UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case Number: 20-22044-CIV-MARTINEZ-OTAZO-REYES

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE 

CO. et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MANUEL FEIJOO, M.D., et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon three pending Motions to Dismiss. Specifically, 

this Order addresses Defendants Manuel Martinez Varela and We Care Medical Services, Inc.’s 

Motion to Dismiss (“We Care Motion to Dismiss”), [ECF No. 23]; Defendants Miami Medical 

Group, Inc., Juan Jimenez, Graciela Jimenez, Jose Marquez, M.D., Maria Nodarse, D.C., Yara 

Vazquez, and Hai Uzan’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 

12(b)(6) (“Miami Medical’s Motion to Dismiss”), [ECF No. 24]; and Defendant Feijoo’s Motion 

to Dismiss and to Strike, [ECF No. 38] (collectively, “Motions to Dismiss” or “Motions”). 

On March 2, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the foregoing Motions. The Court has

carefully considered the Motions, Plaintiffs’ Responses in Opposition thereto, the parties’ 

respective oral arguments, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise duly advised in 

the premises. The Motions are granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs (“GEICO”) bring this action against a series of healthcare clinics seeking to 

recover approximately $3.1 million for allegedly submitting thousands of fraudulent “no-fault” 

insurance charges, also known as “personal injury protection” or “PIP” charges. GEICO alleges 

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that Defendants provided “medically unnecessary, illusory, unlawful, and otherwise nonreimbursable health care services, including putative initial examinations, follow up examinations, 

range of motion testing, muscle strength testing, and physical therapy services” to Florida 

automobile accident victims eligible for coverage under GEICO’s PIP insurance policies. Compl. 

¶ 1. GEICO also seeks a declaration that it is not legally obligated to reimburse Defendants on any 

currently outstanding PIP charges that Plaintiffs contend are also fraudulent. Id. at ¶ 2. Specifically, 

GEICO alleges that Defendants’ billing records falsely represented that Defendants were operating 

in compliance with Florida’s Health Care Clinic Act, Florida’s Patient Brokering Act, and 

Florida’s Self-Referral Act. Id. According to GEICO, the Defendants were not only non-compliant 

with the foregoing statutes and regulations, but were also billing for noncompensable services and 

services that were never actually performed. Id.

In sum, GEICO alleges that these clinics lacked the required licenses to collect no-fault 

insurance benefits; unlawfully billed for services done by massage therapists or chiropractic 

assistants who were not supervised by a doctor or licensed physical therapist; did not appoint 

legitimate medical directors; inflated the degree of clients’ injuries; upcoded and overbilled for 

unnecessary or non-existent examinations and therapies; offered, solicited, or otherwise provided 

kickbacks, or engaged in a fee-splitting arrangement; and referred patients to health care entities 

in which the providers were investors or had an investment interest. 

Based on these allegations, GEICO asserts thirty-four (34) counts seeking a declaratory 

judgment and alleging various violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)–(d), violations of the 

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201–501.213, violations of 

Florida’s Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 772.101–772.19, common law 

fraud, and unjust enrichment. GEICO has named twenty (20) Defendants, including five medical 

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clinics, the clinics’ owners, the clinics’ appointed medical directors, physicians associated with the 

clinics, and the clinics’ massage therapists.1

The movants offer several grounds for dismissal, most of which are universal to all three 

motions. Namely, all Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Complaint lacks the requisite particularity 

under Rule 9(b) for their claims sounding in fraud. In a similar vein, Defendants contend that the 

Complaint impermissibly lumps the Defendants together, constitutes an impermissible shotgun 

pleading, and cannot plausibly allege claims for fraud because Plaintiffs’ allegations show an 

absence of justifiable reliance. 

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” 

it must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the 

complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, including documents referred to in the complaint that 

are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); 

Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] document 

outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff’s 

claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.”). As a general rule, “[i]n ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, the court must accept the well pleaded facts as true and resolve them in the light most 

1 The case has been stayed as to Defendant Jose Estevez based on a Suggestion of Bankruptcy. See ECF 

Nos. 42, 50. Additionally, GEICO has since voluntarily dismissed Defendant Tony Nguyen, D.O., without 

prejudice. See ECF Nos. 57, 60. 

