Testimony 

Before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, May 17, 2005 MARITIME SECURITY

Enhancements Made, 

But Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key 

Challenges 

Statement of Margaret T. Wrightson 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-05-448T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-448T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Margaret 

Wrightson at (415) 904-2200 or 

WrightsonM@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-448T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, United 

States Senate 

May 17, 2005

MARITIME SECURITY

Enhancements Made, But Implementation 

and Sustainability Remain Key 

Challenges 

Federal agencies and local stakeholders have taken many actions to secure 

seaports. For example, federal agencies have stepped up vessel monitoring, 

cargo and container inspection, and security patrol activities. Port 

stakeholders in the private sector and in state and local government have 

taken such actions as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and 

vessels and implementing security plans. These actions provide three types 

of protections: identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of seaports, securing 

the cargo moving through seaports, and developing an informed view of 

maritime activities through intelligence, information-sharing, and new 

technologies to identify and respond to threats. 

Due in large part to the urgency with which these actions were implemented, 

challenges have been encountered in implementing them. While some 

challenges may be resolved with time, others are more difficult to resolve 

and could hinder the actions’ effectiveness. The main challenges GAO has 

identified include failure to develop necessary planning components to carry 

out the programs; difficulty in coordinating the activities of federal agencies 

and port stakeholders to implement programs; and difficulty in maintaining 

the financial support to continue implementation of security enhancements.

As intensified homeland security efforts continue, assessing their 

contribution to security and their sustainability over time will become more 

important. Assessing the progress made in securing seaports is difficult, as 

these efforts lack clear goals defining what they are to achieve and measures 

that track progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation consider 

how much security is enough, more attention will likely be needed to define 

these goals and measures. Doing so is important because no amount of 

money can totally protect seaports from attack by a determined enemy. 

These realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts 

needs to incorporate an approach to assess critical infrastructure, determine 

what is most at risk, and apply measures designed to make cost effective use 

of resources and funding. 

Seaports are difficult to secure due to their size, ease of accessibility by water and land, 

variety of potential targets, and close proximity to urban areas. 

Source: Port of Los Angeles.

More than 3 years after the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, 

concerns remain over the security 

of U.S. seaports and waterways. 

Seaports and waterways are 

vulnerable given their size, easy 

accessibility by water and land, 

large numbers of potential targets, 

and close proximity to urban areas. 

Seaports are also a critical link in 

the international supply chain, 

which has its own potential 

vulnerabilities that terrorists could 

exploit to transport a weapon of 

mass destruction to the United 

States. Federal agencies such as 

the Coast Guard and Customs and 

Border Protection and other 

seaport stakeholders such as state 

and local law enforcement officials 

as well as owners and operators of 

facilities and vessels have taken 

actions to try to mitigate these 

vulnerabilities and enhance 

maritime security. 

This testimony, which is based on 

previously completed GAO work, 

reports on (1) the types of actions 

taken by the federal government 

and other stakeholders to address 

maritime security, (2) the main 

challenges that GAO observed in 

taking these actions, and (3) what 

tools and approaches may be 

useful in planning future actions to 

enhance maritime security. 

What GAO Recommends

This testimony makes no 

recommendations but cites several 

reports in which recommendations 

were previously made. 
Page 1 GAO-05-448T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the nation’s efforts to improve 

seaport security. More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, seaport security continues to be a major concern for the nation. 

For example, many seaport areas are inherently vulnerable, given their 

size, easy accessibility by water and land, large numbers of potential 

targets, and proximity to urban areas. Also, the large cargo volumes 

passing through seaports, such as containers destined for further shipment 

by other modes of transportation such as rail or truck, also represent a 

potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or 

other dangerous materials into the United States. The potential 

consequences of the risks created by these vulnerabilities are significant 

as the nation’s economy relies on an expeditious flow of goods through 

seaports. A successful attack on a seaport could result in a dramatic 

slowdown in the supply system, with consequences in the billions of 

dollars. 

Much has been set in motion to address these risks in the wake of the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Both Congress and the 

administration have been active, through legislation, presidential 

directives, and international agreements, in enhancing seaport security. 

Key agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have been reorganized 

under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and tasked with 

numerous responsibilities designed to strengthen seaport security. Many 

of these tasks were required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act 

of 2002 (MTSA).1

My testimony today draws primarily on the work we have done in 

responding to congressional requests for information and analysis about 

the nation’s homeland security efforts (see app. I for a list of recent 

reports and testimonies we have issued). We conducted our work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and 

the scope and methodology for this work can be found in the respective 

products. Over the course of completing this work, we have made a 

number of recommendations for specific agencies, which can be found in 

appendix II. While this body of work does not cover every program or 

action that has been taken, it does encompass a wide range of these 

 1

 Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 
Page 2 GAO-05-448T 

actions. My testimony will (1) provide an overview of the types of actions 

taken by the federal government and other stakeholders to address 

seaport security, (2) describe the main challenges encountered in taking 

these actions, and (3) describe what tools and approaches may be useful 

in charting a course for future actions to enhance security. 

In summary: 

Seaports are vulnerable on many fronts and the actions taken to secure 

them can be divided into three main categories: reducing vulnerabilities of 

specific targets within seaports, making the cargo flowing through these 

seaport gateways more secure, and developing what is called “maritime 

domain awareness”—a sufficiently informed view of maritime activities by 

stakeholders involved in security to quickly identify and respond to 

emergencies, unusual patterns or events, and matters of particular 

interest. Within each category, several actions have been taken or are 

underway. For example, assessments of potential targets have been 

completed at 55 of the nation’s most economically and militarily strategic 

seaports, and more than 9,000 vessels and over 3,000 facilities have 

developed security plans and have been reviewed by the Coast Guard. 

Customs inspectors have been placed at some overseas seaports and 

partnerships struck up with some private sector stakeholders to help 

ensure that the cargo and containers arriving at U.S. seaports are free of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a radiological “dirty bomb.” New 

assets are budgeted and are coming on line, including new Coast Guard 

boats and cutters and communication systems. Finally, new informationsharing networks and command structures have been created to allow 

more coordinated responses and increase awareness of activities going on 

in the maritime domain. Some of these efforts have been completed and 

others are ongoing; overall, the amount of effort has been considerable. 

The efforts we have reviewed over the past 3 years, many of which were 

quickly implemented to address pressing security needs, have encountered 

challenges that could significantly affect their success. Some of these 

challenges are likely to be resolved with time, but some reflect greater 

difficulty and therefore merit more attention. The more complex 

challenges take three main forms: 

• Program design and implementation: Some agencies have failed to 

design programs and planning components, such as human capital 

plans and performance measures, that are necessary to successfully 

implement their programs and ensure they are effective. For example, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) started implementation of 
Page 3 GAO-05-448T 

two key container supply chain security initiatives before taking 

adequate steps to develop plans and strategies to effectively manage 

critical aspects of the programs such as human capital and 

achievement of program objectives. 

