AlllOb 323M7E

NBS

PUBLICATIONS

NBSIR 80-2038

Psychological Deterrents to

Nuclear Theft:

An Updated Literature Review and

Bibliography

George W. Lapinsky, Jr. Clare Goodman

Center for Consumer Product Technology

National Engineering Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Prepared by

Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory

U S. Department of Commerce

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

May 1980

Issued June 1980

epared for durety and Operations Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, D.C. 20305

This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under'

^QC"M f B99QAXRA101 and Work Unit Code 08

100

.056

80-2038

1980

c. 2

NBSIR 80-2038

It* PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS TO

NUCLEAR THEFT:

AN UPDATED LITERATURE REVIEW AND

BIBLIOGRAPHY

HATIONAI. BOatAV

or afAVOAHSB

UBBARTf

JUL 1 1 1980

Hot ac-c -Ci^c.

Q.UOO

. (JL‘S^

(no. Bo -^0x33

t.9-

George W. Lapinsky, Jr. Clare Goodman

Center for Consumer Product Technology

National Engineering Laboratory

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Prepared by

Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

May 1980

Issued June 1980

Prepared for Surety and Operations Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, D.C. 20305

DATE DUE

DEC 31 2PI IS

This work was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency under;

Subtask Code B99QAXRA101 and Work Unit Code 08

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary

Luther H. Hodges, Jr., Deputy Secretary

Jordan J. Baruch, Assistant Secretary for Productivity, Technoiogy, and Innovation

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler. Director
ptnj

i y

oEst I : m

V

.'*4

' 1. .1

* $

JV

r'li^ ~^: ” ’

^i’*' OT JiTW*3infl3T30 JA3iaOJOH3V8‘»

p^. ,

" _., , ,«... :Tft3Ht HA3JW»/l ,

- WBP' i:^^''%w«tAfilaiJgta .-“

'

'beSs-'^SB WSfw

'?.i' r'Vi’ >.5 «!

,m.

'•5 '

'iilir-'

.il'( *«BWP“ _ 1.

' "^>sS:6i 3-tr.rtc>t«nSpt:w

' 0> 'A'Y »*> T W» , « '

' ^ -V *

. Jt ..'iSu' .

j i^#j

-iffrsffli '

'

' •'/ vwj

. e)aiojoaiiO ^

F -„i#

'-» £S'::„i * •U(TI'l*^ M4

m

1 ,^-.s

P-%

.M

^

-aoB ji!^^ 'iC
Acl' novrledaments

The authors of this report wish to thank Fharon Lyles for an outstanding

job of typing the original manuscript and revisions. Special thanks also to

Arnold Perrey for his translation and interpretation of a foreign languacre

journal article, and to Robert Kershner and Joel Kramer for their

constructive criticism and suggestions throughout various phases of the

project

.
Fife,,M

^ m^rnsi: ' ' -

l^ io '% '.J-^^toiq

runMI*. • — 4 CK .j_Tii=HHRnM^Sk . .jxr>un^HB ick4-X m^iMf'rF ii ^mm*iM '^li i mm bi^mi 'Jw

' '

\ '-^H W

1]

fe

v-S^

If- •«»,

~i^'

T,

iB®

' ’•=»,

'!. i vC

»^i .J"' m

\

m

V »

.* :: j.

,V,„;W'

:'jyb

, >:

-W'W

ir;

I' 'ft'

:f ;''V/'

B'. ;-«^’’ ;>'

!

'*

'i ''«:

,

. ,'^

, ,.r «-'V •'' ."'J

.1 -.

•1 , V', ^:fl

1

. ', '.•

i^« if *. Pav .%1
Contents

Page

Introduction ^ Background 1

Objective and Scope ^ Methodology 1

Format ^ Intruder Characteristics 2

The Criminal Population ^ The Terrorist Population 4

The Psychopathological Population ^ The Insider Population 6

Psychological Deterrents 7 Pre-event Deterrents 8

Information Management and Public Relations 8

Intelligence Gathering 8

Training and Selection of Personnel 8

Event Phase Deterrents 9

Sensory Assaults 9

Noise and Vibration 9

Electromagnetic Radiation 19

Temperature 10

Strenuous Physical Exertion 11

Pain 11

Smell 12

Cognitive and Perceptual Deterrents 12

Perceptual Processes 12

Information Overload 13

Personal Threat 13

Post-Event Deterrents 13

Contingency Planning and Crisis Management 13

Summary 14

Implications for Future Research 14

Bibliography 14

Intruder Characteristics 14

Information Management and Public Relations 22

Intelligence Gathering 25

Training and Selection of Personnel 26

Noise and Vibration 28

Electromagnetic Radiation 30

Temperature - 31

Strenuous Physical Exertion 32

Pain 33

Smell 34

Perceptual Processes 35

Information Overload 36

Personal Threat 38

Contingency Planning and Crisis Management 41
F

- 'f?

5 ; : ; ::;:::

:

''

1: ; . .: ; ; : ; : ;

,«i . . . . .

'. nia'

• •_r'

' 'r:;^ / ,v:/frt»fe«xr'ii5l»tt# *

£X' ^ “ 'li . '

.. ^•'•^^^ »l«ww. 'N.on' t'^Ml

'^, • •'•• •

-'V

• ^ '*' ’ * *'

H

• • • ••:-,>";.;

i'-

M , V . . . - • • • '# • ;

'’ ^*,

«:: : I

H '. i ; :.;: r;

yk
Psychological Deterrents to Nuclear Theft:

An Updated Literature Review and Bibliography

George W. Lapinsky, Jr.

Clare Goodman

A review of the unclassified literature dealing with psychological

deterrents was conducted for the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) . The

review indicates that while human psychological processes (sensory,

perceptual, and cognitive) can be manipulated by various means,

definitive empirical data are lacking which directly relate to deterring

nuclear weapon theft. Behavioral impact research should be undertaken

by DNA to ascertain the deterrence values of the many techniques

identified

.

Key words: Cognitive processes, nuclear weapon theft; perceptual

processes; psychological deterrence; security systems; sensory

processes

.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Behavioral sciences play a new role in the field of physical security of

nuclear storage and processing facilities. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

program to enhance the security of nuclear weapon storage facilities

includes behavioral analysis of psychological processes as well as the

traditional consideration of physical barriers and alarms. By including a multitude of physical and psychological deterrents , security systems

designers can create an environment that enhances the probability of

preventing potential intruders from making a successful penetration into

nuclear weapon storage facilities

.

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

This report, prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), provides an

annotated bibliography and an analysis of the literature on the topic of

psychological deterrents to theft from nuclear weapon storage facilities.

The purpose of this study was to update and expand upon the preliminary

unclassified literature review published by P. G. Meguire and J. J. Kramer

(NBSIR 76-1007) covering the literature up to 1975. This report reviews the

literature from 1975 to the present and expands into several new topic areas

not covered in the first report, but which could be applied to existing and

new security systems to increase the level of security

.

METHODOLOGY

Since security is an interdisciplinary field, its literature is widely

dispersed. Therefore it was necessary to review several data bases and

other informative sources.

| These include: the National Criminal Justice

Reference Service (NCJRS) maintained by the Department of Justice, National

Institute of Justice; Psychinfosearch , the data base of the American

Psychological Association; National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

;

Defense Documentation Center (DDC) ; Sociological Abstracts; Ergonomics

Abstracts and Social Science Citation Index.

1
As references, reports, and articles were obtained from these sources,

all reference lists within the reports were checked for additional relevant

articles. The card catalog and abstracts from the library of the Defense

Nuclear Agency were manually searched.

As reports became available, they were scanned and categorized according

to criteria of relevance and methodological soundness . A six point scale

was used for both criteria. An article was subsequently reviewed in depth

if it was in the top three categories of relevance and methodological

soundness. During th-s review and annotation process, more deletions were

made when closer reading revealed some reports still to be at variance with

the criteria. The relevance criterion was based on an article's

applicability to the psychology of deterrence or to physical security. The

methodological soundness criterion was based on an assumed continuum of

scientific rigor ranging from controlled experimentation to speculation.

Because of the nature of the field of physical security, much of the

literature is speculative. An attempt was made to discriminate between

sound expert opinion and unqualified speculation on the basis of personal

judgment in order to retain as much of the relevant security literature as possible

.

FORMAT

Each subject area includes a discussion and summary of the literature.

In cases where the literature search revealed no new information, the

discussion will obviously be brief and the reader is directed to the Meguire

and Kreuner review (NBSIR 76-1007) for a fuller account. The bibliography

section contains both fully annotated entries and simple reference citations

because some references dealt with the subject area only tangentially or not

in depth. Full annotation of such minor references would be inappropriate

for this report.

INTRUDER CHARACTERISTICS

The literature relevant to the description of possible adversaries to

nuclear security generally applied one of two main methodologies: 1) the

empirical, data-gathering approach, such as Edward Mickolus ' project ITERATE

[25]*and the Rand Corporation's data base of analogous incidents [11] ; and

2) the case study or expert opinion approach in which each incident is

analyzed in depth as a unique event, which may or may not have commonalities

with other incidents - the work of Gustave Morf [28] concerning the FLQ

(Front de la Liberation Quebecois) in Quebec, that of Jay Mallin [22] on

unconventional warfare, and David Hubbard's study of skyjackers [16] are all

good exaunples of this approach. The limitation of both of these approaches

in this discussion is that they are concerned with analogous incidents - there is no unclassified data base of nuclear theft incidents ^ Jn the past

this shortcoming has led security specialists in the nuclear fieTO to design

their deterrents for the "worst-case" situation. It has not been possible,

thus far, to construct a detailc"^ i ^ychological profile of an adversary to

nuclear security. As the data bases of analogous events become more

refined, construction of such a profile may become feasible (for pros and

cons of profiling see Pickrel [32]

,

DeNicke [9]

,

Hubbard [16] , and Rappoport

cuid Pettinelli [33]).

Numbers in brackets refer to references in the bibliography to this report.

2
For the present, the "worst-case" situation shall be assumed, that is,

that the population of possible intruders cannot be specified and may

include anyone who is operationally effective in any of a multitude of

possible scenarios. This assumption is partially confirmed by the

historical and demographic data now available concerning criminal and

terroristic acts. (See following sections.)

For the sake of simplicity, one may categorize possible intruders into

one or more of the following groups: 1) criminal, 2) terrorist, 3)

psychopath, and 4) insider. The insider is included as a special category

because of the unique opportunities of access, and because certain

characteristics of his or her personal background have, hopefully, been

predetermined by various selection factors and processes . The open

literature provides some general information about the characteristics of

each of these four groups, but it is by no means definitive. The following

sections will provide information on each of these four potential adversary

groups with regard to the following characteristics: age, sex,

intelligence, personality, and motivation.

THE CRIMINAL POPULATION

Age: The FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1977 [10] reported that the

highest percentage of arrests in the United States for all types of crime

was in the age bracket of 25-34. However, the distribution is a rather flat

one, that is, involvement in crime, as measured by arrests, begins at ages

13-14 and continues at a fairly stable rate until the age of 50 with

significant peaks at the 25-29 and 30-34 age ranges. Children 10-and-under

accounted for 1.7% of all arrests for serious crimes in 1977 and people 65-

and-over accounted for .7%.

Sex : In the U.S. there has been a phenomenal increase in arrests of

females for serious crimes. Haskell and Yablonsky compared crime statistics

for the years 1960 and 1967 and found an increase of female involvement in

serious crime of over 100% [15] . This trend was accelerated slightly in the

years 1968-1977 to a 115.5% increase. Women are now involved in

approximately 15-20% of all crimes in the U.S. [10] . The predominance of

males in crime according to Cressey (in Sykes & Drabek [39] ) , is experienced

"in all nations, all communities within a nation, all age groups, all

periods of history for which organized statistics are available, and for all

types of crime except those peculiar to women, such as infanticide and

abortion." The degree of overrepresentation of males in crime varies with

culture, size of community, age groups, and certain social variables - males

hold a less commanding lead in arrest rates in large cities of free. Western

hemisphere countries, especially among 15-17 yr olds.

Intelligence*; The literature shows no reason to assume that the

intellectual functioning of the criminal population is not distributed

normally. In the Rand Corporation's analysis of crimes analogous to nuclear

theft, the "typical" adversary group was highly skilled in planning and mid

to high in ingenuity and imagination [11]

.

Personality and Motivation ; Schuessler and Cressey (in Haskell & Yablonsky (15] ) analyzed the results of 113 studies comparing the

personality test scores of criminals and control groups and concluded that

"... the evidence favors the view that personality traits are distributed in

the criminal population in about the same ways as in the general

population .

Concerning motivation, Sutherland (in Sykes & Drabek [39]) states that

"While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values , it is

not explained by those general needs and values since non-criminal behavior

is an expression of the same needs and values." Knowledge of motivating

3
factors may allow some speculation concerning the level of dedication or the

amount of risk an intruder might be willing to take, but at this point we

can only speculate as to probable criminal motivations to a nuclear theft.

In the literature several possible motives are mentioned; the first, and

most obvious, being money, the less mentioned being power, status,

intellectual challenge, obedience to orders, and the release of comrades

from prison.

THE TERRORIST POPULATION

Age: The literature on terrorism seems to show that, historically,

terrorist guerrillas generally are between 22 and 25 yr of age. Terrorist

leaders are usually older, raid-30s to early 50s. Russell and Miller [34]

report that children 12-14 yr of age have been involved in acts of terrorism

in Northern Ireland.

Sex ; According to the Russell and Miller article, "Profile of a Terrorist" [34], terrorism is still predominantly a male phenomenon. Women

were involved in significant terrorist operations less than 20% of the time

in the years 1966-1976. They also reported that the male/female division of

labor was generally based on optimizing the efficiency of the terrorist

operation - for example, women are often used to establish "safe houses,"

gather intelligence, and so forth because females arouse less suspicion than

males in these kinds of activities (see also. Disorders & Terrorism [29] )

.

However, women can and do take on leadership and execution roles as well as support roles, as exemplified by Ulrike Meinhof, Patricia Hearst, and

others

.

Intelligence ; According to several authors [13,28] terrorists seem,

generally, to be average or above average in intelligence. "In fact," say

Russell & Miller [34] "approximately two-thirds of those identified (as)

terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates

or postgraduate students .

Personality and Motivation ; There are some direct observations and

personal interviews encountered in the open literature concerning the

psychological aspects of terrorism, but for the most part, the personality

of the terrorist remains in the realm of secondhand observation and

speculation

.

