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[House Report 109-100]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-100
======================================================================

 
   WITHDRAWING THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE AGREEMENT 
               ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

                                _______
                                

  May 26, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Thomas, from the Committee on Ways and Means, submitted the 
                               following

                             ADVERSE REPORT

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                      [To accompany H.J. Res. 27]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on Ways and Means, to whom was referred the 
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 27) withdrawing the approval of the 
United States from the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization, having considered the same, reports unfavorably 
thereon without amendment and recommends that the joint 
resolution do not pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Introduction:
      A. Purpose and Summary.....................................     2
      B. Background..............................................     2
      C. Legislative History.....................................     3
 II. Explanation of the Resolution....................................4
III. Vote of the Committee............................................7
 IV. Committee Oversight Findings and Recommendations.................7
      A. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures...............     7
      B. Performance goals and objectives........................     7
      C. Constitutional Authority Statement......................     7
      D. Cost Estimate Prepared by the Congressional Budget 
          Office.................................................     8
  V. New Advisory Committees..........................................9
 VI. Congressional Accountability Act.................................9
VII. Federal Mandates.................................................9
VIII.Views...........................................................10

                            I. INTRODUCTION

                         A. Purpose and Summary

    House Joint Resolution 27 would withdraw the approval of 
the Congress from the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).

                             B. Background

Background on the World Trade Organization

    The WTO was established in the Uruguay Round, which was the 
eighth round or series of multilateral trade negotiations under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These 
negotiations to expand trade, which date back to the 
establishment of the GATT in 1948, were a response to the Great 
Depression and the political upheaval and conflicts of the 
1930s, which deepened as a result of protectionist policies 
such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. Work under the GATT system, 
aimed at raising living standards and promoting international 
economic growth through the opening of world markets, has 
spanned six decades.
    The trade agreements reached at the end of 1994 during the 
Uruguay Round were noteworthy in that they greatly expanded 
coverage of GATT rules beyond manufactured goods trade to 
include agricultural trade, services trade, trade-related 
investment measures, intellectual property rights, and 
textiles. The most visible accomplishment of this multilateral 
trade round was to establish the WTO to administer the GATT 
agreements and to settle disputes among WTO members.

Current negotiations in the Doha Development Round

    WTO countries are currently participating in the ninth 
round of negotiations, called the Doha Development Round, which 
was launched in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. The Doha agenda 
provides a mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects and 
for work in on-going WTO committees. According to the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the main focus of the negotiations is in 
the following areas: agriculture, industrial market access, 
services, trade facilitation, WTO rules (i.e., trade remedies, 
regional agreements, and fish subsidies), and development. The 
goal of the Doha agenda is to reduce trade barriers so as to 
expand global economic growth, development, and opportunity. 
The ``2005 Trade Policy Agenda and 2004 Annual Report of the 
President on the Trade Agreements Program'' provides an 
extensive description of the state of negotiations.

The five-year review of U.S. participation in the WTO

    Sections 124-125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) 
(P.L. 103-465) require the President to submit a special report 
on U.S. participation in the WTO every five years from the date 
the United States first joined the WTO. Congress received the 
first of these five-year reports in 2000. Congress received the 
second, and most recent, five-year report on March 1, 2005. 
Included in the ``2005 Trade Policy Agenda and 2004 Annual 
Report of the President's Trade Agreements Program'' is the 
President's review of the WTO, including highlights, recent 
accomplishments, as well as cumulative assessments of major 
trade topics since the WTO was established such as: (1) 
expanded market access in goods and services, (2) economic 
benefits of trade, (3) trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights and investment protection, (4) customs related 
matters, (5) continued operation of a sound and effective 
system to settle disputes, and (6) launch of the Doha 
Development Round in 2001.
    Section 125 of the URAA also provides a legislative 
procedure available every five years for Congress to consider 
withdrawal of Congressional approval for the WTO. The 
legislative procedure is initiated by introduction of a 
resolution containing specified language, which is then 
considered by the House in a specific expedited manner. The 
resolution is privileged and cannot be amended. The text of the 
resolution is as follows:

          Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
        of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
        That the Congress withdraws its approval, provided 
        under section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
        Act, of the WTO Agreement as defined in section 2(9) of 
        that Act.