• Coordinating security efforts with stakeholders: Many private sector 

companies and governmental agencies are involved in seaport security 

efforts, and in some cases progress has been hampered because of 

difficulties in communication and coordination between parties. For 

example, deadlines in the development of an identification card for 

transportation workers have been missed due in part to a lack of 

communication and coordination between TSA and DHS. 

• Funding security improvements: Economic constraints, such as 

declining revenues and increased security costs, make it difficult to 

provide and sustain the funding necessary to continue implementing 

security measures and activities by maritime stakeholders including the 

federal government. Consequently, many stakeholders rely heavily on 

the federal government for assistance, and requests for federal grant 

funding far outstrip the funding amounts available. For example, 

although more than $560 million in grants has been awarded to seaport 

stakeholders since 2002 under federal grant programs for 

implementation of security measures and activities, this amount has 

met only a fraction of the amount requested by these stakeholders. 

 As actions to enhance homeland security continue, and as it becomes 

clearer that the price of these actions will be measured in the billions of 

dollars, it is likely that increasing attention will turn to assessing the 

progress made in securing seaports and determine where future actions 

and funds should be allocated to further enhance security. Although there 

is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led to a heightened 

awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability to identify and 

respond to many security threats, assessing the degree of progress in 

making the nation more secure is difficult. Thus far, seaport security 

actions—and homeland security activities in general—lack performance 

measures to define what these activities are intended to achieve and 

measure progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation 

continue to evaluate how much security is enough, more attention on 

defining these goals and measures will likely be needed by stakeholders. 

Doing so is all the more important because, as groups such as the 9/11 

Commission have pointed out, no amount of money can totally insulate 

seaports from attack by a well-funded and determined enemy. These 

realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts 

also needs to incorporate an approach to identify and manage risk—that 
Page 4 GAO-05-448T 

is, on assessing critical infrastructure, determining what is most at risk, 

and applying sound measures designed to make cost-effective use of 

resources and funding. 

The vast U.S. maritime system contains more than 300 seaports and 3,700 

cargo and passenger terminals. These seaports dot not only our seacoasts, 

but also major lakes and rivers (see fig. 1). Much of the nation’s 

commercial maritime activities, however, are concentrated in about a 

dozen major seaports, such as Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York-New 

Jersey, and Houston. 

Figure 1: Location of U.S. Seaports 

The nation’s seaports are economic engines and a key part of the national 

defense system. More than 95 percent of the nation’s non-North American 

foreign trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, such as foreign oil) 

Background 

Source: GAO presentation of TSA, Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation statistics, and Federal 

Transit Administration data.
Page 5 GAO-05-448T 

arrives by ship. Cargo containers, approximately 7 million of which 

entered the country in 2002, are central to an efficient transportation 

network because they can be quickly shifted from ships to trains and 

trucks and back again. Because of these efficiencies, the U.S. and world 

economies have become increasingly reliant on cargo containers to 

transport their goods. With regard to national security, the Departments of 

Defense and Transportation have designated 17 U.S. seaports as strategic 

because they are necessary for use in the event of a major military 

deployment. Thirteen of them are commercial seaports. 

While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did not involve seaports, 

they called attention to ways in which seaports represent an attractive and 

vulnerable terrorist target. Various studies have pointed out that 

significant disruptions could result from a seaport-related attack. For 

example, the Brookings Institution has estimated that costs associated 

with U.S. seaport closures resulting from a detonated weapon of mass 

destruction could amount to $1 trillion. The firm of Booz, Allen, and 

Hamilton studied the potential cost of discovering an undetonated weapon 

of mass destruction at a U.S. seaport and placed the cost of a 12-day 

closure of seaports at approximately $58 billion. An actual closure of 

seaports along the West Coast occurred for 10 days in 2002 due to a labor 

dispute. According to one estimate, the cost of this closure to the national 

economy for the first 5 days was estimated at $4.7 billion and increased 

exponentially after that.2

 Similarly, if 1 or more of the 17 strategic U.S. 

seaports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were successfully 

attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained and 

critical infrastructure lost, but the military could also lose precious cargo 

and time and be forced to rely heavily on already burdened airlift 

capabilities. 

Since September 11, 2001, a number of actions have been taken or are 

underway to address seaport security by a diverse mix of agencies and 

seaport stakeholders. Federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and TSA, have been tasked with 

responsibilities and functions intended to make seaports more secure, 

such as monitoring vessel traffic or inspecting cargo and containers, and 

 2

 Zeigert, Amy, et. al. “Port Security: Improving Emergency Response Capabilities at the 

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.” California Policy Options 2005. University of 

California Los Angeles, School of Public Affairs (Los Angeles, Calif. 2005). 

Many Actions Have 

Been Taken or Are 

Underway to Address 

Seaport Security 
Page 6 GAO-05-448T 

procuring new assets such as aircraft and cutters to conduct patrols and 

respond to threats. In addition to these federal agencies, seaport 

stakeholders in the private sector and at the state and local levels of 

government have taken actions to enhance the security of seaports, such 

as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels operated 

within the seaports and developing security plans to protect against a 

terrorist attack. The actions taken by these agencies and stakeholders are 

primarily aimed at three types of protections: (1) identifying and reducing 

vulnerabilities of the facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in 

seaports, (2) securing the cargo and commerce flowing through seaports, 

and (3) developing greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced 

intelligence, information-sharing capabilities, and assets and technologies. 

Seaports facilitate the freedom of movement and flow of goods, and in 

doing so they allow people, cargo, and vessels to transit with relative 

anonymity. While seaports contain terminals and other facilities where 

goods bound for import or export are unloaded and loaded, or where 

people board and disembark cruise ships or ferries, seaports also often 

contain other infrastructure critical to the nation’s economy and defense, 

such as military installations, chemical factories, powerplants, and 

refineries. The combination of assets, access, and anonymity makes for 

potentially attractive targets. The facilities and vessels in seaports can be 

vulnerable on many fronts. For example, facilities where containers are 

transferred between ships and railroad cars or trucks must be able to 

screen vehicles entering the facility and routinely check cargo for 

evidence of tampering. Chemical factories and other installations where 

hazardous materials are present must be able to control access to areas 

containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances. Vessels, ranging 

from oil tankers and freighters to tugboats and passenger ferries, must be 

able to restrict access to certain areas on board the vessel, such as the 

bridge or other control stations critical to the vessel’s operation. 

