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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

ALEXIA PREDDY, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT SECURITY 

SERVICES, a Delaware limited liability 

company, and TELESFORO AVILES, an 

individual, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 20-cv-60971-AHS

Judge Raag Singhal

Magistrate Judge Alicia O. Valle

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Alexia Preddy (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint and Demand for 

Jury Trial against Defendant ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services (“ADT”), based on its 

intentional and negligent tortious acts in providing security services to its customers with 

remote-viewing capabilities, and Defendant Telesforo Aviles (“Aviles”), for using those services 

to spy on Plaintiff and others who resided in homes with ADT security systems. Plaintiff alleges 

as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all 

other matters, upon information and belief.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. In April of 2020, Alexia Preddy’s mother received a terrifying phone call from 

ADT: the technician who had installed their indoor security camera system, Telesforo Aviles, 

had granted himself remote access—three years prior when Ms. Preddy was a teenager—and had 

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used that access nearly one hundred times to spy on her and other household members in their 

most private and intimate moments.

2. And Ms. Preddy was not the only one. She soon found out that hundreds of 

households had experienced the same staggering invasion of privacy over at least a seven-year

period. At fault for this breach of trust: ADT’s unsecure and unmonitored “security” services. 

3. While ADT boasts that it has been protecting people for over 145 years and holds 

itself out as the “#1 in smart home security” it failed to even secure its own systems from 

massive and ongoing intrusions into its customers’ private lives. 

4. ADT failed to provide the security services its customers paid for by leaving large 

vulnerabilities in the ADT Pulse application and, as a result, compromised the safety and security 

of its customers’ homes and family members. The ADT vulnerability allowed any one of its 

technicians to grant themselves (or for them to grant anyone else, for that matter) access to a 

customer’s ADT Pulse application and control every aspect of the customer’s home security 

systems, including surreptitiously opening locks, disarming their system, and viewing and 

downloading security camera footage.

5. Remarkably, just three months before ADT revealed this vulnerability, ADT 

conducted a survey recognizing the “strong consumer expectations” of security that consumers 

had in their smart home products: “With many data privacy and security issues in the news, it’s 

no surprise that 92 percent of respondents feel smart home security companies need to take 

measures to protect customers’ personal data and information.”1 ADT bragged that it was leading 

the industry in establishing “best practices” for the protection of consumer privacy, one of which 

1 ADT Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Expectations for Smart Home Privacy Protections, ADT

(Jan. 27, 2020), https://investor.adt.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/ADT-Survey-RevealsStrong-Consumer-Expectations-for-Smart-Home-Privacy-Protections/default.aspx

(permanent link available at https://cite.law/RNP5-BT3U). 

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was strict standards for access to data, promising that “[s]ecurity providers will only share audio 

or video with first responders with their customers’ prior consent, or as required by law, and will 

not otherwise access a customer’s audio or video without the customer’s knowledge.” 

6. In a frantic effort to mitigate and hide the fact that the vulnerability in its 

supposedly industry-leading smart home security systems permitted an employee to spy on 

people in their homes, ADT began a campaign to call all affected account holders and secure a 

release and confidentially agreement in exchange for a monetary payment representing a fraction 

of the value of their claims. This effort, directed by lawyers but carried out by customer service 

representatives, failed to determine whether individuals were represented by counsel, and 

attempted to mislead them into believing that the release would cover account holders and nonaccount holders in the household alike. 

7. Beyond Aviles, potentially countless other unknown individuals have been 

accessing customers’ ADT Pulse accounts and surreptitiously viewing their camera footage, for 

years, all around the country. 

8. The mental and emotional impact this revelation has had on every person 

receiving these calls from ADT is immeasurable. Moments once believed to be private and 

inside the sanctity of the home are now voyeuristic entertainment for a third party. And worse, 

those moments could have been captured, shared with others, or even posted to the internet. 

ADT’s failure to protect its customers irreparably destroyed their sense of security, safety, 

intimacy, and well-being.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Alexia Preddy is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.

