UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-22133-CIV-MARTINEZ

RYAN MAUNES MAGLANA and

FRANCES KARL BUGAYONG,

on behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

CELEBRITY CRUISES INC.

Defendant.

___________________________________/ 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendant Celebrity Cruises Inc. (“Celebrity”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, moves for the entry of an Order dismissing with prejudice Counts II and 

V of the amended complaint [DE 19], which are the only counts of the amended complaint that 

remain at issue in this action. The grounds for this motion are: 

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims Have Been Substantially Reduced.

 The claims asserted in the amended complaint have been greatly reduced both in number 

and scope. This Court compelled arbitration of the five claims that are pleaded in the amended 

complaint. DE 46. Plaintiff appealed only to the extent that the Court compelled arbitration of the 

claims for “intentional tort of false imprisonment” (Count II) and “intentional infliction of 

emotional distress” (Count V). See Maglana v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 2022 WL 3134373, at *3 

(11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2022) (“Maglana and Bugayong appeal the order compelling arbitration of the 

two intentional tort claims.”). Thus, the claims for “preliminary mandatory injunction” (Count I), 

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employment discrimination (Count III), and unpaid wages and penalty wages (Count IV) are no 

longer part of this action.

That leaves only the purported claims for false imprisonment (Count II) and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (Count V). In order to manufacture appellate issues, 

Plaintiffs narrowed those claims on appeal by “stipulat[ing] in oral argument that their tort claims 

are limited to Celebrity’s actions that took place after their termination.” Id. at *5 n.5. Thus, 

instead of what is alleged in the amended complaint, the claims for false imprisonment and IIED 

that were remanded to this Court are now limited to “the 58 days that [Plaintiffs] were confined 

on the Millennium from March 31 to May 26, 2020.” Id. at **1, 5. That is the period of time 

between (a) the day after Plaintiffs were fired for theft, and (b) the date on which the circumstances 

of the COVID-19 pandemic and global quarantine, and the United States Government’s changing 

regulations, permitted Plaintiffs to leave the ship and travel to The Philippines. 

Those claims – for intentional false imprisonment and IIED – should be dismissed with 

prejudice because they fail to state a claim. The claim for false imprisonment fails because 

Plaintiffs’ alleged detention was neither unlawful nor without legal authority, and was reasonable 

under the circumstances. The IIED claim fails for the same reasons and because it is well settled 

that being exposed to illness does not give rise to a claim for IIED.

B. The Allegations Of The Amended Complaint.

This case arises from scariest part of the COVID-19 pandemic – its onset. The strain of 

the virus that was circulating was the most virulent and deadly strain. There was no vaccine. Johns 

Hopkins was tracking worldwide deaths in the hundreds of thousands. The world shut down in an 

ultimately unsuccessful attempt to slow the virus’s spread and, particularly important here, the 

governments of the world closed their countries’ borders and locked down international travel.

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The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued a No Sail Order on March 14, 2020. 

Am. Compl., ¶29; see also 85 Fed. Reg. 16628 (March 24, 2020) (“This action was effective March 

14, 2020.”). The No Sail Order shut down cruise ship operations at U.S. ports and effectively 

prevented foreign crew members from leaving ships that were docked at U.S. ports and entering 

the country. 

Plaintiffs were working aboard Millennium, which is a cruise ship operated by Celebrity, 

when the No Sail Order was issued. Am. Compl., ¶¶2-3. Plaintiffs are citizens of The Philippines. 

Id. The ship was docked in San Diego, California beginning on March 20, 2020. Id. at ¶33. 