In the global sense, the only definable difference between the general

population and the population of probable intruders , including terrorists

,

is the means by which the latter seek to obtain their goals, that is, by

illegitimate and usually violent means. Three factors involved in this

choice to abandon the legitimate course of action are; 1) intruder goals

are perceived to be incompatible with those of the legitimate authority; 2)

legal avenues of negotiation are perceived to be closed, inaccessible, or

logically inappropriate; and, 3) the illegitimate act is perceived to be a viable alternative. Associate! ^th each of these factors are personality

characteristics or learned modes of action which have been attributed to

terrorists by various authors; 1) The first factor, incompatible goals, is

associated with characteristics such as alienation, hopelessness, personal

inadequacy, "existential" fear or fears of the Armageddon, feelings of

relative deprivation, social isolation, ethnocentrism, and distortion of

reality. 2) Perceived lack of legal avenues of negotiation is associated

with feelings of frustration, feelings of urgency to act, and feelings of

superiority over the common masses and the ability to discern the common

good, in addition to many of the same attributes associated with the first

factor. 3) Perception of an illegitimate, and often violent act as a viable

alternative, has as its correlates such characteristics as feelings of

urgency, extreme fear, dehumanization or depersonalization of victims,

diffusion of responsibility within groups, obedience to an authority figure.

4
rationalization, distorted attribution of aggressive arousal, inadequate

reaction to threats of punishment, and the feeling that terrorism and

violence are, if not acceptable, at least effective.

There are some cases which blend terrorism and psychopathology, such as the Japanese Red Army [23], or the infamous "Manson family." However, most

authors agree that the credible terrorist groups are not cadres of madmen

,

but are rational human beings subject to the same laws of behavior as the

general population. (See Anthony Arblaster's "Terrorism: myths, meaning

and morals" for an excellent review of the terrorism literature [2].)

Concerning motivation, the literature on terrorism seems to lead to the

conclusion that although most terrorists are politically motivated, criminal

motivations such as the accumulation of money or weapons , and the release of

comrades from prison may be the specific motivational trigger. Their

dedication is said to be high, in many cases including willingness to risk

serious injury and death. Statistics on the most prevalent mode of terror

suggest that terrorists ^ try, however, to minimize their risks. According

to Mickolus (in Alexander & Finger [25] ) bombings accounted for 55% of

international terrorist incidents in the years, 1968 through 1975. Personal

violent confrontations in the form of assassination or armed attack

accounted for only 9%.

THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL POPULATION

Three types of mental disorder were felt to be worthy of consideration

for the purposes of this report: the explosive personality, the antisocial

personality, and the variations of the paranoid personalities.

Age : It is generally accepted that the forms of personality disorder of

interest to this discussion (mentioned above) can develop at any age, but

are more likely to assume socially dangerous dimensions only in the teenage

years or later [1,31].

Sex : Since manifestations of mental illness vary from culture to

culture and from family to family as a function of socialization and genetic

processes, it would be presumptuous to assert that either sex manifests more

explosive behavior, more paranoia, or more antisocial behavior simply by

reason of sex. The available statistics seem to confirm this. Concerning

the paranoid forms of psychopathology. Page [31] states that the prevalence

rates are about the same for males and females

.

Intelligence : Because of the interactive effects of intelligence,

socioeconomic status, likelihood of diagnosis, treatment, and

institutionalization, it is virtually impossible to ascertain the degree of

correlation, if any, between intelligence and various forms of mental

illness. Regarding hospitalized patients. Page [31] asserts that "paranoid

patients tend to be brighter and better educated than most persons

hospitalized with other diagnoses..."

Personality and Motivation : The explosive personality is characterized

by normal adjustment interspersed with short periods of explosive rage,

which are sometimes followed by a loss of memory of the aggressive

incidents. The aggressive behavior of the explosive personality is usually

undirected, impulsive, and often so overwhelming that all cognitive control

is lost. For these reasons, the probability of this type of personality

attempting a coherent and credible intrusion and theft is low. Even with

inside access, there is a high probability that such a person would be

recognized as a security risk before any significant damage could be done.

Antisocial personalities are characterized by their impulsiveness , low

frustration tolerance, and lack of anxiety, guilt, or remorse for violating

5
social, legal, or moral codes. Punishment seems to have no deterrent effect

on subsequent behavior. Because antisocial personalities are grossly

selfish, irresponsible, and unable to learn from experience or punishment,

it is likely that there will be a criminal history in this individual's

personal background, though not necessarily so. Excessive use of alcohol

and drugs, poor job history, sexual deviance, and a high incidence of

divorce and marital conflict are also typical of this group.

Three types of paranoia are described in the literature: the paranoid

personality, paranoid state psychosis, and paranoid schizophrenia. The

paranoid personality is characterized as jealous, suspicious, rigid,

hypersensitive, and having a primitively developed delusional system in

which the individual basically distrusts others and isolates herself or

himself from them [1,31] . Paranoid state psychosis is characterized by the same qualities as the

paranoid personality except that the delusional system is more developed and

complex, and consists of delusions which are rather bizarre, grandiose, and

of a persecutory nature. Because the delusions of paranoid state

individuals seem far-fetched , these individuals tend to be secretive about

their true views of reality and easily take on the facade of normality [1 ,31)

.

The paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by an even greater break

with reality, the delusional system being fantastic, inconsistent,

illogical, and often accompanied by vivid hallucinations (usually auditory)

.

These individuals are less able to encapsulate their delusions through

secrecy and are more obviously eccentric in their behavior [1,31] . According

to Page [31] , these types of paranoid pathologies account for less than 1%

of all first admissions to public and mental hospitals.

Motivations of this group may range from genocide to suicide , and most

probably will be conceived of as self-defensive because of the persecutory

nature of this group's set of delusions. Their dedication is theoretically

limitless because their distortion of reality may affect important cognitive

abilities such as risk perception.

THE INSIDER POPULATION

Age: Since this population may include civilian support staff, the age

range is extended beyond the military limits somewhat and is estimated to be

16-70 yr of age. Within the exclusion areas, where only military personnel

are allowed, the ages are estimated to range from 18-50 yr [3]

.

Sex: The percentage of females in the total nuclear security guard

force is estimated at 10% or less by DNA [3]

.

It should be noted that, as with the terrorist population, females in nuclear security are not randomly

distributed among jobs, but are utilized more in certain jobs than others

because they have been found to be more operationally effective in those

jobs. A comparison of sex differences in job satisfaction or morale in the

services could not be found in the open literature

.

Intelligence : The intelligence level of the insider population can be, or has been, determined specifically. It may be assumed that they are

functionally average or above average concerning nuclear security matters

due to their training and social contact with others in the security field.

Personality and Motivation : Because of self-screening biases, in the

form of career choice and field of specialization, and because of formally

imposed screening processes such as the Department of the Army's Personnel

Reliability Program (PRP) , there may be personality differences between the

general population and those persons involved in nuclear weapons operations.

6
This literature search, however, revealed no data to confirm or deny the

existence of such differences.

Concerning motivation, one may speculate that, in addition to motives

generally applicable such as greed, one may also add to the list: revenge,

rebellion against authority, symbolic protest, and suicide. Two of the more

plausible insider scenarios involve the criminal insider and the mentally

disturbed insider.

A 1968 study by H. E. Guttraan [14] is one of the few sources in the open

literature which gives any indication of the extent of the insider problem.

His estimate of the probability of an incidence of a psychotic (paranoid

type) with malevolent intentions being employed at or seeking to gain

employment at a specific nuclear weapons lab was 2.5x10”^ or less, iri real

numbers this translated to an incidence of 1 per 5000 persons per year at a facility such as the Sandia Corporation during 1968.

Although Guttman's data and assumptions seem reasonable, his reassuring

estimate could rise in value dramatically if any of the underlying

assumptions were to be violated in the real life situation, or if any of the

component probabilities were inaccurately estimated. It should also be

emphasized that this probability is only for the incidence of an in-house

psychotic with malevolent intentions. The probability that a rational

insider with criminal intentions will attempt a nuclear theft may be as high

or higher.

In addition, one must keep in mind that since the population in question

is fairly large and will probably grow even larger in the future, a seemingly small probability may be critical. Also, the pool from which an

insider may be recruited is increased tremendously if one includes exmilitary people. Mickolus [26] estimates that there are several hundred

thousand of these people who have specific training in nuclear weapons

procedures. If these estimates are correct, the world-wide population of

persons with sensitive inside information is probably near 500,000.

In summary, males age 18-50, appear to be the most probable adversaries

to a nuclear weapons security system. A violent confrontation, such as a terrorist attack, would most likely involve men in their early-to-midtwenties. Females are likely to be used in intelligence gathering,

surveillance, and other covert activities. If females are used in an overt

attack, it is likely that they would be young, highly dedicated, and as well-trained as their male counterparts. Individuals suffering from the

mental disorders discussed above may present less threat to nuclear weapons

security than individuals whose behavior is "normal." This is primarily

because they tend to be more easily detected as security risks before they

have an opportunity for intrusion or illegal access.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENTS

In view of the expanding areas of interest at DNA a broader definition

of psychological deterrents is assumed than the one utilized in the Meguire

and Kramer preliminary literature review (NBSIR 76-1007) . Their review was

limited to those deterrents that provided impact on site and that were

primarily oriented toward the human senses. For the purposes of this study,

a psychological deterrent shall be anything perceived by a potential

perpetrator of a nuclear theft as lowering the probability of successfully

attaining his or her goal (goal, here, may refer to something other than the

theft of a nuclear weapon, such as publicity, embarrassment of governmental

authorities, fulfillment of suicidal fantasy, and a multitude of other

rational and irrational goals) . The key word in this definition is

"perceived" — unless a deterrent is communicated to a potential intruder as

7
a relevant and credible threat to his or her success , it remains outside the

realm of psychological deterrence.

If one conceptualizes deterrence as functioning over time, the theft

scenario can be broken down into three major divisions; pre-event, event,

and post-event. At each of these points in time there will be some major

differences in environment, emotional state, physiological state, and the

psychological set of the perpetrators, the counter-force, and the societyat-large. In this section a discussion of psychological deterrents

appropriate to each of these divisions of the theft scenario will be

presented

.

PRE -EVENT DETERRENTS

Information Management and Public Relations

The dissemination and denial of information are an important part of the

deterrence model. Several authors suggested that correct information

management procedures could be used to optimize the effectiveness of a deterrence system. Almost all, however, were opposed to the use of "news

black out .

Certain pieces of information must be communicated to the public

regarding attempted nuclear theft. The first is the certainty of detection

and punishment (rather than the severity of punishment) . The second, but

equally important, is the availability of non-violent alternatives - as Hans

Toch puts it, "...ultimately, violence occurs because men find it satisfying

and effective in achieving their ends. Violence can thus only be fought by

removing the incentives for it, and by changing the motives that produce it"

[40] .Most authors feel that information dissemination should be approached

cautiously and ethically in order to avoid the danger of its being perceived

as propaganda. The social costs and benefits seem to militate against any

comprehensive, mass media program of public relations. However, specific

instances of communication with the public can be used to the advantage of

all involved. If an attitude of honesty and goodwill is mutually developed,

the community at-large may become a source of valuable intelligence [ 52] and

a military image of benign strength may be perpetuated.

Intelligence Gathering

Several authors listed improved intelligence as a top priority for

deterring crime, especially terrorism. At least one was opposed to

increased intelligence on the grounds of cost and legal and social

appropriateness (see Moynihan in Elliot and Gibson [55] ). This search of the

literature turned up no empirical proof that intelligence gathering deters.

Based on anecdotal information, it is assumed that there is a deterrent

effect, if only because good intelligence increases the probability of

detection

.

Training and Selection of Personnel

A well-trained nuclear security guard force is mentioned by several

authors as an important safeguard as well as a visible deterrent. Proper

selection and training techniques can be used to enhance the competence of

the guard force, to increase morale, to lessen the probability of collusion,

and to project an image that is reassuring to the general public and

threatening to potential adversaries.

8
The comments of several authors about the relative vulnerability of

security systems to compromise by female adversaries suggest that female

guards could be used to greater advantage in many situations (Disorders and

Terrorism, p.59 [63]; Russell and Miller p.25 [34]; Middendorf [27] ). In

addition, greater use of females in the guard force would help to reduce the

masculine connotations associated with the military. Hubbard [16] , among

others , hypothesizes that agencies with a masculine image may attract

sexually inadequate individuals intent on proving their manhood or asserting

their identity. He feels that these individuals are overrepresented in

aberrant acts such as skyjacking. Further research is necessary in order to

determine the most operationally effective use of both sexes in the guard

force

.

Specialized training in personal protection, recognizing surveillance,

recognizing intelligence gathering behavior, tactical training, and antiterrorist training could be used to enhance competence and to increase

motivation in the guard force

.

EVENT PHASE DETERRENTS

Sensory Assaults

As with other subject areas covered in this bibliography, the literature

search revealed no direct applications of the psychological literature to

the deterrence of nuclear theft. The effectiveness of the various potential

deterrents can only be hypothesized at present.

Noise and Vibration

Despite hundreds of studies that have been conducted, the influence of

noise on human responses is still unclear. Meguire and Kramer listed five

means by which noise might be an effective deterrent. Basically these still

remain the same

.

1. Noise may act as an alarm for the security guards,

2 . Noise may be used to warn intruders that their presence has been

detected

,

3. Noise may produce interference or masking of verbal communications

between members of an assault team,

4. Noise may induce incapacitating physiological effects such as pain,

dizziness, blurred vision, nausea, etc., and

5. Noise may have negative effects upon intruder intellectual and

motor performance, hence slowing the completion of the attack.

After reviewing several studies it became evident that human behavior

is, on the whole, rather resistant to short-term noise. Moderately intense

noise, although distressing, does not usually impair performance unless the

task is an extremely difficult one. Under some circumstances, though,

adverse effects do occur such as when noise masks auditory information, or a temporary hearing loss reduces an individual's ability to receive messages.

Vibration, on the other hand, can induce a whole variety of effects,

depending on the frequency, intensity, and displacement characteristics of

the vibration. According to Guignard [72] changes in heart action,

respiration, and circulating stress hormones have been observed in response

to whole-body vibration. Hasan [75] also states that an "inhibition" of

tendon reflexes and the regulation of posture is disturbed.

For most tasks, the intruder will need to take in visual information.

The biomechanical influence of vibration can reduce efficiency by

interfering with visual input, such as by effecting the ability to make

precise control adjustments. This was confirmed in a study by Drazin [68]

which showed that, at around 3 to 4 Hz, impairment of vision was

9
particularly evident. Perforroance impairment was also quite evident at the

2 to 4 Hz level, but it should be noted that at higher frequency levels

impairment was not as large. Cohen [66] also observed performance

impairment occurred when subjects were exposed to a mixture of two different

vibration intensities.

Within the reports reviewed on vibration , several tolerance limits were

mentioned. Three interesting examples were:

1. At around 10-14 Hz the ability of the spine to cope with sudden

accelerations was affected,

2. At around the 20 Hz the head begins to resonate with respect to the

body

,

3. Slow wave vibration of approximately .15 Hz to .30 Hz causes motion

sickness symptoms in some subjects.

In addition to the physical effects mentioned above, there is some

evidence that perceptual distortion of body position takes place when

vertical oscillations of .1 to .5 Hz are used — almost 50% of the subjects

in one experiment perceived their position to be 90® out of phase with their

true position (Malcolm, in Reason and Brand [78] ) . This phenomenon could be

especially effective in an environment devoid of visual cues

.

