Office of Compliance

Report on Occupational Safety

and Health Inspections

Conducted in the Legislative Branch during the 108th 

Congress pursuant to the Congressional 

Accountability Act

advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legislative branch

October 2005


Highlights......................................................................................1

I. Executive Summary.......................................................................3

A. Statutory Basis.....................................................................................3

B. Introduction........................................................................................3

C. 10th Anniversary of the Congressional Accountability Act................5

D. Changing Focus of the New General Counsel...................................6

E. Scope of the Report...........................................................................11

II. Safety Hazards and Compliance...............................................12

A. Emergency Evacuation......................................................................12

B. Alarm and Communication Systems.................................................18

C. Evacuation of Employees and Visitors with Disabilities...................22

D. Fire Sprinkler Systems.......................................................................26

E. Electrical Hazards..............................................................................28

III. Health Hazards and Compliance.............................................32

A. Events Involving Chemical and Biological Agents...........................32

B. Methylene Chloride...........................................................................34

C. Hazard Communication....................................................................35

D. Asbestos............................................................................................36

E. Lead..................................................................................................39

IV. Periodic Inspections...................................................................41

A. The Capitol Building.........................................................................43

B. Dirksen Senate Office Building.........................................................47

C. Hart Senate Office Building..............................................................52

D. Russell Senate Office Building..........................................................56

E. Cannon House Office Building.........................................................61

F. Longworth House Office Building.....................................................64

G. Rayburn House Office Building........................................................67

V. Requestor-Initiated Inspections................................................72

A. Contractor Compliance.....................................................................72

B. Alarms and Evacuation......................................................................75

C. Emergency Action Plans..................................................................76

D. Evacuation of Persons with Disabilities............................................77

E. Police Communications Centers.......................................................77

F. Chemical and Biological Hazards......................................................78

G. Asbestos............................................................................................78

H. Potable Water...................................................................................79

VI. Challenges and Initiatives.......................................................79

A. Increasing Awareness of Safety and Health Issues............................80

B. Advance Notification of Proposed Findings......................................80

C. Reducing Fluctuations in Biennial Inspections.................................81

D. Training Outreach.............................................................................81

E. Monitoring Abatement of Citations and Violation Findings............82

F. Self-Monitoring of Safety Conditions and Maintenance Programs..83

Table of Contents
ii advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

G. Development of Employing Office Health and Safety Programs....84

VII. Recommendations.................................................................85

A. Enforcement Authority - Temporary Restraining Orders...............85

B. Enforcement Authority - Environmental Statutes Protection..........86

C. Enforcement Authority - § 207 Retaliation Protections..................86

VIII. Inspection Methodology and Acknowledgements..............87

Staff of the Office of Compliance..................................................90

Inspection Team............................................................................90

Contact Information......................................................................91

Appendices.................................................................******************

***************...........................................***************************************

***************.......................................*******************************************

***************...............................................************************************

Appendix D.................................Guidelines for Risk Assessment Codes

Appendix E.....................................Buildings Inspected in 2004 vs 2002

Appendix F.............................Responsible Offices Comments to Report

~Note to Reader

Appendices A, B, and C are not included in this version of the Public Report 

because of their volume, and the United States Capitol Police has determined 

that significant portions contain security sensitive information. Accordingly, 

all references to Appendices A, B, and C have been redacted from the Report. 

Appendices D, E, and F are included.
iii

This page is intentionally left blank.
The Congress

ional Accountability Act (CAA) requires 

the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance (OOC) to con-

duct a comprehensive health and safety inspection of all Legisla-

tive Branch facilities at least once each Congress. The covered 

facilities encompass more than 17 million square feet, plus miles 

of steam, subway, pedestrian and other tunnels. During its 2002 

Biennial Inspection, the inspection covered approximately 50% of 

the space within these facilities. In March 2004, the new General 

Counsel initiated a far more detailed and comprehensive “baseline” 

biennial inspection than in past years in order to complete a full 

and accurate assessment of each covered facility. As a result, seven 

times as many violations were identified during the 2004 inspec-

tion as compared to the 2002 inspection. However, because of 

the greater time required to conduct more thorough inspections 

and limited inspector resources, the Office of the General Coun-

sel (OGC) was able to inspect only 25% of covered Legislative 

Branch space. Finding that the OOC 

is “facing an increasing workload 

and scarce resources,” the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), in a 2004 Report concerning OOC operations, recom-

mended that the agency “work with the Congress to develop a 

strategy to ensure that all facilities under OOC’s jurisdiction and 

located in the Capitol Hill complex and the surrounding Wash-

ington, D.C. area ... are covered as part of the biennial safety in-

spections required by the CAA.” Subsequently, Congress approved 

additional resources to enable the OGC to conduct the biennial 

inspection of all covered Legislative Branch facilities in the Wash-

ington, DC metropolitan area during the 109th Congress.

During the 108th Congress inspection cycle, the inspec-

tion team from the Office of the General Counsel developed and 

implemented a new Risk Assessment Code (RAC). The RAC sys-

tem enables the inspection team to ascertain the risks to employee 

health and safety by classifying the severity and probability of oc-

currence of the hazards identified and thus bring its risk assessment 

approach into alignment with general industry practice. This, in 

turn, helps determine priorities for their abatement. Because the 

OOC lacked an electronic storage and retrieval system for record-

ing inspection findings and monitoring employing office abate-

ment of identified hazards, Congress recently funded the OOC’s 

acquisition of a new relational database case tracking system de-

signed specifically for Legislative Branch Occupational Safety and 

Health (OSH) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in-

spections. The OOC is in the process of inputting inspection data 

from all previous inspections into the new case tracking system.

•••

Biennial OSHA Report for the 108th Congress

Highlights:
advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

While substantial progress has been made in improving 

health and safety conditions on Capitol Hill since the adoption of 

the CAA in1995, many of the most significant hazards identified 

in past Biennial Reports remain uncorrected, particularly those related to fire protection and the evacuation of facilities in the event 

of emergencies. In addition to specific hazards, the inspection 

team identified significant program deficiencies. The 108th Biennial Inspection identified 2,666 hazardous conditions of which 

approximately 1,500 were electrical, 700 were fire and emergency 

response, 200 were machinery and equipment, 80 were chemicalrelated, 40 were fall-related, and a number were associated with 

confined spaces. Moreover, many of the violations were ranked as 

RAC 1 (“imminent risk of death or life-threatening injury”) and 

RAC 2 (“probable occurrence of severe injury”). Of the hazards 

identified during the 2004 Biennial Inspection, 45 were identified 

as RAC 1 and 950 as RAC 2. This number is disproportionately 

high when compared with inspections conducted in comparable 

federal facilities by the Government Services Administration.

Following the inspection of each facility, the OGC provided a detailed description of the hazards found to the Architect 

of the Capitol and the employing offices. Unlike prior inspections, this information was provided as soon as possible after the 

completion of each building’s inspection rather than upon distribution of the Biennial Report.

 

The new approach to inspections employed in 2004 was 

also more collaborative. The OGC inspection team conducted 

periodic briefings in advance of and during the course of the inspection. Representatives of the Architect of the Capitol and of 

the employing offices ordinarily accompanied the inspection team 

and promptly corrected many hazards on the spot. As a result, the 

offices responsible for correcting violations reported that 91% of 

the hazards were abated by the end of 2004. 

The General Counsel is also responsible for conduct-

ing health and safety inspections upon the request of covered 

employees and employing offices. The number of such cases 

nearly doubled between the 106th Congress (34) and the 108th

Congress (63). The GAO noted the “increasing demands for 

safety and health inspections, and the very small number of staff 

•

•

•

•
to conduct those inspections.”1

 As a consequence, and because 

OOC safety specialists have been concentrating on conducting 

more thorough biennial inspections, the backlog of open cases 

increased from 27 to 61 between FY 2002 and FY 2004. Additional resources have been provided by Congress for FY 2006 for 

the purpose of conducting Requestor-initiated inspections.

A. Statutory Basis

The General Counsel of the Office of Compliance is required by the 

Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (the CAA or the Act) to conduct 

an inspection of all Legislative Branch facilities at least once each Congress 

in order to evaluate compliance with the occupational safety and health 

standards established by the Department of Labor. See Section 215(e)(1), 

2 U.S.C. §1341(e)(1). The General Counsel also conducts inspections, 

upon request, of specific health and safety hazards identified by employing 

offices, covered employees, and labor organizations. See Section 215(c)(1), 

2 U.S.C. §1341(c)(1). 

Following completion of the biennial inspection, the General Counsel 

is further required to report the results of the periodic inspection to the 

Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and all 

employing offices responsible for correcting violations. The Act requires that 

this Report describe any steps necessary to correct violations uncovered by 

the inspection and assess any risks to employee health and safety associated 

with any violation. See Section 215(e)(2), 2 U.S.C. §1341(e)(2). 

This Report is respectfully submitted pursuant to that mandate.

 

B. Introduction

The biennial safety and health Inspection for the 108th Congress was 

conducted in covered Legislative Branch facilities and buildings in the 

Washington D.C. area during 2004. Under the direction of the General 

Counsel, this inspection was carried out by a highly experienced health 

and safety expert detailed from the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration, assisted by health and safety contractors retained by the 

General Counsel, and student interns. Over 4 million square feet of office 

space, work centers, warehouses, workshops, storage facilities, as well as 

electrical and mechanical plants were inspected in 2004. See ************** 

1 In this regard, the GAO found that “the number of full-time staff assigned to conduct 

the actual workplace health and safety investigations [has] remained steady at a single individual, an 

OSHA workplace safety specialist assigned to OOC from the Department of Labor on a long-term 

detail, with the assistance of part-time contractors on a limited basis.” While the annual workload 

of such cases has “risen dramatically,” the General Counsel’s resources “have not kept pace with this 

growth.” 

I. Executive Summary
advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

 : OOC OSH Inspections - Buildings Inspected in 2004 and 2002. 

Approximately 30,000 employees work in covered Legislative Branch 

facilities on Capitol Hill. 

In order to provide a comprehensive picture of health and safety conditions 

in the Legislative Branch, the OGC requested at the inception of the 

2004 Biennial Inspection that employing offices provide, for inclusion 

in the Biennial Report, information concerning the progress made in 

enhancing safety and health within their respective offices since the last 

periodic inspection in 2002. This and other information made available 

to the OGC reflects that significant steps are being taken to improve 

the overall level of health and safety on Capitol Hill. Additional health 

and safety personnel have been hired by the Office of the Architect of 

the Capitol (AOC), Library of Congress (LOC), the Senate Sergeant 

at Arms, the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer of the House 

of Representatives, and the United States Capitol Police (USCP); the 

Senate Office of Emergency Preparedness conducted training seminars 

regarding OSHA and ADA safety and compliance, the avoidance of 

common hazards, and emergency evacuation procedures, including 

planning for the evacuation of staffers and visitors with disabilities; the 

House Employment Counsel reports that the Office of Emergency 

Preparedness and Operations (OEPPO) conducted training on the use 

of personal protective equipment and emergency evacuation procedures 

and developed training plans to the House Staff on evacuation procedures 

for employees and visitors with disabilities; Employee Emergency Action 

Guide revisions have been developed by the LOC; and the U.S. Capitol 

Master Plan recommendations outline proposals for complete sprinkler 

coverage, compartmentalization barriers and horizontal exits, stairwell 

enclosures, smoke control systems, and other life safety upgrades within 

the Capitol Building. 

Copies of the charts listing the 2,666 individual violations and information 

regarding the status of abatement of each violation that were prepared 

following the inspections are set forth in ** ************** of this Report. The 

abatement information contained in *************** is current as of February 

2004.2 The charts and the Draft Report were provided to all employing 

offices in order to provide an opportunity for comment prior to the formal 

2 Several employing offices have commented that more hazards have been abated than 

is reflected in the **************** charts. However, office resources and logistical considerations 

related to the drafting and printing of this Report prevented the OGC from updating charts 

with information supplied since that date. The OGC will update is newly acquired case tracking 

database as subsequent abatement information is received.
publication of this Report. All comments were carefully considered,3

 and 

appropriate changes have been incorporated into this final Report prior to 

its release. 

 

This Report has been prepared in two formats. A detailed and comprehensive 

confidential version is intended solely for release to Members of the House 

of Representatives, Members of the Senate, interested Committees, and 

senior management officials of covered employing offices. The other is a 

public version that has been screened and from which security-sensitive 

information has been redacted by the OGC and the United States Capitol 

Police. 

 

C. 10th Anniversary of the Congressional Accountability Act

January 2005 marked the 10th anniversary of the passage of the 

Congressional Accountability Act. The CAA has provided Congressional 

and Legislative Branch employees an independent and neutral process to 

resolve workplace disputes, including the correction of safety and health 

hazards and the protections of the other eleven other labor and employment 

laws extended to covered employees under the CAA. During the decade 

following the passage of the CAA, thousands of safety and health hazards 

have been identified and abated as a direct result of the periodic and 

requested inspections conducted by the Office of General Counsel. As 

Susan S. Robfogel, Chairman of the Board, Office of Compliance stated 

in her plenary remarks to the 2004 OOC Legislative Branch Health and 

Safety Conference:

Since the passage of the Act I think we can say with confidence 

that we are seeing continuing improvement in health and safety 

throughout the Legislative Branch of the Government...but 

despite the progress of which we all can be proud, there is certainly 

a lot more that has to be done.

All Legislative Branch employees and the general public have significantly 

benefitted from these actions that have resulted in safer work areas and 

public spaces. 

This Report is the fifth submitted to Congress by the OGC of the Office of 

Compliance since its inception in 1995. The first Report submitted in June 

1996 was conducted pursuant to Section 215(f ) of the CAA and served 

as an initial barometer of the Legislative Branch’s compliance with the 

safety and health standards established by Section 6 of the Occupational 

Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §654. See 2 U.S.C. §1341(f ). 

Reports of subsequent biennial inspections were prepared in 1998, 2000, 

3 Comments were provided by the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Library 

of Congress, the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives, the 

Office of House Employment Counsel, the Senate Employment Counsel, and the Government 

Accountability Office. The employing offices were also invited to submit responses to the Final 

Report. Those responses are included in Appendix F.
advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

and 2002 as mandated by Section 215(e). Each Report focused on a 

particular matter of concern – the 1998 and 2002 Reports on emergency 

preparedness and the 2000 Report on fire safety. 

In light of the tenth anniversary of the CAA, this Report addresses the 

progress that has been achieved in improving the health and safety on 

Capitol Hill as well as newly identified and prior longstanding unsafe 

conditions that remain uncorrected. As this Report documents, since the 

Office of Compliance was established in 1995, the record reflects both 

significant advances and persistent deficiencies in workplace health and 

safety within the Legislative Branch.

D. Changing Focus of the New General Counsel

The Biennial Inspection conducted during the 108th Congress was the 

most thorough examination of facilities inspected since the adoption of 

the CAA in 1995. The seven-fold increase in the number of violations 

identified during this inspection over the number found in 2002 was a 

direct result of the far more comprehensive inspection regimen initiated 

by the General Counsel in March 2004. While more time-consuming and 

resource-intensive than prior inspections, it reflects a new policy designed 

to assure full compliance with CAA mandates and recommendations 

issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its 2004 study 

of OOC operations.4

Accordingly, at the inception of the Biennial Inspection for the 108th 

Congress, the General Counsel determined that it was necessary to create 

a complete “baseline” assessment of existing health and safety conditions 

in the Legislative Branch through detailed “wall to wall” examinations 

of all covered facilities. The General Counsel also decided that the 

inspections would be more consultive with affected agencies, and that the 

inspection team would conduct periodic briefings of employing offices 

in advance of and during the course of the inspection. This resulted in 

inspections that were much more intensive and time-consuming. As a 

consequence, the OGC was unable to conduct a complete its inspection 

of all covered facilities during the 108th Congress. The OGC inspection 

team examined approximately 25% of the more than 17 million square 

feet comprising covered facilities in the Washington, DC metropolitan 

4 The GAO study (GAO-04-400) was mandated by the Consolidated Appropriations 

Resolution of 2003 Conference Report. Congress had requested GAO to “assess the overall 

effectiveness and efficiency of the Office of Compliance in fulfilling its responsibilities and role in 

achieving the overall intent and purposes of the Congressional Accountability Act.” House Report 

108-10, February 13, 2003. 
area.5

 These facilities included the Government Accountability Office, 

the United States Capitol Police Headquarters and Annex, the Botanic 

Gardens Buildings, portions of the Senate and the House (not including 

Ford) Office Buildings, excepting Member offices, Committee spaces, 

and non-AOC spaces, those portions of the Supreme Court under the 

jurisdiction of the Architect of the Capitol, and other facilities that were not 

inspected in 2002. See Appendix E: OOC OSH Inspections - Buildings 

Inspected in 2004 and 2002.

Prior inspections, while covering more square footage, were less 

comprehensive. For instance, in the 107th Congress Biennial Inspection 

in 2002, seventy-five percent of Legislative Branch facilities comprising 

about 50% of the covered square footage were inspected.6 In some of these 

facilities, only limited portions of the buildings were inspected. See 2002 

Report, Appendix D and Appendix E; see also, 2000 Report, p. 26. 7 In 

its February 2004 Report on the OOC, the GAO noted that despite the 

CAA mandate that all covered Legislative Branch facilities be inspected at 

least once each Congress, not all of the Capitol Hill campus was inspected 

during the 2002 inspection, as noted above. See “Office of Compliance: 

Status of Management Control Efforts to Improve Effectiveness”, GAO04-400, February 2004, p. 25. GAO found that the OOC faces “an 

increasing workload and scarce resources.”8 GAO further recommended 

that the OOC “work with Congress to ensure that all facilities under its 

jurisdiction and located in the Capitol Hill complex and the surrounding 

Washington, D.C. area are covered as part of the biennial safety inspections 

required by the CAA....” GAO Report, pp. 28, 31.9

5 Between 2002 and 2004 the OOC gained jurisdiction over a number of additional 

facilities that were not previously covered in the earlier inspection, including the HDU (Hazardous 

Devices Unit) facility of the United States Capitol Police, the Fort Meade Library of Congress 

(LOC) Book Storage Module No.1, and the Cheltenham Police Training Annex. 

6 In addition, Legislative Branch facilities include more than 1000 State and District 

Offices that are subject to OSH inspection coverage under the CAA. None of these facilities has 

been physically visited by OGC inspectors to conduct a biennial inspection, although where an 

inspection has been specifically requested by an employee or employing office, the OGC has obtained 

the assistance of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to conduct an 

inspection. 

7 This citation references the General Counsel’s 2000 Report on Occupational Safety and 

Health Inspections Conducted Under the Congressional Accountability Act. Unless otherwise noted, any 

references herein to an Office of General Counsel Biennial Report will be similarly cited as either the 

“1996 Report”, “1998 Report”, or “2002 Report”.

8 Other than a single OSHA detailee and limited part-time contractors, the Office of 

General Counsel presently has no additional safety and health professional employees on staff. 

9 Recently, Congress approved an increased appropriation for the OOC for FY 2006 to 

enable the OGC to conduct a biennial inspection of all covered facilities in the Washington, DC 

metropolitan area during the 109th Congress.
advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Against this backdrop, the General Counsel gave first priority to those 

facilities that were not inspected during the prior inspection cycle.10 

The OGC also developed and implemented a Risk Assessment Code 

(RAC) system to classify the severity and probability of occurrence of 

identified hazards and thus bring its assessment approach into alignment 

with industry-wide standards. See Appendix D, OOC Guidelines for Risk 

Assessment Codes (RACs). The RAC system standardizes the evaluation 

of hundreds of different conditions so that each inspector applies the 

same standards. The subjective nature of the inspection process is thereby 

minimized. Consequently, during the 108th inspection cycle, the RAC 

ratings assigned by OGC investigators to particular hazards were rarely 

challenged by the responsible employing office. 

RACs are classified in descending order of severity and need of attention. 

For example, a RAC 1 violation involves a hazard of the most serious 

nature, and requires immediate attention in that it poses an imminent risk 

of death or life-threatening injury; a RAC 2 poses a probable occurrence 

of severe injury. The new RAC system will assist employing offices in 

establishing priorities for the abatement of hazards considered to be most 

dangerous and those that require extensive planning, coordination, and 

time to correct. An added benefit of the RAC system is the ability to 

compare conditions in the Legislative Branch with those in other entities 

in the Federal Government and the private sector. 

Another recognized methodology employed to measure fire safety 

protection, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101 Life 

Safety Code worksheet, was used by the General Counsel to provide 

comparison between Legislative and Executive Branch buildings. In 

assessing overall fire safety conditions within a building, the NFPA 101 

rating assigns specific numerical values to general building conditions 

10 These included the Senate and House Page Dormitories, the Senate, House and Library 

of Congress (LOC) Day Care Centers, and the LOC National Library Service for the Blind and 

Physically Handicapped. See Appendix E to the 2004 Report. 
such as the presence or absence of preventive fire safety measures including 

sprinklers,11 fire doors, and emergency lights. If a building has enclosed 

stairwells, no penetrations through fire barriers, a code-compliant fire alarm 

system, and a fully operational and compliant sprinkler system throughout 

the building, a positive value is assessed. Conversely, if the building provides 

no, or only a partial, sprinkler system, or has openings in fire barriers, a 

negative value is assessed. The General Services Administration (GSA) 

utilizes the NFPA 101 system to rate buildings under its jurisdiction. As 

applied by GSA, a rating below “0” is considered to be unacceptable, a “-20” 

rating is “high risk”, and a “+20” is “very good”. Several of the Legislative 

Branch facilities were found to be in the “high risk” category. 

This comprehensive inspection approach yielded significant results. Within 

the same facilities inspected in 2002, the 2004 inspection identified over 

2,300 safety and health violations, compared to the 360 that were identified 

during the 2002 inspection within the same facilities.12 Furthermore, the 

OGC inspectors discovered a surprising number of the highest risk RAC 

1 and 2 violations. Health and safety inspectors routinely expect to find 

a large number of RAC 4s, a smaller number of RAC 3s, and even fewer 

RAC 2s and 1s during a typical inspection. However, the 2004 inspection 

of Legislative Branch facilities identified a relatively small number of RAC 

4 violations, with a large number of RAC 3s and 2s. 

Finally, as discussed below, it was disturbing to find that a substantial 

number of very serious violations found during the 2004 inspection 

had been previously identified in earlier biennial inspections but remain 

unabated. 

To meet its expanding challenge, the Office of General Counsel adopted 

a multi-pronged approach to identify and correct the numerous hazards 

identified during the inspection. Voluntary, collaborative means were 

utilized whenever possible, balanced with the enforcement options of 

Section 215 in order to ensure prompt compliance with the law. The 

OGC’s collaborative efforts have proved to be effective and well-received 

by the covered employing offices. In advance of the inspections, the OGC 

conducted opening conferences for employing offices to brief them on the 

scope of the inspections. In periodic meetings conducted by the OGC, 

employing offices were briefed regarding common violations identified by 

the OGC during the inspections, and were encouraged to conduct pre11 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC questioned “the specific rating values 

assigned by the [OGC] because there was no credit given for sprinkler systems in a number of many 

buildings” [sic]. In a number of inspected buildings, the sprinkler systems did not provide complete 

coverage or did not trigger the building evacuation alarm. The OGC strictly followed the NPFA 

Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety 2001. That Guide specifies the conditions under 

which, and to what extent, credit may be given to buildings that have complete, or only partial, 

coverage. Assessments that did not apply these standards would be subjective. 

12 As previously mentioned, overall, 2,666 violations were found during the 2004 inspections.
10 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

inspections of their facilities prior to the OGC inspection. The AOC 

established “Tiger Teams” – consisting of electricians, plumbers, elevator 

mechanics, etc. – to accompany OGC inspectors or to be “on call” to 

immediately abate serious hazards as they were discovered. This approach 

permitted a large number of deficiencies identified during the inspection 

process to be immediately corrected. Draft findings of identified hazards 

were issued by the OGC to the AOC and other responsible employing 

offices as each facility was inspected rather than awaiting issuance of the 

Biennial Report. As a result of these collaborative efforts, the responsible 

employing offices reported that 91% (2,433) of the 2,666 hazards identified 

during the 108th inspections have been reported as being abated as of the 

printing of this Report.13 See Footnote 2 above.

Unlike the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the General 

Counsel does not routinely issue citations with respect to each serious 

hazard identified during an inspection. OSHA officials typically issue 

numerous citations, along with proposed penalties, upon completion of 

an inspection. Reports are rarely developed that describe the inspection 

findings. By contrast, the OGC traditionally has viewed the routine 

issuance of citations as counter-productive to the goal of achieving, prompt, 

voluntary, and collaborative abatement. Instead, in the exercise of his 

prosecutorial discretion, the General Counsel has most often pursued less 

formal means of achieving abatement of identified hazards. That said, the 

relatively small number of citations issued as a result of the 108th Biennial 

Inspection should not be taken to indicate that the hazards discussed are 

insignificant or do not violate law or regulation.14 As indicated herein, 

this inspection identified a significant number of high-risk RAC 1 and 

RAC 2 violations.

