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96–931PDF 2005

AID TO COLOMBIA—THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN

THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCO-TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2004

Serial No. 108–155

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

VACANCY 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

CALEB MCCARRY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin 

America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..... 28

The Honorable Robert R. Charles, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State ............. 33

Juan Jose Quintana, Counselor, Embassy of Colombia ....................................... 52

Michael E. Shifter, Vice President for Policy, Inter-American Dialogue ............ 55

Sandro Calvani, Representative, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 

(UNODC), Bogota ́, Colombia ............................................................................... 60

Marc W. Chernick, Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University .......... 66

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco: Prepared statement ......................................... 30

The Honorable Robert R. Charles: Prepared statement ....................................... 36

Juan Jose Quintana: Prepared statement ............................................................. 54

Michael E. Shifter: Prepared statement ................................................................ 57

Sandro Calvani: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 63

(1)

AID TO COLOMBIA—THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN 

THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCO-TERRORISM 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. BALLENGER. The Committee will come to order. I will begin 

by offering my opening statement, and then will allow the other 

Members to present their opening statements. We will then watch 

a short video before moving on to our witnesses. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the role of our European allies and 

the effort that they are putting in to eradicate drug trafficking and 

associated terrorism in Colombia. 

Although the British and the Dutch and the Caribbean, at least, 

continue to play critical roles in fighting trafficking of drugs—elicit 

narcotics, that is—to the United States and Europe, we have seen 

little or no such cooperation from most of our other nations of Europe and the European Union. 

In the year 2000, when U.S. contributions to Plan Colombia were 

being debated in the Congress, it was clear that our Government 

was willing to provide most of the required military aid to Colombia, while our European allies pledged similar funding, over a billion dollars, to fund economic and social programs. 

Today, more than 90 percent of all military assistance to Colombia is fully provided by us. And to date, most of the funding 

pledged by the Europeans has yet to materialize. 

While the United States was sensitive to the Europeans’ reluctance to provide Colombia with military assistance, we welcomed 

their pledge of assistance to provide funding for the ‘‘soft side’’ of 

Plan Colombia. Money, pledged by the European Union was to support alternative crop programs, or displaced persons projects, the 

resettlement of demobilized guerillas, opening new export markets, 

and other economic development programs. At the time, we were 

glad that the Europeans wanted to help. However, we expected 

more than mere words and a lot more than the $120 million now 

given annually. This figure, I must note, is equal to what the 

United States has provided in nonmilitary assistance. 

Why should Europe be concerned and care about Colombia? Why 

should stability and peace in the Andean region be of concern to 

Europe? The answer is simple: Illicit narcotics. Illegal drugs from 

2

Colombia, especially cocaine, is now flooding communities of all 

sizes, both here and in Europe. Millions of children and young 

adults, and their families, are being destroyed along with the futures of our nations. Keeping drugs out of our community is the 

greatest challenge to our governments. But no one government can 

do it alone. 

Stopping the flow of drugs from Colombia to the United States 

and Europe will take a concerted effort. And I hate to say this, but 

the United States, with the exception of Great Britain, is shouldering this burden alone. Today, we hope to reinvigorate our allies 

and encourage them to act. 

Let me give you a little background. Committee investigative 

staff reported earlier this month that as much as 50 percent of the 

cocaine from Colombia no longer comes to the United States; it now 

heads to places like Brazil and more and more to Europe. According to some experts in the Drug Enforcement Administration, Europe, which once viewed America’s cocaine and crack cocaine epidemic as simply a regional matter for us to deal with, now gets a 

substantial portion of Colombia’s deadly cocaine, and it is accelerating rapidly. 

Earlier this year, Italian authorities reported an 8-ton seizure of 

Colombian cocaine. Colombian National Police recently reported 

that a commercial airline flight from Jamaica to London had about 

50 couriers moving Colombian cocaine to Europe. Spain now is seen 

as the gateway for Colombian cocaine to Europe. It has witnessed 

a nearly fourfold increase in seizures since 1996. In 2002, 16 countries in Europe reported abuse of crack cocaine. Colombia, it seems, 

is now their problem as well. The European-Colombian drug traffic 

trend is clear, easy to see, and one we can all clearly comprehend. 

Now we need a European response suited to this common challenge. At the donors conference scheduled for February 4th and 5th 

in Cartagena, Colombia, the European Union and its member 

states will be given the prime opportunity to make good on their 

promises by providing the very assistance they pledged to Colombia 

in the previous conferences. 

Our European allies no longer have an excuse to stay on the 

sidelines. Stopping the flow of illegal drugs is vital to the collective 

interests of both hemispheres. Together we must help Colombia 

prevail for both the sake of our children and our communities on 

both sides of the Atlantic. I thank you. 

Before I allow my colleagues to offer their opening statements, 

I wanted to take a few minutes to thank the Members of this Subcommittee for their hard work on behalf of our Nation and the nations of the Western Hemisphere. And I particularly would like to 

thank Ranking Member Bob Menendez. 

Bob, although we have disagreed on things from time to time, 

you have always been fair and willing to discuss matters calmly 

and openly. Your understanding of the issues, unwavering commitment to the region, and your dedication to doing what is right has 

made working with you a pleasure, and I believe that a good working relationship has served our Congress and our constituency well. 

Thank you. 

Now, let me not forget to mention one other person. As you 

know, our staff makes us all look good. I wanted to recognize your 

3

staff director, Jessica Lewis, for her professionalism, hard work, 

and good humor in working with me and my own staff. Thank you, 

Jessica. And I also want to recognize Jessica’s predecessor, Pedro 

Pablo Permuy. 

Finally, I cannot forget my long-time partner in crime, Bill 

Delahunt. Anytime you get a liberal from Massachusetts and a conservative from North Carolina to work well together, you have got 

something special. Thank you, Bill, for your hard work. And I wish 

you the best. 

Mr. Menendez, your opening statement. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for your most gracious comments. There is only one mistake you 

made in that last part of the statement about Mr. Delahunt. It is 

‘‘liberal.’’ At least that is how we see it on so many of those commercials. 

First of all, I also want to take the opportunity—since this will 

be, as I understand it, our last hearing with you as our Chairman—to say that I know that every Member of this Committee, 

certainly all of those on our side as well as yours, want to thank 

you and join me in thanking you for your incredibly dedicated work 

on the behalf of the people of this Hemisphere. You are one of the 

few people on either side of the aisle who takes a true interest in 

Latin America. And you have been a real partner. And even where 

we have disagreed, our goals have been the same. We may have 

disagreed as to how to get there. But we have never disagreed in 

our commitment to the Hemisphere. 

And you will be missed, not only on this Committee, but certainly in your voice in this Congress on hemispheric issues. But I 

know you are not going to be missed in the Hemisphere, because 

I know that you plan to continue your hard work on behalf of all 

of the citizens of the region as you have done for so long, not only 

in your personal engagement and in your professional engagement, 

but in your humanitarian engagement on behalf of the people of 

the Hemisphere. It is really an extraordinary thing to have seen 

over the last 12 years that I have been here, and certainly over the 

last several years that you have been Chair, and I want to thank 

you very much. 

I also want to thank you for the manner in which you conducted 

the work of the Subcommittee, the courtesy and comity which you 

provided to Members on this side of the aisle. If that was the case 

throughout the House of Representatives, I think we would achieve 

a lot greater success. I hope that your successor, whoever that may 

be, will take lessons from the way in which you conduct this Committee. 

I want to thank your very talented staff, who have always been 

collaborative and worked in a spirit of real bipartisanship—even 

when we found areas of disagreement. How could we achieve that? 

And I would like to present a small token of our appreciation, 

Mr. Chairman. It is within the House Rules. It may be wrapped 

in gold, but don’t worry about it, it is not bullion. But it is a book 

that I think you will appreciate on the work that you have done 

in this Hemisphere and the relationships we have had in the Hemisphere. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

4

Mr. MENENDEZ. Turning, Mr. Chairman, I may have to leave the 

hearing at some point simply because I sit on the 9/11 Commission 

Conference Committee, which has been meeting throughout the 

week. And we met late last night and early this morning. I may 

be called away. With deference to our witnesses, I don’t want you 

to think that I am slighting you or the Committee. 

According to the title of this hearing, we are here today to discuss the European role in the fight against narco-terrorism. But I 

believe we are really here to discuss the European role in the fight 

to create prosperity and the fight for democracy and the rule of 

law, and the fight for justice and safety for the Colombian people. 

I have always believed that the fight against the drug lords and 

rebels will only be won as part of a larger fight against poverty, 

violence, and the hard-fought battle for economic and social development. I am a strong supporter of funding to fight the drug lords, 

but I also believe that we must invest in creating real alternatives 

for the people on the ground so that they have sustainable incentives to move away from drug production. 

Clearly, the Europeans and the United States share the same 

goal in Colombia: To work together with our Colombian counterparts to end the longstanding civil war and bring peace and prosperity to the Colombian people. Yet, the United States has taken 

the lion’s share of the burden in Colombia. 

Now, some of my colleagues might suggest that this is a clear 

failure on the part of the Europeans. They might say that the Europeans were supposed to take the ‘‘soft side,’’ and we were supposed to take the ‘‘hard side.’’ Yet, I believe the truth of the matter 

is much more nuanced than that. If we want the Europeans to fully 

engage in the Colombian process, then we must find a way to develop a real working relationship with the Europeans. This Administration’s inability to engage our allies goes far beyond our disagreements in Iraq. Iraq just got the attention of the press. We 

have a transatlantic breakdown in relations that keeps us from 

fully reaching our mutual goals in this Hemisphere. 

Let me be clear. I strongly believe that the Europeans should 

take an active role in the fight against drugs and the fight for development in Colombia. But if we want them on the team, then we 

have to invite them in, listen to their ideas, and be willing to work 

with them. 

We are at a very different moment than we were when Plan Colombia was designed. As you know, Plan Colombia expires at the 

end of 2005, and we have the chance to make Plan Colombia 2 

much stronger by creating a cross-Atlantic alliance committed to 

fighting the drug lords and improving economic and social development in Colombia. And I believe there is a unique window of opportunity for three reasons. 

First, we have learned a lot about what has worked and what 

hasn’t worked in Plan Colombia. We know that we have some successes. In 2003, homicide was down 22 percent, and kidnappings 

were down by 32 percent. Cocaine production decreased by 21 percent, and opium poppy production decreased by 10 percent. 

Now, some experts point out, however, that we haven’t met our 

goals as measured by other standards, such as decreasing the 

5

amount of cocaine on the streets in the United States or lowering 

the price of cocaine. 

We also cannot overlook the fact that there were more internallydisplaced people in Colombia in 2003 than in any other country in 

the world. Colombia still is the largest cocaine producer in the 

world. And while kidnapping and poverty levels have decreased, 

they still remain at alarming rates. And furthermore, concerns 

about Colombia’s human rights records serve as a reminder that 

our policy toward Colombia cannot be focused on ending narcotics 

alone. 

Secondly, the Europeans have new motivation to get more heavily involved in Colombia, because they face a growing cocaine consumption problem and an increase in the amount of cocaine from 

Colombia. 

And, thirdly, we are about to start a new term of the Bush Administration. 

And, no, before you get overzealous, I am not suggesting that 

this is a moment I am celebrating, Mr. Chairman. But I would suggest that the Administration and the likely new Secretary of State 

have an opportunity to create a new legacy for the Administration 

in our own hemisphere on this issue. I hope that will be a topic 

discussed during the President’s trip to Colombia. And this is a 

prime moment to build toward future cooperation with our European colleagues. We should, as they say, ‘‘seize the day,’’ not squander it. 

As we work together on this new plan, I would hope that it 

would include the following elements: 

First and foremost, we must maintain support for drug interdiction and eradication. But we must also increase the proportion of 

funding spent on alternative development, increasing the rule of 

law and other ‘‘soft areas.’’

Secondly, we should also promote a regional approach to the 

problem, which can help prevent cocaine production from simply 

moving from one area of the region to another, the frequently described ‘‘balloon effect.’’ The drug lords don’t let the borders limit 

their vision of how to create the most profitable cocaine business 

in the world. We shouldn’t let those borders limit our vision of how 

to eliminate their business. 

And, thirdly, as I made clear earlier, we must promote real European involvement in the next phase of our work. But I also believe 

that we may need to allow each side to specialize in what they do 

best to maximize our resources and expertise. 

In closing, I would like to be clear that today’s hearing is not a 

discussion, from my view, simply on European or United States involvement in Colombia. Today’s discussion must be on how the Europeans and the United States will work with the Colombians and 

their regional neighbors to reach the goals they see for their own 

countries. 

Ultimately, this is a policy debate over an issue that directly impacts the lives of citizens in all three parts of the world. It is the 

children of United States, European and Colombian parents who 

are dying from cocaine abuse, civil war, or drug-related violence. 

This is an issue that hits home literally in all three places. It is, 

6

I believe, a problem that we can solve only when we truly work together. 

In that spirit, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the witnesses, 

and engaging them after their testimony. And, once again, thank 

you for your incredible dedication to the people of this Hemisphere 

and to your work on this Committee. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

Congressman Paul. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Franco 

and Mr. Charles. It seems like if we are going to have a discussion 

about the Europeans and why they are not participating, it looks 

like we ought to be talking to the Europeans eventually. I am not 

sure we can get the answer—maybe we can—from you on why the 

Europeans don’t get involved. Because quite possibly they are reluctant to—maybe they are not convinced it is a wise investment. 

But, evidently they thought it was at one time and made some 

commitments, but we need to know more about what the Europeans are thinking. 

But there also may be some frustrations about the success. I 

know we like to look at things in a positive manner. But Drug Czar 

John Waters, in an interview in Mexico City here, recently said,

‘‘We have not yet seen in all of these efforts what we are hoping for on the supply side, which is a reduction in availability.’’

And he went on to say that there had been no notable disruption 

in the supply of drugs to the United States. So that raises questions about the success. We have spent over $3 billion since the 

year 2000. And it really raises more profound questions about 

whether we can achieve what we want. 

As a physician, I can verify, you know, how bad the drug usage 

is in this country and how horrible it is. But, then again, the approach is pretty important. If dealing on the supply side doesn’t 

work, maybe it is only going to be on the demand side. As long as 

the demand is there, you know, spraying crops in Colombia, which 

is risky business too, just might mean that this whole effort is 

pushed to Peru and Bolivia and wherever. 

So I think the overall policy has to be addressed on whether or 

not we are pursuing this in the right manner. I know the motivation on everybody’s part is the same. But then again, I am interested in finding out, if we can today, why the Europeans have become so reluctant. And I yield back. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Just a statement for the record. The Chairman 

and Chairman Hyde of the International Relations invited the head 

of the European Union delegation to testify and present the EU’s 

views. 

Without objection, I wish to submit the letter that we received 

declining the invitation. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. PAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think this is 

a good ending to a great career, serving not just the people of the 

United States, but the people of the Hemisphere, for this particular 

hearing, because I think it underscores the commitment that you 

have had during your career here in Congress that has been mentioned by my colleague, Bob Menendez. 

And let me agree with the points that Mr. Menendez made in 

terms of what the focus, as we look forward, should be in terms of 

our efforts. We have had great success, Cass, dealing with our 

counterparts in various national assemblies, the most obvious, of 

course, being the National Assembly of Venezuela, the so-called 

‘‘Boston Group.’’

But I daresay, rather than an exchange of letters—for whatever 

the reason the declination for appearance before the Committee 

today on this hearing that was received from the European 

Union—that whoever your successor is could take this particular 

issue and design a mechanism much like what you launched when 

you and the others created the so-called ‘‘Boston Group’’ to create 

an ongoing dialogue not just in terms of American-European relationships, but how it implicates the Hemisphere. 

I think this is an obvious lesson, because we all remember representations being made that the Europeans would come forward 

with—my memory is a billion dollars’ worth of support for the socalled ‘‘soft side,’’ if you will, in terms of the needs of Colombia to 

deal with this particular issue. 

Clearly, the United States has a moral obligation to Colombia to 

assist in ending the scourge of cocaine and heroin and other drugs. 

While there is a demand, there is going to be a horrible price paid 

by Colombia and other producing nations in terms of disruption of 

their societies. 

But I think that a bold initiative—and I could see a role for you 

as Chairman Emeritus—might very well be the creation of a mechanism which would engender and encourage dialogue with European nations, not in an executive-to-executive role, because often 

times statements are made by executives on all sides in bilateral 

relationships that are as much about posturing as they might be 

about substance. But take it to a different level, and create, if you 

will, a role for Congress to deal with their colleagues not just in 

Colombia, but elsewhere in Latin America, along with members of 

European parliaments and the European Union itself to address 

the issue, in a respectful and civil way, as opposed to attempting 

to assess blame. 

Anyhow, that was a comment that was prompted by the very insightful statement by my friend, Bob Menendez. 

But having said that, I want to address another matter that is 

just as important, and that is the fact that you will be leaving us 

in your capacity as a Member of Congress and as our Chairman. 

You have heard me say this in private on many occasions. But I 

want to say it in public and for the record: We are all going to miss 

you. 

And I think you know on a personal level how much I will miss 

you, Cass. And I think you will be missed more than any of us realVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ize at this particular moment. And as, again, the Ranking Member 

indicated, the Western Hemisphere is going to miss you as much 

as those of us who count you as a friend. 

Because it is true. For years you have been one of the few friends 

that Latin America has truly had in this institution. Few Members 

know the region as well as you do, and I can’t think of a single individual who has such profound affection and love for the people 

of Latin America as Cass Ballenger. It comes from the heart. That 

has been reflected in decades of contribution, not just as a Member 

of Congress, but engagement in extremely worthy causes for the 

people of Latin America. And you have never let ideology get in the 

way of your desire to help. 

As you indicated, for you and I to share this experience together, 

who would have ever ‘‘thunk’’ it. I think I can probably say publicly 

now that you did visit Hyannisport several years ago and, in fact, 

set foot on ‘‘you know what’’ compound, but I won’t expound on 

that any further. 

But I do think that your ability to care about people on a personal level, and again I think of the Boston Group where ardent 

partisans in probably the most bitterly polarized society in Latin 

America—I speak of Venezuela—were able to come together and, I 

think, leave the better for it, where half were members of the government and the other half were members of the opposition. 

I think, Cass, that you created some space in a society that needed it, and still needs it, for dialogue and respectful civil discourse 

to happen. You are to be congratulated for that, because you really 

have established a standard for civility that is hard to match; and 

in a polarized United States Congress, that too has been all too 

rare. 

And Cass Ballenger has always kept his word—and I count that 

as something of great significance—no matter how much heartburn 

it might cause you. And I think back now, not too long ago, to a 

hearing that was held in this very room regarding the situation in 

Haiti, where you gave great latitude in terms of the questioning 

and the amount of time that each Member was able to inquire of 

the Assistant Secretary. 

I am sure that some discussions were held after that about why 

such a lengthy hearing. But it was based upon the fact that you 

really do believe in democracy and civility and keeping your word. 

You never let things get personal; you never look for the limelight. 

You simply did what you felt was right in a quiet, honorable way. 

I am proud to call you my Chairman. I am proud to call you my 

friend. I am grateful that I had the good fortune of serving in the 

United States Congress at the same time that you represented the 

people of your district in North Carolina. 