Finally, two studies completed by Grether et al. [71] are of particular

interest. When heat, noise, and vibration were introduced singly and in

various combinations, the results suggested that the combined stress

condition produced less of an effect on performance than the individual

stressors. The greatest impairment of performance resulted from the

vibration stimulus alone.

Electromagnetic Radiation

The update provided little new information concerning the use of

corpuscular and electromagnetic radiations. The most relevant findings were

those concerning microwave radiation. Grinbarg and Sheyvekhman, in a review

done by NASA [92] , are cited as having reported a raising of the sensory

threshold for pain and unspecified changes in auditory threshold as effects

of short-term exposure (5 min) to radiofrequency energy fields. The

proposed mechanism of this and other perceptual and behavioral effects is

the heating and/or ionizing of neural cells. A subjective awareness of

warmth was also reported. Once the peripheral nerves are heated above some

unspecified minimum level, they may begin to fire spontaneously and cause

perceptual and behavioral aberrations to occur. It is not known whether

these effects can be generated quickly and reliably, without risking

permanent damage to the nervous system.

The effects of visible light were well-documented in the Meguire and

Kramer report on psychological deterrents and this update confirmed their

findings. One minor addition is a report which suggests that, in addition

to "flash blindness," intense flashes of light may under some conditions be

used to distort color perception [8^]

.

Concerning the use of color, the literature remains at the speculative

stage. One report suggests a possible line of further research, "the

apparent heaviness of colours" [93]. If there is such an effect, it could be

incorporated to make objects appear heavier or lighter than they really are.

Temperature

Meguire and Kramer discussed several effective ways temperature may be

used as a deterrent. Little additional information on performance

degradation and physiological tolerance is available from the literature

except for the following minor addition. Several experiments on the effect

of cooling the hands , reported that performance on several tasks involving

10
manual dexterity, including emergency egress, decreased with lowered finger

surface temperatures [95,109], Although bibliography of relevant literature

is included, annotations and abstracts were deemed unnecessary for most

citations since they added no new information.

Strenuous Physical Exertion

In addition to the effects of exercise mentioned by Meguire and Kramer

in the preliminary review, there are a few other specific effects worth

noting. Probably the most relevant to the subject of nuclear security is a study done by Wayne Evans [122] for the U.S. Army in which he examined the

effects of fatigue on pistol firing. Evans concluded that heavy exercise

did not affect accuracy but did affect time-to-fire . Evans explained, "The

pistol firing task seems inherently to require accuracy. Thus, any

disability suffered by the subject due to heavy work was not allowed to

affect his accuracy but was reflected in an increased aiming time. A

somewhat similar finding has been reported for rifle firing with gloves or

gas masks used as impediments to performance (Gruber, et al . [123]). This

also suggests pistol firing and rifle firing are affected similarly by

stress .

That fatigue slows down physical movement patterns seems simple and

commonsense, however, research such as that done by Bates, Osternig, and

James [118] in 1977 at the University of Oregon suggests that the physical

slowdown of body movement is not a uniform reduction of the total pattern

but rather a dynamic change of the relationships of the body parts involved

in the movement. This concept could be very important in optimizing the

design of physical and psychological deterrents, and stop-action film

analysis of relevant body movements should be considered in both the predesign and prototype phases if possible. Physical exercise also increases

response time to visual and auditory cues according to Szmodis [126] , another design consideration.

Gunnar Borg [119] , in a review of the psychological aspects of physical

activities, offers several suggestions which may be relevant to security

system design; (1) the relationship between subjective and objective work

load intensities is such that equal intensity increases in work load over

time will be perceived as being much greater than equal; (2) perceived

exertion for arm work is greater than for equal intensity leg work; and (3)

the function most sensitive to physical stress seems to be hand-arm

steadiness

.

Cerretelli [120] , in an article concerning endurance, reminds us that

psychological factors cannot increase the maximum power of an individual

,

but they can postpone the onset of fatigue. Thus, intense physical

obstacles may be more effective than moderately difficult endurance -type

obstacles. In a novel but somewhat related article, Morgan, et al. [125]

attempted to affect the physical and psychological difficulty of a submaximal ergometer task by the use of hypnotic suggestion. He found that

through hypnosis moderate work loads could be made physically and

psychologically more difficult, but could not be made less difficult. One

may conclude, then, that a physical security system with a physical exertion

component should be designed to ensure maximum physical exertion of the

target population.

Pain

Harmless forms of pain may be used effectively as a symbol or a warning,

but would probably be unreliable as deterrents , due to the variability of

pain thresholds and pain tolerance in the human population. In a study done

by Mumford, Newton, and Ley [129] no correlation was found between

personality variables and two measures of pain, pain perception threshold

and pain tolerance level. This study did suggest, however, that men may

11
have a significantly higher pain tolerance than women. It was also

suggested that severe sensations of pain can cause an "after-glow” of pain

lasting from several seconds to several minutes

A study by Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub, and Collen in 1972, (cited in

Carterette and Friedman [128]) concluded that: (1) pain tolerance decreases

with age, especially in men, (2) men tolerate more pain than women at every

age, (3) Whites tolerate more pain than Blacks, and Blacks more than

Orientals. The greatest pain tolerance was shown by White males under 20 yr

of age. Also cited by Carterette and Friedman, are several "cognitive

dissonance" studies involving pain which suggest that those people who

inflict pain minimize their own perception of similar pain. This implies

that professional criminals and terrorists may have higher pain thresholds

because of cognitive factors

Carterette and Friedman [128] cite other studies which conclude that;

1) pain perception is less for people who voluntarily submit to painful

stimulation, 2) pain is less for those who are expecting severe pain, 3)

pain is less for persons in situations where they know the pain will occur

and how intense it will be (uncertainty anxiety is concomittantly reduced)

Smell

The smell of blood, the "smell of fear," the smell of the enemy (as

claimed by some Vietnam veterans) are familiar concepts to those with combat

experience. As an adjunct to a system of sensory assaults, the use of

smells may be an effective, though short-lived, psychological weapon. Two

example actions are: 1) the presentation of unpleasant or nauseating

smells, and 2) the presentation of emotion-arousing, intraspecific chemical

signals or "pheromones" [132,135].

Many substances may be used for such sensory assaults . Some

particularly unpleasant smells are those of ammonia, pyridine, diethyl

sulphide, butyric acid, and hexane thiol [134]. A study by Rovee , Harris,

and Topp [136] suggests that anxiety causes a decrement in olfactory

sensitivity; therefore, whatever the choice of olfactory stimulus, it should

be presented in a high concentration. In carrying out sensory assaults, it

should also be noted that the sense of smell is quickly "fatigued" by strong

olfactory stimuli; in fact, conscious perception of a strong smell wanes to

about two thirds of its original magnitude in just a few minutes [132] . This

adaptation to a strong olfactory stimulus does not appear to affect

subsequent stimuli unless the sensory stimuli are similar in molecular

structure. Mixtures of odors are generally less effective than single odors

[132] . The second mode of action, the use of so-called "pheromones," is much

more speculative. However, at least one author, William Cain [132] , firmly

believes that man has the capability to communicate by chemical secretion,

but that it is an unpracticed and unrecognized talent. If man does have

such a capability and its range of communications is comparable to that of

other mammals , then we should be oL^e to isolate pheromones through bioassay

which convey messages of: territoriality, warning, defense, alarm,

distress-signalling, and pain indication, to name only a few [135]. If such

chemical signals can be isolated, and proper delivery systems designed,

their worth as adjuncts to a general deterrence system may be more valuable

than other sensory impacts because of their relative unobtrusiveness.

Cognitive and Perceptual Deterrents

Perceptual Processes

Although the open literature provides very little new information on

perceptual distortion, creation of illusion, and camouflage, a few excellent

12
studies of visual perception were discovered. These studies indirectly

suggest that it may be possible to create low cost distance and size

illusions by such low technology methods as painting and lighting changes.

Their effectiveness and feasibility as deterrents to nuclear theft can only

be hypothesized, however, since no applicable documentation exists.

Perceptual distortion in other sensory modes is not well-documented, but

may deserve further research. Tactile illusions in combination with visual

field blanking may be especially worthy of consideration.

Information Overload

The literature search revealed no significant new information about

information overload. The short bibliography which has been included

reflects a few minor additions. Information overload, when sufficiently

stressful, has been shown to cause; 1) a degradation in the ability to

recall learned information [146] ; 2) physiological changes such as pupil

dilation, tachycardia, and hypertension, and changes in skin resistance and

muscle tone [148] ; 3) a tendency to respond in a stereotyped manner [149] ; 4) perceptual distortions caused by overattention to details of the

environment, including both relevant and irrelevant information [151] . Methods of information overload which seem to be most effective in producing

stress (in addition to those mentioned by Kramer and Meguire , NBSIR 76-1007)

are: 1) mixing unsolvable tasks into a group of solvable ones, 2)

interruption of tasks, 3) giving false norms of performance, 4) given false

feedback, 5) rapid pacing, 6) multiple tasks, and 7) using strong sensory

inputs as background "noise" [149]

.

Personal Threat

The effect of personal threat seems to be widely variable depending on a number of factors such as: 1) individual differences in arousal state; 2)

credibility of the threat; 3) immediacy; 4) the relevance of the threat to

an individual's value system; and 5) the adversary's willingness to take

risks, and his rationality in assessing risk. Overall, the use of personal

threat must be viewed as inappropriate for highly motivated adversaries

since they may be willing to suffer extreme mental and bodily injury, or

even death, to attain their goals.

POST-EVENT DETERRENTS

Contingency Planning and Crisis Management

Several authors mentioned the need for a crisis management or

contingency planning team [58,166,167] . Most felt a multidisciplinary

approach was necessary and suggested that behavioral scientists be included

either directly as negotiation specialists or indirectly as consultants.

The hypothesized effects of such a planning effort are; 1) adverse

publicity and rumor can be minimized; 2) coherence and resolve will inspire

the confidence of the public and instill respect or fear in the adversary;

3) physical and social damage can be minimized; and 4) reinforcing elements

of scenarios can be minimized so that the probability of a nuclear-related

incident will be lessened in the future

.

13
SUMMARY

Although the literature indicates that psychological processes can be

directly influenced by a variety of means, there is very little empirical

data that is directly related to the question of psychological deterrence

,

and especially the deterrence of a highly motivated adversary.

A variety of techniques are presented, some of which may be feasible,

others which may not. Only through further, specific applied research and

field experimentation can the . effectiveness of these hypothesized deterrents

be tested. Implementation without further research could, in some cases,

have disastrous effects e.g., a poorly thought-out public relations campaign

could seriously injure the credibility of an agency, cause a loss of public

confidence, and actually invite an attack rather than deter it.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Clearly, an extensive amount of definitive behavioral impact research

should be undertaken to ascertain the deterrence values of many of the

potential techniques and mechanisms cited in this report. For the present

the hypothesized deterrents presented in this literature review remain

speculative at best.

The next step in the process of designing a system of psychological

deterrents should be a joint effort by behavioral scientists and physical

security specialists to prioritize the hypothesized deterrents on the basis

of feasibility and cost effectiveness, and then to determine their

operational effectiveness through laboratory and field experimentation.

Table 1 presents a categorization of each of the hypothesized deterrents

according to their assumed impact on potential adversaries. As can be seen

in the table, the effect of most psychological deterrents on the "worst

case" threat groups is, at best, uncertain. This situation should be

rectified by initiating a program of experimentation and field validation

with those deterrents found to be most appropriate to nuclear security

systems

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRUDER CHARACTERISTICS

[1] Abnormal Psychology , Current Perspectives . DelMar, California: CRM

Books, 1972

.

[2] Arblaster, A. Terrorism: myths, meaning, and morals. Political

Studies , 1977, ^(3), 413-424.

This review provides excellent counterpoint to much of the terrorism

literature. The author unabasheaxy critiques such well-known authors as J.B. Bell, Richard Clutterbuck, and Paul Wilkinson. Arblaster attacks the

various definitions of terrorism and the assumptions that often underly

them, such as the idea that terrorism is "revolutionary" and "aimed at the

overthrow of governments," and that terrorism is "left-wing," Marxist, and

essentially an intellectual and political form of violence. Other topics

attacked as "myths" are: 1) terrorism is ineffective and 2) terrorists are

psychologically warped or mentally deranged.

[3] Beasley, M. Personal Communication, November 9, 1979.

14
Table

1.

Level

of

threat/hypothesized

psychological

deterrent

impact.

<u

Vi

nj U

I

ViL

O

&

x:

Cr •HK

•H

'C

(U S

5

O

*3

oz

m

o

t)

oz

cnO

>-i

«

O

z

(Ao

oz

X X X X X X X X

XXX X X

X X X XXX X X

X X X

X X

X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X

wo X X X X X X X X X

c

o

•H

CP -p c d (0 P

0) Vi •H c •H 0 T3 e c L o '0 (A •P (d 0 0 (U •H (C 4J 1—

(

+3 0

im-H x: -p C O (0 P f—1 (Q +j u O 03 C3 0 P

C «3 ra 0 •rH o M-l •P +3 03 -P

(tJ r—

1

a rH 4J •p IM Vi (A > (d X <u (U (13 -p H *P O 03 a (U Ui P (U X Q p

c o X! c 03 P x; 0 o c ta •rH Cr> P c rH 0 Eh •H -H (U > ((3 P tA 0 (C3 •rH rH O' im E +3 P -H P -p fp

n3 jQ •rH c la 0 fi3 0 -P +3 (d (d E rH •H P P p p a E p

L C (1) 4J 03 P 03 iH 03 p o

0 <u •H w O a, 03 X c iH O 0 CA

U-l iJJ 4J fO •ri o E P W •p 0) P (p p

C C p 0 rH 03 4J p E 03 p 03 M H El z w Eh in 0^ c/3 CU H O.

15

Contingency

Planning

and
[ 4 ] Boozer, D. D. and Engi , D., Nuclear Facility Safeguards Systems

Modeling Using Discrete Event Simulation^ Albuquerque , N . Mex .

Sandia Laboratories , 1977.

This report describes a computer simulation study of the effectiveness

of various safeguard systems for detecting the theft of nuclear materials

Though aimed primarily at sites concerned with special nuclear materials

(SNM) rather than nuclear weapons, this report illustrates the need for

modeling various insider strategies and implementation of appropriate

safeguards if feasible.

[5] Burnham, S. (Ed.) The Threat to Licensed Nuclear Facilities (NRC

AT49-24-0129) ; Washington, D.C.: TKe Mitre Corp., 1975.

This paper discusses the potential threat to nuclear facilities from:

1) foreign governments, 2) foreign terrorists, 3) domestic dissidents, and

4) organized crime. The authors have included a short section on the

psychology of members of potentially threatening groups, but it is

speculative and undocumented.

