Affirm and Opinion Filed May 29, 2014 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00199-CR 

EX PARTE RICHARD NICHOLAS COLON 

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-81243-2012 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Myers, and Justice Evans 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

Richard Nicholas Colon appeals the trial court’s order denying him the relief sought by 

his article 11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus. In three issues, appellant contends the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying relief because he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel at trial. We affirm the trial court’s order. 

Background 

At 7:00 p.m. on December 31, 2011, Frisco police officer J. Gaulden saw appellant and 

Dietrich Stiteler standing outside a vehicle with Colorado license plates. The vehicle was parked 

near the public restrooms in a park. The rear passenger door was open. When the men saw 

Gaulden, appellant dropped a backpack on the ground and began reaching inside the vehicle. 

Stiteler tried to kick “an object” that was on the ground underneath the rear of the vehicle. When 

Gaulden approached the men, he saw that the object behind the rear passenger tire was a brown 
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paper bag. Gaulden called for a cover unit and asked both men to sit on the curb. After other 

officers arrived, Gaulden picked up a white prescription bottle with no label on it that was near 

the paper bag. When he asked the men why the bottle smelled like marijuana, both appellant and 

Stiteler said they had medical marijuana licenses from Colorado for injuries. Both men said 

there was marijuana in a cup holder inside the vehicle. Appellant also stated there was a “K Bar 

knife” inside the vehicle and a .45-caliber handgun on the rear seat that he had been trying to 

hide under a jacket. Gaulden asked both men if they had any weapons on their persons. 

Appellant said he had a knife in his right shoe and a “multi-tool knife” in his pants pocket. 

Gaulden searched appellant and retrieved both knives. Gaulden also found a loaded .45-caliber 

magazine in appellant’s pants pocket and a baggie that contained “two clear capsules with a 

green substance inside and one small white tablet.” Later analysis showed the capsules 

contained marijuana and the tablet was methadone hydrochloride. Gaulden searched appellant’s 

vehicle and found a cup with marijuana inside in plain view in a cup holder, one .45-ACP semiautomatic pistol wrapped in a black jacket in the rear seat, several large “hunting style” knives 

throughout the interior of the vehicle, a small kitchen knife in the center console, a glass pipe in a 

jacket in the trunk, and a large bag that contained marijuana buds in the trunk. 

Appellant was charged by indictment with possession of methadone, a controlled 

substance, in an amount less than one gram. On June 22, 2012, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a 

plea agreement, and the trial court deferred adjudicating appellant’s guilt and placed him on two 

years’ community supervision. On June 27, 2012, appellant filed a motion for new trial. A 

hearing scheduled on the motion was cancelled after appellant withdrew the motion. 

On March 7, 2013, appellant filed an article 11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus 

asserting his plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court 
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entered an agreed order designating the issues and directing appellant’s trial counsel to file an 

affidavit responding to the allegations in the application. Counsel filed an affidavit on July 12, 

2013. 

In the affidavit, counsel stated appellant, who resides in Colorado, was charged with 

misdemeanor possession of marijuana, which was found in appellant’s vehicle, and felony 

possession of methadone, which was found in appellant’s pockets. Counsel stated the decision 

not to file a motion to suppress was made by appellant after counsel discussed the legal aspects 

of the felony case with him, including “the legality of the search of his person, the benefits and 

negative aspects of deferred adjudication community supervision, and appellant’s unwillingness 

to travel to and from Texas for multiple court dates.” Counsel outlined several lengthy telephone 

conversations she had with appellant concerning the case, and detailed her research and 

investigation into the facts of the case. Counsel told appellant that because the case concerned 

the search of appellant’s person after appellant admitted carrying weapons, and prior to the 

search of appellant’s vehicle, the search of his person would probably be upheld because “Collin 

County courts place a premium on officer safety.” Counsel stated she told appellant she was 

“happy to pursue whatever course he wanted,” and that “appellant chose to plead guilty on the 

next court setting.” Appellant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State reducing the plea 

offer from five years to two years deferred adjudication supervision. 

