J-A06027-19

J-A06028-19

2019 PA Super 175

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WAYNE ALLEN GRAY JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1063 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000226-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NICOLE HELENA BAKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1272 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000047-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2019

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellants Wayne Allen Gray Jr. (Appellant Gray) and Nicole Helena 

Baker (Appellant Baker) appeal1from the judgments of sentence entered 

following their convictions at a joint jury trial.

2 Appellants assert that the trial 

court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained when the police unlawfully 

entered their residence to search for another individual. We agree and vacate 

Appellants’ judgments of sentence and remand for further proceedings.

In this matter, Appellants both were charged with one count each of 

hindering apprehension, obstructing administration of law, and resisting arrest 

after law enforcement conducted a warrantless search of their home on 

December 17, 2016. Appellants filed motions to suppress the evidence 

obtained through the search, arguing that the warrantless entry of their home 

was illegal. The trial court held a hearing on July 21, 2017, at which 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Lucas Hall, Pennsylvania State Police 

Corporal David Julock, and Chambersburg Police Department Corporal Shane 

Good testified. 

Trooper Hall testified that on December 16, 2016, he was on duty on 

the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Trooper Hall received a call for a domestic incident

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1 Because these appeals involve the same facts and raise similar issues, we 

consider the merits of both appeals together.

2 Appellant Gray was convicted of obstructing administration of law, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5101, a misdemeanor of the second degree. Appellant Baker was convicted 

of obstructing administration of law, resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104, a 

misdemeanor of the second degree, and hindering apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5105(a)(1). The hindering apprehension charge was graded as a felony of 

the third degree. 
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that was no longer in progress at a home in Fannett Township. N.T. 

Suppression Hr’g, 7/21/17, at 7. Trooper Hall indicated that it took 

approximately forty-five minutes to reach the home where the incident took 

place. Id. at 9. 

When Trooper Hall arrived at the home, he spoke with Nicole Harry. Id.

at 7. She reported that she was in a verbal argument with her boyfriend, 

Isaiah Baker (Mr. Baker),

3 which she believed would turn physical. Id. at 9. 

She left the residence to call 911 and then he fled the residence. Id. Ms. 

Harry indicated to Trooper Hall that Mr. Baker had kicked the bathroom door 

where she had been hiding. Id. at 14. Trooper Hall observed the bathroom 

door to be broken with a footmark on the door. Id. at 15. Ms. Harry related 

that Mr. Baker was violent to her in the past, she was afraid the altercation 

would become physical, and she was scared for her life. Id. at 9, 16. Trooper 

Hall did not observe any physical injury to Ms. Harry, and Ms. Harry did not 

report suffering physical injury. Id. at 15.

Trooper Hall testified, “[Ms. Harry] had stated that [when Mr. Baker left 

her home,] he had took a gun[4] and an Xbox, along with the ammunition from 

the said gun. . . . The gun was believed to be a high point 380.” Id. at 9. 

Additionally, Trooper Hall received information that Mr. Baker was prohibited 

____________________________________________

3 Mr. Baker is Appellant Baker’s son. 

4 Ms. Harry informed Trooper Hall that she believed the gun was stolen since 

she had seen it that night prior to the incident. N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 16. 

We add that Trooper Julock did not find the gun in Appellants’ residence and 

later learned that the gun was at Ms. Harry’s home. Id. at 24.
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from possessing a firearm due to a prior felony conviction. Id. at 16-17. After 

spending approximately one hour at Ms. Harry’s residence searching for the 

firearm without finding it, Trooper Hall notified Corporal Julock “about the 

things that were missing.” Id. at 11. Ms. Harry did not testify at the 

suppression hearing. 

Corporal Julock testified that he was the State Police shift supervisor for

the overnight shift. Id. at 17-18. Corporal Julock received a call from Trooper 

Hall about “the theft of a handgun during a domestic violence incident up in 

Path Valley.” Id. at 18. According to the corporal, Trooper Hall advised him 

of “the theft of a handgun, who took the handgun [i.e., Mr. Baker], and where 

he possibly could be going.” Id. at 18. Corporal Julock testified that he 

received information that Mr. Baker was going to a residence in 

Chambersburg. Id.