[6] Clark, R. C. Technological Terrorism . Old Greenwich, Conn.: DevinAdair, 1979.

The author describes scenarios of superviolence and sabotage that are

now possible because of technological progress. Included are sections on

nuclear destruction, chemical and biological weapons, and computer sabotage.

[7] Cooper, H. H., The Terrorist and the victim. Victimology : An

International Journal . 1976. ^(2), 229-239.

Cooper analyses different types of terrorism and their victims. He also

discusses the dehumanization process by which terrorists rationalize the

murder of their victims . He implies that once-removed techniques of terror

such as bombing are easier to perform. Cooper feels that a "no

negotiations” hostage policy doubles terror by implying that not only have

the terrorists dehumanized their victim but society has done so as well

Cooper feels that there are few terrorists who are totally devoid of human

concern and that "the problem for those concerned with victimology and those

entrusted with tactical responses to terrorism is how to fan the spark of

humanity to a blaze." He offers no suggestion as to how this goal might be

attained

[8] DeLeon, P., Jenkins, B., Kellen, K., and Krofcheck, J., Attributes

of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U .5 . Nuclear Programs . Santa

Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1978.

The authors examine analogous crimes for commonalities which may have

relevance to the nuclear theft situation. Discussed are: goals, planning

skill, resources, transportation, access, and amount of time required to

complete an action

[9] DeNike, L. D., Radioactive malevolence. Science and Public Affairs,

Feb. 1974, 16-20.

The author discusses the likely interaction of nuclear technology and

the predisposition of humans to evil. Two points are made in the article:

1) reliance on h\iman scruples is impossible and 2) it is impossible to use

psychological profiles in the screening of individuals. The article

considers military, as well as terrorist attacks upon nuclear installations.

[10] Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports for the

United States, 1977, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Office , 1978

16
[11] Fine, A. M., Attributes of potential adversaries to U.S. nuclear

programs . The Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security , Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium , March 23-24 , 1977 (NBS

Special Publication 480-32) . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1978.

This work is a brief overview of the Rand Corporation's attempts to

profile the adversary through the use of analogous behaviors such as crime

and terrorism.

[12] Frank, J. D., Some psychological determinants of violence and its

control. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 1972,

6 (3) , 158-164.

Dr. Frank dichotomizes violence into instrumental, or goal -oriented

,

violence, and expressive violence, which is gratifying in and of itself.

Dr. Frank would control instrumental violence by developing non-destructive

alternatives for satisfying specific goals . Expressive violence could be

minimized by developing vicarious and symbolic forms of violence such as spectator sports. Both instrumental and expressive forms of violence could

be minimized through the socialization process —"violent behavior obeys the

same lav/s of learning as other forms of behavior..."

[13] Grabowsky, P. N., The urban context of political terrorism. In

Stohl, E. (Ed.) The Politics of Terrorism . New York: Marcel

Dekker , Inc., 1979.

In this v7ork the author argues that terrorism has become an increasingly

urban tactic. The urban arena provides the terrorist with more high

technology targets , better communications , better transportation

possibilities, and a number of other advantages. Specific points of

interest: 1) urban terrorists highly value the female operative when

secrecy and cover are imperative; 2) indiscriminate violence is most

commonly used in bicultural societies —this action provokes retaliation and

may cause further polarization within a bicultural society; and 3) secrecy

and rumor mongering are most effective in repressive societies.

[14] Guttman, H. E., Probability of an In-house Malevolent Psychotic.

Alburquerque , N. Mex . : Sandia Laboratories (SC-TM-68-681) , 1968.

This is a short technical memorandum which is, unfortunately, not widely

available at the present time. The assumptions underlying all component

estimates are openly stated and can be critically evaluated. Although the

practical utility of quantifying the probability of a rare event is

questionable - witness the "Rasmussen Report" and the Three Mile Island

incident - quantification such as this does, at least, demand a hard look at

the assumptions that underpin nuclear security.

Guttman ' s estimate of the probability that a malevolent psychotic would

be employed at this lab (Sandia) and would

2.5x10“^ v/ith a "two-man rule" of access.

attempt a destructive act was

[15] Haskell, M. R. and Yablonsky, L.

Rand McNally & Co., 1971.

, Crime and Delinquency

.

Chicago

[16] Hubbard, D. G., The Skyjacker:

Macmillan Co., 1971.

his flights of fantasy. New York;

The author uses data gathered in personal interviev/s with skyjackers to

docxament his hypotheses about their personalities. Hubbard typifies the

skyjacker as an inadequate personality who skyjacks to acquire dignity, to

affirm that he belongs to the human race, to perform a courageous, symbolic

act and thereby, absolve himself of his sense of worthlessness. Hubbard

17
suggests five tactics for controlling skyjacking, three of which may be

applicable to other types of crime such as nuclear weapon hostage

situations: 1) "broad dissemination of the findings of medical

research. .. stressing the involvement of sexual inadequacy in the crime"; 2)

addition of more women to essentially male organizations in order to

downplay the "machismo" or male aura associated with them; and 3) eliminate

the death penality while increasing the probability of incarceration and

treatment.

[17] Jeffrey, C. R., Criminal behavior and the physical environment.

American Behavioral Scientist , 1976, ^(20) , 149-288.

The author seeks to establish a model of criminal behavior which takes

into account physiological and environmental psychology. One of his main

points is that the deterrence effect of punishment is nullified in some

sectors of the population by reason of inherited characteristics. These

individuals, whom he calls sociopaths, simply do not "condition" to a fear

of pain.

[18] Jenkins, B. M., Will terrorists go nuclear? The Rand Corporation,

Santa Monica, Calif., Nov. 1975. (NTIS No. AD-A026 579).

This report discusses the potential threat posed by terrorists

,

including the creation of hoaxes, acts of sabotage, occupation or seizure of

nuclear facilities, thefts of nuclear materials, manufacture of nuclear

weapons, and the detonation or threatened detonation of nuclear devices.

Author gives his opinion as to the most likely scenarios and the most likely

perpetrators. The author feels that terrorists are, generally rational

people who see violence as an effective way to attract attention and inspire

fear.

[19] Klausner, S. Z. (Ed.) , Why Man Takes Chances . New York; Doubleday & Co. , 1968

This book contains several studies in stress-seeking. Three studies

attempt an emotional analysis of stress-seekers. Klausner describes the

character attributes and personality of stress-seekers, with particular

attention given to the social reinforcement received by stress-seekers.

[20] Leachman, R. B., Althoff, P., (eds) . , Preventing Nuclear Theft ; Guidelines for Industry and Government . New York: Praeger, 1972.

The book contains papers and summaries of discussions presented at the

Symposium on Implementing Nuclear Safeguards, sponsored by the Diversion

Safeguards Program at Kansas State University. The contents include papers

on; 1) Safeguards overview, 2) National safeguards systems, 3) Social

psychological studies of the safeguards problem, 4) Thefts, criminology,

and jurisdiction, and 5) Who are the enemy.

[21] Mabry, R. C., Nuclear T ' t ; Real ?.nd Imagined Dangers Naval

Postgraduate School , Monterey, Calif., March 1976 (Defense

Documentation Center No. ADA 028855) . This thesis examines the possibility of theft of nuclear material by

non-governmental people or groups. It discusses possible motivations for

committing nuclear theft. The capability of potential thieves is evaluated

as well as site vulnerability and safeguards effectiveness.

[22] Mallin, J. (Ed.) Terror and Urban Guerrillas , A Study of Tactics and

Documents . Coral Gables , Fla . : University of Miami Press'^ 1^71

This book discusses terrorism and special tactics for urban guerrillas.

Chapter 5 is a minimanual for the urban guerrilla. It not only describes

18
the characteristics of the urban guerrilla, but also lists techniques that

the guerrilla should be familiar with. Chapter 6 answers 150 questions that

a guerrilla might need to know.

[23] McKnight, G., The Terrorist Mind . New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1974.

McKnight has established contacts with terrorists around the world.

Articles in the book include: "Red Army Member: No Regrets," "Belfast's

Bloody Guns: Both Sides' Terrorists Regret Innocent Deaths, But ...," and

"Learning the Secrets of Black September." Although his interviev/s are very

unstructured, they do offer some insights into the psychology of various

members of terrorist groups.

[24] Menninger, K., Whatever Became of Sin? New York: Hawthorne Books,

1975.

In chapter 7, Menninger discusses group dynamics, and sin as a collective irresponsibility. The word "group-think" is defined as a kind of

self-deception in which responsibility for an action is diffused among the

members of a group to such an extent that no one individual retains

responsibility for actions taken. The implications of "group-think" for

guilt, accountability, and punishment are also discussed. An interesting

discussion of "police as moral leaders" is included in a later chapter.

[25] Mickolus , E. F., Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism.

In Alexander, Y. and Finger, S. M, (Eds.) , Terrorism : interdisciplinary perceptives . New York: John Jay Press, 1977.

Mickolus discusses the methodology, tentative findings, and future

applications of his statistical approach to the study of terrorism, project

"ITERATE" (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) . In an

appendix he discusses other similar approaches, including the works of Brian

Jenkins and others at the Rand Corp., Ted Robert Gurr , and Ernest Evans.

Mickolus' approach is well organized and thought provoking. Specific

findings of interest: 1) "indirect" attacks such as bombings far outnumber

personal confrontations; and 2) the most frequently mentioned terrorist

motivations are the release of political prisoners, monetary ransom, and the

combination of the two.

[26] Mickolus, E. F., Written communication, July 19, 1977. Advanced

Research Projects Agency: Arlington, Va. 22209.

This report covers all aspects of superviolence or the illegitimate,

unsanctioned use of mass destruction weapons . The report investigates the

problem and the background of superviolence including the political,

psychological, and criminal motives. Some known superviolent incidents are

summarized. The development of an illicit nuclear weapon is investigated.

Finally the threat process itself is reviewed and some solutions to the

superviolence problem are identified.

[27] Middendorf, W., The personality of the terrorist, part 2, the female

terrorist. Kr iminalistik , 1976, ^(8), 357-363. (German.

Unpublished translation by A. Perrey)

.

This report deals with the role of the female in terrorism. Examples

are drawn from various countries of the world, including Ireland, West

Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The author notes that the

personality of the terrorist is difficult to characterize because of the

almost universal refusal of captured terrorists to be interviewed by

behavioral scientists.

The author feels that the use of terrorism can never be fully explained

through rational motivations since violence is only one of many v/ays to

19
attain a goal, - there must be aggressive tendencies intertwined v/ith the

more rational motivations. He also implies, that terrorist activities often

involve widely disparate personality types ranging from schoolteachers to

professional criminals. He further states that psychopathic individuals are

attracted to terrorist groups because of the sensationalism v/hich surrounds

such groups

Middendorf feels that the aspect of "remoteness" or "distance" is an important aspect of terroristic violence. He states that the v/illingness to

kill depends on: 1) the distance (physical and psychological) between the

assailant and the victim; 2) the extent to which responsibility and guilt is

diffused among members of the group; and 3) the ability of the perpetrators

to realistically assess the consequences of a particular act.

Iliddendorf makes one relevant recommendation, that is, that women should

be involved in all aspects of police activity so that we can benefit from

their insights.

[20] Morf, G., Terror in Quebec ; Case Studies of the FLQ . Toronto:

Irvin & Co. , 1970.

The author presents a demographic/biographical history of the FLQ (Front

de la Liberation Quebecois) since 1963. The book is based on personal

interviews with members of the FLQ. Typically, they were young, that is,

under 30, average or above average in intelligence, relatively low in

education, lacking in patience, and socially and emotionally unstable.

[29] National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Disorders and terrorism : Report of the task force on disorders and

terrorism . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Lav/

Enforcement Assistance Administration, Dec. 1976.

This report covers standards that deal with all types of disorders and

terrorism. Proposals are made for training police and law enforcement

agencies in preventive measures that can be taken against mass violence.

The task force gives recommendations on the role the courts should play.

Also included are suggestions for the news media. The appendices contain

articles dealing with an overview of international terrorism.

The appendices also contain information directly related to terrorist

characteristics. This volume contains an excellent, very comprehensive

chronology of incidents of terrorism, quasi-terrorism, and political

violence which was compiled by Marcia McKnight Trick.

[30] National Foreign Assessment Center, International Terrorism in 1978 , Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency , March 1979.

(Available through NTIS)

This article presents statistics and demographics of terrorist incidents

which occurred during the decade, 1968-1978. Bombing and incendiary attacks

remain the most common mode of terrorism, because of the reduced risk they

pose to the perpetrator. Countermeasures are briefly discussed, but the

majority of this article deals with a description of incidents and

perpetrators

[31] Page, J. D., Psychopathology . Chicago: Aldine-Atherton , 1971.

[32] Pickrel, E., Federal Aviation Administration's behavioral research

program for defense against hijacking. The Role of Behavioral

Science in Physical Security , Proceedings of the First Annual

Symposi\im , April 2^-30 , 1976 (NBS Special Publication 480-24).

Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

20
This work is a very brief history of the FAA's efforts to deter

hijacking. Included is a discussion of the use of a behavioral profile to

screen airline passengers for potential hijackers.

[33] Rappoport, L. and Pettinelli , J. D., Social psychological studies of

the safeguards problem. In Leachman, R. B. and Althoff, P. (Eds.)

Preventing Nuclear Theft ; Guidelines for Industry and Government . New York: Praeger Publishers , 1972.

This work addresses issues of: 1) points of vulnerability, 2) probable

adversaries to nuclear security, 3) analogous crimes, and 4) simulation. In

the discussion following this chapter, the shortcomings of profiles and

typologies were briefly discussed.

[34] Russell, C. A. and Miller, B. H., Profile of a Terrorist. Military

Review , 1977, 52 (21), 21-34.

This is an excellent study of eighteen urban terrorist groups . Topics

included in this discussion are: age, sex, marital status, geographic

origin (rural versus urban) , social and economic background, education or

occupation, method/place of recruitment, and political philosophy.

[35] Security of public facilities and systems. Standard 4.8 Commentary.

In Disorders and Terrorism , Report of the Task Force on Disorders and

Terrorism , Washington, ^D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1976.

In this brief treatment of building security it is stated that women are

less suspected, less frequently searched, and less thoroughly searched than

male suspects

.

[36] Slomich, S. J. and Kantor, R. E., Social psychopathology of political

assassination. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , 1969 , ^(3) , 9-12.

Dr. Slomich characterizes political assassins as: 1) "dispossessed

elements of the lower middle classes"; 2) having strong unfulfilled sex

drives; 3) intensely envious; 4) alienated from society; 5) afflicted with

hopelessness and self -destructive drives; 6) generally apathetic, but

exhibiting sporadic outbursts of violence. His discussion of the typical

assassin sounds very much like David Hubbard's characterization of

skyjackers [16]

.

[37] Stohl, M. (Ed.). The Politics of Terrorism , New York: Marcel

Dekker, 1979.