In 2000, a House-introduced resolution to withdraw 
Congressional approval of the WTO failed by a vote of 56 to 
363.
    The Committee on Ways and Means must consider any 
resolution introduced within 45-days or face automatic 
discharge, pursuant to the requirements of sections 124-125. 
After the 45-day period has ended, any Member may bring it to 
the floor of the House. A joint resolution of withdrawal must 
ultimately be passed by both Houses and signed by the President 
within 90 days to be effective. Even if enacted (i.e., signed 
by the President or Presidential veto overridden), the 
resolution does not actually require the President to begin 
withdrawal actions.
    If the resolution is passed and vetoed by the President, 
each House may vote to override the veto before the end of the 
90-day period or within 15 session days from the date on which 
Congress receives the President's veto message, whichever is 
later.

                         C. Legislative History

Committee action

    House Joint Resolution 27 was introduced on March 2, 2005, 
by Representatives Bernard Sanders (I-VT) and Ron Paul (R-TX). 
On March 2, 2005, the resolution was referred to the Committee 
on Ways and Means. On May 24, 2005, the Committee ordered 
adversely reported H.J. Res. 27 to the House of Representatives 
by a voice vote.

Legislative hearing and oversight

    On May 17, 2005, the Trade Subcommittee held a hearing on 
(1) overall results of U.S. membership in the WTO and the GATT, 
(2) whether future participation of the United States in the 
WTO and the multilateral trading system can be expected to 
benefit Americans, and (3) prospects for increased economic 
opportunities for U.S. farmers, workers, businesses, and 
consumers in the Doha Round. At the hearing, Deputy U.S. Trade 
Representative Peter Allgeier and representatives from the 
private sector expressed their views on the United States' 
involvement in the WTO. There was widespread support expressed 
for remaining in the WTO while working on various challenges 
that remain.
    In addition to receiving annual reports by the President on 
the trade policy agenda, the Committee has conducted extensive 
oversight of WTO activities. Most importantly it has monitored 
results of key WTO disputes and U.S. positions in the current 
Doha Round negotiations. Moreover, select Members of the 
Committee participate in the Congressional Oversight Group 
process, which covers all trade matters including WTO issues. 
In addition, Members of the Committee attended the WTO's 
Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September 2003 as part of 
the U.S. delegation and anticipate attending the next 
Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005.

                   II. EXPLANATION OF THE RESOLUTION

Present law

    Under WTO rules, the United States may withdraw from the 
WTO by exercising the procedures set forth in Article XV of the 
WTO Agreement, which requires six months' notice to the WTO 
Director General. Section 125(b) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), establishes a procedure under 
which Congress may withdraw its approval of the WTO Agreement 
contained in section 101(a) of the Act. Sections 124-125 of the 
URAA require the President to submit a special report on U.S. 
participation in the WTO every five years from the date the 
United States first joined the WTO. Following receipt of the 
report, any Member of either the House or Senate may introduce 
a joint resolution to withdraw Congressional approval of the 
WTO Agreement. Congress then has 90 days from receipt of the 
report to act on the resolution. The resolution is privileged 
and cannot be amended.

Explanation of the resolution

    House Joint Resolution 27 states that Congress withdraws 
its approval, provided under section 101(a) of the URAA, of the 
WTO Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
into on April 15, 1994.
    While enactment of a resolution withdrawing Congressional 
approval under section 125 would call into question the future 
of U.S. participation in the WTO, it does not require the 
President to withdraw the United States from the WTO and does 
not begin withdrawal procedures.

