WWW.REFORM.HOUSE.GOV/MIN

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY STAFF

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

MARCH 16, 2004 

 

 

IRAQ ON THE RECORD

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

PREPARED FOR REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN
IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................... i 

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................1 

 

II. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................................................1 

 

III. NUMBER AND TIMING OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ................................................................3 

IV. CATEGORIES OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ..............................................................................6 

A. Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat................................................................6 

 B. Statements about Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities ...............................................................7 

 1. Claims about the Status of Iraq’s Nuclear Program ...........................................8 

 2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes....................................................................10 

 3. Claims about Uranium from Africa ...................................................................13 

 C. Statements about Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs......................15 

 1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons .............................................15 

 2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles..........................................................18 

 3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories..................................................20 

D. Statements about Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda..............................................................21 

V. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS............................................................25 

A. President Bush..............................................................................................................25 

B. Vice President Cheney..................................................................................................26 

C. Secretary Rumsfeld.......................................................................................................27 

D. Secretary Powell ..........................................................................................................28 

 E. National Security Advisor Rice ....................................................................................29 

VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................30
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 19, 2003, U.S. forces began military operations in Iraq. Addressing the 

nation about the purpose of the war on the day the bombing began, President 

Bush stated: “The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not 

live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of 

mass murder.” 

One year later, many doubts have been raised regarding the Administration’s 

assertions about the threat posed by Iraq. Prior to the war in Iraq, the President 

and his advisors repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 

destruction that jeopardized the security of the United States. The failure to 

discover these weapons after the war has led to questions about whether the 

President and his advisors were candid in describing Iraq’s threat. 

This report, which was prepared at the request of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, is a 

comprehensive examination of the statements made by the five Administration 

officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public 

opinion on Iraq: President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, 

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. It finds that the five officials made 

misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public appearances. 

The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific misleading 

statements by the five officials. 

Methodology 

The Special Investigations Division compiled a database of statements about Iraq 

made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary 

Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice. All of the statements in the database 

were drawn from speeches, press conferences and briefings, interviews, written 

statements, and testimony by the five officials. 

This Iraq on the Record database contains statements made by the five officials 

that were misleading at the time they were made. The database does not include 

statements that appear in hindsight to be erroneous but were accurate reflections 

of the views of intelligence officials at the time they were made. The entire 

database is accessible to members of Congress and the public at 

www.reform.house.gov/min. 

This report is a summary of the Iraq on the Record database. Because the 

officials’ statements have been compiled into a searchable database, the report can 

make new observations about the topics that were the subject of misleading 

claims, the timing of these claims, and the officials who were responsible. To 

ensure objectivity, the report was peer reviewed for fairness and accuracy by two 
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leading experts: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the NonProliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and 

Greg Thielmann, former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, 

and Military Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research. 

Findings

Number of Misleading Statements. The Iraq on the Record database contains 

237 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq that were made by 

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, 

and National Security Advisor Rice. These statements were made in 125 separate 

appearances, consisting of 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53 

interviews, 4 written statements, and 2 congressional testimonies. Most of the 

statements in the database were misleading because they expressed certainty 

where none existed or failed to acknowledge the doubts of intelligence officials. 

Ten of the statements were simply false.

Timing of the Statements. The statements began at least a year before the 

commencement of hostilities in Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on 

March 17, 2002: “We know they have biological and chemical weapons.” The 

Administration’s misleading statements continued through January 22, 2004, 

when Vice President Cheney insisted: “there’s overwhelming evidence that there 

was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.” Most of the 

misleading statements about Iraq — 161 statements — were made prior to the 

start of the war. But 76 misleading statements were made by the five 

Administration officials after the start of the war to justify the decision to go to 

war. 

The 30-day period with the greatest number of misleading statements was the 

period before the congressional vote on the Iraq war resolution. Congress voted 

on the measure on October 10 and October 11, 2002. From September 8 through 

October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public 

appearances. A large number of misleading statements were also made during the 

two months before the war began. Between January 19 and March 19, 2003, the 

five officials made 48 misleading statements in 26 public appearances. 

Topics of the Statements. The 237 misleading statements can be divided into 

four categories. The five officials made 11 statements that claimed that Iraq 

posed an urgent threat; 81 statements that exaggerated Iraq’s nuclear activities; 84 

statements that overstated Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities; 

and 61 statements that misrepresented Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda. 

Statements by President Bush. Between September 12, 2002, and July 17, 

2003, President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by 

Iraq in 27 separate public appearances. On October 7, 2002, three days before the 
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congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush gave a speech in 

Cincinnati, Ohio, with 11 misleading statements, the most by any of the five 

officials in a single appearance.

Some of the misleading statements by President Bush include his statement in the 

January 28, 2003, State of the Union address that “the British government has 

learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium 

from Africa”; his statement on October 2, 2002, that “the Iraqi regime is a threat 

of unique urgency”; and his statement on May 1, 2003, that “the liberation of Iraq 

. . . removed an ally of al Qaeda.” 

Statements by Vice President Cheney. Between March 17, 2002, and January 

22, 2004, Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat 

posed by Iraq in 25 separate public appearances. 

Some of the misleading statements by Vice President Cheney include his 

statement on September 8, 2002, that “we do know, with absolute certainty, that 

he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs . . . to build 

a nuclear weapon”; his statement on March 16, 2003, that “we believe he has, in 

fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons”; and his statement on October 10, 2003, that 

Saddam Hussein “had an established relationship with al Qaeda.” 

Statements by Secretary Rumsfeld. Between May 22, 2002, and November 2, 

2003, Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed 

by Iraq in 23 separate public appearances. 

Some of the misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld include his statement 

on November 14, 2002, that within “a week, or a month” Saddam Hussein could 

give his weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda, which could use them to attack 

the United States and kill “30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings”; his statement 

on January 29, 2003, that Saddam Hussein’s regime “recently was discovered 

seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa”; and his statement on July 

13, 2003, that there “was never any debate” about whether Iraq had a nuclear 

program. 

Statements by Secretary Powell. Between April 3, 2002, and October 3, 2003, 

Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 

34 separate public appearances. 

Secretary Powell sometimes used caveats and qualifying language in his public 

statements. His statements that contained such cautions or limitations were not 

included in the database. Nonetheless, many of Secretary Powell’s statements did 

not include these qualifiers and were misleading in their expression of certainty, 

such as his statement on May 22, 2003, that “there is no doubt in our minds now 

that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make 

biological weapons.” 
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Statements by National Security Advisor Rice. Between September 8, 2002, 

and September 28, 2003, National Security Advisor Rice made 29 misleading 

statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16 separate public appearances. 

Although Ms. Rice had the fewest public appearances and the fewest misleading 

statements, she had the highest number of statements — 8 — that were false. 

These false statements included several categorical assertions that that no one in 

the White House knew of the intelligence community’s doubts about the 

President’s assertion that Iraq sought to import uranium from Africa.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The President and his senior advisors have a special obligation to describe 

accurately the national security threats facing the nation. This special obligation 

derives in part from the nature of the subject. There is no decision that is more 

grave than sending our armed forces to battle. The special obligation also derives 

in part from the unique access that the President and his advisors have to 

classified information. On matters of national security, only the President and his 

advisors have full access to the relevant classified information. Members of 

Congress and the public see only a partial picture based on the information the 

President and his advisors decide to release. 

Recently, serious questions have been raised regarding whether President Bush 

and his Administration met this special obligation. Numerous news reports and 

columns have questioned the accuracy of specific statements by President Bush 

and other Administration officials. The White House maintains that any 

misstatements were “only a small part of an ‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi 

President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States.”1 Other observers, 

though, have detected a pattern of consistent misrepresentation. 

The one-year anniversary of the beginning of military operations in Iraq marks an 

occasion for comprehensively assessing whether the President and his senior 

advisors met their obligation to accurately present intelligence to the American 

public. For this reason, Rep. Waxman asked the Special Investigations Division 

to assemble in a single database any misleading statements made by President 

Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other senior Administration officials about the 

threat posed by Iraq. This report summarizes key findings from this Iraq on the 

Record database. The database itself is available to members of Congress and the 

public at www.reform.house.gov/min. 

II. METHODOLOGY

The Iraq on the Record database contains statements from the five Administration 

officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public 

opinion on the Iraq war: President George Bush; Vice President Richard Cheney; 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Secretary of State Colin Powell; and 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

The statements in the database are drawn from 125 public statements or 

appearances in which the five officials discussed the threat posed by Iraq. The 

______________________________________________________________ 

1 White House Admits CIA Warned It before Speech, Los Angeles Times (July 23, 2003) (quoting 

Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley). 
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sources of the statements are 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53 

interviews, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances before 

congressional committees. Quotes from the officials in newspaper articles or 

other similar secondary sources were not included in the database because of the 

difficulty of discerning the context of such quotes and ensuring their accuracy. 

Statements made by the officials before March 2002, one year before the 

commencement of hostilities in Iraq, were also not included. 

The database contains statements that were misleading based on what was known 

to the Administration at the time the statements were made. In compiling the 

database, the Special Investigations Division did not assess whether 

“subjectively” the officials believed a specific statement to be misleading. 

Instead, the investigators used an “objective” standard. For purposes of the 

database, a statement is considered “misleading” if it conflicted with what 

intelligence officials knew at the time or involved the selective use of intelligence 

or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats. 

The database does not include statements that appear mistaken only in hindsight. 

If a statement was an accurate reflection of U.S. intelligence at the time it was 

made, the statement is excluded from the database even if it now appears 

erroneous. 

To determine whether a statement was misleading, the Special Investigations 

Division examined the statement in light of intelligence known to the 

Administration at the time of the statement. The primary sources for determining 

the intelligence available to the Administration were (1) the portions of the 

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that have been released to the public, 

(2) the February 5, 2004, statement by Director of Central Intelligence George 

Tenet entitled Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (3) the recent report of the 

nonpartisan Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled WMD in Iraq: 

Evidence and Implications, and (4) news and other reports quoting U.S. officials 

regarding the intelligence available to the Administration on Iraq. 

In general, hypothetical and implied statements about threats posed by Iraq were 

not included in the database of misleading statements. A few such statements 

were included, however, where they implied a threat in evocative and frightening 

language. These statements were misleading because the effect was to instill in 

the public the perception that the threat actually existed. 

To be conservative, the Special Investigations Division excluded hundreds of 

statements by the five officials that many observers would consider misleading. 

For example, the five officials made numerous claims that Iraq “had” stockpiles 

of chemical weapons. Many of these statements were misleading in that they 

implied that Iraq possessed these stockpiles currently and did not acknowledge 

the doubts of intelligence experts. Nevertheless, these statements were not 

included in the database when they were expressed in the past tense because Iraq 
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did possess chemical weapons at least as late as the early 1990s and used them 

during the 1980s.2

Investigators also excluded scores of statements of certainty that Iraq possessed 

“weapons of mass destruction” prior to the war. To many observers, these 

statements would be misleading because they implied that Iraq possessed nuclear 

weapons without acknowledging the divisions among intelligence officials about 

whether this was the case. The Special Investigations Division excluded these 

general “weapons of mass destruction” assertions, however, because of the 

ambiguity inherent in the phrase. 

The Special Investigations Division asked two leading independent experts to 

peer review this report for fairness and accuracy. These two independent experts 

are: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation 

Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Greg Thielmann, 

former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military 

Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These 

experts judged that this report is a fair and accurate depiction of the 

Administration’s statements. 

III. NUMBER AND TIMING OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, 

and National Security Advisor Rice repeatedly made misleading statements about 

the threat posed by Iraq. They made these statements in 125 separate public 

appearances. The total number of misleading statements made by the five 

officials is 237. 

The 237 misleading statements were made in a variety of forums. On 53 

occasions, the five officials gave interviews in which they made claims that were 

misleading. They also made misleading statements in 40 speeches, 26 press 

conferences and briefings, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances 

before Congress. 

The misleading statements began at least one year before the start of the war in 

Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on March 17, 2002: 

The President’s made it clear that we are concerned about nations such as 

Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction. We know the Iraqis have 

been engaged in such efforts over the years. We know they have 

______________________________________________________________ 

2

 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament 

Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes, UNMOVIC Working Document (Mar. 6, 2003). 
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biological and chemical weapons. . . . And we also have reason to believe 

they’re pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.3 

These misleading statements have continued through at least January 2004. On 

January 22, 2004, Vice President Cheney said in a National Public Radio 

interview, “I think there’s overwhelming evidence that there was a connection 

between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government. . . . I’m very confident that there 

was an established relationship there.”4 He also said in the same interview, “we 

know . . . that prior to our going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring 

mobile biological weapons labs, and we’re quite confident he did, in fact, have 

such a program. We’ve found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we 

believe were, in fact, part of that program.” As described below, both of these 

assertions were misleading in that they failed to disclose the serious doubts held 

by intelligence officials. 

The majority of the misleading statements — 161 — were made in the buildup to 

the war in Iraq. The volume of misleading statements by the five officials peaked 

before key decision points in the buildup to the war. Congress began debate on 

the Iraq war resolution in early October 2002 and voted on the measure on 

October 10 and October 11, 2002. During the 30 days between September 8 and 

October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public 

appearances. This was the highest number of misleading statements for any 30-

day period. 

There were also a large number of misleading statements in the two months 

before hostilities began on March 19, 2003, when the five officials made 48 

misleading statements in 26 public appearances. 

Figure 1 shows the ebb and flow of misleading statements over time.

______________________________________________________________ 

3

 White House, Press Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and his Highness Salmam bin 

Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince of Bahrain, at Shaikh Hamat Palace (Mar. 17, 2002). 

4 Morning Edition, National Public Radio (Jan. 22, 2004). 
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Figure 1: Number of Misleading Statements Made Each Month 

March 2002 - January 2004

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Mar

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

NovDec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

NovDec

Jan

2002 2003 2004

Month and Year

Number of Misleading Statements

Most of the misleading statements in the Iraq on the Record database involve the 

selective use of intelligence or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats. 

For example, statements of certainty that Iraq was close to possessing nuclear 

weapons were misleading because they ignored significant doubts and 

disagreement in the U.S. intelligence community regarding whether Iraq was 

actively pursuing a nuclear program. 

In 10 instances, however, the statements included in the database were false 

statements that directly contradicted facts known at the time by the 

Administration. For example, on July 11, 2003, Ms. Rice stated with respect to 

the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa: “Now, if there were doubts 

about the underlying intelligence . . . those doubts were not communicated to the 

President, to the Vice President, or to me.”5

 This statement is false because, as 

Ms. Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley subsequently acknowledged, the CIA sent Ms. 

Rice and Mr. Hadley memos in October 2002 warning against the use of this 

claim.6

______________________________________________________________ 

5

 White House, Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleezza Rice (July 11, 2003). 

6

 White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing on Iraq Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and the State of the Union Speech (July 22, 2003). 
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IV. CATEGORIES OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS

The misleading statements by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary 

Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice fall into four 

general categories: (1) statements suggesting that Iraq posed an urgent threat, (2) 

statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities, (3) statements regarding Iraq’s 

biological and chemical weapons capabilities, and (4) statements regarding Iraq’s 

support of al Qaeda. Figure 2 shows the number of misleading statements in each 

category. 

Figure 2: Categories of Misleading Statements

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Urgent Threat Nuclear Activities Biological/Chemical

Weapons

Al-Qaeda

Category

Number of Statements

A. Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat 

On February 5, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet categorically 

stated that the U.S. intelligence community “never said there was an ‘imminent’ 

threat.”7

 Yet this was not the impression conveyed by President Bush, Vice 

President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security 

Advisor Rice in their public statements on Iraq. In 10 different appearances, these 

five officials made 11 statements claiming that Iraq posed an urgent threat. 

For example: 

 

______________________________________________________________ 

7

 Central Intelligence Agency, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Director of Central 

Intelligence George J. Tenet at Georgetown University (Feb. 5, 2004). 
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• President Bush stated on October 2, 2002: “the Iraqi regime is a threat of 

unique urgency. . . . [I]t has developed weapons of mass death.”8

• President Bush stated on November 20, 2002: “Today the world is . . . 

uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq.”9

• Vice President Cheney stated on August 26, 2002: “Simply stated, there is 

no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. 

There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against 

our allies, and against us.”10

In one instance, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Iraq could give weapons of mass 

destruction to al Qaeda in “a week, or a month,” resulting in the deaths of up to 

100,000 people. On November 14, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stated: 

Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a month, 

and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass destruction and 

transfer them, either use them himself, or transfer them to the Al-Qaeda, 

and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United 

States, or an attack on U.S. forces overseas, with a weapon of mass 

destruction you’re not talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being 

killed, but 30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings.”11

B. Statements about Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities 

In their potential for destruction and their ability to evoke horror, nuclear weapons 

are in a class by themselves. As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq 

Survey Group, testified on January 28, 2004: “all of us have and would continue 

to put the nuclear weapons in a different category. It’s a single weapon that can 

do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same 

order of damage. . . . I think we should politically treat nuclear as a difference.”12

______________________________________________________________ 

8

 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution (Oct. 2, 2002). 

9 President Bush Speaks to Atlantic Youth Council, CNN (Nov. 20, 2002). 

10 White House, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention (Aug. 26, 2002). 

11 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Live Interview with Infinity CBS Radio (Nov. 

14, 2002). 

12 Testimony of David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group, before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related 

Programs (Jan. 28, 2004). 
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For precisely this reason, the Administration’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear 

capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the 

threat posed by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the 

Administration’s nuclear assertions than by any other piece of evidence. Rep. 

Waxman, for example, wrote to President Bush in June 2003 that in voting for the 

Iraq war resolution: “Like other members, I was particularly influenced by your 

views about Iraq’s nuclear intentions. Although chemical and biological weapons 

can inflict casualties, no threat is greater than the threat of nuclear weapons.”13

Numerous members of Congress stressed Iraq’s nuclear threat in their floor 

statements explaining their support of the resolution.14 

Despite the significance of the nuclear issue, President Bush, Vice President 

Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor 

Rice repeatedly misrepresented the nuclear threat posed by Iraq. The five 

officials made 49 separate public appearances in which they made misleading 

statements about Iraq’s nuclear threat. In these appearances, they made a total of 

81 misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities. 

These misleading statements generally fall into one of three categories: (1) 

misleading statements about the status of Iraq’s nuclear program, (2) misleading 

statements about the purpose of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq, and (3) 

misleading statements about Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from Africa. 

1. Claims about the Status of Iraq’s Nuclear Program 

Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within the intelligence 

community about whether Iraq had resumed efforts to make nuclear weapons. In 

his speech on February 5, 2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity 

on whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that these differences 

were described in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): “let me be clear, 

where there were differences, the Estimate laid out the disputes clearly.”15 In 

particular, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) 

concluded in the NIE that “[t]he activities we have detected do not, however, add 

up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider 

to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.” 

INR added: “Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent 

effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate 

______________________________________________________________ 

13 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to President George W. Bush (June 2, 2003). 

14 See, e.g., Statement of Senator Mary Landrieu, Congressional Record, S10330 (Oct. 10, 2002); 

Statement of Rep. C.L. “Butch” Otter, Congressional Record, H7787 (Oct. 10, 2002); Statement 

of Rep. Dennis Moore, Congressional Record, H7796 (Oct. 10, 2002). 

15 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7.
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that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors.”16 The INR 

position was similar to the conclusions of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), which concluded that there was “no indication of resumed 

nuclear activities . . . nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities.”17

These doubts and qualifications, however, were not communicated to the public. 

Instead, the five Administration officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments 

about Iraq’s nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October 2002 

that “[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is 

seeking the materials required to do so.”18 Several days later, President Bush 

asserted that Saddam Hussein “is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear 

weapon.”19

Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most egregious statement about 

Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, claiming: “we know he has been absolutely devoted to 

trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted 

nuclear weapons.”20 He made this statement just three days before the war. He 

did not admit until September 14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he 

“did misspeak.”21

President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam Hussein waging nuclear 

war against the United States or its allies as one of the most urgent reasons for 

preemptively attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative language 

and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, for 

example, President Bush stated: “Knowing these realities, America must not 

ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot 

wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a 

mushroom cloud.”22

______________________________________________________________ 

16 National Intelligence Council, Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Key Judgements (from October 2002 NIE) (declassified July 18, 2003). 

17 In a Chief Inspector’s Words: ‘A Substantial Measure of Disarmament,’ New York Times 

(Mar. 8, 2003). 

18 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, supra note 8. 

19 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat; Remarks by the President on Iraq (Oct. 7, 

2002). 

20 Meet the Press, NBC (Mar. 16, 2003). 

21 Meet the Press, NBC (Sept. 14, 2003). On May 20, 2003, the Washington Post reported that 

Vice President Cheney’s aides said, “Cheney was referring to Saddam Hussein’s nuclear 

programs, not weapons.” White House Notebook: Energy Policy Spurs Affirmative Action 

Debate, Washington Post (May 20, 2003). 

22 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19. 
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Following the commencement of military operations in Iraq, Administration 

officials continued to make misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear 

program. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld denied on July 13, 2003, that there 

was “any debate” about Iraq’s nuclear capabilities within the Administration, 

stating: “We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate.”23 

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable to find evidence of 

the nuclear program described by the five officials. On October 2, 2003, David 

Kay reported that “we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook 

significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile 

material.”24 In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay reported that “[i]t was 

not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.”25 He added, “As best as has 

been determined . . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had 

deteriorated to such point that it was totally useless.”26 His conclusion was that 

there was “no doubt at all” that Iraq had less of an ability to produce fissile 

material in 2001 than in 1991.27 According to Dr. Kay, the nuclear program had 

been “seriously degraded” and the “activities of the inspectors in the early ‘90s 

did a tremendous amount.”28

2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes 

In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes to Iraq were intercepted.29 This 

discovery led to an active debate within intelligence agencies about the intended 

use of the tubes. 

Numerous experts believed the tubes were for conventional rockets rather than a 

nuclear development program. In his February 5, 2004, speech, Mr. Tenet 

explained that disagreement over the purpose of the aluminum tubes was “a 

______________________________________________________________ 

23 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (July 13, 2003). 

24 Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey 

Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee 

on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

(Oct. 2, 2003). 

25 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12. 

26 Id. 

27 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (Oct. 5, 2003). 

28 Id.

29 Speculation, Fact Hard to Separate in Story of Iraq’s ‘Nuclear’ Tubes, USA Today (Aug. 1, 

2003).
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debate laid out extensively in the estimate and one that experts still argue over.”30 

The agency with the most technical expertise in this area, the Department of 

Energy, believed that the tubes likely were not part of a nuclear enrichment 

program, stating in the NIE that “the tubes probably are not part of the 

program.”31 The International Atomic Energy Agency agreed, concluding: 

“There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use 

in centrifuge enrichment.”32

In addition to dissent from the Energy Department and international inspectors, 

the State Department also expressed formal reservations, stating in the NIE that 

“INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge 

rotors.”33 Instead, the State Department accepted the “judgment of technical 

experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the 

tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges.” The State 

Department explained its position in detail: 

The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by 

the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the 

procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE 

assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for 

use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.35 

According to the NIE, “INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are 

intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.”36

These doubts about the use of the aluminum tubes were not conveyed by 

Administration officials, however. Instead, the aluminum tubes became one of 

the two principal pieces of information cited by the Administration to support the 

claim that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. President Bush, 

Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice 

made 10 misleading statements in 9 public appearances about the significance of 

the aluminum tubes. 

______________________________________________________________ 

30 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7. 

31 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

32 U.N. Split Widens as Allies Dismiss Deadline on Iraq, New York Times (Mar. 7, 2003). 

33 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

34 Id. 

35 Id. 

36 Id.
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For example, Ms. Rice stated on September 8, 2002: “We do know that there 

have been shipments going into . . . Iraq . . . of aluminum tubes that . . . are only 

really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.”37 Similarly, 

Vice President Cheney said on September 8, 2002: “[Saddam Hussein] now is 

trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs 

to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs . . . [s]pecifically aluminum 

tubes.”38 These statements were misleading because they did not present the 

possibility that the tubes were suitable or intended for another purpose, or 

acknowledge that key U.S. experts doubted that the tubes were intended to make 

nuclear bombs. 

In one instance, Secretary Powell did acknowledge that some experts disputed 

that the aluminum tubes were intended for nuclear uses. In his February 5, 2003, 

address before the United Nations, Secretary Powell stated, “By now, just about 

everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of 

opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts 

think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.”39 

Even in that statement, however, Secretary Powell did not make clear that experts 

from the Department of Energy and the State Department’s own intelligence 

division played a significant role in the analysis of this issue and in formal and 

deliberate dissents had disputed the view that the tubes would likely be used to 

enrich uranium. 

On another occasion, Secretary Powell cited the tubes as evidence of pursuit of 

nuclear weapons, without noting that the intended use of the tubes was under 

dispute, asserting: “We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength 

aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear 

weapons program.”40

By January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency had reached the 

tentative conclusion that the aluminum tubes “would be consistent with the 

purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for 

manufacturing centrifuges.”41 Following the occupation of Iraq, the Iraq Survey 

______________________________________________________________ 

37 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002). 

38 Meet the Press, NBC (Sept. 8, 2002). 

39 U.S. Department of State, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Colin L. 

Powell (Feb. 5, 2003). 

40 U.S. Department of State, Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell re: U.S. 

Reaction to Iraqi Arms Declaration (Dec. 19, 2002). 

41 UN News Centre, IAEA Chief: No Evidence So Far of Revived Iraqi Nuclear Arms Programme

(Jan. 27, 2003). 
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Group did not find evidence indicating that the tubes were intended for nuclear 

use. In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay announced: “It is my judgment, 

based on the evidence that was collected . . . that it’s more probable that those 

tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a 

centrifuge program.”42 

3. Claims about Uranium from Africa 

Another significant component of the Administration’s nuclear claims was the 

assertion that Iraq had sought to import uranium from Africa. As one of few new 

pieces of intelligence, this claim was repeated multiple times by Administration 

officials as proof that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In 

total, the five Administration officials made misleading assertions about Iraq’s 

attempts to obtain uranium from Africa in 7 statements in 6 public appearances. 

In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President Bush stated: 

“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 

significant quantities of uranium from Africa. . . . Saddam Hussein has not 

credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.”43 

Other officials echoed this statement. In a January 23, 2003, New York Times oped piece, Ms. Rice argued that Iraq had lied in its December 2002 declaration, 

noting: “the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get 

uranium from abroad.”44 In his opening remarks in his televised press conference 

on January 29, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . . 

recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”45

These claims that Iraq was seeking to import uranium were misleading. The 

documentary evidence behind the assertions was declared to be “not authentic” by 

the International Atomic Energy Agency.46 An envoy, former Ambassador 

Joseph Wilson, was sent by the CIA to investigate the alleged purchase.47 

Ambassador Wilson concluded that it was “highly doubtful that any such 

______________________________________________________________ 

42 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12. 

43 White House, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003). 

44 Condoleezza Rice, Why We Know Iraq Is Lying, New York Times (Jan. 23, 2003). 

45 Press Conference with Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, CNN (Jan. 29, 2003). 

46 Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake; U.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on Purchases 

Were Forged, Washington Post (Mar. 8, 2003). 

47 Joseph Wilson, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, New York Times (July 6, 2003). 
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transaction had ever taken place,” and on his return, he provided detailed briefings 

to the CIA and to the State Department African Affairs Bureau.48

When evidence emerged that the importation claim was false, Ms. Rice claimed 

that the White House had no knowledge of these doubts. She asserted 

unequivocally that no senior White House officials were informed about questions 

about the uranium claim prior to its use in the State of the Union address. She 

stated that “[t]he intelligence community did not know at that time, or at levels 

that got to us . . . that there was serious questions about this report.”49 As she put 

it on another occasion: 

[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in 

or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the Director of 

Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.50

Ms. Rice’s claims were simply false. The CIA sent two memos to the National 

Security Council — one of which was addressed to Ms. Rice personally — 

warning against including the claim in a speech by the President.51 Director of 

Central Intelligence George Tenet also “argued personally” to Ms. Rice’s deputy 

national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, “that the allegation should not be used” 

by the President.52 Further, in the October 2002 NIE provided to top White 

House officials, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research had 

stated that claims that Iraq sought to acquire uranium in Africa were “highly 

dubious.”53

Ultimately, the White House was forced to admit its error. On July 9, 2003, 

White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer said that the statement about importing 

uranium from Africa “should not have risen to the level of a presidential 

speech.”54 The White House minimized the significance of the Administration’s 

use of the Niger claim, arguing that it was “only a small part of an 

______________________________________________________________ 

48 Id. 

49 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (June 8, 2003). 

50 Face the Nation, CBS (July 13, 2003). 

51 White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing, supra note 6. 

52 CIA Got Uranium Reference Cut in Oct.; Why Bush Cited It in Jan. Is Unclear, Washington 

Post (July 13, 2003); see also White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing,

supra note 6. 

53 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

54 White House, Ari Fleischer Holds News Briefing (July 9, 2003). 
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‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the 

United States.”55 

C. Statements about Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons 

Programs 

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, 

and National Security Advisor Rice made misleading statements regarding Iraq’s 

chemical and biological weapons programs in 61 public appearances. In these 

appearances, the five officials made 84 different misleading statements. These 

statements addressed three general topics: (1) Iraq’s chemical and biological 

weapons, (2) Iraq’s efforts to build unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (3) 

Iraq’s mobile biological laboratories. 

1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons 

Prior to the war, there were questions within the intelligence community about 

whether Iraq in fact possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. 

Because Iraq previously had such stockpiles, had used them in the past, and had 

not adequately demonstrated that all previously produced stockpiles had been 

destroyed, the intelligence community made an assessment in the October NIE 

that it was likely that Iraq continued to possess them. Because intelligence 

agencies had no direct evidence of such stockpiles, however, the conclusions in 

the October NIE were cast in the context of an intelligence “estimate.” The NIE 

began its sections on chemical and biological weapons with the phrases “we 

assess” and “we judge.” The NIE concluded that Iraq “probably” had stockpiled 

chemicals and “probably” had genetically engineered biological agents. The NIE 

also included major qualifiers, such as: “We lack specific information on many 

key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs.”56

Other intelligence assessments specifically cited the uncertainty surrounding 

Iraq’s possession of such stockpiles. In September 2002, the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) issued a report that concluded: “There is no reliable information 

on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has 

— or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.”57 The 

report also observed that “[a] substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical warfare 

agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 

______________________________________________________________ 

55 White House Admits CIA Warned It before Speech, supra note 1. 

56 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

57 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities — An Operational Support Study

(Sept. 2002) (unclassified excerpts are available at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates 

/article.asp?newsID=4928). 
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1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United 

Nations Special Commission) actions.”58 While the report assessed that Iraq 

“probably” retained some “CW agents,” it warned that “we lack any direct 

information.”59

Despite these uncertainties among the intelligence officials, the five 

Administration officials made 45 misleading statements in 35 appearances about 

Iraq’s possession of chemical or biological weapons. Often these statements were 

misleading because they projected certainty about their claims. Secretary Powell, 

for example, claimed, “there is no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical 

weapons stocks.”60 Secretary Rumsfeld stated: “He has at this moment 

stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.”61 Vice President Cheney 

asserted: “We know they have biological and chemical weapons.”62 And 

President Bush said bluntly, “he’s got them.”63 

Administration officials sometimes claimed to have specific details about 

stockpile locations and movements. In his speech to the United Nations, for 

example, Secretary Powell showed photographs of supposed Iraqi chemical 

stockpiles, stating: “How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a 

closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the 

four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that 

the bunkers are storing chemical munitions.”64 

Secretary Rumsfeld was even more specific, claiming that the Iraqis were 

“moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing 

them in residential neighborhoods.”65 He also made this statement: “We know 

where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, 

south, and north somewhat.”66 

______________________________________________________________ 

58 Id. 

59 Id. 

60 Fox News Sunday, Fox TV (Sept. 8, 2002). 

61 Testimony by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, House Armed Services Committee 

(Sept. 18, 2002). 

62 White House, Press Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney, supra note 3. 

63 White House, Remarks by the President at Missouri Welcome (Nov. 4, 2002). 

64 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39. 

65 Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Myers Hold Regular Department of 

Defense Briefing (Mar. 11, 2003). 

66 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (Mar. 30, 2003). 
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The five officials also drew selectively from individual intelligence sources. In 

1995, Hussein Kamel, the Iraqi official who had been in charge of Iraq’s weapons 

of mass destruction programs, defected and described how Iraq had violated U.N. 

resolutions in the early 1990s.67 Administration officials cited these claims 

repeatedly. For example, President Bush said: 

In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s 

military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to 

admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other 

deadly biological agents. . . . This is a massive stockpile of biological 

weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing 

millions.68

President Bush failed to disclose, however, that this same defector reported to 

U.N. inspectors that Iraq had destroyed all of its chemical and biological weapons 

stocks.69

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has reported that it is unlikely that 

chemical or biological stockpiles existed prior to the war. As Dr. Kay concluded: 

“I’m personally convinced that there were not large stockpiles of newly produced 

weapons of mass destruction. We don’t find the people, the documents or the 

physical plants that you would expect to find if the production was going on.”70 

Dr. Kay reported in October 2003 that “Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, 

produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed — 

during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN 

inspections.”71

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet echoed these findings: “It also 

appears that Iraq had the infrastructure and talent to resume production — but we 

have yet to find that it actually did so, nor have we found weapons.”72 His bottom 

______________________________________________________________ 

67 How Saddam Happened, Newsweek (Sept. 23, 2002). 

68 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19. 

69 The Defector’s Secrets, Newsweek (Mar. 3, 2003); see also What Went Wrong, Newsweek (Feb. 

9, 2004). 

70 Ex-Inspector Says CIA Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program, New York Times (Jan. 26, 

2004). 

71 Statement by David Kay, supra note 24. 

72 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7. 
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line was that “we do not know if production took place — and just as clearly — 

we have not yet found biological weapons.”73

2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Prior to the war, Administration officials raised the specter of Iraq using 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to distribute chemical or biological weapons 

directly over the United States. Although there was agreement within the 

intelligence community that Iraq had a UAV program, there was a sharp split over 

whether these UAVs were designed to deliver chemical or biological weapons. 

The October NIE concluded that the UAV program was “probably” intended to 

deliver biological weapons. However, the government entity most knowledgeable 

about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and 

Space Intelligence Center, disagreed with this conclusion.74 According to the 

NIE, the U.S. Air Force “does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily 

intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents.” 

Instead, the Air Force experts asserted that “[t]he small size of Iraq’s new UAV 

strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance.”75

The five Administration officials did not acknowledge these doubts in their public 

statements, however. Instead, they made misleading assertions regarding the 

purpose of the UAVs in 5 statements in 5 public appearances. 

For example, on October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11, 

2002, congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush claimed that 

“Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be 

used to disperse chemical or biological weapons.” He did not disclose that 

experts at the Air Force found such a use improbable. Instead, he highlighted the 

fear of Iraq’s UAVs being used “for missions targeting the United States.”76 Such 

statements had an impact on members of Congress. For example, Senator Bill 

Nelson voted for the Iraq war resolution “precisely because of the 

administration’s UAV evidence.”77 He explained: 

I was told not only that [Hussein had weapons of mass destruction] and 

that he had the means to deliver them through unmanned aerial vehicles, 

but that he had the capability of transporting those UAVs outside of Iraq 

______________________________________________________________ 

73 Id. 

74 Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on Iraqi Drones, Washington Post (Sept. 26. 2003). 

75 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

76 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19. 

77 A Flawed Argument in the Case for War, Washington Post (Feb. 1, 2004). 
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and threatening the homeland here in America, specifically by putting 

them on ships off the eastern seaboard. . . . I thought there was an 

imminent threat.78

In his address to the United Nations, Secretary Powell asserted: “UAVs are well 

suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence 

that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that 

could be adapted for UAVs.”79 In making his presentation to the U.N., Secretary 

Powell showed a photo of an “illustrative” UAV, which he suggested was wellsuited for spraying chemical or biological weapons over the United States.80 This 

presentation affected members of Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that 

of the various pieces of evidence presented by Secretary Powell, “the most 

compelling to me was the unmanned aerial vehicle and the development of that 

with spray tanks. And he kind of laid down the fact that this could be in our 

country and there was a possibility that this might be used against the United 

States.”81

President Bush later highlighted Secretary Powell’s presentation, claiming: “All 

the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank 

modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. . . . A UAV launched from a 

vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland.”82

 

The Iraq Survey Group found little to substantiate these claims. According to Dr. 

Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, Iraq’s UAV program “was not a strong point” 

because it was only “theoretically possible” to have “snuck one of those on a ship 

off the East Coast of the United States that might have been able to deliver a small 

amount someplace.” He found only that “at least one of those families of UAVs” 

was a “descendent” of another model that once had a “spray tank on it.” In his 

assessment, there was no “existing deployment capability at that point for any sort 

of systematic military attack.”83

______________________________________________________________ 

78 Id. 

79 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39. 

80 Id. 

81 NBC News Special Report: The Case Against Iraq, NBC (Feb. 5, 2003). 

82 White House, President Bush: “World Can Rise to This Moment” (Feb. 6, 2003). 

83 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12. 
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3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories 

In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile trailers in Iraq.84 

Although intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the trailers, Administration 

officials repeatedly asserted that they were mobile biological weapons 

laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary 

Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice made 34 

misleading statements about the trailers in 27 separate public appearances. 

Shortly after the trailers were found, the CIA and DIA issued an unclassified 

white paper evaluating the trailers.85 The white paper was released without 

coordination with other members of the intelligence community, however. It was 

disclosed later that engineers from DIA who examined the trailers concluded that 

they were most likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons.86 

A former senior intelligence official reported that “only one of 15 intelligence 

analysts assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in June endorsed the 

white paper conclusion.”87

Despite these doubts within the intelligence community, the five officials 

repeatedly misled Congress and the public about the trailers by asserting without 

qualification that they were proof of Iraq’s biological weapons program. 

President Bush made perhaps the most prominent misleading statement on this 

matter when he proclaimed: 

We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological 

laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the 

world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build 

biological weapons. They’re illegal. They’re against the United Nations 

resolutions, and we’ve so far discovered two. And we’ll find more 

weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven’t found the 

banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong, we 

found them.88

______________________________________________________________ 

84 Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare 

Agent Production Plants (May 28, 2003) (online at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/ 

paper_w.pdf). 

85 Id.

86 Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms, New York Times (Aug. 9, 2003). 

87 Powell’s Case, a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms, New York Times (Feb. 1, 2004). 

88 White House, Interview of the President by TVP, Poland (May 29, 2003). 
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Similarly, Secretary Powell’s comments about the trailers frequently asserted with 

certainty that the trailers were biological weapons laboratories. For example: 

• On May 21, 2003, Secretary Powell said: “The intelligence community 

has really looked hard at these vans, and we can find no other purpose for 

them. Although you can’t find actual germs on them, they have been 

cleaned and we don’t know whether they have been used for that purpose 

or not, but they were certainly designed and constructed for that purpose. 

And we have taken our time on this one because we wanted to make sure 

we got it right. And the intelligence community, I think, is convinced now 

that that’s the purpose they served.”89

• On May 22, 2003, Secretary Powell said, “So far, we have found the 

biological weapons vans that I spoke about when I presented the case to 

the United Nations on the 5th of February, and there is no doubt in our 

minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that 

was to make biological weapons.”90

The doubts about the trailers were confirmed by the work of the Iraq Survey 

Group. According to Dr. Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, “the consensus 

opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while [they] had capabilities in 

many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological 

weapons.”91 In a separate interview, Dr. Kay explained that the trailers “were 

actually designed to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, or perhaps to 

produce rocket fuel.”92

D. Statements about Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda

Another key component of the case for going to war against Iraq was the claim 

that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda. As was the case with other featured claims, 

the al Qaeda claims were disputed by intelligence officials within the 

Administration. Yet President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, 

Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice regularly failed to 

______________________________________________________________ 

89 U.S. Department of State, Remarks with Bahrain’s Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin Hamad AlKhalifa After Meeting (May 21, 2003). 

90 U.S. Department of State, Interview with French Television 1 (May 22, 2003). 

91 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12. 

92 Ex-Inspector Says CIA Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program, supra note 70 (paraphrasing 

Dr. Kay). According to recent media accounts, United States intelligence officials never actually 

interviewed the source who provided the original tip that Iraq had mobile bioweapons trailers. 

Experts Say U.S. Never Spoke to Source of Tip on Bioweapons; Information from Iraqi Relayed by 

Foreign Agency, CIA Notes, Washington Post (Mar. 5, 2004).
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acknowledge these doubts or the weaknesses in the case linking Iraq and al 

Qaeda. They made 61 misleading statements about the strength of the Iraq-al 

Qaeda alliance in 52 public appearances. 

Well before the war on Iraq, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 

made clear that the U.S. intelligence community had serious doubts about the 

threat of Iraq arming al Qaeda. In its section on “Confidence Levels for Selected 

Key Judgements in this Estimate,” the NIE gave a “Low Confidence” rating to the 

notion of “Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological 

weapons with Al Qa’ida.” 93 The discussion of this possibility in the NIE 

contained highly qualified language: “Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might 

decide that only an organization such as al-Qa’ida . . . could perpetuate the type of 

terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.”94 The NIE also reported that 

“Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist 

attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure 

of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making 

war.”95

Director of Central Intelligence Tenet stated in an October 2002 letter that there 

were intelligence reports of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq. At the same 

time, however, he asserted clear qualifiers for this information: “Our 

understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida is evolving and is 

based on sources of varying reliability.”96 Senators who were briefed by 

intelligence officials in the fall of 2002 expressed skepticism about the 

significance of the link. For example, Senator Jeffords on October 8, 2002, 

stated, “While there is talk of cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and I don’t 

doubt that there has been some cooperation, I have not seen any hard evidence of 

close cooperation.”97 According to another account: 

Sen. Richard J. Durbin . . . said some classified information he had seen 

did not support the administration’s portrayal of the Iraqi threat. “It’s 

troubling to have classified information that contradicts statements made 

______________________________________________________________ 

93 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16. 

94 Id. (emphasis added). 

95 Id. 

96 Threats and Responses; CIA Letter to Senate on Baghdad’s Intentions, New York Times (Oct. 

9, 2002) (reprinting text of October 7, 2002, letter from Mr. Tenet to Senator Bob Graham, in 

which Mr. Tenet says, “We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and alQa’ida going back a decade,” and “credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa’ida have 

discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression”). 

97 Statement of Senator Jim Jeffords, Senate Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force against Iraq

(Oct. 8, 2002). 
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by the administration,” Durbin said. “There’s more they should share with 

the public.” Durbin would not be more specific, but he did say the 

committee had received the views of some analysts who do not share the 

administration’s conclusion that Iraq was an urgent threat with important 

links to al-Qaeda terrorists.98

Journalists also reported that many intelligence officials within the Administration 

doubted the significance of reported contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. 

According to one report: 

[A]nalysts at the C.I.A. . . . believed that the evidence showed some 

contacts between Baghdad and the terrorist organization, but not an 

operational alliance. . . . [A]t the C.I.A., many analysts believed that Mr. 

bin Laden saw Mr. Hussein as one of the corrupt secular Arab leaders who 

should be toppled.99 

Despite the doubts of many intelligence analysts, the five Administration officials 

regularly asserted that there was a close relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. 

For example: 

• In a November 7, 2002, speech, President Bush stated: Saddam Hussein is 

“a threat because he is dealing with Al Qaida. . . . [A] true threat facing 

our country is that an Al Qaida-type network trained and armed by 

Saddam could attack America and not leave one fingerprint.” 100 

• In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, President Bush stated: 

“Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and 

statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and 

protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without 

fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or 

help them develop their own.”101

• In his February 5, 2003, remarks to the United Nations, Secretary of State 

Colin Powell stated: “what I want to bring to your attention today is the 

potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda 

terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and 

modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network 

______________________________________________________________ 

98 Democrats Urge Focus on Terror Instead of Iraq, Philadelphia Inquirer (Oct. 5, 2002). 

99 The Struggle for Iraq: Intelligence; Hussein Warned Iraqis to Beware Outside Fighters, 

Document Says, New York Times (Jan. 14, 2004). 

100 White House, President Outlines Priorities (Nov. 7, 2002). 

101 White House, State of the Union, supra note 43. 
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headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama 

bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.”102

• In remarks on May 1, 2003, announcing the end of major combat 

operations in Iraq, President Bush stated: “The battle of Iraq is one 

victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 — and 

still goes on. . . . [T]he liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al 

Qaeda.”103

Vice President Cheney’s statements on this topic repeatedly cited reports of a 

specific alleged Iraq–al Qaeda contact: a meeting between Mohammed Atta, one 

of the September 11 hijackers, and a senior Iraqi official in Prague a few months 

before September 11, 2001. For example, Vice President Cheney stated on 

September 14, 2003: 

With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out 

there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in 

Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the 

attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in 

terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know.104 

The Vice President’s assertions about this meeting omitted key information. He 

did not acknowledge that the CIA and FBI had concluded before the war in Iraq 

that “the meeting probably did not take place”;105 that Czech government officials 

had developed doubts regarding whether this meeting occurred;106 or that 

American records indicate that Mr. Atta was in Virginia Beach, Virginia, at the 

time of the purported meeting.107

Assessments following the war further highlighted the tenuous nature of the 

Administration’s assertions about an Iraq-al Qaeda alliance. According to the 

New York Times, “Since American forces toppled the Hussein government and the 

United States gained access to captured Iraqi officials and Iraqi files, the C.I.A. 

has not yet uncovered evidence that has altered its prewar assessment concerning 

______________________________________________________________ 

102 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39. 

103 White House, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May 

1, 2003). 

104 Meet the Press, supra note 21. 

105 A Region Inflamed: Inquiry; Iraqi Agent Denies He Met 9/11 Hijacker in Prague Before 

Attacks on the U.S., New York Times (Dec. 13, 2003). 

106 Id. 

107 Id. 
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the connections between Mr. Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the leader of al 

Qaeda, officials said.”108 

Consistent with this view, during Dr. Kay’s testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on January 28, 2004, the following exchange occurred 

between Senator Warner and Dr. Kay: 

Senator Warner: Any evidence with regard to participation by either 

Saddam Hussein or his principal henchmen in the WMD-sharing with al 

Qaeda or any other terrorist organizations? 

Dr. Kay: Senator Levin — Senator Warner, there is no evidence that I can 

think of that I know of.109

 

V. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS

A. President Bush 

President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 

27 separate public statements or appearances. 

 

Of the 55 misleading statements by President Bush, 4 claimed that Iraq posed an 

urgent threat; 14 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18 

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 19 misrepresented 

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. 

______________________________________________________________ 

108 A Region Inflamed, supra note 105. Last October, Undersecretary for Defense Policy Douglas 

J. Feith sent a memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee regarding the connection between Iraq 

and al Qaeda. In November, the Weekly Standard published the memo’s classified annex, 

claiming that its list of Iraq–al Qaeda contacts proved “an operational relationship from the early 

1990s” and that “there can no longer be any serious argument about whether Saddam Hussein’s 

Iraq worked with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to plot against Americans.” Case Closed, 

Weekly Standard (Nov. 24, 2003). The Defense Department, however, immediately issued an 

official statement that “[t]he classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the 

relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions.” U.S. Department of 

Defense, News Release: DOD Statement on News Reports of al-Qaeda and Iraq Connections

(Nov. 15, 2003). Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also recently testified regarding 

the Feith memo, stating that the CIA “did not agree with the way the way the data was 

characterized in that document.” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on National Security Threats (Mar. 9, 

2004). 

109 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12. 
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On October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11, 2002, 

congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, President Bush gave an address in 

Cincinnati, Ohio, about the threat posed by Iraq. In this speech, President Bush 

made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the highest number of misleading 

statements in any single appearance by any of the five officials. In this single 

appearance, President Bush made misleading statements about Iraq’s nuclear 

capabilities, Iraq’s efforts to procure aluminum tubes, Iraq’s chemical and 

biological capabilities, and Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda. 

Some of the misleading statements made by President Bush included the 

following: 

• “On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. . . . 

It has developed weapons of mass death.”110

• “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 

significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”111

• “The liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al Qaeda.”112

• “We found the weapons of mass destruction. . . . [F]or those who say we 

haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, 

they’re wrong, we found them.”113

B. Vice President Cheney

Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat posed by 

Iraq in 25 separate public statements or appearances. 

Of the 51 misleading statements by Vice President Cheney, 1 claimed that Iraq 

posed an urgent threat; 22 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 

7 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 21 

misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. 

Some of the misleading statements made by Vice President Cheney included the 

following: 

______________________________________________________________ 

110 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, supra note 8. 

111 White House, State of the Union, supra note 43. 

112 White House, President Bush Announces, supra note 103. 

113 White House, Interview of the President, supra note 88. 
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• “[W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement 

system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to 

build a nuclear weapon.”114

• Saddam Hussein “had an established relationship with al Qaeda.”115

• “[W]e believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”116 

C. Secretary Rumsfeld 

Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq 

in 23 separate public statements or appearances. 

 

Of the 52 misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld; 5 claimed that Iraq posed 

an urgent threat; 18 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 21 

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 8 misrepresented 

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. 

Some of the misleading statements made by Secretary Rumsfeld included the 

following: 

• “Now transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a 

month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass 

destruction and transfer them, either use himself, or transfer them to 

the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack 

on the United States . . . with a weapon of mass destruction you’re not 

talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000, 

or 100,000 . . . human beings.”120

______________________________________________________________ 

114 Meet the Press, supra note 38. 

115 White House, Remarks by the Vice President to the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 10, 2003). 

116 Meet the Press, supra note 20. 

117 Meet the Press, supra note 38. 

118 White House, Remarks by the Vice President at the Air National Guard Senior Leadership 

Conference (Dec. 2, 2002). 

119 White House, Remarks by the Vice President, supra note 115. 

120 U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 11. 
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• “[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . . recently was discovered seeking 

significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”121

• “We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate.”123 

D. Secretary Powell 

Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 

34 separate public statements or appearances. 

 

Of the 50 misleading statements by Secretary Powell, 1 claimed that Iraq posed an 

urgent threat; 10 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 32 

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 7 misrepresented 

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. 

Sometimes Secretary Powell used caveats and qualifying language in his public 

statements. For example, on March 9, 2003, he said, “Well with respect to the 

aluminum tubes, we still believe the case is out. The CIA has done a great deal of 

analysis on those tubes. They are not persuaded they were just for rockets. And, 

in fact, another nation this week, a European nation, came forward with some 

additional information that still, I think, leaves it an open question as to what the 

purpose of those tubes was.”124 Secretary Powell’s acknowledgement of 

differences in this example was not an unqualified statement that only mentioned 

one side of an intelligence debate. 

On numerous other occasions, however, Secretary Powell made unconditional 

statements about the threats posed by Iraq without disclosing the doubts of 

intelligence officials. Some of the misleading statements he made included the 

following: 

• “Iraq is now concentrating . . . on developing and testing smaller 

UAVs. . . . UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological 

weapons.”125

______________________________________________________________ 

121 Press Conference with Donald Rumsfeld, supra note 45. 

122 U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 11. 

123 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, supra note 23. 

124 Meet the Press, NBC (Mar. 9, 2003). 

125 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39. 
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• “The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear 

ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a 

weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again.”126

• “So far, we have found the biological weapons vans that I spoke about 

when I presented the case to the United Nations on the 5th of February, 

and there is no doubt in our minds that those vans were designed for only 

one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons.”127 

E. National Security Advisor Rice 

Ms. Rice made 29 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16 

separate public statements or appearances. 

Of the 29 misleading statements by Ms. Rice, 17 concerned Iraq’s efforts to 

develop nuclear weapons; 6 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons 

capacity; and 6 misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. 

Some of the misleading statements made by Ms. Rice included the following: 

• “We do know that [Saddam Hussein] is actively pursuing a nuclear 

weapon.”128

• “We do know that there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq, for 

instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to — high quality 

aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, 

centrifuge programs.”130

• “[T]he declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get 

uranium from abroad.”131

Ms. Rice made significantly more statements that were false — 8 — than any of 

the other four officials. Many of these statements came in June and July 2003 

______________________________________________________________ 

126 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Powell, Remarks at the World Economic Forum

(Jan. 26, 2003). 

127 U.S. Department of State, supra note 90. 

128 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 37. 

129 Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44. 

130 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 37. 

131 Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44. 
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when questions were being raised about why President Bush asserted in his State 

of the Union address that Iraq was seeking to import uranium from Africa. Ms. 

Rice repeatedly stated during this period that no one in the White House was 

informed of the doubts about this uranium claim. For example, she stated: 

• “We did not know at the time — no one knew at the time, in our circles — 

maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our 

circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a 

forgery.”132 

• “[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence 

in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of 

Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.”133

These statements were simply false. As explained above, the CIA had repeatedly 

communicated its objections to White House officials, including Ms. Rice.134

VI. CONCLUSION

Because of the gravity of the subject and the President’s unique access to 

classified information, members of Congress and the public expect the President 

and his senior officials to take special care to be balanced and accurate in 

describing national security threats. It does not appear, however, that President 

Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and 

National Security Advisor Rice met this standard in the case of Iraq. To the 

contrary, these five officials repeatedly made misleading statements about the 

threat posed by Iraq. In 125 separate appearances, they made 11 misleading 

statements about the urgency of Iraq’s threat, 81 misleading statements about 

Iraq’s nuclear activities, 84 misleading statements about Iraq’s chemical and 

biological capabilities, and 61 misleading statements about Iraq’s relationship 

with al Qaeda. 

______________________________________________________________ 

132 Meet the Press, NBC (June 8, 2003). 

133 Face the Nation, CBS (July 11, 2003). 

134 See White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing, supra note 6.