This book is a collection of essays on the process of political

terrorism. No one theoretical position is taken. Stohl, in his

introduction, discusses eight myths of terrorism, which are particularly

interesting. He then divides the process of political terrorism into three

component parts: "(1) the act or threat of violence, (2) the emotional

reaction to such an act or threat, and (3) the social effects resultant from

the acts and reaction." The remainder of the essays deal with the concepts,

theories, ideologies, and sources of terrorism.

[38] Study suggests predictable criminal behavior. Trial , The National

Legal Magazine , Oct. 1977, 11-13.

This article summarizes the preliminary findings of a Rand Corporation

research program funded by LEAA. In-depth interviews of 49 armed robbers

and criminal record searching were the methodologies utilized by the

research team. The major finding to date was that habitual criminals may be

distinguishable from intermittent criminals. One particular finding of

interest among several listed was "offenders who found themselves frustrated

21
in accomplishing a crime because of tight security said they merely

substituted a secondary target..."

[39] Sykes, G. M. and Drabek, T. E., Law and the Lawless , A Reader in

Criminology . New York; Random House, 1969.

[40] Toch, H., Violent Men, ^ Inquiry into the Psychology of Violence . Chicago : Aldine Publishing Co. , 1969

Using peer interviews Toch has gathered data on violent men which can be

useful in two ways: 1) as analogs to violent groups and 2) in analyzing the

psychological motives of specific individuals and group members. He

includes chapters on "The Violent Incident as a Unit of Study," "The

Violence-Prone Person; A Typology," and "Some Implications" for reducing

individual and collective violence.

In his typology, Toch states that the most probable motivation to

violence is intense fear. Concerning group violence, he feels that

participants must be taught other means of achieving their goals; to quote,

"Violence cannot be remedied when there is in fact no other way to achieve

dignity and status .

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

[41] Alexander, Y. and Finger, S. M., (Eds.). Terrorism ; Interdisciplinary Perspectives . New York: John Jay Press, 1977.

This book is an excellent collection of articles and includes a good

treatment of the subject of terrorism and the media (chapter 4) . In chapter

1, Baljit Singh covers strategies, tactics, and targets, including a short

section on the psychology of specific terrorists, their goals and motives.

In chapter 4, H. H. A. Cooper, Bernard Johnpoll, and Yonan Alexander present

discussions of the media, especially concerning the issue of news

suppression. In chapter 4 future implications are addressed in articles by

Edward Mickolus, Joseph Margolin, and Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson. An

extensive bibliography is included.

[42] Baldonado, O. C., et al. Safeguards Systems Concepts for Nuclear

Material Transportation , Final Report (NUREG-6335) . McLean, Va.:

System Development Corp. , Sept. 1977. (NTIS No. PB272-496)

Deterrence is viewed as an a priori method of dealing with an attack,

implemented for the most part through publicity campaigns. Other methods

suggested include infiltration and "planting information." Speculation

about types of adversary, motivation, and likely scenarios is given in

chapter 3. The vulnerability of nuclear materials in the transport cycle is

discussed in chapter 4 . Recommendations are given in chapter 5 —

deterrence is described as the first subsystem and would include centrallycontrolled publicity concerning: 1) the invulnerability of safeguards; 2)

the consequences to be faced by potential adversaries; 3) the "hard-line"

approach to negotiating demands; 4) an image of alertness, efficiency, and

impregnability; 5) special legal penalities for attacks on nuclear

shipments. This is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the

transport cycle available.

[43] Blair, B. G. and Brewer, G. D., The terrorist threat to world nuclear

programs. Journal of Conflict Resolution , 1977 , 2^(3) , 379-403.

After a brief introduction detailing the problematic history of U.S.

safeguards policy, the authors highlight some of the vulnerabilities of the

nuclear weapons security program, using the Minuteman Intercontinental

Ballistic Missile as a specific example. Among their recommendations are:

22
1) installation of "permissive action links," that is, coded arming devices;

2) preaccess screening improvements such as more rigid clearance standards

and better physical and procedural identification techniques; 3) suspension

of visitor access; 4) facilitate public debate and research about nuclear

safeguards while declassifying the information needed to carry on such

debate and research

.

[44] Chauncey, R. , Deterrence: certainty, severity, and skyjacking.

Criminology , 1975, ^ (Feb.), 467-473.

Chauncey analyzes rates of skyjacking attempts to determine the effects

of certainty and severity of punishment. It was found that changes in

certainty produced significant reductions in rate, while changes in severity

of punishment yielded minimal or ambiguous results . Additional arguments to

support this conclusion are given as: 1) the most severe punishment, death,

has not been shown to be an effective threat, and may in some cases be an

extra enticement to a crime like skyjacking in which some perpetrators show

"'clear suicidal intent'" [16] ; 2) total certainty of punishment will

theoretically yield total deterrence, total severity will not because total

severity is unachievable; 3) a person who carefully plans a crime also plans

to escape detection and punishment, therefore no consequence will be a deterrent because the perpetrator believes that he or she will escape the

consequences of his/her criminal act; thus, we must modify the belief and

not the consequences

.

[45] Dror, Y., Crazy States : A Counter -Conventional Strategic Issue . Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971.

This is a highly theoretical treatment of various political entities

,

including terrorist groups. The author discusses various counterstrategies

including the withholding of reward in the form of capitulation. Dror gives

good definition of assumptions underlying deterrence: 1) rationality of

adversary; 2) our credibility to the adversary; 3) threats to opposition are

relevant to their value system; 4) threat must be above adversaries risk

propensity level - 4a) threat should be aimed at values highly regarded by

adversary; 4b) credibility must be reinforced by decisive action; 4c)

deterrence must be assured through visible , irreversible commitments.

[46] Geerken, M. and Gove, W. R., Deterrence, overload, and

incapacitation: an empirical evaluation. Social Forces, 1977,

^(2) , 424-447.

The authors, while addressing the theoretical side of deterrence, give a good definition of the underlying assumptions: 1) rationality of the

adversary, and 2) profit-maximizing motive (see Y. Dror [45] for a more

extensive treatment) . The deterrent in question is certainty of punishment;

the conclusion is that it is effective with rational crimes (that is,

property crimes or what J. D. Frank [12] calls "instrumental violence") , but

certainty of punishment is not as effective in deterring crimes of passion

(murder, assault, and so forth - Dr. Frank's "expressive violence").

[47] National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Disorders and Terrorism : Report of the Task on Disorders and

Terrorism . Washington , D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1976.

Sections of this report which are relevant to information management and

public relations are the following standards and their respective

commentaries: 4.10, Civil Authorities and the Media; 6.10, Deterrence of

Terrorism and Quasi-Terrorism; 6.12, Response to Terroristic Threats; 6.17,

Avoiding the Spread of Extraordinary Violence; 6.25, 7.10, and 8.7,

Relations with the News Media; 10.1, Nonviolent Protest Alternatives; 10.2

News and Entertainment Media Responsibility for the Prevention of

23
Extraordinary Violence; and 10.8, News Media Self -Regulation in

Contemporaneous Coverage of Terrorism and Disorder.

[48] Ibid.

Several of the goals and standards discussed in this report are relevant

to the subject of community relations. In particular, see: Goals 4.1,

Improving the Social Climate, and 4.2, Developing the Community Response;

Standards 4.3, Facilitating Peaceful Demonstration; 4.8, Security of Public

Facilities and Systems; Goal 10.1, Locating Community Responsibility for the

Prevention of Extraordinary Violence; Standards 10.1, Nonviolent Protest

Alternatives; 10.3, Community Cooperation with Law Enforcement and

Prevention Efforts; and 10.7, Community Efforts to Prevent the Spread of

Extraordinary Violence.

[49] Palmer, L. I., Adenaes and the theory of deterrence, a review article

of Punishment and Deterrence by Johannes Andenaes . The Journal of

Criminal Law and Criminology , 1975, ^(1) , 106-109.

Palmer discusses general deterrence which, according to Andenaes, is

"the ability of the criminal law and its enforcement to make citizens lawabiding." This definition removes the forces of deterrence from a minority

of law violators who have been apprehended, and broadens it to encompass the

citizenry in general. Palmer also discussed the dimensions of deterrence,

specifically, the threat of punishment, the fear of punishment, the

perceived risk of detection, and the adjunct social effects of the

moralizing and educative function of the law. These last two functions have

probably been underutilized because of the fear that moralizing and

education may easily become propagandizing. Andenaes feels that we must

face the fears and reality inherent to the concept of deterrence if we are

to deal with them honestly and ethically.

[50] Smith, D. C., Mafia: the prototypical alien conspiracy. Annals , American Academy of Political and Social Science, Jan. 1976, 423, 75-

This paper addresses the problem of America's obsession with

conspiracies. "Mafia" is followed from inception to present and is deemed

to be a construct of law-enforcers, government officials, and media people,

and based on a misinterpretation of fact.

The tendency of the American public to accept conspiracy theories and to

fabricate alien conspiracies where none exist is a point which small groups

of terrorists can capitalize upon. A group of three of four people can seem

like an army if their media impact and terrorism are properly combined.

[51] Tittle, C. R. and Rowe, A. R. , Certainty of arrest and crime rates:

a further test of the deterrence hypothesis. Social Forces, 1974,

^(4) , 455-462.

Tittle and Rowe examine the relationship of certainty of arrest to crime

rates by statistically analyzing data from Uniform Crime Reports. They

conclude that there is a point of criticality above which certainty of

arrest must go before it becomes an effective factor in deterrence, in this

case, 30% certainty was the approximate breakover point.

The authors also discuss motivation as a necessary but not sufficient

component of deviant behavior - many may have the motivation to engage in

deviant behavior, but only those who do not fear the sanctions will engage

in such behavior.

This article reiterates the importance of communicating to potential

criminal the high certainty of detection, arrest, and punishment involved in

24
an unlawful act, and also, the importance of maintaining sanctions which are

relevant to the values of a broad base of the population or which are

flexible enough to be tailored to the motivations of specific, high-threat

groups within the population

.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

[52] Barclay, C. N., Countermeasures against the urban guerrilla. Military

Review , 1972, 5^(1), 83-90.

The author reviews the role of the army in internal security, using the

situation in Northern Ireland as an example. He implies that an obtrusive

military presence is eventually resented by both the dissident and assenting

groups. His discussion of countermeasures is very pragmatic and includes:

1) the use of well-trained troops and reserves; 2) the gathering of specific

and timely intelligence; 3) fostering an attitude of cooperation with local

police forces; and 4) developing a cooperative attitude with the general

public

.

[53] Central Intelligence Agency. International and Transnational

Terrorism : Diagnosis and Prognosis . Washington , D.C.: Library

^

Congress, DOCEX Project, Exchange and Gift Division, 1976.

This is a good, though slightly outdated, analysis of terrorism. It

includes extensive statistical and demographic data. Five primary reasons

for the increase in terrorism are listed: 1) technological advances give

terrorists new capabilities; 2) new technology has given terrorists new,

more vulnerable targets such as power grids and jumbo jets; 3) a permissive

political environment has fostered a worldwide revolutionary atmosphere; 4)

terrorists are being better funded by sponsoring nations and states; and 5)

overall economic conditions have led to dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Timely intelligence, multidisciplinary analytical support, and extensive

inter- and intra-state coordination are felt to be critical. The report

presents the possibility of nations using terrorism as "surrogate warfare."

In a one-page treatment of the nuclear threat, the authors speculate that a barricade of a weapons storage bunker or the threat of broadcasting

chemical, biological, or radiological prisons are more likely than a nuclear

bomb extortion scenario

.

[54] Clutterbuck, R., Living with Terrorism , New Rochelle, N.Y.:

Arlington House Publishers, 1976.

Using case studies of specific terrorist groups, the author attempts to

illustrate terrorist tactics, strategies, motivations, and goals.

Especially interesting is chapter 12 which deals with the psychology and

motivation of terrorists. He also discusses the implications of an

individual's first act of destruction or murder on his subsequent

committedness

.

In chapter 13, "Prevention and Cure," Clutterbuck calls certainty of

detection, conviction, and punishment the most effective deterrent. He

argues succinctly against capital punishment and for better police

intelligence and development of public cooperation. The pro and cons of

various control measures such as passports and identification cards are also

discussed. A section on the government and the media is included. In his

concluding chapter Clutterbuck warns against over-reaction and suggests that

the prevention of terrorism "...lies rather in patiently fostering a climate

of opinion..." in the populace, especially the universities.

[55] Elliott, J. D. and Gibson, L. K., Contemporary Terrorism , Selected

Readings . Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of

Police, 1978.

25
This collection of articles, essays, and lectures in probably the most

comprehensive work on terrorism presently available. Besides the usual

articles on terrorist strategies, tactics, and characteristics, there are

several articles which address nuclear terrorism in particular.

Also of interest was a large section devoted to the response to

terrorism, especially that of the news media, John Wolf makes several

recommendations including the development of a "greater degree of

cooperation between federal intelligence agencies and the news media, in the

form of an educational effort..." to alert all concerned that terrorism is

contagious and criminal, not heroic or idealistic. He cites the need for

surveillance and other intelligence gathering operations, and the need for a federally run public education program on terrorism. H. H. A. Cooper

details intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques for combating

terrorism. Daniel P. Moynihan provides some counterpoint, arguing: 1) that

the threat of punishment does not deter, and 2) that intelligence operations

are generally not cost effective. A short annotated bibliography is

included

[56] Kupperman, R. H., Facing Tomorrow * s Terrorist Incident Today . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (Stock No. 027-

000-00614-1) , 1977.

The author suggests three lines of defense: 1) intelligence, 2)

hardening targets, and 3) crisis management. He discusses chemical tagging

as a possible, cost-effective deterrent to thefts of military stocks of all

kinds , including small arms . The suggested chemical tags could be detected

either with electronic "sniffers" or by trained dogs.

[57] National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Disorders and Terrorism : Report of the Task Force on Disorders and

Terrorism . Washington , D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice , Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1976.

This report presents several standards which are relevant to the subject

of intelligence gathering. They are standards: 4.9, Antiassassination

Measures; 5.3, The Intelligence Function; 5.4, Other Counterterrorist

Measures Undertaken by Intelligence Units or Agencies; 6.4, Self-regulation

of Police Intelligence Operations; 6.5, Police Specialization for Prevention

and Control of Extraordinary Violence; 7.2, Judicial Regulation of

Intelligence Gathering; and 8.2, Information Systems.

[58] Wolf, J. B., Police intelligence focus for counter-terrorist

operations. Police Journal , 1976, ^(1), 19-27.

Dr. Wolf suggests that highly developed police intelligence systems are

necessary to deter and combat terrorist operations. The special problems of

intelligence collection, storage, and dissemination are discussed. Special

operational divisions such as S.W.A.T. type teams and waterfront patrols are

also discussed. The deterrence effect of intelligence, special teams, and

so forth is only assumed, not documented.

