 

of additional surveillance and protective devices and services; and time spent monitoring and 

addressing the current and future consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT. Plaintiff Doty 

and the Sub-Class have also experienced mental anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, loss 

of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)

88. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

89. ADT intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the Class members’ 

seclusion by creating the means and opportunity for its employees to spy on Plaintiff and the Class 

in one of their most private spaces—their homes—and providing Aviles and potentially others 

with round-the-clock access to their most intimate moments. Indeed, ADT had an affirmative duty 

not to let unauthorized third parties gain access to these spaces. 

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90. ADT’s facilitation and failure to stop such access is highly offensive to a reasonable 

person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of the Class members and the 

activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.

91. ADT is also liable for the actions of its agents who accessed Plaintiff’s and the 

Class’s security systems, which was done in the normal and routine course and scope of their 

employment. 

92. ADT’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ seclusion caused 

Plaintiff and the Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, loss of 

security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Class against Defendant ADT)

93. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

94. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) broadly prohibits intentional access 

to computer systems without authorization or in excess of authorization.

95. Plaintiff Doty is an individual and therefore a “person” under 18 U.S.C. § 

1030(e)(12).

96. The ADT Pulse system is a “protected computer” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) 

because it is used in and affects interstate or foreign commerce and communication. Specifically, 

the ADT Pulse system allows consumers to remotely access and monitor their ADT home 

security—including viewing security camera footage, opening locks, and arming or disarming the 

security system—even if the consumer is on the other side of the country or the world. The ADT 

Pulse system communicates with ADT monitoring centers located at various locations around the 

country and the consumer either via the internet or via cellular towers.

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97. ADT violated the CFAA because one or more of ADT’s employees intentionally 

accessed Plaintiff Doty’s and Class members’ ADT Pulse security system accounts without 

obtaining any authorization from the customers. Furthermore, ADT’s employees obtained 

information from Plaintiff Doty’s and the Class members’ ADT Pulse security systems in the form 

of video recordings of their homes and any information showing the status of the security system, 

in general.

98. As such, Plaintiff Doty and the Class have suffered damages as a result of 

unauthorized access to their accounts. That is, Plaintiff Doty and the Class now face a significant 

impairment to the integrity of data, and the ADT Pulse security system in general. Plaintiff Doty 

and the Class have been subjected to ADT’s vulnerability that allowed unauthorized users to 

control their ADT Pulse systems.

99. Plaintiff Doty and the Class have also suffered a significant loss as a result of 

unauthorized access to their accounts. Plaintiff Doty and the Class expended significant time and 

resources in responding to the ADT’s vulnerability and ADT’s employees’ unauthorized access to 

their accounts.

100. Overall, ADT’s vulnerability and its employees’ unauthorized access to Plaintiff 

Doty’s and the Class members’ ADT Pulse systems undoubtedly poses a public safety risk.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

101. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

102. At all relevant times, Telesforo Aviles was ADT’s employee and/or agent.

103. Whenever in this Complaint it is alleged that ADT did any act or thing, it is meant 

that each of ADT’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives did such act and/or 

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that at the time such act or thing was done, it was done with the full authorization or ratification 

of ADT, or was done in the normal and routine course and scope of employment of each of ADT’s 

officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives.

104. ADT had the opportunity and duty to screen its employees, including Aviles, to 

ensure they were fit to perform the duties asked of them.

105. ADT knew or should have known Aviles was incompetent or unfit. Nonetheless, 

ADT made the reckless decision to hire and retain Aviles as a technician.

106. ADT and its agents, servants, and employees, who were at all times acting in the 

course and scope of their employment, were guilty of negligence toward Plaintiff. Defendant ADT 

is further liable for the negligent acts of their agents, servants, or employees, including Aviles, 

under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior. At all relevant times, Aviles was an agent apparent 

or ostensible agent of Defendant ADT. 

107. ADT’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ injuries 

and damages, including, but not limited to, ADT’s negligence in:

a. Failing to perform due diligence in contacting Aviles’s prior employers;

b. Failing to adequately evaluate Aviles’s mental state prior to hiring;

c. Any and all actions and omissions as may be proven at trial;

d. Negligently hiring Aviles in a position allowing him to have access to sensitive 

client information;

e. Negligently allowing Aviles to access sensitive client information when 

Defendant ADT knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that 

Aviles was unfit;

f. Negligently retaining Aviles in its employ in a position that provided him with 

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access to sensitive client information;

g. Negligently and inadequately supervising its employees;

h. Failing to create and/or enforce safety rules, polices, and procedures governing 

employee conduct regarding access to clients’ cameras and other sensitive 

information;

i. Failing to warn Plaintiff of the inappropriate and substandard hiring and 

retention, training, and supervision of their employees; and

j. Negligently allowing Aviles to accomplish the tort upon Plaintiff by the 

existence of his agency relationship with Defendant ADT.