Given the wide range of potential targets, an effective security response 

includes identifying targets, assessing risks to them, and taking steps to 

reduce or mitigate these risks. An essential step in this process is to 

conduct a security or vulnerability assessment. This assessment, which is 

needed both for the seaport as a whole and for individual vessels and 

facilities, identifies vulnerabilities in physical structures, personnel 

protection systems, processes, and other areas that may lead to a security 

breach. For example, this assessment might reveal weaknesses in an 

organization’s security systems or unprotected access points such as a 

facility’s perimeter not being sufficiently lighted or gates not being secured 

Identifying and Reducing 

the Vulnerabilities of 

Facilities, Infrastructure, 

and Vessels 
Page 7 GAO-05-448T 

or monitored after hours. After the vulnerabilities are identified, measures 

can be then be identified that will reduce or mitigate the vulnerabilities 

when installed or implemented. 

Most actions to identify and reduce the vulnerabilities within seaports 

were specifically required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002 (MTSA). Passage of MTSA was a major step in establishing a security 

framework for America’s seaports. This security framework includes 

assessment of risks, access controls over personnel and facilities, and 

development and implementation of security plans, among other activities. 

Table 1 shows some of the actions that have been taken and programs that 

are in the process of being implemented to carry out this framework. 3

 3

 None of the listings in this testimony is meant to be exhaustive of all the efforts under 

way. The Coast Guard has a range of activities underway for reducing seaport 

vulnerabilities that extends beyond the actions shown here. Such activities include, among 

others the use of armed boarding officers, formerly known as sea marshals, who board 

high-interest vessels arriving or departing U.S. seaports and stand guard in critical areas of 

the vessels; the establishment of Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) to provide 

antiterrorism protection for strategic shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical 

infrastructure; and the underwater port security system, which uses trained divers and 

robotic cameras to check ship hulls and piers and an underwater intruder detection 

system. We have not evaluated the effectiveness of these activities. 
Page 8 GAO-05-448T 

Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken and Programs Underway to Identify and Reduce Vulnerabilities 

Action or program Description 

Conducting security assessments and 

developing security plans for facilities and 

vessels

MTSA and its implementing regulations require designated owners or operators of 

maritime facilities or vessels to identify vulnerabilities and develop security plans for their 

facilities or vessels. The plans were reviewed and approved by the Coast Guard. Since 

July 1, 2004, the Coast Guard has been conducting inspections of these facilities and 

vessels to ensure the plans have been implemented. The Coast Guard completed 

inspections of the facilities by December 31, 2004, and is scheduled to complete 

inspections of the vessels by July 1, 2005. 

Conducting security assessments and 

developing seaport-wide security plans 

To meet another MTSA requirement, the Coast Guard led efforts to conduct a seaportwide security assessment of each of the nation’s seaports and develop a security plan for 

the seaport zone. In carrying out these efforts, the Coast Guard worked with a wide variety 

of stakeholders, such as state and local governments, law enforcement, owners and 

operators of facilities and vessels, and trade and labor organizations. 

Development of the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

TWIC is designed to respond to various statutory provisions relating to transportation 

related worker identification including MTSA, which requires a biometric identification card 

be issued to individuals requiring unescorted access to secure areas of seaport facilities 

or vessels. This credential is being designed to be a universally recognized identification 

card accepted across all modes of the national transportation system, including airports, 

railroad terminals, and seaports. 

Port Security Assessment Program Separate from MTSA requirements, the Coast Guard established a program after 

September 11, 2001, to assess vulnerabilities of the nation’s 55 most strategic commercial 

and military seaports. The program has changed considerably since its inception and now 

includes a geographic information system (GIS) to help identify and provide up-to-date 

information on threats and incidents, as well as provide accessible information to help 

develop security plans. 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and TSA data. 

The amount of effort involved in carrying out these actions and 

implementing these programs has been considerable. For example, after 

following an aggressive time frame to develop regulations to implement 

the requirements of MTSA, the Coast Guard reviewed and approved the 

security plans of the over 3,000 facilities and more than 9,000 vessels that 

were required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to reduce 

them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the security plans 

were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it completed onsite inspections of all facilities and thousands of vessels to ensure the 

plans were being implemented as approved. In addition to its work on the 

security plans and inspections, the Coast Guard completed security 

assessments of the nation’s 55 most economically and militarily strategic 

seaports. 

While the facilities, vessels, and infrastructure within seaports have 

vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, the cargoes transiting through seaports 

also have vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. Containers are of 

Securing the Cargo 

Flowing through Seaports 
Page 9 GAO-05-448T 

particular concern because they can be filled overseas at so many different 

locations and are transported through complex logistics networks before 

reaching U.S. seaports. From the time the container is loaded for shipping 

to the time the container arrives at a seaport, the containers must go 

through several steps that involve many different participants and many 

points of transfer. Each of these steps in the supply chain presents its own 

vulnerabilities that terrorists could take advantage of to place a WMD into 

a container for shipment to the United States. A report prepared by the 

National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy stated that a container is ideally suited to deliver a WMD or a 

radiological “dirty bomb.” While there have been no known incidents yet 

of containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have exploited 

containers for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling weapons, people, 

and illicit substances. Such activities demonstrate the vulnerability of the 

freight transportation industry and suggest opportunities for further 

exploitation of containers by criminals, including terrorist groups. 

In general, the actions taken thus far are aimed at identifying, tracking, 

and scrutinizing the container cargo shipments moving into the country. 

Most of these actions are being done by CBP, the DHS agency responsible 

for protecting the nation’s borders and official ports of entry. CBP uses a 

layered approach that attempts to focus resources on potentially risky 

cargo containers while allowing other cargo containers to proceed without 

disrupting commerce. This approach includes the actions and programs 

shown in table 2. Several of these actions involve a strategy of moving 

primary reliance for security away from control systems at U.S. seaports 

of entry and toward improved controls at points of origin and along the 

way.4

 4

 Another program to help secure the overseas supply chain process is the Coast Guard’s 

International Port Security Program. In response to being required under MTSA to assess 

antiterrorism measures maintained at foreign seaports, the Coast Guard established this 

program in April 2004 to protect the global shipping industry by helping foreign nations 

evaluate security measures in their seaports. Through bilateral or multilateral discussions, 

the Coast Guard and the host nations review the implementation of security measures 

against established security standards, such as the International Maritime Organization’s 

ISPS Code. To conduct the program, the Coast Guard has assigned officials to three regions 

(Asia-Pacific, Europe/Africa/Middle East, and Central/South America) to facilitate the 

discussions. In addition, a Coast Guard team has been established to conduct country/port 

visits, discuss security measures implemented, and develop best practices between 

countries. Each year the Coast Guard seeks to visit approximately 45 countries that 

conduct maritime trade with the United States. 
Page 10 GAO-05-448T 

Table 2: Examples of Container Security Actions 

Action Description 

Automated Targeting System (ATS) A computer model reviews documentation on all arriving containers and helps select or 

target containers for additional scrutiny. 

