## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Te xas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 21

- 00358

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 324

- 690890

- 20
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### I.B., J R 

### ., A 

### C HILD2 MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION After a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother ’ s parental rights to her son, I.B. 1 Mother appeals that decision, raising seven points of error : (1) the trial court ab used its disc retion in denying Mother ’ s moti o n for continuance ; (2) the evidence is factually in sufficient to support the finding that Mother placed or allowed I.B. to remain in conditions that endangered the physical or emotional well

- being of I.B. ; (3) the evidence is factually insufficient to sup p ort the finding that Mother engaged in co n duct that endangere d the ph ysical and emotional well

- be ing of I.B., (4) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the finding that Mother

construct ively abandoned I.B. ; (5) the evidence is factually insuff i cient to support the finding that Mother failed to complete c ourt

- ordered services for the return of I.B. ; (6) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the finding that Mother failed to complete a court

- ordere d substance abuse treatment prog ram ; a nd (7) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the finding that ter minating Mother ’ s parental rights was in the best interest of I.B. We overrule Mother ’ s challenge to the trial court ’ s decision to deny her motion for continuance. Because we h old that the evidence is factually s ufficient to support the trial court ’ s finding that Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed I.B. with

1 We use an alias for the child throughout this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).3

persons who engaged in conduct that physically or emotionally endangered I.B., we

ov errule Mother ’ s third point

. Having overruled Mother ’ s third po int, addressing her second, fourth, fifth, and sixth points is not necessary. Finally, we overrule Mother ’ s last issue because factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court ’ s finding that termination was in I. B

. ’ s best interest. Therefore, we af firm the trial court ’ s judgment. II. BACKGROUND Elizabeth Pratt , a supervi sing investigator for Child Protective S e rvices (CPS) testifi ed at trial. Mother gave b irth to I

. B. in October 2020

. The initial intake to CPS was because I

. B. was bor n showing signs of drug withdrawal. He tested positive for the presence of amphetamines and heroin, and he was infe cted with a sexually transmitt ed diseas e. CPS made efforts to prevent removal. I .B. ’ s maternal grandmother was

c onsidered, but was ultimately rejected for placement. The child also had a s tep

grandmother who had originally volunteered to be considered for placement, but she changed her min d

. In addition, the investigator was unable to locat e I .B. ’ s father

. CPS r e moved I.B. from the hospital in early November 2020 when his discharge was approved. CPS had previously removed three children from Mothe r ’ s care. All t hree had been “ affected by drug use ”

— ei ther being born addicted to d rugs or sc reening positive in d r ug tests. One of the children was removed because o f “ serious bodily injury with skull fractures. ” The in vestigator wa s also concerned about Mother ’ s4

extensive criminal hi story. Mostly, s h e had thef t and drug charges da ting back to 2004. Mother, in fa c t, was arrested dur ing the investiga ti on in to I .B. ’ s condition. She was i n j ail during the inves ti gation and the child ’ s subsequent removal

. Anais Montgomery was Mo ther ’ s caseworker. Among Montgomery ’ s concerns

w ere I.B. ’ s s af

ety, Mother ’ s continued d rug use, her incarceration, and h er long his tory of c riminal activity. She gave M other a service plan which i ncluded substance abuse assessment and trea tment, individual counseling for drug addiction , a psychological evaluation and individ ual psychiatric counseling, parenting classes , random drug testing, and an ob ligation to acquire and retain stable housing an d employment. Mother agreed to w ork these services , and they were made an order of the trial cour t. Mothe r testified. S he was thirty

- th ree ye a rs old at the time of t rial. In and out of prison due to drug addiction, she had beg u n using heroin at ag e nineteen

. Mother admitted to using heroin daily during her pregnancy with I .B. This use was no t limited to her latest pregnancy

— she ad mitted to h a

ving been addic ted to heroin during four to six months of her pregnancy in 2007, including giving bi rth w hile on the drug. As Mother acknowledged, this was a “ pre tty serious ” addic tion. Mother went to prison in October 2 020 and stayed there until Augu s t 2021, ab out three months before trial

. She had, therefore, no c ontac t or visitation with I.B. after he was born. Mother was released to a halfw ay house in Odessa