TRAINING AND SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

[59]

Calvert-Boyanowsky , J. and Leventhal , H., The role of information in

attenuating behavioral responses to stress . Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology , 1975, 3^(2) , 214-221.

This discussion suggests that arousal symptoms may be reduced by

"warning" subjects or by giving them prior information about the arousal

state which they may expect to occur. This could be a useful part of the

26
training regimen for security guards as a preparation for response to a critical event.

[60] Galloway, S. L., Response force selection and training. In Kramer, J.

(Ed.) The Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security , Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium , March 23-24 , 1977 (NBS

Special Publication 480-32) . Washington , .C . ; U.G. Government

Printing Office, 1978.

The author discusses many of the problems involved in proper selection

and training of a response force. His recommendations include: development

of a team concept, cross training of security duties among response force

members, frequent in-service training, periodic off-site training, and

general development of an "elite force" competency and motivation. Since

his discussion is limited to the private sector, a few of Galloway's

assumptions and recommendations are not generalizable to military

applications

.

[61] Heckman, R. W., Groner , D. M. , Dunnette, M. D., and Johnson, P. D.,

Development of Psychiatric Standards for Police Selection , Minneapolis, Minn.: Personal Decisions, Inc., 1972. (NTIS No.

PB215-534) . The authors discuss a variety of screening and selection devices. The

need for development of good, job-related performance criteria is

emphasized. The authors conclude that no single test instrument is a good

predictor of performance, but that much of the problem is the lack of

consistent performance measures. The final implication is that a multipredictor/multidimensional criterion selection process should be

developed

.

[62] International Association of Chiefs of Police, Research Division,

Arabush Attacks - A Risk Reduction Manual for Police . Washington

,

D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration, 1974 (NCJRS No. .030021).

This report is aimed at civilian police forces rather than military

forces, however, the expert opinion contained herein is nonetheless

applicable to military security also. Several sections have an indirect

relevance to psychological deterrence - they are : the use of two-man

teams/back-up teams; the use of dogs; training in defensive tactics;

collection and use of intelligence; and, finally, physical conditioning.

[63] National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and

Terrorism . Washington , D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice , Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1976.

Concerning selection and training of personnel, the following standards

V7ere deemed relevant: 6.1, General Recruitment and Training; 6.8, Tactical

Management of Mass Disorders in Progress; 6.13, Tactical Responses to

Terroristic Acts; 6.14, Tactical Responses to Quasi-Terroristic Acts; and

6.15, Use of Force in Tactical Response to Disorder, Terrorism, and QuasiTerrorism. Besides the obvious tactical skills needed, it is suggested that

police officers/security personnel be trained in communications skills and

community relations. Standard 10.10 addresses some rules of behavior for

those who may find themselves in the role of victim or hostage.

[64] NiCastro, J. and Kendrick, H., Some ideas on structuring the problem

of collusion. In Kramer, J. (Ed.) The Role of Behavioral Science in

Physical Security , Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium , March

23-24 , 1977 (NBS Special Publication 480-32). Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

27
The authors suggest several methods of deterring collusion including:

pre-employment polygraph tests and "Q" clearances, random rotation of

duties, two-man rule, isolation, reliability checks, spot inspections, and

finally, the development of espirit de corps. The authors emphasize that

the guard force should not be treated as untrustworthy and that the feeling

of supervisory suppression should be minimized. [65]

Private Security Advisory Council, Prevention of Terroristic Crimes . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration, 1976.

This publication outlines various ways by which individuals may deter

and deal with terroristic acts. Included are plans of action, guidelines,

and checklists for dealing with kidnap and with extortion. Some of the

deterrents discussed here are already in effect at nuclear sites. The

deterrent effect of training personnel in dealing with threats to self and

family is not known, but may have some deterrent impact simply because it

implies a reduction of vulnerability. Richard Clutterbuck in Living with

Terrorism [54] lists similar personal protection methods among his

recommended deterrents

NOISE AND VIBRATION

[66] Cohen, H. H., Wasserman, D. E., and Hornuug, R. W. , Human performance

and transmissability under sinusoidal and mixed vertical vibration.

Ergonomics , 1977, 2^, 3, 207-216.

[67] Davies, D. R. and Jones, D. M., The effects of noise and incentives

upon attention in short-term memory. British Journal of Psychology,

1975, 6£(1) , 61-68.

[68] Drazin, D. G., Factors affecting vision during vibration. Cited in

Kraiss and Moraal (Eds.) Introduction to Human Engineering , Verlag

TUV Rheinland GmbH, Bonn, Germany, 1976. (p. 235).

[69] Frankenhauser , M. and Lundberg, U., Immediate and delayed effects of

noise on performance and arousal. Reports from the Psychological

Laboratories , University of Stockholm , 1973 , No. 407, 1-7.

[70] Green, J. A., Effectivity of antimotion sickness drugs during

artificial gravity simulations. -Aerospace Medicine, 1973, 44(11),

1255-1261.

[71] Grether, W. F., Harris, C. S., Mohr, G. C., Nixon, C. W. , Ohlbaum,

M., Sommer, H. C., Thaler, V. H., Veghte, J. H., Effects of combined

heat, noise, and vibration stress on human performance and

physiological functions. Aerospace Medicine , 1971, 42(10), 1092-1097

in Foundations of Space B ' ology and Medicine , Washington, D.C.:

NASA^ 1975 . ^Chapter 9, Norse and Vibration, by von Gierke, Nixon,

and Guignard , p. 371.)

[72] Guignard, J. C., Vibration, in Guignard, J. C. and King, P. F.,

Aeromedical Aspects of Vibration and Noise , NATO, AGARD-ograph No.

151 , cited in i^arss , K. F., and Moraal, Introduction to Hioman

Engineering, Verlag TUV Rheinland GmbH, Bonn, Germany, 1976. (p.

234) .

[73] Gulian, E., Noise as a stressing agent. Studia Psychologica , 1974,

16 (3) , 160-168.

28
[74] Harris, C. S., Sommer, H. C., and Johnson, D. L., Review of the

effects of infrasound on man. Aviation, Space, and Environmental

Medicine , 1976, 47(4), 430-434.

[75] Hasan, J., Biomedical Aspects of Low-Frequency Vibration, Work - Environment -Health , 1970, £(1) , 19-45.

[76] Lewis, C. H., and Griffin, M. J., A review of the effects of

vibration on visual acuity and continuous manual control , Part I

visual acuity. Journal of Sound and Vibration

,

1978 , ^(3) , 383-413 .

[77] Loeb, M. , Jones, P. D., and Cohen, A., Effects of Noise on Nonauditory Sensory Functions and Performance . LouTsville, Ky.:

Unxversity of Louisville, April l97^ (NTIS No. PB-266247)

.

[78] Malcolm, R. , Human Responses to Vestibular Stimulation and Some

Implications to the Flight Environment . PhD. Thesis, McGill Univ.,

cited In Reason, J. T. and Brand, J. J., Motion Sickness , N.Y.:

Academic Press, 1975.

[79] Morgan, B. J. T., Chambers, S. M., and Morton, J., Acoustic confusion

of digits in memory and recognition. Perception and Psychophysics,

1973, ^(2) , 375-383.

This study could have direct use in the design of acoustically cued

combinations, codes, and so forth. The authors discuss the factors which

seem to cause confusion of certain digits , and also which digits are most

often confused with each other under noise conditions

.

[80] Morrissey, S. J. and Bittner, A. C., Effects of vibration on humans;

performance decrements and limits. In Neal, A. S. and Palasik, R. F.

(Eds.) Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 21st Annual Meeting , Santa Monica, Calif.: Human Factors Society, 1977.

[81] O'Hanlon, J. F. and McCauley, M. E., Motion sickness incidence as a function of the frequency of acceleration of vertical sinusoidal

motion. Aerospace Medicine , 1974 , £5(4) , 366-369 .

[82] Parker, D. E., Ritz , L. A., Tubbs, R. L., and Wood, D. L., Effects of

Sound on the Vestibular System, Oxford, Ohio; Miami University,

1976. (NTIS No. ADA-025969).

[83] Rule, B. G., and Nesdale , A. R., Environmental stressors, emotional

arousal, and aggression. In Sarason, I. G. and Spielberger, C. D.

(Eds.) Stress and Anxiety III , New York: Hemisphere, 1976.

In this chapter the authors discuss both primary stressors, defined here

as environmental insult or trauma, and secondary stressors, defined as "immediate or anticipated barriers to ongoing goal activity."

Several possible design factors were identified in this work: 1)

unpredictable noise is less easily adapted to than predictable noise; 2)

response to a stressor depends upon cognitive factors especially motivation,

and attribution of the source of physiological arousal; 3) a few studies

suggest that men experience more stress and feel more aggressive and

uncomfortable in small rather than large rooms; and 4) when primary and

secondary stressors occur in combination, the effect is not additive, but

depends on the person's cognitive appraisal of the source of his arousal

(i.e., the environment, self, or reaction to another person or persons).

[84] Slarve, R. N. and Johnson, D. L., Human whole-body exposure to

infrasound. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 1975,

46(4), 428-431.

29
[ 85 ] Western, J. B. , Infrasound; a short review of effects on man.

Aviation, Space , and Environmental Medicine , 1975 , ££(9) , 1135-1143. [86]

Whitehead, G. L., et al . , Hearing under stress; the effect of

hyperventilation and hypercapnia on speech discrimination. Aviation , Space , and Environmental Medicine , 1977, 4^(1) , 5-6.

This study suggests that a state of hyperventilation causes no

significant change in the speech reception threshold but does cause

decrement in speech discrimination . The state of hyperventilation can be

induced by a reduction of CO 2 tension or, in some cases, by the introduction

of stress

ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION

[87] Bennet, C. A., and Rey, P., What's so hot about red? Human Factors,

1972, ^(2), 149-154.

This experiment suggests that the common sense design practice of using

colors at at the red end of the spectrum for feelings of "warmth" and colors

at the blue end for "coolness" has no basis in fact.

[88] Birren, F., Color and Human Response . New York; Van Nostrand

Reinhold Company, 1975^

This book is a popularized look at the effects of color on man. The

biological and psychological effects of color are discussed but not well

documented. It may be that color could be a very cost effective component

in an overall psychological deterrents system, but well controlled

experimentation is needed to confirm or deny that speculation. No such

experimentation was doctimented in this book.

[89] Chisum, G. T., et al. Flashblindness Following Double Flash

Exposures. Warminster, Pa.; Naval Air Development Center, April 5,

1974 . (NTIS No. AD-777698)

This study suggests that the luminance of a flash rather than its

temporal characteristics is the most significant factor affecting

flashblindness. The authors also imply that flashblindness protection

devices are available which have occlusion times of 165 s or less.

[90] Demers, M. T., A Study of Human Visual Recovery from Glare . Texarkana, Tex.; Army Material Command, March 1973. (NTIS No. AD768123) . In this study, using dark-adapted suh.jects, recovery from glare took 10

to 40 s with an average of about 30 s.

[91] Holl, H. B., Fundamenta'* ^ in Visibility. Redstone Arsenal, Ala.;

U.S. Army Missile Research and Development Command, February 1977.

(NTIS No. AD/A-040836)

This report covers subject areas such as; visual acuity, determination

of minimum visibility, visibility of light sources, brightness and

illumination of sky and terrain, changes from day to night, the color of

skylight, and variations in visibility during a day.

[92] Michaelson, S. M., Radio-Frequency and Microwave Energies, Magnetic

and Electric Fields. In Marbarger, J. P. and Vasil' yev, P. V.

(Eds.) Foundations in Space Biology and Medicine, Volume II, Book 2.

Washington, D.C.; NASA, 1975, (No. NASA-SP-374-Vol-2-BK-2)

30
[93] Pinkerton, E. and Humphrey, N. K., The apparent heaviness of colours.

Nature, July 1974, 250, 164-165.

This experiment suggests that colored stimuli are subjectively "heavier"

than a white comparison stimulus. Brightness was controlled. Colors were

not compared directly to each other. In comparison to the white standard

stimulus, red was the heaviest, followed by blue, green, and orange, with

yellow being the lightest. No mention was made of the effects of hue

saturation, or color preference.

[94] Shostak, V. I., Color perception after intensive photostimulation.

Kosmicheskaya Biologiya I Aviakosmicheskaya Meditsina. (Space

Biology and Aerospace Medicine). 1975, 9 (5) , 57-60 . Dark adapted subjects who were exposed to a brief, intensive light

source (80 ms and 1600 candle/s) suffered color perception disturbances.

The pattern and duration of the disturbances depended on the spectral

composirion and intensity of the light stimulus.

TEMPERATURE

[95] Allan, J. R. , Marcus, P., and Saxton, C., Effect of cold hands on an

emergency egress procedure. Aerospace Medicine, 1974, 45(5), 479-

481.

[96] Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, U.S. Army Medical

Research and Development Technical Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Army Medical Research and Development Command, 1974. (NTIS No. AD/A001543) .

[97] Astrand, J., Axelson, 0., Erikson, U., and Olander, L., Heat Stress

in Occupational Work. Ambio, 1975, 4(1), 37-42.

[98] Axelson, 0., Influence of heat exposure on productivity. VJorkEnvironment-Health. 1974, 11(2), 94-99.

[99] Blatteis, C. M. and Lutherer , L. 0., Effect of altitude exposure on

thermoregulatory response of man to cold. Journal of Applied

Psychology, 1976, 41(6), 848-858. ^ [100] Dressendorfer , R. H., Smith, R. M., Baker, D. G., and Hong, S. K. , Cold Tolerance of Long-Distance Runners and Swimmers in Hawaii.

Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii, 1977. (NTIS No. PB-275203)

.

[101] Girling, F. and Topliff, E. D. L., The effect of breathing 15%, 21%,

and 100% oxygen on the shivering response of nude human subjects at

10 C. Canadian Journal of Physiology and Pharmacology, 1966, 44,

495-499.

[102] Grether , W. F., Human performance at elevated environmental

temperatures. Aerospace Medicine, 1973, 44(7), 747-755.

[103] Harrison, E. A., Cold VJeather Stress on Humans (A Bibliography with

Abstracts), Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information

Service, 1978. (NTIS No. PS-78/0540).

[104] Hemingway, A., Shivering. Physiological Review, 1963, 43, 397-422.

105] Horvath, S. M. , Physiological Responses to Cold . Santa Barbara,

Calif.: Institute of Environmental Stress (U . of C.), date unknown,

(NTIS No. PB-273254)

.

31
[106] Kissen, A., Reifler, C. B., and Thaler, V. H., Modification of

thermoregulatory responses to cold by hypnosis. Journal of Applied

Physiology, 1964, 19(6), 1043-1050.

[107] Lahiri , S., Weitz , C. A., Milledge, J. S., and Fishman, M. C.,

Effects of hypoxia, heat, and humidity on physical performance.

Journal of Applied Physiology, 1976, 40(2), 206-210.

[108] Lewis, L. T. and Alford, J. J., The influence of season on assault.

Professional Geographer, 1975, 27(2), 214-217.