Supply Chain Stratified Examination Supplements ATS by randomly selecting additional containers to be physically examined. 

The results of the random inspection program are to be compared with the results of ATS 

inspections to improve targeting. 

Container Security Initiative (CSI) Places staff at designated foreign seaports to work with foreign counterparts to identify 

and inspect high-risk containers for weapons of mass destruction before they are 

shipped to the United States. 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism (C-TPAT) 

Cooperative program between CBP and members of the international trade community in 

which private companies agree to improve the security of their supply chains in return for 

a reduced likelihood that their containers will be inspected. 

Operation Safe Commerce Begun by the private sector and now administered by DHS’s Office of Domestic 

Preparedness, efforts center on (1) ensuring that containers are loaded in a secure 

environment at the point of product origin, with 100 percent verification of their contents; 

(2) using such technology as pressure, light, or temperature sensors to continually 

monitor containers throughout their overseas voyage to the point of distribution in the 

United States; and (3) using cargo-tracking technology to keep accurate track of 

containers at all points in the supply chain, including distribution to their ultimate 

destinations. 

Megaports Initiative In 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Initiative to enable foreign 

government personnel at key seaports to use radiation detection equipment to screen 

shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports for nuclear and other radioactive 

material that could be used against the United States or its allies. Through the Initiative, 

DOE installs radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports that is then operated by 

foreign government officials and port personnel working at these seaports. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP and DOE data. 

The table also shows Operation Safe Commerce, initiated by the private 

sector and now administered by DHS’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, 

which employs a similar strategy. This action, in pilot-project form that 

was initially funded by $58 million appropriated by Congress, is intended 

to help strengthen the security of cargo as it moves along the international 

supply chain in containers.5

 In late 2004, the second of two initial phases of 

the project was concluded. This phase involved identifying the security 

vulnerabilities of 19 separate supply chains and trying out technologies, 

such as container seals or sensors, and their integration with 

governmental policies, logistic processes and procedures that could 

mitigate those vulnerabilities. The project has received additional funding 

 5

 The nation’s three largest container port regions (Los Angeles/Long Beach, New 

York/New Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) are involved in the Operation Safe Commerce pilot 

project. 
Page 11 GAO-05-448T 

of $17 million that has been targeted to conduct a third phase in which the 

best technologies and practices identified in the first two phases will be 

further tested on a high number of containers for their effectiveness and 

tamper resistance on three separate supply chains. A report on the best 

practices identified in the first two phases is expected to be issued in June 

2005, and completion of the third phase is expected by October 2006. 

The other actions taken to enhance the security of cargo and commerce 

have been substantial. In 2002 CBP quickly rolled out the CSI and C-TPAT 

programs shown in table 2 and enlisted the participation of several 

countries and companies. By April 2005, CSI was operational at 35 

seaports, located in 18 countries. Similarly, C-TPAT membership grew 

from about 1,700 companies in January 2003 to over 9,000 companies in 

March 2005. Given the urgency to take steps to protect against terrorism 

after the September 11, 2001, attacks, some of the actions were taken 

using an “implement and amend” approach. That is, CBP had to 

immediately implement the activity with the knowledge it may need to 

modify the approach later. For example, in August 2002, CBP modified the 

already developed Automatic Targeting System with new terrorism-related 

criteria. 

The third main area of activity to enhance seaport security—maritime 

domain awareness—is the understanding by stakeholders involved in 

maritime security of anything associated with the global maritime 

environment that could adversely affect the security, safety, economy or 

environment of the United States. This awareness is essential to identify 

and respond to any unusual patterns or anomalies that could portend a 

possible terrorist attack. To be effective, maritime domain awareness must 

be comprehensive and include information on vessels, seaport 

infrastructures and facilities, shipping lanes and transit corridors, 

waterways, and anchorages, among other things. It must also identify 

threats as soon as possible and far enough away from U.S. seaports to 

eliminate or mitigate the threat. By effectively identifying potential threats, 

this awareness can be used as a force multiplier to position resources 

where they are needed most to respond, instead of spreading out limited 

resources to address all threats, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. 

In addition, when shared, this awareness has the potential to facilitate the 

coordination of efforts of local, state, federal, and even international 

stakeholders in responding to potential threats. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took steps such 

as increasing the number of security patrols conducted within seaports 

Developing Greater 

Maritime Domain 

Awareness 
Page 12 GAO-05-448T 

and waterways that helped contribute to increased maritime domain 

awareness. Although maritime homeland security duties are not new to 

the Coast Guard, the number of hours the Coast Guard used resources 

(such as ships, boats, or aircraft) to carry out seaport, waterway, and 

coastal security activities during fiscal year 2003 increased by 1,220 

percent from their pre-September 11, 2001, level. Relative to the rest of the 

Coast Guard’s responsibilities, this represented an increase from 4 percent 

of the Coast Guard’s total annual resource hours being used for seaport, 

waterway, and coastal security activities before September 11, 2001, to 34 

percent by September 30, 2003. These activities provide an important input 

to maritime domain awareness as it places Coast Guard personnel out in 

the seaports where they can observe, report, and respond to suspect 

activities or vessels. In addition, these patrols provide the Coast Guard 

with a visible presence out in the seaport that may deter a potential 

terrorist attack from being carried out. 

As the lead federal agency responsible for protecting the U.S. maritime 

domain, the Coast Guard has spearheaded an interagency approach for 

establishing maritime domain awareness. Within this approach are several 

activities and actions intended to collect information and intelligence, 

analyze the information and intelligence, and disseminate the analyzed 

information and intelligence to appropriate federal, state, local, or private 

seaport stakeholders. Some of these actions were required under MTSA, 

such as the establishment of an Automatic Identification System to track 

vessels, as well as creation of area maritime security committees of local 

seaport stakeholders who identify and address risks within their seaport. 