I would also be remiss not to compliment your staff, whom I have 

grown to like, and to recognize their talents, their ability, and their 

sincere and genuine commitment. And as Bob Menendez said, if 

you keep going, you will get them fired. 

But Caleb and Ted, John Mackey, and all of the others that sit 

there, they are good and decent people. They are invariably wrong, 

but they are good and decent people. 

So with that, Cass, my most sincere and genuine good wishes. 

And good luck, my friend. 

14

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. 

Representative Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to associate myself with the vast majority of Mr. Delahunt’s remarks, with the exception of ‘‘invariably wrong’’ on the staff, because I think they are inevitably right. 

But, Mr. Chairman, it is with such a heavy heart that you are 

leaving us. We have so enjoyed your leadership in Latin America, 

the relationships that you have not only made with each of us, but 

with the remarkable people to our south with whom we share families and histories and a heritage, to let them know that they are 

important to us, that they have not been forgotten. Certainly, were 

it not for 9/11, I believe that your leadership in this arena would 

have created such an enormous opportunity for us as we move forward. 

And we are going to be charged with maintaining that standard 

and that passion that you have shared, not only with all of your 

stellar efforts as our Chair, but with your heart. And you are so 

deeply embraced throughout the Americas for that heart, for your 

inordinate personal generosity, not to mention the role in governance. 

And so I hope that standard that you created, that wonderful bipartisanship, those relationships that you have helped create on 

our trips with us, and that leadership will never ever leave this 

Committee. You may be gone from our presence right here, but 

never forgotten. 

We are going to look forward to your leadership as you continue 

on because, you know, we are not letting you go. We know you are 

going to continue on with our friends in Latin America. They value 

you so. And we value the legacy that you have created here, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you so much. You have had a noble time here. 

So thank you. 

I would also like to make my opening remarks about the hearing 

today concerning the aid to Colombia and the Europeans’ role in 

the fight against narco-terrorism. We are going to hear of recent 

European missteps in Colombia, such as the uncovered Danish 

GeoCash contribution to the FARC. I am hopeful that today’s hearings will focus on the opportunity to create positive contributions 

for our European friends regarding Colombia. 

I thus ask unanimous consent that the written testimony of Colombian Ambassador to the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime in Vienna, Ambassador Serrano, be entered into the record and provided 

to the media here today, especially for the European press. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Ambassador Serrano is the legendary, 

drug-fighting, former Director of the Colombian National Police, a 

two-time International Association of Chiefs of Police Policeman of 

the Year, the only foreign national ever made an honorary DEA 

agent. 

Ambassador Serrano’s perception and his extraordinary analysis 

of illicit drug trafficking trends shows that an ever-greater amount 

of cocaine from Colombia flows throughout Europe. His analysis of 

consumer cocaine use and drug trafficking ought to serve as a 

wake-up call for our European friends. 

At this time, there is no place for complacency on their part regarding Colombia’s narco-terrorism. It must end. The Serrano analysis shows that close to 25 percent of global cocaine consumption 

now occurs in Europe, and that 90 percent of this within Western 

Europe. Since drug use as stated is often a lagging indicator, it 

may even be much higher at this point. Moreover, crack cocaine 

consumption has emerged within Europe as an alarming phenomenon. 

Here in the United States, we know from bitter experience about 

the violence and destruction that can accompany this type of drug 

use, and our friends in Europe need to take immediate action to 

stamp out this worrisome trend. 

Yet, the most startling figure in the Serrano research is the nearly 50-metric-ton seizures of cocaine seized in 2003 in Spain, a country that the Colombian traffickers use as their gateway into Europe. In addition, the traditional North African route for hashish 

smuggling may also have begun to be exploited by the Colombians 

as another means to move more and more cocaine throughout 

Spain and into Europe. 

Despite the alarming evidence, today Spain itself and other nations of Europe, such as Germany, remain less than helpful in 

stemming the flow of illicit drugs from Colombia. Our British 

friends once again seem to be the only European players really 

helping Colombia with its antinarcotics efforts. 

And apart from that, Ambassador Serrano’s, DEA’s, and HIRC’s 

experts have also detected soaring cocaine flows into Europe. This 

increase in illicit narcotics activities means more and more violence, more and more terrorism emanating from Colombia. 

In conclusion, it must by now be clear to our European friends 

that this insidious problem of cocaine trafficking and use extends 

far beyond America into their countries as well. 

Now it is time for European partners to come to the assistance 

of Colombia, because security, peace and prosperity in that nation 

constitute a critical mutual interest. Together with the administration of Colombian President Uribe, who has just done an extraordinary job, we need to tackle this drug challenge and help Colombia with its own dark era of narco-terrorism. Only then will we witness an end to the ancillary violence that harms our communities 

and young children on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Now, I would like to declare that I am not up 

for sainthood. 

But let me just say, first of all, our first witness, Adolfo Franco, 

is Assistant Administrator for Latin American and the Caribbean 

28

of the U.S. Agency for International Development. And before you 

begin, Adolfo, I would like to personally thank you here in public 

for all of the fine work that you have done for us at USAID. I have 

personally witnessed the results of your efforts to help poor people 

of the Americas, especially the children. 

And I know that Latin America is a better place because of your 

fine service at USAID. And I hope you will continue to serve in this 

capacity. And with that, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICAN 

AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 

Menendez and the other Members of this distinguished Committee 

for the opportunity to testify today on USAID programs. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore what all of the distinguished 

Members have said about your extraordinary career and your commitment to Central America and to the process in Venezuela that 

we have worked on. 

Before this hearing began, Mr. Ballenger was asking me, ‘‘Did 

you get these medical supplies down to Puntamayo like I told you 

to?’’ So his heart, his commitment, his hard work, his dedication, 

I think, represents the best of public service. And it has been an 

honor and a privilege to work with you over the years on shared 

goals and objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States Agency for International Development is very proud of its contribution and the efforts of our Government to assist the Government of Colombia and the people of 

Colombia to promote peace and democracy in that country and, 

most importantly, to decrease the flow of drugs into the United 

States, Europe and elsewhere. 

It is an extraordinary privilege for me to serve with my colleague 

who will testify in a few moments, Assistant Secretary Charles, 

who has been an extraordinary leader and a partner in this effort. 

To this end, the United States Agency for International Development is working to achieve the goals of decreasing the flow of drugs 

to the United States and elsewhere by supporting three broad and 

mutually supporting objectives. 

And they are, first, as Mr. Menendez has said, to support democratic institution building and the rule of law in Colombia. Secondly, to support development alternatives and economic opportunities for marginalized Colombian populations. Those are most of 

the people engaged in the production of the cocoa leaf. And lastly, 

through the important work of supporting people internally displaced by the civil war and conflict in Colombia that now goes into 

its sixth decade. 

Incidentally, Colombia does have, as Mr. Menendez said, one of 

the highest displaced populations in the world, and the only one in 

our Hemisphere. According to The World Drug Report of 2004, Mr. 

Chairman, that was recently published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, approximately 13 million people around 

the world are affected by cocaine consumption. 

29

Over 25 percent of these individuals—approximately 3.3 million—are drug users are in Europe, with approximately 90 percent 

of these users residing in Western Europe. To combat this scourge, 

the United States Government continues to urge the European 

Union to increase their support for counternarcotics programs in 

Colombia. 

To that end, last week, I traveled to Spain to meet with the 

Spanish Development Agency to discuss our program in Colombia 

and the means by which we can achieve the mutual goals of providing economic opportunities for those that produce coca so they 

can engage in licit activities in return for their voluntary coca 

eradication. 

Initially, I want to speak about the USAID programs. Our concentrated efforts were in the Puntamayo department in the southern part of the country, which had the highest coca production. We 

have now expanded our efforts to other departments where there 

is a high incidence and threat of coca and poppy cultivation. 

This year, our efforts have supported more than 10,000 hectares 

of legal crops for a cumulative total of 50,000 hectares of legal 

crops since our efforts were launched in the year 2000. 

Our efforts in this period have benefited 38,000 families in this 

part of Colombia. To put this in context, Puntamayo’s population 

is approximately 300,000 people, and our alternative development 

assistance has benefited 38,000 families, and that is, more than 

38,000 individuals. 

Our alternative development also includes activities that improve 

Colombia’s rural infrastructure so that licit crops can be transported and marketed. All of you have traveled to the region and 

know the logistical challenges of transporting licit crops between 

the remote areas of the south and Bogota and other large markets. 

This year alone, another 200 infrastructure projects have been 

completed, and 900 have been completed since 2001. I hope to travel with President Uribe early in the year to the southern part of 

the country to inaugurate and highlight for the Colombian people 

the successes of our programs. 

Under the alternative development program, USAID has built 90 

schools, 40 water systems and 80 municipal buildings ranging from 

homes for the elderly to business centers and community centers, 

all of these in areas where there is illicit coca production. 

USAID is also working to develop agribusiness partnerships and 

is a key participant in negotiations for a free trade agreement between the United States and Colombia to enhance and increase 

market access for licit Colombian products within the Andean region and beyond to the United States and Western Europe. 

Although I want to stress USAID’s work in alternative development, Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other Members of the 

Committee, including Mr. Menendez, are aware of the other activities that we are undertaking in Colombia, including the support for 

the justice system and human rights; the protection for human 

rights workers, judicial personnel, trial witnesses and government 

officials. This is at the center of our efforts to promote equitable society and to attack impunity in that country. 

Together, these projects are creating a civil and human rights 

protection infrastructure and consciousness, a climate of respect so 

30

that the Colombian Government may be able to prevent—and be 

more responsive to—human rights violations and to create a climate of respect for the rule of law. 

I am also particularly proud of USAID’s assistance to the internally displaced people of Colombia. This assistance, which is administered by USAID and the State Department’s Bureau for Population Migration and Refugees, includes food, shelter, income, and 

income generation and education programs. 

Last quarter, IDP programs collectively aided more than 130,000 

persons for a total of 1.9 million people since 2001. More needs to 

be done as there are nearly 2 million displaced people in Colombia. 

Despite these significant accomplishments, the job is not complete and the program continues to evolve in response to a changing political and economic condition in the country. As you know, 

our Presidents will meet next week to discuss the road ahead in 

the year 2005 and beyond. There are, as Mr. Menendez says, windows of opportunities where additional European assistance could 

make a difference. I discussed these matters in Spain last week. 

You are absolutely right, Mr. Menendez. There are areas in 

which we can collaborate and there are areas in which the Europeans can take the lead and others where we can take the lead. 

I intend to pursue that with European colleagues, particularly from 

Spain, in February, when they pay a visit to the Administrator of 

USAID, Andrew Natsios. 

The United States Government will continue to take advantage 

of every opportunity to encourage our European partners to increase their contributions and support in the fight against illicit 

narcotics and to create a lasting peace in Colombia. 

I wish to underscore, Mr. Chairman, that a year and a half ago, 

I attended the consultative group meeting on Colombia in London. 

At that time, I was encouraged that the European Union would 

make substantial contributions. However, to date, I have to share 

some of the concerns of the Members of this Committee that the 

level of support for what is referred to as the ‘‘soft side’’ or ‘‘development side’’ has not been as forthcoming as we would like. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee. It would be my pleasure to answer any questions that you, 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Menendez, other Members of the Committee 

may have for me. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, for the 

opportunity to testify before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Agency for International Development is proud of its contribution and participation in the US government efforts to promote peace and democracy in Colombia and to decrease the flow of drugs into the United States. 

USAID is working toward the achievement of these goals by supporting three 

broad and mutually supporting objectives:

Support for democratic institution building and the rule of law; 

Support for alternative development; and 

Support for internally displaced persons

31

Today I would like to concentrate on alternative development. The United States 

believes that alternative development is an essential component to overall eradication policy that includes aerial spraying. In contrast, most European Governments 

consider alternative development to be an effective substitute for aerial spraying. 

They see alternative development as complementary to law enforcement measures. 

However, these same governments recognize that European funded alternative development activities in Colombia have not yet reached the scale of national level impact. 

And national level impact is what is needed. According to the World Drug Report 

2004, recently published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, some 

13 million people around the world are affected by cocaine consumption. Over 25 

percent (approximately 3.34 million) of these consumers are in Europe, with approximately 90 percent in Western Europe. 

The United States Government continues to urge representatives from the European Union member countries and the European Union to increase their support for 

counter narcotics programs in Colombia. 

USAID’s counter narcotics programs demonstrate what is possible to achieve 

through national level impact programs. In coordination with the private sector, 

USAID is working to improve access to and expand the efficient operation of markets and facilitate sustainable and broad-based income and employment growth in 

strategically targeted areas of the country. Expanding economic and social alternatives will lead to a sustainable expansion of viable alternatives to illicit crop production. 

Initially, USAID programs concentrated in Putumayo and Caqueta ́, areas that 

contained Colombia’s densest coca cultivation, but have now expanded into other departments with high incidence or threat of coca cultivation. This year, our efforts 

have already supported more than 10,000 hectares of legal crops, for a cumulative 

total of 49,000 hectares since 2000. These activities have benefited more than 38,000 

families. 

Our alternative development program is giving families like Bertha Ardila and 

her sons an alternative to the violent coca trade. Nine months after joining the alternative development program the Ardila family have replaced their coca crop with 

24 hectares of corn, yucca and cocoa. In fact they are planning to build a stable and 

buy cows to start a milk production operation with their own resources. The success 

of our alternative development program is spreading as reflected by Mrs. Ardila 

comments, ‘‘Our neighbors used to call us crazy for our decision. Now, they ask us 

about the program and how they can join’’. 

Alternative development also includes activities that improve Colombia’s rural infrastructure, so that licit crops can be transported and marketed. This year alone, 

over 200 infrastructure projects were completed for a total of almost 900 since 2001. 

Under alternative development we have built more than 90 schools, 40 water systems, and 80 municipal buildings—ranging from homes for the elderly to business 

centers and community centers. Projects completed also include 195 sewage projects 

and 35 roads. Democracy and legitimate, accountable businesses continue to take 

root with 21 citizen oversight committees having been formed last quarter, for a cumulative total of 220 municipalities with improved public services. 

Trade is also an important element in bringing economic stability to Colombia. 

Under the Colombian Agribusiness Partnership Program (CAPP), USAID is providing resources to finance a range of competitive agro-processing and cultivation 

expansion activities; and anticipates leveraging upwards over $200 million in private sector financing in the program overall over the next three years. This program 

is also supporting securitized bond issuances designed to provide sustainable capital 

market financing for long-term commercial crop production and processing projects. 

Additionally, USAID under the Colombian Forestry Project is working with farmers 

and agro-forestry businesses to develop employment-intensive and environmentallysustainable industry chain linkages in the forestry sector. Trade and the forestry 

industry are areas of potential collaboration with the European Union and European member countries. 

USAID-sponsored alternative development projects in Colombia are also reinforcing the core functions and values that underpin Colombia’s democratic civil society. Program beneficiaries are uniting and forming associations to ensure progress 

achieved continues after USAID funding has ended. The Association ‘‘Building a Future,’’ for instance, comprised of 14 small farmer organizations, representing 388 

families from Mocoa, recently gained national attention when they were invited to 

speak at a forum in Bucaramanga sponsored by the influential Colombian non-governmental organization, Planeta Paz. The President of the Association, Libardo 

Martinez, when speaking with other local leaders, stressed the importance of community work and organization. According to Martinez, ‘‘. . . the Putumayo experiVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
32

ence has become the reference point for progress for the other departments and for 

the rest of the world.’’ Colombians are increasingly proud of the future they are creating, using rule of law and the legitimate economy as a pivot point. 

I can’t leave without addressing USAID’s achievements in democratic support and 

support to internally displaced persons. 

Building democratic institution and strengthening the rule of law are key elements in creating a stable, prosperous, and drug-free Colombia. We have established 

37 Justice Houses (casas de justicia), which increase access to justice for poor Colombians. Make no mistake: this is not a small victory or goal—it is at the very 

heart, in our view, of sustainable progress and U.S. support. So far, these casas de 

justicia have handled over 2.8 million cases, easing the burden on the over-taxed 

judicial system. Remarkably, the Department of Justice and USAID ‘‘Administration 

of Justice’’ initiatives have also established 35 new Oral Trial courtrooms and 

trained over 10,000 lawyers, judges and public defenders in new oral legal procedures designed to reduce impunity and quicken the judicial process. Similarly, an 

‘‘Early Warning System’’ is up and running, which monitors potential conditions 

that might trigger human rights violations and thereby provides warnings of impending threats. In addition, 11 new mobile satellite units of the national human 

rights unit have been arrayed around Colombia to provide a more immediate response to allegations of human rights violations in the most remote areas of the 

country. Together, these projects are creating a civil and human rights protection 

infrastructure—a climate of respect—so that the Colombian government may be 

able to prevent or be more responsive to human rights violations. Support for the 

Inter-American Human Rights Commission or the Vice President’s Human Right’s 

Observatory are two areas that may be of interest to the European Union. The EU 

and member countries historically have supported democracy and human rights programs. 

Also on human rights, the Colombian government ‘‘protection program’’ has been 

expanded to include protection for mayors, local human rights officials, council 

members, municipal human rights workers, medical missions, journalists, and 

former mayors. In the third quarter of FY 2004, more than 40 individuals received 

protection measures for a cumulative total of 3,540. During this quarter, ten additional offices are in the process of being armored, for a cumulative total of 87 offices 

protected as of June 2004. Further, a professional police corps has been trained and 

equipped to protect judicial personnel, witnesses, and government officials. By providing protection to these individuals and offices, we are playing an increasingly important role in ensuring the ability of Colombia’s leaders, human rights defenders, 

and local officials, to conduct activities in as secure an environment as possible. 

Finally, we provide emergency and longer-term assistance to vulnerable groups, 

particularly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This assistance, administered by 

USAID and the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Migration, and Refugees 

includes food, shelter, psychosocial assistance, physical and mental health services, 

community strengthening, income and employment generation, urban assistance, 

education, and rehabilitation of child ex-combatants. It also strengthens the Colombian agency responsible for IDP coordination, protection, and border monitoring. 

The program runs more than 300 projects in 25 departments and 200 municipalities 

throughout the country. 

USAID through its IDP program has helped many people like Ruth Dary Ortiz 

realize their potential. Ruth lives in the run-down neighborhood called ‘‘Nelson 

Mandela which is home to displaced families who have fled the fighting and instability of the countryside. Armed fighters broke into her home and killed her brother. 

When her family fled their village and moved to Cartagena , they arrived with no 

money or prospects of a job. Today, Ruth is enrolled in a 6-month course in internet 

and computer maintenance supported by Entra 21, a regional youth employment 

program which is funded by USAID. She credits the program as being more than 

just a program but an opportunity in life.’’

Last quarter, IDP programs collectively aided more than 130,000 persons for a cumulative total of over 1.9 million persons since 2001. During the same period, more 

than 7,500 jobs were created for IDPs and other vulnerable persons, such as youth 

at risk of displacement or recruitment by illegal armed combatants. To date, IDP 

programs have provided vocational and skill development training for nearly 52,000 

IDPs and created over 65,000 jobs. Equally important, access to education was increased during the last quarter for more than 900 displaced and other vulnerable 

children for a total of 164,840 recipients since the program began. Finally, more 

than 200 families who were willing and able to safely return to their original communities were assisted last quarter, for a cumulative total of 19,535 families, or over 

97,000 individuals since 2001. The IDP Program also assisted 170 additional child 

ex-combatants during the last quarter. By providing viable life and employment opVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

tions, the program discourages families from taking up cultivation of illicit crops. 

