1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

NACSO NON-PROFIT BUSINESS 

LEAGUE INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CONSUMER FINANCIAL 

PROTECTION BUREAU, 

Defendant. 

Case No.: 

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiff, Nacso Non-Profit Business League Inc. (“NACSO”), by and through undersigned 

counsel, brings this action against Defendant, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” 

or “Defendant”), as a facial and applied challenge to an unconstitutional and a statutorily 

unauthorized, and thus unlawful, regulation infringing on the fully-protected speech of credit 

repair organizations. This Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment as to the invalidity and 

unenforceability of a provision of what is commonly referred to as the Telemarketing Sales Rule 

as defined and set forth below. 

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

NACSO is a non-profit national association that strives to educate its members, which 

include credit repair organizations, so they are able to provide their much needed and desired 

services to help consumers while supporting and facilitating the compliance with reasonable laws 

and regulations to safeguard those consumers. However, the CFPB recently has sought to enforce 

against NACSO’s members an overreaching, unconstitutional, and inapplicable regulation 

contrary to law thereby making this lawsuit necessary. Credit repair organizations are governed by 

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the legislatively enacted Credit Repair Organizations Act. Yet, the CFPB has recently sought to 

apply and to enforce a provision of a Telemarketing Sales Rule that is not promulgated under the 

Credit Repair Organizations Act, which rule prohibits NACSO’s members from being paid for 

their services until at least six months after those services have been rendered. This arbitrary sixmonth waiting period eviscerates the ability of NACSO’s members to be paid for work already 

performed and puts the full burden of the consumer’s credit status on the credit repair 

organizations, long after the credit repair services were provided. This result is not only unfair and 

contrary to the legislatively enacted Credit Repair Organizations Act, but also contrary to law as 

the ability to create a “time and manner” restriction is nowhere within the congressional mandate 

granting any agency authority to promulgate the six-month waiting period set forth in the 

Telemarketing Sales Rule in the first instance. Indeed, circumstances completely outside the 

control of the members of NACSO, such as the present Covid-19 crisis, unfortunately could negate 

the credit repair service results achieved by NACSO members for consumers in the same six (6) 

month window thereby impacting NACSO members’ ability to be paid for services that they fully 

performed and that they are entitled to be paid. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

1. This civil action seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 et seq. and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 

2202 to restrain Defendant from acting under the color of law to deprive credit repair organizations, 

including members of NACSO, of their constitutional rights secured by the First Amendment to 

the United States Constitution. 

2. Specifically, NACSO seeks judicial review of the prohibition on a credit repair 

organization to be able to request or receive payment for services it already rendered for a minimum

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six-month period of time after those services are rendered as set forth in the Telemarketing Sales 

Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2)(ii) (the “TSR”), and a declaration that the TSR: (a) exceeds the 

statutory authority conferred by the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention 

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 et seq. (the “Telemarketing Act”); (b) conflicts with the Credit Repair 

Organizations Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679 et seq. (“CROA”); and (c) is an illegal and unenforceable 

violation of the First Amendment rights of credit repair organizations that improperly impairs 

fully-protected speech because it is content-based and cannot withstand scrutiny. 

3. The CFPB has enforced, and continues to show that it intends to enforce, the TSR 

against credit repair organizations, including members of NACSO. Along these same lines, the 

CFPB is encouraging consumer reporting agencies to not investigate “disputes submitted by credit 

repair organizations and disputes they reasonably determine to be frivolous or irrelevant.” See 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_credit-reporting-policy-statement_caresact_2020-04.pdf (last visited, May 7, 2020). 

4. In both instances, the CFPB continues to financially burden NACSO members 

based on the content of their speech, which reflects the CFPB’s preference and attempts to 

unlawfully silence the speech of credit repair organizations in violation of the First Amendment. 