After completing a Biennial or Requestor-Initiated Inspection, the OGC 

inspector prepares a memorandum to the General Counsel that discusses 

the inspector’s findings and makes recommendations for correcting 

any hazards found during the inspection. The General Counsel may 

forward the memoranda to the responsible employing office to request 

its comments and ascertain when the identified hazards will be abated. If 

voluntary compliance is not promptly initiated or other reasons require 

a more formal resolution, the General Counsel may exercise discretion 

and issue a complaint. Since 1996, the General Counsel has issued 57 

citations.

Once a citation is issued, formal procedures must be followed. Such 

processes can pretermit more informal means of achieving prompt 

13 Additional OGC initiatives are discussed in Section VI of this Report.

14 In response to the Draft Report, the LOC erroneously claims that the lack of formal 

citations equates to a finding that no violations have occurred. 
11

resolution and may foster a confrontational relationship. At times the 

complaint process can be time-consuming and drains resources away from 

both the OGC and the employing office. Moreover, the citation, unlike 

the more detailed memoranda prepared by OGC inspectors, does not 

necessarily explain the finding and how other contributing factors could 

aggravate the conditions. Finally, memoranda on inspection findings are 

easier to understand than formal citations by those who are not experts 

in the safety and health field but who may be required to participate in 

abatement efforts.

The decision to issue a formal citation or follow a more informal process 

lies within the statutory discretion of the General Counsel. The General 

Counsel has issued citations in instances where the identified hazard is 

particularly serious or creates an imminent risk to Legislative Branch 

employees or the public; when the hazard constitutes a “repeat” or similar 

or related violation of the type found in past inspections or which a 

broad, systemic remedy may be required; when an employing office fails 

to cooperate in an investigation or fails to cooperate in an investigation 

or fails to take appropriate and timely steps to correct a hazard; or when 

he determines it is otherwise necessary to effectuate the purposes of 

occupational safety and health laws. 

E. Scope of the Report

This Report is intended to summarize the general findings and issues 

identified in the OGC’s inspections. Particular emphasis is placed on 

continuing hazards that are systemic or remain uncorrected. Technical 

materials, including a detailed explanation of each violation found, the 

RAC assigned to it, the applicable safety code sections, and the status of 

abatement as reported by the responsible employing offices, are included in 

the appendices to the Report.

Parts II and III, respectively, address broad Safety Compliance and Health 

Compliance issues that were either identified during the periodic inspection 

(Section 215(e)(1) of the CAA) or raised by an employing office, employee, 

or labor organization pursuant to Section 215(c). Part IV discusses the 

results of the periodic inspection at specific Legislative Branch facilities. 

Part V summarizes specific concerns raised by requesting parties. Part VI 

outlines the initiatives already implemented and plans the General Counsel 

intends to implement in order to increase efficiency and comply with the 

recommendations contained within the GAO Report. Part VII discusses 

specific recommendations that will enhance the overall safety and health 

for the Legislative Branch, and Part VIII explains the methodology of the 

inspections and acknowledgments.
12 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

A. Emergency Evacuation

The General Counsel has reported in each Biennial Report since 1996 

that fire and suspicious package/potential bomb emergencies, both of 

which require rapid police response and potential building evacuation, 

are hazards most likely to be encountered by employees of the Legislative 

Branch. See 2002 Report, p. 22. Few hazards have the potential to 

adversely affect personal safety as much as ineffective emergency response 

and evacuation procedures or unsafe emergency routes of egress. 

The General Counsel reported in 2000 that the primary Legislative Branch 

buildings – the U.S. Capitol, the Russell, Dirksen, and Hart Senate Office 

Buildings, and the Cannon, Longworth, and Rayburn House Office 

Buildings – alone, serve as the work site for over 12,000 employees and 

are visited by thousands of visitors each day. Unfortunately, the overall 

level of fire safety remains far below that of most other office buildings 

of similar size and age. See 2000 Report, pp. 5-6. Each Report issued 

since 1996 has noted similar deficiencies in fire safety and emergency 

preparedness. Compounding the problem is the extended schedule for 

proposed abatement. The AOC has indicated that many remaining fire 

safety hazards will not be abated for many years, some as long as 2011. 

We noted in the 2002 Report that “the risk of future terrorist action 

emphasizes the importance of completing all fire and safety abatement 

projects that were initiated in more peaceful times. All apparent 

vulnerabilities – inadequate building exit capacity, inaudible alarms, missing 

fire barriers – loom much larger now as the prospect of an emergency has 

become more imminent.” 2002 Report, p. 39.

According to the U.S. Capitol Police, the potential for terrorist activity in 

and around the Capitol Hill area remains high and reinforces the need for 

safe, effective, and protected evacuation routes. As USCP Chief Terrance 

W. Gainer indicated in a prepared statement to the House Subcommittee 

on Legislative Committee on Appropriations in April 2004, 

It is human nature to be optimistic, but recent events have 

reinforced what intelligence information has told us for years, 

that terrorist organizations have the means and the methods to 

strike whenever and wherever. Intelligence and Security experts 

both inside and outside government have stated, the U.S. Capitol 

remains a primary target. It is really not a question of but when 

the United States Capitol Police will again be called to respond 

to another terrorist attack. 

Prepared Statement, Hearings, Legislative Branch Appropriations for 

2005, p. 203, April 28, 2004. See also, The 9/11 Commission Report 

(2004).

II. Safety Hazards and 

Compliance
13

Given the potential that Capitol Hill continues to be a prime target for 

terrorist attacks, it is essential that all necessary steps be taken to provide 

for the safe and prompt evacuation of employees and visitors. In prior 

reports the OGC identified serious deficiencies that significantly impact 

emergency response procedures. The 2004 inspection once again found the 

same or other serious unabated deficiencies. 

• Ineffective fire barriers 

Fire barriers serve to retard the spread of fire and smoke in order to allow 

the safe egress of employees and visitors during an emergency evacuation; 

two means of emergency egress must be provided; and emergency exits 

must not be blocked or locked. 29 C.F.R. §§1910.36 - 1910.37.15 In 

March of 2000, the General Counsel cited the AOC for exit stairwells that 

did not provide ***********************************************************************

******************************************************************************************

********************************************************* See 2000 Report, pp. 7-8. 

The five (5) citations required the AOC to install protective barriers and 

fire-rated doors around the exit stairways. 

The 2004 inspection noted some improvement in the Capitol. As 

recommended by the OGC inspectors, two exit stairways from the 

fourth to the first floors of the Capitol building were fully enclosed and 

protected. Exit capacity was enhanced by installing side-swing doors in 

place of revolving doors. However, a recent on-site inspection noted that 

the enclosure of the stairwells was compromised. In one instance the door 

latch had been disabled; in another, the door was blocked open with a brass 

stanchion.

 

However, as noted, many of the deficiencies in the House and some Senate 

Office Buildings have not been corrected by the AOC. The General 

15 Examples of inadequate fire barriers identified during the 2004 inspection include the 

following: fire barrier penetration (113); bad fire door closures (103); fire doors improperly held 

open (24); damaged or lacking fire doors (21); improper locking mechanism on fire doors (7); open 

exit stairwell (7); lack of a viable fire barrier (6). See **************: 2004 Biennial Safety & Health 

Inspections: Hazard and Abatement Tally.

Non-fire doors in a Legislative Branch 

Building offer no protection during a fire; 

doors are also held open by brass pegs allowing 

toxic smoke to flow freely.
14 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Counsel issued citations to the AOC in March 2000 for deficiencies in 

the exit stairwells of the Capitol, the Longworth, Cannon, and Rayburn 

House Office Buildings, and the Russell Senate Office Building. In 2004, 

the inspectors specifically noted that none of the door hazards in those 

buildings have been corrected. Furthermore, the buildings lack sufficient 

exit discharge capacity to allow employees and visitors to promptly and 

safely exit in the event of an emergency. Most of the pedestrian and 

subway tunnels between the buildings also lack effective fire barriers. 

As a result of fire safety inspections conducted in 2001, seven citatios 

were issued in March 2001 to the LOC and AOC for deficiencies in the 

Jefferson, Adams, and Madison Buildings. See 2002 Report, pp. 23-24. 

The AOC has made significant progress in several areas such as the repair 

of penetrations in fire walls and barriers between floors. However, similar 

to the deficiencies found in the House and Senate buildings, the OGC 

found that the stairwells in the Jefferson and Adams buildings still have not 

been properly enclosed and lack protective barriers and fire-rated doors. 

Vertical openings between book stacks create a danger from smoke and 

toxic fumes. The book conveyor system used in all three LOC buildings 

compromises the effectiveness of existing fire barriers by leaving openings 

unprotected, as well as leaving pipes, ducts, and cables unprotected and 

penetrating into exit routes and fire barriers. 

In order to gauge the reasonableness of the delays in abatement of these 

deficiencies, representatives of the General Services Administration were 

consulted. GSA monitors and maintains most facilities for Executive 

Branch agencies. With the exception of the Old Executive Office Building, 

the GSA reported that such deficiencies are no longer found in buildings 

of similar condition and age in the Executive Branch in the Washington 

DC area, and that all substandard fire barrier and exit conditions have 

been corrected. The OGC recognizes that the age and historic nature 

of Legislative Branch buildings is a substantial impediment to prompt 

abatement. Nevertheless, the AOC was issued citations in 2000 for the 

lack of enclosed stairwells. These conditions remain unabated today. 

History has demonstrated that the existence of open exit stairways presents 

a serious hazard with great potential for fire fatalities. Many Legislative 

Branch buildings such as the Capitol, Russell and Cannon buildings were 

constructed before 1911. The infamous Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire 

in 1911, which resulted in the deaths of 145 persons as a result of open 

stairways that could not retard the spread of fire and smoke, led to the 

development of standards for the construction of stairways, exits, and 

other features to prevent the loss of life in fires. The death of 84 persons 

and injury of 679 during a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, 

Nevada, in November 1980 further demonstrates the dangers of open 

stairwells and breached exits even in buildings of newer construction. 

Accordingly, Legislative Branch employees and visitors continue to remain 
15

at significant risk to exposure during a fire or toxic gas emergency because 

of these long-standing deficiencies. 

• Ineffective fire doors

Several citations have been issued by the OGC for doors that are not 

properly fire-rated. As a result of the 2004 inspection, the Government 

Accountability Office was cited for having fire doors that did not function 

properly and for not having fire-rated doors on emergency exit stairwells. 

Following issuance of this citation, the GAO abated these conditions. 

Exit stairwells with non-fire-rated doors were also found in the recently 

renovated United States Capitol Police Cheltenham Training Center 

and the Cannon and Rayburn House Office Buildings. The Longworth 

House Office Building stairwells have no doors at all and are in need 

of proper protection including fire-rated doors. The AOC was cited for 

these violations following the 2000 inspection. At that time, the AOC 

represented the installation would occur in 2004. The 2004 inspection 

revealed that this did not occur. Additionally, an emergency exit door in 

the Rayburn Building required extensive force and repeated attempts to 

open. The General Counsel issued a Notice of Serious Deficiency Needing 

Prompt Attention. The AOC repaired this deficiency and has instituted an 

inspection regimen requiring the inspection of and testing of all emergency 

exit doors.

•. Blocked stairways and exit corridors

The inspectors found that stairwells in the Supreme Court Building that 

serve as emergency exit routes for AOC employees were partially blocked 

by cardboard boxes and paper files stored within a metal file cabinet. This 

created a dual hazard - blockage and combustible materials.16 

 

Similar to others in the building, this stairway is open and does not have 

16 During the 2004 inspection, inspectors discovered 11 instances of blocked exit pathways 

and 16 instances of combustibles stored improperly in egress paths in covered inspected facilities. See 

*******************.

Combustible materials being stored in an exit 

stairwell.
16 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

fire-rated doors to create an effective fire barrier. The AOC advised the 

OGC that Supreme Court officials did not agree to AOC’s suggested 

renovation. 

Many corridors used as evacuation routes by employees in House Office 

Buildings are also partially, and in some cases nearly totally, blocked by 

furniture and other obstructions. Furniture stored in this manner is often 

left to block any path to the exit. In other instances, staff members failed 

to re-stack the furniture and clear the hallways after they had used the 

corridors as meeting rooms.

• Emergency lighting and standby power

Standby power and emergency lighting are integral to a number of safety 

systems, including safe building evacuation, shelter-in-place staging areas, 

fire alarm systems, fire pump operations, and lighted exit directional signs. 

In both its 2000 and 2002 Reports, the General Counsel urged design 

upgrades and increased standby generator capacity in the Capitol Power 

Plant. See 2000 Report, p. 12; 2002 Report, pp. 23-24. Specifically, the 

2004 inspections underscore the need to improve electrical stand-by power 

to operate fire pumps, fire alarms, public address systems, emergency 

lighting and alerting network systems, and the operation of elevators to 

evacuate employees and visitors who are mobility-impaired. Adequate 

emergency power sources will become even more critical with the opening 

of the Capitol Visitors Center to the public.17

The 2004 Inspection demonstrates that significant improvement is 

needed in the maintenance and capability of emergency lighting sources 

and standby power capacity throughout the Legislative Branch. The 

2000 Fire Safety Report issued by the General Counsel documented 

the problems of inadequate lighting. Nevertheless, thirteen locations 

were identified in this inspection as having insufficient or non-existent 

emergency exit lighting. The battery-operated lighting units in the USCP 

Headquarters Building, the K Street Garage, the E Street S.E. Garage, 

the Longworth House Office Building and the National Library Service 

for the Blind and Physically Handicapped were found to have burned-out 

lights or uncharged batteries that needed to be replaced. Due to the lack 

of adequate maintenance, emergency lighting installations were rendered 

useless for their intended purpose. 

GAO was cited for a lack of emergency lighting in 2002 when it received 

a Notice of Deficiency from the General Counsel to correct these 

deficiencies. When no progress was noted during the 2004 inspection, a 

citation was issued. The GAO has since abated these hazards.

17 The AOC reports in comments to the Draft Report that “the Library Building and 

Grounds is not included in emergency lighting or emergency power upgrade construction funding 

in the FY 2006 budget request.”
17

• Respirators

In response to a Request for Inspection filed by the USCP Fraternal Order 

of Police, the OGC continues to study the efficacy of respiratory protection 

equipment for escape and evacuation during emergency situations. An 

escape mask is intended only to be used to exit an area in the event of an 

emergency and, unlike a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA),18 it 

is not to be utilized in effecting a rescue in a contaminated environment. 

A mass procurement of the *********19 emergency escape mask was made 

for most Legislative Branch employees in 2002. After consultation with 

experts in this field, the OGC made recommendations to the USCP 

regarding training of employees in the use of such equipment which have 

been adopted. Within the last year, the Senate Sergeant at Arms has 

procured a number of **************************************************************

******. These devices have been made available to employees with mobility 

impairment and to U.S. Capitol Police Officers who are assigned to evacuate 

them during emergencies.20 Such devices are not meant to be used to 

rescue people. NIOSH, OSHA, and the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical 

Biological Center have raised concerns regarding the suitability of *********, 

and in some tests it was reported that the actual use of the model indicated 

a shorter operating time than stated by the manufacturer.21 A multi-agency 

group composed of NIOSH, OSHA and the OGC are looking into issues 

concerning the ***** and its intended use. 

The development of emergency escape respirators effective for all chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards is ongoing and major 

improvements are anticipated during the next several years. The National 

18 There are a number of SCBA models that have been approved by NIOSH. Certain 

designated USCP officers have been trained in the use of SCBA’s that were acquired by the USCP in 

2004 for use in providing emergency rescue assistance. 

19 The ********* emergency escape mask is considered by experts to be an early version of 

escape masks for areas potentially contaminated with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 

materials. The ********* lacks an exhalation valve and people with diminished lung capacities may 

experience difficulty breathing when wearing one. See “OSHA CBRN Escape Respirators Safety 

and Health Information Bulletin” (August 2003) and “NIOSH Interim Guidance” ( July 2003). After 

this was discovered, the OGC advised the USCP and training for users was modified to require the 

donning of the respirator to assure that the user can tolerate wearing it.

20 In comments provided to the Draft Report, the House Employment Counsel represents 

that   are being distributed to individuals who have voluntarily identified themselves as mobility 

impaired. Training on the use of VRUs is an ongoing process. 

21 In comments provided to the Draft Report, the Senate Employment Counsel 

disagrees with the Report’s conclusions regarding the suitability of ** *******. The SEC contends 

that ******************** have been “extensively tested” and have been purchased by all branches of 

the armed forces, many city and state police forces, the President of the U.S., and many Federal 

agencies including the ATF, CIA, FBI, Secret Service, and State Department. The OGC, however, 

is concerned about the use of this device because no tests have been conducted with respect to toxic 

industrial chemicals nor the usual range of human factors such as ease in donning the mask, duration 

of use, etc.
18 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) tests, approves, 

and establishes minimum quality standards for respirator equipment for 

use in the workplace. Other governmental entities, such as the U.S. Armed 

Forces, continue to conduct joint testing with NIOSH in search of more 

effective masks and respirators. **************************************************

****************************************************************************************

The Office of General Counsel will continue to consult with experts 

in the field and monitor new developments in the manufacture and 

use of respirators to ensure that employing offices are afforded the best 

information available. 

• Summary

As stated in the introduction to this Section on fire safety, the level of 

fire safety in Legislative Branch buildings remains far below that of 

comparable federal and private sector office buildings. According to a 

Fire Safety Engineer working with the General Services Administration, 

National Capital Region, Legislative Branch buildings “are where [other 

Washington-area Federal Buildings] were 25 years ago” in terms of overall 

fire safety. Conditions attributable to the age, historicity, and construction 

of a building cannot, of course, be abated without adequate time for 

planning and execution. Nevertheless, when the GAO was cited for a 

lack of fire doors in 2004, they abated the violations by March 31, 2005. 

Current proffers of abatement by the AOC, however, do not anticipate the 

correction of many similar hazards for many years, some not until 2011.22

B. Alarm and Communication Systems

The Life Safety Code and OSHA fire regulations require that workplace 

alarms “must be capable of being perceived above ambient noise or light 

levels” and alternatives must be made available for those employees who 

cannot otherwise recognize audible or visual alarms. 29 C.F.R. §1910.165. 

Prior Reports have identified systemic problems with Legislative Branch 

facility alarm systems, including lack of knowledge of operational steps to 

activate building-wide alarms (1998 Report, p. 17); lack of inspection and 

testing procedures (1998 Report, p. 17); failure to inspect and test alarm 

systems (2000 Report, p. 7); and the audibility quality of public address 

systems (2002 Report, p. 9-10). The 2004 inspection revealed that many 

of these deficiencies still remain.

22 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC challenges the comparison with GAO 

regarding the installation of fire doors. Although different conditions may exist in their respective 

facilities, it appears to the OGC that GAO addressed this problem with more alacrity than the 

AOC. Thus, GAO reports that it installed 14 fire doors between 2004-2005. The AOC reports that 

only one fire door was installed in the Longworth, Cannon, and Rayburn House Office and Russell 

Senate Buildings since the AOC was cited for this violation in 2000.
19

• Pre-signal sequencing

Under the Fire Code, a fire alarm system is required that activates a 

general alarm throughout the building to alert occupants of fire or other 

emergencies in Legislative Branch facilities. OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.165; 

NFPA 101 Life Safety Code 2000 Edition, §§ 39.3.4.3(a), 9.6.3.23 There 

are, however, two exceptions to this requirement. First, a positive alarm 

sequence is permitted that complies with Section 9.6.3.4; this Section, 

in turn, references NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 1999 Edition. 

NFPA 72, Section 1-5.4.11, allows a three-minute delay in the activation 

of the general alarm. Trained personnel are allowed up to 180 seconds 

to investigate and evaluate the fire condition; if the system is not reset 

by the expiration of this period, all alarms are activated immediately and 

automatically. The three-minute delay provided by the Life Safety Code is 

considered a reasonable amount of time before sounding the building-wide 

alarm in order to permit an investigation to determine whether there is a 

false alarm.24 

The second exception permits a pre-signal system in accordance with the 

Life Safety Code Section 9.6.3.3; that Section, in turn, requires that the 

initial fire alarm system be automatically transmitted without delay to a 

municipal fire department and an on-site person trained to respond to a 

fire emergency.

In December 2004, the U.S. Capitol Police Board decided to put smoke 

detector and water flow sprinkler alarms25 in pre-signal alarm status in 

the Capitol and in all Senate and House Office Buildings with alarm pull 

stations to remain in pre-alarm status in the Capitol. Alarm pull stations 

that had previously been put in pre-signal status in all Senate and House 

buildings were restored to general alarm upon activation. Accordingly, the 

AOC has reactivated pull stations in the Senate and House Office Buildings, 

23 In response to the Draft Report, the AOC challenges reliance on the Life Safety Code 

because it is not an OSHA standard. The AOC claims that the OGC is limited to enforcing OSHA 

standards. The OGC disagrees with that assessment. In the absence of specific OSHA standards, 

OSHA itself looks to “consensus” standards, such as the Life Safety Code, to be enforced through 

the “General Duty Clause”. See Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act. More specifically, in regard to 

fire safety standards, OSHA applies the Life Safety Code to interpret its own performance-oriented 

standards. 

24 The use of a pre-signal procedure was initially approved with respect to smoke detector 

devices that could be very sensitive and set off even with cigar smoke. See the NFPA 72 code, p. 

72-13 of the 1999 edition, and p. 72-15 of the 2002 edition. Typically, however, there should be no 

similar need to delay fire sprinkler water flow alarms since they are designed to activate when the 

presence of substantial heat or fire is sensed. While in the past there have been very limited occasions 

when water pressure surges may have caused water flow alarm activation in Legislative Branch 

buildings, this condition could be obviated by the installation of proper check valves to minimize 

these water surges. 

25 Water flow alarms detect the movement of water inside the sprinkler system’s pipes, 

thereby triggering an alarm signal. 
20 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

but left them on pre-signal in the Capitol. The Office of Compliance was 

not consulted concerning the foregoing changes.

Under a pre-alarm sequence, all alarm activations, whether from a smoke 

detector or water flow alarm, first show up at the fire alarm panel and 

then are directed to the USCP Police Communications Center (PCC) 

instead of triggering a general alarm. The PCC dispatches officers to 

investigate the source of the alarm to determine whether there is a need to 

sound a building-wide alarm. This process delays the initiation of several 

significant preventive measures - the closing of fire doors, the notification 

of the District of Columbia Fire Department, and, most important, the 

notification to employees and visitors through the sounding of a general 

alarm to promptly vacate the building. These delays typically exceed the 

three (3) minute delay permissible under the Fire and Safety Standards 

established by OSHA, as discussed above. The National Association of 

Fire Protection reports that fires can double in size per minute. NFPA 

Fire Protection Handbook (18th Edition), pp. 1-85 -1-86. 

The procedures followed in the House and Senate Office Buildings do 

not comply with either exception to the Fire Code requirement (discussed 

above) that a fire alarm system automatically activate a general alarm 

throughout the building to alert occupants of fire or other emergencies 

in Legislative Branch facilities. The systems do not provide a positive 

alarm sequence because the alarms are not immediately and automatically 

activated upon the expiration of 180 seconds. NFPA 72, National Fire 

Alarm Code, 1999 Edition, Section 1-5.4.11. Rather, the current procedure 

requires human intervention to activate the general building-wide alarm. 

Nor does it constitute a compliant pre-signal system since the initial fire 

alarm signal is not “automatically transmitted without delay” to the DC 

Fire Department. NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, Section 9.6.3.3.

Moreover, in practice, the use of pre-alarm procedures in the Senate 

and House Office Buildings in some instances causes increased and 

unacceptable delays in notifying building occupants of potential dangers 

and the need to evacuate. During the 2004 inspection, USCP officers 

estimated that in some Senate Office Buildings it would take up to 15-20 

minutes for them to be able to locate the smoke detector, water flow alarm, 

or pull station and ascertain whether a condition existed that warranted 

sounding a general alarm in order to evacuate the building. Given the 

larger size of the House Office Buildings, the time needed to investigate 

in those facilities could take at least as much time as that required in the 

Senate Office Buildings. 

While the restoration of pull alarms in the Senate and House Office 

Buildings to general alarm status is a positive step, the continuation of 

sprinkler water flow alarms and smoke detectors on pre-signal in the Senate 
21

and House Office Buildings is of great concern.26 The delays created by 

the pre-signal sequence pose particular dangers to employees and visitors 

with physical impairments. Because of the large crowds of visitors, many 

of whom are students and families with young children and are unfamiliar 

with exit pathways and evacuation procedures, undue delay in signaling 

the existence of a potential fire emergency appears unwarranted. This is 

particularly true given the dearth of evidence of a history of intentional 

false alarms in these facilities. 

The conditions that exist in several of these buildings bring added urgency 

to prompt notification to building occupants. The Russell Senate Office 

Building, the Longworth House Office Building, and the Capitol all are 

essentially one fire zone buildings, a structural condition that allows the 

spread of smoke and toxic gases to easily travel from one floor to another. 

