13-15 March, 1999

Prepared by Professor Ewan W Anderson,

University of Durham, United Kingdom,

with Contributions from Rapporteurs

Fritz W. Ermarth and Alan Smith

A German-American Partnership

A Report of the George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies Conference on
Designed by VIB, 20 Jan 00
1

A Report of the George C. Marshall European Center 

for Security Studies Conference on

Enhancing the Security of States 

in a Multipolar World: 

Vulnerabilities and

Opportunities

13-15 March, 1999

Prepared by Professor Ewan W Anderson, 

University of Durham, United Kingdom,

with Contributions from Rapporteurs

Fritz W. Ermarth and Alan Smith

Edited under the direction of the Marshall Center’s 

Conference Center
COVER DESIGN AND LAYOUT BY VIB — 20JAN00
2

Preface-Scope of the Conference

This conference was held from 15-19 March 1999 to 

• Examine developing issues that have the potential to 

threaten or destabilize the security of states in Europe 

and Eurasia;

• Discuss how states without a superpower's resources can 

affect their regional geopolitical environments;

• Explore the means that non-superpower or geographically 

smaller states have at their disposal to improve their 

security;

• Develop proposals on how security of a region could be 

enhanced through cooperative action. 

The geographical scope of the conference included 26 countries in

an arc running around Russia from the Baltic States through Central

Asia. Of these 26 countries, 18 were represented at the conference

by delegations drawn from government, military and academic life.

Expertise within these country delegations was complemented by

international experts presenting papers on potential threats to the

stability of countries within the region and possible cooperative procedures for dealing with them. 

To facilitate the consideration of common problems, conference

participants were divided into three working groups: East Central

Europe - North, East Central Europe — South, and Central Asia.

The main emphasis of the conference was on the working groups,

which were tasked to discuss potential threats, security options and

security initiatives. The accent throughout their deliberations was on

the identification of potential solutions to security problems and the

development of clear-cut, practical suggestions for the conference to

put forward. 

The core of this report is a review and analysis of the statements

produced by each of the working groups on the major conference

themes. It also capitalizes on the expertise offered by the international experts present at the conference by blending in key points

from their regional and thematic presentations. 
Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Table of Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Key Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Characteristics of the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Categories of Threats to Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A Broadening Concept of Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Working Group Perspectives on Threats and Opportunities . . . . 18

East Central Europe — North. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Potential Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Actions Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Future Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

East Central Europe — South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Potential Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Actions Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Future Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Perceived Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Actions Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Future Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Common Concerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Recent Approaches to Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Possible Security Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Attendees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Key Issues

R

epresentatives of the eighteen countries present at this conference had broad and demanding visions of security. These

visions centered on “soft” security issues, including assurances of economic, social and political stability and a healthy natural

environment. The delegates were less concerned over traditional

“hard” threats to security–nuclear or conventional war. In most

cases, this even applied to the militarization of large-scale interethnic

fighting. These delegates recognized, however, that the comprehensive security they were seeking was impossible without difficult

domestic changes and an unprecedented level of cooperation with

their neighbors and with regional organizations.

The conference closed on the eve of what became the NATO

air campaign in Kosovo. Though unaware of what was to come, delegates to this conference were either noncommittal or skeptical

about the deployment of military forces in preventive diplomacy

roles, especially in situations short of actual invasion of one country

by another. They were far more attuned to their own needs to preempt Kosovo-like situations by embracing the stability-promoting

measures discussed throughout the week at the Marshall Center. 

The most important common concerns of conference participants included, in order of declining urgency:

• Economic Instability. Economic stability is intimately 

interrelated with all other forms of stability. Anything 

that undermines it — such as illegitimate political 

leadership, corrupt legal or banking systems, unskilled 

workers and unfair taxes — undermines the security of 

the state.

• Refugees and Illegal Immigration. Uncontrolled 

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

4
movements of people seeking refuge from conflicts, 

ethnic persecution or dire economic conditions can 

quickly overwhelm the absorptive capacities of any 

small state, creating economic chaos and social 

upheaval. Many viewed the presence of large numbers of 

illegal immigrants as precursors of criminal activity, 

including narcotics trafficking and black market arms trade.

• An Unstable Russia. Further political and economic 

decline within Russia is a grave concern because of 

the far-reaching consequences. Participants referred to 

the possibilities of the reemergence of a nationalistic 

foreign policy, cuts in regional trade and energy supplies, 

increased emigration to wealthier neighbors, and increases 

in transnational criminal activities. 

• Ethnic Tensions. Ethnic tensions arising from historical 

grievances, perceived economic inequalities, unresolved 

borders and political opportunism were viewed as 

worrisome sources of social instability, migration and, 

in the worst cases, active conflicts with the potential 

for transnational spillover.

• Environmental Disasters. Virtually every state 

represented at the conference was concerned about 

major pollution problems. These concerns included 

cleaning up contamination from former nuclear testing and 

waste disposal sites, chemical and toxic waste dumps and 

obsolete industries, as well as dealing with ongoing cases of 

international river contamination. The single, greatest 

environmental challenge was the drying up of the Aral 

Sea, which is rapidly creating a saline wasteland over a 

vast portion of Central Asia.

To deal with these concerns, working groups endorsed several

international activities that have proven effective in promoting

5

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
stability in the past and enumerated a number of additional initiatives for new comprehensive security measures. 

Participants specifically cited the following ongoing activities as critical for the continued maintenance of stability in the

region: 

• OSCE's cooperative diplomacy and peacekeeping 

efforts;

• NATO’s Partnership for Peace;

• Those economic reform measures required either to 

accede to the European Union or to participate in 

alternative subregional economic groupings.

Ideas for additional initiatives included:

• Creating regular multilateral roundtables to share 

information on movement toward the creation of 

multiethnic societies; border control issues; illegal 

immigrants and refugees; economic integration; arms 

control and CSBMs; and controlling narcotics and 

organized criminal activities.

• Calling on Western technical support (such as offered 

during the conference by Commander of the North 

Atlantic Division, US Army Corps of Engineers) to deal 

with widespread issues of nuclear, chemical and industrial 

contamination. Additionally to dispose of ordnance and 

toxic materials left over from the Cold War.

• Alleviating pollution through a combination of 

national and regional plans for cleaning up rivers; closing

obsolete industries and remediating areas contaminated by 

radioactive materials, abandoned ordnance or toxic 

chemicals and metals. 

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

6
• Continuing to review the CFE Treaty to rebalance 

conventional forces across the region.

• Creating a “nuclear weapons-free zone” in 

Central Asia.

• Setting up an economic and customs union of the 

entire Central Asian subregion that would transform it 

into a single economic zone. 

• Working throughout the region to agree on borders and 

establishing appropriate boundary control and 

management systems. 

• Forming interstate organizations to deal with the 

effects of natural disasters and power shortages,

modeled along the lines of the Baltic States’ BALTRING 

energy sharing and development group.

• Involving Russia in all possible cooperative 

agreements, particularly those concerned with defense 

and security. Russia remains a military superpower casting 

a large shadow across the region. Its scope for transnational

activity may be limited at present, but Russia’s influence 

remains strong.

• Recognizing the sensitivities of states other than 

Russia to the potential imbalances that could result 

from NATO and EU accessions policies as some states 

are chosen and some are not. In the case of EU 

membership, the boundary between neighboring states 

would become a trade barrier. The differences in security 

status would be even more stark in the case of NATO, as 

one nation received a guarantee of military support while its

neighbor did not.

7

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
• Organizing effective help to address the massive 

problems surrounding the desiccation of the Aral Sea.

Conferees decided it was vital to address the problems of 

the Aral Sea basin in their entirety–beginning with a detailed

cost benefit analysis that could attract global financing to 

combat the problems. n

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

8
Characteristics of the Region

T

he challenges to the security of the 26 states in the region

covered by this conference and the abilities of the countries

to deal with them reflect the histories and characteristics of

the various states. All these countries have in common their creation

through the implosion of larger states--either

the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. They share

the pervasive influence of Russia. Over half

are landlocked. Otherwise, they are a disparate group. Most have small populations,

the average for the region being 10.2 million;

however, they range in size from Estonia (1.5

million people) to Ukraine (50.7 million).