III. PARTIES 

5. NACSO is a non-profit association of organizations within the credit repair industry 

which association is headquartered in Broward County, Florida and organized pursuant to 

§501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. NACSO provides education for its members, advocates 

industry standards and ethical business practices for the credit repair industry, and promotes 

compliance with applicable laws throughout the credit repair industry. In addition to face-to-face 

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contact with persons, NACSO members make calls to, and receive calls from, persons whose credit 

worthiness or credit standing may be improved by the services of NACSO members, respectively. 

6. The CFPB is an agency of the executive branch of the United States government 

responsible for, inter alia, “regulating the offering and provision of consumer financial products 

or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491. 

IV. JURISDICTION 

7. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 

Article III of the Constitution. 

8. The TSR constitutes final agency action subject to judicial review under the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 702 et seq.

V. VENUE 

9. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(e)(1) and 5 

U.S.C. § 703 because NACSO is headquartered in this District and no real property is involved in 

this action. 

VI. STANDING 

10. NACSO has Article III standing as an organization to bring suit on behalf of its 

members. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 

(2000); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009). Specifically: 

(i) NACSO’s members provide services to individuals in an effort to improve 

such individuals’ credit history, credit record, or credit rating (i.e., credit worthiness and credit 

standing) and are compensated for such services, and, thus, would have standing to sue in their 

own right to seek the declaratory relief sought herein as they are subject to Defendant’s 

inapplicable enforcement of the TSR; 

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(ii) the declaratory relief sought herein is germane to NACSO’s purpose of 

educating its members as to the applicable law within the credit repair industry, advocating 

industry standards and ethical business practices for the credit repair industry, and promoting 

compliance with applicable laws throughout the credit repair industry; and 

(iii) the declaratory relief sought herein does not require the participation of 

NACSO’s members. 

VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

11. In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act that created and 

established the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. 

12. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC is authorized to prevent 

certain persons and entities from using “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce 

and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 

13. Congress limited the FTC’s authority to make unfair and deceptive determinations 

in rulemaking proceedings by imposing special procedural and judicial review requirements for 

the FTC’s conduct that exceed those otherwise contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. 

14. The FTC is an agency of the executive branch of the United States government 

responsible for, inter alia, enforcing compliance with CROA. In 1994, Congress enacted the 

Telemarketing Act that that provides “consumers necessary protection from telemarketing 

deception and abuse.” 15 U.S.C. § 6101(5). 

15. Towards this end, the Telephone Act authorized the FTC to prescribe rules and 

regulations prohibiting deceptive telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing 

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acts or practices as set forth in the Telemarketing Act and enforcing compliance with such rules 

and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 6102. 

16. The Telemarketing Act provides that such rules respecting “abusive telemarketing 

acts or practices” must include: 

(A) a requirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited 

telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive 

of such consumer’s right to privacy, (B) restrictions on the hours of the day and 

night when unsolicited telephone calls can be made to consumers, (C) a requirement 

that any person engaged in telemarketing for the sale of goods or service shall 

promptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call that the purpose of 

the call is to sell goods or services and make such other disclosures as the 

Commission deems appropriate, including the nature and price of the goods and 

services; and (D) a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the 

solicitation of charitable contributions, donations, or gifts of money or any other 

thing of value, shall promptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call 

that the purpose of the call is to solicit charitable contributions, donations, or gifts, 

and make such other disclosures as the Commission considers appropriate, 

including the name and mailing address of the charitable organization on behalf of 

which the solicitation is made. 

15 U.S.C. 6102(a)(3). 

17. Importantly and as it relates to the compensation for the sale of goods or services 

in the context of “abusive telemarketing acts or practices,” the FTC was not given authority to 

regulate the time or manner in which a “person engaged in telemarketing” is so compensated, but 

rather was given the limited authority to regulate “disclosures...the Commission deems 

appropriate, including the nature and price of the goods and services.” 15 U.S.C. § 6102 (a)(3).

18. In response and pursuant to the authority granted by the Telemarketing Act, the 

FTC promulgated the TSR concerning “abusive telemarketing acts or practices.” See 16 CFR § 

310.4. 