According to Corporal Julock, he arrived at the residence, where he met 

Corporal Good “and a couple other [borough] police officers.” Id. Corporal 

Julock approached Appellants’ residence without a search warrant or an arrest 

warrant. Id. at 28, 31. Corporal Julock testified that “he went to the front 

door, and there was an individual [who] was at the door telling us that we 

needed a search warrant to go into the house.” Id. at 19. Corporal Julock 

then went to the back of the house, where he saw Corporal Good speaking 

with Appellant Baker. Id. Corporal Julock advised Appellant Baker that there 

was a “theft of the handgun and how we don’t need a search warrant because 

we know [Mr. Baker] is in the house at the time. And being probab[le] cause 
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of theft and being a handgun, being a felon, we don’t need a search warrant 

to go in and talk to him.” Id. Corporal Julock stated that Appellant Baker 

was irate and upset, but that he was “trying to reason with her and the other 

people in the house at the time.” Id. 

Corporal Julock then testified that “somebody . . . kept coming to the 

front door,”

5 but that he could not remember who it was. Id. at 20. According 

to the corporal, “[a]fter that we did go into the house.” Id. The corporal 

could not recall whether a State Trooper or a Chambersburg police officer went 

into the house first. Id. Once the corporal entered the residence, he saw two 

individuals were blocking the stairway to the second floor. Id. Ultimately, 

state troopers and local police officers went to the upstairs of Appellants’ 

residence and apprehended Mr. Baker. Id. at 21.

On cross-examination at the suppression hearing, Corporal Julock 

conceded that there was no opportunity for Mr. Baker to harm Ms. Harry at 

the time he entered Appellants’ residence. Id. at 22. Corporal Julock asserted 

that he specifically asked Chambersburg police officers if surveillance was in 

place “in the front and rear of the residence where the individual could leave 

the residence” and was told “yes.” Id. at 25. Further, when defense counsel 

asked whether he could have “secured the scene, and prevented Mr. Baker

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5 The record does not indicate when Corporal Julock went from the back porch 

to the front door of the residence. 
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from leaving, and obtained a warrant[,]” Corporal Julock responded, “We 

could have applied for a warrant, yes.” Id. at 23. 

Corporal Good testified that he was the patrol supervisor of Squad 1 of 

the Chambersburg Police Department. Id. at 26. He received a request from 

the State Police asking his officers to respond to Appellants’ residence in 

Chambersburg and to be on the lookout for Mr. Baker. Id. at 27. Corporal 

Good, who was the first officer to arrive at Appellants’ residence, believed that 

he arrived sometime after midnight. Id. at 31. 

When Corporal Good arrived at the residence, he saw Mr. Baker “walking 

away from” a red vehicle. Id. The corporal then radioed his other officers to 

respond to the residence. According to Corporal Good, “[T]hey set up a 

perimeter, and we kept an eye on the house until State Police arrived.” Id.

at 28. 

According to Corporal Good, he met Corporal Julock when Corporal 

Julock first arrived at the scene. Id. at 28. Corporal Good told Corporal Julock 

that he saw Mr. Baker, and they proceeded to the front door. Id. at 28. 

Appellant Baker answered the door, and “[t]here was some conflict going on 

between the troopers and [Appellant] Baker.” Id. According to Corporal 

Good, “[t]ensions were pretty high.” Id. 

At some point in time, Appellant Baker went to the back of the house, 

and Corporal Good went to speak with her. Corporal Good stated that he 

knew Appellant Baker for a long time, and he wanted to “calm things down.” 

Id. Corporal Good testified:
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We were on the back porch. I asked [Appellant] Baker if she 

would go and get [Mr. Baker], and allow me to talk to him because 

I have known [Mr. Baker] a long time as well. She went to do 

that. I was waiting on the back porch and I heard a loud 

commotion, sounded like a fight going on in the house.

* * *

I entered the house to see what was going on, and I saw troopers 

fighting with [Appellant] Baker and [Appellant] Gray. 