Reasons for change

    The Committee reports Mr. Sanders' resolution to withdraw 
Congressional approval of the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization adversely, because the Committee believes 
that U.S. participation in the global trading system is vital 
to America's long term economic and strategic interests, 
continued prosperity, and strengthening the rule of law around 
the world. In particular, the prospects for further benefits to 
the U.S. economy by a successful conclusion to the current Doha 
Round of negotiations make U.S. participation in the WTO even 
more compelling.

Review of WTO

    The WTO is generally recognized as the most important 
vehicle to advance U.S. trade interests and is critical to 
America's consumers, workers, businesses, farmers, and 
ranchers. All are advantaged by a global trading system that 
must operate with predictability and transparency, without 
discrimination against American products, and providing for 
actions to address unfair trade practices.
    Falling trade barriers as a result of the Uruguay Round 
have helped to increase rapidly the value of trade relative to 
the U.S. economy. United States goods and service trade 
(exports plus imports) reached 18 percent of the value of U.S. 
GDP in 1982 and then grew to 21.7 percent in 1994 and 25.2 
percent in 2004. Both U.S. manufacturing exports and U.S. 
agricultural exports have grown strongly during U.S. membership 
in the WTO in the last 10 years. Between 1994 and 2004, exports 
in these sectors increased 65 percent and 38 percent, 
respectively. United States exports of high technology products 
grew by 67 percent during the past 10 years and account for 
one-quarter of total goods exports.
    On a day-to-day basis, the WTO provides opportunities for 
advancing U.S. interests through the more than twenty standing 
WTO Committees which meet regularly to administer agreements, 
allow members to exchange views, work at resolving questions of 
members' compliance with commitments, and develop initiatives 
aimed to improve the agreements and their operation. The WTO 
has also proven itself important for ensuring sustainable 
global economic development. In promoting expanded economic 
freedom, the WTO provides access to the developing world, 
contributes to a stable and peaceful world, and helps alleviate 
poverty.
    To ensure equal and fair opportunities for U.S. interests 
and to enforce U.S. rights under the agreements, the United 
States has brought more WTO dispute settlement cases than any 
other member. Since establishment of the WTO, the United States 
has initiated 74 cases. The United States represents roughly 17 
percent of world trade, yet has brought nearly 22 percent of 
the WTO disputes between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2004. 
Examples of U.S. initiated cases involving diverse industries 
and interests such as those dairy, apples, biotechnology, 
telecommunications, automobiles, apparel, unfair customs 
procedures, and intellectual property rights. Of those, the 
United States has won 23 on core issues, lost four, and settled 
23 before decision. The remaining 24 are ``in process,'' i.e., 
before a panel, in the consultation stage, or being monitored 
for progress or otherwise inactive. According to USTR, in the 
last five years, the United States has won a total of 16 cases 
and lost 14 as plaintiff and defendant. From 1995 to 2000, the 
U.S. record was 18 wins and 15 losses. In many cases, U.S. 
losses have minimal or no impact on U.S. law or practice, or 
have provided an opportunity to amend U.S. law to make U.S. 
interests more competitive with its trading partners. At the 
same time the Committee notes that the United States is best 
positioned to actively pursue U.S. interests and WTO compliance 
with other members when the United States itself has met its 
obligations, including coming into compliance with dispute 
settlement cases that require adjustments to U.S. law.