108. These actions and omissions of ADT singularly, or in combination with others, 

proximately caused damages to Plaintiff and the Class, including mental anguish and suffering in 

the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

109. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

110. At all times herein, Aviles acted intentionally, maliciously, and without 

justification, to gain unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s private camera, potentially including video 

of Plaintiff partially or completely naked and engaging in intimate and other private activities, 

when Aviles knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress as a 

result.

111. The conduct by Aviles was intentional, malicious. and done for the purpose of 

causing, or was known by Aviles to be likely to cause, Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress, 

and was done with the wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff.

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112. Defendant ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and caution in 

and about the management, maintenance, supervision, control, and operation of its systems and 

each of their employees, agents, and independent contractors, all to the benefit of clients and 

persons like Plaintiff.

113. Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent 

contractors, was reckless in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing 

technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that Aviles made himself 

an authorized user and gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s home camera, thereby allowing 

surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken of Plaintiff in the privacy of her home.

114. Defendant ADT knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious recordings 

of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked and engaging in consensual 

intimate activity, and having private conversations, in a private home; (3) the recordings were 

taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal 

private and personal things about Plaintiff which ADT and Aviles had no right or authorization to

view, use, disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and occasions 

constitutes a substantial and outrageous violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

115. These acts were done intentionally or with a conscious and/or reckless disregard of 

Plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, such as to constitute oppression, 

fraud, or malice. ADT acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, and 

intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, to her detriment.

116. As a direct and proximate result of ADT’s aforementioned acts and omissions, 

Plaintiff suffered emotional injury, mental damage, loss, harm, anxiety, embarrassment, 

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humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress in an amount subject to proof. These damages 

are continuing in nature and will be suffered in the future.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Privacy Monitoring

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

117. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

118. Plaintiff and the Class suffered extreme invasions of their privacy in that ADT’s 

agent or agents have accessed their home security systems, including cameras in their homes. 

ADT’s agents were able to surreptitiously see and record their most intimate moments in a highly 

protected and personal space. 

119. ADT proximately caused Plaintiff’s and the Class’s privacy to be violated by 

designing and maintaining its smart home security products with obvious and significant security 

vulnerabilities, through which ADT’s employees’ surreptitious access to Plaintiff’s and the Class’s 

cameras was a predictable outcome. 

120. The invasion of privacy that Plaintiff and the Class suffered exposes them to even 

more alarming, compounding harms: if still or video recordings were made from Plaintiff’s and 

the Class’s camera feeds, they can be distributed via the Internet to yet more people. Regrettably, 

the Internet has long permitted the establishment of well-organized groups for the trading or 

posting of illicit (or even illegal) material that serves the prurient interest of that group without the 

knowledge or permission of the subjects.12 Plaintiff’s and the Class’s risk of having their private 

lives exposed on the Internet is significantly increased because of ADT’s actions.

12 Some groups operate more publicly than others, both are of concern here. E.g., FEDERAL TRADE 

COMMISSION, FTC, Nevada Obtain Order Permanently Shutting down Revenge Porn Site MyEx (June 22, 2018), 

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/06/ftc-nevada-obtain-order-permanently-shutting-downrevenge-porn/.

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121. Swift detection of the content on the Internet is necessary to contain its spread. Each 

time an image or video is sent to another person, the possibility of removing the image or even 

mitigating the spread is reduced.

122. Commercial “takedown services” are available to monitor the spread of images and 

video, and, for a greater price, will try to get them taken down. In some situations, Plaintiff and 

the Class may even need to hire counsel. Absent ADT’s actions, these services would be 

unnecessary. These services are broadly accepted as necessary because individuals cannot 

reasonably monitor the entire Internet or force individuals to take this material down. 

123. Plaintiff and the Class seek injunctive relief, requiring ADT to create a fund 

sufficient to cover the costs of commercial and/or legal services needed to remedy the invasion of 

privacy that they have suffered, including (1) monitoring for the distribution of images or video 

from their homes, (2) taking down any such media that is posted, and (3) providing any such further 

relief as the Court deems equitable and just. 

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class against Defendant Aviles)

124. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

125. Defendant Aviles intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the Sub-Class 

members’ seclusion by spying on Plaintiff and the Sub-Class in one of their most private spaces, 

their homes, and in their most intimate moments. 

126. Defendant Aviles’s spying on Plaintiff and the Sub-Class is highly offensive to a 

reasonable person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of the Sub-Class 

members and the activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.

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127. Defendant Aviles’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Sub-Class members’ 

seclusion caused Plaintiff and the Sub-Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form of 

anxiety, loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class against Defendant Aviles)

128. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

129. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act broadly prohibits intentional access to 

computer systems without authorization or in excess of authorization.

130. Plaintiff Doty is an individual and therefore a “person” under 18 U.S.C. § 

1030(e)(12).

131. The ADT Pulse system is a “protected computer” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) 

because it is used in and affects interstate or foreign commerce and communication. Specifically, 

the ADT Pulse system allows consumers to remotely access and monitor their ADT home 

security—including viewing security camera footage, opening locks, and arming or disarming the 

security system—even if the consumer is on the other side of the country or the world. The ADT 

Pulse system communicates with ADT monitoring centers located at various locations around the 

country and the consumer either via the internet or via cellular towers.