There are no effective fire barriers to block or retard the growth and spread 

of fire and associated toxic gases and smoke. Employees on the upper 

floors and those who are disabled will be at the greatest risk as the heat 

from a fire will drive these gases and smoke into the top levels via open 

exit stairways and other vertical openings within these buildings. Even 

in buildings with partial fire sprinkler coverage large quantities of smoke 

and gases can be generated from a moderate sized fire; while the sprinklers 

may retard the growth of the fire they may be unable to extinguish it. The 

situation may also be exacerbated by the presence of large quantities of 

paper and other combustibles within these buildings. In sum, the earliest 

possible notification to building occupants of a potential fire emergency is 

essential if they are to have sufficient time to promptly and safely evacuate 

these facilities.

• Covered smoke detectors

The dangers associated with the pre-signal sequencing described above 

are compounded by the continuing problem of covered smoke detectors. 

The inspection team found that at least seven smoke detectors throughout 

Legislative Branch facilities were covered at some time in the past for 

construction work and the covers were not removed when the work was 

completed. These failures rendered the detectors ineffective as an early 

warning system. 

 

26 The AOC Fire Marshall has endorsed the use of the pre-signal sequence in the Capitol 

where there is a larger number of trained officers on duty to enable them to complete an investigation 

within 3-4 minutes.

Capped smoke detector.
22 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Visual alarm systems

The 2004 inspection team found that some Legislative Branch fire alarm 

systems have been modified to install visual alarm devices to aid in the 

emergency warning of the hearing-impaired as required by the Life 

Safety Code. Several buildings, including the Construction Management 

Division Building at Blue Plains, the Russell and Hart Senate Office 

Buildings Garage, and the Supreme Court Building, have not yet 

upgraded their audible alarm systems. A partial installation now exists in 

the Capitol Building.

• Lack of fire alarm systems

 

Following the 2002 inspection, the General Counsel issued a Notice 

of Deficiency to the AOC for the lack of any fire alarm system in the 

Construction Management Division Building. The 2004 inspection 

revealed that an audible-only alarm system has since been installed. The 

AOC has been advised that the lack of any alarm system in the E Street 

Garage constitutes a violation of the Life Safety Code.

The Director of the Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness 

for the LOC recently reported that an updated public address system is 

scheduled to be installed in LOC buildings by 2006. See “LOC Unveils 

Revised Evacuation Plan,” Roll Call, June 15, 2005: p. 3. 

C. Evacuation of Employees and Visitors with Disabilities

The public services and accommodations provisions of the ADA, OSHA, 

and NFPA provide equal access rights to employees and visitors with 

disabilities. See Section 210 of the CAA, 2 U.S.C. §1331.27 These rights 

relate, in part, to health and safety matters, including equal access to safe 

evacuation procedures during emergencies. Thus, if provision is made for 

the evacuation of visitors without disabilities in the event of an emergency, 

evacuation plans must also be developed to assure the prompt evacuation 

of visitors with disabilities as well. 

While there are elements in common between OSHA and ADA 

requirements with respect to the safe evacuation of both visitors and 

employees with disabilities, the following discussion focuses on Legislative 

Branch employees. 

27 The General Counsel reports to Congress on the status of compliance with these 

provisions of the ADA in a separate Biennial Report. 
23

• Emergency egress of persons with disabilities

Several deficiencies were identified during the 2004 inspection that adversely 

affect the ability of employees with mobility-impairments to safely and 

promptly evacuate Legislative Branch buildings. These deficiencies include 

the lack of fire barriers in stairwells and the absence of adequate fire-rated 

doors, pre-signal sequencing of alarm systems,28 limited accessible egress 

points, inappropriately situated staging areas, absence of accurate wall maps 

displaying emergency information, and lack of communication capabilities 

to notify the PCC of employees with disabilities requiring assistance at 

staging areas.

The lack of fire barriers and adequate fire doors poses a unique risk for 

the mobility-impaired since they frequently require longer periods to 

evacuate during an emergency evacuation, or must wait for assistance from 

co-workers or emergency responders. Therefore, any delay in sounding a 

building-wide alarm creates a substantially greater risk for these employees; 

these dangers are not merely hypothetical. Since January 2003, fifty actual 

penetrations of prohibited airspace over the Capitol and White House 

have occurred. See Submitted Testimony of Wilson Livingood, House 

Sergeant at Arms Before the Committee on House Administration, 

United States House of Representatives ( June 9, 2005). Any one of these 

penetrations could have led to an evacuation of Capitol Hill buildings such 

as that prompted during the State Funeral for former President Reagan 

and during the recent evacuation on May 11, 2005. 

Many employees with mobility impairments have the ability to move 

themselves to safety when faced with a situation requiring evacuation. 

However, several impediments to safe and prompt egress were found by 

the inspection team. One is the lack of accessible egress discharge points. 

OSHA regulations require that at least twoseparate exits must be available 

for emergency evacuation of employees. 29 C.F.R. §1910.36(b)(1). These 

routes must assure the safe evacuation of each employee. Since employees 

with disabilities, such as those in wheelchairs, may require special 

accommodation in order to safely evacuate a facility, the exit route must 

be configured to meet their particular needs. OSHA requirements for 

accessible egress routes are specified in the National Life Safety Code and 

are the same as provided in the ADA regulations.29

Deficiencies in the provision of safe evacuation routes for employees with 

disabilities were identified during the 2004 inspection. For example, ********

28 Discussion of these issues is addressed in greater detail in other Sections of this Report. 

Please see Section II.A for a discussion on stairwells and fire doors, and Section II.B regarding presignal sequencing.

29 See 29 C.F.R. §1910.35 - “an accessible means of egress should comply with the accessible 

route requirements of CABO/ANSI A 117.1, American National Standard for Accessible and Usable 

Buildings and Facilities; see also NFPA 101 Life Safety Code 2000 §A.7.5.4.1.
24 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

****************************************************************************************

*************************************************************************** A number 

of areas could be modified to create additional accessible discharge points 

from the building. ***************************************************************

***************** Another ramp on Constitution Avenue is too steep and 

does not have compliant handrails that are designed to allow employees 

in wheelchairs to grasp the handbars. This design flaw could easily create 

a backup for those attempting to escape or injury to wheelchair users in 

the event they should use this ramp as an escape route in an emergency. 

Accordingly, this exit should be posted with signage warning that the 

exit should not be used by employees in wheelchairs in the event of an 

evacuation.30 The curb cuts on the North side of the Dirksen Senate Office 

Building also are too steep and create a similar hazard for wheelchair users. 

In a recent interview with The Hill, Representative Jim Langevin of Rhode 

Island expressed concern about the lack of accessible ramps from the 

House Chambers in the Capitol Building that limits the number of exits 

for individuals who are mobility-impaired. See “People with Disabilities 

Told to Wait at Stairs in an Evacuation,” The Hill, June 1, 2005. 

The absence of wall maps is another significant impediment that may 

hinder the evacuation of employees with mobility-impairments. Wall 

maps provide necessary emergency information such as directions and 

accessible exits for an evacuation. The failure to post and communicate 

emergency exit routes was noted in the first Biennial Report issued in 

1996. See 1996 Report, p. 11. In several buildings, wall maps are available, 

but are not current. 

• Staging areas

Employees awaiting assistance to leave the building during an evacuation 

must be provided safe assembly areas until help arrives. While not 

compliant with the Life Safety Code provisions that require protected 

30 In existing facilities, the removal of structural barriers to access is required under Title 

III of the ADA when their removal is “readily achievable”. Examples of barrier removal considered 

to be “readily achievable” includes the construction of compliant curb cuts at sidewalks and 

entrances, installing ramps, widening doors, and installing accessible door hardware.
25

areas of refuge”, 31 certain assembly areas in Capitol Hill buildings 

have been designated as “staging areas” for employees with mobility-

impairments. In order to serve their intended purposes, these staging areas 

should, to the extent possible, provide protection from smoke and toxic 

gases, emergency lighting that will operate during a power outage, and 

modified communications systems that allow use by employees who are 

vision, hearing, or speaking impaired to call for assistance. See NFPA 101-

2000, Life Safety Code §7.2.12.3.4, §7.9.2.1, §7.2.12.2.5. In the Capitol 

and Longworth House Office Buildings, landings near open stairways 

have been designated as staging areas. These locations carry greater risk 

than areas that are more protected because the chimney effect of heat and 

toxic gases could rapidly overwhelm employees waiting for assistance. 

The landings also are part of the evacuation route for the vast majority of 

employees in these buildings. During an emergency the increased traffic 

could overwhelm these areas and create an additional hazard for employees 

waiting for needed assistance.

The age and design of the House and Senate Office Buildings do not afford 

many options for safe and effective staging areas. Some buildings, however, 

do have properly located staging areas. For example, the Russell Senate 

Office Building provides two designated areas - one as the primary and the 

other as the backup if the first location is compromised. They are located 

close to freight elevators that will be operated by USCP Officers with a 

key during an emergency in order to control access. However, the Russell 

staging areas still would allow smoke and toxic gases to easily rise from 

floor to floor.

• Communication systems

In order to assure safe rescue, staging areas must provide a means of 

communication so that employees with disabilities can be made aware of 

the need to evacuate or for the employees to notify emergency responders 

that they are in need of assistance. NFPA 101-2000, Life Safety Code § 

7.2.12.2.5; See also, 28 CFR Pt. 36 App. A §4.3.11.4. Communications 

systems must be within reach of those in wheelchairs and must signal the 

31 The Life Safety Code provides for “areas of refuge” as part of a required accessible means 

of egress from buildings during a fire emergency. NFPA 101-2000, Life Safety Code § 7.2.12. An 

area of refuge is defined by the Code as “a space located in a path of travel leading to a public way 

that is protected from the effects of fire, either by means of separation from other spaces in the same 

building or by virtue of location, thereby permitting a delay in egress travel from any level.” Life 

Safety Code §3.3.14(2). The Code sets forth certain requirements for an area within a building to 

constitute a Code-compliant area of refuge. See Code § 7.2.12. Because many of the buildings on 

Capitol Hill do not meet the requirements necessary to provide adequate areas of refuge, the USCP 

has designated areas within these buildings where individuals with mobility-impairments go to await 

the arrival of officers or other rescuers to assist in evacuating them as “staging areas” rather than areas 

of refuge. Most Capitol Hill buildings are not protected throughout by an approved, supervised 

automatic sprinkler system, and buildings, such as the Capitol, and the Longworth and Russell office 

buildings do not meet basic Life Safety Code requirements, such as enclosed stairwells. Accordingly, 

every effort should be made to promptly upgrade existing conditions in staging areas to meet, to the 

extent possible, the standards required for areas of refuge, and to minimize time spent in these areas 

by individuals with mobility-impairments to assure that they are evacuated as soon as possible. 
26 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

location to the responders for those employees who are unable to speak. 

Most designated staging areas currently do not provide these capabilities.

Problems of this nature are not isolated to the Legislative Branch, however. 

In a report released on April 15, 2005, the National Organization on 

Disability (NOD) noted that employees with disabilities are routinely 

left out of emergency preparedness and evacuation planning. The NOD 

also reported that nationwide only 16 percent of employers provide 

information in a format that is usable by those employees with vision 

or hearing impairments. To this end, the AOC has made some progress 

installing visual strobe alarms to accommodate the hearing-impaired, 

and the LOC is providing vibrating pagers to employees with vision and 

hearing impairments. 

• Training

Employing offices are responsible to appropriately train those individuals 

who alert and assist persons with disabilities. Specific training is needed 

in the proper operation of special equipment and how to communicate 

instructions to employees with vision and hearing impairments during an 

evacuation. Recent fire drills in the Senate Office Buildings, for example, 

have included practice in the use of freight elevators to assist in the 

evacuation of employees with disabilities. 

During an evacuation of Library of Congress buildings on May 11, 

2005 (that post-dates the 108th Congress but is indicative of problems 

identified by the OGC inspection team), employees who had volunteered 

to evacuate other employees requiring assistance were directed to evacuate 

the building ten minutes after an alarm was sounded. This action had 

the effect of stranding employees who required assistance. Union 

representatives alleged in a Request for Inspection that elevators that could 

have been used by employees with mobility-impairments for evacuation 

were taken out of service by the emergency personnel and sent to the exit 

level. This matter is currently under investigation by the OGC.

D. Fire Sprinkler Systems

Next to early warning alarms, the most important means of protecting 

the lives of Legislative Branch employees from the hazards of fire, smoke, 

and toxic gases is the presence of an effective fire sprinkler system. As 

already noted, effective systems contain a water flow alarm that detects the 

movement of water inside the system’s pipes, thereby triggering an alarm 

signal. 29 C.F.R. §1910.37(a)(4). 

• Lack of sprinkler systems

A continuing problem, mentioned by the General Counsel in the initial 
27

1996 and subsequent Reports, is that many Legislative Branch buildings 

are not protected by fire sprinkler systems. 1996 Report, pp. 11-12. The 

2004 inspection revealed significant improvements in this regard. The 

AOC has expanded fire sprinkler coverage to the Rayburn HOB, parts 

of the Capitol, and the Power Plant Administration Building, and has 

installed new fire pumps to enhance the effectiveness of existing sprinkler 

systems. However, as discussed in Section II.B. above, the inspection team 

was particularly concerned about the delays occasioned by the pre-signal 

features of the House and Senate Office Buildings water flow sprinkler and 

smoke detector alarm systems. 

In other facilities, the deficiencies are more pronounced. Sprinkler 

systems have not been installed in at least one new building, the USCP 

Cheltenham Training Center, and one existing building, the E Street 

Garage. Other buildings, such as the National Library Service for the Blind 

and Physically Handicapped, garages, and the loading dock areas have only 

partial coverage. ********************************************************************

************ Many Capitol Hill buildings have some or most of their areas 

covered by a sprinkler system. However, most still have areas that are not 

covered. To encourage building owners to install sprinkler systems, the Life 

Safety Code exempts from certain safety requirements when a building is 

fully sprinklered. For example, existing business buildings with complete 

sprinkler coverage may increase their common path of travel from 75 feet 

to 100 feet and the acceptable exit travel distance is increased to 300 feet 

rather than 200 feet. 32 Buildings that have complete sprinkler coverage are 

also exempted from having to provide areas of refuge. However, buildings 

lacking complete sprinkler coverage or basic Life Safety Code compliant 

conditions are not entitled to any of these exemptions. 

 

• Blocked sprinklers

The 2002 Report expressed concern that instances of blocked and 

obstructed sprinkler heads were found in all inspected Legislative Branch 

facilities. 2002 Report, pp. 34 - 36. While some progress has been made 

in complying with the OSHA and NFPA standards, the inspection team 

found 86 instances of obstruction and failure to maintain the required 

eighteen inches of separation between the sprinkler heads and obstructions. 

See 29 C.F.R. §1910.159(c)(10); NFPA #25, §2-2.1.2. Most of these 

obstructions provided no clearance whatsoever.

32 Most Congressional office buildings serve a dual purpose. They contain both offices and 

hearing and committee rooms. When hearings occur and large numbers of people are present, the 

fire zone within which the hearing room is located is considered an assembly area under Fire Code 

requirements. In buildings like the Longworth HOB that lack fire barriers, the entire building is 

considered to be a single fire zone. Therefore, the Longworth HOB (and other buildings used in 

the same manner) must meet the requirements for an existing assembly occupancy rather than the 

less stringent requirements for a business occupancy. The Life Safety Code requirements are more 

stringent for assembly occupancies (Section 6.1.13.2). For example, the travel distance for assembly 

occupancies decreases to 150 feet. In any event, the Longworth HOB does not meet travel distances 

for either business or assembly occupancies. 
28 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

E. Electrical Hazards

Electrical hazards have been identified by each OGC inspection team 

dating back to the initial Report in 1996. Using a more comprehensive 

approach, the 2004 inspection team tested nearly every accessible electrical 

outlet in the areas inspected. The electrical deficiencies identified were 

systemic and serious. Workplace electrical hazards are identified in the 

National Electrical Code and OSHA Regulations at 29 C.F.R. §1910.301 

et seq. Unabated electrical hazards pose a direct physical danger to 

individual employees and a general fire danger to Legislative Branch 

facilities. 

Of particular note is the fact that the General Counsel issued 17 Notices 

of Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention as a result of the 2004 

inspection. Nine of those were for electrical-related hazards. Several of 

these problem areas are discussed below.

• Electrical boxes, outlets, and switches

The inspection team identified 170 hazardous electrical boxes, outlets, 

and switches with exposed, energized wires. Many of these wires were 

within employee reach. A majority of these hazards qualified as RAC 2 

in severity requiring prompt correction. Several qualified for RAC 1 in 

severity requiring immediate attention. As discussed in the Executive 

Summary of this Report, the number of high RAC ratings is surprising. 

See Section I.D. A Notice of Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt 

Attention was issued to the AOC for an open electrical box inside a dark 

area with exposed and energized wires hanging from a low ceiling in the 

E Street Building. This hazard was promptly abated by the AOC. 

Combustible materials stored above sprinkler 

heads.
29

Hazards of this type were specifically noted in the 1998 and 2002 Reports. 

1998 Report, p. 21; 2002 Report, pp. 39-40. Many remain unabated.

• Impeded access to electrical panelboards

In the event of emergency, it is imperative that electricians and other 

authorized individuals be able to identify where electrical panels are 

located and to access them quickly. The panelboard itself must provide 

an accurate, current directory of its circuits. Earlier Reports identified 

numerous instances where access to electrical panelboards was impeded by 

the inappropriate placement of furniture. 1998 Report, p. 24. In 2004, the 

inspection team still found instances where stored materials, equipment, or 

furniture blocked the front of electrical panels. More widespread, however, 

was the finding that the circuit breaker directories in most panelboards 

were not current in identifying newly-added circuit breakers, while others 

had no directory at all. Violations of this nature were found at 123 different 

locations. Significant improvement is necessary to ensure access to the 

panelboards and to maintain the circuit directories.

• Ground fault circuit interrupters

Ground fault circuit interrupters (GFCI) protect employees from electrical 

shock hazards when working around or near wet or damp locations. 

Without a GFCI, a faulty electrical appliance could deliver a fatal shock. 

The installation of GFCIs on outlets is relatively simple and inexpensive. 

However, the 2004 inspections found that 120 locations needed the 

installation or replacement of faulty ground fault circuit interrupters. Three 

Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention Notices were issued to the 

AOC in this regard. 

Blanks missing in electrical panel exposes 

employees to live contacts.
30 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

The 2002 Report addressed the importance of installing GFCIs throuhout 

Legislative Branch buildings. The 2004 inspection revealed an overall 

increase in their number. However, the number of hazard findings indicates 

that further improvement is necessary. In particular, all employing offices 

must incorporate periodic inspection and maintenance of these important 

safety devices.

• Extension cords, power cords, and plugs

The 2004 inspection revealed a continuing practice in all inspected facilities 

that creates a significant fire hazard. A total of 450 locations were found 

to be using extension cords as permanent wiring or creating a “daisy chain” 

wherein power strips or surge protectors were linked to extend their reach 

or increase capacity.

Both of these conditions violate the National Electrical Code and OSHA 

requirements. 29 C.F.R. §1910.303 and NFPA 70-1999, §305-3. These 

Daisy chain of power strips to create additional 

outlets.

Electric outlet near sink is not a ground fault 

circuit interrupter (GFCI).
31

standards establish that extension cords may not be used as permanent 

wiring and their use may not exceed a 90-day period. According to the 

National Fire Protection Association, electrical distribution equipment, 

such as extension cords, was the second leading cause of fire deaths in the 

U.S. between 1994 and 1998, causing 91 deaths and $116 million in direct 

property damage.

Specific situations appear to lend themselves to the misuse of extension 

cords. For example, obsolete modular workstations are used in many 

areas of the USCP Headquarters Building. These workstations no longer 

contain the original electrical fixtures. Therefore, power was provided to 

these modular units by an array of extension cords. Such use of extension 

cords as permanent wiring is improper. The Government Accountability 

Office also had an excessive number of extension cord violations. Of the 

373 instances of improper use of extension cords, 137 occurred in GAO 

offices. As a result, a Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention 

Notice was issued to the GAO for its excessive use of extension cords as 

permanent wiring. GAO has since abated this deficiency and made major 

efforts towards procuring power strips and surge protectors to replace 

extension cords. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the House 

and the AOC have committed to procuring longer power strips and surge 

protectors to obviate the need to create unsafe chain extensions in other 

facilities. 

The large number of violations regarding power cords is significant. The 

2004 inspection covered only 25% of the square footage of Legislative 

Branch facilities, and did not include the offices or hearing rooms in the 

House and Senate. Violations of this nature are typically found in such 

office settings.

Similar to the problems noted with extension cords, the 2004 inspection 

team found a continuing problem with electrical powered equipment 

having damaged power cords or three-prong plugs missing the third ground 

prong. Both of these conditions create a significant risk of electrical shock. 

Most electrical devices are designed so that when a fault or short occurs, 

the current is carried back to the breaker box through the safety ground 

wire, the third prong. If the ground wire is missing, the current grounds 

through another source - typically the user of the device. One or both 

of these hazards were found in 190 pieces of electrical equipment. The 

risk from these hazards is not insignificant, but the correction is typically 

simple. In most cases where a deficiency was noted in the plug or cord, the 

employing office representative voluntarily corrected it promptly during or 

immediately after the inspection. 

• Portable space heaters

The 2004 inspection team noted a widespread problem regarding the use 

of portable space heaters in a variety of Legislative Branch buildings. Prior 
32 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Reports did not specifically address this issue. In 2004, the General 

Counsel noted 82 violations regarding the use of heaters that were either 

not certified or defective. Typically, the OGC inspection team found 

portable heaters in use under desks in close proximity to or touching paper 

files and other combustible materials. Some were found with metal sides 

rusted through, others with defective electrical cords that had been taped, 

and still others were plugged into unapproved extension cords. Several 

were found abutting melted plastic wastebaskets. 

Approved commercial portable space heaters are equipped with a “tipover” switch that shuts off electrical current to the device when it falls over, 

thereby preventing carpet and paper fires. Portable heaters without this 

feature have caused many fires in homes and businesses. For example, at 

the time of the drafting of this Report, a George Washington University 

student apartment suffered a devastating and fatal dormitory fire that was 

caused by a defective portable space heater.

• Desk fans

Prior inspection teams and Reports also did not address the appropriate 

use of smaller electrical equipment, such as portable desk fans. The use of 

small electric devices create a significant hazard in the workplace when not 

properly maintained. Many of these are older models with wide openings 

that can significantly injure the fingers and toes of employees. The 2004 

inspection team found five defective portable fans with face-guards that 

were either substandard, damaged, or removed. 33

One of the primary purposes of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is 

to limit the exposure of employees in the workplace to controllable health 

hazards. 29 C.F.R. §1910, Subpart Z (Toxic and Hazardous Substances). 

To this end, the Office of General Counsel monitors these conditions in 

its periodic inspections pursuant to Section 215(e) of the Congressional 

Accountability Act and through investigations initiated upon the written 

request of a covered employee pursuant to Section 215(c). 2 U.S.C. 

§1341(c),(e).

A. Events Involving Chemical and Biological Agents

The 2001 terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, D.C., and 

Pennsylvania brought emergency preparedness to the forefront of Capitol 

Hill and Legislative Branch realities. 2002 Report, p. 3. The threats 

posed by chemical and biological terrorism continue to pose a significant 

potential health hazard to all employees of the Legislative Branch. It is 

33 OSHA mandates that the openings in workplace fans may not exceed 1/2 inch in 

diameter or width. 29 C.F.R. §1910.212(a)(5). 

III. Health Hazards and 

Compliance
33

therefore necessary for all employing offices to achieve full compliance with 

the requirements for written procedures, training and personal protection 

equipment (PPE) established by OSHA to protect emergency responders 

and employees in the event of any incident involving the release of chemical 

and biological agents. 29 C.F.R. §1910.120(q). These requirements were 

established in 1989 by Congressional mandate. 

In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security mandated that all 

emergency responders be trained in the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS). The goal of the NIMS is to foster communication and 

coordination between separate emergency response agencies. For Capitol 

Hill, the Unified Command Group includes the United States Capitol 

Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, 

the House Sergeant at Arms, and the District of Columbia Emergency 

Preparedness Director. 

The General Counsel has issued several citations to address deficiencies 

in the actions and procedures employed by the USCP in its response to 

and procedures regarding chemical and biological incidents. The USCP 

was cited in 2002 for exposing its officers and others to potential anthrax 

contamination during the response to the anthrax incidents of 2002. See 

2002 Report, p. 12. The Report noted, however, that the OGC and the 

USCP had not reached an understanding regarding the conditions under 

which the USCP would provide information deemed to be securitysensitive by the USCP. The parties recently entered into a memorandum 

of understanding that defines the conditions under which the USCP will 

provide access to USCP information that the USCP asserts is securitysensitive. 