19. The TSR states, in pertinent part: 

It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for any 

seller or telemarketer to engage in the following conduct: [r]equesting or receiving 

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payment of any fee or consideration for goods or services represented to remove 

derogatory information from, or improve, a person’s credit history, credit record, 

or credit rating until [t]he seller has provided the person with documentation in the 

form of a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency demonstrating that 

the promised results have been achieved, such report having been issued more 

than six months after the results were achieved. 

16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 

20. The FTC has not sought to enforce the TSR’s six-month rule against credit repair 

organizations. 

21. Notwithstanding, the CFPB believes it is authorized to enforce the TSR against 

credit repair organizations pursuant to the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 

§§ 5301 et seq. See 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(5). 

22. Indeed only recently, and only after conflicting legislation has limited the CFPB’s 

ability to enforce the TSR, the CFPB has sought to enforce the TSR in relation to certain members 

of NACSO. 

23. Specifically, less than a year after the TSR became effective, Congress passed the 

CROA legislation. 

24. CROA was enacted in 1996 with the express purposes of ensuring “that prospective 

buyers of the services of credit repair organizations are provided with the information necessary 

to make an informed decision regarding the purchase of such services” and protecting “the public 

from unfair or deceptive advertising and business practices by credit repair organizations.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1679(b). 

25. Importantly, CROA does not delegate rulemaking authority upon the FTC. See 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1679 et seq.

26. Instead, CROA simply permits the FTC to enforce the requirements or prohibitions 

of CROA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679h. 

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27. Congress’ decision to not delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC reflects the 

congressional intent for CROA, as written, to be the final and decisive law concerning credit repair 

organizations, including the time and manner of their billing practices. 

28. This congressional intent is further reflected in the Consumer Financial Protection 

Act of 2010 that did not transfer the FTC’s CROA enforcement authority to the CFPB. See 15 

U.S.C. § 5581(b)(5). 

29. Indeed, as recently as November 7, 2019, members of Congress confirmed this 

intent by communicating their understanding to the CFPB that not only did “the Federal Trade 

Commission, which enforces CROA, instruct[] credit repair organizations (CROs) and consumers 

that CROA is the law of the land with respect to billing regulations, but also, “with regard to 

CROs, the TSR is no longer operative[.]” See Exhibit A (emphasis added). 

30. An explicit purpose of CROA is “to protect the public from unfair or deceptive 

advertising and business practices by credit repair organizations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1679(b)(2). 

31. Towards this end, CROA prohibits persons from, inter alia: 

(3) mak[ing] or us[ing] any untrue or misleading representation of the services of 

the credit repair organization; or engag[ing], directly or indirectly, in any act, 

practice, or course of business that constitutes or results in the commission of, or 

(4) any attempt to commit, a fraud or deception on any person in connection with 

the offer or sale of the services of the credit repair organization. 

15 U.S.C. §1679b. 

32. The term “credit repair organization” is defined by CROA, in pertinent part, to 

mean: 

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails to sell, 

provide, or perform (or represent that such person can or will sell, provide, or 

perform) any service, in return for the payment of money or other valuable 

consideration, for the express or implied purposes of (i) improving any consumer’s 

credit record, credit history, or credit rating; or (ii) providing advice or assistance 

to any consumer with regard to any activity or service described in clause (i). 

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15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). 

33. As is evident by a comparison of CROA and the TSR, both the legislative regime 

of CROA and the TSR regulations appear to seek to similarly regulate the conduct of persons 

seeking compensation for improving a consumer’s credit history, credit record, or credit rating in 

an attempt to prevent deceptive, misleading, and abusive behavior of such persons. Compare 15 

U.S.C. 1679a(3)(A) with 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2)(ii). 

34. CROA—a federal statute codified by the democratically elected Congress—is 

broader than the TSR—a rule promulgated by appointed officials—in that CROA governs all 

credit repair organizations using any instrumentality of interstate commerce, which includes those 

engaging in telemarketing as well as those which do not engage in telemarketing. 