Id. at 29.

The trial court issued an order denying the suppression motions on 

October 6, 2017. In an accompanying opinion, the trial court reasoned that

while some factors weigh in favor of [Appellants], a balancing of 

the factors reveals a leaning toward finding the existence of 

exigent circumstances. . . . “[T]he time of the entry” . . . was at 

night, which leans in favor of [Appellants]. As to . . . “whether the 

officer was in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon”, while the officers were 

following up on a reported stolen weapon, they were not in hot 

pursuit of Mr. Baker. As to . . . “whether there is a likelihood that 

evidence may be destroyed”, the [c]ourt agrees that the likelihood 

of Mr. Baker destroying the firearm he had reportedly stolen was 

not high.

However, the following factors weigh in favor of finding the 

existence of exigent circumstances. As to . . . the “gravity of the 

offense”, Mr. Baker was suspected of engaging in a domestic 

dispute and thereafter stealing a firearm, which, in tandem with 

the fact that he was statutorily prohibited from possessing a 

firearm, constitutes a relatively serious offense. As to . . . 

“whether there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed”, 

given Ms. Harry’s report of Mr. Baker stealing her firearm and 

ammunition, the police had a reasonable belief that Mr. Baker was 

armed. As to . . . “whether there is a clear showing of probable 

cause” and “whether there is a strong showing that the suspect is 

within the premises to be searched”, Ms. Harry’s report of the 

stolen firearm and ammunition considered in tandem with [the] 

confirmation that Mr. Baker was present in the residence results 

in this [c]ourt’s conclusion that there was a clear showing of both 

probable cause and that Mr. Baker was present at the residence 

they sought to search. As to . . . “whether there is a likelihood 
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that the suspect will escape”, Ms. Harry had recently reported that 

Mr. Baker fled her residence following a domestic dispute, which 

supports the possibility that Mr. Baker may have followed suit in 

fleeing the residence if the police waited to obtain a search 

warrant. As to . . . “whether the entry was peaceable”, the officers 

attempted to peaceably enter the residence of [Appellants]. 

Finally, as to . . . “whether there is a danger to police or others”, 

Mr. Baker was suspected of engaging in a domestic dispute and 

thereafter stealing a firearm, which, in tandem with the fact that 

he was statutorily prohibited from possessing a firearm, suggests 

that the police could reasonably have believed there was a danger 

to them or others.

Given the above rationale, this [c]ourt is persuaded that the 

circumstances possessed an exigency rendering the warrantless 

search of the residence of [Appellants] permissible.

Trial Ct. Op. and Order, 11/6/17, at 12-14.

Appellants proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury convicted Appellant 

Gray of obstructing administration of law and Appellant Baker of obstructing 

administration of law, hindering apprehension, and resisting arrest. On June 

27, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant Gray to one to twenty-three 

months’ incarceration and Appellant Baker to two to twenty-three months’ 

incarceration, to be followed by twelve months’ probation. Appellants did not 

file post-sentence motions. 

Appellants filed timely notices of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statements, challenging the trial court’s denial of their suppression 

motions. The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion referring to its 

opinion and order of October 6, 2017. 

In the appeal at 1063 MDA 2018, Appellant Gray raises the following 

question for our review: “Should [Appellant’s] conviction be overturned based 
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on the fact that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the ‘fruits’ of an 

illegal search[?]” Appellant Gray’s Brief at 4.

In the appeal at 1272 MDA 2018, Appellant Baker raises the following 

questions on appeal, which we have reordered:

[1.] Did law enforcement officers enter [Appellant Baker’s] home 

in violation of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions 

such that the trial court erred in denying [Appellant Baker’s]

suppression motion and instructing the jury that no warrant was 

required?

[2.] Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

support [Appellant Baker’s] felony conviction for hindering 

apprehension, where it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that [Appellant Baker] knew the conduct liable to be charged 

against Isaiah Baker would constitute a felony of the first or 

second degree?