Plaintiffs were fired by Celebrity on March 30, 2020 because Plaintiffs stole an expensive 

bottle of liquor from the ship. Id. at ¶¶36-37; see also Maglana, 2022 WL 3134373, at *1. In 

accordance with the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Plaintiffs would 

normally have been immediately repatriated – at Plaintiffs’ expense – to The Philippines from 

California. Am. Compl. at ¶¶36-37; see also Maglana, 2022 WL 3134373, at *1. However, these 

were not normal times because the No Sail Order made it impossible for Plaintiffs to leave the ship

and enter the U.S. in order to travel to The Philippines. Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not (and, indeed, 

cannot) allege otherwise in the amended complaint. Thus, as of March 31, 2020 – which is the 

first day of the 58-day period over which Plaintiffs are suing – United States law prohibited 

Plaintiffs from leaving the ship. 

On April 23, 2020 – 23 days into the 58-day period over which Plaintiffs are suing – the 

CDC first announced that crew members on ships docked at United States ports could disembark 

their vessels and enter the U.S. in order to return home “‘if cruise lines submit a signed attestation 

stating that they have complied with requirements to safely disembark their crew members.’” Am. 

Compl. at ¶43 & p. 12 n.5 (emphasis added). 

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The attestation was required to be signed by a cruise line’s (1) President and Chief 

Executive Officer; (2) Chief Ethics and/or Compliance Officer; and (3) highest-ranking Medical 

Officer. Those cruise line executives were required to swear – subject to the imposition of personal 

criminal liability, including imprisonment, as provided in 18 U.S.C. §1001 – that each and every 

one of the cruise line’s thousands of shipboard crew would follow an exhaustive list of rules until 

each employee reached his or her house or next work-posting, including – most broadly – that each 

crew member “will have no interaction with the public during their travel home or to their new 

duty station (e.g., rental car companies, restaurants, other public areas, etc.).” The attestation 

required by the CDC is attached to this motion as Exhibit 1.

1

According to the amended complaint, the fact that the executives at Celebrity and its parent 

corporation, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., would be required to swear – subject to the imposition 

of personal criminal liability, including imprisonment – that each of the thousands of crew 

members would abide by the CDC’s rules at all times while traveling from the United States to 

their houses abroad, caused concern and gave “pause” to the executives. Am. Compl. at ¶50 & 

p.14 n.7. Nonetheless, and in the hope that the threat of criminal prosecution might be removed, 

Celebrity informed its crew on May 3, 2020, that it would sign the attestation. Id. 

Getting the foreign crew members off the ships and into the United States was only onehalf of the equation for repatriation. The other half of the equation was that – in a time when 

countries had sealed their borders in order to slow or stop the spread of COVID-19 – the crew 

members’ countries needed to agree to admit people who were coming off a cruise ship. The 

 1 The Court may consider this document and its terms in connection with this motion to dismiss 

because the amended complaint expressly refers to the document, the authorities governing 

Plaintiffs’ ability to leave the ship are central to Plaintiffs’ claims, and Plaintiffs cannot dispute 

the authenticity of the document. See, e.g., Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002); 

Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134).

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amended complaint contains absolutely no allegations regarding when The Philippines began 

permitting its citizens to reenter that country after having been aboard cruise ships. 

That is important because the CDC would not permit crew members to get off the ships to 

hand around and wait in the United States until such time as the crew members’ countries would 

admit them. Instead, the CDC required the crew members to stay on the ships until they could be 

taken directly to transportation that would take them out of the Unites States and ultimately to their 

countries. Ex. 1. Under the CDC’s rules, crew members were prohibited from staying in a hotel 

prior to boarding their transportation, prohibited from interacting with the public, and could not 

have a transportation layover exceeding 8 hours. Id.

On May 26, 2020, Plaintiffs and 200 other Filipino citizens aboard the Millennium were 

flown to The Philippines on a charter flight arranged and paid for by Celebrity. DE 10; see also 

Maglana, 2022 WL 3134373, at *2.

Against that backdrop, Plaintiffs allege that Celebrity falsely imprisoned them on the ship 

following the termination of their employment (Count II) and, in doing so, intentionally inflicted 

emotional distress upon them (Count V), because it was not until May 26, 2020 that Plaintiffs 

disembarked the ship in order to travel to The Philippines on a charter flight that was arranged and 

paid for by Celebrity. Counts II and V should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a 

claim.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Count II, For Intentional False Imprisonment, Fails To State A Claim.