. Two weeks prior to tr ial, Moth er moved out of that halfway house and into a home i n San Angelo shared by her own mother and her mother ’ s husband. During her stint in the halfway5

house, Mother was drug tested about eight times, all with negativ e results. In addit ion, she rec eived one drug t est (negative result) af ter she moved in wit h her

m o ther. S he had begun a twelve

- step program about four days before trial, but she had not yet come up with a rel apse preven tion plan. Af ter Mother moved to San Angelo, her case wo rker tried to s et up a p sychological evaluation and parenting classes with M o t her , but Mother did not engage with the plan or call any o f the provided telephone numbers

. Mother also testified that , at the time of trial, she was employed full

- time at a meat proc essin g plant. However, she did not provi de proof of her employment to h er caseworker, as mandated by the court

- ordered service plan.

III. THE DENIAL OF MOTHER’S REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETI ON In her first point of error, Mother contend s that the t rial court abused its discretio n in denying her m otion to continue her trial. 2 Mother was the only witness regarding her motion f or continuance. Sh e
test ified that s he went to jail on a theft ch ar ge in October of 2020 , follo wing the birth of I .B

. From the hospital, I .B. was subsequently removed int o the Department ’ s care, Mother went to trial on the theft charge , an d she was sentenced to prison the following month. A ft er nine months, she was relea sed on parole. Mother was then

c onfi ned to a halfway house in Odessa until October 9, 2021.

2 At trial, Mother sought both an extens ion o f the dismissal deadline and a continuance of her trial. On appeal, Mother limit s h er complaint to the trial court ’ s denial of her cont

inuance motion.6

Mother t estified tha t , while in prison, she tried to take pare nting classes as p art of her court

- order e d ser v i ces , but the COVID outbreak p r evented her from completing anyt hing. At the halfway house, she was able to complete a cognitive skills c lass, AA, and NA. During these months, Mother was able to correspond both with her c ase wor k er an d her attorn ey . Dur ing cross

- examination, Mother ad mitted that it was her own fault she was confined, that she would have been a ble t o “ work service s ” had s he not been confine d , and , therefore, her being unable to complete the servi ces wa s due to her own actions

. A mo tion for continuance shall n ot be granted except for sufficient cause supported by an affidavit, consent of the partie s, or by opera t ion of law. T ex. R. C iv. P. 251. If a party ’ s motion for continuance is not made in wr itin g and verified, then we will pre sume the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Ohlhausen v. Thompson , 704 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, n o writ). Here, the record does not contain a written motion or an affidavit

. Theref o re, Mo t her did not comply with Rule 25 1, a nd the trial court could not have abused its discretion in denying the oral motion for continuance. Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W

. 2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1 986).
E ven if th ere had been a proper w ritten and ver ified motion for co n tinu ance, Mother could still not sh ow an abuse of discretio n. A trial court may grant a 180

- day

ex tension of the dismissal deadline in a suit filed by the d epartm e nt to terminate a p arent

- c hild relationship on a showing that “ extraordinary circums t ances n eces sitate7

the child remaining in t he temporary managing co nservatorship of the department and tha t continuing the appointment of the department as temporary manag i ng conservator is i n the b est interest of the child. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 26 3.401 ( b). T h e fo cus when ana lyzing if a trial cou rt abused its d is cretion in denying an extension should be on the needs of th e chi ld, whether extraordinary circumstances demand that the child re main i n the department ’ s care , and whether continuing that care i s in the b est interest of the child. In re A .J.M. , 375 S.W.3d 599, 6 04 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied). Mother explained to the trial court that her confinement in prison was the ma in

rea s on she was unable to complete her services. Thi s c ircum s tance , by her admission,

was her own fault

. “ Actions that are considered to be the parent ’ s fault will generally not constitute extraordinary circumstances. ” In r e J.S.S. , No. 10

- 19

- 00102

- CV, 2019 WL 451 1483, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Wa co Sep t. 18 , 201 9, pet. denied ) (mem. op.).

“ Generally, parents cannot blunder their way into extraordinary circumstances. ” In re C.G. , No. 02

- 20

- 00087

- CV, 2020 WL 4518590, at * 3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug . 6, 2020, pet. de n ied) (mem. op.)