In addition to these actions, the Department of Defense and DHS formed a 

Maritime Domain Awareness Senior Steering Group in 2004 to coordinate 

national efforts to improve maritime domain awareness. Under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 13, issued in December 2004, this steering 

group is required to develop a national plan for maritime domain 

awareness by June 2005. According to the head of the Coast Guard’s 

maritime domain awareness program, a draft of this plan is being reviewed 

before it is submitted to the President. Table 3 shows some of the actions 

currently being taken or underway to enhance maritime domain 

awareness. 
Page 13 GAO-05-448T 

Table 3: Examples of Activities to Develop Maritime Domain Awareness 

Maritime Domain 

Awareness activity Example of activity 

Collection of information and 

intelligence 

Automatic Identification System: AIS uses a device aboard a vessel to transmit an 

identifying signal to a receiver located at the seaport and other ships in the area. This 

signal gives seaport officials and other vessels nearly instantaneous information and 

awareness about a vessel’s identity, position, speed, and course. The Coast Guard 

intends to provide AIS coverage to meet maritime domain awareness requirements in 

all navigable waters of the United States and further offshore. As of May 2005, the 

Coast Guard has AIS coverage in several seaports and coastal areas.a

 In addition to 

this system, the Coast Guard is also working with the International Maritime 

Organization (IMO) to develop functional and technical requirements for long-range 

tracking out to 2,000 nautical miles. The Coast Guard proposed an amendment to the 

International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) for this initiative, which is 

currently under consideration by the international body. However, according to the 

Coast Guard, the issue of long-range tracking is contentious internationally and it is 

uncertain whether the amendment will be adopted. 

Analysis of information and 

intelligence 

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers and Field Intelligence Support Teams:

Centers have been established by the Coast Guard on the East and West Coasts to 

provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard commanders and units. The teams also 

conduct initial analysis of intelligence in coordination with federal, state, and local law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

Dissemination of information and 

intelligence 

Area Maritime Security Committees: The committees serve as forums for local 

seaport stakeholders from federal agencies, state and local governments, law 

enforcement, and private industries to gain a comprehensive perspective of security 

issues at a seaport location. Information is disseminated through regularly scheduled 

meetings, issuance of electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around seaport 

facilities, and sharing key documents. The committees also serve as a link for 

communicating threats and security information to seaport stakeholders. 

Interagency Operational Centers: These centers provide information 24 hours a day 

about maritime activities and involve various federal and nonfederal agencies directly in 

operational decisions using this information. Radar, sensors, and cameras offer 

representations of vessels and facilities. Other data are available from intelligence 

sources, including data on vessels, cargo, and crew. Unlike the area maritime security 

committees, these centers are operational in nature with a unified or joint command 

structure designed to receive information and act on it. Representatives from the 

various agencies work side by side, each having access to databases and other 

sources of information from their respective agencies. These currently exist in three 

locations: Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; and San Diego, California. 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

a

 The Coast Guard currently has AIS coverage in the following areas: Alaska (Anchorage, Homer, Nikiski, Seward, Valdez, and 

Juneau); Puget Sound (Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Port Angeles, and Olympia); the Columbia River entrance; San Francisco Bay and 

approaches; Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor and approaches; San Diego and approaches; Hawaii (Honolulu and Pearl Harbor); Gulf 

of Mexico (Houston-Galveston, Port Arthur, Berwick Bay, and Lower Mississippi River-New Orleans-Baton Rouge); South Florida (Key 

West, Miami, and Port Everglades); Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; New York, New York; Long Island Sound (New 

Haven and New London); Boston Harbor and approaches; and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. 

While many of the activities to develop maritime domain awareness are 

still underway, some progress has already been made. One activity in this 

area that we have recently looked at concerns the process of information 

sharing between federal and nonfederal seaport stakeholders participating 
Page 14 GAO-05-448T 

on area maritime security committees.6 The Coast Guard organized 43 of 

these committees, covering the nation’s 361 seaports. While a primary 

purpose of the committees is to develop a seaport-wide security plan for 

their respective seaports, the committees also provide links for 

communicating threats and security information to seaport stakeholders—

links that generally did not exist prior to the creation of the committees. 

The types of information shared among committee members with security 

clearances included assessments of vulnerabilities at specific seaport 

locations, information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and 

strategies to use in protecting key infrastructure. Our review found that 

the committees improved information sharing among seaport security 

stakeholders, including the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of 

information shared. 

Another aspect of improving maritime domain awareness involves having 

the assets to communicate and conduct patrols, and in this regard, the 

Coast Guard has budgeted for and is in the process of receiving substantial 

new resources. In 1996, the Coast Guard initiated a major recapitalization 

effort—known as the Integrated Deepwater System—to replace and 

modernize the agency’s aging and deteriorating fleet of aircraft and vessel 

assets. The focus of the program is not just on new ships and aircraft, but 

also on newer, more capable assets, with improved and integrated 

command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. Although the 

program was started before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast 

Guard plans to leverage these capabilities of the 20 year, $17 billion dollar 

program to enhance its maritime domain awareness and seaport security 

operations such as patrols and response. 

Propelled by a strong sense of urgency to secure the seaports, federal 

agencies, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, accomplished a 

considerable amount in a short time. At the same time, these actions have 

also shown the strains that often occur when difficult tasks must be done 

quickly. We have not examined every action that has been started or 

enhanced regarding maritime security, but our work to date has covered a 

number of them. It is not surprising that we have found, besides the 

 6

 GAO, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but 

Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394 (Washington, 

D.C.: April 15, 2005). 

Challenges for 

Improving Maritime 

Security Take Three 

Main Forms 
Page 15 GAO-05-448T 

progress made, a number of missteps, false starts, and inefficiencies. 

These represent challenges to overcome. 

While some of these challenges will be resolved with time, analysis, and 

oversight, there are other challenges that bear even more careful watching, 

because they may prove to be considerably more difficult to overcome. I 

would like to highlight three of those challenges, providing examples from 

our recent work. These three challenges involve (1) design and 

implementing programs, (2) coordinating between different agencies and 

stakeholder interests, and (3) determining how to pay for these efforts. 

I will discuss today two illustrative examples related to challenges in 

program design and implementation that we have identified from our 

work. These include the (1) lack of planning and performance measures 

for program design and (2) lack of experienced personnel for program 

implementation. 

One effect of having to design programs quickly is that they may lack such 

elements as strategic plans and performance measures needed to set 

program goals and monitor performance. The lack of such tools can create 

problems that need to be resolved as the program unfolds. For example, 

we have reviewed CBP’s actions to establish a system meant to reliably 

identify potentially risky cargo containers. 

Our work has shown that a need exists for additional efforts in several 

homeland security activities, including securing cargo, in order to help 

ensure the effectiveness of the approach.7

 As we noted in a July 2003 

report, the former U.S. Customs Service, part of which is now CBP 

initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 in 

response to security vulnerabilities created by ocean container trade and 

the concern that terrorists could exploit these vulnerabilities to transport 

or detonate WMDs in the United States. 8

 During the first year, program 

 7

 GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater 

Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: July 2003); and GAO, 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo 

Containers for Inspection, GAO-04-557T (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). In addition, we 

have additional work underway regarding the Container Security Initiative program and 

expect to issue our report in May. 