Count II of the amended complaint purports to state a claim for intentional false 

imprisonment. As narrowed on appeal, Plaintiffs allege that Celebrity intentionally and falsely 

imprisoned them aboard the Millennium for the 58 days between (a) March 31, 2020, the day after 

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Plaintiffs’ employment was terminated for theft, and (b) May 26, 2020, when Plaintiffs left the 

vessel and returned to The Philippines aboard a charter flight that was arranged and paid for by 

Celebrity. Count II should be dismissed with prejudice because it fails to state a claim.

Plaintiffs allege that this claim for the intentional tort of false imprisonment “arise[s] under 

the General Maritime Law of the United States . . . .” Am. Compl. at ¶7. “General maritime law 

is ‘an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created 

rules.’” See Smolnikar v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 787 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 

2011) (quoting East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerice Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65

(1986)). In the absence of well-developed maritime law pertaining to a particular claim, courts 

incorporate “general common law principles and [] state law to the extent they do not conflict with 

federal maritime law.” See id.; see also Kantrow v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 510 F.Supp.3d 1311, 

1317 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Smolnikar, 787 F.Supp.2d at 1315) (same). Because there is no 

well-developed maritime law pertaining to false imprisonment,

2 it is appropriate to incorporate 

principles of Florida law to this claim.

Under Florida law:

To state a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must 

establish: ‘1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person 

2) against that person’s will 3) without legal authority or “color of 

authority” . . . 4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the 

circumstances.’

 2 Indeed, it is questionable whether maritime law even recognizes a claim for false imprisonment. 

See, e.g., Richards v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 118 F.Supp.2d 150, 152-53 (D.P.R. 1999)

(“[F]alse imprisonment is not the type of traditional maritime tort which general admiralty law 

embraces.”); but see Butts v. ALN Group, LLC, 512 F.Supp.3d 1301, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (“The 

Court disagrees that the tort of false imprisonment is not available under general admiralty law.”). 

Solely for the purposes of this motion, Celebrity will proceed as though maritime law recognizes 

a claim for false imprisonment.

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See Archer v. City of Winter Haven, 846 F. App’x 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Harder v. 

Edwards, 174 So.3d 524, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)) (ellipses in original); see also Anderson v. 

Ahluwalia, 587 F.Supp.3d 1179, 1191 (S.D. Fla. 2022) vacated in part on other grounds 2022 WL 

3156409 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2002) (same). “‘[A] person is not liable for false imprisonment unless 

his act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or with knowledge that such 

confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it.’” See Archer, 846 F. App’x at 765 

(quoting Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 1944)); see also Hernandez v. Metro-Dade 

County, 992 F.Supp. 1365, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (same).

Count II fails to state a cause of action for false imprisonment because, according to the 

facts alleged in the amended complaint, Plaintiffs’ “detention” was not unlawful, as required by 

the second element; was not “without legal authority,” as required by the third element; and was 

not unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances, as required by the fourth element.

Plaintiffs were fired for theft on March 30, 2020. Plaintiffs could not be sent back to The 

Philippines the next day (March 31) because, at that time, the ship was docked in California and 

the CDC’s No Sail Order prohibited Plaintiffs from disembarking the ship and entering the United 

States. Am. Compl., ¶29; see also 85 Fed. Reg. 16628 (March 24, 2020). At the threshold, then, 

it was not Celebrity that prevented Plaintiffs from leaving the ship on March 31—it was the United 

States Government’s issuance of the No Sail Order that “detained” Plaintiffs. 