. The trial court did not, ther efore, abu se i ts discretion in rejecting Mother ’ s incarceration

- based argument. See In re K.P. , No. 02

- 09

- 00028

- C V , 2009 WL 2462564, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2009, no pet. ) (me m. op . ) (hol ding th a t when a parent “ throug h his or her own choices ” fails to com ply with a service plan, a trial court does not abuse its discr etion in refusing to grant an extensio n ). The same hold s true with respect t o Mother ’ s argument that the COVID8

p a nde m ic also pr eve n t ed her from complying w ith services while she w as in pris on . Even if COVID interfer ed with her ability to complete serv ices while in prison, Mother ultimately b l ames her incarceration

— an incarceration which re s ulted from her own actions

. Moreover , as th e Family Code makes clear, the f ocus in granting or refusin g to grant an extension should be on what serves the best interest of the child. Mother, by

contra s t, f a iled t o explain to the trial court ho w an extens i on woul d benefit I.B. and instead focused o n the fact that she was incarcerated and that th e COVID pandemic prevented her from completing services

. Mother ’ s reasons for extending the dismissal deadline were unrelated to what was in I.B. ’ s best interest and underscores why granting an extension wa s n ot justified

. See In re M.S. , 602 S.W.3d 676, 679

– 80 (Tex. App.

— Texa r ka na 2020, no pet.). We overrule Mother ’ s first point. IV. FACTUAL SUFFICIENC Y OF END A NGER MENT
In her second and third points of error, Mother claims that th ere was factually insuff i c i ent evidence to support the trial court ’ s find ing s of endangerment under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 61 .001 (b ) (1) (D), (E) . We disagree with Mother.

A. F ACTUAL S UFFICIEN C Y S TANDARD OF R EVIEW For a t r i al court t o ter minate a parent

– child relationsh ip , the Department mu st prove two elements b y clear and convincing evi denc e: 1) that the parent ’ s actions

sa tisfy one ground l isted i n Famil y Code Section 1 61 .001(b)( 1); and 2) t h at9

t ermina ti on is in the chi l d ’ s best in teres t. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.00 1(b ); I n re E.N.C. , 3 84 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L. , 163 S. W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2 005)

. Evidence is c lear and convinc in g if it “ will produc e in the m in d of the trier of fa c t a firm b el ief or convict i o n as to the truth of the allegations sought to be e stab lished. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 ; E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 80 2

. In ev a luat ing the evidence ’ s f

a ctual suffic iency to s up port ter mination , w e must perfo rm “ an exacting re v

iew of the entir e record

. ” In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nev ertheless, we giv e du e deference to the fac tfin der ’ s finding s and do not supplant t he judgment with our ow n . In r e H.R. M. , 20 9 S

. W. 3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We rev

ie w the whole reco r d to de cide whet her a f actfinder could reasonably form a firm convicti on or belief t hat the Depa rtment proved the term inat ion g r ounds. Te x. Fam. Code Ann. § 161. 001(b); I n re C.H. , 8 9 S.W. 3d 17, 28 (T ex . 20 02). If the factfinder re asonab ly could form such a fir m conv ictio n o r belief, then the evidence is fact ually sufficie nt. C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 1 8

– 19

.

B
. E ND ANGERMENT UND ER S U BSECTION ( E ) T he tria l cou r t grant ed the termination in part on the grounds l i s ted in S ubsections (D) an d (E ) of Section 161.001 (b) ( 1)

. If a trial co u r t ’ s termination is based on (D) or (E) , an appe lla te court m ust review one o f those g rounds (or both if neither with stands appellate review) when raised on appea l

— even if other gro un ds

wou ld supp ort ter mination

— because a termina tion on e i t h er of th ose gr o u nds has

c oll ate ral consequences for the par en t ’ s r elations h ip with other chi ldren th e parent10

may have in th e future

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (providing that a p rior termination under (D) or (E) is a ground for termin a tin g parental rig h t s to a different child); In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 23 0, 237 (Tex. 2019) (“[I]f a court of appeals affirms the termination on either [(D) or (E)] grounds, it must provide the details o f it s analysis.”) ; In re T.C. , No. 02

- 19

- 00291

- CV, 2019 W L 6 606172, at *1 n . 3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Dec. 5, 2019, pet. deni ed) (mem. op.) (“We read N.G. to say that an affirmance under either (D) or (E) suffices because under (M) an affirmance under

one ma kes the other m oot.”)