Counsel stated that after appellant completed the plea, she was informed by a 

misdemeanor prosecutor that appellant’s co-defendant had filed a motion to suppress, the motion 

had been granted, and the co-defendant’s cases were dismissed. Counsel informed appellant 

about the situation, and appellant instructed counsel to file a motion for new trial. In the motion 

for new trial, counsel argued the State should have disclosed that appellant’s co-defendant had 
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filed a motion to suppress evidence and the outcome of that hearing. After a hearing date was set 

on appellant’s motion for new trial, counsel talked with a felony prosecutor assigned to the 219th 

Judicial District Court. The prosecutor said if appellant insisted on having a hearing on the issue 

and won, the prosecutor would withdraw the deferred adjudication offer, leaving appellant to go 

open to the trial court if he lost on a motion to suppress. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss the 

misdemeanor possession case if appellant agreed to cancel the hearing on the motion for new 

trial. Counsel stated she talked with appellant about the prosecutor’s stance. She also explained 

collateral estoppel and why his co-defendant’s outcome on his motion to suppress did not 

guarantee appellant would have the same outcome. Appellant agreed to withdraw the motion for 

new trial. Counsel cancelled the hearing on the motion for new trial, and the State filed a 

dismissal of the misdemeanor possession of marijuana case on July 20, 2012. 

Counsel’s affidavit included an email dated August 7, 2012 from appellant asking her to 

file another motion for new trial and motion to suppress. In the email, appellant said, “I know I 

have flip flopped on this a lot but I have a lot at stake I feel but after spending the 17 hour drive 

from Colorado back to Texas yesterday and speaking with my family and my attorney in 

Louisiana I think I have a decent shot at a good outcome on this one.” 

In response to counsel’s affidavit, appellant filed a letter from counsel dated August 7, 

2012, that outlined her work on the case and notified appellant that she had concluded her 

representation. Appellant specifically focused on the following paragraph to demonstrate 

counsel’s ineffectiveness: 

We discussed the possibility of doing a Motion to Suppress. I made it 

clear, however, that your case was in front of a very conservative judge whose bar 

for suppressing evidence is known to be quite high. The choice was really how 

many times to come to Texas to fight a case that I did not feel we had [a] strong 

chance of winning under the circumstances. You opted to take the conservative 

route, accepting the deferred plea deal with only one further trip to Texas. 
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The trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court 

found that (1) appellant’s own evidence regarding counsel’s representation of him was consistent 

with counsel’s affidavit; (2) the statements in counsel’s affidavit were credible; (3) counsel’s 

affidavit showed counsel conducted appropriate investigation and discovery in the case; (4) 

counsel analyzed the various search and seizure issues in the case; and (5) counsel’s opinion as 

to the chances of success of a motion to suppress was reasonably derived. The trial court denied 

appellant the relief sought by written order dated January 27, 2014. 

Applicable Law 

In reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief, we view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling. Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 

819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 

S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of 

discretion. Id. In conducting our review, we afford almost total deference to the judge’s 

determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact 

findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We afford the same amount 

of deference to the trial judge’s application of the law to the facts, if the resolution of the 

ultimate question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. If the resolution of the 

ultimate question turns on an application of legal standards, we review the determination de 

novo. Id. 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must meet the twopronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Lopez 

v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The appellant must show both that 
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counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. See id. In the context of a guilty plea, to demonstrate 

prejudice, the appellant must show that but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not 

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 

866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). In the context 

of appellant’s motion for new trial, appellant would have to show that but for counsel’s 

performance, the trial court would have granted appellant a new trial. See Jimenez v. State, 240 

S.W.3d 384, 416 (Tex. App.–Austin 2007, pet. ref’d); see also Waddles v. State, No 05-01-

00310-CR, 2002 WL 1308725, at *2 (Tex. App.–Dallas June 17, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op. not 

designated for publication). 

Analysis 

 In his first two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

him the relief sought by his application for writ of habeas corpus because trial counsel was 

ineffective for not filing a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and counsel’s errors rendered 

appellant’s plea involuntary. The State responds that counsel was instructed by appellant not to 

file a motion to suppress and the record does not show appellant’s plea was involuntary. 