Putting aside who kept Plaintiffs on the ship, Plaintiffs’ “detention” was not intentional 

false imprisonment. The No Sail Order required Plaintiffs to remain on the ship and made it 

unlawful for Plaintiffs to leave the ship, which means the “detention” was not unlawful (second 

element) or without legal authority (third element). Additionally, the fact that the No Sail Order

prohibited Plaintiffs from leaving the ship also means that Plaintiffs’ “detention” was not 

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“unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances” (third element). There was no false 

imprisonment beginning on March 31, 2020. Instead, there was a government order that made it 

impossible for Plaintiffs to disembark the ship, and required them to remain aboard.

The amended complaint alleges that on April 23, 2020 – 23 days into the 58-day period 

over which Plaintiffs are suing – the CDC first announced that foreign crew could leave their 

ships and enter the United States for the purpose of traveling directly to their homes. Am Compl., 

¶43; Ex. 1. However, even then the U.S. Government would not let a crew member simply leave 

the ship if that is what he or she wanted to do. Id. Instead, the Government required the cruise 

lines’ most senior management to swear – subject to the imposition of personal criminal liability, 

including imprisonment – that the return travel of each and every one of the thousands of crew 

members leaving the ships to travel abroad would comply with the CDC’s various rules that 

included things such as “hav[ing] no interaction with the public during their travel home or to their 

new duty station (e.g., rental car companies, restaurants, other public areas, etc.).” Ex. 1.

The amended complaint concedes that the threat of criminal prosecution caused concern 

and gave Celebrity’s executives pause because they would be agreeing to go to prison if any of the 

thousands of foreign crew violated any of the CDC’s rules. Am. Compl. at ¶50 & p.14 n.7. The

executives’ concern about swearing, subject to the imposition of personal criminal liability, that 

thousands of people would each comply with the CDC’s onerous travel requirements – which 

concern Plaintiffs seem to allege caused them to be detained beginning on April 23, 2020 – was 

not “unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances” (third element). 

The amended complaint concedes that despite that well-founded concern, Celebrity 

informed its crew on May 3, 2020 that its executives would sign the attestation in the hope that the 

threat of criminal prosecution would ultimately be withdrawn. Am. Compl. at ¶50 & p.14 n.7. 

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And, on May 26, Plaintiffs and 200 other Filipino citizens aboard the Millennium were flown to 

The Philippines on a charter flight that was arranged and paid for by Celebrity. DE 10; see also 

Maglana, 2022 WL 3134373, at *2. 

The amended complaint’s allegations regarding this period of time – from May 3, when 

Celebrity said it would sign the attestation; to May 26, when Plaintiffs left the ship to travel to The 

Philippines – are sparse, to be charitable. Am. Compl., ¶51. Plaintiffs’ position appears to be that 

it took Celebrity too long to get them to The Philippines after Celebrity agreed to sign the 

attestation, thus falsely imprisoning Plaintiffs aboard the ship. However, any such position is 

belied by the materials cited and linked in the amended complaint, which control over any contrary 

allegations in the amended complaint. See Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Simmons v. Peavey-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812, 813 (5th Cir. 

1940)) (“‘Where there is a conflict between allegations in a pleading and exhibits thereto, it is well 

settled that the exhibits control.”).

The CDC required that every flight that Plaintiffs and the other crew members would take 

to get their countries – not just the outbound flights from the United States, but also all connecting 

flights occurring entirely abroad – be private charter flights. Ex. 1. The CDC required that all

ground transportation, in the United States and abroad until the crew members reached their 

“respective homes or new duty stations,” be conducted by “industry-chartered private transport” 

or “personal vehicles (no rental cars, taxis, or ride-share services).” Ex. 1. Once a crew member’s 

journey home started, the CDC required that the crew member “will not have a transportation 

layover exceeding 8 hours.” Ex. 1. And, obviously, Plaintiffs could not be flown or otherwise 

transported to The Philippines unless and until that nation’s borders were open and Plaintiffs were 

permitted to enter. 

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That it took 23 days for Celebrity to arrange travel from California to The Philippines in 

the middle of pandemic and global quarantine – travel that was required, under penalties of 

criminal liability, to comply with the CDC’s onerous requirements – is not “unreasonable and 

unwarranted under the circumstances.” 

Count II should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for false 

imprisonment occurring between March 31 and May 26, 2020.

B. Count V, For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, Fails To State A Claim.

Count V of the amended complaint purports to state a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (IIED). Plaintiffs allege that Celebrity keeping them aboard the ship 

“unlawfully and without just cause” gives rise to a claim for IIED. Am. Compl. at ¶103. Plaintiffs’ 

purported cause of action for IIED should be dismissed with prejudice because it fails to state a 

claim.

“Courts sitting in admiralty typically look to the standards set out in the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) as well as state law to evaluate claims for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (‘IIED’).” See Wu v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2017 WL 1331712, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 

Apr. 11, 2017) (citing Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 2002)). A claim 

for IIED requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that, among other things, the defendant engaged in 

“extreme and outrageous conduct.” See id. The cause of action for IIED is “sparingly recognized” 

and “[a] plaintiff alleging IIED faces an extremely high burden . . . .” See id. “This sparse 

recognition is reflected in the [] maritime cases addressing claims of IIED.” See Kantrow v. 

Celebrity Cruises Inc., 510 F.Supp.3d 1311, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2020). “Whether conduct is 

sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to state a claim for IIED is a question of law for the Court to decide.” 

See Garcia v. Carnival Corp., 838 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2012).

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The heightened burden required for IIED claims simply is not met here. As set out more 

fully above, the CDC’s No Sail Order prohibited Plaintiffs from leaving the ship and required them 

to stay aboard. Then, the CDC changed its rules and allowed crew members to leave their ships 

and enter the United States for the sole and limited purpose of travelling directly to their countries, 

but only if Celebrity’s top executives swore – under penalty of personal criminal liability – that 

each of Celebrity’s thousands of crew members would comply with the CDC’s rules until they 

reached their homes in The Philippines). Once that window opened, Celebrity arranged the travel 

that would take Plaintiffs and the hundreds of other Filipino crew aboard the Millennium from 

California to The Philippines – in the midst of a pandemic and global quarantine – in a way that 

satisfied (a) the CDC’s logistically challenging requirements of ensuring that Plaintiffs would not 

encounter any member of the public at any time from the moment Plaintiffs and the others left the 

ship in California until they arrived at their respective houses in The Philippines, and (b) The 

Philippines’ requirements, including when it would permit the crew to return. 

Those facts – which come from the amended complaint and the materials it cites and links 

– do not come anywhere close to stating a claim for IIED, and, indeed

[a] brief survey of Florida and maritime cases addressing claims of IIED

underscores this point. See, e.g., Rubio v. Lopez, 445 Fed.Appx. at 175 

(finding failure to allege sufficient outrageous conduct where deputy sheriff 

hobble-tied arrestee on black asphalt pavement in sun, resulting in seconddegree burns to face and chest); [Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 

827, 842 (9th Cir. 2002)] (finding no outrageous conduct where crew 

member on cruise ship remarked in the plaintiff's hearing after her husband 

fell overboard that her husband was probably dead and that his body would 

be sucked under the ship, chopped up by the propellers, and would probably 

not be recovered); Garcia v. Carnival Corp., 838 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1339 

(S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.) (finding no outrageous conduct where crew 

members assaulted cruise passenger and prevented her from leaving her 

room for a period of time); [Vamper v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 14 

F.Supp.2d 1301, 1306-07 (S.D. Fla. 1998)] (finding no outrageous conduct 

where defendants fabricated reckless driving charge against plaintiff, called 

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him the “n” word, threatened him with termination, and physically struck 

him on ankle). 

See Wu, 2017 WL 1331712, at *2 (parentheticals in original) (additional internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted); see also Kantrow, 510 F.Supp.3d at 1324-25. The time that Plaintiffs spent 

on the ship after their employment was terminated does not give rise to a clam for IIED.