They also vary greatly in area from the 2.7

million square kilometers of Kazakhstan,

one of the largest countries in the world, to

the 20,000 square kilometers of Slovenia.

Taken together, the region includes a population almost the size of the United States and

encompasses a land area roughly one-third

the size of Russia. The political background of the region is differentiated according to whether the states are former members of the

Warsaw Pact, former Soviet Union (FSU) republics, products of

secession, previously independent states or new states. 

Because all these states are acutely resource-limited, they

have greater problems than larger states in meeting threats to

stability or constraining the effects of conflicts potentially

affecting them. They have limited resources for defense.

Generally, the states lack forces appropriate for the security

issues they now face. They are simultaneously pursuing difficult programs to promote economic growth, democratization,

and defense reform. They are also seeking support and security assurances from international organizations working to promote new regional mechanisms to preempt or manage a rapidly diversifying array of future threats.

9

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Because all

these states

are acutely

resourcelimited, they

have greater

problems than

larger states 

in meeting

threats to 

stability
While dealing with this challenging array of changes, the states

of the region represented at this conference are also forced to

balance their quests for sovereignty and distinct national identities against pressing needs for greater regional cooperation

and integration. Political independence has required that the states

reengineer economic links with neighbors, rethink security and border control issues, appreciate common environmental goals, and

become more sensitive to their interconnectedness in virtually all

aspects of national life. n

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

10
Catagories of Threats to Stability

C

onference participants brought with them a well-developed

sensitivity to a broad range of security concerns that went

well beyond the traditional Cold War focus on straightforward military threats. The extent to which each participating state

expressed concerns about a mix of economic, political, social, cultural, environmental

and military issues varied. Most, however,

were more worried about the potential for

economic, social or environmental crises

than military issues.

Economic Instability was regarded as

both a symptom of other problems and a

fundamental cause of other types of

instability, from social upheaval to armed

conflict. The intimate relationship of economic stability to a functioning market economy and a transparent legal system was made

clear in a paper entitled, “Economic

Development and the Impact on Stability” by

Professor Friedemann Muller of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und

Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany. In his presentation he also observed

that a functioning market economy could not exist without a solid

legal system, open capital markets and an honest banking system.

Because internal economic stability is a prerequisite for dealing flexibly with change on a national level and for competing

successfully in the global economy, those states with unreliable

banking systems, hostile legal systems, excessively restricted

competition or politically driven economic decision-making

processes are likely to be threatened by economic instability.

Political and Social Instability arising from ethnic tensions was

11

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Internal 

economic 

stability is a

prerequisite

for dealing

flexibly with

change on a

national level

and for 

competing 

successfully 

in the global

economy
treated extensively in two papers on ethnic tensions by Professor

Tom Gallagher of the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford

University, United Kingdom, and addressed in each of the working

groups. Ethnic nationalism — a claim that ethnic identity should be

the basis of citizenship — was raised as the root cause of social and

political challenges through most of the region covered by the conference. As the working groups noted, the most serious threats to

stability occurred in circumstances when ethnic nationalism

combined with border disputes or economic disparities and

leaders were willing to use the resulting discontent to build

political power.

Environmental Risks were noted as threats to stability

throughout the conference. Though the greatest emphasis on environmental problems was in the Central Asia working group, all

noted the destabilizing effects of lost arable land, diminished health,

and reduced economic opportunities that result from mismanagement of water, industrial contamination and military testing or

improper disposal of toxic nuclear or chemical materials. 

Military Threats were treated last during the conference, but the

existence or possibility of armed conflict was included in the deliberations of all working groups. Although traditional military balanceof-power issues, including questions of nuclear weapons use, were

left largely in the background, problems of subregional conflicts

with horizontal escalation and multinational involvement were

areas of concern.

Conferees also were aware of the broadening geographical range

of sources for future security problems. Where appropriate, the conference used a three-level classification system to array the geographical scales of threats to states in the region:

• Substate Threats — those affecting areas within states. 

Substate threats could range from an internal ethnic conflict

to a region of severe environmental contamination within 

the boundaries of one country.

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

12
• Interstate Threats — those occurring directly between 

neighboring states. Interstate threats to stability could arise 

over unresolved boundary issues and contested access to 

water.

• Transnational Threats — those with multinational or 

global scope, such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, 

refugee movements or conflict involving multinational 

organizations. 

The boundary between the three levels cannot be precise and a

threat at one level may spill over into another. Dr. Ewan Anderson,

Professor of Geopolitics in the Centre for Middle Eastern and

Islamic Studies at the University of Durham, United Kingdom,

noted in his conference presentation and paper, “Geopolitical

Overview,” that the complexity of the post-Cold War world results

in large measure from the fact that intractable problems tend to

transcend even these three levels of analysis. For example, Kosovo is

a substate problem of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), an

interstate problem with Albania and Macedonia and a transnational

problem with the dispersion of refugees to other parts of Europe

and North America. Similarly, a transnational problem can cascade

down to the lower levels. The transnational problem of arms smuggling is an interstate threat between Afghanistan and Pakistan and a

substate threat in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. n

13

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Broadening Concept of Security

I

n the face of macropolitical threats, the concept of security has broadened. This broadening was highlighted at the

opening of the conference in a paper entitled “Regional

Overview North Central Europe” by Major General Dietrich

Genschel addressing the concepts of hard and soft security.

• Hard Security is a state’s capability to deter external threats

to the country and, should this fail, to defend the country’s 

territorial integrity and core values. Hard security is 

largely the province of a nation’s armed forces and its 

defense establishment.

• Soft Security is the product of economic, political and 

social stability and sound environmental policy. It has 

domestic and interstate attributes. Domestically, it rests 

on the preconditions of sound economic healthtrusted banking and legal systems, open capital 

markets and fair commercial competition-and a 

populace willing to accept ethnic diversity. On the 

interstate and transnational levels, soft security entails trade 

and cultural relations with surrounding countries and the 

global environment, and a multinational approach to 

preemptive ecological management. Soft security 

implicitly presumes that the state is not exposed to 

external military threat.

Comprehensive Security. Professor Ewan Anderson combined

these concepts of security in the even broader one of comprehensive security. In his words, “the idea of common security has been

developed to recognize the legitimate interests of all sides and

encapsulates all facets of military-related measures from 

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

14
confidence–building to arms control, peacemaking, peacekeeping and disarmament.

However, approaches to security imply more

than just military security. Economic, political, social, cultural and environmental security are all identified as possible components.

To cover such threats, internal and external,

macropolitical, interstate and substate, the

term ‘comprehensive security’ is probably the

most appropriate.” 

Preventive Diplomacy. The sustaining of comprehensive security usually requires some form of preventive diplomacy — that is,

taking steps to prevent the causes of instability from growing or

spreading across borders. The non-controversial aspects of preventive diplomacy include early warning of potentially destabilizing

developments followed by mutually agreed diplomatic, economic or,

in the case of environmental problems, technical support actions. 

Military Intervention. Preventive deployment of military forces

to limit or affect the outcome of an armed conflict is the most

extreme and controversial extension of preventive diplomacy. This

measure is controversial because the threat or act of deploying military forces in another country constitutes forcible intervention in the

affairs of a sovereign state. Any such deployment raises moral, prac -

tical and legal issues. In a paper entitled “International Interventions

in Secessionist Conflicts in Europe: A Threat to Sovereignty, a

Challenge to Stability,” Dr. Pavel Baev of the International Peace

Research Institute in Oslo, pointed out that most secessionist

movements, if left alone, usually fail of their own accord. In

addition, many military interventions fail to meet their political

or humanitarian objectives. But if they are undertaken for clear

and limited objectives, are justified in the minds of their supporting publics as necessary responses to cruel or collapsing

regimes and are properly planned and executed, they can

make a difference.