Doha Round

    The Doha agenda provides a mandate for negotiations on a 
range of subjects and work in ongoing WTO committees: 
agriculture, industrial market access, services, trade 
facilitation, WTO rules (i.e., trade remedies, regional 
agreements, and fish subsidies), and development. Benefits from 
a successful Doha Round would be significant. According to 
USTR, elimination in industrial tariffs alone could help lift 
300 million people in the world out of poverty and raise global 
income by $500 billion, with much of the benefit attributable 
to trade between developing countries. For the United States, 
the benefits would be equivalent to an $18 billion tax cut for 
American consumers and manufacturers while expanding the U.S. 
economy by $95 billion. For these reasons, the Committee 
strongly seeks a comprehensive and ambitious result in the Doha 
Round.
    In addition to industrial goods trade, the Doha Round 
provides the United States and rest of the world with historic 
opportunities to achieve agricultural reform and to greatly 
diminish current market distortions that present barriers to 
farmers everywhere. The United States also seeks an ambitious 
opening of services market that will benefit the wide range of 
important industries. WTO negotiations on trade facilitation 
will result in more efficiency and predictability, lower cost 
for moving goods across borders, and less corruption by customs 
officials abroad. The Committee considers each of these areas 
important in its own right and expects the Administration to 
firmly support a balanced approach to the negotiations.
    The Committee is concerned that such a balanced approach is 
not supported adequately by other WTO members despite their 
long term interests in greater trade liberalization. In 
pursuing a balanced final agreement, the U.S. trade negotiating 
positions have been fair, offering ambitious trade 
liberalization in areas where the United States has both 
offensive and defensive interests. This is in marked contrast 
to many other countries, which have demanded more access while 
refusing access to their own markets, have sought to be 
explicitly exempted from new obligations, or have sought to 
effectively protect their sensitive industries and trade 
distorting programs through targeted exceptions. Accordingly, 
the Committee supports the Doha agenda as a means to reduce 
trade barriers broadly so as to expand global economic growth, 
development, and opportunity. While the Committee believes that 
developing countries should receive certain special and 
differential treatment in areas in which they are not 
developed, a successful trade agreement, however, cannot 
provide significant exemptions for countries, economic sectors, 
or products.
    Despite the clear and compelling reasons for remaining in 
the WTO, the Committee notes several aspects of the current 
system that need improving. Such improvements will benefit the 
United States and can be addressed by a continued U.S. active 
presence as a member of the WTO, particularly in the only 
current negotiations. First, as tariffs have decreased, 
countries have taken to raising non-tariff barriers in various 
forms such as discriminatory internal taxes and standards 
targeting foreign goods. In the agriculture area, there are 
many sanitary-phytosanitary standards with inadequate 
scientific basis that effectively block U.S. exports. Second, 
U.S. trade remedy laws have occasionally been impacted by 
dispute settlement panels that read more exacting, and 
sometimes impractical, requirements into the WTO agreements. 
While the United States retains effective use of all of its 
trade remedy options, the panel ``gap filling'' in this and 
other areas raises very important concerns for the Committee, 
and the Committee urges USTR to continue to insist upon 
adherence to the appropriate standard of review by panels, the 
Appellate Body, and the WTO Secretariat and to the terms of 
reference of the review. Lastly, the consensus-based structure 
of the WTO gives recalcitrant and protectionist members the 
ability to minimize and dilute trade liberalizing efforts in a 
manner out of proportion to their economic commitment to the 
free trade system. The Committee supports U.S. efforts to 
redress all of these points as an active member in good 
standing of the WTO.

                       III. VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the following statements are made 
concerning the vote of the Committee on Ways and Means in its 
consideration of the resolution, H. J. Res. 27.

                    Motion To Report the Resolution

    The resolution, H.J. Res. 27, was ordered adversely 
reported by voice vote (with a quorum being present).

          IV. COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives (relating to oversight findings), 
the Committee, based on public hearing testimony and 
information from the Administration, concludes that it is 
appropriate and timely to consider and adversely report this 
measure.

              A. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
H.J. Res. 27 does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                  B. Performance Goals and Objectives

    The rule requiring a statement of performance goals and 
objectives is inapplicable.

                 C. Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this resolution in article I, section 1 of the Constitution.

      D. Cost Estimate Prepared by the Congressional Budget Office

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, requiring a cost estimate 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, the following 
report prepared by CBO is provided.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, May 25, 2005.
Hon. William ``Bill'' M. Thomas,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 27, a joint 
resolution withdrawing the approval of the United States from 
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 
ordered reported by the House Committee on Ways and Means on 
May 24, 2005.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Annabelle 
Bartsch and Emily Schlect.
            Sincerely,
                                     Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director.
    Enclosure.

