BLD-199 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

No. 19-3438 

___________ 

MICHAEL ROBINSON, 

 Appellant 

v. 

GEISINGER HOSPITAL; DONALD ZYCOSKI; DAWN FAUST; 

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH; GEISINGER MEDICAL CENTER; ANTHONY 

MATULEWICZ; DEGG STARK; MAUREEN TROUTMAN; DAVID FEINBERG; 

SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPT; ROBERT SHLABY; SHAMOKIN CITY; 

NORTHUMBERLAND COURT SYSTEM; NORTHUMBERLAND TAX OFFICE; 

NORTHUMBERLAND BOARD OF ELECTIONS; NORTHUMBERLAND 

CHILDREN AND YOUTH; NORTHUMBERLAND SPECIAL CONFLICTS; 

NORTHUMBERLAND DA OFFICE; NORTHUMBERLAND MENTAL HEALTH; 

NORTHUMBERLAND PUBLIC DEFENDERS; NORTHUMBERLAND 

DOMESTICS; SARA RODOMSKI; STACEY RODOMSKI; BRITTANY RODOMSKI; 

LAURA TROUTMAN; AQUA; MAYOR JOHN BROWN; JOHN BROWN, JR.; 

COUNCILMAN RHODES; MARC LIEBERMAN; SAGE, COAL TOWNSHIP 

POLICE OFFICER; WILLIE OLLIE MARTIN, SR.; DAN MCGRAW; GENEE 

SHAFER; JOSEPH LESCHINSKI; VINCENT ROVITO; RICHARD BOZZA; NICOLE 

BOZZA; RICHARD SLABY; BRUCE ROGERS; FRANK KONOPKA; OFFICER 

PRIMERANO; SCOTT WEAVER, SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF 

TOBIAS; SHAMOKIN CITY COUNCIL; AMANDA MILLER, 

NORTHUMBERLAND CHILDREN AND YOUTH; VINNY CLAUSI, EX COUNTY 

COMM.; SCOTT ROUGHTON; MALOURI, SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

SIKO, SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMENT; JUDGE ROSINI; JUDGE DIEHL; 

JUDGE JONES; JUDGE COLE; JUDGE WILLIAMS, JR. 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 4-18-cv-00989) 
2 

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

May 14, 2020 

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: May 22, 2020) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Michael Robinson appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his 

complaint for failure to state a claim. We will affirm. 

I. 

 Robinson is a former candidate for mayor of Shamokin, Pennsylvania. In this case, 

which is one of several related actions that he has filed,1

 Robinson filed suit under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against an entity he identified as Geisinger Hospital. 

Robinson alleged that a Geisinger employee improperly accessed his phone while he was 

involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment. Following various orders and 

additional filings, a Magistrate Judge ultimately allowed Robinson to file a Third 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 

1

 See M.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 4-17-cv-1321, 4-17-cv-1322 & 4-17-cv-1416. The District 
3 

Amended Complaint. 

 In that complaint, Robinson named over 60 defendants and alleged a wide-ranging 

conspiracy to harm him in retaliation for his mayoral candidacy, during which he claims 

to have uncovered evidence of criminal activity. Robinson alleged that defendants, inter 

alia, obtained his involuntary commitment, prosecuted him (successfully) for harassing 

his own lawyer and his mayoral opponent, refused to investigate his complaint that his 

opponent accused him of pedophilia, caused him to lose custody of his children, 

wrongfully ticketed his car for parking violations, and planned to murder him. Among 

the forms of relief he requested were the referral of criminal charges to state and federal 

Attorneys General and an order appointing Robinson as a “special RICO investigator/ 

attorney” to investigate defendants’ alleged pension fraud and other matters. 

The Magistrate Judge screened Robinson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) and recommended that the District Court dismiss Robinson’s federal 

claims for failure to state a claim and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

his state-law claims. The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the District Court 

dismiss Robinson’s federal claims with prejudice and without further leave to amend on 

the ground that further amendment would be futile. In addition, the Magistrate Judge 

recommended denying some 30 motions that Robinson had filed seeking restraining 

orders, the institution of criminal charges, and other forms of relief. 

Court dismissed those actions, but Robinson did not appeal. 
4 

Robinson filed objections but did not raise any specific challenge to the Magistrate 

Judge’s analysis. Over those objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation, dismissed Robinson’s complaint, and denied his pending 

motions. Robinson appeals.2

II. 

 We will affirm largely for the reasons explained by the Magistrate Judge. In brief, 

Robinson raised no specific allegations regarding most of the defendants and his largely 

conclusory allegations against others fail to state a federal claim. 

Robinson’s only specific allegation that might conceivably have supported such a 

claim is his allegation that a Municipal Court clerk “forged” a judge’s signature on a 

November 2018 warrant for non-payment of fines and that, as a result, the judge 

2

 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We typically review de novo the 

dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 

186 (3d Cir. 2015); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We do so in 

this case even though Robinson did not file meaningful objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s recommendation because the Magistrate Judge’s report did not warn Robinson 

that his failure to object could subject him to plain-error review. See EEOC v. City of 

Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing, inter alia, Leyva v. Williams, 

504 F.3d 357, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2007)). To state a claim, the complaint must contain 

“sufficient factual matter; accepted as true; to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

[its] face.” Fantone, 780 F.3d at 193 (quotation marks omitted). We review for abuse of 

discretion the District Court’s dismissal without leave to amend, see Shifflett v. 

Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2019), and its decision not to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction, see Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). In 

addition to filing his notice of appeal, Robinson filed with the District Court motions that 

could be construed as ones for reconsideration, which the District Court has denied. 

Those rulings are not before us because Robinson has not challenged them by filing a 

new or amended notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
5 

“vacated” the warrant. (ECF No. 59 at 7, 11.) As the Magistrate Judge explained, 

however, that allegation does not state a Fourth Amendment claim because Robinson 

does not allege that he was arrested or otherwise seized pursuant to that warrant. See 

Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017). Nor did Robinson allege sufficient 

detail regarding this incident, or any other, to state a plausible federal claim. 

We also see no basis to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that any further 

amendment of Robinson’s complaint would have been futile. Robinson’s numerous 

filings on appeal do not suggest otherwise and, to the contrary, tend to confirm that 

conclusion. Finally, because the District Court properly dismissed all claims over which 

it had original jurisdiction, the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Robinson’s state-law claims. See Kach, 589 F.3d 

at 650 (citing, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). In that regard, we construe the District 

Court’s dismissal of those claims as one without prejudice. See id. 

III. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. The motion 

of appellees Geisinger Hospital, et al., for leave to file a reply is granted in part and 

denied in part.3

 All other pending motions are denied. 

3

 These appellees seek leave to file a surreply in opposition to Robinson’s document titled 

“brief-motion-order,” in which he requests an order directing defendants not to contact 

him. Appellees do so in order to advise us that Robinson has sent them documents that 

could be deemed threatening, and they further request an order directing Robinson to 

“cease and desist such communications.” The parties’ filings do not reveal the need for 
6 

such relief at this time, and appellees’ motion is denied to that extent. Appellees’ motion 

is granted, however, to the extent that they seek leave to file their surreply.