15

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Finding 

legitimacy 

for military 

intervention 

is a major

problem in

coordinating 

preventive

deployments
Finding legitimacy for military intervention is a major problem in coordinating preventive military deployments. It is an

open question whether it can be bestowed through anybody other

than the UN. There was no consensus at the conference on this

issue, so there is clearly a need for far more thought and discussion

on the subject before any overall guidelines can be produced. 

Roles of International Organizations. At the transnational

level, the UN with its Charters and Resolutions, together with the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides a legal underpinning

for many aspects of security. NATO, a Cold War defense alliance,

has been transformed in both function and membership to address

security issues, both in-area and increasingly out-of-area. While full

NATO membership is limited and accession will be judged case by

case, its far more broadly based Partnership for Peace program has

been active in many states of East Central Europe and Eurasia.

Indeed, with the development of the Combined Joint Task Force

(CJTF) program, the key difference between full and associate membership is the guarantee of direct supporting military intervention to

members when threatened. NATO has also forged relationships

with Russia and the Ukraine and has spawned the European Security

and Defense Identity (ESDI). 

More widely based in its membership than Partnership for

Peace, is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), whose essential role is to promote soft security. It has a membership of 55 states, including all those of the former Soviet Union. OSCE is pragmatic and it implements measures

by cooperative means. Through preventive diplomacy and cooperative security measures, most delegates considered it the

body most prepared to address the complexity of modern,

soft-security problems.

Because economic stability is a major determinant of security, the extension eastward of the European Union with its allembracing criteria for membership also provides a security

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

16
safeguard. Its Common Foreign and Security Policy addresses both

soft security and hard security. Finally, more focused regional

cooperative groups such as the Council of Baltic States and

the Arctic-Barents were noted during the conference as important for security at the interstate level. n

17

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Working Group Perspectives

W

hile they have much in common and perhaps even a

common destiny, each of the three subregions addressed

by the conference is different politically, geographically,

economically and militarily. Furthermore, the states within each

region differ considerably from each other. This heterogeneity led to

significant differences among the conference’s three working groups

in their modes of operation, the foci of their discussions and the

content of their reports. To provide consistency summarizing their

work, their reports are presented using the conference’s guideline

that they address potential threats, actions taken and future options

for dealing with security issues within each sub-region.

East Central Europe — North

This sub-region included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. All but Slovakia participated in the conference. 

A consensus emerged among conference participants that this

was the most stable of the three subregions covered by the

conference. The Czech Republic and Poland had acceded to NATO

as the conference began — easing their concerns about hard security

provisions. Moreover, the preconditions for economic stability

were agreed to be relatively well established in a majority of

the states, and concern over hard security issues was relatively

low. 

Potential threats. Though the risks presented for the subregion

did not apply to all countries that participated, the majority of the

states present viewed their major security concern to be uncontrolled immigration. Any large-scale transborder movement of

people seeking refuge from economic hardships would create

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

18
instability by overwhelming the receiving country’s labor market,

social services, educational systems and health care facilities and by

prompting a rise in drug trafficking and arms smuggling. 

The group was concerned over an interrelated set of political and military threats to stability that included possible

changes in Russia — such as:

• Increasingly negative perceptions of NATO;

• Unwillingness to cooperate with neighbors;

• A rise of extremism; 

• The subverting influence of organized crime; 

• Unconfirmed borders; 

• The uneven distribution of forces in border areas such as 

the Leningrad Military District;

• The black-market sale of weapons from Russian military 

units.

Working Group members were also concerned over any

slowdown in EU enlargement, which could produce increasing

economic and political disparities between those who are

members and those who are not, and any geographically

unbalanced pattern of accessions to NATO.

Economic, social and environmental risks were a concern to

conferees from the area. Participants pointed to:

• Financial crises affecting the sub-region;

• The rise of discriminatory trading practices;

• Collapse of the social consensus behind economic reform;

• Specific areas of ethnic tension (such as between returning 

Crimean Tartars and Russians in the Crimea);

• Growing differences in wealth between different regions 

within a state — particularly if there appeared to be 

discrimination against minorities;

• Natural disasters, for example, extended flooding; unsafe 

19

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
nuclear power plants;

• Environmental issues, to include polluted water supplies, 

toxic material deposits, and unexploded ordnance in the 

Black and Baltic Seas. 

One technical security issue identified by the states of the north

central subregion was the potential for year 2000 computer failures.

The potential for uncontrolled military weapons activation, power

plant failures and failures in hospitals were of particular concern.

Actions Taken. Initiatives taken in the subregion to limit uncontrolled immigration include establishment of readmission treaties

that make repatriation effective and the strengthening of border

controls, including converting military border troops into police

forces with new geographical orientations. Military stability in the

subregion had been promoted through the implementation of the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the NATO-Ukraine

Charter and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Nuclear weapons have

been removed from Ukraine and Belarus and NATO offices have

been established in Kiev. There have been numerous bilateral and

multilateral agreements on political, economic and military issues

and an overall agreement to the terms of the OSCE Treaty (Vienna

document 1994). Furthermore, Russia has been included in OSCE

stabilization efforts. Economically and socially, the two major initiatives have been accession to both the global and regional trade

regimes (WTO and CEFTA respectively) and Partnership for Peace

which has provided the means to train search and rescue disaster

relief teams. 

In the environmental field, a number of far-reaching measures

have been set in place. BALTRING, a regional energy sharing network, has been established and all existing power plants have been

categorized according to their risk potential. Tax incentives have

been enacted to encourage industrial modernization and pollution

control. Participants cited examples of the Ecoconversion Policy,

under which bilateral arrangements are made to exchange foreign

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

20
debt relief for ecological projects of direct benefit to the debt holder. Initial work has also been undertaken to enhance public awareness of pollution problems and to begin reclamation measures.

Some major cities have installed new water purification systems. Year

2000 commissions have been tasked to address the problem of computer failure.

Future Options. 

To preempt problems associated with uncontrolled migration,

the conferees proposed that:

• Visa policies be better coordinated;

• Russia and Belarus should be encouraged to adopt 

readmission agreements;

• Activities of border and immigration personnel needed to 

be coordinated by establishing a council of border control 

organizations and services. 

To promote political and military stability, the conferees considered it important to:

• Review the CFE treaty to rebalance forces;

• Integrate Russia into existing multilateral structures;

• Open a planned NATO mission in Moscow;

• Sustain and intensify Partnership for Peace activities;

• Assist in the retraining of excess military personnel.

To promote economic stability, conferees proposed to:

• Promote long term foreign investment;

• Reform social security and pension systems where it has not

been done;

• Promote the development of relatively poor regions 

through tax incentives;

• Work on the long-term reform of features required for EU 

membership. 

21

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
• Reach an agreement with Russia to remove double tariffs 

on imports.

To alleviate the effects of natural disasters and environmental

problems, several regional cooperative measures were suggested:

• The expansion of the BALTRING energy-sharing network;

• Creating transboundary plans for water pollution control;

• Exchanging specific information on the nature and location 

of explosives and toxic materials;

• Establishing international restrictions on the transport of 

environmentally hazardous products;

• Creating “green lung” areas of forests on a regional basis;

• Allowing obsolete industries to close with alternative 

employment assistance.

East Central Europe — South

This subregion included Slovenia, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia,

Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Moldova. All countries had delegations at the conference. In contrast to the overarching concerns

of the North Central European delegates on the higher priority

of longer-range soft security issues, representatives of the

South Central European area were focused on more immediate

hard security issues and the need to deal simultaneously with

painful economic transformations.

Potential Threats. The major concern of delegates from

this subregion was the volatile situation in Kosovo in the wake

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s rejection of the Rambuoillet

Agreement. Attendees were concerned about the risks that a

conflict in Kosovo could pose for a spillover of fighting to

adjoining countries as well as the humanitarian and economic

damage from conflict there. Additionally they were concerned

with the disruption that a Kosovo conflict could pose to a

process of regional integration, and the potential for crime and

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

22
smuggling to develop if current government controls broke

down.