35. However, CROA and the TSR conflict concerning when a credit repair organization 

may charge or receive compensation for the performance of its services. 

36. Specifically, CROA states “[n]o credit repair organization may charge or receive 

any money or other valuable consideration for the performance of any service which the credit 

repair organization has agreed to perform for any consumer before such service is fully 

performed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1679b (emphasis added). 

37. Whereas, the TSR provides a credit repair organization cannot “request[] or 

receiv[e] payment of any fee or consideration for [its] goods or services...until [t]he [credit repair 

organization] has provided the person with documentation in the form of a consumer report from 

a consumer reporting agency demonstrating that the promised results have been achieved, such 

report having been issued more than six months after the results were achieved.” 16 CFR § 

310.4(a)(2)(ii). 

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38. Thus, a credit repair organization that is in full compliance with CROA—a federal 

statute passed by the democratically elected branches of government—may be deemed by the 

CFPB to nonetheless be in violation of the TSR—a rule promulgated by unelected officials—

depending upon when the credit repair organization requests or receives compensation for its 

services. 

39. A violation of the TSR is subject to enforcement by the FTC as an unfair or 

deceptive act or practice, including monetary penalties per violation, and by the CFPB as an unfair, 

deceptive, or abusive act or practice, including monetary penalties per violation. 15 U.S.C. § 

6102(c). 

40. Understandably, this conflict has created extreme confusion and angst among the 

members of NACSO which seek to adhere to applicable laws and regulations. 

41. The TSR is only applicable to credit repair organizations who communicate via 

telephone and request or receive payment for goods or services represented to improve a person’s 

credit history, credit record, or credit rating, which includes the removal of derogatory information 

from a person’s credit history. 

42. By requiring credit repair organizations, including members of NACSO, to wait at 

least 6 months to receive compensation for services rendered, the TSR has a chilling effect on the 

fully-protected speech of credit repair organizations, including members of NACSO, in violation 

of the First Amendment. 

43. Indeed and in addition to its conflict with CROA, the TSR’s six-month rule that the 

CFPB seeks to enforce against members of NACSO exceeds the statutory rulemaking authority 

conferred by Congress in the Telemarketing Act and, as applied, infringes on the fully-protected 

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speech of the members of NACSO by imposing unconstitutional barriers that, in light of the 

monetary penalties associated with a violation of TSR, suppress their protected speech. 

44. The CFPB’s disdain for and unlawful targeting of credit repair organizations is 

further reflected in the CFPB’s recent instruction to consumer reporting agencies to not investigate 

“disputes submitted by credit repair organizations,” which instruction, if followed, precludes credit 

repair organizations from providing their valuable services in the first instance—namely, to 

remove derogatory information from a consumer’s credit report and/or to improve a consumer’s 

credit history, credit record, or credit rating (i.e., credit worthiness and credit standing). 

45. There is an actual, justifiable controversy among the parties and a present need for 

a declaration as to the invalidity and unenforceability of the TSR. 

46. Unless this Court grants the declaratory relief sought herein, the constitutional 

rights of NACSO and its members will continue to be injured by CFPB and its unlawful 

enforcement of the TSR. 

47. Plaintiffs have performed all conditions precedent to bring this action or any said 

conditions have been satisfied, excused, or waived. 

COUNT 1 

(Unlawful Agency Action in Excess of Statutory Authority) 

48. NACSO incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 

47, supra. 

49. The Telemarketing Act does not give the FTC or any agency, including the CFPB, 

authority to issue rules regulating the time or manner in which a person engaged in telemarketing 

deemed “abusive” by the TSR is compensated for the sale of such person’s good or services. 