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favorable to the plaintiff.” St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 795 F.2d at 954. Nonetheless, courts “are not 

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

The Court will first set forth the applicable statutory and regulatory framework, and then 

address the merits of Defendants’ Motions.

A. Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law

Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law (“No-Fault Law”) requires automobile insurers to 

provide PIP coverage to victims of motor vehicle accidents “for reasonable, necessary, related 

and lawful treatment, without regard to fault.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. B&A Diagnostic, 

Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 627.730–627.7405). 

Covered medical benefits include reimbursement only for “services and care that are lawfully 

provided, supervised, ordered or prescribed....” Fla. Stat. § 627.736(1)(a)(1). Under the No-Fault 

Law, “lawful” or “lawfully” means “in substantial compliance with all relevant applicable 

criminal, civil, and administrative requirements of state and federal law related to the provision 

of medical services or treatment.” Id. § 627.732(11). 

Insurers are not required to pay a claim (1) for any service or treatment that was not lawful 

at the time rendered; (2) to any person who knowingly submits a false or misleading statement 

relating to the claim; (3) with respect to a bill that does not substantially meet the statute’s billing 

requirements; or (4) for any service or treatment that is “upcoded.” See id. § 627.736(5)(b). 

“Upcoding” is defined as “an action that submits a billing code that would result in payment 

greater in amount that would be paid using a billing code that accurately describes the services 

performed.” Id. § 627.732(14).

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To satisfy the statute’s billing requirements, service providers, like the Defendants here, 

must properly complete and submit applicable Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

(“CMS”) billing forms; use proper CPT codes; and ensure statements of medical services do not 

include charges for services provided by an entity without valid licensure to perform such 

services. See id. § 627.736(5)(d). Additionally, to be eligible for PIP reimbursement, healthcare 

services must be medically necessary. See id. § 627.736(1)(a). To be considered “medically 

necessary,” the underlying healthcare service must be (a) provided in accordance with generally 

accepted standards of medical practice; (b) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, 

extent, site, and duration; and (c) not be primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, 

or other healthcare provider. See id. § 627.732(2). 

The No-Fault Law also specifically precludes reimbursement for massage therapy. 

Reimbursable medical benefits “do not include massage...regardless of the person, entity, or 

licensee providing massage...and a licensed massage therapist...may not be reimbursed for 

medical benefits under this section.” Id. § 627.736(1)(a)(5); see also Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. 

Quality Diagnostic Health Care, Inc., No. 18-20101-CIV, 2019 WL 1383654, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 

Feb. 26, 2019) (holding while it is not unlawful for unsupervised massage therapists to practice 

limited forms of physical therapy incidental to their massage practice, to the extent these services 

are performed without supervision by another licensed medical professional, they constitute 

massage rather than physical therapy and are therefore non-reimbursable). On the other hand, a 

registered chiropractic assistant may assist with patient examinations or treatments other than 

manipulations or adjustments, provided that they are working under the direct supervision and 

responsibility of a licensed chiropractor or certified chiropractic physician’s assistant. See Fla. 

Stat. § 460.4166(2); see also Fla Stat. § 460.4166(1). 

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B. The Health Care Clinic Act

The Florida legislature enacted the Health Care Clinic Act (“Clinic Act”) to improve the 

regulation of health care clinics throughout the state. See Fla. Stat. § 400.990; see also Gov’t 

Emps. Ins. Co. v. DG Esthetic and Therapy Ctr., Inc., No. 18-20921-CIV, 2019 WL 1992930, at 

*6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2019). As part of this comprehensive oversight plan, the Clinic Act requires 

health care clinics to appoint a medical director. See Fla. Stat. § 400.9935(1) (clinics owned by 

non-licensed individuals shall “appoint a medical director who shall agree in writing to accept 

legal responsibility for [certain] activities on behalf of the clinic.”). A medical director typically 

must review patient referral contracts and maintain compliance with statutory recordkeeping 

requirements. See id. Medical directors are also required to review clinic billings to ensure they 

are lawful. See id. 

The Clinic Act also provides an exemption for health clinics “that [are] wholly owned by 

one or more licensed health care practitioners...if one of the owners who is a licensed health care 

practitioner is supervising the business activities and is legally responsible for the entity’s 

compliance with all federal and state laws.” See Fla. Stat. § 400.9905(4)(g). Nonetheless, under 

this exemption, “a health care practitioner may not supervise services beyond the scope of that 

practitioner’s license.” Id. Importantly, “[a] charge or reimbursement claim made by or on behalf 

of a clinic that is...operating in violation of this part, regardless of whether a service is rendered 

or whether the charge or reimbursement claim is paid, is an unlawful charge and is 

noncompensable and unenforceable.” Id. § 400.9935(3).

C. The Patient Brokering Act and the Self-Referral Act

Florida’s Patient Brokering Act broadly prohibits offering or paying any “commission, 

benefit, bonus, rebate, kickback, or bribe, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind” or engaging “in 

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any split-fee arrangement, in any form whatsoever, to induce the referral of a patient or patronage 

to or from a health care provider or health care facility.” Fla. Stat. § 817.505(1)(a). The statute also 

prohibits soliciting or receiving any such commission, as well as aiding or otherwise participating 

in conduct prohibited by the statute. See id. § 817.505(1)(b)–(d).

Similarly, the pertinent portions of Florida’s Self-Referral Act state that “[a] health care 

provider may not refer a patient for the provision of designated health services to an entity in which 

the health care provider is an investor or has an investment interest.” Fla. Stat. § 456.053(5)(a).

Additionally, “[n]o claim for payment may be presented by an entity to any individual, third-party 

payor, or other entity for a service furnished pursuant to a referral prohibited under this section.” 

Id. § 456.053(5)(c).

D. Arguments for Dismissal

Having outlined the applicable statutory framework, the Court now turns to Defendants’

arguments for dismissal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires “a short and plain 

statement...showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). GEICO’s

Complaint here is neither short nor plain. Indeed, it contains thirty-four (34) causes of action 

compiled into over 1,134 paragraphs spanning 312 pages—not including subparagraphs or the 554 

pages of exhibits attached thereto. The Court appreciates that this a complex civil conspiracy case. 

And the Court is cognizant of the fact that “a complaint...will not fail for mere surplusage,” so 

long as it is sufficient to give Defendants notice of the claims against them. Bailey v. Janssen 

Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 F. App’x 597, 603 (11th Cir. 2008); see Lenz v. Michaels Org., LLC, No 

8:19-cv-2950-TPB-AEP, 2020 WL 6119376, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2020) (“Although the 

complaint is unnecessarily lengthy...the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient to give 

Defendants notice....”). Nonetheless, as this Court has warned GEICO in the past, “the 

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particularity requirement under 9(b) does not excuse a lack of editing for efficiency.” Gov’t Emps. 

Ins. Co. v. A&C Med. Ctr. Servs., Corp., No. 18-24198-CIV, ECF No. 114 at 3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 

2019). Accordingly, this Court will again require GEICO to file an amended—and much shorter—

complaint, specifically to cure “GEICO’s penchant for repetition and addition of unnecessary legal 

authority.”

2

Id.; see also Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Merced, No. 8:20-cv-00802-KKM-AAS, Pretrial 

Conf. Tr. 5:10–7:25, ECF No. 97 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2020) (while not making a merits 

determination, requiring GEICO to file amended, shortened complaint in similar case, citing 

concerns about misjoinder and failure to comply with Rule 8).3

Nonetheless, as this Court has noted in a similar case brought by GEICO, “[t]his case is 

not unique.” A&C Med. Ctr. Servs., Corp., ECF No. 114 at 2. Several courts throughout the 

Eleventh Circuit, including this one, have already rejected many of the dismissal arguments the 

movants raise here based on lack of particularity, purported shotgun pleading4, and implausibility. 

See, e.g., id.; DG Esthetic and Therapy Ctr., Inc., 2019 WL 1992930, at *6; Quality Diagnostic 

Health Care, Inc., 2019 WL 1383654, at *6; Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Alternative Med. Ctr. of Fla., 

Inc., No. 16-24035-CIV, ECF No. 17 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2017); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. AFO 

Imaging, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-2419-VMC-CPT, 2021 WL 734575, at *4–12 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 

2021); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. KJ Chiropractic Ctr. LLC, No. 16:12-cv-1138-Orl-36DAB, 2013 

2 As just one example, neither the Court nor the Defendants need to be told more than once which organ 

systems are recognized by the CPT Assistant. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 406, 596, 742. Nor does the Complaint

need to include verbatim clinical examples for various CPT codes. Persistent repetitive summaries of the 

relevant statutory schemes are unnecessary, inefficient, and may lead to confusion (or annoyance).

3 The Court shares Judge Honeywell’s concerns about potential misjoinder, especially where it is unclear 

how the separate clinics are related to one another aside from the fact that they all have hired Dr. Feijoo on 

some level. This is also likely why the Complaint reads as five separate complaint/summary judgment

hybrids.

4 With the exception of GEICO’s claim for declaratory relief, as discussed supra.

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WL 12155947, at *3–8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by 2014 

WL 12617566 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014).

While Defendants contend that they have not been adequately informed of the nature of 

their participation in the alleged frauds, the Court finds that the detailed allegations, coupled with 

the exhibits attached to the Complaint, suffice at the motion to dismiss stage. See id. Again, “[t]he 

Court will not reinvent the wheel here.” A&C Med. Ctr. Servs., Corp., ECF No. 114 at 3. Aside 

from the issues set forth below, the Court will not delve into a full-scale analysis of the Complaint’s 

sufficiency based on particularity or alleged shotgun pleading.

Additionally, Defendants’ arguments as to GEICO’s failure to act as a reasonable consumer 

are unpersuasive.

5

See Suite 225, Inc. v. Lantana Ins. Ltd., 625 F. App'x 502, 508 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(agreeing with lower court decision that found an insured's argument “absurd” that insurer “should 

have conducted a more thorough investigation” and agreeing further that “the insurer is entitled to 

rely on the representations of an insured, without checking all its files to determine if the insured 

is committing a fraud”). To the extent that GEICO knew or should have known about Defendants’

alleged fraudulent billing practices, any evidence of that can be—and is more appropriately—

adduced at the summary judgment stage.

1. Extent of Supervision Issue

Miami Medical’s Motion to Dismiss raises an argument seemingly absent from the plethora 

5 We Care Medical’s contention that GEICO lacks standing because Florida’s healthcare licensing and 

compliance statutes and regulations, such as the Clinic Act, the Patient Brokering Act, and the Self-Referral 

Act, do not create private rights of actions is also misplaced. And has previously been rejected by other 

courts. See KJ Chiropractic Ctr. LLC, 2013 WL 12155947, at *6. Plaintiffs are not seeking relief under 

these statutes; they are citing the alleged violation of these statutes as support for their claims of fraud. This 

is sufficient. Id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, 

LLC, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1329 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2017) (finding that plaintiff did “not attempt to assert 

a private cause of action for violations of the Patient-Brokering, Anti-Kickback, Anti-Rebate, or Insurance 

Fraud Statutes, but rather contends that that defendants’ conduct in violation of these statutes is unjust....”) 

(cleaned up).

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of GEICO’s fraudulent PIP-claim cases in this Circuit, at least at the motion to dismiss stage. 

Essentially, Defendants argue that GEICO’s contention that “direct supervision” is required is a 

self-serving legal construction of the applicable statutes, when in reality, and at the very least, it is 

unclear what constitutes appropriate supervision. Therefore, according to Defendants, even if 

GEICO is correct in its interpretation that the statutes require direct supervision, GEICO cannot 

plead that the Defendants knowingly committed fraud under the No-Fault Law. See ECF No. 24 at 

4–5. If it was unclear what level of supervision is required, Defendants could not have knowingly 

defrauded GEICO. 

The No-Fault Law instructs that a person acts “knowingly” when “a person, with respect 

to information, has actual knowledge of the information; acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth 

or falsity of the information; or acts in reckless disregard of the information, and proof of specific 

intent to defraud is not required.” See Fla. Stat. § 627.732(10) (emphasis added). First, GEICO 

alleges not only that the extent of supervision was inappropriate under the statute, but also that 

Defendants were billing for services provided without any supervision whatsoever. These 

allegations describe activity that would undoubtedly fall short of the definition of appropriate 

supervision, whether that definition is clear or not. Additionally, even if the Court were to agree 

that the level of supervision required is not firmly established, at the motion to dismiss phase, it is 

enough that GEICO has alleged that the Defendants knew that they were submitting claims without 

the requisite level of supervision. And the factual allegations provided in support of this assertion 

are sufficient to establish at least the plausibility of Defendants’ knowledge. The veracity of that 

assertion is better determined at a later stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court will not 

dismiss the Complaint on this basis.