Four Requests for Inspection were filed in 2003 and 2004 by the USCP 

Fraternal Order of Police, on behalf of its bargaining unit members regarding 

chemical or biological emergencies. One Request alleged confusion of 

roles between the USCP and LOC Police in responding to emergencies 

of this nature. The General Counsel’s investigation outlined the apparent 

deficiencies in the coordination efforts between the two agencies. Most 

suggestions offered by the General Counsel were adopted. The most 

significant improvement resulted from an agreement between the USCP 

and LOC Police that the USCP Hazardous Devices Unit (HDU) will 

respond to any suspicious package emergencies within any LOC building.

Other Requests filed by the LOC’s FOP focused on the LOC Police’s 

response to the release of unknown chemical substances. In some incidents, 

LOC Police Officers were sent as escorts of contaminated victims to 

the health unit without protective equipment to protect them from 

contamination. In other incidents, the Police Officers were ineffective 

in controlling the spread of contamination when exposed victims left the 

contamination scene to proceed to the Health Unit without assistance or 

containment. In others, areas where suspect substances were released were 
34 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

cleaned before samples could be saved and evaluated to determine their 

nature in order to develop an appropriate response plan. 

The extent to which the USCP has made improvements for the protection 

of its officers and to its procedures for responding to such emergencies 

is presently unknown to the General Counsel. Because it views such 

information to be security sensitive, the USCP denied OGC access to 

its abatement schedules and emergency plan procedures for responding 

to chemical and biological incidents. However, as noted, the parties have 

recently agreed upon procedures whereby the USCP will provide the 

OGC with access to security sensitive documents.

B. Methylene Chloride

Methylene chloride is a volatile chemical that has been used as a stripping 

agent and industrial lubricant. Since 1998, its use has been strictly regulated 

by OSHA because of its carcinogenic nature and the knowledge that it 

causes respiratory distress, depress the nervous and cardiovascular systems, 

damage to the liver and kidneys, and eye irritation. For this reason, the 

use of and exposure to methylene chloride is subject to strict monitoring 

and exposure control requirements. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.1052. 

As part of the 1998 Report, the OGC inspection team recommended 

that the AOC and the Senate Sergeant at Arms furniture refinishing 

shops substitute non-toxic furniture strippers in place of the methylene 

chloride-based agents used at that time. See 1998 Report, p. 35. If 

methylene chloride is used, the specific procedures established by OSHA 

must be strictly followed. The AOC committed to phasing out all use of 

this chemical.

During the 2004 inspections, the inspection team found methylene 

chloride still in use in four AOC work areas and being used improperly. 

The AOC’s Construction Management Division (CMD) was found to be 

using a furniture stripper containing large amounts of methylene chloride 

for the purpose of stripping old paint and varnish from large doors. The 

OGC team identified several additional problems: employees were unaware 

of the hazardous nature of the chemical and had not been advised to wear 

protective equipment to prevent inhalation or skin absorption; the AOC 

safety manager was unaware that the chemical was being used within the 

CMD; and the ceiling exhaust vents to the ventilation system located over 

the work area resulted in the chemical vapors being pulled from the work 

table, directly past the employees’ breathing zone. 

The inspection team also found methylene chloride still being used as 

a carpet softener in the Senate AOC carpet shop and as a lubricant in 

the E Street Garage. Employees in both of these work areas were not 

aware of the serious health hazards associated with the chemical. No 

Material Data Safety Sheet (MSDS) as required by 29 C.F.R.§1910.1200 
35

was available for the methylene chloride lubricant in the E Street garage. 

Additional containers of chemicals containing 90% methylene chloride 

were found in the U.S. Capitol Building paint storage area. The Senate’s 

chemical supplier had twice been requested to send a correct MSDS; an 

incorrect one was sent on both occasions. This hazard is significant because 

the MSDS informs employees of what chemicals are present, how they 

should be handled, and what precautions to employ should a cleanup be 

required. 

The General Counsel determined that these deficiencies warranted a RAC 1 

rating requiring immediate abatement. Two Notices of Serious Deficiency 

Needing Prompt Attention were issued to the AOC. As a result, the AOC 

has represented that it removed all methylene chloride-based chemicals 

from its inventory and switched to the use of safer substitutes. 

C. Hazard Communication

The General Counsel’s inspection team found as part of the 2004 inspection 

that many work areas and employing offices throughout the Legislative 

Branch continue to use hazardous chemicals. Many of these work areas 

did not have any, and most did not have all, material safety data sheets 

required by 29 C.F.R. §1910.1200. Absent readily accessible MSDS sheets, 

employees working in these areas may not be aware of the hazards posed by 

the chemicals and the means they can and should employ to protect their 

health and physical well-being. 

The MSDS is one of the most effective and efficient preventative measures 

available to protect employees from the hazards that these chemicals pose. 

For the most part, the MSDS is available for viewing on and downloading 

from the manufacturer’s website. Under OSHA standards, an MSDS 

must provide a minimum set of information for each chemical, such as 

maximum allowable health exposure levels, the specific hazards associated 

with exposure to the chemical, and the types of protective clothing and 

equipment that should be used when handling or using the chemical. 

Typically, an MSDS recommends methods for the clean-up of releases 

or spills, as well as instructions regarding how to store and transport the 

chemical.

Both the 1996 and 1998 Reports identified serious deficiencies in 

employing offices communicating adequate information with regard to 

hazardous chemicals being used by employees. These failures were found 

to be widespread and significant. See 1996 Report, pp. 18-19; 1998 

Report, p. 33. The 1998 Report specifically criticized employing offices 

for making little improvement in the training of their employees regarding 

the identification and use of hazardous chemicals. The Report noted in 

particular that employees exposed to hazardous chemicals in the work 

environment exhibited little knowledge of the hazards of the chemicals 
36 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

they used. 1998 Report, p. 34. A citation was issued to the AOC in 

March 2000.

The current periodic inspection identified 34 documented violations of the 

requirement to communicate hazards to employees. Even where MSDS 

sheets were found, many were out of date. Such violations constitute a 

RAC 2 hazard. As discussed above, a RAC 2 hazard is one in which 

a serious illness is likely to occur, resulting in a permanent partial or 

temporary total disability injury if not promptly abated. See Appendix D, 

OOC Guidelines for Risk Assessment Codes (RACs).

The first step in abating these hazards is to assure that current MSDSs 

are made available wherever hazardous chemicals are used. Interviews 

with employing office representatives revealed that MSDS’s were typically 

not available because the representative had failed to print or update the 

current sheet. The second step is to ensure that employees are made aware 

of the existence of the MSDS and to provide training in the specific 

hazards posed by the chemicals they use. 

D. Asbestos

Most Legislative Branch buildings on Capitol Hill were constructed 

during a time when asbestos was used in construction to enhance fire 

safety. Asbestos was used in floor tiles, ceiling tiles, pipe lagging, insulation 

for large boilers, sheet rock embedded plaster, and mixed into concrete 

and flooring materials. As a consequence, materials used in buildings 

constructed during this period are presumed to contain asbestos unless 

they are sampled and proven to be free from asbestos or within permissible 

limits. 29 C.F.R. §1910.1001(b).

During the 108th Congress, the General Counsel identified a number of 

instances of non-compliance regarding the identification and control of 

asbestos and protective steps required for the removal of asbestos materials. 

Most of these instances came to the attention of the General Counsel 

as a result of employee and labor organization Requests for Inspection 

pursuant to Section 215(c) of the Congressional Accountability Act. 2 

U.S.C. §1341(c). Several others were also discovered during the periodic 

inspection.

• Identification and control of asbestos

One Request for Inspection was filed regarding deteriorating floor tiles 

in the LOC photo-duplication facility. An OGC safety and health 

inspector sampled the tiles and discovered that they were asbestos 

containing materials (ACM). Other materials in the work area were 

considered to be “presumed asbestos containing materials” (PACM) 

as defined in 29 C.F.R. §1910.1001(b). Fortunately, testing of the air 
37

samples indicated that the ambient exposures from these materials did not 

exceed permissible limits. However, the LOC and AOC were notified 

that they had failed to “exercise due diligence in informing employers and 

employees about the presence and location of asbestos containing materials 

and PACMs”. 29 C.F.R. §1910.1001(j)(2)(I). The United States Public 

Health Service Federal Occupational Health Agency under contract with 

the AOC completed a comprehensive asbestos survey throughout the 

Jefferson and Adams LOC Buildings, including the Photo-Duplication 

Shop. The Public Health Service advised AOC officials that asbestos was 

present in the tiles. This information was not provided to employees in the 

Photo-Duplication Shop.34 OSHA regulations require that such notices 

be clearly posted and specifically inform employees which materials are 

ACM or PACM. 29 C.F.R. §1910.1001(j)(2)(I), §1910.1001(j)(2)(iii).35

Employees who perform housekeeping and routine maintenance duties 

have a particularized need for this information. In this particular case, the 

employees performing these duties suspected that the tiles might contain 

asbestos and employed the only preventive measures available to them, 

such as using wet mops rather than sweeping to clean the floor.36 

As part of another employee-requested inspection, an OGC industrial 

hygienist discovered a serious health hazard in the AOC’s asbestos 

program procedures. Under the AOC’s procedures, any samples containing 

less than one percent asbestos were declared to be “asbestos free” and 

thereby exempted from the use of any special precautions during removal 

operations. OSHA has issued public notices advising that even materials 

containing less than one percent asbestos will still produce dangerous levels 

of airborne levels of asbestos fibers during certain removal operations. As 

a result, the General Counsel directed the AOC, and the AOC agreed to 

revise its program directives and retrain any employees who perform duties 

relating to or involving asbestos removal.

During periodic inspection of the hazardous materials area of the Capitol 

Building, an OGC inspector discovered an air mover fan connected to an air 

duct by a suspicious white cloth material. Analysis of the material revealed 

that the material was comprised of 100% asbestos. The inspector was 

concerned that these fibers could be released into the hazardous materials 

34 In response to the Draft Report, the AOC asserts that AOC officials provided a copy 

of the asbestos survey to LOC officials and thereby fulfilled its obligations. However, pursuant to 

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(j)(2), the AOC as a “facility owner” is specifically required to inform both 

employers and employees about the presence of ACM and PACM. 

35 In response to the Draft Report, the LOC asserts that “no fibers were detected”. Even 

if no fibers were detected, the employing office is not relieved from its obligations to minimize the 

potential exposure to employees regarding the presence of “presumed” asbestos containing materials.

36 In response to the Draft Report, the LOC asserts that its cleaning contractors were 

aware of the presence of asbestos floor tiles. However, in this case, the work was performed by LOC 

employees, not contractors.

 
38 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

area. The AOC promptly replaced the connector with a non-asbestos 

material upon notification of this condition by the General Counsel.

• Asbestos removal operations

Employees involved in construction projects are frequently concerned 

about the presence of asbestos in floor tiles that are to be removed. In 

many such situations, hazardous levels of asbestos are released when tiles 

are broken. It is not surprising, therefore, that the OGC received six 

Requests for Inspection regarding operations where material suspected 

of containing asbestos was being removed. The timely assessment of the 

presence of asbestos is necessary in order that required precautions may 

be employed. Such precautions include taking bulk samples to determine 

the level of asbestos and the use of wet methods during cleanup and High 

Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters.

One Request for Inspection arose as the result of a project to remove a false 

floor in the Cannon House Office Building. Prior to and during the first 

two days of the project, the AOC told employees that the tiles had been 

tested and did not contain asbestos. Therefore, no air samples were taken 

and no protective equipment was provided. The AOC later discovered 

that the tiles did contain asbestos. The OGC inspection report noted 

that the AOC failed to monitor the ambient level of asbestos around the 

construction site; had not established a regulated area for the work; had 

not used HEPA-equipped vacuum cleaners, had not used wet method 

removal or leak-tight containers in disposal operations; had not used 

appropriate protective equipment; and had not employed an appropriate 

level of supervision. 29 C.F.R. §1926.1101(c)(2), (e)(1), (g)(1), and 

(g)(7)(I).37 The AOC reports that this condition has been corrected. 

Additional Requests for Inspection focused on the removal of asbestos 

wall panels in the LOC Jefferson Building and Madison Building 

loading dock. The Jefferson Building complaint arose when the lack of 

communication between the AOC and LOC resulted in a failure to ensure 

that LOC employees were apprised of the status of the project.38 Specific 

violations included gaps in the records that document monitoring results, 

the physician’s written opinion, and the training of abatement workers. 

A Madison loading dock inspection Request focused on the alleged 

failure of the AOC to follow its abatement plan. In that case, the OGC 

investigation revealed that the project construction team significantly 

37 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC reports that the asbestos removal project 

has been completed and that procedures have been modified so that unsafe processes will not be 

repeated.

38 The LOC reports in comments to the Draft Report that AOC officials failed to inform 

the LOC that an asbestos removal operation was being conducted.
39

altered the abatement plan and relocated an exhaust duct to expel air inside 

of the garage rather than to the outside. That change did not conform with 

the established abatement plan.39

Inspectors from the OGC will continue to monitor these conditions 

in the Jefferson and Madison Buildings to ensure that they conform to 

the established abatement plans and regulatory requirements established 

by OSHA for the safe removal and handling of materials containing 

asbestos.

E. Lead

A number of employee Requests for Inspection pertaining to lead exposure 

were filed during the 108th Congress. The exposures arose from three 

primary sources - lead-based paints, lead particles in the Rayburn House 

Office Building, and elevated lead levels in drinking water systems in the 

three primary LOC buildings.

• Lead paint

Many Legislative Branch buildings were constructed at a time when the 

use of lead-based paint was quite common. Some older buildings have 

received multiple layers of lead-based paints. As the use of these paints 

was curtailed, many of these buildings have received additional coats of 

paint that did not contain lead. Lead paint becomes a problem when the 

paint begins to peel or blister or the paint is disturbed during renovation. 

For the most part, the AOC has implemented an effective containment 

program that seeks to contain lead at its source, such as by use of a plastic 

containment area that is kept under negative pressure during renovation 

operations. Any such containment program must comply with 29 C.F.R. 

§1926.62(e)(2) and §1910.1025. 

Frequently, flaking particles fall on desks and other work surfaces. While 

the particles are typically too large to inhale, the residue may come into 

contact with an employee’s hands and is subsequently ingested. The 

problem becomes more pronounced in cramped work areas that are 

common in older Capitol Hill buildings. In many of these buildings, 

closets and bathrooms have been converted into employee workstations. 

Under these conditions, flaking paint particles pose a more serious health 

hazard because the employee is more likely to come into physical contact 

with the particles. 

39 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC asserts that it had authority to deviate from 

the abatement plan. However, OSHA regulations require evaluations and planned control methods 

by a certified industrial hygienist or licensed professional engineer who is also qualified as a project 

designer. See 29 C.F.R. §1926.1101(g)(6)(ii). The AOC does not assert that such a professional 

approved this change in the abatement plan.
40 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

One of the older Capitol Hill buildings, the Jefferson LOC Building, 

has a similar problem - lead flaking from the walls and ceilings that 

accumulates on flat surfaces over time. The AOC has effectively addressed 

this problem by cleaning residual dust both prior to commencing and 

after completing any work project. When followed, this process allows 

the AOC to achieve acceptable sample results while facilitating a prompt 

release of space back to the LOC. Another effective preventive measure 

to minimize lead levels in office settings is simply to promptly report 

peeling paint conditions to the AOC for repair.

• Rayburn House Office Building ventilation system

In 2002, significant quantities of lead were discovered in the ventilation 

system of the Rayburn House Office Building. Several Congressional staff 

employees filed a Request for Inspection after dark particles were observed 

coming from overhead air vents. The resulting investigation continued 

through 2004 and is therefore discussed as part of this Report. A sample 

of the material collected from the employees’ desktops was sent for lead 

analysis. The results indicated that the sampled material contained over 

50% lead. Lead particles were found throughout the ventilation system, 

including the area above the desk of one of the requesting employees. 

Both large and small lead particles had become imbedded in the system. 

Particles were found, in particular, in the air mixer boxes and in the 

ventilation system where outside air is blended with inside air and recirculated. An industrial hygienist from the OGC concluded that the 

lead particles had been present in the ventilation system for some time. 

This poses a continuing risk to employees.

A comprehensive inspection was subsequently conducted by AOC 

contractors who took numerous air and wipe samples throughout other 

parts of the building.40

• Lead in drinking water

In January 2004, the Library of Congress AFSCME Professional Guild, 

Local 2910, filed several Requests for Inspection concerning low water 

pressure and poor water quality in the Adams and Jefferson LOC 

Buildings. Water samples were taken by the OGC inspection team from 

multiple locations and analyzed for lead content. The results of these 

tests indicated elevated lead levels in both buildings. Further testing by 

the LOC and AOC representatives in other LOC buildings revealed 

40 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC and House Employment Counsel state that 

these subsequent samples did not reveal levels that exceeded OSHA and HUD/EPA acceptable 

levels. However, the AOC does not deny that lead particles were present in the ventilation system. 

When disturbed, these particles can be released through the ducts and pose a potential danger to 

employees. For this reason, Dr. Laura Welch, a leading Occupational Physician and consultant to 

the OGC, recommended that the potential exposure continue to be monitored.
41

additional contaminated sites. The General Counsel issued a citation to the 

AOC on January 3, 2005, for failing to provide potable water to employees. 

See 29 C.F.R. §1910.141(b)(1). After conducting independent tests, the 

AOC abated these conditions by shutting down all drinking fountains in 

the Adams Building and specific fountains in the Jefferson, Madison, and 

other Capitol Hill Buildings that tested above the EPA limit for lead. As a 

partial remedial measure, the AOC is providing bottled water in the Adams 

Building where the fountains have been disabled. The AOC has also hired 

a consultant to study the problem and to propose a long-term solution.

Problems with elevated lead levels in the Capitol Hill drinking water 

predate the enactment of the Congressional Accountability Act. In 1992, 

the AOC shut down the drinking water system in the Dirksen Senate 

Office Building. At that time, the chiller units and water pipes connecting 

to the fountain system were ultimately replaced to achieve acceptable 

results. 

During the course of the 2004 investigation, the General Counsel’s safety 

and health specialist consulted with representatives from the General 

Services Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. GSA 

also has had to shut down drinking fountains and provide bottled water 

in some Federal buildings until the sources of elevated lead exposures 

were identified and abated. As a routine matter, the EPA advises against 

drinking from certain types of bathroom fixtures41 since those fixtures are 

not regulated and frequently contain high levels of lead.

In summary, exposure to lead is more pronounced on Capitol Hill than 

one would presume. The General Counsel recommends that ongoing 

monitoring be conducted by the AOC to minimize future exposure to the 

conditions in the Rayburn House Office Building. The present condition 

of the drinking water in the LOC buildings must be regularly monitored 

after a fix is implemented to determine that lead levels were effectively 

abated.

 

The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 requires the General Counsel 

of the Office of Compliance to conduct inspections of all Legislative 

Branch facilities at least once each Congress to enforce compliance with 

the occupational safety and health standards established by the Department 

of Labor. Section 215(e)(1), 2 U.S.C. §1341(e)(1).

Over 4.1 million square feet were inspected during the 108th Congress. 

Over twenty-six hundred (2,666) hazards and serious program deficiencies 

were identified during the inspections. As previously indicated, the number 

of hazards discovered in 2004 was more than seven times higher than the 

41 Examples of such bathroom fixtures include faucets used in utility closets, in laundry 

rooms, threaded faucets, and self closing faucets.

V. Periodic Inspections
42 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

360 identified during the 2002 inspection for the 107th Congress. The 

General Counsel attributes the difference to the comprehensive nature 

of the inspection conducted by the inspection team. As explained in the 

Executive Summary of this Report, the inspection team conducted a wallto-wall inspection in order to create a baseline of the existing health and 

safety conditions in Legislative Branch facilities. See Section I.D.

The nature of the hazards identified are serious and in some instances 

pose a significant risk to employees of the Legislative Branch. As 

previously discussed in the Executive Summary of this Report, Section 

I.D, the General Counsel implemented a risk assessment code for this 

inspection cycle based on definitions and categories established by the 

Department of Defense in order to evaluate the severity of the hazards 

encountered during the inspection. See Appendix D, Guidelines for Risk 

Assessment Codes. The RAC describes the relative risk of injury (for 

safety hazards) or illness (for health hazards) by combining the probability 

that an employee could be injured with the severity of the potential injury 

or illness. Typically RACs are scored on a scale of RAC 1 (imminent 

risk of death or life-threatening injury), RAC 2 (probable occurrence of 

severe injury), to RAC 5 (de minimis risk of injury and not imminent). 

The OGC does not collect data or report on RAC 5 findings since they 

pose little risk or hazard to employees. Using this standard, nearly 40% of 

the hazards were ranked as RAC 1 or RAC 2.

The General Counsel also utilized the same NFPA 101 rating system used 

by the GSA to evaluate the overall fire safety of other Federal Government 

buildings. As discussed in the Executive Summary above (see Section 

I.D), a rating below “0” is considered to be unacceptable, while a rating of 

“-20” is “high risk”, and a rating of “+20” is “very good”. The inspection 

team anticipated that the ratings would have a wide variance. As discussed 

below in the summary of each building, this prediction was correct. The 

inspection data revealed a “-28” rating for the Longworth House Office 

Building, which contains significant aggravating factors, such as a lack of 

protected stairwells, to a “+14” rating for the USCP Headquarters and the 

Postal Square buildings which are newer and have more safety features. 

When the inspection of each facility was completed, a chart detailing each 

hazard was prepared and provided to the responsible employing office. In 

addition to assigning a RAC code, the chart identified the locations where 

the hazards were found, the statutory or regulatory provisions that were 

violated, and what corrective actions were required to abate the hazard. 

The employing office was provided thirty days to respond regarding 

the status of abatement or anticipated abatement date, and to provide 

comments concerning the violations. The employing offices responsible 

for correcting violations reported that ninety-one percent of the hazards 

identified by the inspection team were corrected during the course of, 

or following, the inspection. Of particular note, the GAO reported that 
43

it had abated all but eleven of the 559 hazards identified in its facilities 

during the inspection. Nine of those unabated hazards are scheduled to be 

abated by December 2005, and the remaining two in FY 2006.

 

A narrative summary of the partial inspections of the United States Capitol 

Building and the Senate and House Office Buildings is detailed below.42

Other findings of the periodic inspection are detailed in ************* ****** 

********. **************, 2004 Biennial Safety and Health Inspections: Hazard 

and Abatement Tally identifies the total number of hazards found, by type, 

in each building or facility. 

A. The Capitol Building

U.S. Capitol Building

RAC 1 4

RAC 2 44

RAC 3 67

RAC 4 5

 TOTALS 120

The United States Capitol Building presents a unique challenge to the 

Architect of the Capitol and others responsible for assuring that it is 

in compliance with safety and health requirements.43 In large part, this 

challenge is due to the age, construction, high occupancy, and the need 

to preserve the historical integrity of the Capitol. Susan S. Robfogel, 

Chair of the Board of the Office of Compliance, stated in her opening 

plenary remarks to the 2004 OOC Legislative Branch Health and Safety 

Conference that:

We all have a tremendous responsibility not only to protect the safety and 

integrity and grandeur of these buildings...it’s a very difficult task to meld 

the grandeur of the buildings with the need for health and safety inside 

these buildings.

The inspection team conducted a limited inspection during the 108th 

Congress. Member offices, hearing rooms, and committee rooms were 

not inspected but will be subject to inspection during the 109th Congress. 

42 Committee spaces, Members’ offices, and non-AOC spaces were not inspected during the 

2004 inspections but were inspected in the 2002 inspections.

43 “The Architect of the Capitol shall have the care and superintendence of the Capitol....” 

“All improvements, alterations, additions, and repairs to the Capitol Building shall hereafter be made 

under the direction and under the supervision of the Architect of the Capitol.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 1812, 

1814.
44 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

A number of the hazards identified in 2004 were identified in previous 

Reports, some of which were the subject of citations, but remain 

uncorrected. The OGC team inspected approximately 24,000 of 843,000 

square feet, identifying 119 violations, of which five were ranked as RAC 

1s and 44 were ranked as RAC 2s.

• Egress

The Capitol Building was constructed long before the adoption of fire 

safety codes. Therefore, many stairways, including those that are used as 

emergency exits, are not enclosed. ********************************************

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*********************************************** The inspection team noted that 

progress has been made with the replacement of some revolving doors 

with side swing doors that enhanced egress capacity, thereby allowing 

more people to evacuate in a short time. However, that action does not 

begin to resolve the underlying deficiency in egress capacity, especially 

during peak tourist periods, such as the late spring and early summer when 

approximately eight thousand tourists tour the Capitol daily. See “Capitol 

Tour Overhaul Could Include Ending Staff-Led Visits,” Roll Call, April 

28, 2005: p. 3. Gage-Babcock also indicated in a report released on May 

17, 2000, that the Capitol Building had a deficient capacity of negative 

2076 on the first floor and negative 516 on the third floor. 