. Accord in g l y, we be gin with groun d (E )

. The endange r m ent ground permits te rmination (assuming termin ati on is in the child ’ s best inter est) when the parent “ engaged in conduct or knowin gly placed the child wit h pers ons who eng aged i n condu ct whic h endan g ers the physical o r emotio na l well

- bei n g of the child

. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 61 .001 (b)(1) (E)

.

“ Enda nge r ” in this context means “ to ex pose to loss or injury , t o jeopa rdize. ” In re M. B. , No. 02

- 15

- 00128

- CV , 2015 WL 4380868, at *12 ( T e x. A pp.
— F or t Worth July 16 , 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citi ng T e x. Dep ’ t o f Human Serv

s. v. Boyd , 727 S .W.2d 531, 533 (Tex . 1 987) a nd In re J.T.G. , 121 S.W. 3d 117, 125 (T ex. App.

— For t Worth 2003, no pet.) )

. The r elev an t inquiry un der (E) is “ whe ther evi d e nc e exist s that the

en dang erment of the child ’ s physical we ll

- b e ing was t h e direct result of the par e nt ’ s conduct, includi ng acts, omissions, or failures to act. ” M.B. , 2 015 WL 43 80868, at

* 12

. T ermi nation under S u b sect ion (E) must be based on mo re than a si ngle ac t or11

omission; a volunta ry, deliberate, and cons cious c ourse o f co n duct by the pa rent is
req uired. J.T. G. , 121 S. W.3d at 125

. However, t he paren t ’ s conduct need not be di rected at the child or act ually ca use th e child injury ; “ [t] he spec ific dan g e r to the ch ild ’ s well

- bein g may b e inferre d from parent al misc o n duct s t andi n g alone. ” M.B. , 2015 WL 4 380868, at * 12

. Co urts may consider a parent ’ s cond uct that occu rred

out side t he child ’ s presence or a ft er the c hild ’ s removal by the Depar tment. In re M

. S

. , No. 0 2

- 2 0

- 00147

- CV, 20 20 WL 60 66400, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort W o rt h O ct. 1 5 , 2020, no pet.) (mem. op .)

. “ A s a gene ral rule, con duct th at subje c t s a ch il d to a life of un certaint

y and ins tability endangers th e chil d ’ s p h ysical and emotional well

being. ” M.B. , 2015 WL 4380868, at *12

. A trial court may cons id e r a p ar ent ’ s f ailure to complete a se rv

ice plan as pa rt of i t s endangering

- conduc t analys i s . Id

. (c i ting In re R.F. , 115 S.W .3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.

— Dall as 2003, no p e t.) )

. Further, “ [d] rug abuse dur ing pregnancy constitutes conduct that endangers a ch ild ’ s physical a nd emotional well

- being. ” In re M.R.J.M. , 280 S.W .3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wort h 2009, no pet.)

. Although an endangerment fi nding ba sed on drug use a lone is n ot a ut omatic , I n re C.V. L. , 591 S.W.3d 73 4, 7 51 (Tex. Ap p . — D allas 2019, pet. denied ) , t he f a c t that a mot her

uses illegal drugs while preg na nt obviously tends to show that a mo ther has embarked on a course of conduct t h at endangers the w ell

- b eing of h er child , s ee In re C.A.J. , 122 S .W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wo rth 2003 , no pet .)

. Evidence o f improved conduct, especially of short d u rati on , d oes not conclu sively negate the probat ive value12

of a long history of dr ug use a n d i rresponsible choices. In re S.L

. - E.A. , No. 02

- 12

- 0048 2

- CV, 2013 WL 1149512, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Ma r. 21, 2013, p e t
. denied) (mem. op.)