8

 GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater 

Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C: July 2003). 

Challenges in Program 

Design and 

Implementation 

Lack of Planning and 

Performance Measures for 

Program Design 
Page 16 GAO-05-448T 

officials quickly designed and rolled out the initiative, modifying 

operations over time. The service achieved strong initial participation 

among the countries that it sought to enroll in the initiative, reaching 

agreement with 15 governments to place U.S. personnel at 24 seaports, and 

placing teams in 5 of these seaports. However, CBP had not taken 

adequate steps to incorporate human capital planning, develop 

performance measures, and plan strategically—factors essential to the 

program’s long-term success and accountability. We noted, for example, 

that: 

• More than 1 year into the implementation of the initiative, CBP had not 

developed a systematic human capital plan to recruit, train, and assign 

the more than 120 program staff that would be needed for long-term 

assignments in a wide range of foreign seaports, some of which could 

require language capabilities and diplomatic skills. 

• CBP lacked performance measures for the initiative that demonstrated 

program achievements and established accountability. For example, 

the service lacked measures that assessed the impact of collocating 

U.S. and foreign customs officials in foreign seaports to determine 

which containers should be targeted for inspection. 

• CBP’s focus on short-term operational planning in order to quickly 

implement the program impeded its ability to systematically carry out 

strategic planning. We noted that the service did not have a strategic 

plan for the initiative that describes how it intends to achieve program 

goals and objectives. As a result, CBP lacked elements of strategic 

planning that would improve the management of the program and 

allow CBP to establish accountability for planned expenditures. 

As also reported in July 2003, another program that did not take adequate 

steps to incorporate the human capital planning and performance 

measures necessary for the program’s long-term success and 

accountability is CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program. Initiated in November 2001, C-TPAT is an initiative that 

attempts to improve the security of the international supply chain. It is a 

cooperative program between CBP and members of the international trade 

community in which private companies agree to improve the security of 

their supply chains in return for a reduced likelihood that their containers 

will be inspected. 

During the first year, more than 1,700 companies agreed to participate in 

the program, and most received the key benefit—a reduced likelihood of 
Page 17 GAO-05-448T 

inspections for WMDs. However, we noted similar kinds of problems to 

those in the CSI program. For example, we found that: 

• Even as it rolled out new program elements, CBP lacked a human 

capital plan for increasing the number of C-TPAT staff from 10 to more 

than 160. 

• CBP had not developed performance measures for C-TPAT that would 

establish accountability and measure program achievements. For 

example, CBP had no performance measure to assess the impact of 

C-TPAT on improving supply chain security practices, possibly 

resulting in benefits being granted to undeserving companies. 

• CBP lacked strategic planning in rolling out C-TPAT, failing to 

communicate how it planned to implement critical program elements 

designed to verify that companies have security measures in place and 

follow through with recommended changes. 

We are currently reviewing both the CSI and CTPAT programs and will 

soon be issuing reports to update our earlier evaluation of these programs. 

One major challenge in program implementation is the lack of experienced 

personnel, which is to be expected given the rapid increase in newly hired 

personnel since September 11, 2001. Agencies such as the Coast Guard 

expect to see large increases in the number of staff over the next few years 

to help meet new and expanded responsibilities. Consequently, they also 

face a challenge in absorbing this increase and training them to be fully 

productive. We pointed out early on that this would be a challenge for the 

Coast Guard,9

 and subsequent work has shown this to be the case. For 

example, after a Coast Guard internal review found that readiness of its 

multi-mission stations—the shore-based units whose responsibilities 

include finding and rescuing mariners in danger--had been in decline for an 

extended period, the Coast Guard began efforts to improve the readiness 

of the stations. This effort was complicated by the new homeland security 

responsibilities the stations assumed after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001. In a recent review of staffing and readiness at these 

multi-mission stations,10 we found that the Coast Guard was still in the 

 9

 GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to the 

New Department, GAO-03-467T (Washington, D.C.: February 2003). 

10 GAO, Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2005). 

Lack of Experienced Personnel 

for Program Implementation 
Page 18 GAO-05-448T 

process of defining new standards for security activities and had yet to 

translate the impact of security-related mission responsibilities into 

specific station readiness requirements, such as staffing standards. 

Consequently, even though station staffing had increased 25 percent since 

2001, the Coast Guard was unable to align staffing resources with mission 

activities, which resulted in a significant number of positions not being 

filled with qualified personnel and station personnel working significantly 

longer hours than are allowed under the Coast Guard’s work standards. 

We also identified personnel or human capital challenges such as lack of 

experienced personnel related to the Coast Guard’s program to oversee 

implementation of MTSA-required security plans by owners and operators 

of maritime facilities and vessels. These security plans are performancebased, meaning the Coast Guard has specified the outcomes it is seeking 

to achieve and has given seaport stakeholders responsibility for identifying 

and delivering the measures needed to achieve these outcomes. While this 

approach provides flexibility to owners and operators in designing and 

implementing their plans, it also places a premium on the skills and 

experience of inspectors to identify deficiencies and recommend 

corrective action. Because the Coast Guard had to review and assess for 

compliance more than 12,000 security plans for facilities and vessels, it 

had to rely heavily on reservists, which varied greatly in the level of their 

skills and experience in this area. For example, some reservists had 

graduate degrees in security management while others had no formal 

security training or experience. In June 2004, we recommended that the 

Coast Guard carefully evaluate its efforts during the initial surge period for 

inspections.11 The Coast Guard has adjusted its inspection program to 

make its compliance assessments more relevant and useful, but it has not 

yet determined the overall effectiveness of its compliance actions. 

Coordinating massive new homeland security actions has been an 

acknowledged challenge since the events of September 11, 2001, and 

seaport security has been no exception. On the federal side alone, we have 

for several years designated implementing and transforming the new DHS 

as a high-risk area.12 Since the agency’s inception in March 2003, DHS 

leadership has provided a foundation to maintain critical operations while 

 11 GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning 

Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004). 

12 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005). 

Challenges in Coordinating 

Actions 
Page 19 GAO-05-448T 

undergoing transformation, and the agency has begun to put systems in 

place to operate more effectively and efficiently as an agency. In managing 

its transformation, however, DHS still faces such issues as forming 

effective partnerships with other governmental and private-sector entities. 