132. Defendant Aviles intentionally accessed Plaintiff Doty’s and Sub-Class members’ 

ADT Pulse security system accounts without obtaining any authorization from the customers. 

Furthermore, Defendant Aviles obtained information from the Plaintiff Doty’s and the Sub-Class 

members’ ADT Pulse security systems in the form of video recordings of their homes and any 

information showing the status of the security system, in general.

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133. As such, Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class have suffered damages as a result of 

unauthorized access to their accounts. That is, Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class now face a 

significant impairment to the integrity of data, and the ADT Pulse security system in general. 

Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class have been subjected to an unauthorized user controlling their 

ADT Pulse systems.

134. Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class have also suffered a significant loss as a result of 

unauthorized access to their accounts. Plaintiff Doty and the Sub-Class expended significant time 

and resources in responding to Aviles’s unauthorized access to their accounts.

135. Overall, Aviles’s unauthorized access to Plaintiff Doty’s and the Sub-Class 

members’ ADT Pulse systems undoubtedly poses a public safety risk.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Sub-Class against Defendant Aviles)

136. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein.

137. At all times herein, Aviles acted intentionally, maliciously, and without 

justification, to gain unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s private camera, potentially including video 

of Plaintiff partially or completely naked and engaging in intimate and other private activities, 

when Aviles knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress as a 

result.

138. The conduct by Aviles was intentional, malicious, and done for the purpose of 

causing, or was known by Aviles to be likely to cause, Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress, 

and was done with the wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff.

139. Defendant Aviles knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious recordings 

of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had a 

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reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked and engaging in consensual 

intimate activity, and having private conversations, in a private home; (3) the recordings were 

taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal 

private and personal things about Plaintiff which Aviles had no right or authorization to view, use, 

disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and occasions constitutes a 

substantial and outrageous violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

140. These acts were done intentionally or with a conscious and/or reckless disregard of 

Plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, such as to constitute oppression, 

fraud, or malice. Aviles acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, and 

intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, to her detriment.

141. As a direct and proximate result of Aviles’s aforementioned acts and omissions, 

Plaintiff suffered emotional injury, mental damage, loss, harm, anxiety, embarrassment, 

humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress in an amount subject to proof. These damages 

are continuing in nature and will be suffered in the future.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Shana Doty, individually and on behalf of the Class of similarly 

situated individuals, prays for the following relief against Defendant ADT:

A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class, and appointing her counsel as class counsel;

B. Declaring that ADT’s actions, as set out above constitute a breach of contract, 

negligence, a violation of the Texas DTPA, intrusion upon seclusion, and a violation of the CFAA;

C. Awarding damages, including statutory, exemplary, and punitive damages where 

applicable;

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D. Awarding three times Plaintiff’s and the Class’s economic damages and mental 

anguish pursuant to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(1); 

E. Awarding injunctive relief in the form of privacy monitoring;

F. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys’ 

fees;

G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 

allowable;

H. Awarding such other injunctive and declaratory relief as is necessary to protect the 

interests of Plaintiff and the Class; and

I. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

FURTHERMORE, Plaintiff Shana Doty, individually and on behalf of the Sub-Class of 

similarly situated individuals, prays for the following relief against Defendant Aviles:

J. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Sub-Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Sub-Class, and appointing her counsel as class 

counsel;

K. Declaring that Aviles’s actions, as set out above constitute intrusion upon seclusion, 

a violation of the CFAA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress;

L. Awarding damages, including statutory, exemplary, and punitive damages where 

applicable;

M. Awarding Plaintiff and the Sub-Class their reasonable litigation expenses and 

attorneys’ fees;

N. Awarding Plaintiff and the Sub-Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 

allowable;

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O. Awarding such other injunctive and declaratory relief as is necessary to protect the 

interests of Plaintiff and the Sub-Class; and

P. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted,

SHANA DOTY, individually and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated,

Dated: July 16, 2020 By: /s/ Christopher Michael Brown

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys

Jay Edelson*

jedelson@edelson.com

Benjamin H. Richman*

brichman@edelson.com

J. Eli Wade-Scott*

ewadescott@edelson.com

EDELSON PC

350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60654

Tel: 312.589.6370

Fax: 312.589.6378

Matthew R. McCarley*

mmccarley@fnlawfirm.com

Christopher Michael Brown

cbrown@fnlawfirm.com

FEARS NACHAWATI, PLLC

5473 Blair Road

Dallas, Texas 75231

Tel: 214.890.0711

Fax: 214.890.0712

Amy M. Carter*

amy@clgtrial.com

Heather V. Davis*

hdavis@clgtrial.com

CARTER LAW GROUP, P.C.

5473 Blair Rd.

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Dallas, Texas 75231

Telephone: (214) 390-4173

*Admitted via Pro Hac Vice

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