[3.] Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant Baker] intended 

to hinder the apprehension of Isaiah Baker; where the evidence 

failed to show that [Appellant Baker] independently knew that 

officers had entered her home to apprehend him, or that officers 

communicated any intent other than to speak with Isaiah Baker 

as part of their investigation[?]

[4.] Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellant Baker] intended to obstruct the administration of law, 

where the Commonwealth failed to establish that [Appellant 

Baker] had any intent other than ensuring that a proper warrant 

was obtained[?]

[5.] Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellant Baker] intended to obstruct the administration of law, 

where the Commonwealth failed to establish that [Appellant 

Baker] had any intent other than ensuring that a proper warrant 

was obtained prior to the officers’ entry into her home[?]

[6.] Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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[Appellant Baker] resisted arrest, where the Commonwealth failed 

to establish that [Appellant Baker] was the subject of a lawful 

arrest?

Appellant Baker’s Brief at 4-6.

We address Appellants’ first issues together. Appellants contend that 

the police did not have a right to enter their residence without a warrant. 

Appellant Gray asserts that,

[l]ooking at the factors [used to determine whether exigent 

circumstances exist] and the heavy burden on the Commonwealth 

together with the fact that . . . exigent circumstances should be 

weighted against the Commonwealth, it is clear that the search of 

a home of [Appellants] was unreasonable. The gravity of the 

offense in question was minor and there was no likelihood that 

[Mr.] Baker would escape. Even though the police conceded the 

house was secure, they entered the home as though it was a 

hostile environment[,] and entry was made at night. 

Furthermore[,] as the officers testified, there was no likelihood 

that the weapon in question would be destroyed in that the 

weapon was not being used at the time of the incident.

Appellant Gray’s Brief at 9-10.

Appellant Baker asserts that 

[w]hile the trial court ruled in connection with the suppression 

hearing that exigent circumstances existed to provide an 

exception to the requirement of a warrant, and instructed the jury 

at trial that a warrant was not required, this ruling and instruction 

are not supported by the evidence presented at either the 

suppression hearing or at trial. 

. . . In this case the officers testified directly that they could have 

[obtained a warrant], but chose not to. . . . [The police officers’]

actions do not support a conclusion that they believed any 

exigency existed. They didn’t force entry on the first contact at 

[Appellants’] front door. . . . The officers’ reason for entering the 

home does not contemplate any exigency. They simply believed 

that [Mr. Baker] had committed a felony and that allowed them to 

enter [Appellants’] home to search for him and question him. Even 

if the officers believed that they had probable cause to arrest [Mr. 
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Baker], they could not have done so by entering [Appellants’]

home without a warrant.

Appellant Baker’s Brief at 20-22.

We review an order denying a motion to suppress as follows:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 190 A.3d 580 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

Generally, 

a search warrant is required before police may conduct any 

search. Absent the application of one of a few clearly delineated 

exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively 

unreasonable. This is the law under both the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.

One such exception to our well-established warrant requirement 

is “exigent circumstances,” which this Court has explained, as 

follows:

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 

requirement recognizes that some situations present a 

compelling need for instant arrest, and that delay to seek a 

warrant will endanger life, limb[,] or overriding law 
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enforcement interests. In these cases, our strong 

preference for use of a warrant must give way to an urgent 

need for immediate action.

Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517-18 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).6 “The Commonwealth must present clear and 

convincing evidence that the circumstances surrounding the opportunity to 

search were truly exigent, . . . and that the exigency was in no way 

attributable to the decision by the police to forego seeking a warrant.” 

Commonwealth v. Rispo, 487 A.2d 937, 940 (Pa. Super. 1985) (citation 

omitted).

A number of factors must be considered to determine whether exigent 

circumstances existed, including:

____________________________________________

6 We note that our Supreme Court recently reiterated that Fourth Amendment 

rights are paramount in the search of a person’s home. See Commonwealth 

v. Romero, 183 A.3d 364, 405-06 (Pa. 2018) (opinion announcing the 

judgment of the court) (noting that even where the police had an arrest 

warrant for an individual who did not live at the defendant’s residence, a 

warrant to search the residence was necessary absent exigent circumstances). 