We have made numerous recommendations related to information sharing, 

particularly as it relates to fulfilling federal critical infrastructure 

protection responsibilities.13 For example, we have reported on the 

practices of organizations that successfully share sensitive or time-critical 

information, including establishing trust relationships, developing 

information-sharing standards and protocols, establishing secure 

communications mechanisms, and disseminating sensitive information 

appropriately. Federal agencies such as DHS and the Coast Guard have 

concurred with our recommendations that they develop appropriate 

strategies to address the many potential barriers to information sharing. 

However, as of January 2005, many federal efforts to do this remain in the 

planning or early implementation stages especially in the area of homeland 

security information sharing, including establishing clear goals, objectives, 

and expectations for the many participants in information-sharing efforts; 

and consolidating, standardizing, and enhancing federal structures, 

policies, and capabilities for the analysis and dissemination of information. 

In this regard, the issue of information-sharing across agency and 

stakeholder lines has emerged as a significant enough challenge that we 

have also designated it as a high-risk area. Here are three examples that 

illustrate the kinds of problems and challenges that remain related to 

seaport security. 

While coordination of information-sharing at the seaport level appears to 

have improved, seaports are experiencing challenges with regards to 

nonfederal officials obtaining security clearances. For some time, state 

and local seaport and law enforcement personnel have reported problems 

in obtaining federally generated intelligence information about their 

jurisdictions because they did not have a federal security clearance. 

However, as of February 2005—over 4 months after the Coast Guard had 

developed a list of over 350 nonfederal area maritime security committee 

participants as having a need for a security clearance—only 28 had 

submitted the necessary paperwork for the background check. Local 

 13 GAO, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key 

Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2003); and Homeland 

Security: Information-Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management 

Issues, GAO-03-715T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003). 

Obtaining Security Clearances 
Page 20 GAO-05-448T 

Coast Guard officials told us they did not clearly understand their 

responsibility for communicating with state and local officials about the 

process for obtaining a security clearance. After we expressed our 

concerns to Coast Guard officials in headquarters in February 2005, 

officials took action and drafted guidelines clarifying the role that local 

Coast Guard officials play in the program. 

In a January 2005 report,14 we reported that improvement in the 

coordination of state, local, and federal entities during seaport exercises 

was needed. While it was still too early to determine how well entities will 

function in coordinating an effective response to a seaport-related threat 

or incident, we identified four operational issues that needed to be 

addressed in order to promote more effective coordination. We found that 

more than half of the seaport exercises and after-action reports we 

examined raised communication issues, including problems with 

information sharing among first responders and across agency lines. We 

also found that over half of the exercises raised concerns with 

communication and the resources available, including inadequate facilities 

or equipment, differing response procedures, and the need for additional 

training in joint agency response. To a lesser extent, we found concerns 

with participants’ ability to coordinate effectively and know who had the 

proper authority to raise security levels, board vessels, or detain 

passengers. 

Beyond information-sharing, a host of challenges remain in coordinating 

across agency lines and in resolving issues that cut across a wide range of 

stakeholder perspectives. In this regard, there is perhaps no better 

example in our recent work than the delayed attempts to develop a major 

component of the security framework envisioned under MTSA—an 

identification card for maritime workers. The transportation worker 

identification credential (TWIC) was initially envisioned by TSA before it 

became part of DHS to be a universally recognized identification card 

accepted across all modes of the national transportation system, including 

airports, seaports, and railroad terminals, using biological metrics, such as 

fingerprints, to ensure individuals with such an identification card had 

undergone an assessment verifying that they do not pose a terrorism 

security risk. TSA initially projected that it would test a prototype of such 

a card system in 2003 and issue the first of the cards in August 2004. After 

 14 GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Sharing Information about 

Security Exercises 

Developing a Transportation 

Worker Identification 

Credential 
Page 21 GAO-05-448T 

TSA became part of DHS, testing of the prototype was delayed because of 

the difficulty in obtaining a response from DHS policy officials who also 

subsequently directed the agency to reexamine additional options for 

issuing the identification card. In addition to coordinating within DHS, 

TSA has had to coordinate with over 800 national level transportationrelated stakeholders. Several stakeholders at seaports and seaport 

facilities told us that, while TSA solicited their input on some issues, TSA 

did not respond to their input or involve them in making decisions 

regarding eligibility requirements for the card.15 In particular, some 

stakeholders said they had not been included in discussions about which 

felony convictions should disqualify a worker from receiving a card, even 

though they had expected and requested that DHS and TSA involve them 

in these decisions. Obtaining stakeholder involvement is important 

because achieving program goals hinges on the federal government’s 

ability to form effective partnerships among many public and private 

stakeholders. If such partnerships are not in place—and equally important, 

if they do not work effectively—TSA may not be able to test and deliver a 

program that performs as expected. Until TSA and DHS officials agree on 

a comprehensive project plan to guide the remainder of the project and 

work together to set and complete deadlines, and TSA can effectively 

manage its stakeholders’ interests, it may not be able to successfully 

develop, test, and implement the card program. We issued a report on 

TWIC in December 200416 and the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs has asked us to review the program 

again. 

Our reviews indicate that funding is a pressing challenge to putting 

effective seaport security measures in place and sustaining these measures 

over time. This is the view of many transportation security experts, 

industry representatives, and federal, state, and local government officials 

with whom we have spoken. While some security improvements are 

inexpensive, most require substantial and continuous funding. For 

example, a preliminary Coast Guard estimate placed the cost of 

 15 Of the facilities testing TSA’s prototype, we visited ports and facilities in the Delaware 

River Region, including Wilmington Port Authority, the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, 

and the South Jersey Port. We also visited ports and facilities on the West Coast, including 

those in the Port of Seattle, Port of Los Angeles, and Port of Long Beach as well as ports 

and facilities in Florida, including Port Everglades and the Port of Jacksonville. 

16 GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker 

Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004). 

Challenges in Providing 

Funding for Seaport 

Security Actions and 

Initiatives 
Page 22 GAO-05-448T 

implementing the International Maritime Organization security code and 

the security provisions in MTSA at approximately $1.5 billion for the first 

year and $7.3 billion over the succeeding decade. This estimate should be 

viewed more as a rough indicator than a precise measure of costs, but it 

does show that the cost is likely to be substantial.17

At the federal level, more than $560 million in grants has been made 

available to seaports, localities, and other stakeholders since 2002 under 

the Port Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative. 

The purpose of these programs was to reduce the vulnerability of seaports 

to potential terrorist attacks by enhancing facility and operation security. 