The European Union member countries have supported activities in support of indigenous peoples and to help prevent trafficking in persons. Continued support in 

these areas is likely to be of interest to the member states. 

Despite these significant accomplishments, the job is not complete and the program continues to evolve in response to changing political, economic and social conditions. There are windows of opportunities where additional European assistance 

will make a difference. The United States Government will continue to take advantage of every opportunity to encourage our European partners to increase their contributions and support in the fight against the illicit narcotics trade to create a lasting peace in Colombia. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before you and the Members of the Subcommittee this afternoon. It would be a pleasure to respond to any 

questions you or others Members may have.

Mr. BALLENGER. I would like to add one thing. I was in Colombia 

the week before last, and your officer there in Bogota said, ‘‘Why 

don’t you kind of mention it to the President, if they would just fix 

the road up from Puntamayo back to Bogota, that all of these developments that you have put in down there would be much more 

efficiently delivered and so forth.’’

So when I got a chance, I asked him. He said, well, how long is 

it? I think it is 170 kilometers. At your man’s suggestion, I said, 

and we are willing to split the cost with you. And I think we planted the seed. Let’s hope that they pave that road. It was a pretty 

crummy looking road that I rode on. 

Mr. FRANCO. I will look into this matter, Mr. Chairman, and report back to you. There have been two issues with road construction, and one has been the road maintenance issue. We need to 

make sure that those are tended to. There is a willingness often 

to build roads but then the maintenance issues and the necessary 

investments later on, that particularly the Colombians need to 

pledge, need to be undertaken to ensure that the road can be maintained. 

Second is the security issue for us, but I will follow-up on that, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I appreciate it. 

Now we go to our friend. Bobby Charles serves as the Assistant 

Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Since this is probably my last hearing, I want to commend Bobby 

for his efforts to fight the drug trafficking in America and elsewhere. I believe, through Bobby’s hard work, things are really 

turning around. While more work needs to be done, I believe that 

with people like Bobby on our side, we can and will succeed in the 

end. 

And with that, I turn it over to you, Bobby. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT R. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. CHARLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think I just need 

to add my gratitude to the pile of gratitude that sits before you already. 

We have traveled a lot of the world together. And when I was 

up here at this end of the avenue, your leadership has been, as evVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

eryone has said—Mr. Menendez, my colleague, from Mr. Franco, 

and every other Member—has been exemplary, not just in the professional sense, but has been an example to me personally. Because 

whether it was getting corrugated steel to the houses that had been 

destroyed in a hurricane, or working with individuals who had suffered in other ways, you always stepped up to the plate personally 

and professionally, and really showed a remarkable way to do that. 

So I thank you also for all of the work you did. 

I know that you worked very closely with Speaker Hastert over 

many years to help create some of the very things that we are talking about here today: The momentum for change. And really you 

are one of the fathers of that. 

And I also have to say that I sat up behind a lot of these daises, 

and I think a lot of the work that has been done by your staff has 

really been a driver for change, in particular Caleb McCarry, Ted 

Brennan and John Mackey. And we continue to work with them because they are real leaders in their own right. So thank you very 

much. 

I would like to just say a few words and then, obviously, back 

off for questions. Mr. Chairman and all of the distinguished Members, we obviously have a real battle on our hands in Colombia and 

throughout the region, not only with drugs but with narco-terrorism. And I think that part of what we need to see is that there 

is something of a tipping point afoot here. 

Its origins go back in time to when His Excellency, Jose Serrano, 

was in fact the Chief of Police in Colombia, and when members of 

this panel and others on both sides of the aisle created the response to Plan Colombia and ultimately supported this extraordinary effort to try to move toward something big. 

I do believe that we are at a tipping point in Colombia. And I 

do believe that calls for more European assistance, not least because they are increasingly implicated. 

A tipping point, of course, is a moment. It is an objective indicator when things begin to really accelerate. And while some of the 

statistics were mentioned by Congressman Menendez, I think it is 

worth taking just a moment to hear some of them, because they 

will hearten people. Particularly as we look toward consolidating 

gains, and looking to our European friends and allies to add further support to the regional success that I hope will be coming. 

By way of example, the cocaine seizures set records in the last 

3 years in Colombia. In 2003, 145 metric tons of cocaine were 

seized in Colombia, compared to just 80 in 2001. 

On cultivation, in 2002 you had a 21 percent reduction in cultivation. In 2003 you had a 15 percent reduction. You are going to see 

big reductions this year again. What is happening there? The question is answered by, Deterrence is what is happening there. 

As you spray and kill these crops, they become less-profitable 

risks and costs rise. People get into the alternative development, 

which Mr. Franco has so ably described down there. 

Murders, down on both the common and the mass side over the 

past 2 years by 18 percent. This year alone, it is down by 47 percent; again, that number from this time last year. Kidnappings are 

down 57 percent over the last 2 years, down again 39 percent from 

35

this time last year. Terrorist acts are down 19 percent over the last 

2 years, and down 34 percent again from this time last year. 

Captures—now this is important—of the kinds of insurgents we 

are talking about. Captures of paramilitary personnel are up 280 

percent in Colombia over the last 2 years; captures of the FARC 

and ELM members are up 209 percent and captures of 

narcotraffickers—big king-pin types which everybody recognizes—

are up 69 percent over the last 2 years. 

Attacks on towns are down 89 percent. Of course, this reflects 

the increased stabilization that has come from 158 new areas, municipalities being stabilized for the first time in the history of Colombia. President Uribe has stabilized all 1,098 of the municipalities through a standing police force that isn’t getting overrun by 

the FARC or the AUC. 

And attacks on the pipeline are down by 40 percent. Those are 

not small things. Those are objective indicators of a tipping point. 

And I think they call out for added assistance, not only from the 

United States Congress, which in many ways has been the father 

of this entire program, but from our European allies. 

There are a lot of things that can be said about this, but I think 

I am going to jump ahead a bit and talk about the fact that the 

numbers clearly show that we have to be in this together. Every 

element, every indication of cocaine use in Europe indicates that 

cocaine use is rising and that, as a result of that, we need to be 

tackling it. We use twice the amount of Colombian cocaine in this 

country than Europe uses, but we provide four times the assistance 

to Colombia for the broad panoply of programs that we see making 

this kind of difference. 

Let’s talk numbers, because that is really what you want to hear. 

And I think it is important to understand both where we stand and 

how important it is to move further faster. 

Since Plan Colombia was announced, there have been three formal donor conferences in Madrid, Bogota and Brussels. By the way, 

that goes well beyond the many additional side meetings. I just had 

a meeting last week with the British. Mr. Franco has meetings all 

of the time. Our colleagues have meetings all the time. This is always an issue on the agenda. It never slips off the agenda as far 

as we are concerned. It will continue to drive itself higher up on 

the agenda. 

On July 10, 2003, there was a donor planning meeting in London, and the fourth donor conference is now going to be held in 

Cartagena, Colombia, in 2005 for overall review of the participation. 

I should say that Secretary Powell, my colleagues in other Bureaus of the State Department and I, regularly engage the Europeans bilaterally and multilaterally on the needs that Colombia 

presents. That is also true when we talk specifically to UNODC, 

who will have a representative here today. I met with Mr. Costa 

just last week. It was either earlier this week or late last week, I 

don’t get enough sleep to remember, but it was one of those two. 

And we also have the Dublin Group, the mini Dublin Groups, the 

SECAD at OAS and a number of forums in which we tackle this 

issue. 

36

And you are absolutely right. I am grateful for this hearing because, in addition to giving us all an opportunity to acknowledge 

your leadership and hard work, it is really timely in terms of asking for additional assistance. 

According to the Colombian Agency for International Coopera- tion, the European Union and its members invested about $120 

million in Colombia in 2003, of which $84 million was bilateral. 

Recognize these numbers are soft, because a lot of the programs 

are actually measured by program rather than by annual allocation. So it is hard to know. This is a discernment based on what 

we think is being spent. 

Major bilateral programs include Belgium for $2 million, France 

for $8 million, Germany for $20.9 million, the Netherlands for $8 

million, which obviously presents other issues, Spain for $30 million and Sweden for $11.4 million. 

There are a number of other smaller projects, rural development, 

strengthening penal institutions, beyond alternative development 

in its more well-recognized sense of alternative crops. The United 

States, on the other hand, obligated $580 million in Andean 

counterdrug initiative funding alone in 2003. This included $168.2 

million in alternative development and institution building. In 

other words, in 2003 again, the United States obligated four times 

the amount of money that the entire European Union memberstates contributed. 

These numbers obviously also don’t reflect June support, but 

then remember that we contribute to Colombia through the U.N. 

and through the UNODC. My office alone gives millions of dollars 

to the UNODC for this purpose. 

These figures move into even sharper focus when you consider 

that at least 150 metric tons—as others have said—of cocaine enters Europe each year while the United States receives 350 metric 

tons. To put it more clearly, the United States consumes twice the 

amount of cocaine consumed in Europe, yet the United States obligated to Colombia 400 percent of the assistance—400 percent more 

in assistance in 2003—than all the member states. 

There is a lot more that can be said about it, but I think I am 

going to end in saying, in short, when you have a shared big problem, it requires an uncompromisingly bold and shared solution. 

That is where we are, Mr. Chairman. We understand—and I 

think we share almost word for word—the concerns that you have, 

that the other Members have and also that Mr. Menendez has so 

ably discussed. 

I am happy to answer questions, specific or general. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT R. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

invitation to discuss aid to Colombia and the European role in the fight against 

narcoterrorism. Before I begin to talk about the subject of today, I would like to take 

a moment to recognize the extraordinary efforts of Chairman Cass Ballenger over 

the years. Representative Ballenger, you have been a staunch and longtime supporter of INL programs in Colombia and you will be missed in Congress, in the 

State Department, in INL, and in Colombia. I salute your many years of fine service. 

37

I have told you before that I believe we are at a tipping point in Colombia. Seizures and eradications are at record levels. Kidnappings, massacres, and murders 

are down significantly. People are now talking about peace as something that could 

really happen sooner rather than later. All of these success stories create a powerful 

testament for more assistance to Colombia, so that this hard earned momentum is 

not lost. Congress has recognized this by providing continued bipartisan support to 

Colombia. However, we cannot provide this assistance alone. Help is needed from 

other nations that are friends of Colombia and who have a stake in combating 

narcoterrorism and drug consumption. Both Europe and the United States have recognized the need for demand countries to take responsibility along with supply 

countries. 

I would preface my comments by making a broad general statement. European 

support and concern for Colombia seem to be growing, although both are still not 

what they could be. On counternarcotics, the European focus is on demand reduction and alternative development, rather than eradication and interdiction. Nonetheless, this support is welcome. European engagement contributes to the overall social and economic progress being registered in Colombia. The Europeans, multilaterally and bilaterally, are engaging more directly and we encourage this. 

Our support to Plan Colombia, complemented by our regional efforts in the Andes, 

represents a significant investment by the American people and Congress to fight 

the flow of drugs responsible for ending thousands of lives each year in the United 

States, most of them young Americans. It is also a robust effort to fight powerful, 

often entrenched terrorists in this Hemisphere. Finally, it is a bold and uncompromising initiative to protect democratic rule in Colombia, and across the Andean region. The grand gamble of robust support by the U.S. Congress—now showing fruit 

in Colombia—would not have been possible without the extraordinary, courageous 

and determined leadership of President Uribe. Since taking office in August 2002, 

his administration has taken an aggressive stand against narcoterrorism. That 

stand has enabled the broad panoply of hard and soft Colombia programs to work. 

I would like to say for the record, here today, that I believe President Uribe qualifies as one of the most courageous leaders in the Western Hemisphere, and perhaps 

in the history of our hemisphere. He is showing the kind of political leadership, perhaps even for allies in the region, which engenders more than respect—it is the kind 

of intellectual and operational leadership that causes lasting, sustainable change in 

a country, and may across the entire region and in the hemisphere. He is at the 

tip of a spear, and the spear is a true paradigm shift, away from a world that views 

drug trafficking and terrorism as immutable, and toward a world that calls and renders both terrorism and drug trafficking part of a dead past. He is cutting a swath 

that we all should be proud to follow, in many ways like the leadership of Elliot 

Ness in 1930’s Chicago or Rudolph Guilliani in 1990’s New York. He is demonstrating that past assumptions are subject to challenge, and that past norms can 

be altered and even ended. I am grateful to him for his leadership, and all Americans should be, even as I am enduringly grateful to the U.S. Congress and the leaders on and off this committee who have long championed the Andean Region 

counter-drug effort and before it, Plan Colombia. I must pause to note that one of 

the strongest leaders on this issue has been this chamber’s present leader, and my 

former boss, Speaker Dennis Hastert, as well as many of the members and staff of 

this committee. That said, it is today my pleasure to be able to testify before you. 

I earnestly thank you for your unwavering support for the people and programs that 

are making a difference in Colombia—and therefore in heartland America. 

The abhorrent plagues of narcotics consumption and narcoterrorism do not recognize national borders. They are transnational problems that require transnational 

solutions. The drug problem is not limited to just the U.S. or to Colombia. Every 

nation on Earth is affected daily by the heartbreaking loss of life, productivity, and 

health directly attributable to illegal narcotics. Our friends and allies in Europe are 

not immune from the negative effects of illegal drugs. Cocaine consumption is a 

growing problem in Europe. The European Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction 

(EMCDDA) 2003 report indicates that cocaine use in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands is increasing. As our own experience 

has shown, this problem must be engaged on all fronts, and with all available tools. 

Europe as a whole and individual countries have been actively engaged in Colombia since the beginning of Plan Colombia and have implemented some very worthwhile projects, some of which I will describe to provide an idea of European efforts. 

Nevertheless, it is important to repeat that more could be done. We are at a point 

where we must keep the pressure on the narcoterrorists and provide opportunities 

to Colombians who want peace and prosperity. Letting up now would be like quitting in the third quarter of a football game. We must push forward. We may not 

be in the end zone, but we have certainly passed the 50-yard line. Significant and 

38

increased support from Europe will be necessary if we are to sustain the positive 

momentum in Colombia. Colombia and Europe will benefit from increased European 

support, and both will suffer without it. 

OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE

Since Plan Colombia was announced, there have been three formal donor conferences in Madrid, Bogota ́, and Brussels. On July 10, 2003, there was a donor planning meeting in London, and the fourth donor conference will be held in Cartagena, 

Colombia in 2005 to review progress and better coordinate programs that are being 

implemented as a result of the earlier meeting. This fourth conference was originally planned for 2004, but has now been postponed until 2005. Secretary Powell, 

my colleagues in other bureaus of the State Department, and I regularly engage the 

Europeans bilaterally and in multilateral fora to engage them on the needs of Colombia and the benefits to increasing their assistance. My bureau pressed these 

issues last month in direct talks with the European Union in Brussels and again, 

earlier this month at the Major Donors Meeting of the UN Office on Drugs and 

Crime (UNODC). These conversations are sometimes tough, and they should be. 

Other mechanisms we use to promote cooperation and greater European assistance 

include the Dublin Group, Mini-Dublin Groups, and the Inter-American Drug Abuse 

Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of the American States (OAS). 

OVERALL EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE—A COMPLICATED PICTURE

European aid to Colombia is varied in both sources and funding mechanisms. 

There is no one clearinghouse or entity that provides the complete picture. There 

is multilateral aid and bilateral aid. There are loans, grants, and concessions, plus 

a variety of budget approval and disbursement processes. In addition, most countries track funds by project execution and not years, as we do. Many countries provide assistance solely through multilateral organizations like the UN and others via 

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Many of the projects are not directly 

linked to confronting narcotrafficking. In spite of all these difficulties in tracking the 

numbers, the universal sentiment in Colombia and in the State Department, is that 

EU and European bilateral assistance has increased, but that more could and 

should be done by the countries of Europe. Due to the difficulty in getting definitive 

numbers, I will rely heavily on overall big picture numbers provided by the European Union and the Colombian Agency for International Cooperation (ACCI) for 

what has actually been spent in Colombia. I am sure that some projects have been 

missed and some numbers may be lower or higher. Nonetheless, I believe that the 

overall portrait of numbers that I will share with you is relatively accurate. According to ACCI, the EU and its member states invested about $120 million in Colombia in 2003, of which $84 million was bilateral. Major bilateral programs included Belgium ($2 million), France ($8 million), Germany ($20.9 million), the Netherlands ($8 million), Spain ($30 million), and Sweden ($11.4 million). EU commission projects include a $35 million Peace Laboratory in the Magdalena Medio region 

of Colombia, and a $33 million Peace Laboratory in the state of Norte de Santander. 

Other projects are much smaller in scope and include such projects as rural development, strengthening of penal institutions, assistance to uprooted communities, and 

promotion of organic fruit production with small farmer collectives. The U.S. on the other hand, obligated $580 million in Andean Counterdrug Initia- tive (ACI) funding alone in 2003. This included $168.2 million in alternative development and institutional building. In other words, in 2003 the U.S. obligated over 

4 times the amount of money as the entire EU and its member states. These numbers do not include support from the UN, but remember we also support Colombia 

via the UN. These figures move into even sharper focus when you consider that at 

least 150 metric tons of cocaine enters Europe each year, while the U.S. receives 

over 300 metric tons. To put it more clearly, the U.S. consumes twice the amount 

of cocaine that is consumed in Europe, yet the U.S. obligated in Colombia 400 percent more in assistance in 2003 than did the EU and its member states. While Colombia is not the sole provider of cocaine to the U.S. or to Europe, it is certainly 

the major provider producing two-thirds of the world’s coca and processing even 

more. 

WHERE THE EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE IS GOING

The European Union and the countries of Europe do have a number of worthy 

projects in Colombia. In general, the Europeans prefer to invest in what we often 

call ‘‘soft’’ projects. These projects are often development oriented in nature and generally devoted to non-law enforcement recipients. The EU also has appropriated a 

substantial amount of money for humanitarian projects via the EU Humanitarian 

39

Aid Office (ECHO). For the period of 2002 through 2004, the EU provided over $35 

million to Colombia for this purpose even though much more has been promised. 

This is indicative of one of the problems with the European efforts to date; some 

pledges have yet to materialize, and when pledges are actually obligated, there is 

great delay in disbursing the funds. The time to act in Colombia is now, while the 

narcoterrorists are on the ropes, not possibly two or three years from now. 

EUROPEAN UNION MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE

The Colombian Agency for International Cooperation lists five major European multilateral projects in Colombia. These projects have disbursed less than $10 million in the last five years. They include alternative development in the Colombian 

states of Meta, Caquete ́, and Santa Marta; a monitoring system for illicit crops; decentralization of the National Drug Plan; capacity building for control of drugs and 

precursor chemicals; and strengthening of local authorities in the fight against corruption. These are all projects that clearly are worthwhile and need to be done, but 

$10 million is not nearly enough to address problems that have a profound effect 

on Europe. These are all important projects, but we would like to see more. Big 

problems require uncompromisingly bold solutions. 

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC)

At present, the UNODC has at least five projects in Colombia that receive funding from European countries. The total value for these projects is a little over $11 million with a little over half of this amount already used in Colombia. The largest of 

these provides $4.3 million for an alternative development project with farmers in 

the states of Caqueta ́ and Meta. The project started in January of 1999 and will 

finish in December of 2006. The next largest project is one entitled, ‘‘Sustainable 

Livelihoods’’ that is also a developmental project. It began in September of 1999 and 

has a completion date of December 2004. The approved budget is $1.9 million. A 

third project provides $1.7 million to strengthen the capacity of the Colombian justice system in investigating, prosecuting, and sentencing drug and precursor traffickers. This project started in January of 1998 and is scheduled to be completed 

by December 2005. The fourth project is a prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation 

project for $1.7 million. It began in January of 1999 and will wrap up in December 

of 2005. The final UNODC project is for almost $1.5 million and is designed to build 

upon the work of a previous project that developed an integrated monitoring system 

for illicit crops. The goal of this project is to expand the database beyond geographical data to include social and economic data as well. These projects complement a USAID grant to UNODC totaling $5 million supporting alternative development activities in the department of Narin ̃ o and complimentary verification and 

monitoring systems. There are issues that require intense and continuing dialogue 

with UNODC, and I am well aware of them, but the efforts are on-going and generating results. 

WHERE GREATER ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED

What we do in places like Colombia has a direct effect here, in the United States. 

The same is true for Europe. Failure to invest more in Colombia will only compound 

the problems of narcotics consumption and narcotrafficking in Europe in the future. 

Six areas that will be discussed at the upcoming Cartagena conference are: Forestry, Reintegration into Society, Alternative and Productive Development, 

Strengthening the Rule of Law, Regional Development Programs, and Forced Displacement and Humanitarian Programs. 

We believe Europe can provide significant help in the area of dealing with internally displaced persons, demobilized persons, and deserters. As peace flourishes, 

there will be a significantly increased need for programs and projects dealing with 

these individuals and ensuring that they are integrated back as productive members 

into Colombian society. We have asked the Europeans about their plans in this area 

and have been told that they are considering how to respond. President Uribe has 

recently announced that Colombia will begin to demobilize thousands of paramilitary members in the coming months. I want to emphasize that this demobilization must in no way exonerate members of the insurgent and paramilitary groups 

who have committed serious crimes and acts of terrorism from facing justice in Colombia, Europe, or the U.S., and President Uribe has echoed this sentiment to us. 

Another area where European assistance is needed is the area of money laundering and terrorist financing. This is the lifeblood of the narcoterrorists, and we 

must attack their money at every opportunity and in every country. Europe has a 

well-developed banking system and significant experience and expertise in dealing 

with money laundering. The Colombian narcoterrorists use European banks, and 

40

European assistance would be particularly welcomed in this area. Since September 

11, our own experts have been working double time on terrorist financing, and we 

would welcome European assistance. 

Europe is especially well suited to help combat the diversion of precursor chemicals. Europe, like the U.S., has a highly developed chemical sector that exports to 

the whole world. Unfortunately, some of these chemicals are diverted to the manufacture of drugs that are killing children in Colombia, the U.S. and Europe. Denying 

this vital component to the drug trade would certainly seem like a promising area 

for the Europeans to pursue with Colombia. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS ACHIEVEMENTS IN COLOMBIA

Even though you, the Members of Congress need no convincing, I think it important to review what we have done in Colombia, so that everyone knows that the 

American taxpayer’s dollars are being put to good use. If the Europeans look closely 

at these success stories, I think that they too would agree that increasing their investment in Colombia’s battle against narcoterrorism is the right thing to do. I 

would encourage them to mimic the comprehensiveness of our program and not 

limit themselves to just ‘‘soft’’ projects and programs. The bird’s eye view of Colombia is encouraging. The commitment of Congress and the effective implementation 

of our programs are paying off, and Colombians finally have hope for a better future. 

ERADICATION

In 2003, INL and the Colombians, working closely together, eradicated 116,000 

hectares of coca via aerial spraying. At the same time, alternative development programs in Colombia resulted in the manual eradication of an additional 8,441 hectares. The 113,850 hectares under cultivation this year represents a 33 percent reduction from the peak-growing year in 2001 when 169,800 hectares of coca were 

under illicit cultivation. Riding on the success of Colombia reductions, production of 

coca in the Andean region dropped for the second straight year—this time by 16 percent. 

The Colombian government, with USG support, is making similar progress on 

opium poppy eradication. In 2003, Colombia sprayed 2,821 hectares of opium poppy 

while 1,009 hectares were manually eradicated. This was a reduction of 21 percent 

for 2003. In 2002, our efforts reduced coca cultivation by 15 percent. This was a double-digit decline for the second straight year—a first time accomplishment. With Colombian heroin victimizing children from Florida to Illinois, New York, Maine, and 

points West, we must continue our vigorous efforts to eliminate all the poppy in Colombia. 

This year our spray goal for coca and opium poppy is ambitious: 130,000 hectares 

of coca and all opium poppy. To date, we are ahead of schedule on these eradication 

milestones. As of November 15, 2004, we have sprayed over 119,000 hectares of coca 

and over 3,000 hectares of poppy. When we meet our 2004 goals, it will be the third 

year in a row that coca and opium poppy eradication has increased. I am certain 

that we will meet the spray goals for 2004, and we will have our third year in a 

row of record eradication. I wish I could then say ‘‘Three strikes and you are out,’’ 

to the narcotraffickers, but much remains to be done. However, record eradication 

statistics combined with record seizure numbers are going to have a positive effect 

on our constant efforts to keep illegal drugs off the streets of America. 

I would be remiss if I did not state for the record that we take environmental 

concerns very seriously in our spray program. We have sought to be responsive to 

Members of Congress and non-governmental organizations that have understandably expressed concern about the potential effects of aerial eradication on human 

health and the environment. We adhere to a higher level of environmental safety 

in Colombia than any comparable use of herbicide in the world. 

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Consolidating gains and sustaining progress requires that those who grow coca or 

opium poppy be not only discouraged from involvement in the drug trade, but also 

encouraged to enter legitimate markets. Accordingly, alternative development complements interdiction and eradication programs by increasing legal economic opportunities for former producers of coca and poppy. These USAID programs, initially 

concentrated in Putumayo and Caqueta ́, areas of Colombia’s densest coca cultivation, have expanded into other departments with high incidence or threat of coca 

cultivation. This year, our efforts have already supported more than 10,000 hectares 

of legal crops, for a cumulative total of 49,000 hectares since 2000. These activities 

have benefited more than 38,000 families. 

41

Alternative development is more than alternative crops. It also includes activities 

that improve Colombia’s rural infrastructure, so that licit crops can be transported 

and marketed. This year alone, over 200 infrastructure projects were completed for 

a total of almost 900 since 2001. The project built more than 90 schools, 40 water 

systems, and 80 municipal buildings—ranging from homes for the elderly to business centers and community centers. Projects completed also include 195 sewage 

projects and 35 roads. Another indication that democracy and legitimate, accountable businesses are taking root is that 21 citizen oversight committees were formed 

last quarter, for a cumulative total of 220 municipalities with improved public services. 

USAID-sponsored alternative development projects in Colombia are reinforcing 

the core functions and values that underpin Colombia’s democratic civil society. Program beneficiaries are uniting and forming associations to ensure progress achieved 

continues after USAID funding has ended. The Association ‘‘Building a Future,’’ for 

instance, comprised of 14 small farmer organizations, representing 388 families 

from Mocoa, recently gained national attention when they were invited to speak at 

a forum in Bucaramanga sponsored by the influential Colombian non-governmental 

organization, Planeta Paz. The President of the Association, Libardo Martinez, when 

speaking with other local leaders, stressed the importance of community work and 

organization. According to Martinez, ‘‘. . .the Putumayo experience has become the 

reference point for progress for the other departments and for the rest of the world.’’ 

Colombians are increasingly proud of the future they are creating, using rule of law 

and the legitimate economy as a pivot point. 

INTERDICTION

Interdiction efforts are central to the continuing success in Colombia, and an area 

where European support could be increased. We provide assistance to and work 

closely with Colombia’s armed forces and police. As a result, Colombian forces reported seizures of 145 metric tons of cocaine and coca base in 2003. If sold on U.S. 

streets, we estimate an additional $1.75 billion would have reached drug traffickers 

and the narcoterrorism they support. In fact, cocaine seizures have increased every 

year since 2001. Since President Uribe took office in August 2002, Colombian forces 

have also seized nearly 1,500 kilograms of heroin. 

Another good news story seldom written or talked about is Colombia’s effective 

Air Bridge Denial program (ABD). This program is proving to be a highly effective 

deterrent to international narcotrafficking. Since its resumption in 2003, the program has tracked and sorted thousands of flights, and forced down and/or destroyed 

over 26 suspected narcotics trafficking aircraft. As of August 2004, the Colombian 

Air Force and its regional partners had seized almost two metric tons of illicit drugs 

through the ABD program. In 2003, the program resulted in 6.9 metric tons of drugs 

seized regionally. The key here is not the number of planes destroyed or the amount 

of drugs destroyed; rather, our goal is to effectively deter the use of Colombian airspace by traffickers, while protecting civil aviation. Narcotics trafficking patterns 

are beginning to measurably change in response to the Colombian Air Force effort. 

We are undermining the narcotics industry, while also methodically and decisively 

extending democracy and strengthening security throughout Colombia. We have 

helped fund the establishment of police in 158 municipalities, many of which had 

not seen any government or security presence in decades. For the first time in the 

recorded history of Colombia, there is now a state presence in all 1,098 of Colombia’s municipalities. This is an enormous step forward for the people of Colombia 

and their democratically elected government. As John Locke might say, where there 

is security and a stable social compact, people will abide the law and mix their labor 

with the land in a legitimate, lasting way. Due in very large measure to the foresight of this body—the U.S. Congress—we are seeing real success. 

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE RULE OF LAW

To improve the rule of law, USG projects also have assisted the Government of 

Colombia in establishing 37 Justice Houses (casas de justicia), which increase access 

to justice for poor Colombians. Make no mistake: this is not a small victory or goal—

it is at the very heart, in our view, of sustainable progress and U.S. support. So 

far, these casas de justicia have handled over 2.8 million cases, easing the burden 

on the over-taxed judicial system. Remarkably, the Department of Justice and 

USAID ‘‘Administration of Justice’’ initiatives have also established 35 new Oral 

Trial courtrooms and trained over 10,000 lawyers, judges and public defenders in 

new oral legal procedures designed to reduce impunity and quicken the judicial 

process. Similarly, an ‘‘Early Warning System’’ is up and running, which monitors 

potential conditions that might trigger human rights violations and thereby provides 

42

warnings of impending threats. In addition, 11 new mobile satellite units of the national human rights unit have been arrayed around Colombia to provide a more immediate response to allegations of human rights violations in the most remote areas 

of the country. Together, these projects are creating a civil and human rights protection infrastructure—a climate of respect—so that the Colombian government may 

be able to prevent or be more responsive to human rights violations. 

Also on human rights, the Colombian government ‘‘protection program’’ has been 

expanded to include protection for mayors, local human rights officials, council 

members, municipal human rights workers, medical missions, journalists, and 

former mayors. In the third quarter of FY 2004, more than 40 individuals received 

protection measures for a cumulative total of 3,540. During this quarter, ten additional offices are in the process of being armored, for a cumulative total of 87 offices 

protected as of June 2004. Further, a professional police corps has been trained and 

equipped to protect judicial personnel, witnesses, and government officials. By providing protection to these individuals and offices, we are playing an increasingly important role in ensuring the ability of Colombia’s leaders, human rights defenders, 

and local officials, to conduct activities in as secure an environment as possible. This 

is another area in which European support and expertise would be welcome. 

Finally, we provide emergency and longer-term assistance to so-called ‘‘Vulnerable 

Groups,’’ particularly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This assistance, administered by USAID and the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Migration, and 

Refugees includes food, shelter, psychosocial assistance, physical and mental health 

services, community strengthening, income and employment generation, urban assistance, education, and rehabilitation of ex-child combatants. It also strengthens 

the Colombian agency responsible for IDP coordination, protection, and border monitoring. The program runs more than 300 projects in 25 departments and 200 municipalities throughout the country. 

Last quarter, IDP programs collectively aided more than 130,000 persons for a cumulative total of over 1.9 million persons since 2001. During the same period, more 

than 7,500 jobs were created for IDPs and other vulnerable persons, such as youth 

at risk of displacement or recruitment by illegal armed combatants. To date, IDP 

programs have provided vocational and skill development training for nearly 52,000 

IDPs and created over 65,000 jobs. Equally important, access to education was increased during the last quarter for more than 900 displaced and other vulnerable 

children for a total of 164,840 recipients since the program began. Finally, more 

than 200 families who were willing and able to safely return to their original communities were assisted last quarter, for a cumulative total of 19,535 families, or over 

97,000 individuals since 2001. The IDP Program also assisted 170 additional child 

ex-combatants during the last quarter. By providing viable life and employment options, the program discourages families from taking up cultivation of illicit crops. 

European countries have similar projects in this area and I would encourage them 

to increase their efforts. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We all know the facts; the United States has invested well over $3 billion in Colombia since 1999 to fight narcoterrorism. This investment is beginning to produce 

some very impressive results that will have a direct positive impact on our national 

security. The U.S. Congress has been incredibly supportive in this noble endeavor 

and should be commended. Drugs, violence, and crime undermine democracy, rule 

of law, and the stability required for economic development. The drug trade continues to kill tens of thousands of people throughout the world. Consumer nations 

like ourselves and the countries of Europe have a moral obligation to assist Colombia in its battle. Besides the moral obligation that seems obvious, the European 

countries should act out of self-interest, because their citizens are consuming drugs 

from Colombia. This consumption will generate greater crime and increased social 

ills. Even scarier is the fact that the drug trade funds terrorists and violent criminal 

groups in Colombia, which could spread to other countries if not stopped. If we want 

the evils caused by illicit drugs to stop, we, the Europeans, and all other countries 

must be resolved to halt the production and trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and other 

narcotics now. For, if we do not, we will most assuredly see them again—on our 

doorsteps and street corners. The violence seen on our television screens against our 

friends and allies to the south is difficult to bear; violence in our very midst imposes 

a burden far heavier on our hearts and lives. I promise you that I will redouble my 

efforts to ensure that the nations of Europe realize that we all have a stake in ending the drug threat in Colombia and that there is a need for greater investment in 

the battle against narcoterrorism. 

43

On balance, the Colombians, with U.S. assistance and support, are on track to dismantle narco-terrorist organizations by seizing their current and future assets in all 

manners possible. We will face challenges in the coming years that, if not addressed 

aggressively, have the potential to reverse some of these gains. In particular, the 

outcome of Colombia’s peace process will affect our operations. We must also sustain 

our support for other allies in the Andes to make sure that the Colombian criminal 

organizations do not export their production and processing methods to other countries. European assistance is key to ensuring not only that Colombia’s ability to 

build a strong, peaceful country is enhanced, but also that European countries will 

stand with us to achieve these mutual goals. 

I appreciate this Committee’s strong commitment to our efforts and look forward 

to exchanging views on how to carry these efforts into the future. Let me close by 

offering you this assurance that with or without additional support from Europe I 

will continue to ensure that outstanding performance and positive results are 

achieved in the U.S. assistance program to Colombia INL. We will continue to make 

progress in combating illegal drug production through partnerships with our foreign 

allies and with the many federal agencies involved in these efforts. We are committed to fight the scourge of narcotrafficking and narcoterrorism in our hemisphere 

and welcome others who share this commitment to join the fight. Full stop. 

Thank you.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. If I may offer a suggestion, Adolfo, 

I was in Putumayo 10 days ago or 2 weeks ago—I forget exactly 

when. The development that USAID has put on there is so exceptional that you could hardly explain to anybody in this country that 

you all really have done such a job. 

I mean—recognize, I come from a part of North Carolina that is 

heavily oriented toward furniture manufacturing, and we are right 

in the heaviest part of the Amazon Basin where there is unlimited 

timber that they are planning on cutting and spreading it over a 

15-year period. The whole basic idea—the lumber mill that was 

there would match anything that we could find at any furniture 

factory in North Carolina and probably even better, because it was 

comparatively new. And the basic idea that for people like me 

that—I didn’t realize that black pepper was something valuable. 

They have got a whole unit there that you all installed, and I found 

out that black pepper is a very expensive product that they can 

produce cheaper because it grows wild there—and we put the installation there. 

When you go to vanilla, again, I hadn’t the foggiest idea how you 

develop vanilla. But to see the way that the whole thing had been 

put together, and I don’t think there was any other—was there any 

other participation in that particular project, besides USAID? 

Mr. FRANCO. No, sir. Well, first of all, thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

A couple of things. I appreciate your insights, and of course, you 

know this part of Colombia better than anyone. 

First, let me just say, when I assumed this position 3 years ago, 

the first briefing I had—I was still working on the Hill at the 

time—was about Putumayo and that there would be absolutely no 

prospect of being able to carry on development activities, alternative development, or any kind of development activities in that 

department. And 3 years since, I think we have made remarkable 

progress, and we still have a long way to go. 

I will say that, without the eradication and the aerial spraying, 

our work would not be possible. That is an essential element, because it is the disincentive. 

Once that does take place, then we are prepared to offer the 

things that you have described—and as Secretary Charles has said, 

44

it becomes a less profitable endeavor—and people are also willing 

to voluntarily eradicate in exchange for what we call agricultural 

inputs or other alternatives. 

For these products, such as lumber, we are trying to make some 

market contacts. Our approach has been, unlike in the past, finding the market opportunities first and then seeking the right conditions in Putumayo or elsewhere where we are working to fulfill 

that market demand, and that is precisely what we have done with 

pepper, which is a very highly-prized product. It is the same with 

cocoa in other regions for the production of chocolate. It is for vanilla. It is for some domestic products as well, like the hearts of 

palm and a number of other products that are also produced there 

that are largely consumed nationally. So our goal has been 

throughout to find niche opportunities where we know there is a 

demand and the particular product or set of products can be exploited in the Putumayo area. 

To answer your question, we are going at it alone, largely, in 

Putumayo. It has been USAID and our partner organizations working there. That is one of the things I did discuss when I was in Europe last week. 

We do have some differences—Mr. Menendez is right—with the 

Europeans as to approach. But reforestation and lumber products 

and harvesting the forest is something that is very dear to many 

Europeans, and many European societies would want to promote 

this type of development. I am looking into those types of opportunities. 

It is also the center of President Uribe’s efforts, as you know, to 

reforest parts of Colombia that have been badly managed because 

of coca production, which is not indigenous to Colombia, and has 

had a terrible environmental effect. It degredates the soil. So we 

are looking for those opportunities, but we are going at it alone. I 

am hoping I can engage the Europeans on this. 

Mr. BALLENGER. One suggestion I would make, because I don’t 

think anybody in the United States would believe the beautiful operation that you have going there——

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you sir. 

Mr. BALLENGER [continuing]. Is there not somebody in the news 

media that would be interested in saying something positive about 

the effort there, about sending a camera crew down, 60 Minutes or 

somebody? Wouldn’t it be nice to have them on our side? 

Mr. FRANCO. It would be nice. Let me just relate my experience. 

We have friends from the press here. I hope they take us up on 

it. Generally, bad news, for some reason, is what most of the news 

media seems to be interested in. 

I just returned from Haiti yesterday. When the storm first hit 

Gonaive, I just couldn’t get enough calls from CNN and all the networks telling me we weren’t responding fast enough. We have 

made incredible progress in the last 6 weeks, as said by third parties, not by the USAID. Now, there is a lot less media interest as 

to the progress made on Gonaive, but I will do my level best. 

Maybe we can have a 60 Minutes program or something like it 

about the great progress. What I was told 3 years ago was that 

Putumayo was like the ‘‘Wild West’’ and we could not do development there, and look what has happened in 3 years. 

45

Mr. BALLENGER. By the way, let me just ask you something. You 

gave some numbers—and I have been raising money all my life, either for the United Fund or my own campaign or all this other 

stuff, and pledges are wonderful things. Those were, I guess, what 

we are talking about, that the Europeans made pledges of certain 

numbers. 

But the numbers, were you reading the delivery on pledges, the 

money that came, or is that still just pledges? 

Mr. CHARLES. Most of that was actually numbers reflecting the 

money that had come. But if you remember, the proportions, they 

are not very high. By way of example, we were talking about single 

digits for each of those European countries. Yet we are talking 

about more than half a billion dollars committed by the United 

States. So the answer to your question is, I have more numbers for 

you if you want them. 

Mr. BALLENGER. No, not terribly. 

Mr. CHARLES. On the one side, pledges committed are actually 

there. But I will tell you, I think a great deal more can be done 

and everything consistent with everything that has been said here 

today. There are things that Europeans can do, and individual 

countries can be committed to doing. More of that will allow us to 

do more of the things that we do well, and it is not just eradication. 

It is everything from culture, lawfulness, teaching to building court 

houses and training judges. I mean, there are many, many opportunities. I think that the thing that we all have said—but it is worth 

reiterating—is that President Uribe’s leadership is truly a unique 

thing in this Hemisphere. I think this is one of the most courageous leaders, not only in the Hemisphere alive today, but I think 

perhaps in the history of the Hemisphere. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Right. 

Mr. CHARLES. Really a remarkable man committed to doing for 

his country, his countrymen, and ultimately for the region, something that we cannot afford to let pass the opportunity to support 

him. We need to keep helping him. We need to keep helping. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I agree. 

Mr. CHARLES. And so do Europeans. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank both of our witnesses. I am glad I wasn’t called 

away so I could hear what you had to say in addition to your written testimony, which I have reviewed. 

Mr. Administrator, join the club on not getting good press, so 

what can I say. 

Plan Colombia is set to end at the end of 2005, leaving the Congress and Colombia and the United States in a situation of either 

reauthorizing the same plan or reshaping the current plan to fit 

Colombia’s current circumstances. Can you share with the Committee—or maybe, I am not sure if the Secretary is in a position 

to do so—what if any, are the current plans regarding Plan Colombia? 

Does the Administration plan to request a reauthorization of it? 

Will it be the same Plan Colombia that we are currently operating 

under, or do you expect changes to be made? If so, could you give 

us a sense of the scope of those changes? 

46

Mr. FRANCO. Well, it is a little bit above my pay grade, to be 

truthful with you, Mr. Menendez. I will be as forthright as I can. 

First, our Presidents, President Bush and President Uribe, will 

be meeting shortly in Cartagena. I know that we will be speaking 

about next year and the future and what needs to be done. 

What my job entails—and Secretary Charles can comment on 

this—is to report on two aspects. That is, what we have accomplished to date, and I have tried to outline some of the areas; secondly, what we forecast the needs to be. 

For example, on the IDP situation, we don’t expect that situation 

to dramatically change. And we are helping hundreds of thousands 

of people in very difficult and dire circumstances. 

The alternative development programs by USAID have been, by 

world development standards, remarkable in 3 years, but they have 

been an enormous undertaking and a huge investment, of which for 

most of these products—and they are just bearing fruit, literally—

will require a period of time to sustain them. 

It is not something you build and walk away from. So our programs, to be sustainable, will require a vision of a longer period of 

time to develop. So our report—and that would be decided, of 

course, by the Secretary of State, by the President and ultimately 

by the Congress—will be to assess what we have accomplished and 

what we would envision, for example, if there were no future Plan 

Colombia and what that would entail. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, let me go to someone who might be slightly 

above your pay grade, I think. 

Mr. CHARLES. I will. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Maybe significantly above your pay grade. 

Mr. CHARLES. Well, I doubt if I am above. I know, based upon 

my pay, I can’t be above anybody’s pay grade. 

But I would like to support what Adolfo said and, actually, however, be a little bolder, which may mean that he is the only one 

testifying in front of you next time. But I will be quite bold and 

tell you that, yes, I think there has to be some mechanism for consolidating the gains. I will refer to your opening remarks where 

you referenced four components that you think should be within 

that, within the parameters of what has probably already been discussed up here on the Hill or the other end of the avenue. I think 

you can safely say those four components will all be a critical piece. 

You mentioned the importance of basically continuing what we 

do well—which is eradication, interdiction, and support for the justice sector. You mentioned an increase in alternative development 

or a sense that alternative development has to continue to realistically both be tied to the eradication and to create the kind of continuing incentive mix. 

We are not talking a whole lot here today yet about the auto 

eradication programs in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. But if I can 

compliment Mr. Franco, they are extraordinary. And they are generating real results. They are the kind of thing that we must continue to throw good money after good. This is not good money after 

bad. This is a real commitment, a piece of it. 

The third thing is the regionalization you mentioned. This has to 

be a piece of it. You mentioned the balloon effect. We are very fortunate, because we are not seeing the balloon effect yet, and why? 

47

Because there is a real commitment being made throughout this region, not only by us but by regional leaders, to see things differently. We have to reinforce that in the next edition, or whatever 

we call it, in support of the Andean region. 

The final one was getting real European buy-in. It takes some 

folks longer to see that the writing on the wall applies. And I 

think, unfortunately, the sad reality of emergency room statistics—

Mr. Paul mentioned, you know, his reference to medical impacts. 

It is obviously going to show up in Europe. There is going to be a 

need to turn the volume down on that problem. And the only way 

you are going to do that is to work together with us. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Is there a draft of Plan Colombia 2 that is being 

discussed? 

Mr. CHARLES. There is no draft, but there is a very clear understanding between Republicans, Democrats, Congress and the Administration that there is a need to be firm. I will tell a little story 

that sort of illustrates this. Ronald Reagan used to tell a story of 

a man that was drowning. And a man heard someone drowning 

and went to save him and grabbed a rope and threw the rope out 

to him and made sure that the drowning man had held on real 

tight to the other end of it. Then he dropped his end to go find 

somebody else to rescue. 

We can’t do that in this region. Everybody is working together 

right now. We have to do everything we can to reinforce the successes that we are seeing. And so my answer to you would be, within the range of common sense, within the range of understanding, 

that we have something good happening, that we are at a tipping 

point. Just by way of example, in a recent poll, more than 70 percent of the Colombian people envision a world in which there is no 

civil war and no major drug trafficking in their country. 

That is fundamental. That is big. That is a change in perception. 

Now, once the attitude and democracy and all the things that are 

happening spread throughout the region, you have to reinforce 

that. You can’t back away from it. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Do we expect President Bush and his meetings 

with President Uribe to talk about the new—whatever we are 

going to call it—whatever the next phase is? 

Mr. CHARLES. Obviously, I am not privy to even the briefing papers on this yet. But I will tell you that my sense is that the 

progress will be discussed. Whatever the requirements are to continue the progress will be discussed. Undoubtedly in the course of 

the next—however many months—there will be discussions here on 

the Hill in terms of how do we get there from here. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. If you were called upon either by the Administration or this Committee to say what sort of changes, or what sort 

of incentivization, beyond what we have both discussed that should 

be their natural interest, would be necessary to gather greater European assistance, and how the process of designing the program 

can be improved to solicit better European responses, what would 

you say? Either one of you, for that fact? 

Mr. CHARLES. I think, as an opener, we need to do a better job, 

perhaps, of explaining that we are all in this boat together, number 

one. I can go through all the numbers. But the reality is, we are 

in this together. It is going to be a growing problem for them. Ten 

48

years ago, they didn’t have a problem that related to Colombia in 

any significant way. They do now. 

The second thing I think we need to do is explain that—and I 

think we all need to talk more about it. We are beginning, both 

USAID and the State Department, INL, to explain that security—

when an environment becomes more secure, that opens the door to 

further discussion about the economic side of what you need to do 

to support that, to sustain it. 

That is true of every country in the world, and frankly, it goes 

back to John Locke and the basic notion that, when you secure an 

environment with a social contract, people mix their labor with the 

land. They begin to protect it. You know, in many ways it is, people 

will protect titled land when it begins to be titled. 

One of the other things that USAID is doing very effectively is 

that people won’t run back into the jungle to produce more drugs. 

They will stay there. Now, once that begins to happen—and again, 

President Uribe has stabilized all 1,058 municipalities—that is the 

moment at which we need to go back to our European friends and 

say, ‘‘Now, you may not like eradication and you may not like some 

of the other things we do, but now you have got to pony this up 

together and make this count and stick, so that it is the long term, 

not the short term.’’

Mr. MENENDEZ. If I may, Mr. Chairman, since you and I are the 

only ones left at the hearing—and I really appreciate the answers 

that I am getting. 

One of our witnesses later on in a separate panel will state that 

they don’t believe that a division of labor between the United 

States and Europe is the appropriate process, that both should be 

involved in a comprehensive policy. What do you think about that? 

Mr. CHARLES. Well, I think, de facto, that is what happens. Right 

now, for example, there are two big peace prosecutions, and the 

Europeans are a third. I am forgetting what the exact names of 

these are, but one of them is for $33 million, one of them is for $35 

million. Peace laboratories, they are called. They are actually a region which comprehensively tackles everything from health to education, to infrastructure, to broad alternative development. 

Well, now, look at what the United States has done in supporting 

Colombia as a larger matter across the entire country. The only addition to that is that we do eradication. Frankly, in some of the 

peace laboratories, these regions, we have actually coordinated to—

actually, we do the eradication because that is not something they, 

really, I guess, are comfortable doing. But at the end of the day, 

what matters is that the job is done. 

Historically, whether it is in a corporate context or here in Congress, you know, not everybody is on every Committee. You have 

got to divide labor. You have got to get the job done and drive results. I think at the end of the day, we will all be proud, including 

the European participation—those countries, that they are putting 

more in—of what we have achieved. 

Mr. FRANCO. Mr. Menendez, may I add something to that? 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. FRANCO. I fully concur with what Assistant Secretary 

Charles said. But you mentioned earlier in your remarks, when you 

were talking about Chairman Ballenger, we have all had the same 

49

common goals and objectives. I firmly believe that is the case in all 

of my discussions with the Europeans and particularly with the 

Spanish, who are the largest bilateral European donor in Colombia. 

We do have different approaches. I will be candid with you. We 

do have different methods and approaches in Colombia and elsewhere. We have a division of labor in Haiti today. Our Canadian 

colleagues are taking the lead on the energy sector. We have divided the country geographically. We have divided them in sector 

by terms of expertise in terms of the experience we have had. We 

have worked 40 years in Haiti on food distribution. 

Colombia represents, I think, a similar case. There are areas, for 

example reforestation and human rights, where the Europeans 

have a keen interest. We work in these areas as well. I don’t think 

there is anything wrong, because we have the same goals and objectives to sit down in a comprehensive way with the Europeans 

and look at those approaches that work best and the areas of expertise that each of the donors or the specific countries can bring 

to the table. Sometimes, we will work in partnership in certain 

areas, and other times—for example, the IDP program—one country or one donor might take the lead. 

So I think we have a common goal and objective. I have never 

met anyone in Europe, in my discussions, that has taken the side 

of the FARC or another organization that is working against the 

interests of democracy. We have different approaches in how to 

work. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. A question in my mind, as a witness in a later 

panel suggests, is that the European Union did not buy into a militarized, antinarcotic strategy as the focus of how to achieve success. Is that something that we will be looking at and considering? 

Because you can get partial buy-in and do these things in division 

of labor. But you can do substantial buying with the type of money 

that you are looking for if you have a more comprehensive nature 

that everybody agrees to. I am wondering what the validity of 

those arguments are for your view. 

Mr. CHARLES. Let me offer three responses. 

First, that may have been true in the first instance, but, right 

now, it is proving itself out that the coordinated effort where they 

do what they feel they can do, and we do what we think we can 

and should also do, is proving that, in support of extraordinary political leadership and political will on the part of President Uribe, 

we are getting the kinds of results that we want. So, number one, 

perhaps that would be revisited just as a matter of principle. 

Number two, as you move toward a stabilized society—let us use 

El Salvador, a favorite of the Chairman’s—where you get to a 

greater calm and civil society—not that we are ever going to eliminate drugs. We aren’t going to eliminate crime. We haven’t eliminated crime in Washington, DC, Los Angeles or North Carolina or 

Maine or anywhere else. But we will get it down to a very manageable level with this kind of leadership, will, support and allies 

working with us. As we move in that direction, the propensity 

rises, the opportunity rises to put more—nonmilitary aid becomes 

more important whether that is justice sector support training or 

even equipment for nonmilitary services. 

50

Third answer is, actually, we are getting some military support, 

or the Colombians are. For example, Spain recently approved a sale 

of $6 million in military equipment to Colombia to assist in the 

counterdrug operations. To a large extent, this is something 

where—and we have these conversations of course on the Senate 

side as well—the long term, which we would like to bring toward 

the midterm and maybe even into the near term, is that you 

Colombianize this effort. That more of it is taken on domestically, 

because the overall big expenses begin to fall, and you begin to get 

the stabilization of these various parts of the country. 

But as we move toward that, I think that division of labor cannot—I don’t mean that division of labor would ever be an obstacle 

to the receipt of other assistance in an area where someone wasn’t 

previously active. I think that anything that any of us can do to 

reinforce this—and, again, I think the average American is supported by this. The average American is being benefited big time 

by what we are doing in Colombia. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. My last two questions, Mr. Chairman. One is, 

people tend to confuse the European Union with Europe and individual bilateral countries with the union as an entity. 

Can you tell us what the European Union contribution in Colombia versus the specific contribution of European countries are? And 

how successful has the European Union been in creating a cohesive 

Colombia policy, given differences between member states? 

Then my last question would be, you point out in your written 

testimony that the Europeans need to take stronger action against 

Colombian drug lords who use European banks. What would you 

like to see them do that they are not doing? 

Mr. CHARLES. First of all, it is a very good point that the European Union obviously has its own commitments. I asked for numbers coming in here on this. And I think they are in the $120 million range when you add all the bilateral and the EU pieces. 

I cannot adequately break it out. I can give you a written document that gives you more detail on this. But in essence, what it 

is, there is a lot of indefinitiveness in terms of project time frames 

and who is in and who is out at what times. But the short of it 

is that there is an EU commitment, and there are a number of bilateral commitments, and I point Spain out as a first instance. 

The second part of the question was? 

Mr. MENENDEZ. You mentioned in your statement that you would 

like to see the Europeans take stronger action against drug lord accounts and banks in Europe. What is it specifically that you want 

to see them do that they are no not? 

Mr. CHARLES. I think money laundering is a very big deal, and 

it is getting bigger. I have both testified and written elsewhere on 

this, but I think that there is an overlap, an increasing overlap 

with terrorist financing, and I think that we all have a greater interest in trying to get more prosecutions under money laundering 

laws, but also a greater connectivity in terms of tackling the bigger 

money laundering issues. So you have law writing and law enforcement and you have ultimately got understanding its connectivity to 

terrorist financing. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. You keyed me up, fire away. 

51

Mr. FRANCO. Just to answer Mr. Menendez’s question, then we can save the document. The European contribution of that $120 

million that the Secretary reported is $36 million, and the rest of 

the remaining $84 million is broken out bilaterally with Spain 

being the largest contributor. We do have, sometimes, difficulty in 

actually knowing what they mean by programs committed, time 

frames. It is a little difficult for us to actually see when the money 

is actually on the ground. 

Mr. CHARLES. One last point on that. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I have got another one. We have got another fellow to talk to. So I have a real tough one for you. 

Mr. CHARLES. Okay. 

Mr. BALLENGER. What contacts do you know that Raul Reyes, Alfonso Cano and Mono Jojoy have made with the government officials in Europe? 

Mr. CHARLES. I know of nothing, but the very fact that you asked 

the question will make me look at it. 

Mr. BALLENGER. What about contacts with NGOs in Europe, the 

same three? 

Mr. CHARLES. I don’t know, but I will look at it. 

Mr. BALLENGER. What about the Danish NGO who reportedly gave $8,500 to the FARC? Do you condone this? Do you believe that 

the other European NGO’s contribute financially to the FARC? 

Mr. CHARLES. I read that same report. I don’t know what is behind it. We are inquiring. Let me say, that would be a very bad 

thing. As you know, I registered some public complaints recently 

about a major news magazine that did what I thought was a glorification of the FARC as some sort of entity that helped the poor. 

I have to tell you, any aid by any organization or entity to the 

FARC is unacceptable. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Have you gentlemen got anything you would 

like to add? 

Mr. CHARLES. Probably not. I just want to say, again, Mr. Chairman, that it has been a real pleasure working with you over the 

many years, and I know that between you and the speaker and Mr. 

Menendez and a lot of people who have cared about this issue and 

have brought it to the forefront so that it could truly be discussed—

people sometimes think a hearing just brings it to a discussion, but 

I think, in the end, it also produces the kinds of appropriations and 

results that we get. 

There are 16 countries with 16 appropriation processes that may 

now pay more attention to this, and certainly, it will be because of 

this hearing and because of your leadership over the many years 

that you have pressed this. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, I would just like to say to both of you, it 

seems to me we are doing a heck of a lot better job. Let me just 

say, if we could back up about 4 or 5 years and shoved you in 

there, we could have saved a lot of money. But I would like to 

thank you both for participating in this. 

And like I say, if the medical supplies don’t get to Putumayo 

sometime soon, how about letting me know? 

Mr. FRANCO. I promise you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you both. 

52

Mr. CHARLES. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Gentlemen, if we could. 

I know we kept you for a while here, Mr. Menendez. For those 

of us that are trying to shut this place down, this Committee, that 

he has to go to somehow finish—I hope finish—some of the product 

so that we can get through with this session of Congress. 

Let me just say, we welcome you, and turn it over to Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the panelists, some of which the Democratic side 

invited here, and regret that I just got a call to the Conference 

Committee on the 9–11 Commission’s reports. 

I have had the opportunity to read your individual testimony. So 

unless you change it orally on me dramatically, I will know what 

you basically are saying. But I hope to be back and to be able to 

go back and forth with some of what I asked the other panel and 

hear the other responses. I mean no disrespect by it. 

I hopefully will be back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Right. Well, let me say a welcome to several of 

you that I already know. 

Let me introduce Mr. Quintana. We talked yesterday afternoon. 

So we will start with you. 

You are a career diplomat in the Colombian Foreign Service, now 

serve as a political counselor in the Colombian Embassy in Washington and have previously served in The Hague, the Netherlands, 

and in Sofia, Bulgaria. 

We welcome you, Mr. Quintana. 

You have time for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JUAN JOSE QUINTANA, COUNSELOR, 

EMBASSY OF COLOMBIA 

Mr. QUINTANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I start my testimony, let me recall what Ambassador Luis 

Alberto Moreno said to a journalist yesterday concerning Mr. Cass 

Ballenger. He said, you are, sir, a very good friend of Colombia. We 

all share that view. Let me tell you, you will be greatly missed 

down there, not only in Putumayo but in other regions of the country. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. 

Mr. QUINTANA. Let me begin by saying that Colombia has a very 

constructive relationship with the European Union and its member 

states. In the political plane, the European Governments have consistently expressed support for the Colombian State in its fight 

against terrorism and drug trafficking. On several locations, they 

have underlined the need for the international community to contribute to Colombian efforts aimed at defeating those who are waging a war against our democratic institutions. 

In this context, it is noteworthy that all Colombian illegal armed 

groups that are listed as terrorist organizations by the State Department, that is FARC, ELN and AUC, are currently included in 

the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations. 

Just a few weeks ago, Colombians were outraged when learning 

that, in defiance of European legislation concerning aiding and 

abetting terrorist organizations, an NGO from Denmark was openVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
53

ly collecting donations for the FARC. We are pleased to report now 

that the Danish Government has been very understanding and has 

assured us that all the required measures will be taken in order 

to determine the legal consequences of such an action. 

It is also very encouraging that there have been an impressive 

reaction against this type of attitude on the part of important EU 

member governments who have firsthand knowledge of the deadly 

effects of terrorist acts, such as Italy, Spain and Germany. We just 

hope that these unacceptable actions will not go unpunished, and 

that international public opinion does not endorse those providing 

any form of assistance to illegal arms groups who finance themselves by committing heinous crimes like attacks on civil populations, random acts of terrorism and large-scale kidnapping and 

extortion, not to mention their involvement in all the stages of the 

drug trafficking business. 

With regard to the latter, our European friends have fully accepted that the principle of shared responsibility implies that all countries have united in the fight against this and other crimes of a 

transnational nature, and that no nation can keep fighting these 

scourges by itself. 

In this regard, let me point out that, since Spain happens to be 

a main port of entrance to the European narcotics market, the Colombian National Police have a close day-to-day working relationship with the Spanish Police and its Guardia Civil. We also have 

developed an effective partnership with British authorities, particularly in the field of intelligence sharing. 

However, the bulk of the assistance that the European countries 

provide to Colombia consist of development aid, under a set of 

guidelines adopted by the European Commission as part of its 

Strategy for Cooperation for the years 2001–2006. According to this 

policy paper, the main goal of EU cooperation policies is to help Colombia in its search for peace, as a necessary requirement for our 

nations’ long-term sustainable development. The Commission’s response to this challenge entails support for ongoing Colombian actions in the search for peace; focusing on the roots and causes of 

the conflict; and humanitarian assistance for the victims of the conflict. 

At the turn of the new century, Colombia and the countries of 

Europe agreed to further their cooperation in the fight against poverty and social inequities. These efforts now have a suitable framework with the birth of what is already known in international cycles as ‘‘the Group of 24,’’ comprised of those countries and international organizations that attended a meeting on international assistance to Colombia convened by the United Kingdom and held in 

London in July of last year. 

At the closing of that meeting, participant governments and organizations stressed a strong political support to the Government 

of Colombia and its efforts to confront the threats to democracy, 

growing terrorism, drugs trafficking, human rights and international humanitarian law violations, as well as the serious humanitarian crisis in the country. 

As a follow up of that conference, a second steering and cooperation meeting will be held in February 2005 in Cartagena, and we 

expect that it will be attended by representatives, full members of 

54

G–24, who, moreover, will have this kind of opportunity to make 

in situ visits to several projects currently being implemented. It is 

expected that this meeting will bring about new commitments, 

which will permit the design and implementation of additional 

projects that will benefit the population of Colombia and the most 

needed economic and social development of diverse communities 

throughout the nation. 

The major problems that Colombia faces are transnational in nature and require concerted responses by concerned actors. The EU 

and its member states are among such actors, and Colombia values 

highly the fluid political relation that it has been able to build with 

them, and is grateful for the assistance and cooperation it has received and is receiving, from them. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quintana follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUAN JOSE QUINTANA, COUNSELOR, EMBASSY OF

COLOMBIA

EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me this opportunity to address the 

Subcommittee with regard to European assistance to Colombia. 

Let me begin by saying that Colombia has a very constructive relationship with 

the European Union and its member States. In the political plane, the European 

governments have consistently expressed support for the Colombian state in its 

fight against terrorism and drugs trafficking, and on several occasions they have underlined the need for the international community to contribute to Colombian efforts 

aimed at defeating those who are waging a war against our democratic institutions. 

In this context, it is noteworthy that all Colombian illegal armed groups that are 

listed as terrorist organizations by the State Department, that is, FARC, ELN and 

AUC, are currently included in the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations. 

Just a few weeks ago Colombians were outraged when learning that, in defiance 

of European legislation concerning aiding and abetting terrorist organizations, an 

NGO from Denmark was openly collecting donations for the FARC. We are pleased 

to report now that the Danish government has been very understanding and has 

assured us that all the required measures will be taken in order to determine the 

legal consequences of such an action. It is also very encouraging that there has been 

an impressive reaction against this type of attitude on the part of important EU 

member governments who have first hand knowledge of the deadly effects of terrorist acts, such as Italy, Spain and Germany. We just hope that these unacceptable 

actions will not go unpunished and that international public opinion does not endorse those providing any form of assistance to illegal armed groups who finance 

themselves by committing heinous crimes like attacks on civil population, random 

acts of terrorism and large-scale kidnapping and extortion, not to mention their involvement in all stages of the drugs trafficking business. 

With regard to the latter, our European friends have fully accepted that the principle of shared responsibility implies that all countries are united in the fight 

against this and other crimes of transnational nature, and that no nation can keep 

fighting these scourges by itself. In this regard, let me point out that since Spain 

happens to be a main port of entrance to the European narcotics market, the Colombian National Police have a close day-to-day working relationship with the Spanish 

Police and its Guardia Civil, and that we also have developed an effective partnership with British authorities, particularly in the field of intelligence sharing. 

However, the bulk of the assistance that the European countries provide to Colombia consists of Development Aid, under a set of guidelines adopted by the European Commission as part of its Strategy for Cooperation for the years 2001–2006. 

According to this policy paper, the main goal of EU cooperation policy is to help Colombia in its search for peace, as a necessary requirement for our nation’s long-term 

sustainable development. The Commission’s response to this challenge entails support for ongoing Colombian actions in the search for peace; focus in the roots and 

causes of the conflict; and humanitarian assistance for the victims of the conflict. 

For its part, the main areas on which European cooperation projects focus are:

• Economic and social development and poverty alleviation;

55

• Alternative development;

• Support for justice system reform; and

• Promotion of human rights. 

At the turn of the new century, Colombia and the countries of Europe agreed to 

further their cooperation in the fight against poverty and social inequities. These 

efforts now have a suitable framework with the birth of what is already known in 

international circles as ‘‘the Group of 24’’ , comprised of those countries and international organizations that attended a meeting on international assistance to Colombia convened by the United Kingdom and held in London in July of last year. 

At the closing of that meeting, participant governments and organizations stressed 

‘‘their strong political support to the Government of Colombia and its efforts to confront the threats to democracy, growing terrorism, drugs trafficking, human rights 

and international humanitarian law violations, as well as the serious humanitarian 

crisis in the country’’. 

As a follow up of that conference, a second Steering and Cooperation Meeting will 

be held in February 2005 in Cartagena, and we expect that it will be attended by 

representatives of all members of G–24 who, moreover, will have the opportunity 

to make in situ visits to several projects currently being implemented. It is expected 

that this meeting will bring about new commitments which will permit the design 

and implementation of additional projects that will benefit the population of Colombia, and the much needed economic and social development of diverse communities 

throughout the nation. 

Mr. Chairman, 

The major problems that Colombia faces are transnational in nature and require 

concerted responses by concerned international actors. The EU and its member 

states are among such actors, and Colombia values very highly the fluid political 

relation that it has been able to build with them, and is grateful for the assistance 

and cooperation it has received—and is receiving, from them. 

Thank you very much.

Mr. BALLENGER. Next, we will hear from Mr. Michael Shifter, 

Vice President for Policy for the Inter-American Dialogue. 

We have known each other for years and attended hundreds of 

meetings together, I guess, at one time or another. Since 1994, he 

has played a major role in shaping the Dialogue’s agenda and has 

developed and implemented the organization’s program strategy in 

the area of democratic governance and human rights. He is an author on Latin American issues, and has taught Latin American politics at both Harvard and Georgetown. 

With that, Michael, it is yours. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. SHIFTER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

POLICY, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to just say a word if I could, as Vice President of 

the Inter-American Dialogue, that we are also going to miss you as 

a Co-Chair of our Congressional Members Working Group and your 

leadership on Latin American issues. But you are welcome to come 

back to any of the dinners at any time you like. There will always 

be a chair for you. 

I just want to share a few thoughts—and I appreciate very much 

the invitation this afternoon. I think we are at a moment of great 

opportunity for dealing more effectively with the Colombia situation, and President Bush’s visit on Monday, I think, underscores 

that. 

That there has already been a lot of progress has been made 

clear in the first panel. I think the country is in a better place now 

than it was a few years ago. I think Europe has a vital role to play 

in this process, in this effort. But, at the same time, I don’t think 

it is reasonable to expect that Europe is ever going to reach the 

56

scale and commitment of the United States. I just think that they 

are going to play an important role, a supporting role, but it is not 

going to be at the same level. 

I think it is important to strive for more of a convergence, at 

least conceptually, between the United States position and the European position. There will always be different priorities and different emphases, but I think it is a mistake to have this division 

of labor that we sometimes hear of; we will do the hard things, and 

the Europeans will do the soft, more socially-oriented programs. I 

don’t think that is good for Colombia. I think, at least, it leads to 

mixed signals and some confusion. So I think that we should really 

push to try to get much greater agreement and convergence. 

It is easy to point to how the Europeans are falling short and 

have been disappointing in terms of how much they have actually 

spent on Colombia, compared to what was anticipated or committed 

in Plan Colombia. I think there has been, however, a process over 

the last couple of years that has been very positive. 

The Europeans have increasingly recognized the importance of 

the drug question as a cause of violence and conflict in Colombia. 

They increasingly have taken a tougher stand on the terrorist 

groups in Colombia and have made that position public. 

So a lot of the obstacles, in my judgment, that one saw 4 years 

ago when Plan Colombia was launched, really have been overcome. 

To me, that provides a common ground for much closer collaboration and convergence. 

I think that, at the same time, the United States has to recognize that the Europeans have identified important issues, and their 

emphasis on social development objectives, human rights questions, 

are also things that the United States, perhaps, has been a bit slow 

to recognize and appreciate fully as well. 

So my view is one of both sides kind of coming together at this 

point. And now the task, as it moves forward, is really to figure out 

what is a common approach that would reflect the priorities of the 

Colombians and that both the United States and Europe could support and accept. 

Clearly there are a lot of differences within Europe. The United 

Kingdom and Spain are different from the other countries. I think 

one should be careful in talking about the role of Europe, because 

Europe is many things, as has been mentioned. 

But, overall, I think that one could note a shift in the position 

of Europe and most of the countries in Europe in terms of the emphasis on drugs and terrorism now and what was the case then, 

4 or 5 years ago. That really presents enormous possibilities for 

greater convergence. 

I think the United States should encourage this shift. I think it 

can do things by, for example, increasing some of the pressure to 

improve the human rights situation in Colombia and also to emphasize—in a greater way than it already has—concerns for social 

development, alternative development, improving the justice system, the rule of the law; concerns that the Europeans have emphasized for a long time that clearly are central. 

Now, we are entering a new phase in Colombia where those 

kinds of concerns, I think, should get more importance. I think 

there is an evolution in the thinking on the part of Europeans. I 

57

would hope there would be an evolution of the thinking here in 

Washington as we move ahead for Plan Colombia. 

One thing I think we have learned elsewhere, throughout the 

world, is that it is perhaps more difficult to prepare for the postconflict, for the peace situation, than it is for the conflict itself. 

I think, as we shift gears from dealing with the conflict—even 

though the conflict still continues, and there is a way to go—to 

really thinking about how Colombia will deal in the post-conflict 

situation, the question of institution building, social reform—those 

kinds of concerns should get a much higher priority. 

We have already done a lot of that. But I think we could do a 

lot more, and I think we could do it a lot better. 

So I think, to respond to Congressman Menendez’s question, I 

think there should be a reorientation in the next phase of Plan Colombia. I think, given what Colombia needs, that will produce a 

much greater coincidence and convergence with what Europeans 

have been doing. 

Let me just say, finally, that I think one question that has not 

been raised sufficiently—and I think it should be—is that both Europe and the United States need to engage the countries of the region. The next phase should place much more emphasis on a regional approach to dealing with Colombia. 

Colombia is not going to make progress toward a sustainable 

peace, an enduring peace, unless the neighboring countries cooperate more than they have. I think Brazil is a critical player in all 

of this. I think, as one looks forward, there really needs to be an 

agreement between Europe, the United States, and Brazil which 

stands out as a real target of opportunity. 

So just to conclude, after our elections here in the United States, 

a lot of people are talking about windows of opportunity and a lot 

of foreign policy issues. I just hope that Colombia is considered to 

be at the top of the list. Because, despite a lot of problems that remain, there has been progress, and there is a real chance to move 

ahead and to construct an order that will be sustainable and that, 

I think, could be a success story if one looks at it in a couple years 

from now. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. SHIFTER, VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY, INTER- AMERICAN DIALOGUE

I very much appreciate your invitation to appear before the Subcommittee today 

to talk about ‘‘Aid to Colombia: The European Role in the Fight Against Narco-terrorism.’’ With President Bush making his first visit to Colombia and meeting with 

President Uribe on Monday, this strikes me as an excellent opportunity to think seriously about how the US government can join with the international community 

to most effectively assist the Colombian government’s efforts to build an enduring, 

peaceful, democratic order. The Colombian government has already accomplished a 

great deal to reverse the country’s decline—much of it attributed to violence fueled 

by the drug trade—and prepare conditions for an eventual, negotiated settlement 

with the armed groups. This hearing offers a chance to think ahead and take a 

longer view about how external assistance can be most helpful. 

Europe has a vital role in contributing to Colombia’s effort to end its longstanding 

civil conflict and address the serious drug problem. To be sure, Europe’s role has 

always been, and probably always will be, less central than the role of the United 

States in supporting Colombia. For reasons of geography, history and culture, the 

United States is more deeply tied with Colombia. Particularly over the past several 

years the United States government has wisely shown that it is prepared to devote 

58

considerable resources to such a critical policy challenge. The Europeans are unlikely to ever match that scale or commitment. 

Although it is unreasonable to expect that US and European approaches to supporting Colombia will be identical to one another, it is essential to strive for as 

much convergence in objectives and strategies as possible. This is critical if Colombia is going to be able to devise sustainable solutions to its profound problems. Setting out a ‘‘division of labor’’ between the United States and the Europeans—with 

the United States seen as providing ‘‘hard,’’ military and anti-drug aid and the Europeans focusing on ‘‘soft’’ assistance oriented towards social development—is unwise. It risks pulling the Colombians in conflicting directions and creating confusion 

and incoherence. There should be no ‘‘right vs. wrong’’ logic in thinking about external assistance to Colombia. Instead, it is preferable to aim for a common approach 

that reflects and responds effectively to the priorities set by Colombia’s democratic 

government. Such a comprehensive, wide-ranging approach was best expressed and 

spelled out in the ‘‘London Declaration’’ that followed a meeting of key national and 

multilateral donors to Colombia in July 2003. 

It is easy and tempting to point to the shortcomings of the European role in assisting Colombia in its battle against terrorism and drugs. Indeed, the European 

commitment to the overall Plan Colombia package has been disappointing, and has 

fallen considerably short of its anticipated contribution of some US $1 billion. European governments have also generally been slow in recognizing two fundamental 

features of the Colombian situation: first, the barbarity of the country’s two insurgent groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and, 

second, the centrality of the drug question in fueling political, destabilizing violence 

in Colombia, and the importance of tackling the problem at the supply side as well 

as the demand side. It is fair to say that European governments, and particularly 

its non-governmental sector, has tended to overemphasize the inequities of Colombia’s social and political order as being ‘‘root causes’’ of the conflict. To be sure, such 

inequities are real, and need to be addressed. But so are the narcotics and terrorism 

problems, to which the Europeans have for a long time given relatively short shrift. Still, since the US contribution of $1.3 billion to Plan Colombia was approved in 

June 2000, the distance has narrowed between the US and European positions regarding Colombia. Encouragingly, there is a stronger basis for common ground than 

before. First, European governments now officially regard all of the illegal armed 

actors as terrorist groups. This marks a positive change, and reflects greater agreement with the US position. There are fewer illusions and less romanticism about 

the FARC particularly than just a few years ago. In 2002, the Pax Christi group 

in Holland published an extensive study on the kidnappings industry in Colombia, 

offering a devastating critique of an abuse most commonly attributed to the FARC. 

And both Holland and Sweden are now backing President Uribe’s demobilization of 

the paramilitary forces. 

Second, more European governments have recognized that for Colombia, and most 

Colombians, security is an urgent priority. The recognition has led to an understanding that security assistance is vital for the Colombian government to allow for 

the pursuit of broader social and economic development. They have also come increasingly to hold the view that the drug trade is a major factor in accounting for 

the country’s pervasive lawlessness and insecurity. They increasingly believe that 

to combat this trade, it is not sufficient to seek to reduce consumption, and promote 

effective alternative development programs. Law enforcement, and attacking the 

source of the drugs, also has its place. 

Of course, Europe is far from monolithic. There are differences, sometimes rather 

sharp, among the various countries. The United Kingdom has an approach and priorities that most closely resembles that of the United States. The country has contributed security assistance to Colombia, and has even been involved in sharing of 

intelligence. Until the new government took over last April, the Spanish position 

had also been quite close to that of the United States. Prime Minister Zapatero has, 

however, sought to distance Spain to some extent from the policy pursued by Prime 

Minister Aznar. A pending sale of Spanish tanks to Colombia was, for example, suspended right after the new government took office. (Moreover, the harder line stance 

of both these countries can in part be attributed to their own extensive experience 

dealing with such terrorist groups as the IRA and ETA.) 

Some of the other European countries have been more reluctant to fully endorse 

the priorities accepted by the US and the Colombian government. The Scandinavian 

governments particularly, but also other European governments, are less willing to 

provide security assistance to the Colombian government, chiefly on human rights 

grounds. There is considerable concern about documented links between the country’s security forces and some paramilitary groups. Still, even among European 

countries critical of the position taken by the US and the Colombian government, 

59

there has been a discernible shift in recent years, and there is every reason to believe that shift can continue. The United States can and should encourage such a 

shift by further increasing its pressure to help improve the human rights situation. 

Indeed, the evolution of European thinking on the Colombian situation presents 

a unique opportunity as the United States begins the debate about its future support for Colombia. So far, US support has been mainly concentrated in the security 

area, with a focus on fighting drugs and, since August 2002, armed groups, whether 

or not there is any direct narcotics connection. The aid to a determined Colombian 

government has helped yield important and positive results, as reflected in a decline 

in coca production, and also in kidnappings, homicides and other key security indicators. Colombia’s conflict is far from over, but the conditions are riper for a settlement with illegal, armed groups—and there is no longer talk of a possible ‘‘failing 

state’’, as there was four years ago. The Colombians deserve most of the credit for 

this promising turnaround, but US assistance has also played an important role. 

Now, however, it is critical to assist the Colombians to prepare for an eventual 

peace. Given the size and fragmentation of the armed groups, and the continued, 

pernicious role of narcotics in the country, it is logical to anticipate a very challenging and difficult post-conflict situation. This phase will require sustained support from the United States; otherwise, there is risk of backsliding. In addition, the 

nature of the support should shift, with a greater emphasis on Colombia’s critically 

important social reform and institution-building tasks. True, the United States has 

already contributed a great deal in this regard. But it can do better. 

Just as Europe has moved closer in fundamental respects to the position held in 

the United States regarding Colombia, the reverse should also take place. The 

United States would do well to focus a greater share of its resources in the next 

stage of support to Colombia to social reform and development aims. The proposed 

Social Investment Fund of $2.5 billion over five years, under consideration in the 

US Congress and now designed to cover the region as a whole, could be a model, 

particularly for continued aid for Colombia and other countries directly affected by 

the conflict. Unless resources are redirected in this way, any peace settlement could 

prove illusory and fleeting. Giving high priority to economic development goals will, 

over time, also enable Colombians to assume an even larger share of the overall financial contribution. 

In addition, more vigorous efforts to strengthen the country’s judicial system and 

rule of law should be undertaken. Despite some noteworthy advances, the human 

rights situation in Colombia remains critical, and the United States should continue 

to give this question high priority. Extending the presence of Colombian security 

forces throughout the country is but a first step in a long-term process. The United 

States should also encourage the Colombian government to strengthen mechanisms 

of control and monitoring of the human rights situation, in addition to maintaining 

pressure to sever links between government forces and paramilitary groups. The demobilization program with the paramilitaries has proceeded by fits and starts. The 

international community, the United States together with Europe, should assist the 

Colombian government in pursuit of this formidable challenge, and help make sure 

that there is a proper balance between justice and peace and violators of the law 

are held accountable. 

It is clear by now that success in Colombia depends not only on external support 

from the United States and Europe, but most crucially from the other Latin American countries, particularly those in the Andean neighborhood. An effective program, 

building on but also going beyond Plan Colombia, should be sensitive not only to 

pursuing greater convergence with Europe, but also in consulting and engaging Colombia’s neighbors in a fully regional approach. The Andean Regional Initiative is 

a good start, but that effort should be expanded. In South America, Brazil should 

be viewed as a strategic partner of the United States in assisting Colombia regain 

full governmental authority, attack drugs, and reduce the violence. Brazil, along 

with other countries in Latin America, has a strong stake in reaching such goals. 

The post-election environment in the United States offers a window of opportunity 

to make progress on an array of key foreign policy challenges. Colombia is one of 

them. The country has enormous assets and advantages. It is also politically united 

in wanting to see an end to the conflict. Under strong leadership and a broad consensus, the country seems poised to move towards an enduring, sustainable peace. 

For that to happen, however, a longer term and more comprehensive commitment 

by the United States, in concert with Europe and other Latin American countries, 

is essential. Though it would be premature to deem Colombia a genuine success 

story, with the right mix of resources and imagination, from national and international sources, it could well become one. I hope this hearing, and President Bush’s 

visit to Colombia next Monday, will lead the United States to do its part in taking 

advantage of this opportunity. 

60

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I would be happy to clarify or expand 

on any of these points, or answer any questions you might have.

Mr. BALLENGER. Next, we have Mr. Sandro Calvani. 

Mr. Calvani currently serves as the representative of the United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, in the field office of 

Bogota, Colombia. 

Prior to working in Colombia, Mr. Calvani worked with the 

Country Director of the U.N. Office of Drug Control Policy in Bolivia, as well as in the Caribbean. He holds a Masters of Science 

Degree in Biological Sciences from University of Genoa in Italy, 

and has done postgraduate work at Colorado State and Harvard 

University. 

I would like to welcome you aboard, Mr. Calvani, and thank you 

for making the trip. 

It is all yours, sir. 

STATEMENT OF SANDRO CALVANI, REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED 

NATIONS OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC), BOGOTA ́ , 

COLOMBIA 

Mr. CALVANI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, first of all 

for the invitation to my boss, Mr. Costa, to contribute our view to 

this congressional hearing. 

I live in Colombia, and I am a frequent visitor to the most remote areas of the country. For the Colombian citizen of all walks 

of life, the state of insecurity, of violence, wherever it pervades, is 

unacceptable. 

In the recent past, it has resulted in the poor quality of life. It 

has created a poor investment culture. It represents a serious obstacle to economic growth and employment generation. That is why 

it is very encouraging for me to witness myself how much these 

issues are important in the American Congress, the largest democracy in the world, and to you personally, sir, as well as to Congressman Mr. Menendez and the other Members of this Subcommittee. 

I agree with almost everything I listened to during these 2 hours 

on the policy ideas which have been discussed for the present policy and the suggestions for the future policy. Therefore, it would be 

quite difficult for me to contribute any new figures, any new statistics or any new ideas. 

However, I will try my best, also using the advantage that I 

have, since I have been a United Nations representative to the European Union, to the European Parliament, to the European Council very recently. So I think I understand how the other side of the 

Atlantic interprets the situation. 

First of all, the European Union drug strategy, 2000–2004, is the 

present strategy. Now, a new strategy is being discussed for the future. 

So this hearing, I think, comes at the right moment to contribute 

to the United Nations as well as to the United States, the State 

Department, to have an appropriate understanding of how it could 

be changed on both sides of the Atlantic. The European Union 

strategy is fully aligned with the principles approved at the United 

Nations General Assembly’s Special Session on Drugs. The Vienna 

European Council of December 1998 has recognized that Latin 

61

America and the Caribbean are priority regions and that the European Parliament needs to focus on Colombia. Foreign aid to Colombia is 20 years old. All the aid of UNODC to Colombia has been 

funded by European countries and the United States. 

So the European countries and the United States together are 

the protagonists of what the United Nations does in Colombia. Foreign aid in drug control to Colombia through the United Nations 

Office on Drugs and Crime, in the past 20 years, has been $65 million. If we analyze these grants, we see very clearly that the European countries helped Colombia in social and human development, 

such as drug abuse prevention, rehabilitation and alternative development programs, as well as support to justice. The United 

States grants, through the United Nations, supported law enforcement activities and, more recently, alternative development and 

monitoring of illicit crops. 

The major characteristic of the European Union’s anti-drug policy in Colombia are that the European Union designs and implements a large range of activities, especially in the area of social 

and human development. Recently, they added what might be 

called ‘‘soft law enforcement,’’ activities, executed through the 

United Nation bodies or through the European member countries, 

which strengthen justice and institution building. 

Both the United Nations and some European countries support 

activities aimed at strengthening the institutional capacities of the 

Colombian institutions to face precursor control—interdiction, aerial, rivers, maritime interdiction. The European Union also recently 

funded five forensic laboratories to control chemical precursors 

throughout the area and the control of illicit drugs. 

In the past years, the European Union has moved away from 

prevention and demand reduction into more law enforcement. All 

illicit crops of Colombia are monitored, their magnitude is identified through one of the most advanced systems in the world—practically, I think the most advanced in the world—with satellite images. It is called the Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de los 

Cultivos Illicitos. It is a United Nations program, which was founded initially by the Europeans and is now founded also by the 

United States with a new grant of $800,000 of USAID and INL 

funds. The United Nations, together with the EU, also devote attention to the criminal justice system and alternative development, 

We reached approximately 10,000 families. We have been associated with some of the USAID programs. In particular, I am very 

glad to say, also, we have been involved in the Putumayo success 

story, which the Chairman mentioned. In fact, all those alternative 

development products that now come out of Putumayo—I mention 

because I have been there recently—like palmitos and palm hearts, 

now sold around the world with a joint logo of the United Nations 

and U.S. Government and USAID, they are a strong message to all 

consumers—whether in Florida or in Belgium, to the housewives 

who understand that governments of the world will do something 

to reduce the supply of drugs. 

However, sir, alternative development schemes in Colombia, in 

my opinion, have not reached the scale required to make a big impact on the national level. I have seen the scale in Thailand, where 

we have eliminated all illicit crops. I have seen it in Bolivia, and 

62

I can tell you that in Colombia, we have not reached that scale. 

The success story of Putumayo can easily become a success story 

of Colombia. 

There is nothing which prevents us to replicate a success story 

in Narin ̃ o or in Choco or Meta, Caqueta or in the Sierra, Nevada. 

But we need more funds, and I agree on previous statements, with 

the fact that the other side of the Atlantic could contribute much 

more. 

In the European strategy, it is indicated that the war against 

drugs has been fought with the support of the United States. That 

indicates that Plan Colombia is seen by the Europeans as a truly 

United States bilateral assistance package, making it difficult for 

them to be fully involved or sometimes even reluctant in the soft 

side of it. However, I have also good news. 

Plan Colombia’s social and human development concerns—I have 

now found more interest with the European Governments. Two 

days ago, on Monday, I was in Santa Marta to open the first new 

European Government contribution to the Family Warden Program 

(Familias Guardabosques). It is a Presidential program by President Uribe, where the United Nations is putting in an alternative 

development component. Italy is contributing 1 million euros—a little bit more than $1 

million—to launch, to open this window of opportunity. I am aware 

that other European Governments are very close to a decision to 

enter possibly at the beginning of the next year. The European 

Union social policy group has a large program on the so-called development and peace, and some of those programs also have an illicit crop reduction component. However, it is not tied aid; they do 

not require elimination of illicit crop, like the United Nations and 

the United States do require. 

In my written statement, which is available to you, I have suggested five areas of stronger cooperation, which is: (1) Better international control of chemical precursors. All chemical precursors 

come from the United States and Europe. I think our member 

countries have a duty to control them better. These are not quantities which go in the stomachs of young girls. They cannot be 

going around the world with mulas, with body transporters. These 

are millions of liters of chemicals. These are containers. They are 

big. These are something like ships entering Cartagena, Barranquilla or other ports. We can do better in that area, and the United 

Nations has good practices to achieve that result. We could control 

better small arms and automatic weapons, because this is what 

makes the strength of the armed groups to keep the people under 

control and to force them to produce illicit crops, even when they 

would like not to do it. 

(2) Alternative development could be enhanced, expanding hectare by hectare, as much has been spent in other parts, like in Bolivia and Peru where we have been successful in almost complete 

elimination of the illicit crops. 

(3) Finally, all concerned partners, I believe, should have a serious effort to achieve effective coordination of all foreign aid against 

drugs and terrorism in Colombia. We should probably be more 

transparent. There should be clear chapters of budget lines—in the 

present European Union aid, there is not a budget line on drug 

63

1 UNODC websites: www.unodc.org www.unodc.org.co 2The previous paragraph is adapted from: Elsie Garfield and Jairo Arboleda, Violence, Sustainability, Peace and Development, in: World Bank, Colombia, the Economic Foundation of 

Peace, Bogota ́, 2003, page 35. 

control—so that all parliaments of the world can understand what 

has been done, how the money is being spent and how we can 

achieve a better cooperation. 

I think that $1 million per year on coordination—like we did in 

southeast Asia, like we did in the Caribbean and in Afghanistan—

could give an enormous result in terms of credibility, international 

trust, efficiency and transparency. 

Once more, I thank you for this opportunity, and the United Nations will always be available to provide you all information you 

may require. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvani follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SANDRO CALVANI, REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME1 (UNODC), BOGOTA ́, COLOMBIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 

The two major determinants of the poor human security situation in Colombia 

are the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and the internal conflict sustained by the Colombian outlaw armed groups. Both scenarios are intimately 

linked to the global threats caused by narcotrafficking and terrorism. UNODC 

believes that—together with Afghanistan—the Colombian nexus must remain 

among the two top priorities of the security related international aid policies, 

based on the globally recognised principles of multilateral co-responsibility. 

UNODC advocates and offers its support in order to continue to build better consistency and more transparency of foreign aid in partnership with the Colombian 

Government, the United States and the European Union to fight and overcome 

the various expressions of narco-terrorism in Colombia. UNODC stresses that 

building trust and peace conditions are both tools and welcome side effects of 

agreed multilateral human security policies. Rather than the representing a 

threat to the neighbouring countries, a safer Colombia where poverty and narcoterrorism are being progressively eliminated will be a harbinger of common security for the Andean and Central American regions. Perceived strengths and 

weaknesses of present foreign aid policies, including those of the European Union 

are discussed and a few recommendations are proposed.

The two major determinants of the poor human security situation in Colombia are 

the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and the internal conflict sustained by 

the Colombian outlaw armed groups. Both scenarios are intimately linked to the 

global threats caused by narcotrafficking and terrorism. Thus UNODC believes 

that—together with Afghanistan—the Colombian nexus must remain among the two 

top priorities of the security related international aid policies, based on the globally 

recognised principles of multilateral co-responsibility. Beyond the United Nations, 

such principles have been recently reiterated by the G8 group of most industrialised 

countries, the Organization of American States and by the European Union and its 

Member States. 

As a resident in Bogota ́ and a frequent visitor of the most remote areas of the 

country, I must state also that to target the nexus between violence, poverty and 

isolation, narcotrafficking and terrorism represents an absolute priority for the Colombian people. For the Colombian citizens of all walks of life—those most affected 

in the areas under the direct control of narco-terrorism as well as those who suffer 

the national effects—the state of insecurity and violence, wherever it prevails, is unacceptable. In the recent past it has resulted in a poor quality of life; it has created 

a poor investment climate; it represents a serious obstacle to economic growth and 

employment generation. Many opinion makers and independent observers have also 

argued that narco-terrorism is an historical threat to the very foundations of the 

Colombian social fabric and to the very survival of Colombia as a nation. In a recent 

poll 92 % of Colombians ranked violence as the problem with the most perverse effect on them and their families, far above any other social and economic issue.2

64

I will focus my witness on the major challenges the international community faces 

in Colombia to confront the narco-terrorism nexus, with special attention to the 

main characteristic of foreign aid and the European role in the fight. I will provide 

a few recommendations which UNODC thinks might enhance the result of our common efforts. In order to provide a complete briefing on these subject I have provided 

also an extended written text and a set of updated statistics to support my statements. 

1. The European Union and illicit drugs in Colombia 

At global level the EU drug control policies are currently laid down in the ‘‘European Union Drugs Strategy 2000–2004’’. The strategy is characterized by being balanced, multidisciplinary and integrated. It is fully in line with the policies established by the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) in 1998. 

The Vienna European Council of December 1998 declared Latin America and the 

Caribbean as priority regions. 

Foreign aid to Colombia in the area of drug control is more than twenty years 

old. From 1985 to 2004, the international cooperation to UNODC’s activities in Colombia were funded mainly by European countries, and the US. The total UNODC 

programme 1985–2004 amounted to 65.5 mill. 

The analysis of grants to UNODC in Colombia clearly show that European countries helped Colombia in social and human development, such as drug abuse prevention, rehabilitation, and alternative development programmes, as well as support to 

justice. The US grants supported law enforcement activities and more recently alternative development and monitoring of illicit crops. 

In the past five years the US contribution to multilateral fight against narcotics in Colombia has reached US$ 5.4 million. The US bilateral effort in the same area 

has reached US$ 2.3 billion. 

The major characteristic of the EU anti-drugs policy in Colombia are:

• The EU designs, funds and implements a large range of activities especially 

in the area of social and human development, but also in complementary 

areas of what might be called ‘‘soft law enforcement’’. Such activities are executed through United Nations’ bodies, or through the EU Members’ bilateral 

programmes or through the European Commission.

• Both the UN and some European countries support activities aiming at 

strengthening the institutional capacities of the Colombian institutions to face 

precursor control, interdiction (aerial, rivers, maritime and air interdiction) of 

drug trafficking. UNODC supported and financed mostly with European 

funds the establishment of five forensic laboratories to control chemical precursors and illicit drugs.

• In the past years, the EU priorities in Colombia have shifted away from prevention and demand reduction, to pay instead more attention to law enforcement plans.

• Illicit crops, their location, their magnitude and dynamics are identified and 

interpreted through the world’s most advanced and transparent methodology 

with satellite images, called SIMCI (Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de los 

Cultivos Illicitos), a UNODC project, mostly funded by Europeans. In 2003 

the same project has received for the first time a grant of US$ 800.000 from 

USAID with US/INL funds..

• UNODC and EU devote equal attention to support the Colombian criminal 

justice system and its transition to the adversarial system, as complementary 

areas to the fight against drugs and crime.

• UNODC, other UN bodies, US and most European countries have devoted 

large funds to alternative development. 

However Alternative Development schemes in Colombia have never 

reached the scale required to make a big impact at national level.

• Contrary to UN and US led alternative development schemes, the EU funded 

rural development programmes in areas where illicit crops are present are 

not tied to the certified and enforceable elimination of illicit crops.

The Colombian anti-drug policy was initially discussed on bilateral basis between 

the US and Colombia, leaving the European partners and Canada aside. In the 2002 

issue the EU strategy paper states: ‘‘The war against drugs has been fought with 

the support of the USA’’ [Page 8]. Plan Colombia is seen as a truly US bilateral assistance package, focused on elimination of illicit crops, with some social components, in particular in the area of alternative development. This might explain why, 

for quite a long time, the EU countries and Canada were reluctant to provide supVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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port and cooperate in the existing anti-drug policy, and to complement the Plan Colombia with additional social programmes and alternative development. Plan Colombia’s social and human development concerns are relatively recent additions with 

some early results that are now attracting the interest of some European Governments, including the Govt. led Family Forest Warden Programme. 

The EU is placing special emphasis on a regional Andean approach to drug control policies that is reflected in the Union’s trade relations and a specialized dialogue on drugs. Financed from the budget lines for financial and technical cooperation, drug-control related projects in execution or about to start amount to more 

than ÷. 140 million [EU data, June 2004]. 

2.. The EU policy on armed groups. 

Restoring peace has been identified as the most significant development priority 

for Colombia. The EU’s top objective is to help Colombia in its search for peace that 

is regarded as a pre-requisite to any form of sustainable development. Over the period 2000–2006 an amount of to ÷145.0 million was devoted to such goal. One of 

its main programmes is called Peace Laboratories (÷.67.8 million). The programme 

includes four components: peace culture and integral right, productive and social infrastructures, productive activities, and institutional strengthening. 

The EU funded ‘‘peace laboratories’’ in the Magdalena Medio and other regions, 

the anti-landmines programme, as well as support to administrative and judicial reform are prominent components of the EU aid in this sector. In 2002–03 Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden 

also participated with similar or linked programmes which amount to more than ÷. 

50 million. (EU Colombia Country Strategy paper, Annex 8) 

3. Topics where foreign aid and technical assistance are still needed 

• Research that led to hard facts on narco-terrorism: transparent,. more detailed 

and reliable figures on drug production, yield, prices, drug consumption etc. 

and its links to other driving factors, such as the impact of the drug economy 

on the armed conflict, smuggling of arms, support to foreign groups.

• National drug data systems. Colombia is not a participant of the Global 

UNODC NDS data collection and analysis methodology.

• Integrated control of chemical precursors with participation of the bordering 

and the chemical producing countries.