Indeed, as the Romero Court noted, 

[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the privacy interests in all 

homes. To overcome that privacy interest, a warrant used to enter 

a home must reflect a magisterial determination of probable cause 

to believe that the legitimate object of a search is contained 

therein. . . . If entry into a residence is necessary to search for 

[an] individual, then the warrant must reflect a magisterial 

determination of probable cause to search that residence, 

regardless of whether the warrant is styled as an “arrest warrant” 

or a “search warrant.”

Id. at 403.
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(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is 

reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is above 

and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4) whether 

there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within 

the premises being entered, (5) whether there is a likelihood 

that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) 

whether the entry was peaceable, and (7) the time of the 

entry, i.e., whether it was made at night. These factors are 

to be balanced against one another in determining whether 

the warrantless intrusion was justified.

Other factors may also be taken into account, such as whether 

there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence 

will be destroyed if police take the time to obtain a warrant, or a 

danger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

Ford, 175 A.3d at 990 (quoting Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 

270-71 (Pa. 1994)). We consider the totality of the circumstances “as seen 

through the eyes of the trained officer.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Moreover, 

[e]xigent circumstances exist where the police reasonably believe 

that someone within a residence is in need of immediate aid. 

Additionally, it is widely recognized that situations involving the 

potential for imminent physical harm in the domestic context 

implicate exigencies that may justify limited police intrusion into 

a dwelling in order to remove an item of potential danger. The 

relevant inquiry is whether there was an objectively reasonable 

basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons 

were in danger.

Id. (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). 

In Rispo, police observed a drug dealer enter and leave the defendant’s 

house to obtain methamphetamine to complete a drug deal. Rispo, 487 A.2d 

at 938-39. The officers entered the home and arrested the defendant without 

a warrant. Id. at 939. This Court concluded that exigent circumstances did 

not exist to justify entry into the defendant’s home because there was no 
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evidence that the defendant or other occupants of the home had become 

aware of the police surveillance, it was unlikely that the cash used to buy 

drugs would be destroyed, and “[t]he police could have kept the residence 

under covert surveillance in relative safety until a warrant was obtained.” Id.

at 941.

In Commonwealth v. Martin, 620 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Super. 1993) (per 

curiam), a woman saw her ex-husband in the defendant’s home. Martin, 620 

A.2d at 1195. The woman knew there were warrants out for her ex-husband’s 

arrest and called the police to inform them of his whereabouts. Id. The police 

arrived at the defendant’s house and informed the defendant that they had an 

arrest warrant and were going to search her house for the man. Id. The 

defendant objected to the search since the police did not have a search 

warrant. Id. Nevertheless, the officers searched the defendant’s home and 

discovered the man in a hidden room on the third floor. Id. Following these 

events, the defendant was charged with hindering apprehension. Id. She 

filed a motion to suppress evidence of the discovery of the arrestee in her 

home, which the trial court denied. Id. This Court reversed, holding that, 

under Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the arrest warrant 

for the man did not authorize the search of the home in the absence of exigent 

circumstances. Id. at 1196.

In Commonwealth v. Wright, 742 A.2d 661 (Pa. 1999), our Supreme 

Court contemplated 18 Pa.C.S. § 2711(b), which requires the seizure of 
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weapons in certain cases involving domestic violence, in the context of a 

warrantless search to obtain such weapons.7 

In that case, the defendant forcefully removed his wife from their bed 

and then fired a shot from a nine-millimeter handgun, which grazed her scalp 

and fractured her skull. Wright, 742 A.2d at 662. The police arrested the 

defendant and secured the scene. Id. Approximately two hours later, without 

obtaining consent from the defendant or his wife, the police searched for and 

found the handgun that the defendant used. The defendant filed a motion to 

suppress the gun, claiming the police should have obtained a warrant to 

search the residence. Id. at 663. Our Supreme Court held that although 

Section 2711(b) suggests that an arresting officer is obligated to confiscate 

weapons used in the domestic violence incident, “the seizure of a weapon 

pursuant to Section 2711(b) is subject to the limits of existing Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 664.