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10. Defendant ADT, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under 

the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located at 1501 Yamato Road, Boca 

Raton, Florida 33431.

11. Defendant Telesforo Aviles is a natural person and a citizen of the State of Texas.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 

because (i) at least one member of the Class is a citizen of a different state than Defendant ADT, 

(ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and (iii) none 

of the exceptions under that subsection apply in this action.

13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant ADT because Defendant 

ADT conducts business in Florida and has its headquarters in this District. This Court has 

personal jurisdiction over Defendant Aviles because Defendant Aviles conducts business in 

Florida through his employment with Defendant ADT. 

14. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant ADT 

maintains its headquarters and conducts significant business in this District. 

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. ADT Promises Safety and Security to Consumers.

15. ADT is a home security company that touts its longstanding expertise in security 

and claims to have been providing security services since the 19th century. According to ADT, it 

has “been helping protect homes longer than any other company in the business.” ADT provides 

residential security systems and monitoring plans that purportedly “protect what matters most in 

your life.” In short, ADT promises that it is “fully committed to your security.”2

2 ADT Services | In-Home Consultation, Installation, Repairs, Customer Support, 

https://www.adt.com/services (last visited July 15, 2020).

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16. ADT markets and sells a comprehensive security system package that includes the 

hardware necessary to operate a home security system, the monitoring services that detect home 

intrusions and alert the police, and the security system installation.

17. ADT offers various tiers of its home security systems at different price points. 

The basic tier, for example, features security monitoring equipment with 24/7 alarm monitoring 

while the highest tier home security package includes various convenience and home automation 

features. 

18. One of the highest tier home security packages is ADT Pulse. ADT Pulse allows 

consumers to “check on your home - even if you’re away” by giving them remote access to 

control their home security system from a mobile application or a web browser portal. 

Specifically, consumers can arm and disarm their home security systems, remotely lock and 

unlock doors, view live camera footage, and control various smart home devices like a 

thermostat and lights. See Figure 1, showing a screenshot of ADT’s marketing materials for ADT 

Pulse.3

3 ADT Pulse® | Official ADT Smart Home Automation System, https://www.adt.com/pulse (last 

visited July 15, 2020).

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(Figure 1.)

19. Consumers must purchase various smart devices from ADT to reap the benefits of 

the ADT Pulse service and all the advertised remote accessibility features. ADT touts that its 

smart home features are not only more convenient to consumers, but they provide “smarter 

security.” For example, ADT claims that the purchase of its smart locks for use with the ADT 

Pulse system will result in a “whole new level of security and convenience...” as shown in

Figure 2. 

(Figure 2.)

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20. Most importantly, ADT encourages consumers to purchase video cameras for 

both outdoors and indoors uses to “keep an eye on the things you value most.”4 The indoor 

cameras, according to ADT, are specifically intended to “check in on your kids” and can be set 

up to stream and capture video clips of events “like when your kids get home from school.”5

21. Consumers use the ADT Pulse mobile application to “check any or all of your 

ADT home security cameras” and to “look in on your family and your pets any time with livestreaming video.” Furthermore, consumers are able view stored video clips from their security 

cameras on their phones via the ADT Pulse mobile application.6

22. To use the ADT Pulse smart home features—like remotely viewing security 

camera footage, disarming a security system, or unlocking smart locks—consumers must login 

into the ADT Pulse mobile application or the ADT Pulse web browser portal by using their 

username and password. Anyone with valid login credentials, like a family member, can access 

and control the security system remotely. 

23. For the ADT Pulse system to function correctly, an ADT technician needs to 

perform the system installation and configuration.

24. Each new security system installation comes with a “worry-free professional 

installation” where “highly-trained ADT technicians will set-up your ADT security system so 

you don’t have to.”7 ADT technicians will also test the security system and assist the consumer 

in connecting their smart phone to the ADT security system for use with ADT Pulse, as shown in 

Figure 3. 