. A parent ’s criminal histo ry
— whether it entails conduct, convictions, or im prisonment

— is rele vant to t h e question of whether she e ngaged in an endangering course of conduct. In re S.R. , 452 S. W.3d 351, 360

– 61 (Tex. App

. — Houston [14 t h Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); A.S. v . Tex. D ep’t of Fa mily & Protective Servs. , 394 S.W.3d 703, 712

– 13 (Tex. Ap p . — El Pa s o 2 012, no pet.). Routinely subjec ting a child to the probability that the child will be left a lone because a parent is i n jail endange r s the child’s physical and emotion a l well

- be ing. S ee S .L.

- E.A. , 2013 WL 114951 2, at *8; In re S.M. , 389 S.W.3d 483, 492 ( Te x. App.

— El Paso 2012,

no pet.). F inally , a tri al court may consider in its analysi s a paren t ’ s f ailure to visit, whic h ca n endanger t he child ’ s emotional well

- being

. I n re M.K. , N o. 02

- 19

- 004 59

- CV, 20 20 WL 1949 629, at * 6 (Tex

. App.

— Fo rt Wo rth Apr. 23, 2020, no p et.) (mem. op

. ) ; M.B. , 2015 WL 4380868, at *12

. Mother ’ s history of drug use is the defining aspect character izing her enda n g ering behavior toward I.B. Mother had been usi ng heroin s ince age nineteen. At th e t ime of tria l, that amounted to fourte en years o f using drugs like methamphetamin e and heroin. More di sturbing, M o ther admitted to using heroin

“ daily ” during her pregn a n cy (and during an ea r lie r preg nancy in 2007) an d13

understo od t hat such use was a d ang er to the health and safety of her chi ld

. See In re J.M. , No . 2

- 08

- 00 259

- CV, 2009 WL 112679, a t * 5 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Jan. 15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( finding fact ual l y s ufficie nt evidence of e ndangerme nt where mother ad mitted us ing cocaine whi le pregnant ). While it i s true t hat M o th er had been incarcerated si nce not long after the birth of I.B. and had therefore pro bably

not used drugs during the period of removal , h e r l ack of a r elapse preven tion plan could have justif

ied a con clusion t ha t he r incarceration

- sobriety would pa le i n co nt rast to her fourteen

- year addiction

. See id. ( despite mo ther ’ s testimony that she had been drug

- free for a month, trial court could ha v e r easonab ly believed that she w oul d continue to use cocaine). Additional ly, i mprisonme nt alone may no t cons titute an endangeri ng cours e of

con du ct, but it is a fact prop erly co nsider ed on the endangerme nt issue. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533

– 34

. Mother ha s a n extens ive cr iminal history, including drug and theft charges exte nding b ack to 2004. Th is history includ ed convictions in Tarrant County for possession of hero in in 2008 and 2017 in addition to the theft convic t ion for which she was in pr iso n during the pendency of her case. Mother ar gues on appeal that there was no u nsu pervised access during t he pendency of the case “ during w hich tim e she would have endangered the child. ” As

w e recently stated in a case wi th similar fa cts, such unsuper vised access is hardly
necessary to est ablish a violation of Subse ction (E) , and, in any e vent , “ a parent ’ s continu in g cour se o f co nd uct can include conduct o ut sid e the child ’ s presence,14

conduct b e fore and after the child ’ s re mov al from the parent ’ s care, and even con duc t taking place bef

ore th e ch ild ’ s birth. ” In re E.C. , No. 02

- 20

- 00022

- CV, 2020 WL 2071755, at * 7 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth A pr. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem . op.)

. F inally, we may consider Mother ’ s failure to complete a se rvice plan as part of an endangerment a nal

y sis und er subsect ion 161.001(b)(1)( E)

. In re K.S. , No. 02

- 18

- 00191

- CV, 2018 WL 4659120, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Sep t. 28, 2018, no pet.)

. It is undisputed that Mother had a copy of the original service pl an by the time it was made a n order of the co u rt in D ecember of 2020. Although Mother took some classes while she was incarcerated, she did not do anything after her release other tha n participat e in Narcotics Anonymous. After Mother ’ s r elease from prison , she was confined to a halfway hous e in Ode s sa and was therefore unable to complete any service s from t here. When Mother moved to San An gelo, her c aseworker ar ranged for her to participate in a psychological evalu ation and class es over Zoom

. However, Mother failed to eng age in any of those ser vic e s. We hold that the evidence, viewed with the appropriate de ference, was factually sufficient f

or the factfinder to reasonably form a firm conviction or be lief t hat Mother had engaged in conduct or had knowingly plac ed I.B. with persons who had engag ed i n conduct that end ange red his physical or emotional well

- be ing. We overru le Mother ’ s third issue

.15

Because we have affirmed th e s uff ic ien c y of the evidence t o s upp ort th e (E) ground, we n eed not address the ( D) ground

. S e e In re E.C. , 2020 WL 2071755, at *5

. We therefore do not address Mother ’ s second is sue. V. MOTHER ’ S FO URTH , FIFTH , AND SIXTH ISS UES ARE M OOT In her fourth , fi fth, and sixth issues, Mother claim s that the evidence is factually insuffi cient to justify the trial court ’ s termi nation of he r pare ntal rights under Subsections (N) (constructive abandonmen t), ( O ) (fai l ing to complete servi ce plan), and (P) (failing to comple te substan ce abuse p rogr am) of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1). Bec ause we held the evi dence to be factuall y suffici ent under Subsection (E) , we will not address Mother ’ s challenges t o the ot her g rounds for terminatio n fou nd b y the trial court

. See In re D.D.G. , 423 S.W.3d 46 8, 475 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2014, no pet.). V I. BEST INTEREST
In Moth er ’ s seventh poi nt of er ror , s he attacks the factual suffici ency of the evidence su pporting the trial co u rt ’ s fi nding t ha t te rmination was in I.B. ’ s best interest

. A. L AW A l thou gh we generally presume that keeping a child with a pare nt is in the child ’ s best interes t, In re R. R. , 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 20 06), the best

- interest analys is i s chi ld

- centered, foc using on the child ’ s well

- being, safety, and d evelo pment , I n re A. C. , 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex . 2018). In determining whethe r evid ence is16

sufficient to suppor t a best in ter e st finding, we review the en tire record. In re E. C .R. , 4 02 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child ’ s best i ntere st may b e th e s ame evidence that is probati ve of a S ubs ection (b) (1) groun d. Id

. at 249; C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28 ; see Te x. F am. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (1 ), (2) . We also consider the

ev idence in light of n on exclusive factors that the factfinder may appl y in determin i ng the child ’ s best interest:

• the child ’ s desi res;

• the child ’ s e motion al a nd physical needs now an d in the fu tur e ;

• the e m otion a l and ph ys i ca l danger to the child now a n d in t h e f utur e;

• the pare n tal abiliti es of t h e individual s seeking cus t ody;

• the pro g ram s a vailable to assist these in d ividuals to promote the child ’ s be st inte res t;

• the plans for the c hild by t hes e indiv id u als o r by the ag e nc y seeking custody;

• the sta b i lit

y o f t he h ome or propo s ed placemen t;

• the parent ’ s act s or omis sions that may ind i cat e t hat the existing parent

– chi l d relationsh ip is not a prop er one; a nd

• the parent ’ s excuse, if a n y, for th e a c ts or om i ssion s . Holle y v . Adams , 54 4 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 7 2 (T ex . 19 76); see E.C.R. , 402 S.W.3d at 249 ( stating that in revie wing a bes t

- intere s t f ind ing, “we consider, among ot h er evidence, the Holley fa ctors ”); E. N.C. , 3 84 S.W.3d at 807. Th e s e facto rs do not fo rm an

ex h austive li s t, and some factors may not a p p ly to som e ca ses. C.H. , 8 9 S.W.3d at 27.17

F u rthermore, u ndisputed ev id ence of just o ne fac tor may suffice in a partic u lar case to support a finding t hat te rmin ati on is in the child ’ s b e st inte re st. Id. On the o t her hand , t he presence of paltry evidenc e rel ev a nt to e ach factor w i ll not supp ort suc h a finding. Id. ; In re J. B

. , N o. 02

- 18

- 000 34

- CV, 2018 WL 3289612, at *4 ( Tex. App.

— Fo rt Worth July 5, 20 1 8, no pet .) (mem. op.). B. D ISCUSSION 1 . C hil d ’ s D esires I.B. w as j ust over one year old at the ti me of tr ial. As such, he was nonverbal

a nd unable to express an y opinion re garding the ca se and his mothe r. Because there was no evide n ce of I. B

. ’s desir es, th is fact or is neutral. See In re X.R.L. , 4 6 1 S.W.3d 633, 640 (T e x. Ap p.
— Texarkan a 201 5, no pet. ) ( “ [T]h e first Holley f actor is n eutral beca us e no evidenc e of t he children ’ s desires was prese nted

. ” ).

2
. Child ’s E motio nal and P hy si cal N ee ds and Dange r to the Child N ow and in the Fut ure Childre n n e ed lo ng
- term safety and stability. Se e Tex. Fam. Co de Ann

. § 263 .307 (a) ( “ [T]he p rompt and perman ent p la cement o f the child in a safe envir o n m ent i s presumed to be in t he child ’ s best int erest
. ” ); In re M.A .J. , 612 S. W.3d 398, 411 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1 st Dist. ] 2020, pet. d enied) (op. on reh ’ g) ; A.C. v. Tex. Dep ’ t o f F am. & Protective Servs. , 577 S.W. 3d 68 9, 705

– 0 6 (Tex. App.

— Aust in 201 9, pet. d enied

). Mother posed a danger to I.B. becaus e of her long

- term dru g use.18

As a lready discussed, Mo ther admit t ed to us i ng cocaine and heroin since she was nineteen. Th is d rug use cont inued during her preg nanc ie s, including while she was pr egna nt wi t h I.B. F rom a parent ’ s past mis c onduct , a fact f ind er m ay infer a p are nt ’ s future conduct

. See A. S. , 394 S .W.3 d at 71 4 ( “ [E] v id ence of past misconduct

or ne glect is perm issible a s an inf erence that a parent ’ s f

uture conduct may be

m easure d by t hei r past conduct. ” )

. This is particularly true in Mother ’ s case as her la ck of a relapse preve ntion plan could hav e led th e tri a l court to reas onab ly bel iev e that her recent sobr iety was only temporary. Ind eed, Mother admitted a s much w h en she testified that she had quit heroin more th an ten times in the past and that her incarcerati on had resulted in a kind of “ forced sobrie t y. ” Thus, t he fac tfi nder c ould have formed a fi rm belief that Mother ’ s past drug use could af

f ect I. B

. ’ s emot

ional and physical needs no w and i n the fu ture and even

co nstitute an emotional and physica l danger to him.

3
. Pare ntal A

bilities and P lan s for th e C hild o f th e I nd iv id uals S eeking C ustody
I .B. ’ s foster parents pla n to adopt him. I .B. has bonded well with his fo ster parents as well as with the other ch ildren in their home. He has begun learning to walk, he has been eating well, an d hi s d octor be l ieves that I.B . has thrived in foster

care. This rep resents a substa ntial change from when I.B. came into care

— he was born premature and was showing sign s of drug wit hdrawal and STD exposu re . I.B. ’ s foster parents ha ve taken advan tage of Ear ly C hil dh ood In tervention (ECI) in order19

t o help remedy some of hi s developm ental dela ys. They are ready to provide any therapies he may need, such as feedin g, speech, or occupation al therapy. The foster parents have generally been atten ding to I .B. ’ s needs, incl udi n g maki ng sure that he gets to doc tor ’ s a ppoin tmen t s and hi s va rious therapies. In the opinion of I.B. ’ s caseworker, the fo s ter parents are able to meet I.B

. ’ s physical , emotional, and fin a n cial needs now and in the fut ure . See In re Z.C. , 28 0 S.W.3d 470 , 476 (Te x. App.

— Fo rt Wo rth 200 9, pet. denied) (stating that stability a nd permanence are import ant to upbringing of a child and affirming finding that termination was in child ’ s best interest when child w as thri

vi ng in foster care)

. By con trast, there wa s no evid ence of an y bon ding between M other an d I. B. Mother has neither seen nor vi sited I.B. since he was born. E ven immediately after I. B. ’ s birth, Mother ’ s contac t with him was l imited due to hi s re ce iving t reatment in the neo nata l intensive care u nit

. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep ’ t of Family & Protective Ser v s . , 300 S.W. 3d 305, 312 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (holding that mere

“ lackluster efforts ” to visit child supported findin g that termination was in child ’ s best interes t). This fact or supp ort s the trial court ’ s finding.