• Alarm systems

The Capitol Building’s fire alarm system operates exclusively on a 

pre-signal sequence.44 All alarm notices are forwarded to the USCP 

Communications Center (PCC). Only officers on duty at the PCC can 

activate the building-wide alarm after investigating the source of the 

alarm signal. USCP officers interviewed by the inspection team assert 

that they can investigate and respond to emergency calls within three to 

five minutes. Some of these officers, however, have never had training, 

or been recently trained, in the use off portable fire extinguishers even 

though their emergency duties include extinguishing small fires. 

The Capitol Building lacks a sufficient number of pull stations located near 

exits, alarm horns, and strobe lights. Additional horns in and around the 

Rotunda, Crypt, and National Statuary Hall were installed by the AOC 

in 2004. While this is a significant improvement, the number of signaling 

devices available is still inadequate in many parts of the building where 

ambient noise levels rise with high numbers of visitors. To accommodate 

this deficiency and to meet the needs of the hearing-impaired, the AOC 

44 See discussion in Section II.B of this Report for details regarding pre-signal sequencing. 
45

has installed visual alarms in many public places where tourists visit. None, 

however, have been installed in the office and non-public areas. 

• Fire barriers

The Capitol Building is currently considered to be one fire zone. *******

*****************************************************************************************

************************************************************* Unenclosed stairways 

pose a significant problem because of their tendency to act as chimneys in 

the event of fire. These stairways are the primary route of escape for many 

employees. ***************************************************************************

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***************************

These deficiencies prompted the General Counsel to issue a citation to 

the AOC in March 2000. Since that time, the AOC has begun to address 

this significant hazard. Fire doors have been installed in the entrance 

ways to the tunnel that leads to the Cannon House Office Building and 

the subway to the Dirksen Senate Office Building. However, hold-open 

devices that automatically close when an alarm is sounded have not been 

installed in the two East front exit stairwells. The installation of these 

devices would stop the dangerous practice of blocking these doors open. 

The Senate stairway is used as a tourist route and is blocked open by guides 

and Member staffers with a metal stanchion. On the House side, the latch 

on the first floor fire door was found to be disabled. 

Many fire doors and barriers in the Capitol still do not meet basic fire 

safety standards. The switchgear and two emergency generator rooms 

have no fire barriers. In the food service area of the basement, metal fire 

doors were installed with regular glass instead of fire-safe wire glass. This 

modification effectively negates the fire barrier qualities of the doors. Two 

other fire doors in the central corridor would not close automatically.

• Smoke detectors

Significant progress has been made in the installation of effective smoke 

detection devices within the Capitol Building. Detectors have been placed 

throughout the building in individual locations and in the return air duct 

system.

During the inspection, it was noted that a smoke detector in the AOC 

manager’s office was in alarm mode. Even though the alerting signal 

was sent to the fire alarm panel approximately fifty feet from the PCC, 

no emergency response was activated as would be expected with a presignal system. This deficiency further supports the concerns raised by the 

inspection team regarding the effectiveness of the pre-signal system and 

whether the system is inspected by the USCP. It is unknown whether this 

was an isolated problem or one that is systemic to the entire alarm system. 
46 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Fire suppression

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• Electrical hazards

Hazards of an electrical nature constituted 65 of the total 120 violations 

found in the Capitol. Many of these hazards were of a RAC 1 and 2 

level that could cause electrocution or start a fire. The General Counsel 

issued a Notice of Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention to the 

AOC on November 18, 2004, regarding a metal pedestal fan that was 

plugged into a malfunctioning ground fault circuit interruption (GFCI) 

outlet that would not trip. The floor area surrounding the fan was wet 

from water running from a nearby pipe. If the fan were to short under 

these conditions, a potentially fatal shock could electrocute an employee 

standing on the damp floor. A similar situation was discovered in a food 

preparation area. Both of these conditions were promptly corrected with 

the installation of new GFCIs by the AOC. These deficiencies underscore 

the necessity for the AOC and employing offices to regularly inspect 

GFCI electrical outlets.

• Hazard communication

The OGC inspection team discovered containers of methylene chloride 

paint stripper.45 Neither the AOC representative, nor employees using 

the material, were aware that the stripping chemical was carcinogenic. 

Problems with chemicals of this nature are largely avoided by a good 

hazard communication program and full use of the appropriate Material 

45 The risks associated with methylene chloride are discussed in this Report in Section III.

B.
47

Safety Data Sheets. A citation was issued in 2000 by the General Counsel 

to the AOC for this serious non-compliance.46

• Summary

As noted in the 2002 Report, the Capitol Building has very serious 

problems with regard to fire safety due to its lack of exit capacity, many 

open stairwells, and lack of fire doors. While progress has been made in 

some areas, the structure and frequently overcrowded conditions present a 

high risk for both employees and visitors during emergencies. The AOC 

has developed plans to correct these problems, but many of the projected 

abatement dates are more than five years in the future.

B. Dirksen Senate Office Building 47

Dirksen Senate 

Office Building

RAC/Hazard

RAC 1 4

RAC 2 102

RAC 3 82

RAC 4 5

 TOTALS 193

Inspectors from the Office of General Counsel could only conduct a limited 

inspection of the Dirksen Building within the time and resources available. 

The inspection was primarily limited to the attic area, basement and subbasement levels, and a small number of offices on the ground floor. Even 

so, a significant number of hazards were discovered in the inspected areas. 

The inspection team inspected approximately 7,000 of 706,603 square feet, 

identifying 191 violations, of which four were ranked as RAC 1 and 101 

were ranked as RAC 2. 

• Alarm systems

The OGC inspection team is also concerned about the pre-signal sequencing 

utilized by the alarm system. This concern is addressed in detail in Section 

II.B. of this Report. The primary concern in this regard is that the delays 

46 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC states that it is working to improve its hazard 

communication program and acknowledges that the OGC has identified specific deficiencies. 

47 “... [T]he Senate Office Building[s], and the employment of all services (other than for 

officers and privates of the Capitol Police) necessary for its protection, care, and occupancy, ... shall 

be under the control and supervision of the Architect of the Capitol, subject to the approval of the 

Senate Committee on Rules [and Administration] as to matters of general policy....” 2 U.S.C. §2023. 
48 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

created by the investigations far exceed the three-minute window permitted 

by the Life Safety Code and the National Fire Alarm Code. NFPA 72-

1999, § 1-5.4.11. At the time of the inspection most employees in the 

Dirksen Building, as well as AOC representatives, were unaware that pull 

station alarms were tied into the pre-signal sequence, even though most 

emergency action plans incorporate activating a pull station as a first step. 

A fire drill in the Ford House Office Building in 2004 demonstrated this 

danger. During that drill, the individual responsible for activating the 

pull station activated multiple stations because successive attempts failed 

to sound the general alarm. In an actual emergency, such confusion could 

cause further delays since the emergency responders sent to investigate 

the source of the alarm would not know which location to inspect to 

determine the extent and nature of the emergency prior to sounding the 

building-wide alarm. However, as discussed above, the USCP Board has 

since directed that these pull stations be reconnected to the main alarm. 

See Section II.B.

The inspection team also documented a significant number of capped 

smoke detectors located in the sub-basement where AOC workshops are 

located. None of the AOC employees interviewed could explain why 

this had occurred. The capping of smoke detectors prevents them from 

working and is a specific violation of OSHA regulations and the Life 

Safety Code. 29 C.F.R. §1910.164(c); NFPA 101.2000, §4.6.

• Fire doors

The inspection team documented twelve violations regarding noncompliant fire doors in the Dirksen Building. These deficiencies stemmed 

from blocking fire door exits, propping open fire doors that are designed to 

be self-closing, and self-closing doors that required maintenance in order 

to close and latch properly. A Notice of Serious Deficiency Requiring 

Immediate Attention was issued to the AOC on October 13, 2004, 

for a blocked exit off of the Senate Dining Room. The rear exit doors, 

which serve as an alternate emergency exit for large numbers of building 

occupants, were blocked in order to create a space to store paper records. 
49

The inspection team also noted that the exit signs were covered with 

cardboard and that the exit doors in an adjacent kitchen area had flooring 

materials piled against the fire door so that it could not open. These doors 

serve as an alternate exit for the kitchen staff. These hazards created a 

situation where only one exit was available from the entire dining room 

area. 

• Penetrations into fire walls

Breaches into fire walls negate the efficacy of the protection afforded by 

the barrier by allowing smoke and toxic gases to pass through the holes. 

On the positive side, the number of penetrations decreased substantially 

from the time the last comprehensive fire safety inspection was conducted 

in the Dirksen Building in 1999. However, the OGC inspection team 

discovered eight holes and penetrations in various fire walls throughout the 

building that were apparently caused by contractors installing security or 

other devices, such as cable, and then failing to fire-stop the openings when 

the project was completed. 

Exit door is blocked by combustible materials.

Holes or penetrations through fire wall.
50 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Fire suppression

Several deficiencies were noted in the Dirksen Building’s sprinkler system. 

The building itself has extensive coverage, but several areas, including 

the cafeteria, emergency generator room, and several sub-basement 

shop areas, lack any coverage. The sprinkler heads in another area, the 

Southside Sundae Shop, were found to be non-functional because they 

were located above a false ceiling. In eight other locations throughout the 

building, the sprinkler heads were found to be blocked by the storage of 

cardboard boxes and other combustible materials stored too close to the 

heads. The OSHA standards require a minimum clearance of eighteen 

inches between the sprinkler head and any other object. See 29 C.F.R. 

§1910.159(c)(10); NFPA #25, §2-2.1.2.

The kitchen of the Senate Chef is protected by an Ansul Fire Protection 

system that operates by spraying extinguishing liquids on cooking and 

grease fires. The system is effective in preventing the spread of fires that 

are difficult to extinguish. These systems must be periodically inspected 

by the manufacturer to ensure that they are operational. However, the 

inspection team noted that the system lacked current proof of inspection.

• Electrical hazards

The number of electrical hazards documented in the Dirksen Building 

is exceptionally high as compared to other buildings. Hazards of an 

electrical nature constituted 116 of the 193 total violations documented in 

the Dirksen Building. The most serious resulted in the General Counsel 

issuing a Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention Notice to the 

AOC on October 17, 2004, due to an undersink outlet lacking a ground 

fault circuit interrupter. The damp surfaces surrounding the sink area 

created a significant risk of electrical shock for employees working in this 

area. 

Missing ceiling tiles interfere with activation of 

sprinkler heads.
51

The team noted multiple instances of power strips and extension cords 

being inter-connected to create additional outlets for a work area; outlets 

requiring installation of GFCIs; broken outlets and receptacle covers; 

electrical devices with broken ground prongs; outlets with no ground 

protection; and exposed electrical contacts. In one instance, when the 

OGC inspector plugged a testing device into a regular wall outlet in the 

sub-basement, sparks flew out of the outlet, causing the circuit breaker to 

trip. When an AOC electrician examined the outlet, the contents fell out 

in pieces when the cover of the receptacle was removed. 

• Unsecured containers

Several instances of compressed gas containers and an unsecured cylinder 

containing acetylene were identified by the inspection team. The cylinder 

of acetylene was found laying on its side on a cart in a busy walkway and 

was susceptible to being bumped off of the cart. Valves of pressurized 

cylinders are easily damaged during a fall. In such case, a serious flash fire 

or explosion could occur that would be fatal to any person located nearby. 

Cylinders containing acetylene require particular care since acetylene is 

shock–sensitive and can therefore ignite without a source of ignition. As 

a result of this finding, the AOC moved and properly secured the cylinder.

Outlet below sink without GFCI protection.

Contents of electrical outlet that fell out in pieces 

during inspection.
52 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

C. Hart Senate Office Building

Hart Senate 

Office Building

RAC/Hazard

RAC 1 1

RAC 2 63

RAC 3 55

RAC 4 8

TOTALS 127

Only a limited inspection was conducted of the Hart Senate Office 

Building. The inspection team inspected approximately 95,000 of 

1,094,805 square feet, identifying 125 hazards, of which one was ranked 

as RAC 1 and 62 were ranked as RAC 2. 

• Chemical hazards

As previously noted, methylene chloride is a volatile chemical that has 

been used as a stripping agent and industrial lubricant. See Section III.

B. Since 1998, its use has been strictly regulated by OSHA because of 

its carcinogenic nature. Methylene chloride causes respiratory distress, 

depresses the nervous and cardiovascular systems, damages the liver and 

kidneys, and causes eye irritation. For this reason, the use of and exposure 

to methylene chloride is subjected to strict monitoring and exposure 

control requirements. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.1052. 

In its 1998 Report, the OGC inspection team recommended that nontoxic agents be used in place of any product containing methylene chloride 

because of the significant health problems associated with the chemical. 

The General Counsel issued a Notice of Serious Deficiency Needing 

Prompt Attention to the AOC on October 19, 2004, for the continued 

use of sewing softener on carpeting in the Senate Upholstery Shop48. This 

deficiency qualified as a RAC 1 hazard. The Material Safety Data Sheets 

were not the correct ones for the methylene chloride product being used, 

and the product labels failed to provide adequate warnings. The shop’s 

employees were therefore unaware of the dangers associated with this 

chemical, and the protective measures required to protect themselves. 

• Egress

The 2002 Report noted that no handrails had been installed on the 

48 Prior and subsequent Notices of Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention were 

issued to the AOC on May 20, 2004 and December 5, 2004 for the improper use of methylene 

chloride in the Construction Management Division at D.C. Village and the U.S. Capitol Building. 

See further discussion in Section III.B. of this Report.
53

main stairwells on the 3rd through 6th floors even though flights of stairs 

with four or more risers must be equipped with standard railings. This 

deficiency remains uncorrected. The inspectors also discovered that the 

outside balcony perimeter railing is too low and fails to comply with even 

the greater grandfathered allowances permitted under OSHA’s standards 

for existing systems. 29 C.F.R. §1910.23(c).

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********** However, since the freight elevator does not service the top (9th) 

floor, only one staging area near the passenger elevator is available on that 

floor. None of the elevator shafts contain smoke detectors, therefore, once 

an alarm has been activated, the elevators should be operated only under 

the control of a trained officer or firefighter. This hazard is particularly 

serious for employees with mobility impairments. **************************

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In addition, the exterior wheelchair ramps on Constitution Avenue are 

too steep and do not have compliant handrails. These deficiencies have 

been noted in previous inspections and continue to create a hazard for 

employees with mobility-impairments. 

Two shop areas containing a motor controller and fire pump controls were 

found to lack needed emergency lighting. Emergency lighting is necessary 

to both direct employees and to illuminate critical mechanical systems 

should the building’s main energy supply fail. 

Directional and exit signage was also found to be inadequate. Wall maps 

are outdated and fail to designate either exit routes that are wheelchair 

accessible or emergency staging areas. This deficiency was also noted in 

the 2002 inspection.

• Fire barriers and alarms

The effectiveness of the fire barriers in the Hart Building is of particular 

concern to the OGC. The Hart Building is one of two on Capitol Hill 

with atriums.49 **********************************************************************

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atrium in this building, as with most, is too high to activate a sprinkler head 

in order to extinguish a fire. Therefore, sprinkler systems are not required 

in such areas by the Life Safety Code. *****************************************

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************************************ The AOC is considering the installation of 

such a system. A smoke control system would help protect employees if 

49 The other is the Madison Library of Congress Building.
54 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

it were tied into the fire alarm system. Without a smoke control system, 

the delays occasioned by the use of the pre-signal sequencing, discussed 

previously in Section II.B., increase the risk to employees and visitors on 

the upper floors.

Some stairwells in the Hart Building are enclosed and these are intended 

to be used as exits in the event of a fire emergency. ************************

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*************** This deficiency was noted in the 2000 Report but remains 

uncorrected. One horizontal fire door did not fully close and latch while 

other fire doors were found to either not close on their own, to have faulty 

latches, or to not be properly sealed. All of these defects are significant 

because in the Hart Building most stairways are part of exit routes that 

lead to exit doors in other parts of the building. 

Other barriers were found to be similarly compromised by holes and 

unprotected penetrations. Several holes were found in the fire wall that 

isolates an electrical switchgear room from exit corridors. Several fire 

doors between a large mechanical room and the garage were significantly 

damaged when the AOC cut openings to accommodate filters. A double 

set of fire doors providing fire barrier protection between the loading dock 

and the building were found to be so severely damaged that they were 

blocked open by a wooden wedge and concrete block, even though the 

doors were equipped with an electronic hold-open device.

Some stairway fire doors are equipped with electronic hold-open devices. 

The presence of such devices is normally considered to be a positive feature 

because they prevent the doors from being propped open. However, 

where the alarm system is tied into a pre-signal sequence, as is the case in 

the Hart Building, the hold-open feature becomes a hazard in the event 

of a fire because the delay in sounding the alarm prevents the doors from 

closing, thereby allowing fire and smoke to overwhelm the stairwells and 

rise to other floors. See Section II.B. Any protection afforded by the door 

at the subway entrance was effectively negated by a metal stanchion used 

to block it open.

• Fire suppression

The Hart Building still lacks complete sprinkler coverage, such as in one 

work area of the Construction Management Division. In several locations, 

combustible materials were also found to be stored closer than eighteen 

inches from the sprinkler heads. As previously noted, OSHA standards 

require a minimum clearance of eighteen inches between the sprinkler 

head and any other objects. 
55

In one inspected area, a false ceiling had been removed without repositioning 

the sprinkler heads to the appropriate level in relationship to the new ceiling. 

Sprinkler heads are heat-activated because hot air rises to the highest level. 

In the event of a fire, hot air would initially bypass these sprinkler heads, 

thereby creating a delay in activating the sprinkler. 

Two other upright sprinkler heads were found to be installed in a sidewall 

position near the north wall of the loading dock in the compactor area. The 

incorrect installation of sprinkler heads significantly limits their effectiveness 

especially in areas, such as the compactor area, where combustible materials 

accumulate.

In two separate areas, access to fire extinguishers was blocked by large rolls 

of wiring. Smoke detectors are not provided in most areas, and a plastic 

cover was found covering an existing smoke detector inlet in an elevator 

machinery room. 

• Mechanical hazards

Any mechanical equipment that utilizes pressure relief valves 

requires periodic inspection and testing to ensure that the valves are 

capable of releasing excessive pressure. Any rupture in the equipment 

can be catastrophic, including injury or death to employees, damage to 

a building’s mechanical systems, and possible fire. In the Hart Building, 

three air compressors and two hot water heaters had not been recently 

inspected and tested. 

Equipment that has moving parts capable of causing serious injury or 

amputation must provide adequate guarding to prevent contact with the 

dangerous components. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.212(a)(5). The guards on the 

fans in two elevator machinery rooms had inadequate protection to prevent 

contact with the blades. No protective guards were found on large fans in 

two other locations - on an air handler and an emergency generator. 

Unstable stacking of items on shelf and there is no 

sprinkler coverage in area.
56 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Electrical hazards

The electrical panelboards in six locations failed to properly identify 

the location of the areas controlled by the individual circuit breakers. The 

hazards associated with this deficiency was discussed in detail previously 

in this Report. See Section II.E. Front panel covers were also found to 

be missing from several electrical panel boards. Such panel boards pose 

a significant risk of fire and electrocution when employees inadvertently 

come into contact with the live components.

D. Russell Senate Office Building

Russell Senate 

Office Building

RAC/Hazard

RAC 1 5

RAC 2 31

RAC 3 60

RAC 4 5

 

TOTALS

101

The Russell Senate Office Building was constructed in 1908 and 1909, 

long before most Fire and Safety Codes existed. Therefore, it, like the 

Capitol Building, presents a unique challenge. As with the other Senate 

Office Buildings, only a partial inspection could be conducted. No office 

space was inspected. The inspection team inspected approximately 

161,000 square feet of the total 661,000 square feet in the building. One 

hundred one hazards were identified. Five were rated as RAC 1 and 31 

were rated as RAC 2. 

 • Fire barriers

The Russell Building, like the Capitol, constitutes one large fire zone. 

****************************************** As noted in the 2000 Fire Safety 

Report, exit stairways remain unenclosed and lack properly rated fire 

doors, even though these conditions have been noted in prior Reports 

and inspections. ******************************************************************

***************************************************************************************

***************************************************************************************

************************************************ It is particularly hazardous for 

employees with disabilities who must gather at designated staging areas for 

assistance. Furthermore, physical barriers, such as fire doors and enclosed 

exit stairwells are needed to give employees and visitors adequate time to 

safely evacuate in the event of a fire. 
57

For example, two exit stairways extend from the basement level to the 

attic level. The stairways are entirely open and lack any fire barriers in the 

event of an emergency. The double doors at the top of these stairs and at 

the basement level are not rated fire doors and have no automatic closure 

mechanisms. They are routinely blocked open. If a need exists for these 

doors to be held open, they should be replaced with fire doors and equipped 

with electronic hold-open devices enabling them to be closed whenever a 

fire alarm is sounded. 

A fire door in the Masonry Shop did not provide adequate protection. 

Its metal panel moved below the correct position, which would allow fire, 

smoke and toxic gases to pass through. In other locations, the walls that 

are intended to serve as a fire barrier around Electric Substation B and that 

between the Plumbing and Storage Pipe Shop and the public corridor, had 

holes that would also allow significant penetration of fire, smoke, and toxic 

gas in the event of a fire. All three of these deficiencies should be restored 

by being sealed with fire stopping materials.

However, several improvements were noted by the inspection team, such 

as the posting of proper signage. 

• Alarms

The fire alarm system in the Russell Building utilizes a pre-signal sequence. 

At the time of the inspection, none of the signaling devices including the 

smoke detectors, water flow detectors, and manual pull stations immediately 

sounded a building-wide alarm. Instead, signals were sent to the central 

alarm station and communicated to the PCC in order that officers from 

the USCP can investigate whether a building-wide alarm is necessary. The 

Life Safety Code permits a three (3) minute delay. However, AOC and 

USCP employees in the Senate Office Buildings informed the inspection 

team that such investigations may take up to fifteen minutes. Since the 

inspection by the OGC team, the AOC, at the direction of the USCP 

Board, has restored manual pull stations to general alarm status in all 

Senate and House Office Buildings.

Interviews conducted by the OGC inspection team revealed that employees 

were unaware of how the pre-signal sequence works. Employees need to 

be trained regarding the alarm system. First, employees need to know that 

when an alarm does sound, it is not likely to be a false alarm. Experience 

indicates a low number of intentional false alarms. Second, employees 

must be made aware of primary and alternate evacuation routes. Finally, 

employees need to be made aware that calling the USCP emergency 

number may be the most effective means to report a fire. 
58 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Fire suppression

The AOC has procured a new fire pump to enhance the effectiveness of the 

existing sprinkler system. Fire sprinkler coverage is provided throughout 

most of the Russell Building, ****************************************************

****************************************************************************************

********* The inspection team recommends that an assessment be made to 

determine the necessary coverage. 

Despite the extensive coverage of the sprinkler system, the inspection 

team noted that the effectiveness of the system was compromised in 

several areas. In the Attic Locker Area, shelving was installed between 

two sprinkler heads creating a wall of stored material. In another Locker 

Storage Area, the Paint Shop, and in two sections of the Electrical Shop, 

combustible materials were found within eighteen inches of the sprinkler 

head plane. Materials were also stored on top of the fire sprinkler piping 

in the Electrical Shop. Loading sprinkler pipes in this manner can bend 

the pipes and interfere with the spray pattern when in use. 

• Egress

OSHA requires that workplace buildings provide at least two accessible 

emergency exits for employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.36(b)(1). *****************

****************************************************************************************

********************************************************************** However, both 

the carriage entrance on the second floor and the Northeast Corner exit 

to the First Street sidewalk could be easily modified to provide emergency 

exit accessibility. 

****************************************************************************************

************************************************** These elevators and the internal 

telephones are on an emergency standby power system enabling their 

operation if primary electrical power is interrupted. These telephones 

have the capability of signaling to a central location, such as the PCC, 

and identifying the exact location of the telephone initiating the call. 

This feature would aid both firefighters and employees with mobility 

impairments who have staged by the elevators waiting for assistance. To 

serve this purpose, the telephones must be located with 54 inches of the 

floor and kept unlocked. 

The inspectors also noted that additional smoke detectors are required in 

the elevator lobbies, shafts, and machinery rooms and that the existing 

detectors were not operational. Further, the elevators should be equipped 

with a firefighter recall function in order to allow for manual key operation. 

None of the elevators should continue to operate automatically once the 

fire alarm has been activated. In the event of an emergency requiring 

evacuation, USCP officers must be available to aid employees and visitors 
59

who require assistance. It is imperative, therefore, that the officers are aware 

of these responsibilities and how to manually operate the elevators in order 

to reach the staging area on each floor. The inspectors discovered, however, 

through interviews with USCP officers, that not all had been trained in 

procedures as to how to evacuate employees requiring assistance or in the 

manual operation of the elevators.

Self-illuminated exit signs were provided for most exit routes. However, 

the main exit from the Day Laborer’s Shop, which has multiple rooms, 

did not have an exit sign designating it as the exit to the main corridor. 

Another door from the Women’s Massage Room in the Health Center can 

only be opened with a key from the inside. This locking mechanism needs 

to be changed to allow the door to be readily opened without a key from 

the inside but still control entry from the outside.