Concerning seasonal effects on crime, Lewis and Alford found no direct

relationship between specific temperatures and assault. There does seem to

be a seasonal trend, however. " low assault rates are recorded throughout

the country from November to May and high rates are recorded in the

remaining months . This trend cannot be explained by increased social

contact because it takes place even in subtropical climates . The author

suggests that the mechanism may be either relative changes in temperature

(increases of 68® to 88® in the South yielding the same results as increases

of 38® to 58® in the North) or, secondly, that violence, for some unknown

cultural/historical reasons, begins its season in May in all parts of the

country

[109] Lockhard, J. M. , Kiess, H. 0., and Clegg, T. J., Effect of rate and

level of lowered finger surface temperature on manual performance.

Journal of Applied Psychology, 1975, 60(1), 106-113.

[110] O' Hanlon, J. F., McGrath, J. J., and McCauley, M. E., Body

temperature and temporal acuity. Journal of Experimental Psychology,

1974 , 102 (5) , 788-794 .

[111] Poulton, E. C., Hunt, J. C. R. , Mumford, J. C., and Poulton, J. The

mechanical disturbance produced by steady and gusty winds of moderate

strength: skilled performance and semantic assessments. Ergonomics,

1975, ^(6) , 651-673.

[112] Ramey, J. D. and Morrissey, S. J., A composite view of task

performance in hot environments. In Neal, A. S. and Palasek, R. F.

(Eds) Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 21st Annual Meeting,

Santa Monica, Calif.: Human Factors Society, 1977.

[113] Shvartz , E. and Magazanik, A., Tolerance to heat following cold

stress. Aerospace Medicine, 1973, 44(7), 725-729.

[114] Timbal, J., Colin, J. , and Boutelier, C., Circadian variations in the

sweating mechanism. Journal of Applied Physiology, 1975, 39(2), 226-

230.

[115] Vanaaaard . L. . Phvsioloaical reactions to wet-cold. Aviation, Space,

and Environmental Medicine, 1975, 46(1), 33-36.

[116] Wilkerson, J. E., Raven, P. B., Boldnan , N. W. , and Horvata , S. M.

,

Adaptations in man's adrenal function in response to acute cold

stress. Journal of Applied Physiology, 1974, 36(2), 183-189.

[117] Wilson, 0., Goldman, R. F., and Molnar, G. W., Freezing temperature

of finger skin. Journal of Applied Physiology, 1976, 41(4), 551-558.

STRENUOUS PHYSICAL EXERTION

[118] Bates, B. T., Osternig, L. R. , and James, S. L., Fatigue effects in

running. Journal of Motor Behavior

,

1977, 9^(3) 203-207.

32
[119] Borg, G., Psychological Aspects of Physical Activities, in Larson, L.

A. ed.. Fitness, Health, and Work Capacity. N.Y.; MacMillan Pub.,

1974 .

[12^') Cerretelli, P., Exercise and Endurance, in Larson, L. A. ed . , Fitness , Health, and Work Capacity , N.Y.; MacMillan Pub., 1974 .

[121] Couzelis, P. M., Circadian variations in responses of trained and

untrained men to submaximal exercise. (Doctoral dissertation, Kent

State Univ. , 1976) Ann Arbor, Mich.; Xerox University Microfilms

(No. 77-3821)

.

The author found circadian rhythms in blood pressure, pulse pressure,

tidal volume, blood lactate, and serus potassium during exercise. These

rhythms could not be overridden by exercising at a specific time each day.

This study suggests that nighttime decrements in performance cannot be

overcome by simple changes in the training schedule.

[122] Evans, Wayne, Performance on a Skilled Task after Physical Work or in

a High Altitude Environment, Journal of Perceptual & Motor Skills,

1966, 2^, 371-380.

[123] Gruber, A., Dunlap, J. W. , DeNittis , G., Sanders, J. L. , Perry, V.

and Dixon , B . D . , Development of a Methodology for Measuring Infantry

Performance in Rifle Firing and Reloading . Ft. Lee, Va.; USATECOM

Pro j . No. 8-3-7700-01, Phase II, 1965.

[124] Ilmarinen, J. , Rutenfranz , J., Kylian, H., and Flint, F., Untersuchung

zur Fagesperiodik verschiedener Kreislauf-und Atemgrossen bei

submaximalen and maximalen Feistungen am Fahrraderogometer . European

Journal of Applied Physiology , 1975 , 3^(4) , 255-267 . The authors suggest that working capacity is less at night, but only if

the task is near the limit of the subject's endurance capacity; otherwise

the decrement is not significant.

[125] Morgan, VJ. P., Raven, P. B., Drinkwater, B. L., and Horvath, S. M. , Perceptual and Metabolic Responsivity to Standard Bicycle Ergonometry

Following Various Hypnotic Suggestions ^ Washington , D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1971, (NTIS No. AD767447)

.

[126] Szmodis, I., Exercise effects on the time of reactions to auditory

stimuli, European Journal of Applied Physiology , 1977, 37, 39-46.

[127] Young, M. E. , Effects of Fatigue on Human Behavior and Performance , A

Bibliography Covering the Years, 1964-1979, Springfield, Va.:

NTIS/U.S . Dept, of Commerce, 1979. (NTIS No. P5-79/0071) .

PAIN

[128]

Carterette, E. C. and Friedman, M. P. (Eds.) Handbook of Perception , Vol . VIB , Feeling and Hurting

.

New York: Academic Press , 1978 .

[129] Mumford , J. M. , Newton, A. V., and Ley, P., Personality, pain

perception and pain tolerance. British Journal of Psychology, 1973,

6£(1) , 105-107.

[130] Sinka, A. K. P., Experimental induction of anxiety by conditions of

uncertainty. (Doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Mich., 1950). Ann

Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms. (No. 00-02465).

33
In this study the author successfully generated various levels of

anxiety (self-report and physiological measures) by varying the level of

"uncertainty" with which shocks are presented. Most interesting are: 1)

the finding that sessions in which the subject felt he had some control over

shocks via successful performance of a pursuit task were more anxietyprovoking than sessions in which shocks were not contingent upon

performance; 2) the mere announcement of the conditions of uncertainty

produced the same physiological effects as the concrete events themselves

The author concludes that the expectation of pain is not as important in the

generation of anxiety as is the uncertainty associated with those

expectations

[131]

Sternbach, R. A., Psychological dimensions and perceptual analyses,

including pathologies of pain. In Carterette, E. C. and Friedman, M.

P. (Eds) . Handbook of Perception , Vol . VIB , Feeling and Hurting . N.Y.: Academic Press, 1978.

Sternbach discusses pain threshold, pain tolerance, pain endurance,

anxiety, and cognitive factors affecting pain. He also includes sections of

personality parameters and pathologies of pain.

SMELL

[132] Cain, W. S., The odoriferous environment and the application of

olfactory research. In Carterette, E. C. and Friedman, M. P.,

Handbook of Perception , Vol . VIA , Testing and Smelling , New York:

Academic Press, 1978.

Cain gives a good treatment to the subjects of adaptation, mixing,

masking and counteraction, and includes an interesting section on chemical

communication and pheromones

[133] Engen, T., Kuisma, J. E,, and Eimas, P. D., Short term memory of

odors. Journal of Experimental Psychology , 1973, 99(2), 222-225.

The authors note in the introduction that man can identify 3 levels of

odor intensity and 16 different odor qualities. This capability could be

used in some kind of multisensory coding.

[134] Harper, R., Human Senses in Action, London: Churchill Livingston,

1972.

[135] Johnston, J. R., Moulton, D. G., and Turk, A., Communication by

Chemical Signals , Vol . I^, N.Y.: Appleton-Century - Crofts, 1970.

This highly technical book is not directly related to the nuclear theft

problem, but it does suggest an area of research which has thus far been

ignored, that is, the psychological effects of certain smells or pheromones.

Messages which are conveyed by mamma ‘'s in this way (and there is the

possibility that man also communicates this way) are listed, including:

territory marking, warning, defense, alarm, submission, encouragement of

approach, distress-signalling, and pain indication. Pheromones may be

useful in enhancing the psychological deterrence of a system, but the

required human research in this area has yet to be done. This book shows

what can be done in animal studies and opens the imagination to many

possibilities in the realm of human research.

[136]

Rovee , C. K., Harris, S. L., and Topp, R., Olfactory thresholds and

level of anxiety. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 1973, 2(2),

76-78

34
This study suggests that anxiety causes a decrement in olfactory

sensitivity. A second result of interest was that all subjects, anxious or

not, found it very hard to discriminate differences of concentration of the

stimulus

.

PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES

[137] Biederman, I., Glass, A. L. , and Stacy, E. W. , Searching for objects

in real-world scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1973,

^(1) , 22-27.

The authors found that speed of detection of a target was slowed when

the scene was jumbled, especially when the target was not present, but had a high probability of being present in the scene. The mode of "jumbling" was,

however, inappropriate for use in the real world (photos were cut and

rearranged) . Complication of real-world scenes through physical

rearrangement may deserve some research.

[138] Braunstein, M. L., Depth Perception through Motion, New York:

Academic Press, 1976.

Chapter 5, "Slant Perception" is the only chapter with possible

application to security systems . Both static and dynamic slant perception

are discussed. Detailed discussion of the relative contribution of various

environmental cues permits the design of a variety of slant illusions.

[139] Coren, S. and Girgus , J. S., Seeing is Deceiving The Psychology of

Visual Illusions . Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.,

Publishers, 1978.

This is a very readable account of the history of visual illusions and

their application to both theoretical and real-world problems . The authors

analyze illusions of size, direction, location, and shape. They evaluate

the relative contribution of perceptual cues , developmental and cultural

experience, and learned perceptual strategies. A short section on eye

movement and illusion destruction implies that illusions which are presented

for only a short time are the most effective. Many of the illusions

discussed could be attempted in a nuclear security setting at a low cost.

[140] Dickinson, J., Proprioceptive Control of Human Movement , London:

Lepus Books, 1974.

Two chapters of this book, "Proprioception and Performance" and

"Proprioception and Learning," may have application to nuclear security

especially regarding the coding and tooling of arming mechanisms. The

author states that vision is the primary means of monitoring performance

.

Proprioceptive information is secondary, and in cases of conflicting input,

proprioceptive information is transformed to agree with visual feedback.

This suggests that "braille" codes in which vision plays no part or gives

conflicting information will be more difficult to perform. Another finding

of interest was that proprioceptive sensitivity is greater in the dominant

arm. This suggests that designing a braille code arming device that can

only be manipulated with the left hand would make the arming task more

difficult for the majority of the population. Transfer of learning effects

could be minimized by violating learned stereotypes such as turning a bolt

clockwise to tighten.

[141] Leibowitz , H. W., Detection of peripheral stimuli. In Visual Search , Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1973.

The author cites reports which confirm the hypothesis that when foveally

and peripherally presented stimuli compete for attention, peripheral stimuli

35
have lower priority. This "tunnel vision" effect has also been caused by

environmental stressors and danger-induced stress. However, several

experimenters reported that under conditions of heat stress and exertion,

subjects showed no decrement in either foveal or peripheral visual fields.

Further research is suggested.

[142] Muhar, I. S., Effect of stress on perception. Indian Journal of

Psychology , 1974 , 49^(4), 291-297.

This study investigated changes in perception when a presented

distortion is accompanied by stress. The experimenter found that subjects

under stress perceived distortions faster and perceived distortions as being

of greater magnitude than unstressed subjects. This suggests that although

visual distortions may be recognized as such by an intruder, the effect may

still disturb timing, coordination, and judgments of distance.

[143] Stvibbs, D. F., What the eye tells the hand. Journal of Motor

Behavior , 1976 , 8^(1), 43-58.

This author concludes that the speed and accuracy of hand manipulations

are negatively affected by the lack of visual cues for posture maintenance.

This suggests that the blanking of the visual field in the FEDS system could

be augmented by the addition of sloped surfaces or "rock and roll"

obstacles

[144] Weiss, E. B., Weather control: an instrument for war? Survival,

1975, ^(2) , 64-68.

In this article the author speculates about the possible military

applications of weather control. Many of these applications could be used

to enhance a deterrence system if they are found to be cost-effective.

Among the weather modifications discussed were: fog generation, increasing

rainfall, increasing snowpack, and generation of hail. These techniques

seem more appropriate for specific, tactical response situations than longterm, non-specific deterrence. Several weather control techniques could be

used to enhance detection on a long term basis however.

[145] Williams, L. G., Studies of extrafoveal discrimination and detection.

In Visual Search. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,

1973.

Although the author is concerned with target detection, much of his

discussion could be used in the design of Ccimouflage and illusions. For

instance, Williams reports that subjects searching for multidimensional

targets prioritize target characteristics according to their situational

potency - in this particular experiment the hierarchy was: 1) color, 2)

size, and 3) shape. If this kind of information could be empirically

determined for objects in a bunker, or bunkers in an arsenal, the objects,

bunkers, and weapons could be be made less discriminable from other parts of

the surrounding environment.

INFORMATION OVERLOAD

[146] Chatter jee. A., The effect of distraction stress on information

processing performance. Behaviorometric , 1973, 3^(2), 74-83.

This study confirms the degrading effect of information overload on

recall. The overloading was accomplished by simultaneously presenting two

tasks, a short-term memory task and a simple problem solving task.

[147] DeGreene , K. B., Systems Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,

1970.

36
Among the subject areas covered in this book are several which have some

relevance to nuclear security systems and deterrents. Specifically, they

are: chapter 12, "Systems Staff ing" ; chapter 13, "Training: Men-Man and ManMachine Communication," and chapter 14, "Psychophysiological Stress:

Environmental Factors Leading to Degraded Performance." This latter

chapter, though oriented toward the point of view of reducing stress to

improve performance, can be used to devise ways of increasing stress and

anxiety, and degrading performance.

[148] Graveling, R. A., and Brooke, J. D., An analysis of stress and the

characteristics of the human response to stress. In Brooke, J. D.

(Ed.) British Proceedings of Sports Psychology , 1974, 203-211.

The authors discuss the effects of environmental load on the human

organism. They provide a chart which succinctly details some of the

responses one may expect to occur when the human organism is loaded to near

capacity. Among these responses are pupillary dilation, hypertension,

tachycardia, changes in skin resistance, and changes in muscle tone.

[149] Lazarus, R. S., Deese , J., and Osier, S. F., Review of Research on

Effects of Psychological Stress Upon Performance ^ Lackland AFB , San

Antonio, Tex.: Perception and Motor Skills Laboratory, Human

Resources Research Center Air Training Command. 1951 (NTIS No. ADA010669) . ^ y

Because of ethical considerations , there are very few stress studies

being done at present. Some of the least restricted work was done 20-30 yr

ago. This report reviews some of them and lists some of the experimental

procedures used to produce stress , such as : mixing unsolvable tasks into a group of solvable ones; interruption of tasks; giving false norms of

performance and false feedback; using any strong extraneous sensory input as background "noise"; rapid pacing; and multiple tasks. One of the most

interesting responses to stress which were observed was the tendency to

stereotyped responses. This finding could be used to optimize the

probability of detection of an adversary, given that further research

confirms this effect. Other common responses to stress are discussed.

