___________

No. 95-1342

___________

Mary Lou Graham, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Bill Harman, of the Joplin *

Police Department; City of *

Joplin, Missouri; David *

Niebur; Michael Talley, *

*

Appellees. *

___________ Appeals from the United States

 District Court for the 

No. 95-2124 Western District of Missouri.

___________

 [UNPUBLISHED]

Mary Lou Graham, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Bill Harman, of the Joplin *

Police Department; City of *

Joplin, Missouri; David Niebur; *

Michael Talley, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: January 26, 1996

 Filed: March 5, 1996

___________

Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM. 
 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for 1

the Western District of Missouri.

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Mary Lou Graham appeals the district court's orders granting partial 1

summary judgment for defendants in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, entering

judgment in favor of defendants following a jury trial on her supplemental

state-law claim, and denying her motion for a new trial. We affirm.

During a traffic stop conducted by a Joplin, Missouri police officer,

Graham produced an out-of-state driver's license. When the officer asked

Graham her age, she refused to tell him, and after the officer called for

back-up, she asked him if she was free to go and started her car. The

officer then grabbed Graham's keys out of the ignition, and advised her

that she was under arrest for obstruction. See Joplin, Mo., Code § 26-5

("[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and willfully

obstruct, resist, or oppose any officer of the city . . . in the discharge

of any . . . duty. . . . [P]hysical obstruction, . . . failure to fully

cooperate, etc., shall be deemed violations of this section").

Graham instituted this action asserting that her arrest was unlawful,

as she did not withhold any information that was not available on her

driver's license, and that the obstruction ordinance was overly broad and

thus facially unconstitutional. She also maintained that the Joplin Police

Department had a policy of unlawful searches and seizures, and had

insufficiently trained its officers. Finally, Graham contended that after

her arrest, she was subjected to an unlawful strip search at the city jail.

See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.193.2 (1987) (generally, no person arrested for

a non-felonious offense may be strip-searched). 

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on

Graham's section 1983 claims, concluding that the officer was entitled to

qualified immunity; rejecting Graham's challenge to the
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validity of the ordinance; and finding insufficient evidence to support her

claim that the police department had a policy of unlawful searches and

seizures, and inadequately trained its officers. The district court denied

summary judgment as to the strip-search claim, however, concluding that a

genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Graham was stripsearched. Following a trial on this claim, the jury returned a verdict for

defendants. The district court subsequently denied Graham's motion for a

new trial, in which she challenged the jury instruction delineating

Missouri's definition of a strip search. This appeal followed.

Upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court that

the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity, as he had at least

arguable probable cause to arrest Graham for violating the obstruction

ordinance. See Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989). When

Graham refused to tell the officer her age, the officer could have

reasonably believed she was failing to fully cooperate in his effort to

determine the validity of her out-of-state license. Given this initial

refusal to cooperate, Graham's subsequent act in starting her car could

have caused the officer to reasonably believe that Graham was physically

obstructing his duties by attempting to flee before he could issue her a

traffic citation. Cf. Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995)

(officers were qualifiedly immune from arrestee's false-arrest claim, as

they could have reasonably believed she obstructed governmental

administration by locking herself in automobile and attempting to start

engine with apparent intention of driving away). 

We also agree with the district court that Graham's challenge to the

validity of the obstruction ordinance fails, because the ordinance

"provide[s] reasonable notice to persons of ordinary intelligence" as to

what conduct it prohibits. United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 828 (8th

Cir. 1994). The record is void of
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any evidence supporting Graham's claim that the police department had a

policy of unlawful searches and seizures, and failed to train its officers.

Thus, we conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment on

Graham's section 1983 claims.

The jury's verdict on Graham's state law strip-search claim was

likewise proper. Contrary to Graham's contention on appeal, the testimony

of the police matron who conducted the search indicates that Graham was not

strip-searched, because the type of search described did not involve "the

removal or rearrangement of . . . clothing . . . so as to permit inspection

of the genitals, buttocks, anus, breasts, or undergarments." Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 544.193.1(2) (1987). We conclude further that the district court

accurately instructed the jury as to what constitutes a strip search by

quoting the above statutory definition, adding that it is not unlawful to

require the removal of clothing for safety purposes, cf. State v. Friend,

711 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (safety concerns support removal

of property from detainees), and omitting only irrelevant provisions of the

strip-search statute. See National Automotive Trading Corp. of China v.

Pioneer Trading Co., 46 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (jury

instructions proper where they adequately and sufficiently state generally

applicable law). Because the instruction was proper, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Graham's motion for a new trial.

See Keenan v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir. 1994)

(standard of review). 

Accordingly, we affirm.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.