Wall maps need to be updated throughout the Russell Building. In 

particular, the wall maps should provide necessary egress information 

for employees with mobility impairments, such as designations of exit 

discharge points that are wheelchair-accessible, staging areas, and ADAcompliant restrooms. 

• Electrical hazards

Sixty-three of the 101 violations identified in the Russell Building were 

related to electrical hazards. When electricity must be shut off during an 

emergency or for scheduled maintenance, it is imperative that the circuit 

directories on the panelboards accurately label the service provided by each 

circuit. As in other Legislative Branch buildings, the panel directories are 

rarely current or accurate in the Russell Building. Access to one of these 

improperly maintained panelboards was also obstructed in the Plumbing 

Storage and Pipe Shop. Another panel in the Electrical Shop had a broken 

part in front of the panel creating an opening that permitted contact with 

live components. Another in the Refinishing Area had openings that 

exposed energized wires.

Five instances were found where ground fault circuit interrupters (GFCIs) 

were defective or had not been installed in locations where electrical outlets 

were dangerously close to sources of water. Six instances of damaged power 

cords were also discovered. While only two instances of daisy-chained 

power strips were found, one was particularly egregious in that twenty-one 

different battery charges were being run off of a single electrical outlet. 

A number of two-prong outlet receptacles were found lacking a safety 

ground. 

• Confined spaces

Ventilation is provided throughout the Russell Building by a number of 

large air handler units. Four of these areas were large enough to allow entry 
60 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

by employees where the fan blades rotate. No protective guards were 

installed. These areas are considered to be “confined spaces”. Confined 

spaces are areas that have limited or restricted entry and exit. While they 

are not designed for continuous occupancy, they are large enough and 

configured to allow an employee to enter with his or her entire body in 

order to perform work. OSHA standards require specific signage be posted 

at the entry points for confined spaces. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.146. When 

the confined space area exposes the occupant to specific hazards, such as 

fan blades unprotected by fan guards, high voltage, or other hazards, entry 

may require a specific permit. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.146(f ). These areas 

must be marked as confined spaces, access must be limited, and be subject 

to a comprehensive confined space program.

• Unsecured compressed gas cylinders

The significant risks associated with unsecured compressed 

cylinders is discussed in detail below. See Section V.A. The OGC 

inspection team found three instances in which compressed gas cylinders 

were not secured. 

One cylinder contained acetylene, which is a highly volatile chemical. 

Another had its regulator attached which adds to the risk of valve damage 

should the cylinder fall. When valves are damaged, they frequently begin 

to leak. Damaged cylinders have been known to explode or to become 

missiles causing extensive damage and physical injury. 

Cylinders are not secured and will fall over 

easily.
61

E. Cannon House Office Building

Cannon House 

Office Building

RAC 1 9

RAC 2 22

RAC 3 45

RAC 4 3

 TOTALS 79

As with the Capitol and Senate Office Buildings, only limited inspection 

of the Cannon House Office Building could be conducted by the OGC 

inspection team due to time and resource constraints. The inspection team 

inspected approximately 76,000 square feet of the total 776,000 square feet 

in the building. Seventy-nine hazards were identified. Nine were rated as 

RAC 1 and twenty-two were rated as RAC 2. 

• Fire barriers

The Cannon Building constitutes one fire zone. *****************************

********************************** Deficiencies with the emergency exit routes, 

exit stairways, and fire doors pose serious risks to employees. ****************

******************************************************************************************

******************************************************************************************

************************* To date, this deficiency remains unabated. Stairwells 

with non-compliant doors create a significant risk for employees, especially 

those who are mobility-impaired and those who may work on the upper 

floors of the building. During an emergency, employees who require 

assistance must report to a staging area to await help. Frequently, these 

staging areas are located inside the stairwells on floor landings. 

The inspection team found that many doors within the building intended 

to serve as fire barriers are not compliant fire doors. To qualify as a fire 

door, the door must have been evaluated by a testing laboratory and provide 

protection against smoke and fire for a specified period of time. In the 

Cannon Building, doors must be effective for two hours since the building is 

not fully protected by a sprinkler system. 29 C.F.R. §1910.36(a)(2); NFPA 

101-2000, §7.1.3.2.1. Doors on the 5th floor Southeast and Southwest 

exit stairways, which enclose the Southwest exit stairway at the basement 

level, and doors at the Northeast basement stairway, are not fire-rated and 

would not latch. The building also has two circular stairs. These stairs have, 

on various levels, either no doors, old wooden doors that are not fire doors, 

or doors that are propped open and, therefore, cannot automatically close in 

the event of a fire. Glass panels in several other doors were either missing 
62 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

or were not fire-resistant. 

The North basement corridor is frequently occupied by hundreds of 

tourists waiting to tour the Capitol Building. A 2002 Gage-Babcock 

Report identified serious exit capacity problems associated with the main 

exit floor. Adding additional tourists to the basement corridor only 

exacerbates this problem. 

Electrical substation B in the Cannon Garage houses high voltage 

equipment and the trash baling room houses waste material and debris. 

Both of these areas are considered to be highly combustible. However, 

the inspection team found the fire barriers to be deficient. The perimeter 

walls of the substation have not been sealed with fire-stopping material, 

and the fire barrier above the *****************************************************

*********** 29 C.F.R. §1910.36(a)(2).

• Fire suppression

Fire extinguishers are considered to be the first line of defense in containing 

small fires before a fire is large enough or hot enough to trigger activation 

of the sprinkler system. However, to be effective, fire extinguishers must be 

maintained in serviceable condition. 29 C.F.R. §1910.157(c). Typically, 

craftsmen from the AOC inspect extinguishers on a monthly basis. 

However, in twelve locations in the Cannon Building, the inspection team 

found that the fire extinguishers were not being properly maintained. 

Some of the extinguishers had not been inspected since 2002. ************

****************************************************************************************

****************************************************************************************

************************************

• Electrical hazards

Hazards of an electrical nature constituted 35 of the 79 hazards 

identified by the OGC inspection team. Approximately, one-third of the 

electrical hazards involved missing cover plates.

Faceplate missing off electrical junction box 

exposing energized wires.
63

A missing cover plate represents a significant hazard because live parts are 

exposed and can result in electrical shock to employees who come into 

contact with the wires. Another risk is fire resulting when sparks and 

molten metal are not contained during a short-circuit or other electrical 

failure.

The electrical panels in three locations, Room B-37, Room B-24, and the 

Compactor Room, failed to have current circuit breaker directories. 

 As was discussed in Section II.E. of this Report, it is imperative that 

electricians and emergency responders be able to quickly access the panel 

and access the location of the circuits in the event of emergency.

• Continuing deficiencies

Several deficiencies that were cited in the 2002 Report have not been 

corrected by the AOC and continue to create significant hazards. The 

guardrail in Room 5N overlooking the Rotunda is of an inadequate height. 

OSHA standards require such a railing to be 42 inches high to prevent a 

fall over the top. With a drop of more than four feet, this low railing poses 

a real and present danger to employees working in the area. The Cannon 

Carry Out food preparation area continues to store unsecured cylinders 

of compressed carbon dioxide. These cylinders are susceptible to being 

knocked over. Unfortunately if pressurized tanks fall, a sudden release of 

pressure can cause the cylinder to project forward at high speeds, with the 

potential of serious physical injury to employees and physical damage to 

the building structure.

Circuit breaker panel is missing its directory/

index.
64 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

F. Longworth House Office Building

Longworth House 

Office Building

RAC/Hazard

RAC 1 6

RAC 2 41

RAC 3 80

RAC 4 9

 TOTALS 136

As with the Cannon House Office Building, only a limited inspection 

was conducted of the Longworth House Office Building. The inspection 

team inspected approximately 37,000 of 637,000 square feet, identifying 

136 violations, of which six were ranked as RAC 1 and 41 were ranked 

as RAC 2.

• Fire barriers

****************************************************************************************

****************************************************************************************

********************************************************50 The exit stairways in the 

Longworth Building lack protective enclosures and doors to the floors 

they service. No upper floor stairwells are enclosed. Some stairwells such 

as those in the Southeast (ground floor) and Southwest corners (subbasement to basement levels) are only partially enclosed. None provide 

any protection to the upper floors in the event of a fire in the lower floors. 

The AOC was issued a citation in March 2000 for this very serious 

deficiency. The AOC has not scheduled abatement of this hazard until 

after 2008.

50 The danger of open stairwells is discussed in Sections II.A. and IV.A. of this Report.

Open stairwells in Longworth House Office 

Building.
65

As in the other House and Senate building areas inspected, the Longworth 

Building was found to have significant holes in fire barrier walls throughout 

its structure.51 Penetrations were also found by the OGC inspection team 

between the Food Court and Locker Rooms and in Rooms SB-213, 

SB-213A, Room SB 242, and the sub-basement electrical closet. These 

penetrations not only reduce the effectiveness of the barriers but also 

aggravate the problems created by the presence of open stairwells. 

• Emergency exits

The OGC inspectors found that the Longworth Building lacks adequate 

directional signage to enable employees and visitors to rapidly exit the 

building. For example, both the Southwest corner stairway and midlanding between the sub-basement and basement at the Southeast corner 

lack signage and a gate or other barrier indicating the level at which to exit 

the stairwell to the outside. This same deficiency was noted in the 1999 

Fire Safety Report. No “Not an Exit” signs are posted in the sub-basement 

mid-landing that leads to the Cannon and Longworth tunnel. The absence 

of such signage fails to advise employees and visitors that the closest exit 

is up one level. The General Counsel also advised the AOC that the attic 

area lacks any lighted signage indicating exit routes. 

In the Food Court Catering area, a telephone cable wire had fallen across 

the exit route to a height of five to six feet off of the floor. This lowhanging cable created a hazard to most employees, and would have proved 

to be especially dangerous during a drill or actual evacuation. 

Since none of the exits are fully protected and the exit travel distances are 

unusually long for many areas of the building, effective emergency lighting 

along exit routes is essential to better ensure the safety of employees working 

in the Longworth Building. Battery-operated emergency lighting units 

have been installed in some areas of the building. However, a test on each 

unit demonstrated that the units in Room B-217, B-218, and the Gift Shop 

did not work. The AOC was advised as part of the 2002 inspection that 

battery-operated lights must be tested monthly. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.35; 

NFPA 101-2000, §7.9.3. This failure highlights the need for improvement 

in the AOC’s testing programs.52

51 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC reports that these hazards have been abated.

52 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC reports that a testing plan for all emergency 

lights has been implemented. However, during the 2004 inspection, as in prior inspections, OGC 

inspectors found many emergency lights to be non-operational. Accordingly, AOC should reexamine 

the adequacy of its current monitoring program. 
66 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Fire suppression

The Longworth Building was the site of a grease fire in May 1998 that 

caused extensive damage and injured three employees who required 

hospitalization. However, the inspection team in 2004 found several 

deficiencies still remaining in the fire suppression systems. First, in ten 

locations, stored materials were found to be blocking the sprinkler heads. A 

distance of less than eighteen inches significantly reduces the effectiveness 

of the sprinkler. In the Food Court dining area, emergency lights, smoke 

detectors, and sprinklers were found to be taped over. The automatic fire 

suppression system in the Food Court kitchen area offers a trip device to 

manually activate the system. The assigned managers and employees were 

unaware of the location or purpose of the manual trip feature. In at least 

three locations, access to the fire extinguishers was obstructed. 

• Electrical hazards

Two significant hazards were found in the dishwashing area of the Food 

Court. One breaker box did not have an enclosed panel on its five-foot 

front. This condition exposed employees to contact live components 

when they open the door. The hazard was further aggravated by the fact 

that the surrounding floor area was wet. A slip in this area could result 

in contact with the breaker box. Contact with the live components under 

these conditions could result in serious injury or death. This condition 

was noted in the 2002 Report, but still remains uncorrected. Another 

significant hazard in the Food Court area was found in an electrical switch 

box where the wires were pulled out from the box onto the floor, and the 

floor was covered with approximately one-eighth inch of water.

Hazards of an electrical nature that could cause electric shock or fire 

constituted 80 of 136 documented deficiencies. A number of renovation 

projects that have been undertaken in the Longworth Building over 

the course of years have involved rewiring and the installation of new 

circuits and electrical panelboards throughout the building. However, the 

electrical panels in at least eight locations have not been properly updated 

to label the directory of circuit breakers. As discussed in Section II.E. of 

this Report, it is imperative that electricians and emergency responders 

be able to quickly locate and identify circuits that may need to be deenergized. A ninth electrical panel in a training room, Room B-245, 

was obstructed by the recent installation of electrical components. The 

deficiencies with these panel boards were noted in the 2002 Report and 

remain uncorrected.

• Confined spaces

Confined spaces are areas that have limited or restricted entry and exit. 

While they are not designed for continuous occupancy, they are large 
67

enough and configured to allow an employee to enter with his or her 

entire body in order to perform work. OSHA standards require specific 

signage to be posted at the entry points for confined spaces. See 29 

C.F.R. §1910.146. When the confined space area exposes the occupant 

to specific hazards entry may require a specific permit. Air handler units, 

such as those found in the attic area Room SB-204, and Room SB-229 

require appropriate signage identifying them as confined spaces. The AOC 

must further investigate to determine whether these areas also qualify as a 

permit-entry required space.

• Mechanical hazards

The inspection team found several examples of ineffective or nonexistent 

machine guarding. All power transmission equipment, such as V-belt 

pulley drives that are found on air handlers, are required to have protective 

guards to prevent contact if they are located within seven feet of a working 

surface. See 29 C.F.R. §1910.219. Without guards, these devices may 

pull an employee into a nip point at a pulley, causing serious injury such 

as amputation. Less serious injuries, such as abrasions, may occur if an 

employee comes into contact with moving objects. More effective guarding 

is needed at the air handlers in the attic in B-97 and near Control panel 

ACP-17; in the sub-basement at the West wall Fan Room and Room SB229; and also at the compressor belt drive in Room SB-204. 

G. Rayburn House Office Building

Rayburn House 

Office Building

RAC/Hazard

RAC 1 2

RAC 2 165

RAC 3 212

RAC 4 27

 TOTALS 406

The Rayburn House Office Building was the site of the greatest number of 

safety violations of any Capitol Hill building identified during this biennial 

inspection. As with the Cannon and Longworth House Office Buildings, 

only a limited inspection could be conducted of the Rayburn Building. The 

inspection team inspected approximately 732,000 of 2.4 million square 

feet. The inspection included the Capitol’s Subway and Carpentry Division 

Shops because the Architect of the Capitol’s House of Representatives 

jurisdiction includes these areas. The inspection team identified a total of 

406 hazards. Two were ranked as RAC 1 and 212 were ranked as RAC 2 

in severity.
68 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

• Fire barriers

The AOC was cited in March 2000 because the four central stairways, 

which serve as emergency exits, did not have fire-rated fire doors and the 

existing fire doors were not maintained in proper operating condition. 

The 2004 inspection revealed that little progress has been made in these 

deficiencies. Except for the installation of appropriate fire doors at the 

penthouse level and one set of double fire doors at the basement level, 

no fire doors have been installed at any floor level in the three remaining 

stairwells. The non-compliant doors are not designed to withstand the 

heat of fire and they lack the required tight clearances, latches, or astragals. 

29 C.F.R. §1910.36(a)(3) and (d). 

The Office of General Counsel has previously recommended the 

institution of a comprehensive program of fire barrier maintenance in 

order to ensure the effectiveness of the fire barriers in Legislative Branch 

buildings. The lack of such a program in the Rayburn Building has resulted 

in conditions that have compromised the effectiveness of its fire barriers. 

The OGC inspectors discovered that the wire glass in three fire doors had 

been replaced with standard plate glass. The pane in another fire door 

contained a hole. Another 17 doors were not able to close or latch. All 

of these deficiencies significantly reduce the protection that these doors 

are intended to provide against the spread of fire, smoke, and toxic gases. 

The inspectors also found that the fire doors in a main corridor and the 

primary access door to the Members Storage Area were manually blocked 

open, rendering them ineffective against stopping fire and smoke.

 

Holes were also found in nineteen fire barrier walls throughout the 

Rayburn Building. The locations include the Penthouse, basement garage, 

sub-basement, and three levels of the Rayburn Garage.

Hole in fire wall allows penetration of toxic 

smoke.
69

• Egress

A Notice of Serious Deficiency Needing Prompt Attention was issued on 

June 8, 2004, because the exit discharge door at the top of the stairs leading 

from the Swimming Pool area required excessive force to open. It would not 

open until a USCP officer kicked it multiple times. Particularly troubling 

is that this condition had been known by the USCP for many months prior 

to the inspection. The AOC promptly repaired this deficiency on June 9, 

2004. Conflicting instructions were posted on this exit door. One sign 

indicated a 15-second delay and the other a 30-second delay, which can 

result in confusion and panic during an emergency situation. All discharge 

doors with delayed-opening devices must have appropriate signs indicating 

proper procedure for opening the door in the event of an emergency. 29 

C.F.R. §1910.35; NFPA 101-2000 §7.2.1.6.

As one of the largest buildings on Capitol Hill, the Rayburn Building houses 

a large number of employees. Renovation projects frequently occur, during 

which the corridors often serve as make-shift storage areas for furniture 

that is moved into and out of offices. OGC inspectors observed significant 

obstruction of the corridors making movement through the corridors 

difficult for employees, especially those with mobility impairments. On 

other occasions, tables set up by camera crews for their equipment create a 

significant restriction on passage through the corridors. 

Another deficiency directly affecting employees with mobility impairments 

is the requirement for two accessible and compliant exits. Currently, only 

one compliant and accessible exit is provided.

Many other violations in the emergency lighting and illuminated signs 

were found by the inspection team. The Subway Division shop in the 

Capitol Building (which falls under the AOC’s House of Representatives 

jurisdiction) is a large, multi-room area. The one and only emergency 

light was identified in a prior Report as being inoperable. During this 

inspection, it was again found to be inoperable, resulting from a dead 

battery. No emergency lighting was found in the Members’ Locker Area 

in the Swimming Pool complex. Even though that area provides an 

illuminated exit sign, one of the two bulbs was not functioning. Bulbs in 

the exit signage of the Members’ Gym was not functioning. In addition, 

the exit route was obstructed by furniture. The exit route from the Exercise 

Room in the Northeast corner of the Gym, the Women’s Fitness Center, the 

Recording Studio, the Building Engineer’s Area of the Air Conditioning 

Division, and all lacked emergency lighting. The Women’s Fitness Center 

and the Recording Studio also lacked approved exit signs. 

• Fire suppression

One area of improvement noted by the inspection team in the Rayburn 

Building was that during the past three years, a fire sprinkler and smoke 
70 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

detection system has been installed in most of the occupied areas of 

the building. During this same time period, the fire alarm system was 

extensively upgraded. These devices remain two of the most effective 

measures against fire. 

Even with these improvements, significant hazards were identified. The 

2000 inspection found that the Halon fire suppression system, used in 

several computer rooms, had not received its annual inspection. While it 

was inspected since the 2000 inspection, it was again found to be overdue 

for its annual inspection. The fire sprinkler valve in the closet area near 

Lobby Number 6 was last inspected in November 2000. 

Thirteen specific violations of materials being stored less than 18 inches 

below the plane of fire sprinkler heads were found. Two of the locations 

where stored materials obstructed the fire sprinkler plane were in the 

USCP Pistol Range where ammunition is stored and in the Members’ 

Storage Room. It is important to note that only several dozen storage 

areas were inspected. Therefore, it is anticipated that many more similar 

violations exist throughout the building.

Deficiencies were also noted with the frequency of inspection of the 

building’s fire extinguishers. Fire extinguishers are to be visually examined 

on a monthly basis to ensure that they are fully charged and operable. One 

extinguisher in the Trash Baling Room had not been inspected since 2000. 

Of particular concern was the fact that it had previously been discharged 

and returned to its normal position. It is therefore impossible to determine 

how long this problem existed. Twenty-five other units had verification 

tags indicating inspections in excess of one month. Twelve had not been 

inspected since 2003, and of those one had not been inspected since 1974 

and two others not since 1984. 

• Safety hazards

The inspection team found four instances of pressurized cylinders that 

were unsecured. 

Unsecured pressurized gas cylinders.
71

As discussed previously in this Report, the valves of pressurized cylinders 

are easily damaged during a fall. Serious flash fires or explosions may 

occur, as well as the cylinder may become a missile-like projectile capable 

of inflicting serious injury to employees and physical damage in its path. 

Deficiencies were also found in the protective guards of mechanical 

equipment such as a power saw, rotating water pump shaft, two grinders, 

seven fans, the trash baling machine, and twenty-seven air handlers.

Many of the air handler units in the Rayburn Building were found to not 

have appropriate warning signs posted at the entry points for confined 

spaces.

Lead-acid batteries emit hydrogen gas which is highly flammable. Therefore, 

OSHA requires the posting of “No Smoking” warning signs where such 

batteries are recharged. 29 C.F.R. §1910.178(g)(10). The charging stations 

for electrical storage batteries outside the Sheet Metal Division Shop, 

the Air Conditioning Division Shop, and in a parking area failed to post 

such warning signage. One room with similar batteries failed to provide a 

required eyewash station. 29 C.F.R. §1910.151(c). Three other locations, 

including the Trash Baling Room and the High Voltage Room, provided 

eyewash stations, but access to them was obstructed.

Material safety data sheets were found to be missing or unavailable in at 

least eight (8) areas. The significance of the MSDS was discussed previously 

in Section III.C. of this Report. See Section III.C.

• Electrical hazards

The improper use of extension cords was prevalent throughout the Rayburn 

Building. The OGC inspection team found 63 specific violations of this 

nature. A lack of available electrical outlets appeared to be the leading 

cause of the improper use of extension cords. For example, several rooms 

with only two electrical outlets were found to house five work stations. In 

one work area, alone, five power strips were plugged into a single power 

strip to expand the number of outlets to 25. 

The inspection team also found 25 instances of exposed, energized wiring, 

20 locations where ground fault circuit interrupters (GFCIs) were required 

but had not been installed, and eight instances of missing electrical 

grounds.

As in other buildings in the Legislative Branch, the electrical panelboards 

housing circuit breakers in the Rayburn Building were either incomplete 

or outdated. Extensive rewiring and expansion of electrical service occurs 

on an on-going basis throughout the building. However, at least 13 

panelboards had directories and indexes that failed to properly identify the 

function of all circuit breakers. 
72 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Section 215(c) of the Congressional Accountability Act allows covered 

employees, employing offices, and bargaining units representing covered 

employees to file Requests for Inspection alleging violations of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act. 2 U.S.C. §1341(c). Pursuant to this 

authority, the Office of the General Counsel investigates such allegations 

and makes a determination as to appropriate action. Since these issues are 

often raised by employees most intimately exposed to the daily working 

conditions in the Legislative Branch, they warrant serious attention. 

The ultimate goal in these circumstances is to identify and facilitate an 

appropriate abatement or corrective action where serious hazards are 

identified by the OGC. As part of this function, the General Counsel 

may issue a citation and, when necessary to enforce corrective action, a 

formal complaint.

The OGC experienced a 55% increase in the number of Requests for 

Inspection filed during the 108th Congress over the number filed during 

the 107th. Sixty-five Requests were filed during the 108th Congress, 

compared to 42 in 2001-2002. The vast majority of Requests continue to 

be filed by individual employees or Union representatives. Several Requests 

raised significant legal issues that have broad implications regarding the 

jurisdiction and scope of the CAA and the liability of employing offices.

The discussion below highlights the Requests for Inspection initiated from 

2003-2004 that raise the most significant issues and those matters that have 

been raised several times in separate Requests. Some attention is focused 

on issues that arose during the 107th Congress, but were investigated 

or resolved during the 108th Congress. The matters addressed include 

contractor compliance, alarms and evacuation, Police Communications 

Centers, chemical and biological hazards, asbestos, and lead in water. 

A. Contractor Compliance

Three incidents during the 108th Congress focused on injuries caused by 

contractors retained by the AOC. Two incidents caused actual physical 

injury to Legislative Branch employees. Another incident potentially 

exposed employees to significant risk of injury and the Cannon House 

Office Building to significant risk of property damage. 

In the first incident, OGC inspectors investigated a complaint filed by a 

Member of the House of Representatives regarding debris and furniture 

stored in the hallways of the Cannon House Office Building that created 

a fire and evacuation hazard. During the course of that investigation, 

the inspection team became concerned when they noted unsecured, 

pressurized cylinders of acetylene and oxygen. The acetylene cylinder 

and an unsecured oxygen cylinder were standing upright on an elevated 

concrete platform. The inspectors took immediate action regarding the 

unsecured cylinders because pressurized cylinders easily become missileV. Requestor-Initiated 

Inspections
73

like projectiles when they are damaged in a fall, thereby creating a risk of 

fire and explosion. Acetylene explosions have been known to blow out 

entire building sections. These cylinders had been left unsecured by an 

AOC contractor hired to modernize the elevators.

