IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

IN ADMIRALTY

CASE NO.: 0:20-cv-60970-RS

IN RE THE COMPLAINT OF:

LOHENGRIN, LTD., as owner of the 2006 

M/Y Lohengrin, a 2006, 161-foot aluminum 

trideck motoryacht from Trinity Yachts,

IMO Number 8735998, for Exoneration from

or Limitation of Liability

/

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [DE 16] filed by Petitioner, 

Lohengrin, Ltd., the Response in Opposition [DE 26], filed by Respondents, Tommy Lee and TQY 

LLC (“Respondents”) and the Reply [DE 31]. On May 25, 2020, Petitioner filed a Complaint for 

exoneration or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 

30501, et seq. (See Compl. [DE 1].) On June 25, 2020, Respondents filed their answer and 

affirmative defenses, and a claim to Petitioner’s Complaint (the “Claim”) [DE 10].

1

 The Claim

consists of one single cause of action. Petitioner moves to dismiss the Claim, asserting that 

Respondents have failed to designate any specific causes of action. Respondents, however, assert 

that they only seek to bring a negligence claim under maritime law. For the reasons stated below, 

the Motion is denied. 

1 Respondent improperly titles its “claim” as a “counterclaim.” Supplemental Rule F(5) of the 

Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims does not refer to a claim in response to a 

complaint for exoneration as a “counterclaim,” but rather as a “claim.” Thus, the Court will not 

refer to Respondent’s claim as a counterclaim but as a claim. 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a vessel fire, which occurred on November 16, 2019, while the 

subject-vessel, the M/Y Lohengin, a 161-foot Trinity (the “Vessel”), was docked in the water at the 

Universal Marine Center. (See generally DE 1.) At the time of the fire, Respondents allege that 

they had many items and equipment in the water where the fire occurred. (DE 10 ¶ 8.) As a result 

of the fire, Respondents suffered a loss of approximately $424,399.80, because of the damage to 

their items and equipment. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Respondents filed a claim against Petitioner, asserting 

maritime negligence and seeking to recover monetary damages for the loss suffered as a result of 

the fire on the Vessel. 

On July 31, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On August 31, 2020, Respondent filed its Response 

in Opposition and on September 8, 2020, Petitioner filed its Reply. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Supplemental Rule F(5) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims, 

governs the claim at issue. It states: “Each claim shall specify the facts upon which the claimant 

relies in support of the claim, the items thereof, and the dates on which the same accrued.” 

Supplemental Rule F(5). Pursuant to Supplemental Rule A(2), the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure apply to Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims “except to the extent 

that they are inconsistent with [the] Supplemental Rules.” Supplemental Rule A(2). Courts have 

found that Rule 12(b)(6) is the proper standard of review governing a challenge to the sufficiency 

of a claim under Supplemental Rule F(5). See Matter of Horizon Dive Adventures, Inc. v. Sotis, 

Case No. 17-10050-Civ-King/Simonton, 2018 WL 6978636, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2018) 

(collecting cases). 

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“The appropriate standard for deciding to dismiss a claim is whether it appears beyond 

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim.” GSW, Inc. v. Long Cty., 

Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). All facts set forth in the complaint 

are to be accepted as true. Id. The Court draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal marks and citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Still, a well-pled complaint 

survives a motion to dismiss “even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of these facts is 

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556.

III. DISCUSSION 

As an initial matter, Petitioner seeks dismissal of the Claim, contending that Respondents 

have failed to designate any distinct causes of action. More specifically, Petitioner contends that 

it is unclear precisely what legal claim or claims—whether negligence or unseaworthiness—

Respondents seek to assert against Petitioner. In their response, Respondents admit that they only 

seek to assert a claim for negligence under maritime law. Thus, the Court is not inclined to dismiss 

the Complaint because although there is a single cause of action, Respondents admit that their 

claim is sounding in maritime negligence.

2

 Next, Petitioner seeks dismissal of any negligence 

claim because Respondents have failed to allege how Petitioner’s purported negligence caused the 

2 Any arguments raised by Petitioner and asserting that Respondents have failed to state a claim 

for unseaworthiness are moot because Respondents admit that they do not seek to bring a claim 

for unseaworthiness. 

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fire on the Vessel. The Court will address this argument. 

To properly plead a negligence claim, a plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the 

defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached 

that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff 

suffered actual harm. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012). Courts 

have held that the elements of maritime negligence are essentially the same as those for common 

law negligence. Id. To prove causation a plaintiff must establish both actual cause or but-for 

cause, and proximate cause. Marabella v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1229 (S.D. 

Fla. 2020) (citing Smith v. United States, 497 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 1974)). Furthermore, the 

Court notes that under admiralty law, causation is a material element of a negligence claim and 

the issue of proximate cause involves the application of law to fact, which is left to the fact finder. 

Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336. At the motion to dismiss stage, it is enough if one can reasonably 

infer actual and proximate causation for plaintiff’s injuries from defendant’s alleged negligence. 

Id. This is satisfied where a sufficiently detailed factual background of the incident is alleged 

along with allegations of the purported foreseeable causation of plaintiff’s injuries. See Franza v. 

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss 

maritime negligence claim where “[p]laintiff sufficiently pleaded a basis for proximate cause . . . 

”). 

Petitioner contends that the Claim should be dismissed because Respondent fails to allege 

facts supporting proximate cause. Taking Respondent’s allegations as true, the Court finds that 

Respondent has adequately alleged proximate cause and has stated a claim for maritime 

negligence. Specifically, the Claim alleges: 

The fire that commenced on Petitioner’s vessel, spread to the M/Y Reflection, and 

damaged and destroyed the TQY Claimants’ items and equipment, was caused by 

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the fault, neglect, actions or inactions of Petitioner, its principals or agents, by 

failing to maintain the vessel in a reasonably safe condition, by failing to properly 

maintain the vessel’s fire suppression system, by failing to have the vessel’s fire 

suppression system properly installed in the vessel, by failing to maintain the vessel 

in a seaworthy condition, by failing to exercise reasonable care in the detection, 

suppression and/or prevention of the fire onboard the vessel and/or for other reasons 

that may arise through discovery. 

As a proximate result of the neglect, fault, actions or inactions of the Petitioner 

and/or its principals or agents, fire commenced on Petitioner’s vessel, the M/Y 

Lohengrin, spread to the M/Y Reflection, moored close by, causing extensive fire 

damage to the TQY Claimants’ items and equipment in the water where the fires 

occurred, including around Petitioner’s vessel, the M/Y Lohengrin, and the M/Y 

Reflection. 

The TQY Claimants affirmatively aver that the casualty complained of and the 

alleged damages resulting therefrom were caused in whole or in part by the 

negligence of the Petitioner and/or its principals, agents or crew, and that such acts 

of negligence were within the privity and knowledge of the Petitioner and/or its 

principals or agents. 

(Id.¶¶ 12-15.)

Thus, the Court finds that the Claim sufficiently alleges a claim for maritime negligence. 

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss [DE 16] filed by Petitioner, Lohengrin, Ltd. is 

DENIED. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on 17th day of February 2021.

cc: Counsel of Record 

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