50. Instead, the Telemarketing Act gives the FTC the limited authority to issue the 

following rules concerning abusive telemarketing acts or practices: 

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(A) a requirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited 

telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive 

of such consumer’s right to privacy, (B) restrictions on the hours of the day and 

night when unsolicited telephone calls can be made to consumers, (C) a requirement 

that any person engaged in telemarketing for the sale of goods or service shall 

promptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call that the purpose of 

the call is to sell goods or services and make such other disclosures as the 

Commission deems appropriate, including the nature and price of the goods and 

services; and (D) a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the 

solicitation of charitable contributions, donations, or gifts of money or any other 

thing of value, shall promptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call 

that the purpose of the call is to solicit charitable contributions, donations, or gifts, 

and make such other disclosures as the Commission considers appropriate, 

including the name and mailing address of the charitable organization on behalf of 

which the solicitation is made. 

15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3). 

51. Contrary to the only authority provided by Congress, the TSR reflects the 

unauthorized determination that a credit repair organization which uses telephones in interstate 

commerce and requests or receives compensation from a person for services rendered prior to 

providing such person “documentation in the form of a consumer report from a consumer reporting 

agency demonstrating that the promised results have been achieved, such report having been 

issued more than six months after the results were achieved,” engages in abusive acts or 

practices. 16 CFR § 310.4(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 

52. The promulgation of the TSR’s six-month rule exceeds the rulemaking authority 

provided under the Telemarketing Act and does not permit or support an interpretation of the 

Telemarketing Act to permit time and manner restriction on the payment for services rendered by 

credit repair organizations, which includes members of NACSO. 

53. As such, the TSR’s time and manner restriction on the payment for services 

rendered by credit repair organizations, including members of NACSO, see 16 CFR § 

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310.4(a)(2)(ii), exceeds the delegated statutory rulemaking authority within the meaning of 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) and cannot be enforced by the CFPB. 

54. Notwithstanding, even if the rulemaking authority delegated by Congress to the 

FTC pursuant to the Telemarketing Act is somehow determined to be broad enough to encompass 

the TSR’s regulation on the time or manner in which a credit repair organization can be 

compensated for its services, the subsequent enactment of CROA, which exclusively occupies the 

credit repair organization industry field by explicitly regulating such organizations, must trump 

such authority, broad or otherwise, of the FTC. 

55. This is particularly so given that Congress chose to enact regulations and 

prohibitions upon credit repair organizations at the federal level through the passage of CROA 

and, importantly, did not delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC or any agency, including the 

CFPB. Surely if Congress wanted to have the FTC or any agency interpret or promulgate rules 

concerning CROA, it would have delegated such authority. 

56. Instead, Congress chose to permit the FTC only to enforce CROA as written. 

57. While the TSR’s six-month rule could perhaps have been valid at one point in time 

concerning credit repair organizations, the TSR lost its validity and applicability because any 

rulemaking authority the FTC or any agency, including the CFPB, may have had regarding credit 

repair organizations pursuant to the TSR was forfeited upon the enactment of CROA. 

58. CROA supersedes and invalidates the TSR’s six-month rule concerning credit 

repair organizations. 

59. As a result, the TSR is unlawful and inapplicable to credit repair organizations 

already governed by the statutory scheme set forth in CROA. 

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COUNT II 

(Unconstitutional Content-Based restriction on Protected Speech)

60. NACSO incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 

47, supra. 

61. The First Amendment prohibits discrimination as to the content of speech or the 

identity of the speaker. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, (2015) (“Government regulation of 

speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 

idea or message expressed.”) 

62. The TSR is based on the content of the speech, which includes the identity of the 

speaker. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000). 

63. Content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Id., 529 at 813. 

64. Because the TSR regulates, indeed chills, speech based on its content, “it must be 

narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative 

would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). 

65. Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the TSR is narrowly tailored to 

further a compelling interest which they are entitled to protect using the least restrictive means 

available. See Secretary of the State of Md., v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-960 

(1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980). 

66. TSR is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest through 

the use of the least restrictive means available, as evidenced by Congress’s passage of CROA that 

prohibits payments to credit repair organizations “before such service is fully performed.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1679b(b). 