The other two incidents involved temporary security barriers surrounding a 

construction site at the Adams Library of Congress Building. Installing the 

security barriers around the building required the contractor to construct a 

temporary chain link fence around the construction area and the sidewalk 

along the edge of Second Street S.E. The first incident occurred in late 

October 2004. The fence blew over on an LOC employee who received 

cuts, abrasions, and torn clothing as a result of the accident. 

The other incident occurred in early November 2004 along the same 

temporary sidewalk. Another LOC employee fell after she stepped into 

a dip located near the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue and Second 

Street, S.E. The failure to provide lighting in this area either apparently 

caused, or significantly contributed, to this accident. The employee’s injuries 

included cuts and bruises to her legs and arms. Both of these conditions 

were promptly remedied upon notice to the AOC. The AOC modified the 

contract to provide additional safety precautions to secure the temporary 

fencing and to install temporary lighting.

The General Counsel issued a citation to the AOC for the unsafe 

conditions created by the contractor who had failed to properly secure an 

acetylene cylinder, thus endangering Legislative Branch employees in the 

Cannon Office Building . The citation focuses on the degree of oversight 

and responsibility the AOC is required to provide over contractor work 

being executed in Legislative Branch facilities. The AOC conducts much 

of its construction and repair work through the use of contractors; these 

contractors are also used to monitor the work of other contractors, including 

their safety practices. The AOC has contested this citation, asserting that 

it has limited, if any, responsibility to ensure compliance with OSHA and 

safety standards whenever work, including that of monitoring the work of 

Temporary fence that fell over and injured people 

held up by cement block.
74 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

contractors, is performed by its contractors.53 

The General Counsel contends that the OGC’s jurisdiction to hold the 

AOC accountable for complying with safety standards does not turn 

on whether the AOC performs its work directly or through the use of 

contractors. Were it otherwise, maintenance of health and safety in much 

of the Legislative Branch would depend on the diligence and skill of 

independent contractors rather than that of the Architect of the Capitol. 

However, by statute, the Architect of the Capitol is specifically charged 

with responsibility for the supervision and control of all services necessary 

for the protection and care of the Capitol and the Senate and House 

Office Buildings.54 Moreover, under OSHA’s Multi-Employer Citation 

Policy (CPL 02-00-124, Dec. 10, 1999, Sections X(c) and X(e)), the AOC, 

as both a controlling and exposing employer engaged in construction 

and repair work in these facilities, is accountable for safety violations. 55

Accordingly, the General Counsel charged that the AOC was responsible 

for preventing, identifying, and ensuring abatement of safety hazards at 

its construction sites whether those hazards were created by the AOC 

directly or through contractors it selected to carry out its work. 

It is the position of the General Counsel that in adopting the CAA, 

Congress, rather than delegating to the Executive Branch the authority 

to enforce OSH standards on Capitol Hill, created an entity within the 

Legislative Branch to assure compliance with the OSH Act with respect 

to covered employing offices. This statutory scheme provides a uniform 

pattern of enforcement throughout the Legislative Branch by the Office 

of Compliance. Under the AOC’s approach, however, OSHA, rather than 

the Office of Compliance, would be responsible for enforcement of 

53 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC objects to this characterization of its 

position. However, the AOC elected not to provide an alternative statement of its position.

54 See 2 U.S.C. §2001 (“The House of Representatives Office Building ... and the 

employment of all service, other than officers and privates of the Capitol police, that may be 

appropriated for by Congress, necessary for its protection, care, and occupancy, shall be under the 

control and supervision of the Architect of the Capitol, subject to the approval and direction of a 

commission consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and two Representatives 

in Congress, to be appointed by the Speaker.”); 2 U.S.C. §1833 (“The electrician, together with 

everything pertaining to the electrical machinery and apparatus, and the ventilation and heating 

of the House of Representatives, and all laborers and others connected with the lighting, heating, 

and ventilating thereof, shall be subject exclusively to the orders, and in all respects under the 

direction, of the Architect of the Capitol, subject to the control of the Speaker .... And all engineers 

and others who are engaged in heating and ventilating the House shall be subject to the orders, 

and in all respects under the direction, of the Architect of the Capitol, subject to the control of the 

Speaker....”).

55 The AOC is not relieved of its statutory responsibilities by contracting out to other 

entities any of its obligations for assuring safety on the jobsite. Cf. Brock v. City Oil Well Service 

Co., 795 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1986); Central of Georgia Railroad Company v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 

620, 624 (5th Cir. 1978)(“[A]n employer may not contract out its statutory responsibilities under 

OSHA..”).
75

health and safety standards on Capitol Hill to the extent the AOC delegated 

its safety responsibilities to employers not directly subject to the CAA. 

The AOC’s position in this matter is not dissimilar to that taken in another 

context that was the subject of a recent testimony before the Subcommittee 

on the Legislative Branch by David M. Walker, Comptroller General 

of the United States concerning the AOC’s failure to provide adequate 

safety oversight of the work performed by contractors and safety risks in 

its management of the Capitol Visitor Center project. See “Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate”, May 17, 2005, Capitol Visitor Center: 

Priority Attention Needed to Manage Schedules and Contracts, p. 9 

(“AOC had not fully exercised its authority to have the contractors take 

corrective actions to address recurring safety concerns.”).

The General Counsel continues negotiation with the AOC in an effort to 

achieve an appropriate resolution of this matter. 

B. Alarms and Evacuation

Employees and union representatives filed fourteen Requests for Inspection 

during 2003-2004 concerning alarms and evacuations. These Requests 

concerned the effective functioning of alarms and the impact on the 

evacuation of Legislative Branch facilities. 

At least eight of those Requests focused on delays that occurred in 

activating the building-wide alarm systems in the Madison and Adams 

LOC Buildings. These systems use a pre-signal sequence whereby a signal 

is sent to the LOC Police Communications Center when a smoke alarm 

is activated. Upon receiving the signal, an officer is dispatched to inspect 

the location to determine whether the building-wide alarm for evacuation 

should be activated. A fifteen minute delay occurred during one response, 

in part as a result of the AOC failing to notify the LOC about the system 

change and in part as a result of the inadequate training of LOC Police 

Officers and insufficient staffing of the PCC. The lack of training has 

been corrected but the adequacy of staffing is still under review. Since the 

inspection, the LOC Police have instituted a change in policy to activate a 

building evacuation within three minutes of the initial signal as required by 

the 2000 Life Safety Code, Section 9.6.3.4. 

In several other incidents, alarms could not be heard in parts of the 

buildings or were only activated in parts of the Madison LOC Building. 

One deficiency was remedied by replacing an amplifier and the addition 

of an alarm horn. Another deficiency was remedied by replacing a faulty 

smoke detector. 
76 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Two Requests focused on the concern raised by the General Counsel in 

the 2002 Report that the audibility of the alarm system in the Capitol 

Building is inadequate. The Requests alleged that the evacuation alarms 

were not audible when the Capitol Building is crowded. Tests conducted 

by the OGC inspection team supported the allegations. No alarms were 

present in the immediate area and distant alarms could not be heard 

above the ambient noise, in the Rotunda, Crypt area, or Statuary Hall. 

This constitutes a violation of the Life Safety Code of the National Fire 

Protection Association. Section 13.3.4.3.3; 29 C.F.R. §1910.165(b)(2). 

The AOC has undertaken equipment upgrades to partially correct these 

conditions. Fire alarms have been installed in the three areas, but as was 

recommended in the 2002 Report, a comprehensive survey regarding the 

audibility of the alarms in the public areas of the Capitol is still needed.

Other violations of the Life Safety Code were raised in four Requests 

for Inspection. Employees complained that doors of LOC Buildings 

were being closed during times the buildings were open to the public. 

These matters were resolved when the LOC Police issued a corrective 

order requiring that doors be open and staffed during all times when 

the buildings were regularly open to the public. In several other union 

Requests, it was alleged that LOC Police Officers were unable to open a 

revolving door at the Adams Building during an emergency evacuation, 

thereby limiting egress through one doorway. The allegations further allege 

that the officers delayed employees from crossing the street to report to 

designated assembly points. This matter is currently under investigation. 

C. Emergency Action Plans

Union representatives have filed a total of eight Requests for Inspection, 

citing deficiencies in the execution of the LOC’s Emergency Action Plans 

(EAPs) for building evacuation. One Request was filed after only one LOC 

building was evacuated when an unauthorized airplane entered restricted 

air space above Capitol Hill. Another Request questioned a substantial 

gridlock that occurred in the Madison Building during a fire evacuation. 

Employees were required to exit through a book detection gate instead of 

being directed to exit through all available doors. These complaints have 

been resolved by providing refresher training on evacuation procedures 

to LOC Police Officers and improving internal LOC communication 

regarding the scheduling of evacuation drills. The LOC also developed 

an Employee Emergency Action Guide that addresses shelter-in-place 

procedures and office emergency plans. 

Four additional Requests resulted from a welding fire in the Madison LOC 

Building. Those Requests were consolidated for investigation. In one, the 

welders did not follow Hot Work Permit procedures and attempted to 

extinguish the fire themselves instead of immediately sounding the fire 

alarm. Other employees suffered smoke and contaminant inhalation when 
77

they were allowed to reenter the Madison Building too soon following the 

fire. These hazards have been partially abated. 

In another Request, LOC Police Officers were unable to direct District 

of Columbia firefighters to containers (Knox Boxes) that house building 

and elevator keys during an evacuation. Such training was provided to the 

Officers in November 2004. 

D. Evacuation of Persons with Disabilities

A number of Requests for Inspection filed with the Office of General 

Counsel during the 108th Congress raise serious and complex concerns 

regarding the evacuation procedures for persons with disabilities. In 

January 2003, a fire evacuation occurred in the LOC Madison Building. 

During this evacuation, employees with mobility impairments gathered in 

designated staging areas for rescue assistance but were then directed to exit 

via the stairwells. Other employees became ill from lingering smoke when 

they were permitted to return before the building was cleared for a safe 

return. This incident also resulted in Requests questioning whether the 

staging areas in the Madison Building meet all fire safety standards, whether 

the pre-signal sequencing feature is effective, why elevators continued to 

operate after the alarms sounded, and should elevators be used to evacuate 

employees with disabilities under specific conditions.56

E. Police Communications Centers

As noted above, both the USCP and LOC Police forces operate 

communications centers. Two Requests for Inspection were filed regarding 

PCC understaffing and untrained and undertrained officers operating the 

LOC’s PCC. An initial investigation by the OGC determined that PCC 

technician training manuals needed to be updated with current information 

to allow the Police Technicians to properly perform their duties. Instead, the 

manuals only provided information on equipment that was no longer used. 

A union-initiated Request alleged that LOC Police radios were improperly 

shut down in October 2004 for repair purposes when the Library was open 

to the public. These matters are currently under investigation.

Two separate Requests for Inspection alleging health violations arose in 

both the USCP and LOC. An officer employed in the LOC alleged she 

was exposed to toxic fumes and a USCP officer alleged that she was exposed 

to heavy second-hand smoke from co-workers during her duty shift. An 

investigation of the LOC matter revealed that the fumes emanated from 

cutting pressure-treated wood and resin board, but the exposure level 

was far below that considered to be permissible by OSHA. The General 

56 The LOC reports in comments to the Draft Report that vibrating pagers have been 

provided to the hearing-impaired, areas of rescue assistance established, and stair chairs and monitors 

provided for the mobility-impaired to assist in evacuation efforts. 
78 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Counsel closed the case from the USCP because OSHA has adopted no 

enforceable standard regarding indoor air quality.

F. Chemical and Biological Hazards

The General Counsel issued five citations to the LOC regarding Requests 

filed in 2001 by the LOC Fraternal Order of Police officers after the LOC 

failed to provide written chemical and biological emergency response 

procedures; failed to provide written procedures regarding the wearing 

of personal protection equipment; and failed to provide training in 

those procedures. The violations have been partially, but not completely, 

abated. 

Several union-initiated Requests for Inspection, similar to those filed in 

the LOC, alleged that the USCP did not provide its officers with adequate 

personal protection equipment to respond to possible anthrax incidents; 

adequate training on how to respond to chemical and biological threats; 

adequate training on how to examine suspicious packages; and respirator 

masks failed to provide adequate protection.57 These deficiencies remain 

unabated, and in large part uninvestigated, because the OGC has not been 

provided requested documents related to the USCP’s emergency planning 

steps and procedures. The USCP’s position is that the documents are 

security-sensitive. Since this Report was prepared, the parties have 

negotiated an agreement governing the release of security-sensitive 

documents to address this and similar situations. See Section III.A.

G. Asbestos

At least seven employee and union Requests were filed regarding possible 

exposure to asbestos. The Requests arose from various sectors - the LOC 

Madison Building, the Capitol, and the Ford House Office Building. 

In one, LOC employees were exposed to asbestos after the basement in 

the Madison Building flooded. During removal of the carpet, floor tiles 

containing asbestos were loosened thereby releasing particles of asbestos 

into the air. Testing by an OGC industrial hygienist revealed that the glue 

and tiles were in fact asbestos containing materials (ACM). Later testing 

found that the airborne fibers were within the safety limits established by 

OSHA.58 The inspection determined that LOC employees had not been 

timely notified that floor tiles contained ACM, a violation of the OSHA 

57 The background information regarding the acquisition of ************ emergency escape 

masks is discussed in greater detail in Section II.A.

58 In comments to the Draft Report, the AOC asserts that no exposure occurred and that 

all tests returned negative. However, any exposure in this case occurred at the time the tiles were 

disturbed. Testing performing at a later date or time would not indicate this condition.
79

standards. However, the tiles have now been properly removed, disposed 

of, and replaced. 

In the Senate Recording Studio, an employee reported that an AOC 

contractor had cut into wall boards containing asbestos, releasing asbestos 

particles into the air. As a result of this incident, the AOC and the Senate 

Sergeant at Arms evacuated all employees in the vicinity and cleaned the 

area according to OSHA guidelines. After the cleanup, an inspector from 

the OGC tested and verified that the airborne levels of asbestos were 

within acceptable limits. 

Two Requests were filed by employees in the Ford House Office Building. 

Both alleged that during roof construction in 2004, asbestos dust had 

settled in their work areas. Testing by inspectors from the Office of the 

General Counsel showed that the dust present, while containing traces of 

asbestos, was well below levels considered to be permissible. 

H. Potable Water

Issues regarding the access to and quality of drinking water within 

Legislative Branch buildings was raised again during the 108th Congress. 

The Library of Congress Professional Guild filed several Requests for 

Inspection concerning low water pressure and water quality in the Jefferson 

and Adams LOC Buildings. Water samples, taken from both sources, 

indicated the presence of elevated lead levels. The General Counsel issued 

a citation in January 2005. Following the issuance of the citation, the 

AOC is temporarily providing bottled water at those sites where elevated 

levels of lead were found and where the fountains have been disabled. A 

consultant has been retained to propose a long-term solution.

The Russell Senate Office Building was the focus of two separate union-

initiated Requests alleging that night employees did not have access to 

potable water one night when water was temporarily shut off and that 

personal protection equipment was not provided to clean up feces in 

restroom water. This matter remains under investigation. 

 

The statutory duties of the Office of General Counsel related to safety and 

health extend beyond the duty to inspect Legislative Branch buildings for 

violations and upon the request of individual employees. The Office of 

Compliance is also tasked to

...carry out a program of education for Members of Congress 

and other employing authorities of the Legislative Branch of the 

Federal Government respecting the laws made applicable to them 

and a program to inform individuals of their rights under laws 

applicable to the Legislative Branch of the Federal Government.

VI. Challenges and Initiatives
80 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

See 2 U.S.C. §1381(h)(1). To this end, the General Counsel, in cooperation 

with the Executive Director of the OOC, has pursued several initiatives 

to foster a more interactive and collaborative approach to preventing and 

abating safety and health violations. These initiatives include increasing 

awareness of health and safety issues, providing advance notice of findings 

to employing offices following inspections, and conducting quarterly safety 

and health conferences for employing offices, unions, and employees.

 

A. Increasing Awareness of Safety and Health Issues

During the 108th Congress, the Office began to publish web-based 

information sheets known as “Fast Facts”, which cover a broad range of 

topics and provide Legislative Branch employees and employing offices a 

brief summary of how to avoid common workplace hazards. To date, six 

“Fast Facts” have been published addressing such topics as obstruction 

of fire sprinklers, fire door safety, space heaters, damaged power cords, 

electrical panel accessibility, and extension cords and power strips. The 

“Fast Facts” are an effective tool because they are simple, easily distributed, 

and contribute to awareness of hazards that otherwise may go unnoticed 

and uncorrected.

“Bulletins” are now published quarterly, and occasionally in special editions, 

by the Office of Compliance. These publications address the broader 

scope of protections provided by the Congressional Accountability Act, 

including health and safety issues. Several “Bulletins” have covered these 

issues including such topics as public access and accommodation rights, 

common office hazards, workplace safety, office emergency action plans, 

safe mail handling procedures, preparing for an emergency, and stress 

and anxiety in the workplace. The “Bulletins” themselves are generally 

two pages and address both employer obligations and employee rights 

and how the Office of the General Counsel may assist in enforcing these 

rights. They also direct readers to additional sources for information and/

or assistance.

B. Advance Notification of Proposed Findings

The General Counsel determined that the inspections conducted pursuant 

to the Congressional Accountability Act during the 108th Congress 

would not only be more comprehensive but would also be conducted 

using a more collaborative approach than employed in prior years. Before 

the inspections commenced, the General Counsel conducted opening 

conferences for employing offices; parties were notified of the scope of 

the investigations; and periodically during the course of the inspections, 

employing offices were briefed by the OGC inspection team regarding 

violations identified thus far so that they could correct conditions before 

their buildings were inspected. Employing offices were provided with a 
81

copy of the inspection findings as each facility was inspected rather than 

having to await the completion of the biennial inspection. This allowed 

employing offices ample opportunity to comment on the findings before 

they were finalized by the General Counsel and submitted to Congress as 

part of the Biennial Report.

C. Reducing Fluctuations in Biennial Inspections

In order to provide more time for inspections and reduce the inspection 

schedule compression, the Biennial Inspection for the 109th Congress 

is being commenced early in the new session. In the past, the biennial 

inspection was often not conducted until the second year of each session 

of Congress. This severely limited the time available for staff to conduct 

Requestor-Initiated Inspections during the same period. As a result, these 

inspections were deferred and backlogs grew. The delay in disposing of 

this growing backlog of open cases deservedly drew criticism from labor 

organizations and employing offices alike. By conducting inspections 

over a two-year period, the overall quality of all inspections should be 

enhanced, and the ability to inspect all covered facilities during the term 

of each Congress and to be more timely in conducting Requestor-Initiated 

Inspections should be improved.

In its FY 2004 Annual Report, p. 11, the OOC noted that ”even with the 

greater efficiency derived from the longer inspection cycle, the General 

Counsel will be unable to conduct all periodic and Requestor-Initiated 

Inspections on a timely basis until adequate additional staff and resources 

become available. This problem is expected to worsen as the AOC brings 

under its jurisdiction additional facilities, such as the Capitol Visitors 

Center.” Accordingly, the OOC submitted an amended budget request 

for FY 2006 seeking additional resources to enable the OGC to conduct 

complete and timely health and safety inspections. This request was 

approved by both the House and the Senate.

D. Training Outreach 

As part of its mission to educate Legislative Branch employing offices and 

employees, the Office of Compliance conducted the first-ever Capitol Hillwide conference on workplace safety and health in Congress. Moderated 

by the Congressional Management Foundation, the conference included 

panel discussions, featuring Jay Eagen, Chief Administrative Officer, U.S. 

House of Representatives and Susan P. Adams, Director of Safety, Fire, and 

Environmental Programs, Office of the Architect of the Capitol, as well as 

expert speakers, including Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 

Safety and Health, John L. Henshaw, and Alan C. McMillan, President 

and Chief Executive Officer, National Safety Council. Representative 

Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Representative John Larson (D-CT) also 

addressed the conference. The conference program focused on creating 
82 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

and implementing health and safety programs in employing offices, with 

emphasis on resources available to assist employing offices through the 

Voluntary Protection Programs Participants’ Association and coordinating 

program information with other Hill offices. 

One outgrowth of the conference was the creation of the Legislative Branch 

Health and Safety Group. Open to all interested Legislative Branch staff 

having safety and health responsibilities, the Health and Safety Group was 

initiated by the Office of Compliance in order to provide a forum to relay 

information to employing offices “‘at the front end’ concerning significant 

activities and initiatives,” as suggested by the GAO. (GAO Report, pp. 33-

34). The Health and Safety Group generally meets on a quarterly basis 

allowing the OGC to share information with employing offices on the 

progress of periodic inspections, OSH and ADA deficiencies discovered 

during inspections, and other items of common interest. It also serves 

as an outlet for providing educational information, such as presentations 

by the Library of Congress and the Architect of the Capitol regarding 

the role played by Jurisdictional Occupational Safety and Health ( JOSH) 

Committees in addressing health and safety concerns. As noted in the 

OOC’s FY 2004 Annual Report, p. 12, the General Counsel will also be 

exploring the formation of a safety management group within Congress, 

composed of senior level staff from employing offices, to focus on the 

sharing of best practices and achieving greater coordination of safety and 

health efforts at the management level. 

E. Monitoring Abatement of Citations and Violation Findings

Following the completion of both periodic and Requestor-Initiated 

Inspections and the notification the existence of violations, the responsible 

employing offices submit abatement plans to the OGC that may be either 

short or long-term in duration. The CAA contemplates prompt abatement 

of all identified violations. In particular, §1341 (c)(6) of the CAA directs 

that “if new appropriations are necessary to correct a violation... correction 

or compliance shall take place as soon as possible, but not later than the 

end of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the citation is 

issued ....” 

Employing offices report that the vast majority of violations are corrected 

during or shortly after the inspection. However, because of the time and 

cost involved and the need for new appropriations, certain violations 

may require more extended time to abate. It has become apparent to 

the General Counsel during the 108th Biennial Inspection that there 

has been little progress in abating many serious violations. Moreover, 

responsible employing offices often do not apprise the General Counsel of 

the status of abatement efforts or of changes in abatement schedules that 

have further extended the estimated completion dates. In other instances, 

abatement has been partial or ineffective. In the past, because of limited 
83

resources, the OGC has placed insufficient emphasis on abatement and has 

relied too much on voluntary action by employing offices to follow through 

on meeting their abatement obligations. 

During the course of the 109th Congress, the General Counsel will place 

special emphasis on monitoring and assuring compliance by responsible 

employing offices with outstanding unabated citations and other uncorrected 

violations. The implementation of a new case tracking system in 2005 

significantly enhances the OGC’s ability to increase this oversight and 

monitoring function. We also intend to work with the employing offices 

to explore ways to assist them in addressing any systemic problems that 

may contribute to delayed or inadequate abatement, and the recurrence of 

repeat violations.

F. Self-Monitoring of Safety Conditions and Maintenance 

Programs

From its initial Report to Congress in June of 1996, the OGC has 

emphasized that one of the most significant obstacles to the prevention 

of and prompt correction of safety and health hazards in the Legislative 

Branch is the lack of self-monitoring and self-compliance by employing 

offices through effective safety and health programs. The General Counsel 

noted that while many larger organizations, such as the AOC, LOC, and 

GAO, have formal, written safety policies, the programs lack essential 

elements to serve as preventive safeguards. See 1996 Report, pp. 5-6. 

Closely related to the failure of some employing offices to timely comply 

with established abatement plans is the failure to develop and implement 

effective monitoring and maintenance programs to assure against a 

recurrence of the same or similar types of violations. It goes without saying 

that employing offices are responsible for assuring that adequate health 

and safety conditions exist for their respective own employees; the Office 

of Compliance was not created to function in their stead as the safety office 

for Legislative Branch instrumentalities. Rather, the OOC serves both an 

enforcement and educative function: to assure compliance with applicable 

safety and health code requirements and to inform and assist employing 

offices in carrying out their respective safety and health responsibilities. 

Accordingly, it is essential that employing offices continuously operate 

pro-actively with respect to the health and safety environments within 

their own offices, and not rely excessively on OGC biennial inspections to 

identify all hazardous conditions. 

Employing offices have enhanced their efforts at self-policing since 1996, 

and as discussed earlier in this Report, they have augmented safety and 

health professionals on their respective staffs to this end. See pp. 3-4, 

above. However, given the number of violations identified during the 

108th Biennial Inspection, much work in this area remains to be done. For 
84 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

example, this inspection team, and those during past periodic inspections, 

have frequently cited employing offices for violations that were ultimately 

abated. However, in subsequent inspections, they have found numerous 

instances where the same types of hazards were discovered in the same 

or different locations, leading to findings of new violations. This would 

suggest either a failure of adequate abatement in the first place or a failure 

to adequately examine and address identified violations throughout the 

organization on a systemic basis and to “look for patterns and identify 

possible common or underlying causes of potential workplace hazards.” 

See GAO Report, p. 29.