4
. Progr am s A

vai labl e to A ssist T he se I ndividuals t o P romote the C hild ’s B est I nter est I.B. receives regular th erapy through ECI to mak e sure tha t he r eaches hi s devel opment al goal s. Continuing with ECI will e nsure that I.B

. receive s an y help he20

needs in cluding feeding, speech, and occupational therapy. In addition, E CI will continue to receive Medicaid benef its to ma ke sure he ge ts any ne cessary support in the futu re . Mother, by contras t, ha s not completed any court

- ord e red service s or parenting classes except for N arcotics A nonymous. Even if programs were available to Mother, a reasonable factfinder could doubt Mot her ’ s willingness t o acces s them and follow through

. The tri al co urt was entitled to find that this fa cto r weighed in favor of terminating Mother ’ s parental rights.

5
. S t abilit y o f t he H ome or P ropose d P lacement Mother was in prison for most of I.B. ’ s short li fe. She w as released on parole a few months b efore t he fi nal hearing. Mother then spent some tim e in a half way house, followed by a move into her own mother ’ s home in San Ang elo. Her current home cannot be regarded as a potential placement

— the g randmother has “ CPS history ” which has rule d her out. Mother ’ s life outside of her home also does not app e ar particularly stab le. She testified that she has been worki ng at a meat processing plant. H owever, when requested, Mother failed to provide p ro of of this employment to her case worker. In any event, as Mother had only started this job about a week bef

o re trial, there was no way she could hav e demonstr ated an ability to provide I.B. wi th a safe and stable en vironmen t. I.B. is currently in a stable, adoptio n
- motiv ated foster home. He is doing well in that placement and has bonded with both his fost er p arents and the other c h ildren21

in the home, the home is safe and a ppropriate, and they are abl e to meet I.B. ’ s medical needs. T his factor su ppor ts th e trial court ’ s best

- interest finding. 6
. Pare n t’s A cts or O mi ssions tha t M ay I ndica te that the E xist ing P aren t –

C h ild R elation ship is N ot a P rope r O ne and Parent ’ s Excuse, if An y, for the A cts or Omissions Mother did not dispute h e r hi stor y of drug abus e , criminal activity, and incarceration. Mother had previo usly had three other children removed from he r

ca re, all of them testing positive for drugs at birth and one having s uffered a skull fracture. Montgomery, the cas ewor ker, testified that if I.B. were return ed to his mother, she was concerned about Mother ’ s ability to provide for the child because M ot h er did not have stable employment. Further, Mother had not t aken s ubstantial steps to prevent future dr u g add iction. It was Mont gomer y ’ s opinion, therefore, that allowing I.B. to go home with Mother would not be in the chil d ’ s best interest

. Mother c l aimed at t rial that sh e would be able to bond with I.B. and parent him

s afely. There was, howeve r, no evidence of bonding

— Mother had not seen I.B. since he was born. Further, give n Mother ’s e xtensive history of drug addict ion, her scant four days in a r e covery program, and her lack of a relapse plan , the trial c ou rt w a s justified in disbelieving that Mother ’s home would be a safe environment for the child. T h is fa ctor support s t he t rial cou rt ’ s best

- interest fi ndi ng.22 7 . Ana lys is and H olding The Depa r tm e n t r e moved I .B. from a drug

- addled, unstable enviro nment. Mot her d id little to address the problems that led to her child ’s removal. By contrast, I.B. is in a n adoption

- motivated fo ster home wh ere he has bonded and receives all the care he needs. W e ho ld t hat the evidence i s f actually sufficie nt to show th at termina ting M ot her’s p arental rights wa s in the best interest of I.B. See C .H. , 89 S.W.3d at 25 ( statin g that to be factual ly s uffic ient, based on the enti r e record, the court must

con clude tha t a fa c t finder co u ld reasonably form a firm belief or conviction ab ou t the

t rut h of the Department ’ s allegatio ns )

. We ov er rule Mot her ’ s se venth issue.

V II
. CONCLUSION Ha vi ng overruled the r elevant iss ues, we affirm the trial c ourt ’ s judgm ent
. /s/ Br ian Walker Brian Walker J u stice Del ivered: April 28, 2022