Although this document is very old, it is well worth reading and could be

useful to an imaginative system designer.

[150] Pachella, R. G., Intellectual Performance under Stress. Arlington,

Va. : Advanced Research Projects Agency, Sept"^ 1976 . (NTIS No. ADA038196) . This review suggests that although there are some individuals who seem

to be generally unaffected by situational stress, there are a few universal

effects. One such effect is the inability of both relaxed and anxious

people to detect logical inconsistencies when trying to remember meaningful

information. The author discusses various methods of controlling

information overload, the relationship between motor control and information

overload, and the effects of speed stress.

[151] Simonov, P. V., Psychophysiological stress of space flight. In

Marbarger, J. P. and Vasil 'yev, P. V., Foundations of Space Biology

and Medicine

.

Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1975.

Assxaming that a well-trained adversary and a well-trained astronant

share some motivational and character attributes , this article may have some

relevance to nuclear security systems. The author describes the differences

observed in astronants in simulation (no stress) and real flights

(stressful). In flight:

1) there is an increased awareness of the responsibility to complete

difficult actions, and an increased awareness of the responsibility

to "do it right the 1st time" because there may be no second

chance

.

37
2 ) men become increasingly perceptive to everything in the environment

that they perceive to have information relevant to the situation,

including noises, vibration, and occasionally this is paralleled by

a distorted concept of the situation.

The author cites the facilitating effect of prior conditioning. Those

who had positive emotions from overcoming past difficulties in their life

were more likely to succeed in overcoming present difficulties.

The author states that even in cases where procedures are performed

perfectly, there is an element of emotional stress, and that this stress

emanates from the element of risk perceived by the person, the "pragmatic

uncertainty" of success. The Yankelevich coefficient for emotional stress

is given: number of known failures/number of known attempts. This formula

could be optimized by correct information dissemination. The author also

suggests that feedback is necessary for some men to correctly perform

certain tasks. When deprived of this capability to monitor their

performance, they become unsure, confused, and performance degrades.

[152] Gallagher, R. J., Stimmell , K. G., and Wagner, N. R. , The

Configuration of Road Convoys : A Simulation Study . Albuquerque, N.

Mex., Sandia Laboratories , 1977

This report is a description of a computerized model of the transport

cycle. The model suggests that random placement of the "target vehicle" in

a convoy increases the probability of both vehicle and personnel survival.

The implication is that any added element of uncertainty is a deterrent

because the probability of a successful attack is lessened.

PERSONAL THREAT

[153] Baker, G. W. and Chapman, D. W., Man and Society in Disaster , New

York; Basic Books, 1962.

This book has general relevance to the nuclear theft problem, especially

for those who are concerned with possible post-theft scenarios. Of special

interest to those interested in deterrence were : chapter 3 , "Psychological

Effects of Warnings" by Irving L. Janis, chapter 4, "Reaction to Uncertain

Threat" by Stephen B. Withey, and chapter 10, "Dimensions of Models in

Disaster Behavior" by Dwight W. Chapman.

Janis discusses an adaptive process common among men in hazardous

professions which he calls "danger-contingent" reassurances, a combination

of selective vigilance and self-reassurance. This may be analogous to the

mind set of the criminal or terroristic intruder. To generate the greatest

fear, Janis says, give a great deal of unambiguous information about the

impending danger and no information about how to cope with it or what

resources are available to cope with it. Ambiguous information may tend to

increase vigilance when the threat is of "moderate or high" intensity.

In chapter 4, Withey characterizes "threat" as stress with the

additional characteristic of probability. He elaborates at least five

primitive characteristics of threat: 1) probability; 2) qualitative nature,

such as pain, and deprivation; 3) estimated magnitude; 4) timing; and 5)

possibility of escape or adaptation. He also presents a 15 point scenario

of "reactions to threat" in which reactions are seen as stages of

progressive adaptation, each stage, more costly to the organism than the one

previous. Chapman discusses behavioral modelling in general and Withey 's model of reaction to threat (chapter 4) in particular. His chapter is well

thought out and should be read by anyone interested in behavioral modelling

of disastrous or dangerous events.

38
[154] Baron, R, A,, Threatened retaliation from the victim as an inhibitor

of physical aggression. Journal of Research in Personality, 1973,

7(2) , 103-115'.

This study suggests that threatened retaliation from the victim was

highly effective in inhibiting subsequent aggression only for subjects who

had not previously been angered by the victim, and was relatively

ineffective in preventing such behavior in subjects who had previously been

exposed to strong provocation. More interesting were the possible

mechanisms hypothesized to under ly this behavior - 1) the perception that

the provoked will "lose face,” and 2) that the emotional arousal connected

with possible retaliation will be, on one hand, interpreted by the subject

as fear and , on the other , as rage

.

Baron suggests two other, more effective, ways of dealing with highly

provoked aggressors: 1) the introduction of restrained, nonaggressive

models, and 2) eliciting empathic arousal in the aggressor by increasing the

perceived suffering of the victim. (This latter suggestion seems to

contradict this author's findings elsewhere [164] .)

[155] Baron, R. A., Threatened retaliation as an inhibitor of human

aggression: mediating effects of the instrumental value of

aggression. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 1974, 3 (3B) , 217-

219.

This study is one of the few controlled experiments on the effect of

threatened punishment. Results suggest that threatened punishment is a very

weak deterrent to human aggression.

[156] Brown, S. C. and Martin, J. N. T. (Eds.) Human Aspects of Man -Made

Systems, St. Albans, Great Britain: The Open University, Press,

1977.

Poulton's chapter gives a concise discussion of skilled performance and

stress. The most common kinds of stress are listed as: personal threat,

multiple tasks, noise, heat, sleep loss and drugs. Poulton suggests: 1)

that a common way of trying to overcome stress is to concentrate on what the

subject believes to be the important aspects of the task; 2) combined

stresses can be additive or neutralizing in their effects depending on their

arousal properties; 3) two decisions cannot be made at once, unless one of

them involves an "overlearnt" skill. Starr's section on social benefit

versus technological risk is interesting to those in the nuclear field, but

is only indirectly related to psychological deterrents.

[157] Chaiken, J. M. , What ' s Known about Deterrent Effects of Police

Activities. Santa Monica, Calif . : The Rand Corp., 1976. T^DC/NTIS

No. ADA040854)

.

Chaiken 's treatment of the deterrent effects of police activity is

succinct and pragmatic. Some of the deterrent effects observed and

discussed are displacement of crimes in time and place, time delays in the

onset of deterrence, and what the author calls phantom effects, in which

police activities deter crimes at times and in places where the police are

not in operation, similar to the psychological concept of generalization.

Chaiken hypothesizes that phantom effects "occur because potential criminals

have imperfect or false information about operational details , perhaps

engendered by deliberate deception by the police." Chaiken concludes that

only very large increases in the amount of patrol will produce detectable

deterrent effects.

[158] Cooper, C. L. and Payne, R. , Stress at Work . New York: John Wiley

and Sons, 1978.

39
This v;ell-written book includes a very concise discussion of

environmental stressors in chapter 2 . Relevant topics covered in that

chapter include: flicker, noise, vibration, temperature effects, perceived

danger, and combined stressors.

[159] Ferguson, W. N., Psychological deterrent value of the patrol dog.

iiilitary Police Law Enforcement Journal , 1975 , ^(5) , 52-53.

This article discusses not only the deterrent effects of patrol dogs,

but also discusses the underlying assumptions of deterrence itself. The

author points out that the psychological effectiveness of the patrol dog

depends on two intervening variables: 1) visibility, that is, in the public

relations sense; and 2) the credibility of the handler's release criterion.

[160] Grosser, G. H., Wechsler, H., and Greenblatt, M. (Eds.) The Threat of

Impending Disaster , Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964.

There are several chapters in this book which are of interest to those

in the nuclear field. From the deterrence point of view, Lazarus' treatment

of stress experimentation is well worth reading . The most interesting

concept discussed was that some physiological stress reactions are generated

equally as well by anticipation as by reality. (See also, Sinka [130].)

Williams , in his chapter on warning-response systems , suggests that an

ambiguous warning will be interpreted in the most optimistic way possible;

other parts of this chapter and several other chapters would be invaluable

for conceptualizing post-theft scenarios.

[161] Janis, I. L., Air War and Emotional Stress , New York: McGraw-Hill

Book Co. , 1951

This book, although old, is not outdated. Several factors were cited as contributing to the elicitation of fear reactions: 1) element of randomness

and uncertainty; 2) experiencing a "near-miss" or the loss of a friend or

relative; and 3) the sight of mutilated casualties. Janis also discusses

the reinforcing effect of "remote-misses," in which fear is replaced by

confidence because of the subject's "successful escape." He also discusses

the extinguishing of the fear response by non-meaningful alerts . It is

suggested that darkness and fog enhance fear reactions by masking salient

cues in the environment. Janis also discusses some social psychology

concepts that give insight to possible post-theft scenarios.

[162] Musheno, M. C., Levine, J. P., Palumbo, D. J., Television

surveillance and crime prevention: evaluating an attempt to create

defensible space in public housing. Social Science Quarterly, 1978,

5^(4) , 647-656.

This study suggests that certain types of crime are not deterred by the

presence of T.V. surveillance. However, these results may not be

generalizable to the nuclear theft situation since those doing the

surveillance in this study were private citizens, not police officers, MPs

,

or security guards

[163] Study suggests predictable criminal behavior. Trial, 1977, 13(Oct.),

11-13.

This article offers one preliminary finding of interest: "offenders who

found themselves frustrated in accomplishing a crime because of tight

security said they merely substituted a secondary target..." This statement

was derived from a Rand interview sample of 49 imprisoned armed robbers.

Should this displacement phenomenon occur within the nuclear security

situation, it is possible to imagine scenarios such as off-site

assassination of security personnel, kidnap and extortion plots, and

alternative nuclear targets such as reactors, or manufacturing plants.

40
(This displacement effect is also discussed in Jan M. Chaiken's report

What's Known about Deterrent Effects of Police Activities, 1976 [157].)

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

[1C4] Baron, R. A., Aggression as a function of victim's pain cues, level

of prior anger arousal, and exposure to an aggressive model. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology , 1974, ^(1) , 117-124,

Baron's article supports the hypothesis that signs of pain and suffering

reinforce aggressive behavior in highly provoked subjects. If we assume

that a potential intruder is such a highly provoked or angered person , pleas

for mercy or other signs of suffering will not only be ineffective but may

facilitate further aggressive behaviors.

[165] Geen, R. G., Stonner , D., and Shope, G. L., The facilitation of

aggression by aggression: evidence against the catharsis hypothesis.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1975 , ^(4) , 721-726 . The authors provide further evidence for the hypothesis that aggressive

behavior is reinforcing to itself. Aggression seems to increase in

frequency as it becomes reinforced as a mode of releasing frustration.

[166] National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and

Terrorism . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept . of Justice , Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration, 1976.

The following standards were presented as part of the committee's report

and have relevance to the concepts of contingency planning and crisis

management: 4.1 and 8.1, Contingency Planning; 4.2, Interagency

Cooperation, 4.11, Relief and Restoration Measures; 4.13, Aftermath

Measures; 6.2, Planning for Mass Disorders; 6.24, Relations with Mental

Health Professions; 6.3 Planning the Police Response to Individual and

Small-Group Terrorism and Quasi-Terrorism; 6.6, Bureaucratic Organization of

Prevention and Response Efforts; 6.16, Negotiation under Duress; 6.26,

Community Relations Efforts in the Aftermath of Extraordinary Violence; 7.1

Judicial Participation in Planning for Response to Extraordinary Violence;

10.6, Professional and Nonprofessional Intervention in Incidents of

Extraordinary Violence; 10.11, Community Action in the Aftermath of Disorder

and Terrorism; 10.12 Followup Reporting of Extraordinary Violence by News

Media; and 10.13, Research Efforts in the Aftermath of Extraordinary

Violence

[167] Schlossberg, H. and Freeman, L. , Psychologist with a Gun . New York:

Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1974.

This book is an anecdotal rather than technical work written by a police

officer/psychologist in the New York Police Department. Of interest are

certain tactics which the N.Y.P.D. instituted for hostage situations: 1)

wait it out if at all possible, giving top priority to the saving of lives;

2) use news blackout if necessary to reduce crowd size; 3) use lighting

blackout; 4) keep the situation as non-violent as possible by ordering

cease-fire once the field of fire has been cleared and officers are under

cover; 5) allow the adversary to perceive some chance of escape - if the

situation is perceived hopeless, a desperate act is more likely; and 6) use

some non-aggressive method to keep the adversary vigilant and, in doing

this, fatigue him quickly - the example given by Schlossberg was driving an armored ambulance back and forth in front of a store where gunmen were

holding 11 people hostage. The authors also briefly discuss the social

interaction process with the public noting that "The public's attitude

toward the police is vital in determining how effective the police are."

41
N3S-1 14A (REV. 9-78)

U.S. DEPT. OF COMM.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET

i. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO. NBS IR 80-2038

Ne,

\Y-''

"u$, lJ 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Psychological Deterrents to Nuclear Theft; An

Updated Literature Review and Bibliography

5. Publication Date May 1980

!,* 'Vi' ssssiaiMi^sii^ir^lnlrint 7. AUTHOR(S)

George W. Lapinsky, Jr. and Clare Goodman

8. Performing Organ. Report No.

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Project/Task/Work Unit Mo.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20234

11. Contract/Grant No.

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND COMPLETE ADDRESS fSrreer, City, stare. ZIP)

Surety and Operations Directorate

Defense Nuclear Agency

Washington, D.C. 20305

13. Type of Report & Period Covered

M.

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

I I Document describes a computer program; SF-185, FIPS Software Summary, is attached.

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or tesa factual summary of moat significant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or

literature survey, mention it here,) A review of the unclassified literature dealing with psychological

deterrents was conducted for the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) . The

review indicates that while human psychological processes (sensory, perceptual, and cognitive) can be manipulated by various means, definitive empirical data are lacking which directly relate to deterring

Behavioral impact research should be undertaken

iLntified^^^^^^^^^

deterrence values of the many techniques

17, KEY WORDS (aix to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the first key word unless a proper name

separated by semicolons)

Cognitive processes, nuclear weapon theft; perceptual processes

psychological deterrence; security systems; sensory processes.

18. AVAILABILITY [gD Unlimited

I I For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

I I Order From Sup. of Doc., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC

20402, SD Stock No. SN003-003-

Order From National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA. 22161

19. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS REPORT)

UNCLASSIFIED

20. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS PAGE)

UNCLASSIFIED

21. NO. OF

PRINTED PAGES

45

22. Price

USCOMM-DC
1
)I