The Commonwealth also argued in Wright that exigent circumstances 

existed to satisfy an exception to the search warrant requirement. Id. 

However, as the Supreme Court noted:

It is widely recognized that situations involving the potential for 

imminent physical harm in the domestic context implicate 

exigencies that may justify limited police intrusion into a dwelling 

in order to remove an item of potential danger. Indeed, some 

courts have gone so far as to suggest that a report of domestic 

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7 Section 2711(b) states that “[t]he arresting police officer shall seize all 

weapons used by the defendant in the commission of the alleged offense[, as 

enumerated in Section 2711(a)].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2711(b).
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violence is sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant such an 

entry. Other courts have remained more circumspect.

This is not, however, a case in which the delay occasioned 

by obtaining a warrant would have subjected a victim of 

domestic abuse to further risk of physical harm—at the 

time the search was conducted, the potential for imminent 

violence had been eliminated.

Id. at 664-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In the instant matter, similar to the defendant in Martin, Appellants did 

not consent to the search of their home. The police entered and searched 

Appellants’ residence despite Appellant Baker’s protests that they needed a 

search warrant to do so. Further, the police did not have an arrest warrant 

for Mr. Baker, as they did for the individual sought in Martin, where it violated 

third-party Fourth Amendment rights to search a home without a search 

warrant. See Martin, 620 A.2d at 1196. Accordingly, unless exigent 

circumstances existed, the police did not have the authority to search 

Appellants’ home. 

Although the police officers may have suspected that Mr. Baker was 

armed, based on our review of the record, we agree with Appellants that 

exigent circumstances did not exist to support the warrantless entry of 

Appellants’ residence. While Ms. Harry may have believed that Mr. Baker stole

her firearm because she last saw the gun the night before the incident, there 

is no indication that she observed him taking it. In fact, Ms. Harry’s gun was 

later located in her home. 

Furthermore, the time of entry was at night, there was no apparent 

danger to the police or other persons in the residence, and Mr. Baker was not 
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fleeing from police. In fact, the police observed Mr. Baker walking from his 

car toward Appellants’ house. Moreover, there was little likelihood that 

evidence could be destroyed or that Mr. Baker could escape from the home, 

since the police, including multiple state and local police officers, had arrived 

and were surveilling all of the exits to the residence. Indeed, Trooper Julock 

conceded that he could have obtained a warrant before approaching 

Appellants’ home. See N.T. Suppression H’rg at 23. 

Finally, Mr. Baker’s alleged possession of a firearm did not create 

exigent circumstances. Mr. Baker allegedly stole a gun during an earlier

incident with Ms. Harry in Fannett Township. Later, when Mr. Baker arrived 

at Appellants’ house in Chambersburg, he was at a different location than the 

earlier incident, and Ms. Harry was not present. As in Wright, this was not a

“case in which the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would have 

subjected a victim of domestic abuse to further risk.” See Wright, 742 A.2d 

at 665. Since Appellant was no longer in Ms. Harry’s presence, “the potential 

for imminent violence had been eliminated.” See id. Moreover, there was no 

indication that Mr. Baker or any of the occupants of the home were aware of

the police surveillance outside the home. See Rispo, 487 A.2d at 941.

Therefore, under these circumstances, the Commonwealth failed to 

establish clear and convincing evidence that there was a compelling need to 

enter Appellants’ residence to arrest Mr. Baker. See Caple, 121 A.3d at 518. 

Although there was a concern that Mr. Baker may have been armed, there 

was no imminent threat of a risk to life, limb, or an overriding law enforcement 
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interest. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it 

found exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry into Appellants’ 

home.

8

 See Ford, 175 A.3d at 989.

Judgments of sentence vacated. Orders denying suppression of 

evidence obtained during search of Appellants’ home reversed. Remanded for 

further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2019

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8

In light of our decision to reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling and the 

possibility of further proceedings on remand, we decline to consider Appellant 

Baker’s remaining challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. On remand, 

it will be incumbent upon the Commonwealth to determine whether adequate 

evidence remains to proceed.