• Prevention and control of money laundering.

• Judicial, police and customs cooperation, including fight against corruption. 

4. A stronger cooperation could be achieved between the EU, the UN and the US

• Boost the international control of chemical precursors: help identifying the origin of the seized precursor and join forces in the prevention and combat of 

precursor smuggling. A joint task force following the example of operations 

in Afghanistan, could be a path to follow.

• A programme to control small arms and automatic weapons could be established. While weaknesses in this sector have been identified and good practices are established by the Organization of American States and by the UN, 

the national action plans are still weak. Significant quantities of official firearms end up in the wrong hands.

• Alternative development should be enhanced. So far the AD activities are not 

sufficiently coordinated among foreign and national partners and the amounts 

of funds devoted only allows for pilot experiences. All recent evaluations and 

international independent reports have stressed that AD should: apply at 

large scale; be part of a wider integrated rural programme; benefit from a 

strong linkage with the plans on forfeited lands and with a land reform; become a part of a wider alliance linked to the existing forms of general preferences and the trade agreements.

• All concerned partners should make a serious effort to achieve an effective coordination of all foreign aid against narco-terrorism in Colombia. As ACCORD in South East Asia, the recent experience in Afghanistan, the Caribbean anti-narcotics Barbados Plan of Action have demonstrated, impressive 

results can be achieved through a transparent, smart, lean and computer 

based co-ordination effort. UNODC has the experience and the know-how to 

make it happen, using the expertise of some UN Member Countries. Previous 

experiences in other countries have shown that approximately US$ 1 million 

per year spent on co-ordination may provide invaluable outputs of efficiency, 

international trust and transparency.

66

I thank you for your kind attention.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Calvani. 

Next is Dr. Marc Chernick. 

Dr. Chernick is a visiting Associate Professor in the Department 

of Government in the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University. Dr. Chernick earned his Ph.D. from Columbia 

University. 

He has written extensively on drug trafficking in the armed conflict in Colombia and elsewhere in the Andes. We look forward to 

hearing your testimony. 

If you would, please proceed, Dr. Chernick. 

STATEMENT OF MARC W. CHERNICK, VISITING ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CHERNICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I also want to thank Mr. Menendez for the invitation as well. I 

want to begin by placing this question of European contributions 

upon Colombia in the context of the broader evolution upon Colombia. Because as you well know, Plan Colombia was originally a Colombian program, a $7.5 billion program. It was designed in the 

last Government of President Pastrana—it was originally aimed as 

an integral program that would have its ultimate aim of a political 

settlement in the armed conflict, both to address multiple issues, 

including humanitarian issues, drug concerns, political and criminal violence and economic. 

The original conception of Plan Colombia was that the United 

States, the Europeans, the international community and the Colombian Government would share costs. 

But what happened was that the first to step up to the plate was 

the United States. Plan Colombia was debated in the United States 

Congress, and the result was a special $1.3 billion supplementary 

appropriation by the Congress in June of 2000 where the principal 

focus was anti-narcotics, perhaps thinking that the division of labor 

would be shared. 

Now, principally, again, this was an anti-narcotics program, but 

there were still significant investments and support for human 

rights, rule of law, local governments and humanitarian assistance 

to IDPs. 

After the congressional authorization, there was a series of donor 

conferences held first in Madrid, July of 2000—that was immediately after the appropriations here—in April of 2001 in Brussels 

and, in between that, a meeting in Bogota. At these conferences, 

to the dismay of many Colombian officials, it became clear that 

there was a resistance from many European Governments to the 

key elements of United States policy, particularly fumigation, and 

what they viewed as a militarized approach to the drug war. 

They were not opposed to many of the broader elements of Plan 

Colombia as originally designed. They opposed the U.S. input that 

effectively became the broader framework for Plan Colombia. 

At Madrid, the Europeans agreed to formally organize a consultative group in support of the Colombian peace process and not to 

organize European donors to Plan Colombia. And to reinforce that 

position, the European Parliament passed resolutions denouncing 

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Plan Colombia and again affirming European support for the peace 

process. 

Now, individual countries did pledge to support Plan Colombia 

bilaterally, most notably—as has been mentioned in the other 

statements—Spain, then under President Aznar, who pledged $100 

million. Norway, not an EU member, pledged $20 million. But 

clearly, the European contribution fell short of what had been anticipated. 

Now, at that time, as mentioned, the political context in Colombia was quite different than it is today. There were negotiations 

with the guerilla movements. The Europeans also committed themselves to playing an active role. The United Nations had organized 

a group of friends of the various peace processes. It is worth noting 

that, with the peace processes with the ELN, the second guerilla 

movement in Colombia, Switzerland, Spain, France and Norway 

served as friends. And in the peace process with the FARC, Germany, Switzerland, France, Norway, Sweden and Spain served as 

part of the group or friends. 

Before the final breakdown in February of 2002, there were a lot 

of diplomatic initiatives led by the French Ambassador which supported the United Nations to help salvage the process. 

Now, it is probably worth noting, very quickly, that this experience in Colombia and the tensions that arose between the Europeans and the Americans over Plan Colombia corresponded with 

the emergence of the European Union as a player in world affairs. 

That is, the European Union was just beginning to articulate a single foreign policy or was attempting to do that and to promote a 

different world view. Colombia is perhaps where this first very 

clearly manifested itself, and then we began to see this elsewhere 

in the world. But what is more important than this history is what 

has happened since, it seems to me. 

Since that period, there has been a lot of criticism of European 

cooperation. But if you look at what individual countries have done, 

the aid is not insignificant. IFI, which is the Spanish program for 

Colombia’s agency for international cooperation, lists over $900 

million in external support to Plan Colombia. Now that includes 

international organizations, but much of that comes from Europeans. 

The Europeans were very slow in articulating a formal response, 

particularly the European Union. But by 2002, the European 

Union developed its central response, which was peace laboratories 

program. 

Now, the numbers I have are different and higher than the ones 

that were put forth in the earlier panel. In fact, I have been working not with the peace laboratories directly, but the peace laboratories work collaboratively with a World Bank program called the 

Program for Peace and Development. 

They are in the same area doing the same funding of the same 

programs, but with separate budgets. The first peace laboratory 

would be building on a program that was already underway by the 

World Bank in Magdalena Medio. The Europeans authorized 

$20,424,000. 

Just this past year, the Europeans and the World Bank approved 

a second peace laboratory. Now, the second peace laboratory for the 

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Europeans will cover three regions beyond Magdalena Medio. 

Magdalena Medio will include it, and then three additional ones in 

Calca, in Catatumbo north of Santander, and the eastern part of 

Arauca. 

Now for that they have earmarked already $49,680,000, and it 

is projected that will rise to 130 million euros. That is a substantial 

commitment. At the same time, the World Bank has approved a 

two-phase $80 million loan to support the same programs in the 

same areas. 

It also should be added that on top of the core European Union 

and World Bank funds for these peace and development zones, 

there is the mechanism, through the Agency for Cooperation, for 

other nations to contribute. And they have contributed to these 

zones, including USAID, which gives money to these zones, or 

through Magdalena Medio, and will also to the new ones through 

the Agency for Cooperation. 

Now, what these programs are doing is they are basically designed to promote development in zones of violence, many of which 

are drug-producing zones, and thereby promoting peace. 

What is interesting to me now is that in many respects, as the 

peace laboratories are being consolidated, there is a slow convergence between some of the aims of the EU peace laboratories and 

the kinds of ideas I hear for Plan Colombia 2. The earlier panel 

said there is no plan yet, and that is true in a formal sense. It is 

true in a literal sense. But there is clearly lots of discussion in Bogota about where that will go, and much of what that is doing is 

talking about investment in regional areas zones of peace, so there 

is this convergence. 

So, in conclusion, in the initial context of the full-scale peace 

process has passed, but today there is an interest among both Europeans and United States officials to consolidate gains. While the 

Europeans are unlikely to endorse fumigation and other aspects of 

the drug war, the gap is considerably less today than it was 4 years 

ago. 

Plan Columbia 2 will be a United States-Colombia program, but 

I expect that as the U.S. develops its program over the next year, 

the conditions are propitious for greater coordination. The Europeans will have a fundamentally separate but increasingly complementary program. 

So I thank you for your time, and I am happy to take questions. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me thank all of you for being here. I do hope 

that—good, the camera came back. For a minute, you know, you 

have these hearings, and all of the sex appeal appears in the first 

panel, and the news media disappears, and your part of the story 

doesn’t get covered. 

I would like to say, since this was all about the European assistance and aid and so forth, it makes a heck of a lot more sense to 

somebody from Colombia or somebody from Europe or Italy, shall 

we say, or even some of our eggheads from the various and sundry 

colleges around here to deliver a much more positive, shall we say, 

aspect of what is going on now. 

I would like to ask you, Michael—we have heard about it year 

in and year out and so forth and so on, and it came up a couple 

of times, the balloon effect. I know we read about cocaleros in BoVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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livia and so forth. I would like to ask each of you if you have some 

feeling of what is going on as far as the balloon? Is there such a 

thing? Somebody said there was not. But it appears to me that it 

is somewhere, and that Peru and Ecuador and Bolivia seem to be 

maybe having difficulty. Am I wrong? Let me just start with you, 

Michael. 

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you. I think what has been reported is that 

for the first time, we see overall cultivation has gone down. So it 

has gone down significantly in Colombia. It has been reported—the 

latest figures I have seen, it has gone down in Peru; in Bolivia it 

has gone up slightly. 

So overall you don’t quite see the displacement. I think it is very 

premature, though, to say that we have sort of conquered or overcome the balloon effect. And certainly we don’t see a lot of evidence 

here that the price and availability of cocaine has changed very 

much. 

So I think the approach still really needs a lot of improvement. 

I really think it is a mistake to say this is working, even though 

if we take a snapshot today, the overall cultivation has gone down. 

There is some evidence that it is likely to reemerge again in other 

places, in Brazil and Ecuador, as you mentioned, other places in 

Colombia and the like. And there is—obviously, to the extent that 

there is still a demand and a market for it, it is very, very hard 

to deal with that. 

I think that one area that we can really make progress in, on the 

drug question, is for the United States to play a stronger role in 

encouraging cooperation at a higher political level among all of 

those countries. There is a lot more that can be done in that. I 

think that is the problem. Everybody looks to the United States to 

see what targets they meet. And I think if we try to encourage a 

process among those countries, we can help try to deal with that 

problem. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Right. 

Mr. Calvani, go ahead. 

Mr. CALVANI. There is no traditional balloon effect on the highrisk borders, which means, of course, Ecuador and Venezuela. We 

are pretty sure there is no transfer of any such crops on those sites. 

However, there is a new Venezuelan responsibility with reference 

to other kinds of chemical precursors. All that gasoline now seized 

for the protection of coca paste, and the cocaine has now an origin 

from Venezuela. That means that the Government of Venezuela 

has a new responsibility to control better that kind of chemical precursor. 

There is no risk for Brazil and Panama to replace coca eliminated in Peru and Bolivia, traditional producers of coca in the past. 

I think that the countries who have suffered so much, and the Government and the State in those countries, have understood the 

problems so well that there is no chance that there will be another 

balloon effect. 

In the past, the coca came from Peru into Colombia, and now 

there is no chance it is going back, because those governments are 

aware of what would happen. And they have all of the measures 

in place in order to keep the reduction steady. And the big reducVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:27 Mar 15, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\111804\96931.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tion in Colombia has not caused the move of the crop to Peru and 

Bolivia in the past year. 

Mr. CHERNICK. Let me just comment on that. I am not sure that 

the laws of the drug war, the balloon effect, have been rescinded. 

It isn’t playing the role of mass transfers as we saw in the past 

from Peru and Bolivia up to Colombia. But what we have seen in 

Colombia, and it is very real, is a slight decrease; that is, that the 

coca farmers are reseeding at a slower rate than fumigation for the 

first time that happened since 2003. 

But, if you look around Colombia, Plan Colombia was dedicated 

centrally in Putumayo, Catatambo, the south, and much of that 

has been disbursed into nontraditional areas. I was, this summer, 

traveling essentially around the Choco, and much of it has moved 

up in the Choco, which had not experienced coca cultivation. It was 

also moving into Arauca and the north, and Norte de Santander. 

So now it is—there are smaller fields. They are mixed with other 

crops. But you see in the peripheral area the movement of the drug 

crops to them, and with them, by the way, the following paramilitary and militaries, so that the conflict is moving out to the 

edges. 

And let me just add another fact, a bit anecdotal, because it is 

what I saw. The formal statistics show that overall on the Andean 

region, drug production has declined, and Peru has not shown an 

increase. Bolivia has shown a marginal increase. I was actually 

traveling in a coca-producing region in Peru this summer as well, 

in the Rio Apurimac, and there the coca trade is booming. And I 

was very surprised to see it, because I had been in that area 10 

years before, and it was a coca region, a secondary region. Now it 

is a primary region. 

And they told me something else there, which Mr. Calvani would 

probably know more about than I. But the people in the region said 

that they are now planting more densely the coca crop so that the 

official statistics may be misleading; that what one hectare used to 

carry in terms of coca plant and its yield into coca paste is now 

much greater, because there is a new technology which is widely 

used, in this region of Peru at least, where they more densely pack 

the coca plants in rows. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Had you run into that, Mr. Calvani? 

Mr. CALVANI. Yes. This is not the balloon effect. This is more industrialized crime. That means that the reduction of hectarage provokes a need of producing better. That means higher efficiency, 

more plants in less hectares, small hectares spread all over the territory. Sixty-six percent of the total production is in fields less than 

3 hectares, and more than half of it is in fields smaller than 1 hectare. That means spread all over the territory. 

In Colombia, they imported the Bolivian coca plant, which is the 

kind of plant that has the highest content of alkaloid, they take 

better care of the plant, so instead of being 1 meter, is now 1 meter 

and a half. That is an average. And there are significant plants in 

the Sierra Nevada with 2 meters, and for the first time in my life 

in 20 years, I have seen in Sierra Nevada plants of 3 meters, which 

means trees of coca. 

Then the care of the plant—they don’t eliminate the leaves by 

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more because they destroy the plant, and the plant is kept in good 

care like we see with tea in Sri Lanka. That means removing only 

the big leaves on the bottom of the plant; leave the green leaves 

at the end of the branch so the branch can grow again. 

It is a more industrialized crime, and no longer poor peasants 

who are trying to survive. It is suddenly becoming more efficient. 

It happens because the consumption has not gone down in the 

world. As you know, sir, the United States has reduced, slightly, 

its consumption, but Europe has increased. So in the end, while 

only one country produces the big bunch of coca, if the demand remains more or less the same at global level, of course they have 

to industrialize and produce better in the few fields where they are 

still allowed to do it. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Let me ask you gentlemen, because three of you 

probably have been in that area. 

When I was in southern Colombia, they brought a fellow in who 

showed us how they made coca paste and all of this kind of stuff. 

And the shocking thing to me—and at the time everybody was raising all kinds of Cain about the spray, that we were going to ruin 

the river, the Amazon was going to be poisoned forever. And when 

you looked at the precursor chemicals that were going into the 

manufacture of coca and coca paste, the spray that might have 

been being involved was so minute in comparison, it is a wonder 

that the chemicals—I mean, precursor chemicals that go into making coca are poisonous, cement and hydrochloric acid and all of this 

stuff, and yet somehow the idea of spraying became poisonous to 

the world, but precursor chemicals nobody even talked about. 

Has there been any effect of the use of those terrible precursor 

chemicals? Has there been any effect on the waterways of—that is 

where they dump it all. Has it had any effect as far as anybody 

knows on the flora and the fauna of that area? 

Yes, sir. Mr. Calvani. 

Mr. CALVANI. Yes, we do know, sir. Chemical precursors, in particular gasoline and permanganate and the acid, they go into the 

waterways, and they provoke a lot of damage, in particular for the 

fishery, and a lot of damage also to the public health and to the 

environment. If you see Sierra Nevada now, 5 hectares of primary 

forest has been destroyed to cultivate 1 hectare of coca. And a lot 

of environmental destruction is due to chemical precursors. 

I am convinced that the chemical precursors control in Colombia 

can be done better, as it has been done in the Mekong, in Southeast Asia, through cooperation on the border and through putting 

a lot more pressure on governments and governments of producer 

countries. 

Seventy percent of chemical precursor chemicals, for example, 

come from Trinidad and Tobago. They do not produce chemical precursors. So of course they come from the United States or from Europe through Trinidad and Tobago. What is missed by law enforcement in the States and Europe can be controlled by Venezuela or 

by the Caribbean Governments effectively, because at the end they 

have one port, they have one authority, one Custom authority. It 

could be done better. The United Nations has a lot of experience 

in that. But we are facing a serious problem in funding our chemical precursor control programs. 

72

Mr. BALLENGER. I would be glad to volunteer any aid that we 

might give you as far as Venezuela is concerned, but I am not sure 

that we are allowed in Venezuela. We have a film that I was going 

to show—I mentioned it earlier—that I would like the staff—if I 

may run a short video. I think it speaks to what we are talking 

about at the present time. 

I do wish the news media, those of you that are still here, would 

put a little bit more positive feeling—except for Mr. Calvani, I 

think everything turned out to be partially positive. But he kind 

of picked up on the things that we are all worried about, that were 

not involved in the drugs, the development of the trees. Pretty soon 

we are going to have a redwood forest that you can pick like coca. 

[Whereupon a videotape was played.] 

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, for those of you that speak Spanish, I commend you, but I don’t speak Spanish. So I hope you enjoyed it. 

I would like to thank all of you, because basically you did give 

them a different picture of, shall we say, the commitment of the 

European Union, European nations. And I would like to thank you 

and hope that the meeting that you are going to have with—in 

Cartagena in February or March would show a recommitment as 

far as the people there are concerned. 

If you want a politician to come down there, I am not allowed—

I have got about another week or 10 days where I am allowed to 

talk about anything in this building, and then all of a sudden I 

can’t talk to anybody here because of our strange laws that we 

have. But I do plan on continuing to participate in the problems 

of Central and South America. It has been something that I have 

always wanted to do. 

And I would like to thank each of you for being here. Sadly, the 

number of people on our Committee that—if they don’t get the bills 

finished, I think we are going to go home tomorrow. But right now, 

my poor friend Mr. Menendez, they have been meeting for 2 or 3 

weeks tying to settle the 9/11 request of the President, to settle 

what the Senate picked and what the House picked, and my understanding is they are getting nowhere. 

But in the meantime, I think, truthfully speaking, if there was 

a constructive thing that we did today, it was to rejuvenate the 

idea of the combination between the European nations and the 

United States. I volunteered on several cases to—since I can’t participate in Congress anymore, I can at least participate in some of 

the meetings. 

So, Michael, if you invite me, I guess I can come in to some of 

your meetings, but I can’t invite you to come in. But thank you 

kindly. I appreciate your attendance, and really, I got a great deal 

out of it. And I hope the news media picked up on the second half 

of this. It was a little bit more positive story than the first half. 

But we in Washington have a tendency to put everything according 

to our picture, and luckily we got a different picture from some of 

the people that are involved in that. 

And, Mr. Quintana, I know that yesterday you were worried to 

death about coming to this thing, and I think you did a good job, 

and you didn’t get your Government in any kind of trouble. 

Let me thank you again for all of you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

73

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