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67. These crucial differences as to the timing of payment to credit repair organization 

for services rendered (i.e., “before such service is fully performed” v. “report having been issued 

more than six months after the results were achieved”) underscore the intent of Congress when 

enacting the Telemarketing Act and CROA and the unlawful and excessive scope and application 

of the TSR regulation the CFPB seeks to enforce. 

68. The TSR prohibits the credit repair organization industry, and only the credit repair 

organization industry, from requesting or receiving compensation for services for an arbitrary time 

period of at least 6 months after services are rendered. As applied, the TSR targets the credit repair 

organization industry and chills the fully-protected speech rights of those credit repair 

organizations, including members of NACSO, based upon the content of the communication—

namely, “goods or services represented to remove derogatory information from, or improve, a 

person’s credit history, credit record, or credit rating.” 

69. Indeed, should the credit repair organization “represent[] to...improve a person’s 

credit history, credit record, or credit rating” and accomplish just that, but 5 months later the 

consumer then independently damages his/her credit record through no fault of the credit repair 

organization thereby negating the “represented...improve[ment,]” such credit repair organization 

would never be compensated for its services despite accomplishing precisely what it represented 

it would accomplish on behalf of the consumer. 

70. In such a situation, credit repair organizations are improperly targeted and, 

furthermore, could cease to exist, thus being unable to even communicate or assist consumers. As 

a result, the TSR, as applied, is “presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment [because] 

it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.” Simon v. 

Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991). 

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71. The TSR is “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.” 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 

72. Accordingly, the TSR is unlawful. 

COUNT III 

(The TSR is Underinclusive) 

73. NACSO incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 

47 and 60 through 72, supra. 

74. A law is underinclusive and thus not narrowly tailored “when it discriminates 

against some speakers but not others without a legitimate ‘neutral justification’ for doing so. Even 

when the government has a compelling interest for restricting speech, it may not seek to further 

that interest by creating arbitrary distinctions among the speakers that bear no ‘reasonable fit’ to 

the interest at hand. ” Nat’l Fed. of the Blind, v. F.T.C., 420 F.3d 331, 345 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410-417 (1993)). 

75. An underinclusive law “raises serious doubt about whether the government is in 

fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.” 

Brown v. Entertainment Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011). 

76. The TSR is underinclusive because it prohibits the credit repair organization 

industry, and only the credit repair organization industry, from requesting or receiving 

compensation for services for an arbitrary time period of at least 6 months after services are 

rendered. 

77. The speech of credit repair organizations, including members of NACSO, is no 

more harmful than other speech allowed by TSR that is not regulated as to time or manner of 

payment. 

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78. There is no relation between any legitimate government interest upon which the 

TSR is predicated and the speech banned, muzzled, chilled, regulated, or allowed by the TSR. 

79. As such, the TSR, as an impermissible means of advancing any legitimate interest 

of the government, is unconstitutional. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Nacso Non-Profit Business League Inc., respectfully requests 

the following relief and judgment from this Court: 

(a) A declaration that the TSR violates the United States Constitution and is, thus, 

unenforceable; 

(b) A declaration that the promulgation of the TSR unlawfully exceeds the delegated 

statutory rulemaking authority under the Telemarketing Act, and conflicts and was superseded 

by CROA, which renders the TSR invalid and unlawful; 

(c) An order awarding Plaintiff, Nacso Non-Profit Business League Inc., any 

supplemental relief including, but not limited to, its costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing 

this action to the greatest extent permitted by applicable law; and 

(d) Any such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in favor of 

Plaintiff, Nacso Non-Profit Business League Inc. 

Dated: May 21, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Beth-Ann E. Krimsky 

Beth-Ann E. Krimsky 

Florida Bar No. 968412 

Lawren A. Zann 

Florida Bar No. 42997 

GREENSPOON MARDER LLP 

200 E. Broward Blvd., Suite 1800 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 

Tel: (954) 527-6296 

Fax: (954) 333-4027 

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EXHIBIT A 

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