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2. Defendants Yara Vazquez & Hai Uzan

Defendant Vazquez is a licensed massage therapist and a registered chiropractic assistant 

in Florida. Defendant Uzan is also a licensed massage therapist in Florida. Both Defendants are 

alleged to have “purported to perform many of the [f]raudulent services on behalf of Miami 

Medical.” Compl. ¶¶ 3(xii)–(xiii). Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to set forth any 

allegations that Vazquez and Uzan actually participated in the fraud, aside from providing the 

services they were hired to perform. It is true that the Complaint suggests these individuals played 

a minor role by simply performing the therapy; nonetheless, this goes to the extent of their 

knowledge of the fraud, which, again, is better determined at a later stage of the proceedings. At 

the motion to dismiss phase, it is sufficient to allege that they indeed knowingly participated in 

Miami Medical’s allegedly fraudulent billing practices by misrepresenting the level of supervision 

they were receiving while providing physical therapy to patients.

3. Declaratory Judgment

In Count I of the Complaint, GEICO seeks declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. Specifically, GEICO seeks a judgment declaring that 

“Feijoo, P.A., We Care, New Life, Accident Rehab, and Miami Medical have no right to receive 

payment for any pending bills submitted to GEICO.” Compl. ¶ 888 (emphasis added). According 

to GEICO, there remains more than $75,000.00 in pending fraudulent claims submitted. Id. ¶ 886.

The Supreme Court has noted that “district courts possess discretion in determining 

whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit 

otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdiction prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 

277, 289 (1995). Courts in this Circuit have differed as to whether allegations of this kind create a 

justiciable controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Compare Gov’t Emps. 

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Ins. Co. v. Alternative Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc., No. 16-24035-CIV, 2017 WL 9360860, at *3 (S.D. 

Fla. June 30, 2017) (finding that there is a “substantial controversy” as to “whether GEICO is 

required to pay the allegedly fraudulent bills submitted by [defendants]”) with KJ Chiropractic

Ctr. LLC, 2013 WL 12155947, at *7–8 (finding that the majority of the declaratory relief sought 

by GEICO was “addressed to injuries alleged to have occurred in the past,” and therefore 

insufficient to assert a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act). 

For purposes of this case, the Court takes issue with a few things. First, “Plaintiffs seeks

several declarations regarding a variety of contested legal and factual issues against differing 

Defendants, all in one count.” KJ Chiropractic Ctr. LLC, 2013 WL 12155947, at *7. What’s more, 

GEICO seeks blanket relief as to any of the pending claims from all Defendants, without parsing 

which amount is attributed to each or how each pending claim is alleged to be fraudulent. This 

violates the pleading standards set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 10 (each claim to be stated in a separate count); see also KJ Chiropractic Ctr. LLC, 2013 

WL 12155947, at *7. As such, Count I is dismissed without prejudice.

E. Feijoo Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading... 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Striking a 

pleading is considered a “drastic remedy” and is generally viewed “with disfavor.” See Exhibit 

Icons, LLC v. XP Cos., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Gill-Samuel v. Nova 

Biomedical Corp., 298 F.R.D. 693, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2014). A motion to strike will therefore be 

denied “unless the material has no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to 

one of the parties.” Williams v. Delray Auto Mall, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 697, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2013).

The allegations that Defendants contend should be stricken do not meet this rigorous 

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standard. Therefore, the Feijoo Defendants’ request to strike is denied.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, [ECF Nos. 23, 24, 38], are GRANTED IN PART 

and DENIED IN PART as set forth herein.

2. Count I of the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

3. GEICO shall file an amended complaint of no more than seventy-five (75) pages, 

exclusive of exhibits, on or before April 9, 2021.

4. Defendants shall answer the amended complaint within ten (10) days of its filing.

If GEICO includes amended requests for declaratory relief, Defendants may move to dismiss as to 

those counts only.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 19th day of March 2021.

___________________________________

JOSE E. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies provided to:

Magistrate Judge Otazo-Reyes

All counsel of record

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