4 Wireless Home Security Cameras & Video Surveillance Cameras | ADT, 

https://www.adt.com/security-cameras (last visited July 15, 2020).

5 Shop ADT® Indoor Home Security Cameras | ADT, https://www.adt.com/indoor-securitycamera (last visited May 7, 2020).

6 Supra note 3.

7 ADT® | Compare Home Security System Packages | 2020, https://www.adt.com/compare (last 

visited July 15, 2020)

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(Figure 3.)

25. ADT further promotes its security services by stating that its technicians are what 

sets them apart from the competitors in being able to earn its customers’ trust and protect the 

most important people in their lives. According to its website: “Our people are dedicated to 

taking care of the people and property you value most in your life. Our customers trust us to help 

protect those things that cannot be replaced.” See Figure 4, showing a screenshot from ADT’s 

website.8

(Figure 4.)

8 Why ADT has the Best Home Security and Customer Service | ADT, 

https://www.adt.com/security-benefits (last visited May 7, 2020).

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26. Moreover, ADT knows precisely how important the security of smart home 

devices is to consumers. ADT went out of its way to commission a survey of more than 1,200 

consumers in December 2019, and found that 92% of consumers felt that “smart home security 

companies [like ADT] need to take measures to protect customers’ personal data and 

information.” And ADT went so far as to issue a press release dedicated to saying it was doing 

just that, in order to “maintain consumer trust and promote responsible data privacy practices 

within the industry.” 

27. The greatest concern that consumers had, revealed by ADT’s survey, was 

“hacking.” In response to those concerns, ADT boasted that it was leading the industry in 

creating a “Consumer Privacy Initiative,” to create “clear guiding principles and best practices” 

for how security providers “manage consumer data and protect their privacy.” Those principles 

included “Privacy by Design,” promising to “embed[]” privacy “in all areas of the security 

industry,” which “begins with the design of the products used to help protect and connect 

customers.” They also included, specifically, “Handling of Audio and Video,” claiming that 

security providers would share audio or video only with prior consent and would otherwise never 

“access a customer’s audio or video without the customer’s knowledge.”9

II. ADT Failed to Detect a Seven-Year-Long Breach of its Systems That, at the Very Least, 

Resulted in an ADT Employee Improperly Accessing Customers’ Accounts.

28. Unfortunately for all of ADT’s Pulse customers and those living in homes with 

ADT Pulse security systems, a vulnerability in the Pulse system completely obliterates all of 

ADT’s promises of security and protection. 

9 ADT Survey Reveals Strong Consumer Expectations for Smart Home Privacy Protections, ADT (Jan. 

27, 2020), https://investor.adt.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/ADT-Survey-RevealsStrong-Consumer-Expectations-for-Smart-Home-Privacy-Protections/default.aspx

(permanent link available at https://cite.law/RNP5-BT3U).

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29. On or around April 23, 2020, ADT began to contact some of its customers to 

inform them that a vulnerability in the ADT Pulse system had allowed unauthorized users to 

access customers’ ADT Pulse accounts as if they were a regular user. In other words, an 

unauthorized user could remotely arm and disarm security systems, access smart home devices, 

and view and download security camera footage, including footage from indoor cameras

designed to, among other things, protect their children. 

30. In fact, ADT’s investigation revealed that at least one ADT employee in the 

Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas area, named Telesforo Aviles, had access to more than 200 different 

customers’ ADT Pulse accounts for the last seven years. According to an ADT spokesperson, 

Aviles was able to add—and, in fact, did add—his own personal email address to customers’ 

accounts, allowing him to remotely login to a customer’s account using his own unauthorized 

credentials.

31. This type of access could only occur because ADT failed to implement adequate 

procedures that would prevent non-household members from adding non-household email 

addresses. Similarly, ADT failed to monitor consumers’ accounts and promptly alert them any

time a new email was added to their accounts. Countless checks could have been in place to 

prevent or at least stop this conduct. Instead, this breach came to light only by luck and 

happenstance: a customer, reporting a technical issue, inadvertently revealed the unwanted thirdparty access. But for that event, ADT would be unaware of this invasive conduct and it would 

continue unabated to this day (and likely expanding to new households).