G. Development of Employing Office Health and Safety 

Programs

Substantial progress has been made by some employing offices in the 

development of safety and health programs. Due to time and resource 

constraints, a thorough examination of these programs by the OGC was 

not possible during the 2004 inspection. During the 109th Biennial 

Inspection, however, the General Counsel intends to begin a comprehensive 

review of these programs. One noted deficiency observed in the 108th 

Biennial Inspection was in the area of employee training programs. These 

programs should be designed to ensure that all employees understand 

and are aware of the hazards to which they may be exposed and the 

proper methods for avoiding such hazards. Where the nature of the 

job requires it, specialized training must be provided. While significant 

training protocols have been developed by some employing offices, such 

as the AOC for its construction workers, the Senate, through its Office of 

Security and Emergency Preparedness, and the House, through its Office 

of Emergency Planning and Preparedness, and Operations,59 there were 

other areas observed where the lack of adequate training was noted during 

the 2004 Biennial Inspection. For example, as discussed in Section III.

C, the inspection team found that in four work sites employees were not 

adequately notified of the dangers of the chemicals they were using, such 

as methylene chloride. In that case, the safety programs did not provide 

procedures for the timely and accurate updating of MSDS information or 

employees were unable to recognize the chemical hazards on the identified 

on the MSDSs due to a lack of adequate training. Other areas where 

there were observed deficiencies included insufficient training in confined 

space standards and in recognizing electrical hazards..

The General Counsel again recommends that all employing offices selfevaluate the effectiveness of their safety and health programs on an 

ongoing basis. 

59 The House Employment Counsel reported this information in comments to the Draft 

Report. 
85

As stated at the outset of this Report, Section 215(e)(1) of the CAA 

requires the General Counsel to provide a comprehensive assessment of 

the health and safety conditions within the Legislative Branch. In addition 

to identifying specific hazards, the General Counsel has the correlative 

responsibility “to look for patterns and identify possible common or 

underlying causes of potential workplace hazards.” See GAO Report, p. 29. 

An essential element of this responsibility is to suggest recommendations 

that will further enhance the health and safety of all employees of the 

Legislative Branch. 

This Report has previously identified specific hazards that require 

correction by the responsible employing offices. There is no need to restate 

these findings here. See Sections II through VI. However, some of the 

hazards identified by this Report do suggest programmatic and systemic 

problems that are worthy addressing, both because of their nature and 

their longstanding duration. In addition, this Section will discuss specific 

legislative issues encountered by the General Counsel that affect his ability 

to enforce compliance with health and safety laws and regulations, some of 

which have previously addressed in prior Reports.

A. Enforcement Authority - Temporary Restraining Orders

Since 1998, the Board of the Office of Compliance has recommended 

that Congress grant specific authority to the General Counsel to seek a 

restraining order in Federal District Court in the case of imminent danger 

from violations of the OSHA. See OOC, Section 102(b) Report, p. 2 and 

***************, p. B2 (December 2004). Section 215(b) of the CAA provides 

remedies for violations of substantive provisions of the OSHA. Under 

Section 215(b), the remedy for a violation of the CAA is a corrective order, 

“including such order as would be appropriate if issued under Section 13(a)” 

of the OSHA. OSHA authorizes the Secretary of Labor authority to seek 

a temporary restraining order in District Court in the case of imminent 

danger. The General Counsel takes the position that Section 13(b) of the 

OSHA, by application, gives the OGC the same authority to petition for 

injunctive relief. See 29 C.F.R. §662(a). 

Nevertheless, the OOC Board and the General Counsel believe that 

express authority to seek preliminary injunction relief should be made 

explicit since it is essential to the OGC’s ability to promptly eliminate 

potential hazards that pose imminent threats. In these cases, corrective 

action must be swift and sure. Accordingly, the General Counsel reiterates 

the Board’s recommendation that Congress amend the CAA to clarify the 

General Counsel’s standing to seek, and federal district courts to enter, 

temporary restraining orders. 

VII. Recommendations
86 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

B. Enforcement Authority - Environmental Statutes 

Protections

A fundamental rationale for the passage of the CAA was to safeguard the 

Constitutional principle of separation of powers, precluding Executive 

Branch agencies from exercising administrative enforcement and 

jurisdiction over the Legislative Branch. Accordingly, many Members 

supported Congressional exemption from regulatory statutes, such as 

those enforcing compliance with environmental protections. 

With regard to these environmental statutes60, the Executive Branch still 

exercises administrative and enforcement authority over the Legislative 

Branch. As the Board of the OOC recommended in its 2004 Section 

102(b) Report, p.3, Congress should amend the CAA to transfer 

enforcement authority from the Department of Labor to the Office of 

Compliance to eliminate the separation of powers conflict that currently 

exists. See OOC Section 102(b) Report, p. 3 and *********** (December 

2004).

C. Enforcement Authority - §207 Retaliation Protections

Over the years, Legislative Branch employees have effectively served as the 

“eyes and ears” of the General Counsel in informing him of the possible 

existence of serious hazards that may affect their safety and health and 

that of many other employees, including management representatives, 

that would not otherwise come to his attention. In order to assure the 

free flow of this information to the General Counsel, it is essential to 

protect from intimidation and retaliation Legislative Branch employees 

who exercise their rights to report and allege violations of safety and 

health violations. Section 207 of the CAA affords that right to employees. 

However, to assure that this right is effectively vindicated, the OOC Board 

has recommended that the General Counsel be granted the authority to 

investigate and prosecute violations of the anti-retaliation requirements of 

Section 207 of the CAA. OOC Section 102(b) Report, p. 2 and ************ 

***, p. B1 (December 2004).

Covered employees who have sought information from the Office 

of Compliance respecting their substantive rights under the safety 

and health provisions of the CAA have expressed concern about their 

exposure in coming forward to bring a claim. They have also indicated 

their reluctance to shoulder the litigation burden without the support of 

OGC investigation or prosecution. Investigation and prosecution by the 

OGC would effectively insulate employees from these burdens. 

60 The subject statutes include the Toxic Substances Control Act, Clean Water Act, Safe 

Drinking Water Act, Energy Reorganization Act, Solid Waste Disposal / Resource Conservation 

Recovery Act, Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, and Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.
87

This step is important to preserve confidence in the CAA and to avoid 

discouraging Legislative Branch employees from exercising their rights or 

supporting employees who do. Whenever a violation of safety and health 

is not brought to the attention of the OOC or the employing office due to 

employee fears of retaliation, the efficacy of the CAA is undermined. 

The 2004 Biennial Inspection was commenced in March 2004. The 

inspection was led by Stephen Mallinger, Certified Industrial Hygienist 

and Special Assistant to the General Counsel since November 1997 on 

long-term detail from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 

Mr. Mallinger’s substantial contributions to the advancement of health and 

safety on Capitol Hill deserve particular recognition. Mr. Mallinger was 

principally assisted in the inspection by Thomas H. Seymour, a part-time 

consultant to the General Counsel since 1999 and registered Professional 

Safety and Fire Protection Engineer, David Thompson, a safety consultant 

retained for the 2004 Biennial Inspection, and Jessica Hubert, a student 

intern from the University of Maryland School of Engineering. Mr. 

Thompson was principally responsible for scheduling inspections and 

preparing charts of violations and abatement information. RequestorInitiated Inspections were conducted by Messrs. Mallinger, Seymour and 

Henry C. Woodcock, a health and safety consultant retained by the OGC 

since 1999. 

The dates for OGC inspections were scheduled after prior consultation 

with representatives of the Architect of the Capitol and the employing 

offices, and adjustments in scheduling were often made to minimize 

any interference with employing office operations. In advance of the 

inspection of each facility, an opening conference was held for interested 

participants, advising of the content and procedures that would be followed. 

As with OSHA inspections, management representatives designated by 

the employing offices and AOC representatives accompanied the OGC 

inspection team. Representatives of affected employees were also invited 

to participate and frequently did so. Inspectors discussed violations of 

OSHA standards with representatives of the employing offices and the 

AOC, and offered technical advice on how to eliminate the identified 

hazards. Photographs were taken of many of the conditions observed. 

Early on, briefings were held to provide employing offices with “heads up” 

about violations commonly identified during the first inspections so that 

these hazards could be corrected in advance of the inspections in their 

facilities. As with OSHA inspections, the General Counsel’s goal in these 

inspections has been to help employing offices and employees to reduce onthe-job hazards. Frequently AOC personnel were able to correct hazards 

“on the spot.”

Since the 2004 Biennial Inspection was much more detailed and thorough 

than in past years, the Architect of the Capitol and employing offices were 

VIII. Inspection Methodology 

and Acknowledgments
88 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

required to devote more extensive staff time in accompanying the OGC 

inspection team and in providing information necessary to the completion 

of the Report and associated appendices. Throughout this inspection 

process, this Office has received excellent cooperation from the employing 

offices and the Architect of the Capitol. In this regard, particular thanks 

is extended to Pennie Hardesty, Susan Adams and other AOC personnel 

for their generous assistance in aiding this Office to accomplish this 

important task.

James Abbott, Deputy General Counsel of the Office of Compliance, 

was the primary author of the Report and had overall responsibility 

for its preparation. Major portions of the Report were prepared by Mr. 

Mallinger and Mr. Seymour as well as Senior Attorney Kate Tapley 

and Attorney Eilin Chiang. Carol Griffith, Paralegal/Administrative 

Assistant, Sarah Buckbee, Assistant Systems Administrator, Kisha Harley, 

Legal Technician, and Jonathan Orr, OOC Communications Director, 

assisted in the production of the Report. 

 Peter Ames Eveleth

 General Counsel
89

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90 advancing safety, health, and workplace rights in the legistlative branch

Peter Ames Eveleth

General Counsel

James Abbott

Deputy General Counsel

Sarah Buckbee

Assistant Systems Administrator

Carol Griffith

Paralegal/Administrative Assistant to the General Counsel

Kisha Harley

Legal Technician

Stephen Mallinger

Special Assistant to the General Counsel, 

Lead Safety and Health Inspector

Kate Tapley

Senior Attorney

David K. Young

Management/Program Analyst 

Tom Seymour

Fire, Safety, and Health Inspector

David Thompson

Safety and Health Inspector

Henry Woodcock

Certified Industrial Hygienist

Jessica Hubert

Student Intern

Staff of the Office of 

Compliance

Inspection Team
91

Office of Compliance

Room LA 200, John Adams 

Building

110 Second Street, SE 

Washington, DC 20540-1999

t/ 202-724-9250

tdd/ 202-426-1912

f/ 202-426-1663

Recorded Information Line/ 202-

724-9260

www.compliance.gov

Contact Information:
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Appendices

Appendix A ..................................**************************

Appendix B ..................................**************************

Appendix C ..................................**************************

Appendix D .......Guidelines for Risk Assessment Code

Appendix E ..........Buildings Inspected in 2004 vs 2002

Appendix F ..Responsible Offices Comments to Report

~Note to Reader

Appendices A, B, and C are not included in this version of the Public Report because of their volume and 

the United States Capitol Police has determined that significant portions contain security sensitive information. 

Accordingly, all references to Appendices A, B, and C have been redacted from the Report. Appendices D, E, and 

F are included.
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Appendix D - Guidelines for 

Risk Assessment
APP D:2

Appendix D

1

Office of Compliance Guidelines

for Risk Assessment Codes (RACs) - July 29, 2004

Office of Compliance (OOC) inspectors assign a risk assessment code (RAC) to each hazard 

encountered during routine inspections. The RAC describes the relative risk of injury, illness or

premature death that could result from exposure to a hazard. RACs vary between a RAC 1 for a

relatively high risk and a RAC 5 for an insignificant risk. Because the OOC does not identify

hazards that have insignificant risks (de minimis violations), we do not have RAC 5 findings. 

A RAC uses a combination of the probability that an employee could be hurt and the severity of

the illness or injury. The tables below outline the definitions of these elements and the process

for combining the elements to determine a RAC. We use two methods: one for safety hazards,

which could result in injuring an employee, and another for health hazards, which are conditions

that could cause an occupational illness.

Table 1 shows the matrix used to determine RACs for safety hazards. The inspector finds the

RAC by selecting the probability category from the first column and the worst-case severity

category from the next four columns. The cell where the severity and probability descriptions

intersect contains the appropriate RAC.

Table 1. Safety Risk Assessment Code Matrix

Probability Categories

Hazard Severity Categories

I II III IV

Likely to occur immediately (A) RAC 1 RAC 1 RAC 2 RAC 3

Probably will occur in time (B) RAC 1 RAC 2 RAC 3 RAC 4

Possible to occur in time (C) RAC 2 RAC 3 RAC 4 RAC 5

Unlikely to occur (D) RAC 3 RAC 4 RAC 5 RAC 5

OOC has based the structure of the RAC tables (Tables 1 and 2) on information from John

Zoldak of The Zoldak Group, Inc., and the definitions of the classifications and categories on the 

Department of Defense Instruction 6055.1, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pd2/i60551p.pdf.

The definitions of the Hazard Severity categories from the DOD Instruction are as follows:

• Severity Category I: Death or permanent total disability.

• Severity Category II: Permanent partial or temporary total disability; off work more than

3 months.

• Severity Category III: Lost-workday or compensable injury.

• Severity Category IV: First aid or minor supportive medical treatment.
APP D:3

Appendix D

2

RACs for health hazards require a more complex approach. Health RACs include factors such as

exposure conditions, routes of entry, medical effects, exposure duration, and the number of

employees exposed. Table 2 below outlines the RAC categories for health hazards and Tables 3

through 8 give the process for calculating the probability and severity categories for Table 2.

Table 2. Health Risk Assessment Code Matrix

Probability Categories

Hazard Severity Categories

I II III IV

Likely (A) RAC 1 RAC 1 RAC 2 RAC 3

Probable (B) RAC 1 RAC 2 RAC 3 RAC 4

Possible (C) RAC 2 RAC 3 RAC 4 RAC 5

Unlikely (D) RAC 3 RAC 4 RAC 5 RAC 5

To determine the Hazard Severity for Table 2, add the factors in Tables 3 and 4, then use Table 5

to select the category.

Table 3. Exposure Points (for use in Table 5)

Is an exposure route other

than inhalation possible?

Exposure Conditions

< AL

Intermittently

> AL, but < OEL > AL, but < OEL > OEL

No 0 points 3 points 5 points 7 points

Yes 2 points 4 points 6 points 9 points

“AL” is the action level, which usually requires training, medical monitoring, records, and other measures.

“OEL” is the occupational exposure limit that applies to the situation. These limits include OSHA permissible

exposure limits (PELs), threshold limit values (TLV®s) from the American Conference of Governmental

Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), and short-term exposure limits (STELs) and ceiling limits from either OSHA or

ACGIH.

Table 4. Medical Effects Points (for use in Table 5)

Condition Points

No medical effects (could include nuisance odors) 0

Temporary reversible illness requiring supportive treatment (e.g. eye irritation, sore throat) 1 to 2

Temporary reversible illness with limited period of disability (e.g., metal fume fever) 3 to 4

Permanent illness or loss of capacity (e.g., permanent hearing loss) 5 to 6

Severe disabling and irreversible illness or premature death (e.g., asbestosis) 7 to 8

Note: Be sure to use the correct medical effects for exposure conditions.

Use acute effects for exposures > STELs and chronic effects for exposures > time-weighted average OELs.
APP D:4

Appendix D

3

Table 5. Health Hazard Severity Category (for use in Table 2)

Health Hazard Severity Category Total points from Tables 3 and 4

I 13 to 17 points

II 9 to 12 points

III 5 to 8 points

IV 1 to 4 points

To determine the Health Hazard Probability for Table 2, add the factors in Tables 6 and 7, then

use Table 8 to select the category.

Table 6. Number of Exposed Employees (for use in Table 8)

Number of Exposed Employees Points

< 5 exposed employees 1 to 2 points

5 to 9 exposed employees 3 to 4 points

10 to 49 exposed employees 5 to 6 points

> 49 exposed employees 7 to 8 points

Table 7. Exposure Duration (for use in Table 8)

Exposure

Frequency

(during the year)

Exposure Duration (during a week)

1 to 8 hours/week > 8 but < 30 hours/week > 30 hours/week

Irregular, intermittent 1 to 2 points 4 to 6 points 8 points

Regular, periodic 2 to 3 points 5 to 7 points 8 points

Table 8. Health Hazard Probability Category (for use in Table 2)

Health Hazard Probability Category Total points from Tables 6 and 7

Likely 14 to 16 points

Probable 10 to 13 points

Possible 5 to 9 points

Unlikely 1 to 4 points
APP D:5

Appendix D

4

Guidance for Applying Risk Assessment Codes (RACs)

Apply RACs to Hazardous Conditions, Not to Generic Violation Categories

Inspectors should not attempt to match a RAC with a specific description of a violation without

considering the conditions in which the violation exists. In other words, they should make no

attempt to be consistent in assigning the same RAC to the same violation, unless the conditions

involved in the violation are also consistent.

Example: A violation for exposure to asbestos in the air could result in a RAC 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5,

depending on the conditions. Exposure to asbestos below the action level with no other

contamination would have 8 medical-effects points and, therefore, a Severity Category of III. If a

maintenance worker enters a closet with that level of asbestos for a couple of hours a month, the

total Health Hazard Probability points would be 4, which would equate to “Unlikely.” The

resulting RAC would be 5, which would be de minimis.

On the other hand, if a group of 6 people has that same asbestos exposure (below the AL with no

other contamination) every workday, then the Health Hazard Probability points would be 11,

which would equate to “Probable.” The resulting RAC would be 3. 

Apply RACs to “Covered Employees”

Because the scope of OOC’s occupational safety and health inspections is limited to hazards to

employees covered under the Congressional Accountability Act, our RACs are based only on

those hazards. While other organizations might use RACs to track risks for the public or for

potential facility damage, OOC RACs will not cover those types of hazards.

Example: A guardrail does not meet either the OSHA criteria to protect employees or the

building code requirements to protect the general public. If the spacing between the railings

poses a low risk for employees but a high risk for children, our RAC would be based on the low

employee risk rather than the higher risk for members of the public.

Applying RACs for Unknown Exposure Conditions

When employees use substances that could expose them to hazardous levels but the employer has

not measured or modeled the exposure, the inspector will need to either sample or estimate the

level of exposure to determine the appropriate RAC. Unfortunately, odor levels and irritant

levels can rarely be used to indicate levels that are hazardous; therefore, other means will usually

be needed to estimate exposure levels.

The specific substance standards in 29 CFR Subpart Z that include permissible exposure limits

(PELs) require the employer to determine the exposure level. They also require the employer to

protect employees as though exposures exceed the PEL until exposure monitoring demonstrates

otherwise. For violations of these standards, calculate the RAC using points for exposures above

the PEL, unless there is a clear indication that exposures are less than the PEL.

For substances that do not have specific standards in Subpart Z, the inspector can use judgment
APP D:6

Appendix D

5

and experience to estimate the potential exposure after reviewing the method of application or

use, vapor pressure of the material, process temperature, amount and rate of use, and volume of

the area where the substance is used.

Applying a RAC for a Condition Having Multiple Risks

A violation will often have multiple potential outcomes. Examples include:

• Methylene chloride can cause both loss of consciousness during intermittent

short-term exposures and long-term exposures can produce cancer.

• Many electrical violations can result in minor shock, major injury, death, localized

fires or major facility fires.

To determine the appropriate RAC for such a violation, we look at two scenarios and use the

highest RAC between them. We look at the scenario most likely to occur and determine that

RAC. Then we look at the scenario with the most severe effects and determine that RAC. The

highest of these two RACs (lowest number on our scale) is assigned to the violation.

Do Not Use RACs to Dictate an Abatement Schedule

A RAC provides information about the relative risk. More serious RACs (RAC 1 and RAC 2)

should justify more resources and attention to correct hazards than less serious RACs (RAC 3

and RAC 4). We do not, however, use RACs to indicate a time-line for correcting a violation. If

a RAC 4 violation can be corrected simply by eliminating an extension cord or by removing an

obstruction, then the violation should be corrected immediately.

Do Not Reduce RACs to Reflect Reduced RACs for Interim Control Measures

Conditions that have been assigned serious RACs should usually require the employment of

interim control measures. These measures should reduce the probability or severity of an injury

or illness and result in a less serious (higher number) RAC. Employing offices will normally

adjust these RACs as a part of managing their safety programs.

The OOC does not participate in adjusting RACs unless we receive a formal request to assist

with this process.

Apply RACs to Direct, Indirect and Root Causes of Hazards

It is axiomatic that hazards, illnesses, and injuries usually have multiple causes and sources.

Correcting a direct cause will physically eliminate the hazard or violation. For example,

replacing a chemical that produces hazardous exposures with a chemical that does not produce

such exposures addresses the direct cause of the hazard.

RACs also apply to indirect and root causes of hazards. Examples of indirect causes include

missing MSDSs that would inform employees of hazardous materials that are otherwise not

known, training that has not covered the procedures needed to avoid a hazard, lack of guidance

regarding safe processes, an inadequate program in which the missing elements would reduce or

eliminate the direct causes, etc.
APP D:7

Appendix D

6

Typical Examples of Risk Assessment Codes

Table 9 describes several sets of violations and conditions to show how we assign the RACs. 

These examples are instructional; therefore, no policy is implied by the conditions and hazards

included in this table.

Table 9. Typical Examples of Risk Assessment Codes (RACs)

Violations, Conditions, and Potential Hazards Severity Probability RAC

Energized junction box is missing a cover. The box is within 8 feet of

the floor and poses a potential electrocution hazard upon contact in a

work area or frequently-used walkway or corridor.

I C 2

Energized junction box is missing a cover. The box is within 8 feet of

the floor and poses a potential electrocution hazard upon contact but

is not located in a work area or frequently-used walkway or corridor.

I D 3

Energized junction box is missing a cover. The box is more than 8

feet from the floor (relatively inaccessible) and has flammable

materials near the location, and poses a limited fire hazard..

III B 3

Fire extinguisher not inspected or maintained. It is not located in a

sprinkler-protected area and a fire would pose a fire hazard with no

protective measures.

III B 3

Fire extinguisher not inspected or maintained. It is located in a

sprinkler-protected area and a fire would pose a fire hazard with

incomplete protective measures.

III C 4

A confined space exists with a potential atmospheric hazard. The

space is not labeled or marked as a permit required space; no entry

program has been developed. No known entries have been made but

the space is accessible and it could pose an inhalation hazard.

I C 2

A confined space exists with a potential atmospheric hazard. The

space is not labeled or marked as a permit-required space; no entry

program has been developed. Entries have been made without

protective measures, posing a likely inhalation hazard.

I B 1

3 or 4 employees use methylene chloride (carcinogen) for more than

30 hours a week at levels above the PEL with poor ventilation, no

respiratory protection, and no PPE to prevent potential skin exposure.

Table 3 = 9

Table 4 = 7

Total = 16

Severity I

Table 6 = 2

Table 7 = 8

Total = 10

Probable

1

5 or 6 employees use methylene chloride very infrequently at levels

above the PEL with poor ventilation, no respiratory protection, and no

PPE to prevent potential skin exposure.

Table 3 = 9

Table 4 = 7

Total = 16

Severity I

Table 6 = 3

Table 7 = 1

Total = 4

Unlikely

3
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Appendix E - Buildings Inspected 

 in 2004 vs 2002
APP E:2

Appendix E

Buildings Inspected in 2004 and 2002

Buildings Inspected in 2004:

Supreme Court

U.S. Capitol*

Senate Underground Garage

Russell SOB*

Hart SOB*

Dirksen SOB*

Cannon HOB*

Longworth HOB*

Rayburn HOB*

East-West Underground Garage

U.S.C.P. Headquarters and Annex

Botanic Gardens Buildings

GAO

Senate Day Care, C. St.

Senate Page Dorm

St. Cecilia’s Day Care (LOC)

House Day Care in Ford

House Page Dorm

Fort Meade LOC Book Storage

U.S.C.P.’s K St. Garage

AOC’s E St. Garage

LOC’s Taylor St.

CMD Blue Plains

Postal Square

Cheltenham Training Annex

Highlighted buildings were inspected in

2004 but not in 2002.

* Committee spaces, Members’ offices, &

non-AOC spaces were not inspected during

the 2004 inspections but were included in

the 107 Congressional biennial inspections th

[have not yet been inspected during the

designated building inspection in 2004]. 

Buildings Inspected in 2002:

Supreme Court

U.S. Capitol

Russell SOB

Hart SOB

Dirksen SOB

Cannon HOB

Longworth HOB

Rayburn HOB

East-West Underground Garage

U.S.C.P. Headquarters and Annex

Botanic Gardens Buildings**

GAO

U.S.C.P.’s K St. Garage

CMD Blue Plains

Postal Square

Ford HOB

Fort Meade warehouses

Madison Bldg.**

Jefferson Bldg**

Adams Bldg**

Blue Plains U.S.C.P. Canine facility

P Street U.S.C.P. Warehouse

Capitol Power Plant

** Partial inspections
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Appendix F - Responsible Offices 

Comments to Report

 Architect of the Capitol

 House Employment Counsel

 Senate Employment Counsel

 United States Capitol Police
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