H.J. Res. 27--A joint resolution withdrawing the approval of the United 
        States from the agreement establishing the World Trade 
        Organization

    CBO estimates that enacting H.J. Res. 27 would likely have 
no effect on the federal budget. The legislation would withdraw 
the U.S. Congress's approval of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreement that was provided under section 101(a) of the 
implementing legislation (Public Law 103-412). If the United 
States were to withdraw from the WTO, any subsequent changes in 
U.S. collections of tariff duties could have significant 
budgetary effects. However, the ultimate impact of the 
legislation is unclear. In particular, it is not clear that 
enactment of this resolution would require the United States to 
withdraw from the WTO--and even if it did, there might not be 
any changes in tariffs. Based on information from the 
Administration in the past that suggests that such legislation 
would not affect the application of the WTO agreement to the 
United States, CBO concludes that enacting H.J. Res. 27 would 
probably have no budgetary impact.
    H.J. Res. 27 contains no intergovernmental mandates as 
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would 
not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 
Withdrawing from the WTO would broaden the conditions under 
which the U.S. government could impose trade restrictions on 
imports. Trade restrictions--such as increased tariff duties or 
quota limits more restrictive than under current law--would 
impose private-sector mandates on importers of affected items. 
However, because the legislation would probably not affect the 
application of the WTO agreement to the United States, CBO 
concludes that H.J. Res. 27 would likely impose no new private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA.
    This estimate was prepared by Annabelle Bartsch and Emily 
Schlect (for federal costs) and Paige Piper/Black (for the 
private-sector impact). This estimate was approved by G. Thomas 
Woodward, Assistant Director for Tax Analysis.

                       V. NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

    H.J. Res. 27 does not establish or authorize any new 
advisory committees.

                  VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

    H.J. Res. 27 does not apply to activities relevant to the 
Congressional Accountability Act.

                         VII. FEDERAL MANDATES

    H.J. Res. 27 provides no Federal mandates.

                              VIII. VIEWS

                              ----------                              

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    We support continued U.S. participation in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the ongoing ``Doha Development Round 
Agenda'' of trade negotiations. We strongly disapprove of H.J. 
Res. 27, which would withdraw congressional approval of the 
Agreement establishing the WTO.
    The Doha Round of trade negotiations should be our nation's 
top trade priority, given the magnitude of the potential impact 
of a successful outcome on the U.S. economy, and the potential 
benefits for American workers, farmers and businesses. Ninety-
seven percent of all U.S. trade is with other WTO Members. The 
WTO, and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), have opened foreign markets around the world to 
U.S. goods and services, creating new opportunities for U.S. 
businesses, farmers and workers. The United States has, in 
general, benefitted from the more predictable environment for 
trade fostered by WTO rules and, taken as a whole, the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism.
    Nonetheless, it is important to recognize, particularly on 
this 10-year anniversary of the organization, that there 
remains substantial room for improvement at the WTO. In 
particular, both the ongoing Doha Round negotiations and the 
WTO dispute settlement system are facing significant challenges 
that will need to be addressed to preserve--and, in some cases, 
restore--confidence in the system of rules that undergirds the 
world trading system.
    The Doha Round of negotiations has reached a critical 
phase. It is generally agreed that in order to have a 
successful meeting of ministers this December in Hong Kong, the 
members of the WTO will have to come to a significant level of 
agreement by July in three key areas.
    First, on agriculture, it will be essential that the final 
Doha agreement significantly narrows the gap between U.S. and 
EU spending on farm supports. We are hopeful that Pascal Lamy, 
the former Trade Commissioner of the EU, who recently was named 
the next Director General of the WTO, will provide strong 
leadership in this regard. We suspect that a key reason that so 
many countries placed their confidence in Mr. Lamy is the 
potential that he can persuade his former colleagues in the 
European Commission and EU member states to take the steps 
necessary to accomplish this critical goal.
    Second, the so-called ``non-agricultural market access'' 
(NAMA) negotiations present two key challenges: tariff 
reductions and the elimination or reduction of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). In both of these areas, much work remains to 
be done. In order to produce commercially meaningful results 
for U.S. manufacturers and workers in the Doha Round, it will 
be important to achieve commitments for substantial tariff 
reductions, particularly by advanced developing countries.
    The elimination of non-tariff barriers also is increasingly 
critical for U.S. manufacturers, especially small 
manufacturers, and particularly in large markets such as Japan, 
China and Korea. Because experience has demonstrated that the 
benefits of tariff reduction in the automobile and other 
manufacturing sectors may be undermined by NTBs, U.S. tariff 
commitments should be linked to progress on NTBs.
    Third, there is now widespread agreement that negotiations 
on services are far behind even the other areas of 
negotiations. Services are a priority for the United States, as 
services accounted for approximately 30% of U.S. exports of 
goods and services in 2003. Services industries employ as much 
as 80% of the U.S. workforce. In addition, after this year, 
services trade is likely to be the only area in which the 
United States has a trade surplus--albeit a rapidly shrinking 
one. We hope US. negotiators will be able to make up for lost 
time in the next two months so that an ambitious services 
package will be prepared for approval in Hong Kong.
    Finally, it is essential to take this opportunity of the 
10th anniversary of the WTO to highlight the weaknesses of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. None is as glaring as the 
penchant for overreaching that has been manifest in a 
significant number of WTO decisions.
    Under the old GATT system, silence in an agreement meant 
that a country could do what it deemed appropriate. Under the 
decisions of the Appellate Body and panels of the WTO, silence 
has been altered to mean that the Appellate Body and panels do 
what they think is appropriate.
    The WTO agreements do not give panels this authority, and 
Congress, in approving the WTO Agreements, certainly did not 
intend for panels to have this authority. In short, this 
overreaching must be corrected--fully and quickly. If it is not 
corrected, it risks eroding support for the WTO. In fact, it 
has already begun to do so.
    The number of cases in which overreaching is occurring is 
clear and disturbing. In cases brought against the United 
States since 1995, panels or the Appellate Body have 
overreached in 22 out of 33 instances, or in fully two-thirds. 
Even more disturbing, in 23 instances involving trade remedy 
issues brought against the United States since 1995, there has 
been overreaching in 20 of them--more than 85 percent.
    The consequences of this overreaching are clear. In 10 
years, the WTO has not affirmed a single safeguard measure--as 
applied by the United States or any other country. In trade 
remedy cases involving the United States--antidumping duties, 
countervailing duty measures and safeguards cases--the WTO has 
upheld the U.S. decision in only 2 of 17 cases.
    A growing number of observers is coming to recognize that 
this extraordinary loss rate is because WTO panels and its 
Appellate Body do not respect the letter of the WTO agreements 
and are ``filling in gaps'' beyond what US. negotiators agreed 
to in the Uruguay Round. USTR has even recognized this problem 
with proposals it has made to the dispute settlement 
negotiations in the Doha round.
    The tendency of the WTO dispute settlement panels and 
Appellate Body to overstep their authority is unacceptable and 
damaging to U.S. businesses and workers. Decisions involving 
overreaching undermine confidence in the WTO system and will 
make negotiating new agreements that much harder.
    To conclude, we believe that most of our colleagues in the 
House will agree that, on balance, the benefits of US. 
participation in the WTO outweigh the costs, and that the 
organization has been a positive force in promoting and shaping 
global trade. But we also hope that our colleagues will view 
this ten year anniversary of the WTO as an opportunity to 
assess the WTO's strengths and weaknesses and to develop and 
implement mechanisms for improving the organization.

                                   Charles B. Rangel.
                                   William J. Jefferson.
                                   Rahm Emanuel.
                                   Jim McDermott.
                                   John B. Larson.
                                   Ben Cardin.
                                   Michael R. McNulty.
                                   Sander Levin.
                                   John Lewis.
                                   Xavier Becerra.
                                   Stephanie Tubbs Jones.

                                  
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