32. As such, countless other ADT technicians and/or employees could have taken 

advantage of ADT’s lax security and granted themselves unfettered access to other customer 

accounts—entirely unbeknownst to both the customer and to ADT.

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33. Although ADT claims it has implemented procedures to prevent similar incidents 

in the future, it is already too late for an unknown number of households whose accounts and 

security camera footage have already been accessed and potentially exploited. 

FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF PREDDY

34. Ms. Preddy’s household has been a long-time ADT security customer. In 2017, 

Ms. Preddy’s mother received an offer from ADT to upgrade her account to the ADT Pulse 

system which included installing security cameras in their home. ADT represented to Ms. Preddy 

and her mother that this upgrade would enhance their personal security.

35. Ms. Preddy, only a teenager at the time, had reservations about installing security 

cameras inside of the home, however. When her mother expressed those reservations to ADT, it 

reassured them both that the security system was perfectly safe.

36. Indeed, Ms. Preddy’s mother relied on ADT’s representations, including both 

representations by ADT representatives and ADT’s representations on its website, about the 

ADT Pulse system’s safety and security and accepted ADT’s upgrade offer in September 2017. 

37. Shortly thereafter, an ADT technician installed the ADT Pulse system, including 

an indoor security camera with a wide-angle view inside Ms. Preddy’s home.

38. On April 24, 2020, a phone call from ADT destroyed whatever security and safety 

its security system promised. ADT called Ms. Preddy’s mother to explain that one of its 

technicians had gained access to her account and had been watching her and Ms. Preddy. 

According to ADT, at least one of its technicians accessed her home security cameras on 

approximately 73 different occasions.

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39. In an email later that day, ADT Chief Customer Officer Jamie Haenggi described 

it as “a difficult message to hear.” Difficult is, of course, woefully inadequate to truly describe 

Plaintiff’s loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

40. Based upon the cameras’ wide-angle lens and placement, ADT’s employee had an 

opportunity to watch at least the following events:

a. Ms. Preddy nude; 

b. Ms. Preddy in various states of undress;

c. Ms. Preddy getting ready for bed; and

d. Moments of physical intimacy.

41. Immediately after the call, Ms. Preddy’s mother disconnected the ADT camera in 

their home. Ms. Preddy expended significant time addressing the current and future 

consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT, including, but not limited to, removing ADT 

security hardware, and researching additional surveillance and security devices and services.

42. Prior to April 24, 2020, Ms. Preddy and her mother never received any call, text, 

email, or notification of any kind informing them that another user was added to the ADT Pulse 

account or that a third-party user accessed the ADT Pulse account.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

43. Class Definition: Plaintiff Alexia Preddy brings this action on behalf of herself 

and a class of similarly situated individuals, as well as a sub-class of those individuals, defined as 

follows:

Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) reside in a household with an ADT 

Pulse security system, but are not the account holder; (2) where that security system was 

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remotely accessed by an employee or agent of Defendant ADT without authorization

from the account holder.

Sub-Class: All individuals in the United States who (1) reside in a household with an 

ADT Pulse security system, but are not the account holder; (2) where that security system 

was remotely accessed by Telesforo Aviles without authorization from the customer.

The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over 

this action and the members of their family; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, 

successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a 

controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons 

who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose 

claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated by a court of law on the merits; (5) Plaintiff’s 

counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of 

any such excluded persons.

44. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown and is not 

available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class 

likely consist of hundreds of individuals. Members of the Class can be easily identified through 

Defendant ADT’s records. The Sub-Class consists of more than two hundred households, and 

members of the Sub-Class have already been identified by Defendant ADT. 

45. Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims 

of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any 

questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class 

include but are not limited to the following:

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a. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligence;

a. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes gross negligence;

b. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes an intrusion upon 

seclusion;

c. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of 

emotional distress; 

d. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct entitles the Class to privacy 

monitoring; and

e. Whether Defendant ADT’s conduct constitutes negligent hiring, 

supervision, and retention. 