 Counsel’s affidavit states counsel told appellant a motion to suppress evidence would 

“probably be upheld” in his case because it involved a search of his person after he told an 

officer that he was carrying knives. Counsel further told appellant she would be “happy to 

pursue whatever course” appellant wanted. Counsel’s affidavit further points out that appellant 

chose to accept a plea bargain from the State for two years deferred adjudication community 

supervision in exchange for a guilty plea. On the other hand, appellant asserted in his application 

for writ of habeas corpus that counsel did not file a motion to suppress because she was afraid 
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the motion would be denied, and that counsel’s statement to him that his case is before a “very 

conservative judge whose bar for suppressing evidence is known to be quite high” illustrates that 

point. 

 There was conflicting evidence, which the trial court resolved against appellant. See Ex 

parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 819. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding appellant has not met his burden to show counsel’s performance was deficient or that 

the result would have been different. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d t 142. We overrule appellant’s first 

two issues. 

In his third issue, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion in denying him 

habeas corpus relief because counsel was ineffective in failing to properly investigate the case 

during the motion for new trial stage. Appellant asserts counsel’s failure to find out about the 

co-defendant’s motion to suppress being granted and the subsequent dismissal of the codefendant’s cases shows counsel was ineffective. The State responds that counsel was not 

ineffective in failing to learn the disposition of a co-defendant’s case when that disposition had 

no bearing on appellant’s case. 

Appellant received deferred adjudication community supervision as a result of his plea 

bargain. Because there has been no conviction or finding of guilt, a motion for new trial is not 

proper in cases of deferred adjudication community supervision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.1; 

Donovan v. State, 68 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, appellant has not shown 

he would have received a new trial, and the trial court could have properly concluded appellant 

was not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this basis. See Jimenez, 240 S.W.3d at 416. 

Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that even had the trial court conducted a 

hearing on the motion, it would have granted appellant a new trial. See id. Counsel’s affidavit 
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states that after learning the co-defendant’s motion to suppress was granted, she apprised 

appellant of the situation and then filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that the evidence 

given in testimony at the co-defendant’s motion to suppress hearing, as well as the ruling and 

subsequent dismissal of all charges, should have been provided to her as Brady material. See 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). After a hearing date was set, one of the 

prosecutors assigned to the trial court stated he would withdraw the deferred adjudication offer if 

appellant went forward with a hearing and the motion was granted. Counsel negotiated with the 

prosecutor for a dismissal of appellant’s misdemeanor case if appellant agreed to withdraw the 

motion for new trial. Counsel then talked to appellant regarding the prosecutor’s offer and 

explained collateral estoppel and why the outcome of the co-defendant’s motion to suppress 

evidence hearing did not guarantee the same outcome for appellant.1

Finally, there is nothing in the record showing counsel did not investigate the case during 

the motion for new trial stage. The failure to learn about the disposition of the co-defendant’s 

cases does not show ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly because the outcome of the 

co-defendant’s motion to suppress evidence hearing had no legal bearing on appellant’s case. 

Appellant withdrew his motion for new trial even after he learned of the outcome of the codefendant’s cases, and there is nothing in appellant’s affidavit that shows he would have rejected 

the State’s plea bargain of two years’ deferred adjudication community supervision had he 

known the outcome of the co-defendant’s motion to suppress evidence hearing. 

We conclude appellant has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient or that 

the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Ex Parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d at 

                                                            

1

 We also note that although appellant indicated by email of August 7, 2012 that he wanted to file a new motion for new trial, any motion for new 

trial filed on or after that date would have been untimely. A properly filed motion for new trial is timely only if filed within thirty days after the 

sentence is suspended or imposed in open court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a).
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869; Jimenez, 240 S.W.3d at 416. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the relief sought by the application for writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte 

Peterson, 117 S.W.3d at 819. We overrule appellant’s third issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant the relief sought by his application for 

writ of habeas corpus. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

140199F.U05 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
‐10‐ 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

EX PARTE RICHARD NICHOLAS 

COLON 

No. 05-14-00199-CR 

 Appeal from the 219th Judicial District 

Court of Collin County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 

219-81243-2012). 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright, 

Justices Myers and Evans participating. 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order denying the writ of 

habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered May 29, 2014 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE