Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 31A01-1509-JC-1476 | May 16, 2016 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Susan E. Schultz 

Corydon, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General 

Robert J. Henke 

Deputy Attorney General 

Abigail R. Recker 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the matter of Se.G. and So.G.: 

R.N. (Mother), 

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner. 

May 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

31A01-1509-JC-1476 

Appeal from the Harrison Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable John T. Evans, 

Judge 

The Honorable Lisa Garcia Reger, 

Juvenile Referee 

Trial Court Cause No. 

31C01-1504-JC-28 

31C01-1504-JC-29 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 31A01-1509-JC-1476 | May 16, 2016 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary 

[1] R.N. (Mother) and K.G. (Father) divorced shortly after K.G.’s father molested 

one of their children in the presence of Mother. As part of the divorce, Mother 

agreed that Father would have sole custody of the children and that she would 

not have any parenting time. The children lived with Father and his new wife. 

Four years later, the children were adjudicated children in need of services 

(CHINS) after Father murdered their stepmother and then killed himself while 

the children were home. The trial court ordered that Mother, who had not seen 

her children in four years, could not start visiting them until recommended by a 

psychologist. 

[2] The evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS determination—in particular, 

the court’s conclusion that treatment is unlikely to be provided or accepted 

without the coercive intervention of the court. Mother previously failed to 

intervene when her child was being molested by his grandfather and she has not 

had contact with the children in the four years since that allegation was 

substantiated by the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). Further, 

although the dispositional order delays visitation until Mother and the children 

complete additional therapy, we find that the order “provides a reasonable 

opportunity for participation by the child’s parent” according to Indiana Code 

section 31-34-19-6. We therefore affirm the CHINS adjudication and 

dispositional order. 
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Facts and Procedural History 

[3] Mother and Father had two sons, So.G., born in December 2007, and Se.G., 

born in February 2009. In September 2011, while Mother and Father were still 

married and living together, DCS investigated an allegation that So.G.’s 

paternal grandfather molested him while Mother was in the room. DCS 

Family Case Manager (FCM) Channell Hood investigated the allegation. 

Shortly thereafter, Father agreed to a safety plan that required him to ensure 

that Mother had no unsupervised contact with So.G. unless advance notice was 

given to FCM Hood. During the investigation, Mother admitted that she 

observed the sexual abuse. According to FCM Hood, Mother said “she didn’t 

know what to do. I believe she said she was numb.” Tr. p. 60. In December 

2011, DCS substantiated the child-molesting allegation against the grandfather 

and substantiated the allegation of “environment life[/]health endangering” 

against Mother. Id. at 64. 

[4] Four months later, Mother and Father got divorced. As part of the divorce, 

Mother agreed that Father would have sole custody of the children and that she 

would not have any parenting time. As a result, Mother has not had contact 

with the children since 2011. She remarried and currently lives in Louisiana 

with her husband and his daughter. 

[5] Father also remarried, and the two boys lived with Father and his wife until 

April 25, 2015. That day, Father shot and killed his wife before turning the gun 

on himself. Four children were in the home during the murder-suicide, 
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including So.G. and Se.G. The two boys were in a different part of the house, 

so they did not see the shooting. However, after hearing the gunshots, the boys 

went to investigate and they discovered their stepmother’s and Father’s bodies. 

[6] The police reported the shooting to DCS, and FCM Melinda Coleman came to 

the house. She was told that Mother’s parental rights had been terminated and 

that Mother was living in either Texas or Louisiana. FCM Coleman placed the 

children with Father’s half-brother and his wife. Later that night, FCM 

Coleman contacted Mother and learned that her parental rights had not been 

terminated after all and that she was living in Louisiana. 

[7] DCS filed a CHINS petition two days after the murder-suicide, and a factfinding hearing was conducted before a juvenile referee eight weeks later. At 

the hearing, the children’s therapist testified that “present contact between the 

children and [Mother] will absolutely re-traumatize those kids every single time 

[the contact] happens. And I’m not sure we will get through trauma treatment 

if we are retriggering them constantly.” Id. at 93. FCM Coleman testified that 

the children were not placed with Mother after DCS received her contact 

information for several reasons: Mother had not seen the children in four years, 

DCS substantiated an allegation against Mother in 2011, the therapist 

recommended against contact with Mother, Mother lives in Louisiana, and 

DCS is uncertain about Mother’s mental capacity to care for the children. 
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[8] Following the fact-finding hearing, the referee submitted a recommended order 

finding the children to be CHINS, and the trial court signed the order as 

written. The order includes the following findings of fact: 

[The children] witnessed the murder of their step-mother and 

suicide of their father and are in need of counseling and 

treatment to address the trauma therefrom. 

[So.G.] has been sexually abused by a family member in the 

presence of Mother and [Se.G.]. . . . Both children are in need of 

counseling to address this trauma. 

The mother has not seen her children for a period of 

approximately four years and has taken no steps to amend or 

revise the court order which suspends her right to parenting time. 

The children are afraid of their mother and are in need of 

counseling and treatment to address the four year absence of their 

mother. The mother neglected to seek counseling for her 

children or herself during that four year period. 

Appellant’s App. p. 12. The court, then, concluded that: 

The children’s mental health is seriously endangered due to the 

acts and omissions of the parents of the children. 

* * * * * 

The children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are 

not receiving; and are unlikely to be provided or accepted 

without the coercive intervention of the court. 

Id. 

[9] At the dispositional hearing, the children’s therapist again testified that contact 

with Mother would be harmful. The therapist recommended that Mother enter 

into therapy in Louisiana, and once Mother’s therapist had sufficient 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 31A01-1509-JC-1476 | May 16, 2016 Page 6 of 11

information about Mother’s condition, the two therapists could work together 

to develop a plan for reestablishing contact between Mother and the children. 

The referee submitted her recommendation, and the court ordered that Mother 

complete a psychological evaluation and any recommended treatment, and that 

“DCS shall arrange for a licensed psychologist to complete an independent 

review of possible visitation between the mother and child[ren] and make a 

separate recommendation. Visitation will begin once recommended.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 18, 23. Mother now appeals both the CHINS adjudication 

and the dispositional order. 

Discussion and Decision 

[10] Mother makes two arguments: there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the 

necessary treatment for the children is unlikely to be provided or accepted 

without the coercive intervention of the court, and that the dispositional order 

impermissibly allows a psychologist to decide when visitation should begin.1

 

1

 Mother also argues that the referee did not submit sufficient findings to permit child hearsay into evidence 

during the fact-finding hearing. See Ind. Code § 31-31-3-6 (requiring juvenile referees to “submit findings and 

recommendations in writing to the juvenile court, which shall enter such order as it considers proper”). 

However, the child hearsay addressed only the questions of whether the children were endangered and in 

need of treatment. On appeal, Mother agrees that the children have been endangered and require treatment. 

There is also sufficient evidence without the child hearsay to substantiate Mother’s role in the 2011 molesting 

of So.G. by his grandfather. Therefore, the admission of the hearsay, if it was in error, would be harmless 

error. Accordingly, we do not address Mother’s arguments regarding the admission of the child hearsay. 
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I. Insufficient Evidence 

[11] Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the CHINS 

determination. In reviewing a trial court’s determination that a child is in need 

of services, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). Instead, we consider 

only the evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 1287. 

[12] Here, the trial court adopted the findings and conclusions recommended by the 

juvenile referee according to Indiana Code section 31-31-3-6. When the trial 

court enters findings of fact and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We first consider 

whether the evidence supports the factual findings and then whether the 

findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the 

record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference, and a 

judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. 

[13] In this case, the CHINS petition was filed pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-

34-1-1, which provides: 

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes 

eighteen (18) years of age: 

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the 

child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision; and 
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(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: 

(A) the child is not receiving; and 

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the 

coercive intervention of the court. 

[14] Mother agrees that the children have been endangered and require treatment. 

She only disputes “the court’s conclusion, without factual recitation, that the 

care, treatment, or rehabilitation needed by the children was unlikely to be 

provided or accepted without the coercive intervention by the State.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 23. However, both the factual recitation and the record 

support this conclusion. First, the court found that “So.G. has been sexually 

abused by a family member in the presence of Mother and Se.G.” Appellant’s 

App. p. 12. This finding is supported by testimony that DCS substantiated an 

allegation of “environment life[/]health endangering” against Mother in 2011 

because she did not respond appropriately when she saw her son being 

molested by her father-in-law. Tr. p. 64. Second, the court found that Mother, 

who had not seen her children in four years, did not take any steps during that 

time to amend or revise the court order that suspended her right to parenting 

time. It was not clearly erroneous for the court to infer that its intervention will 

be required based on Mother’s past inability to intervene on behalf of her 

children. Moreover, the children’s therapist testified that contact with Mother 

right now “would be traumatic and devastating” and would impede the 

children’s recovery. Tr. p. 98-99. 
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[15] Nevertheless, Mother argues that this case is factually similar to D.B. v. Indiana 

Department of Child Services, 43 N.E.3d 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. In 

D.B., the father lived in another state and had not seen his two-year-old 

daughter in sixteen months. DCS petitioned to have the child declared a 

CHINS when mother was murdered. This Court determined that there was 

insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the father was a fit and 

capable parent. Id. at 606. This case is easily distinguishable from D.B. because 

Mother has a substantiated allegation of “environment life[/]health 

endangering” from 2011, which was the last time she had contact with the 

children. 

[16] Based on the findings and the record in this case, it was not clearly erroneous 

for the court to conclude that coercive intervention is required, to ensure 

appropriate treatment for the children. 

II. Dispositional Order 

[17] Mother also contends that the court erred when it ordered that visitation would 

not start until recommended by a psychologist. Mother argues that under 

Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6, it is impermissible for a court to allow a 

psychologist to determine when visitation will begin. 

[18] Section 31-34-19-6 provides, in relevant part: 

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best 

interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional 

decree that: 

* * * * * 
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(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the 

child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. 

[19] In this case, the court did enter a dispositional order that will ultimately give 

Mother a “reasonable opportunity” to participate in the care of her children. 

The children’s therapist testified at the fact-finding and dispositional hearings 

that contact with Mother would hinder the children’s treatment and that she did 

not recommend it at that time. The court, therefore, could have simply ordered 

no visitation. But the therapist also testified that visitation could be appropriate 

after Mother begins therapy and Mother’s and the children’s therapists can 

jointly consider when and how visitation should be introduced. The court 

crafted a dispositional order reflecting the therapist’s recommendation for 

achieving future visitation. The order also permits visitation to begin as soon as 

it is recommended by a psychologist, without requiring an additional court 

order. The dispositional order is well supported by the testimony and 

recommendation of the children’s therapist, and it provides a reasonable 

opportunity for Mother’s participation in light of the children’s present 

therapeutic needs. 

[20] Mother further argues that “absent specific directions of the court to commence 

visitation between [Mother] and her children, there is a risk that there will be no 

progress toward reunification[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 29. This risk is addressed 

by the periodic case review. Indiana Code section 31-34-21-2 requires the court 

to conduct a formal hearing at least every six months to review the case of each 

CHINS under the supervision of DCS. In addition, Indiana Code section 31-
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34-23-1 provides that the court may amend the dispositional order on its own 

motion or the motion of a parent, among others. Sections 31-34-21-2 and 31-

34-23-1, taken together, ensure that the court will continue to oversee progress 

on the dispositional order, Mother will have an ongoing opportunity to present 

evidence regarding visitation, and the court may intervene if necessary. 

[21] The dispositional order is in the best interest of the children, and the order 

provides Mother with a reasonable opportunity to participate. We, therefore, 

find no error. 

[22] Affirmed. 

Barnes, J., and Mathias, J., concur.