Conferees were well aware of the stresses caused by ethnic

nationalism in areas other than Kosovo. Though many grievances

and territorial issues had been or were being resolved, (such as conflicts over Transylvania, minorities in Macedonia, and border issues

between Romania and Moldova), the potential for instability arising from irredentist feelings among nationalistic minorities

identifying themselves on ethnic rather than civic values, was

still present. Bosnia-Herzegovina was seen to exemplify many of

the security risks attending this sort of nationalistic identification.

Though Bosnia-Herzegovina was being stabilized by the presence of

SFOR and foreign assistance, it was a subject of concern because it

suffered from war damage, displaced populations, disputed boundaries, and internal violence. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

supports an observation by Dr. Tom Gallagher that the greatest

risk for ethnically driven conflict would occur when civic values were weak, economic opportunities limited, and there were

tangible grievances that could be manipulated for short-term

political ends.

All countries in this subregion were concerned about the economic effects of illegal immigrants and the related problems of the

spread of crime and corruption. The problem of organized crime

was seen to be more severe than that encountered with the traditional Mafia. The groups involved were characterized as

highly sophisticated, flexible, ruthless and enterprising. Their

operations included the smuggling of arms, drugs and commercial

products and money-laundering. For many states in the region this

could result in the corruption of state entities and the undermining

of law and order, a particularly serious problem in states where new

law enforcement and judicial structures were still being developed. 

Beyond Kosovo and alienated ethnic minorities, conference delegates saw threats to stability caused by Russian economic

23

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
instability, which in the worst case, would

spill over into the economies of this subregion. Economic instability or collapse in

Russia would also exacerbate problems stemming from the activities of organized crime

groups and weapons proliferators. To a lesser

degree, delegates were concerned that Russia

might have a post-imperial nostalgia for influence in the region, and thus back Serbia in

future regional confrontations.

Though overshadowed by the hard threats

of armed ethnic conflicts, risks to stability from natural disasters and

environmental problems, particularly those resulting from heavy

industrial and radioactive contamination, were noted as areas of continuing concern. Finally, as was the case with the North Central

European region, the states representing South Central Europe

expressed a general anxiety over boundaries and poor border

control which could exacerbate tensions in areas such as the

Transdenistr.

Actions Taken. Recent, key actions to promote stability in this

subregion involved a mix of national and international initiatives.

Largely through national or bilateral efforts, many potential

sources of ethnic conflict had been reduced or eliminated.

These included territorial issues between Hungary and

Bulgaria in Transylvania, between Romania and Moldova, and

the status of minorities in Macedonia and Albania.

International activities of NATO and the OSCE in stabilizing

Bosnia-Herzegovina were noted-though no consensus developed on

how long forces should remain there. Preparations for membership

in the EU — seen as the key avenue for integration into the rest of

Europe — had been taken by most states in this subregion.

Although the results varied from acceptance in the first round of

enlargement (Hungary and Slovenia) to associated state status

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

24

The problem

of organized

crime was

seen to be

more severe

than that

encountered

with the 

traditional

Mafia. 
(Bulgaria and Romania) to trade and cooperation agreements

(Macedonia and Albania), the entire process was viewed as essential for achieving the long-range goal of integrating the subregion economically with the rest of Europe.

Future Options. Delegates from this subregion highlighted a

need to strengthen diplomatic relationships on a subregional and

pan-European basis. They considered it crucial that the integration

of their countries into the major European political, economic

and military communities should not be retarded by current

problems since this would demoralize their populations and

jeopardize the creation of stable and prosperous democracies.

Specific steps might include:

• Pursuing French and US initiatives to promote subregional 

cooperation;

• Promoting the development of structures necessary to join 

the EU;

• Working through OSCE to develop confidence and 

security-building measures (CSBMs) for the region;

• Continuing to work with the United States on 

reconstruction efforts which, in the best case, could become

a new Marshall Plan;

• Normalize relationships with the FRY and engage it in a 

positive way in the affairs of the subregion;

• Continue to develop relationships with NATO though 

Partnership for Peace initiatives. 

Conference delegates were clear that pending problems in

Kosovo would have to be resolved and relations with the FRY

normalized before critically important economic reconstruction could begin. There was no clear consensus, however, on

how to do this. Some delegates favored NATO intervention; others

favored a hands-off, containment policy; others favored various

forms of positive engagement with the contending states. 

25

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
To work toward settlement of unresolved border issues and deal

with refugee issues, conference delegates proposed a series of

regional roundtables. These roundtables also could help develop

measures to promote local arms control and strengthen steps necessary for building civil societies in areas of conflict.

Central Asia

This subregion included Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. All but Turkmenistan were represented at

the conference. For these representatives, the basic problems of

the subregion flow from its isolation and unpreparedness for

sudden independence in 1991 and the consequences of the

subsequent struggles to achieve internal political and economic stability while dealing with major cases of environmental

mismanagement.

Perceived Threats. The basic concern of conference delegates was over the internal stability of their countries. Their list

of internal political and economic threats to stability included:

• Limited experience with democratic processes. Prevailing 

political cultures center on clan structures and authoritarian 

regimes that are prone to sudden power shifts, rather than 

organized succession. 

• Ethnically based sub-national differences that contain the 

potential for active conflict, as has been the case in 

Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

• Lack of social cohesive forces to replace communism.

• High population growth rates, exacerbating pre-existing 

economic inequalities.

• Crime and corruption.

Conferees stressed that these political and economic challenges were aggravated by a number of serious environmental

and health issues. The most prominent was the desiccation of

the Aral Sea basin.

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

26
Through over-abstraction of water for irrigation, the Aral Sea has now diminished to

under two-thirds of its previous size, resulting in widespread water shortages and hazards ranging from severe health issues to

salinization of farmland. Other environmental threats, particularly the widespread environmental pollution created at heavy industrial sites from the Soviet period and radioac -

tive contamination from former Soviet

nuclear test ranges and waste sites, afflict the

region.

Representatives from the subregion

viewed Afghanistan as their major

transnational threat. While Afghanistan

poses no direct military problem, it is associated with cross-border terrorist infiltration,

drug trafficking and, potentially, religious extremism. Any spillover

of its civil war could affect the stability of the entire region. 

Less significant than Afghanistan, but nonetheless important in

generating potential instability is the economic state of Russia.

Though relations with Russia were generally seen as good, serious

instability or an implosion of the Russian economy would

affect directly the economies of Central Asia though reductions in trade and increases in cross-border criminal activity.

The Fergana Valley, which is located across the boundaries of

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, was cited by Professor Ewan

Anderson as a potential flash point for instability. It is the locus of

unresolved border issues, a crossroads for drug and weapons movements, a site of numerous nuclear waste dumping sites and potential

water problems resulting from old and unreliable dams.

Actions Taken. In the face of these geopolitical and natural

27

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Serious 

instability or

an implosion

of the Russian

economy

would affect

directly the

economies 

of Central

Asia though

reductions in

trade and

increases in

cross-border

criminal 

activity
threats, a number of initiatives have been taken in Central Asia.

Early attempts were made to address the plight of the Aral Sea

region when the International Foundation for the Salvation of the

Aral Sea was established in 1993. Membership includes the World

Bank, together with a number of Inter-Governmental

Organizations, including the EU. In addition, the problems of the

sea are being addressed through Green Parties and various environmental societies. 

To promote military stability, a treaty on collective security has

been signed. It includes Russia in its membership. States of the subregion cooperate with NATO through its Partnership for Peace program and join in UN peacekeeping activities. CENTBAT, a Central

Asian peacekeeping battalion, has already been deployed within the

region. Finally, to promote the integration of minorities into national

life, one of the states has established an Assembly of Peoples.

Future Choices. Conference participants agreed that stability in

Central Asia would come only with economic development. For this,

Western expertise and investment was invaluable. More specifically, it

was clear Western support was also required for the development of

economic and social infrastructure projects, including water distribution programs and the sustaining of educational activities left to

lapse when the Soviet Union collapsed. Delegates noted, however,

that to guard against corruption, investing states should take responsibility for implementing their investments. Finally, Western, and particularly US, technical skills were needed to combat radioactive contamination-a problem in Central Asia that is on a scale not

approached anywhere else in the world. 

Delegates proposed that movement begin toward an economic and customs union for states of the subregion. This concept of a single economic zone for Central Asia was seen as a means

of strengthening their fragmented post-Soviet economies and pooling their limited resources. 

To enhance military stability at the transnational level,

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

28
Central Asian representatives considered increasingly close

relations with NATO through Partnership for Peace to be

essential. Delegates also voiced support for the establishment

of a “nuclear weapons-free zone” in Central Asia. n

29

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Common Concerns 

T

he characteristics of the region covered by this conference make it difficult to generalize about threats and

possible options for dealing with them. The states

within it vary enormously in population, size, history and level

of economic development. Thus, their perceptions of threats

to stability and their priorities for dealing with them vary considerably. Each state has a unique geopolitical location and therefore the main issues, in terms of threats and possible responses

identified, cannot necessarily be related to all three regions and certainly not to all participating states. However, there are clearly discernible points on which there was a general convergence of

views.

Ethnic Tensions. Ethnic tensions arising from historical grievances and perceived economic inequalities, exacerbated by political

opportunism and contested borders, were of great concern to all

participants in the conference. In the mildest of circumstances,

these tensions held the potential for social and economic instability and for uncontrolled migration. In the worst cases, ethnically rooted tensions have led to active conflicts, which exercise significant influence in the area and offer the potential for

spillover on an increased scale. Further conflict in Kosovo, for

example, could clearly affect most of Southeast Central Europe, particularly if support from Russia were enhanced. Most at risk would

be Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Central Asia, the

effects of spillover from the civil war in Afghanistan are apparent.

Settlement of the Afghan conflict would appear to be a prerequisite

for the long-term stability of the region. 

Refugee Flows and Illegal Migration. Apart from transboundary aggression, the major threats posed by any conflict

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

30
spillover are likely to be refugee movements. According to a paper by Dr. Robert

Mandel, Chairman of the International

Affairs Department at Lewis and Clark

College, United States, entitled “Causes and

Consequences of the Mass Movement of

Peoples: A Security Analysis,” internal conflict has provided the dominant impetus to

refugee outflows. Conflict is particularly likely

to generate refugee outflows when it involves

unrestricted violence directed toward specific

vulnerable groups of people. Dr. Mandel also

observed that refugee flows and illegal migration are likely to occur in conditions short of active conflict when

political persecution, economic inequality and deprivation, and cultural antagonisms make people seek relief though relocation.

Refugees and illegal immigrants were seen by conferees as

risks to stability because they could, when in large numbers,

overwhelm the recipient country’s economic and social integrative capabilities. Similarly, illegal immigration can be linked

to increased likelihood of arms smuggling, drug trafficking

and the appearance of criminal enterprises.

Economic Instability. One of the conference’s themes was that

economic stability is intimately interrelated with political and

social stability so any development that undermines it is a

threat to the nation as a whole. Hence, corrupt legal or judicial

systems rigged or politicized capital markets and unreliable banks

contribute directly to domestic economic instability and to weakness

in international competition for capital and markets. 

Russia. All conference attendees considered the influence of

Russia in the region to be pervasive. The perceived threats

from Russia varied from country to country and ranged from

hard to soft. Predominant among threats to stability originating in

Russia were attempts to restore hegemony, the effects of further

31

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Major pollution problems

ranging from

industrial to

those associated with the

military and

the nuclear

industry exist

throughout

the region.
economic collapse and the consequences of implosion. There was,

among a few delegates, a fear of latent imperialism (referred to as

imperialistic nostalgia) and the effect this might have on Russian foreign policy-particularly in the event of renewed conflict in the

Balkans.

Far more significant, however, was the fear that the further

political, economic and social decline in Russia would generate intolerable stresses in regional economic growth, trading

patterns, energy supplies, human migration, growth of criminal activity and related problems such as narcotics and

weapons proliferation. The present parlous state of the

Russian economy and its greatly reduced level of government

control have already allowed the development of transnational

drug trafficking and arms smuggling, closely linked to a range

of other criminal activities. Apart from organized crime, the break

up of the Soviet Union has resulted in widespread corruption, the

virtual absence of border controls and the identification of a vast

array of environmental problems. 

Pollution. Major pollution problems ranging from industrial to

those associated with the military and the nuclear industry

exist throughout the region. Pollution from anachronistic heavy

manufacturing sites, mines and equipment storage areas was noted as

a problem in all subregions covered by the conference. Though the

specifics varied, there were general concerns over military-associated

contamination from the dumping of nuclear, chemical and explosive

materials in the adjacent seas; the burial of radioactive material and

other toxic substances in insecure sites; and the problem of residual

contamination at what formerly were experimental locations,

involved in work on weapons of mass destruction. In many cases,

the scope of necessary reconstitution of the environment is

beyond anything previously addressed.

Natural and Man-made Disasters. Throughout much of the

region, the rapid onset of natural disasters such as floods,

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

32
landslides or earthquakes is relatively frequent. This places a

heavy and unpredictable burden on the finances and social

structures of small states. Man-made potential and actual disasters include those associated with water diversion projects, dams,

nuclear power stations and radioactive pollution. Chernobyl is perhaps the best known example of a man-made disaster which became

a transnational issue. Another is the case of the increasing desiccation of the Aral Sea. The threat is substate, interstate and

transnational and ranges from economic and social disruption to

salinization, desertification and the dispersion of dust and salt on a

global scale. The issue is closely tied to the hydropolitics of the

states of Central Asia and the water budget of the entire Aral Sea

basin. It is perhaps the greatest potential ecological disaster in

the world.

Transnational Issues: Crime, Narcotics, Arms Smuggling

and Terrorism. Organized crime and its destabilizing effects

on the economy and civil order were of concern to all working

groups. The visible example of the problems Russia has had in separating its business and governmental processes from the corrupting

influence of criminal organizations was seen as a warning to smaller

states to limit the extent of criminal activities in their societies. 

The problems associated with narcotics trafficking reflect the fact

that the region is on the route from both the Golden Triangle and

the Golden Crescent to Western Europe and North America.

Similarly, borders and border controls are not sufficiently established. With the deterioration of Russian military discipline and traditional markets for high-value exports, black market arms dealings

were seen as another transnational threat. Concerns about possible

linkages between illegal immigration and arms or narcotics smuggling was another source of anxiety. However, the movement of

weapons of mass destruction or their components was not perceived by conference attendees as a current problem for the region. 

Terrorism, particularly in states vulnerable to the effects of

33

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
conflict spillover, was viewed as a significant threat. Funding is

readily obtainable from the various forms of illegal trade, and given

the presence of organized criminal elements in the region, terrorism

merges with crime. The alliance of religious extremism with terrorism was not viewed as a potentially threatening issue. The

feeling was that religious changes would be evolutionary rather than

through violent activity.

Unresolved Boundaries. All three subregions raised the

issue of boundaries and the need for improved surveillance

and control. Not only are there boundary disagreements throughout the region, but the transnational threats noted above illustrate

the need to address the issue. An essential function of a state is

the maintenance of security over its territory and lack of

boundary control could equate to a lack of sovereignty.

Unequal Treatment by NATO and the European Union.

Conference participants tended to see, as a general panacea for

most of the threats throughout the region, the integration into,

or at least cooperation with, various Western economic and

security organizations. The EU and NATO were the obvious targets however, accession, except in the medium-to-long term, was

unrealistic for many of the states. Thus, the key stability issue that

emerged was the consequences of non-selection. States not yet part

of these leading European organizations feared that the differences

between selected and non-selected states were likely to increase.

Three states have already attained full membership into NATO,

while their immediate neighbors have not. Although the OSCE

and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programs are designed to

enhance stability and improve security, they were viewed by

most states as second-best alternatives to full membership in

NATO or the European Union. n

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

34
Recent Approaches to Security

T

he countries of the region covered by this conference

have made great strides in joining organizations or

entering into treaty arrangements intended to promote

long-term stability and security. This is evidenced by the universal

membership of states in the region in the

OSCE; extensive participation in NATO’s

Partnership for Peace program and the recent

accession of three states into NATO. The

OSCE is viewed as a crucial body for providing soft security and linking the states of

Europe-including Russia, while Partnership

for Peace has for many states become an

adjunct to full NATO membership.

Agreements have been reached and actions

taken to remove nuclear weapons from

Ukraine and Belarus. Former members of

the Warsaw Pact have sustained the

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. NATO has reached special

agreements with Russia and the Ukraine (the NATO-Russia

Founding Act and NATO-Ukraine Charter). International operations by NATO and the OSCE have stabilized Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To promote economic stability, many states in the region have joined

the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Central European

Free Trade Association (CEFTA).

Apart from these links with Western and global organizations,

regional cooperation has developed apace. In the northern part

of the Eastern Central Europe subregion, for example, the Council

of Baltic Sea States and the VISEGRAD group offer models for

cooperation throughout the region. Economic collaboration in initiatives such as the BALTRING energy sharing program of the Baltic

35

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Despite 

the differences

between states

and between

areas within

the region, 

significant

cooperation

has already

been 

established
States project has been matched in other subregions by cooperative

developments in security and peacekeeping such as CENTBAT, a

Central Asian peacekeeping battalion. Bilateral agreements have proliferated and bodies such as the Assemblies of People in Central

Asia have been developed to safeguard the rights of minorities. Key

single issue problems such as the drying up of the Aral Sea have

been addressed-though not solved — in a number of ways, including the establishment of the International Foundation for the

Salvation of the Aral Sea. The Baltic States have formalized an

Ecoconversion Policy, under which bilateral arrangements were

made to exchange foreign debt relief for ecological projects of

direct benefit to the creditor. 

Hence, despite the differences between states and between

areas within the region, significant cooperation has already

been established. Although it is difficult at present to see that

the states of the region have a common destiny, it is clear that

they have a common vision. n

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

36
Possible Security Initiatives

T

he general findings of the conference were that the

states represented face a mixture of common and particular threats to their stability. They have accomplished a great deal during their few years of independence

but there is a greater need to improve future security than

means to pursue them. The first consideration in looking

toward the future, however, should be to continue current

processes that have proven themselves effective in promoting

stability. Some of these current processes include:

• Recognizing that stability depends on healthy 

economies that are, in turn, dependent on the rule of 

law; inclusive democratic processes; and skilled, 

educated populations. National efforts to make the 

changes needed to move toward membership in the 

European Union — or towards subregional agreements that

promote the kinds of economic, legal and social reform 

that EU accession requires — will promote stability for the 

countries taking these steps. 

• Supporting the low-key, soft security-promoting 

activities of the OSCE. OSCE efforts to promote 

communication among hostile parties and to invoke 

cooperative preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping 

activities have been a positive factor in dealing with clashes 

involving ethnic minorities seeking self-determination. 

• Sustaining regional programs such as NATO’s 

Partnership for Peace as a means of promoting the 

economic and political conditions for stability.

37

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
A number of additional initiatives were proposed in the working

groups and plenary sessions of the conference:

• Creating regular subregional roundtables to share 

information on the creation of multiethnic societies, 

resolving border control issues, dealing with illegal 

immigrants and refugees, promoting economic integration 

and arms control, developing CSBMs, and controlling 

narcotics and organized criminal activities.

• Calling on Western technical support — of the sort 

offered during the conference by Commander of the North

Atlantic Division, US Army Corps of Engineers — to deal

with widespread issues of nuclear, chemical and industrial 

contamination and to dispose of ordnance and toxic 

materials left over from the Cold War.

• Alleviating pollution through pursuing a combination 

of national and regional plans for ending water pollution;

closing obsolete industries; and cleaning up areas 

contaminated by radioactive materials, abandoned ordnance 

or toxic chemicals and metals. To address the threat posed 

by pollution requires funding on a vast scale which can only

be provided by international sources. There is also the need 

for scientific and technological cooperation so that the 

expertise of the West, and particularly the US, can be 

deployed. Indeed, the US is the only other state which has 

had to contend with many of the potentially more severe 

aspects of radioactive contamination.

• Continuing to review the CFE Treaty to rebalance

conventional forces across the region.

• Creating a “nuclear weapons-free zone” in 

Central Asia.

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

38
• Setting up an economic and customs union of the 

entire Central Asian subregion that would transform it 

into a single economic zone. 

• Working throughout the region to agree on borders 

and establish appropriate boundary control and 

management systems. The largely political process of 

agreeing on borders — particularly those contested by 

ethnic nationalists-can be done with the help of Western 

technical assistance and arbitration. Effective boundary 

management requires, in many cases, the retraining of 

former border troop and military units to assume 

immigration, police and surveillance duties. With effective 

boundary management, controls over illegal immigration, 

trafficking in drugs and black market arms, the movement 

of terrorists and potentially, the spread of human epidemics

can be improved. Further, well defined borders and 

effective boundary management makes possible 

international water sharing agreements and pipeline routing 

decisions. These decisions encourage investment by the 

West and the sharing of high technology. 

• Forming interstate organizations to deal with the 

effects of natural disasters and power shortages,

modeled along the lines of the Baltic States’ BALTRING 

energy sharing and development group.

• Involving Russia in all possible cooperative 

agreements, particularly those concerned with defense and

security. Russia remains a military superpower casting a 

large shadow across the region. Its scope for transnational 

activity may be limited at present, but its influence remains 

strong. 

• Recognizing the sensitivities of states other than 

39

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Russia to the potential imbalances that could result 

from NATO and EU accessions policies as some states

are chosen and some are not. In the case of EU 

membership, the boundary between neighboring states 

would become a trade barrier. The differences in security 

status would be even more stark in the case of NATO, as 

one nation received a guarantee of military support while its

neighbor did not.

• Organizing effective help to address the massive 

problems surrounding the drying of the Aral Sea — 

caused largely by unwise diversion of its water supplies and 

their wastage through unlined canals. The entire sea is 

expected to shrink to one fourth of its original size by 2015

and become intensely saline, causing the surrounding area 

to turn to desert and releasing dust and salt on a global 

scale. Therefore, much of Central Asia is suffering 

economic and social disruption. While a number of bodies 

have been established to study the problem, nothing has yet

been accomplished to relieve the problem. Conferees 

decided it was vital to address the problems of the Aral

Sea basin in their entirety — beginning with a detailed 

cost benefit analysis that could attract global financing to 

combat the problems. n

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

40
Agenda 

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World 

Vulnerabilities & Opportunities

Prepared by Professor Ewan W Anderson, University of Durham,

United Kingdom, with Contributions from Rapporteurs

Fritz W. Ermarth and Alan Smith

Sponsored by George C. Marshall European Center 

for Security Studies

15-19 March 99

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

Purpose

To provide a forum to discuss issues that transcend national boundaries, can quickly become destabilizing of countries that have

restricted resources or are geographically smaller in relationship to

their neighbors, and require bilateral/multilateral cooperation to

address. 

Objectives

• From a multi-faceted perspective, examine developing issues

that have the potential to threaten or destabilize the security

of states in the European and Eurasian regions.

• Discuss how states without superpower resources, influence

and affect the regional geopolitical environment. 

• Explore the means that non-superpower or geographically–

smaller states may have at their disposal to improve their 

security. 

• Develop proposals on how security of the region can be 

enhanced through collective/cooperative action.

41

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Sunday, 14 March 1999

Arrivals and Registration

1800-1830 Reception

1830-2030 Welcome Dinner 

Monday, 15 March 1999

Overview

Moderator: Mr. Fritz Ermarth

0800-0830 Inprocessing and Set-up

0830-0900 Introduction/Opening Remarks and 

Administrative Briefing

0900-1000 Keynote Speaker: Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Minister 

of Defense, Austria 

1030-1130 Geopolitical Overview Professor Anderson, 

University of Durham

1300-1615 Overview of the Regions: Three presentations

1300-1400 North-Central Europe (Czech, Slovak, Poland, 

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine) Dr. Dietrich 

Genschel, General Major, A.D. 

1400-1500 South-Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia, 

Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgarian, Albania, 

Hungary, Moldova) Dr. Marie-Janine Calic, University 

of Munich and Ebenhausen 

1515-1615 Eurasia Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzistan, Uzbekistan. Dr. Shirin Akiner, Director, 

School of Oriental and African Studies, U.K. 

1615-1730 Question & Answers, Panel Discussion with day's 

speakers, led by moderator of the day Mr. Fritz 

Ermarth.

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

42
Tuesday, 16 March 1999 

Potential Threats to National Security and Regional Stability

Moderator: Mr. Alan Smith

0800-0845 Economic Development and the Impact on Stability, 

Dr. Friedemann Mueller, Ebenhausen 

0845-0930 Impact on Regional Stability from the Resurgence of 

Demographic, Ethnic and Religious Tensions within 

and between States, Professor T. Gallagher, 

University of Bradford, UK 

0930-1015 Mass Movement of Peoples: Cause and Effect of 

Instability and Potential for Regional Instability, Dr. 

Robert Mandel, Lewis & Clark College 

1015-1045 Question and Answer session led by moderator of the

day Mr. Alan Smith.

1100-1200 Working Groups: The working groups will address 

such topics as they affect the stability of the state, 

region, or across-regions:

• Ethnic and religious tensions—actual and potential

• Possibilities of armed conflict, or political activism

• Susceptibility to outside interference and influence 

• Possibility of armed conflict in the region and 

possibility of spillover

• Migration: Identification of the “losing” and 

“recipient” states.

• Underlying causes that may lead to mass migration: 

• Economic disparities;

• Political issues and divisions; 

• Human rights concerns;

• Social Issues;

• Ethnic & religious divisions

• Demographic impact on loosing and 

recipient states 

• Impact on military manpower planning

• Illegal migration and correlation with incidence 

of crime

43

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
• Impact on social welfare system and the economy 

on recipient states

• Inciting right-wing/left-wing radicalism

• Current obstacles to intergovernmental 

cooperation or interaction

1300-1700 Working Groups (continued). 

Wednesday, 17 March 1999

Morning: Potential Threats to National Security and Regional Stability

Moderator: Captain (German Navy) Hartmut Spieker

0800-0930 Regional Environmental Issues. Professor Murray 

Feshbach, Georgetown University (Includes time for 

questions and answers) 

0930-1200 Working Groups. Identify environmental 

threats/hazards in the region; explore their potentially

politically destabilizing impact, and the adequacy of 

crisis-management responses. Some topics for 

discussion would be:

• Hazardous waste

• Deterioration of key shared waterways as means of

transport, irrigation, etc

• Regional Air and water pollution and polluters

• Nuclear power plants: 

An alternative to other polluters/scarce resources; 

A source of hazardous waste

Potential for international crisis

• Environmental impact of military activities.

• Impact on health and demographics in the region 

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

44
Wednesday, 17 March 1999

Afternoon: Security Options: Recent European 

Approaches to Security: Adequacy and Need for Refinement 

Moderator: Captain (German Navy) Hartmut Spieker

1300-1345 Human Rights/Minority Rights? Professor T. 

Gallagher, University of Bradford, UK 

1345-1430 Switzerland: Model for Internal Affairs and Security 

Policy? Colonel Schneider, General Staff, Swiss 

Ministry of Defense 

1430-1530 The EU and New Security Threats, Mr. Fraser 

Cameron Representative from European Union, 

Directorate 1A

1545-1630 New, Non-Traditional Roles for Military, 

Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Management, Dr. 

Wilfred von Bredow, Universitaet Marburg 

1630-1730 Panel Discussion, Question and Answer: Moderator 

Captain Spieker, and Afternoon Speakers.

Thursday, 18 March 1999

Security Initiatives or Models to Address Security Concerns

Moderator: Colonel Howard

0800-0845 Secession and Sovereignty, Dr. P. Bayev, Peace 

Research Institute, Oslo, 

0845-0930 Mechanisms to Enhance Stability through Collective 

Security: Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement, 

Humanitarian Intervention, Dr. Kuehne, Ebenhausen 

0930-1015 OSCE: Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives to 

Enhance Stability, Professor Viktor-Yves Ghebali, 

Universite de Geneve 

1045-1130 Multilateral Cooperation to Alleviate Regional 

Environmental Issues, Major General Jerry Sinn, 

Commander, North Atlantic Division, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers 

1130-1200 Questions & Answers, Panel Discussion led by 

45

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
Moderator Colonel Howard and Morning’s Speakers

1300-1700 Working Groups: Developing and Fine-Tuning the 

Proposals to Enhance Security of States and Regions 

in a Multipolar World: (To continue into the evening 

hours if required.) Identify which tools will address 

the threat, what regional initiatives may be applicable 

to other states/regions, and what are the requirements

for new initiatives/programs. (Include a coffee break 

in time slot)

• Current responses/preparedness of states to 

respond — to internally or eternally developing

situations (to include crises outside the region) —

and the adequacy of these means.

• Bilateral/Multilateral Politico- Military Initiatives of

Cooperation in the Region

• Existing mechanisms for cooperation, 

communication, and exchange of data

• Current responses/preparedness of states to 

respond — to internally or eternally developing 

situations — and their adequacy

• Regional initiatives of cooperation on 

environmental issues and their adequacy and 

applicability

• Availability and adequacy of information/data on 

environmental problems and crises

1700-1730 Marshall Center Brief, Col Franz-Xaver Lauterer

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

46
Friday, 19 March 1999

Conclusions and Proposals

Moderator: Professor Ewan W. Anderson

0800-1015 Reports from the Working Groups (45 minutes each)

1030-1200 Synthesis and Discussion: (Rapporteurs and Working 

Group Facilitators) Compare and contrast across the 

three regions, the issues and the applicability of 

proposed solutions/measures to enhance security; 

requirements and prospects for bilateral, regional, 

Eurasian cooperation to meet the security 

vulnerabilities and opportunities for cooperation in 

the future. 

1200-1230 Closing Remarks.

47

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

Attendees

REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

Mr. Sokol BARE

General Director

Advisior to Prime Minister Security and Defense

Albanian Police

Prof. Dr. Sabit BROKAJ

Presidenca e Republikes se Shqiperise

Defense and Security Advisor to the President

Dr. Arian STAROVA

Chairman the of Board

Albanian Institute of International Studies

REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

Mr. Roumen KANTCHEV

Security Advisor, Council of Ministers 

Principal Advisor

Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Dr. Ante BARISIC

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science

Department of Comparative Politics

University of Zagreb

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

COL Mate PADEN

Chief, Defense Policy Departmen

Ministry of Defense

REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA

Mr. Erik MANNIK

Head Defense Policy Planning Bureau

Ministry of Defense

48

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

Dr. Laszlo SZABO

State Secretariat for Security & Defense Coordination

Prime Minister's Office

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Rakhimkul A. BALMAKHAEV

Head

Department for Documentary Provisions

Ministry of Defense

Mr. Victor D. FEDOTOV

Chief Expert

Republic of Kazakhstan National Security Council

Ministry of Defense

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

Mr. Salamat K ALAMANOV

Deputy Head of Department

International Relations

Office of the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan

Dr. Esengul J BEYSHEMBIEV

Master of Law, Dean

International University of Kyrgyzstan 

REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

Mr. Nils JANSONS

Head

Security Policy Division

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. jur. Talavs JUNDZISaltic 

Director

Baltic Center for Strategic Studies

Latvian Academy of Sciences

Mr. Atis LEJINS

Director

Latvian Institute of International Affair

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

49
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

Mr. Evaldas IGNATAVICIUS

Head

CIS Division, Political Departmen

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Janina SLEIVYTE

Ministry of Defense

Adviser to the Minister

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ms. Emilija GELEVA

Adviser to the Prime Minister

Prime Minister's Office

Dr. Stojan KUZEV

Assistant Minister for Combat Readiness

Ministry of Defense

Mr. Sasko TODOROVSKI

Assistant Minister for Security Systemsa

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Mr. Nicolae CHIRTOACA

Director

Euroatlantic Center of Moldova

Mr. Dumitru CROITOR

Vice Minister

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Iurie PINZARU

Consultant

Foreign Policy Issues

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

LTC Alexander FIEVEZ

Head Faculty Strategy

Department of Army Studies

Netherlands Defence College

50

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (Continued)