Two more things merit brief mention. First, the claim for IIED alleges that Plaintiffs were 

kept on the ship “unlawfully and without just cause, perpetually, without wages[,]” which added 

to their emotional distress. Am. Compl. at ¶103 (emphasis added). Whether Plaintiffs were 

required to be paid wages while they remained aboard the ship – and whether they were paid wages 

during that time – are the same issues that were raised in the claim for unpaid wages and penalty 

wages (Count IV) for which the Court compelled arbitration and that Plaintiffs did not challenge 

on appeal. Any and all wage-related issues are required to be determined in arbitration, and if 

Plaintiffs’ position is that the claim for IIED requires the determination of wage-related obligations 

arising under the collective bargaining agreement – the same agreement that contains the 

arbitration provision – then the claim for IIED must be dismissed in favor of arbitration.

Second, the claim for IIED includes allegations that because Plaintiffs were kept on the 

ship, they were “continually exposed to the pandemic3

,” which added to their emotional distress. 

Am. Compl. at ¶105. Those allegations fail to state a claim for IIED because it is well-settled that 

being exposed to illness – and even contracting illness as a result of such exposure – does not give 

rise to a claim for IIED. See, e.g., Kantrow, 510 F.Supp.3d at 1325-26 (dismissing IIED claim 

with prejudice where cruise passengers alleged they were exposed to and contracted COVID-19 

while on a cruise ship); Brown v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 2017 WL 3773709, at **1, 3 

 3 In saying that they were exposed to “the pandemic,” Plaintiffs presumably intended to say that 

they were exposed to the virus. 

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(S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2017) (granting a motion to dismiss a claim for IIED brought by a cruise 

passenger who contracted Legionnaires’ disease while onboard and “was hospitalized for seven 

days and suffered kidney disease, congestive heart failure, and pulmonary failure, among other 

things,” where the plaintiff alleged that the cruise line waited until after the cruise began to inform 

passengers of the presence of Legionnaires’ disease on the vessel and that passengers on the 

immediately preceding cruises had contracted the disease) (“While the Plaintiff’s allegations 

describe truly objectionable behavior, the allegations simply do not rise to the level of 

outrageousness required by the applicable case law.”); Negron v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 2018 WL 

3369671, at **1, 3 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2018) (granting a motion to dismiss a claim for IIED where 

the plaintiff alleged that the cruise line transported her to a local hospital where she and her family 

were exposed to Ebola after the onboard medical personnel misdiagnosed her with a heart attack) 

(“Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant’s conduct 

is not such that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as utterly intolerable 

in a civilized community. While the Plaintiffs’ allegations describe distressing events, the 

allegations simply do not rise to the level of outrageousness required by the applicable case law.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Count V, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, should be dismissed with prejudice 

because it fails to state a claim.

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III. CONCLUSION

 For these reasons, Celebrity respectfully requests the entry of an Order dismissing with 

prejudice Counts II and V of the amended complaint, which are the only counts of the amended 

complaint that remain at issue in this action. 

Respectfully submitted,

 HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3300 

 Miami, Florida 33131 

 (305) 374-8500 (telephone) 

 (305) 789-7799 (facsimile) 

 By: /s/ Scott D. Ponce 

Alex M. Gonzalez (FBN 0991200) 

alex.gonzalez@hklaw.com

Scott D. Ponce (FBN 0169528) 

sponce@hklaw.com 

HAMILTON, MILLER, & BIRTHISEL LLP

Jerry D. Hamilton (FBN 970700) 

jhamilton@hamiltonmillerlaw.com

Evan S. Gutwein (FBN 58741) 

egutwein@hamiltonmillerlaw.com

150 S.E. Second Avenue, Suite 1200 

Miami, Florida 33131 

(305) 379-3686 (telephone) 

(305) 279-3690 (facsimile) 

Attorneys for Defendant 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 25, 2023 I electronically filed this document using 

the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically serve a copy on all counsel of record. 

 By: /s/ Scott D. Ponce 

 

#181989961_v1

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