There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other 

members of the Sub-Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect 

individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to 

the following:

a. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intrusion upon seclusion; and

b. Whether Defendant Aviles’s conduct constitutes intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.

46. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of other members of the Class and SubClass, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class and Sub-Class sustained damages arising out 

of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct.

47. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and 

protect the interests of the Class and Sub-Class and has retained counsel competent and 

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experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class 

or Sub-Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff.

48. Predominance and Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class 

certification because Class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair 

and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all parties is impracticable. The 

damages suffered by the individual members of the Class and Sub-Class will likely be relatively 

small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex 

litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the 

individual members of the Class and Sub-Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ 

misconduct. Even if members of the Class and Sub-Class could sustain such individual litigation, 

it would still not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the 

delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in 

this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and 

provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision 

by a single Court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of 

decisions ensured.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

Negligence

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Preddy and the Class against Defendant ADT)

49. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

50. Defendant ADT had full knowledge of the purpose for which its security cameras 

were being used and the sensitivity of the people and things the cameras were designed to secure 

and protect—that which “matters most” to their clients. ADT also knew the types of harm that 

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Plaintiff and the members of the Class could and would suffer if the integrity of the security 

system was compromised.

51. ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring that all ADT security 

systems were secure, safe to use, and inviolable by unauthorized parties. This duty includes, 

among other things, ensuring that reasonable and proper protocols and safeguards are in place so 

that consumers’ security cameras are not easily compromised by unauthorized users. 

52. Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent 

contractors, was negligent in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing 

technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that its employees could 

make and did make themselves authorized users gaining unauthorized access to the ADT Pulse 

account connected to their home, thereby allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed 

and taken of Plaintiff in her home.

53. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims 

of any inadequate security practices and procedures. ADT knew of or should have known of the 

inherent risks of allowing ADT cameras to be set up and used without adequate security 

protocols and safeguards. 

54. Defendant ADT further knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious 

recordings of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked, engaging in 

consensual intimate activity, and having private conversations in a private home; (3) the 

recordings were taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings 

would reveal private and personal things about Plaintiff which ADT and Aviles had no right or 

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authorization to view, use, disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and 

occasions constitutes a substantial violation of Plaintiff’s right of privacy.

55. Beyond ordinary negligence, Defendant ADT was grossly negligent because the 

acts and omissions of Defendant ADT and its employee and agents were more than momentary 

thoughtlessness or inadvertence. Rather the conduct, when viewed objectively from the 

standpoint of Defendant ADT at the time of these events, involved an extreme degree of risk, 

considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, 

Defendant ADT had subjective knowledge of the risk of employees gaining unauthorized access 

to clients’ cameras, but failed to disclose to Plaintiff the vulnerability of their monitoring systems 

and the ability of ADT employees to monitor and observe their home without their consent, and 

acted with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of their clients.

56. ADT’s own actions and inactions created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff 

and the members of the Class. ADT’s misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to 

sell security systems with sufficiently robust security protocols to prevent unauthorized users 

from gaining access to the cameras, and failing to inform Plaintiff and the members of the Class 

when unknown individuals added their email addresses to customer accounts. 

57. ADT was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and the 

members of the Class and had a duty to do so.

58. ADT, through its actions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the 

members of the Class by failing to ensure their cameras and set up procedures were sufficiently 

robust to protect against unauthorized use. 

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59. As a result of ADT’s negligence, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have 

suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injury including, but not limited to: mental 

anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety, 

humiliation, and anger; the time spent monitoring and addressing the current and future 

consequences of the exposure enabled by ADT; and the necessity to engage legal counsel and 

incur attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

60. Further, because ADT’s acts and omissions resulted from gross negligence, 

exemplary damages should be awarded against ADT in an amount to be determined by the jury 

in this case. Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded without limitation, as set forth in 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(c).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Preddy and the Class against Defendant ADT)

61. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

62. ADT intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the Class members’ 

seclusion by creating the means and opportunity for its employees to spy on Plaintiff and the 

Class in one of their most private spaces—their homes—and providing Aviles and potentially

others with round-the-clock access to their most intimate moments. Indeed, ADT had an 

affirmative duty not to let unauthorized third parties gain access to these spaces. 