Dr. Petervan der GELD

Deputy Head, Course Leader

Department Interservice Studies

Netherlands Defense College

REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Mr. Jacek BYLICA

Assistant Director

Department of Security Policy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

BG Boleslaw IZYDORCZYK

Counsellor to Minister of Defense

Ministry of Defense

Dr. Krzysztof SZAMALEK

Director, National Security Council Department

National Security Bureau

ROMANIA

BG PhD. Simion BONCU

Chief, Military International Relations Directorate

Ministry of Defense

Mr. George PREDESCU

Deputy Director NATO,

WEU and Strategic Issues Division'

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

COL Grigore RADASLAVESCU

Deputy Editor

Observatorul Militar (The Military Observer)

Ministry of Defense

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

COL Jan HUMENIK

Chief Senior Officer

Department of Defense Policy and Development of Army

Ministry of Defense

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

51
SLOVAK REPUBLIC (Continued)

Mr. Miroslav WLACHOVSKY

Director, Department of Analysis and Policy Planning

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Mr. Peter BAHCIC

Secretary of the Committee for Defense

The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia

COL Dusan HUDOLIN

Assistant Director, Intelligence Security Service

Ministry of Defense

Mr. Miran JERIC

Deputy of the National Assembly

Mr. Brane KROMAR

Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic Studies

Ministry of Defense

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

Mr. Dodarjon M. MAKHSUDOV

Chairman, Commission on National Reconciliation

Ministry of Defense

Mr. Bahriddin S. VAKHIDOV

Senior Office, Department of Foreign Relations

Ministry of Defense

UKRAINE

COL Olexander HYRYCH

Assistant First Deputy Minister

for Relations with the Parliament

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

COL Vitaliy KOZAK

Chief of Section

Information and Analytical Directorate

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

52

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
UKRAINE (Continued)

COL Serhiy USTYNOV

Chief of Section, Defense Planning & Policy Dept.,

Main Operational Directorate

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

LTC Mirodil SH ABDURAZZAKOV

Chief of Department

National Security Service

National Security Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Mr. Rustam A. TUKHTABAEV

Main Consultant of the Presidential Apparat3

National Security Issues

Presidential Apparat of the Republic of Uzbekistan 

KEYNOTE SPEAKER

The Honorable Werner FASSLABEND

Minister of Defense 2

Republic of Austrian

Ministry of Defense

SPEAKERS

Dr. Shirin AKINER

Director, Central Asia Research Forum

School of Oriental & African Studies

University of London, 

Dr. Evan W. ANDERSON

Centre for Eastern & Islamic Studies

University of Durham

United Kingdom

Dr. Pavel K. BAEV

Senior Researcher, Editory

International Peace Research Institute

Prof. Dr. Wilfried von BREDOW

Vice President

Institute for Politikwissenschaft6

Philipps-Universitaet Marburg

Marburg, Germany

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

53
SPEAKERS (Continued)

Dr. Marie-Janine CALIC

Senior Researcher

European Department

Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft & Politik

Ebenhausen, Germany

Dr. Fraser CAMERON

Foreign Policy Adviser

Central Planning Staff of the Directorate General for

External Political Relations (DG1A) of the 

European Commission, Belgium

Mr. Fritz W. ERMARTH

Private Consultant, International Affairs

Washington, D.C., USA

Dr. Murray FESHBACH

Professor

Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies

Georgetown University

Washington, D.C. USA

Dr. Tom GALLAGHERS

Chair, Ethnic Peace and Conflict

Department of Peace StudiesP

University of Bradford, United Kingdom

Dr. Dietrich GENSCHEL

Advisor (German Member)

International Defense Advisory Board

Germany

Prof. Dr. Victor-Yves GHEBALI

Research Institute for International Affairs

Geneva, Switzerland

COL Russell D. HOWARD

Deputy Head, Social Sciences Department

United States Military Academy

West Point, NY, USA

54

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:
SPEAKERS (Continued)

Dr. Winrich KUEHNE

Deputy Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft u. Politik

Ebenhausen, Germany

Dr. Robert M. MANDEL

Professor

International Affairs Department

Lewis & Clark College

Washington, USA

Dr. Friedemann MUELLER

Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft & Politik

Ebenhausen, Germany

COL Peter SCHNEIDER

Deputy Chief of Staff

Swiss General Staff

Bern, Switzerland

MG Jerry L. SINN

Commander & Division Engineer.

North Atlantic Division

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USA

Mr. Alan B. SMITH

Private Consultant, International Affairs

Wilmington, North Carolina, USA 

Mr. Hartmut SPIEKER

Director

Department for Regional Stabilization

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,

Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

THE MARSHALL CENTER STAFF

Ambassador Marshall BREMENTr

Associate Director, for International Liaison

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

55
SPEAKERS (Continued)

COL Franz-Xaver LAUTERER

Director

Conference Center

LTG (RET) John P. Otjen

U.S. Deputy Director

LTC Wolfgang BRUNNER

Division Chief

Ms. Diane LUSTIG

Conference Planner

56

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

58

Enhancing the Security of States in a Multipolar World:

The George C. Marshall Center

Conference Center

Mission

The Conference Center’s mission is to serve as an international

forum for defense contacts, to share ideas vital to European security

and to focus on methods to promote regional cooperation by incorporating the principles of democracy and the conditions for a market economy. Additionally, the Conference Center assists Partnership

for Peace nations in their efforts to establish national security structures and supporting institutions which are compatible with democratic principles and processes; such as, the establishment of civilian

oversight of the military and market economies. To accomplish this

mission, the Conference Center targets very senior civilian and military government officials and parliamentarians from the Atlantic to

Eurasia.

History

The Marshall Center Conference Center began in 1993 with 4

conferences per year, growing to 18 conferences in 1999 and 22

conferences projected in the year 2000. This increase in the number

of conferences is directly attributed to its ability to tailor the topics

and sessions to the needs of the requesting nation. Over 4,100 participants have benefited from conferences and seminars since the

program’s inception. The Conference Center organizes conferences

on a variety of security related topics as identified by our Partner

Nations. 

Focus

The yearly conference program is divided between bilateral, single nation, seminars and multinational and regional conferences.

Bilateral events focus on a narrowly defined topic, requested by the
partner nation, which provides assistance to solve a specific problem. Examples include: Threat Reduction in a Resource Constrained

Environment; Analysis and Revision of National Security Strategy;

and Development of Crisis Response Architecture. 

Multinational and Regional Conferences focus on a variety of

security and economic concerns, giving participants the opportunity

to hear from experts and to discuss with their peers impacts and

concerns.

During these conferences and seminars, participants are invited to

actively engage in exploring avenues toward solving contemporary

stability and security problems involving their countries and regions.

Scheduling

Conferences can be requested at anytime however, once the

Fiscal Year program has been established, it may take several months

to satisfy a request. 

The Marshall Center solicits requests for conference/seminar topics through American embassies in January for the Conference

Schedule which begins that October. Responses are due by the end

of February. Requests should include: a detailed purpose or expected

outcome; the scope of the conference (number and level of attendees); identification of participating countries; duration (normally 5

days but shorter or longer if necessary); location; dates; support that

the requestor can provide and a point of contact. 

Requests are consolidated and submitted to the Director, Marshall

Center by 15 April. The final list and budget is submitted to higher

headquarters by June. A complete Conference Schedule for the year

can be found at the Marshall Center web site.

Submit requests through the American Embassy or to:

Director, Conference Center

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Gernacker Strasse 2

D • 82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen 

FAX: 49-8821-750-841

The Marshall Center Web Site: 

http://www.marshallcenter.org

DSN: 440-2882 COM: (08821) 750 882

E–mail Address: gcmc@marshallcenter.org

Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

59