63. ADT’s facilitation and failure to stop such access is highly offensive to a 

reasonable person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of the Class 

members and the activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.

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64. ADT is also liable for the actions of its agents who accessed the security systems 

in Plaintiff’s and the Class’s homes, which was done in the normal and routine course and scope 

of their employment. 

65. ADT’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ seclusion caused 

Plaintiff and the Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form of anxiety, loss of 

security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

66. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

67. At all relevant times, Telesforo Aviles was ADT’s employee and/or agent.

68. Whenever in this Complaint it is alleged that ADT did any act or thing, it is meant 

that each of ADT’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives did such act and/or 

that at the time such act or thing was done, it was done with the full authorization or ratification 

of ADT, or was done in the normal and routine course and scope of employment of each of 

ADT’s officers, agents, servants, employees, or representatives.

69. ADT had the opportunity and duty to screen its employees, including Aviles, to 

ensure they were fit to perform the duties asked of them.

70. ADT knew or should have known Aviles was incompetent or unfit. Nonetheless, 

ADT made the reckless decision to hire and retain Aviles as a technician.

71. ADT and its agents, servants, and employees, who were at all times acting in the 

course and scope of their employment, were guilty of negligence toward Plaintiff. Defendant 

ADT is further liable for the negligent acts of their agents, servants, or employees, including 

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Aviles, under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior. At all relevant times, Aviles was an agent 

apparent or ostensible agent of Defendant ADT. 

72. ADT’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ 

injuries and damages, including, but not limited to, ADT’s negligence in:

a. Failing to perform due diligence in contacting Aviles’s prior employers;

b. Failing to adequately evaluate Aviles’s mental state prior to hiring;

c. Any and all actions and omissions as may be proven at trial;

d. Negligently hiring Aviles in a position allowing him to have access to 

sensitive client information;

e. Negligently allowing Aviles to access sensitive client information when 

Defendant ADT knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that 

Aviles was unfit;

f. Negligently retaining Aviles in its employ in a position that provided him 

with access to sensitive client information;

g. Negligently and inadequately supervising its employees;

h. Failing to create and/or enforce safety rules, polices, and procedures 

governing employee conduct regarding access to clients’ cameras and other 

sensitive information;

i. Failing to warn Plaintiff of the inappropriate and substandard hiring and 

retention, training, and supervision of their employees; and

j. Negligently allowing Aviles to accomplish the tort upon Plaintiff by the 

existence of his agency relationship with Defendant ADT.

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73. These actions and omissions of ADT singularly, or in combination with others, 

proximately caused damages to Plaintiff and the Class, including mental anguish and suffering in 

the form of anxiety, stress, loss of security, fear, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

74. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

75. At all times herein, Aviles acted intentionally, maliciously, and without 

justification, to gain unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s private camera, potentially including 

video of Plaintiff partially or completely naked and engaging in intimate and other private 

activities, when Aviles knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional 

distress as a result.

76. The conduct by Aviles was intentional, malicious. and done for the purpose of 

causing, or was known by Aviles to be likely to cause, Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 

distress, and was done with the wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff.

77. Defendant ADT had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and caution 

in and about the management, maintenance, supervision, control, and operation of its systems 

and each of their employees, agents, and independent contractors, all to the benefit of clients and 

persons like Plaintiff.

78. Defendant ADT, by and through its agents, employees, and independent 

contractors, was reckless in its acts and/or omissions by, amongst other things, allowing 

technicians to create authorized user accounts, and by failing to discover that Aviles made 

himself an authorized user and gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s home camera, thereby 

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allowing surreptitious videos and images to be viewed and taken of Plaintiff in the privacy of her 

home.

79. Defendant ADT knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious recordings 

of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked and engaging in consensual 

intimate activity, and having private conversations, in a private home; (3) the recordings were 

taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings would reveal 

private and personal things about Plaintiff which ADT and Aviles had no right or authorization 

to view, use, disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and occasions 

constitutes a substantial and outrageous violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

80. These acts were done intentionally or with a conscious and/or reckless disregard 

of Plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, such as to constitute oppression, 

fraud, or malice. ADT acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, and 

intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, to her detriment.

81. As a direct and proximate result of ADT’s aforementioned acts and omissions, 

Plaintiff suffered emotional injury, mental damage, loss, harm, anxiety, embarrassment, 

humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress in an amount subject to proof. These damages 

are continuing in nature and will be suffered in the future.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Privacy Monitoring

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against Defendant ADT)

82. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

83. Plaintiff and the Class suffered extreme invasions of their privacy in that ADT’s 

agent or agents have accessed the security systems installed in their homes, including cameras 

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inside their homes. ADT’s agents were able to surreptitiously see and record their most intimate 

moments in a highly protected and personal space. 

84. ADT proximately caused Plaintiff’s and the Class’s privacy to be violated by 

designing and maintaining its smart home security products with obvious and significant security 

vulnerabilities, through which ADT’s employees’ surreptitious access to the cameras in 

Plaintiff’s and the Class’s homes was a predictable outcome. 

85. The invasion of privacy that Plaintiff and the Class suffered exposes them to even 

more alarming, compounding harms: if still or video recordings were made from those camera 

feeds, they can be distributed via the Internet to yet more people. Regrettably, the Internet has 

long permitted the establishment of well-organized groups for the trading or posting of illicit (or 

even illegal) material that serves the prurient interest of that group without the knowledge or 

permission of the subjects.10 Plaintiff’s and the Class’s risk of having their private lives exposed 

on the Internet is significantly increased because of ADT’s actions.

86. Swift detection of the content on the Internet is necessary to contain its spread. 

Each time an image or video is sent to another person, the possibility of removing the image or 

even mitigating the spread is reduced.

87. Commercial “takedown services” are available to monitor the spread of images 

and video, and, for a greater price, will try to get them taken down. In some situations, Plaintiff 

and the Class may even need to hire counsel. Absent ADT’s actions, these services would be 

unnecessary. These services are broadly accepted as necessary because individuals cannot 

reasonably monitor the entire Internet or force individuals to take this material down. 

10 Some groups operate more publicly than others, both are of concern here. E.g., FEDERAL 

TRADE COMMISSION, FTC, Nevada Obtain Order Permanently Shutting down Revenge Porn Site MyEx

(June 22, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/06/ftc-nevada-obtain-order-permanentlyshutting-down-revenge-porn/.

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88. Plaintiff and the Class seek injunctive relief, requiring ADT to create a fund 

sufficient to cover the costs of commercial and/or legal services needed to remedy the invasion 

of privacy that they have suffered, including (1) monitoring for the distribution of images or 

video from their homes, (2) taking down any such media that is posted, and (3) providing any 

such further relief as the Court deems equitable and just. 

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

(On Behalf of Plaintiff Preddy and the Sub-Class against Defendant Aviles)

89. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

90. Defendant Aviles intentionally intruded upon Plaintiff’s and each of the SubClass members’ seclusion by spying on Plaintiff and the Sub-Class in one of their most private 

spaces, their homes, and in their most intimate moments. 

91. Defendant Aviles’s spying on Plaintiff and the Sub-Class is highly offensive to a 

reasonable person as it reveals intimate private details about Plaintiff and each of the Sub-Class 

members and the activities they participate in inside the privacy of their own homes.

92. Defendant Aviles’s intrusion upon the Plaintiff’s and the Sub-Class members’ 

seclusion caused Plaintiff and the Sub-Class members mental anguish and suffering in the form 

of anxiety, loss of security, loss of safety, humiliation, and anger.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Sub-Class against Defendant Aviles)

93. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.

94. At all times herein, Aviles acted intentionally, maliciously, and without 

justification, to gain unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s private camera, potentially including 

video of Plaintiff partially or completely naked and engaging in intimate and other private 

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activities, when Aviles knew or should have known that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional 

distress as a result.

95. The conduct by Aviles was intentional, malicious, and done for the purpose of 

causing, or was known by Aviles to be likely to cause, Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 

distress, and was done with the wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff.

96. Defendant Aviles knew or should have known that: (1) the surreptitious 

recordings of Plaintiff contained private and confidential information about Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff 

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in being partially and fully naked and engaging in 

consensual intimate activity, and having private conversations, in a private home; (3) the 

recordings were taken without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; (4) the surreptitious recordings 

would reveal private and personal things about Plaintiff which Aviles had no right or 

authorization to view, use, disseminate, or disclose; and (5) the viewing of these private acts and 

occasions constitutes a substantial and outrageous violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy.

97. These acts were done intentionally or with a conscious and/or reckless disregard 

of Plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, such as to constitute oppression, 

fraud, or malice. Aviles acted outrageously and beyond all reasonable bounds of decency, and 

intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon Plaintiff, to her detriment.

98. As a direct and proximate result of Aviles’s aforementioned acts and omissions, 

Plaintiff suffered emotional injury, mental damage, loss, harm, anxiety, embarrassment, 

humiliation, shame, and severe emotional distress in an amount subject to proof. These damages 

are continuing in nature and will be suffered in the future.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Alexia Preddy, individually and on behalf of the Class of 

similarly situated individuals, prays for the following relief against Defendant ADT:

A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class, and appointing her counsel as class 

counsel;

B. Declaring that ADT’s actions as set out above constitute negligence, intrusion 

upon seclusion, negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress;

C. Awarding damages, including statutory, exemplary, and punitive damages where 

applicable;

D. Awarding injunctive relief in the form of privacy monitoring;

E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and 

attorneys’ fees;

F. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 

allowable;

G. Awarding such other injunctive and declaratory relief as is necessary to protect 

the interests of Plaintiff and the Class; and

H. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

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FURTHERMORE, Plaintiff Alexia Preddy, individually and on behalf of the Sub-Class 

of similarly situated individuals, prays for the following relief against Defendant Aviles:

I. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Sub-Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Sub-Class, and appointing her counsel as class 

counsel;

J. Declaring that Aviles’s actions, as set out above constitute intrusion upon 

seclusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress;

K. Awarding damages, including exemplary and punitive damages where applicable;

L. Awarding Plaintiff and the Sub-Class their reasonable litigation expenses and 

attorneys’ fees;

M. Awarding Plaintiff and the Sub-Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the 

extent allowable;

N. Awarding such other injunctive and declaratory relief as is necessary to protect 

the interests of Plaintiff and the Sub-Class; and

O. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable.

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXIA PREDDY, individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated,

Dated: July 24, 2020 By: /s/ Christopher Michael Brown

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys

Jay Edelson*

jedelson@edelson.com

Benjamin H. Richman*

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brichman@edelson.com

J. Eli Wade-Scott*

ewadescott@edelson.com

EDELSON PC

350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60654

Tel: 312.589.6370

Fax: 312.589.6378

Matthew R. McCarley*

mmccarley@fnlawfirm.com

Christopher Michael Brown

cbrown@fnlawfirm.com

FEARS NACHAWATI, PLLC

5473 Blair Road

Dallas, Texas 75231

Tel: 214.890.0711

Fax: 214.890.0712

Amy M. Carter*

amy@clgtrial.com

Heather V. Davis*

hdavis@clgtrial.com

CARTER LAW GROUP, P.C.

5473 Blair Rd.

Dallas, Texas 75231

Telephone: (214) 390-4173

*Admitted via Pro Hac Vice

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