The programs funded several projects, including security assessments; 

physical enhancements, such as gates and fences; surveillance equipment, 

such as cameras; and the acquisition of security equipment, such as patrol 

vessels or vehicles. Awardees have included seaport authorities, local 

governments, vessel operators, and private companies with facilities in 

seaport areas. Interest in receiving port security grants has been strong, 

and, as figure 2 shows, applicant requests have far exceeded available 

funds. We are currently examining the Port Security Grant Program at the 

request of several Members of Congress, and we are focusing this review 

on the risk management practices used in comparing and prioritizing 

applications. Our work is under way, and we expect to issue our report 

later this year.18

 17 GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning 

Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

18 DHS has proposed consolidating homeland grant programs into a single program. Known 

as the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP), the program would lump 

together grant funding for transit, port security and other critical infrastructure, and 

eliminate specific grant programs for port, rail, truck, intercity bus, and nongovernmental 

organizations security. In its fiscal year 2006 budget request, the administration proposed 

$600 million for TIPP, a $260-million increase in overall funding from fiscal year 2005 for 

the specific transportation security grant programs. In fiscal year 2005, funding for port, 

rail, truck, intercity bus, and non-governmental organizations security totaled $340 million. 
Page 23 GAO-05-448T 

Figure 2: Comparison of Requests and Awards for Funding, Port Security Grant 

Program, Fiscal Years 2002-2004 

Note: Figure 2 does not include $75 million that was awarded to 14 high-risk seaport areas under the 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) by the Office of Domestic Preparedness. This program is 

separate from its basic UASI program, which provided formula grants to 50 urban areas for 

equipment, training, planning, exercise, operational needs, and critical infrastructure. 

Where the money will come from for all of the funding needs is unclear. In 

our 2002 statement on national preparedness,19 we highlighted the need to 

examine the sustainability of increased funding not only for seaport 

security, but for homeland security efforts in general. The current 

economic environment makes this a difficult time for private industry and 

 19 GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector 

Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T

(Washington, D.C.: April 2002). 

Dollars in millions

0

400

600

200

800

1000

1200

1400

Round 2

(June 2003)

Round 3

(Dec. 2004)

Round 4

(June 2004) 

Round 1

(June 2002)

Funding rounds

Amount awarded in grants

Total amount requested by grantees

92

169

49

179

656

996 987

697

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Page 24 GAO-05-448T 

state and local governments to make security investments and sustain 

increased security costs. According to industry representatives and 

experts we contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a 

very thin profit margin, making it difficult to pay for additional security 

measures. Budgetary and revenue constraints, coupled with increasing 

demands on resources, makes it more critical that federal programs be 

designed carefully to match the priorities and needs of all partners—

federal, state, local, and private—and provide the greatest results for the 

expenditure. 

The final purpose of my testimony today is to offer observations, based on 

the work we have done to date, about important next steps for decision 

makers in charting a course for future actions. The terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, evoked with stunning clarity the face and intent of 

enemies very different from those the nation has faced before—terrorists 

such as al Qaeda, willing and able to attack us in our territory using tactics 

designed to take advantage of our relatively open society and individual 

freedoms. The amount of activity in response has been considerable, and 

although there have been no serious incidents in the United States in the 

interim, the threat of terrorism will likely persist well into the 21st century. 

Thus, it is important to continue to make progress in our efforts. Beyond 

addressing the kinds of challenges discussed above, however, two other 

matters stand out. One involves developing a better understanding of how 

much progress has actually been made to secure our seaports; the other 

involves developing a better strategy to manage risk and prioritize what 

areas need further progress and how resources can be best allocated. 

Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led 

to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability 

to identify and respond to many security threats, it is difficult to translate 

these actions into a clear sense of how far we have progressed in making 

seaports more secure. One reason is that seaport security efforts, like 

homeland security efforts in general, lack measurable goals, as well as 

performance measures to measure progress toward those goals. As others 

such as the Gilmore Commission have stated, a continuing problem for 

homeland security has been the lack of clear strategic guidance about the 

Setting Performance 

Goals and Measures 

and Assessing Risk 

Are Important Next 

Steps 

Lack of Goals and 

Measures Makes 

Determining Progress 

Difficult 
Page 25 GAO-05-448T 

definition and objectives of preparedness.20 For example, the Coast Guard 

has a set of performance indicators for each of its nonsecurity missions. It 

regularly reports on how well it is doing in rescuing mariners at sea, 

interdicting foreign fishing boats attempting to fish the in U.S. exclusive 

economic zone, or maintaining aids to navigation on the nation’s 

waterways. However, although it has been more than 3 years since the 

September 11, 2001, attacks, the Coast Guard is still in the process of 

developing a performance indicator for its seaport security activities that 

can be used to indicate what progress has been made to secure seaports. 

Completion of this indicator and careful tracking of it over the long term is 

essential to help ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely to 

make seaports more secure. Similarly, as discussed earlier in describing 

the actions taken to secure the cargo transiting through seaports in 

containers, performance measures are needed to determine the progress 

such actions are making to reduce vulnerabilities of the international 

supply chain. 

A challenge exists in measuring progress in this area, because seaport 

security, like many aspects of homeland security, relies upon the 

coordinated actions of many stakeholders and, in many cases, upon 

“layers” of defenses. In this regard, we have pointed out that systems and 

service standards—which focus on the performance, design, and overall 

management of processes and activities—hold great potential to improve 

coordination across such dimensions and enhance measurement of 

continued preparedness.21 While such standards are already being used in 

many parts of the private sector, creation of performance and results 

measures for national security in general, and seaport security in 

particular, remains a work in progress. 

Even with clear goals and effective performance measures, it seems 

improbable that all risk can be eliminated, or that any security framework 

can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of potential terrorist 

threat that highly motivated, well skilled, and adequately funded terrorist 

groups could think up. This is not to suggest that security efforts do not 

 20 The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging America’s New Normalcy (Arlington, VA: Dec. 

15, 2003). 

21 GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism, GAO-04-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2004). 

Risk Management Is an 

Essential Tool for 

Focusing Efforts 

Effectively 
Page 26 GAO-05-448T 

matter—they clearly do. However, it is important to keep in mind that total 

security cannot be bought no matter how much is spent on it. We cannot 

afford to protect everything against all threats—choices must be made 

about security priorities. Thus, great care needs to be taken to assign 

available resources to address the greatest risks, along with selecting 

those strategies that make the most efficient and effective use of 

resources. 

One approach to help ensure that resources are assigned and appropriate 

strategies are selected to address the greatest risks is through risk 

management—that is, defining and reducing risk. A risk management 

approach is a systematic process for analyzing threats and vulnerabilities, 

together with the criticality (that is, the relative importance) of the assets 

involved. This process consists of a series of analytical and managerial 

steps, basically sequential, that can be used to assess vulnerabilities, 

determine the criticality (that is, the relative importance) of the assets 

being considered, determine the threats to the assets, and assess 

alternatives for reducing the risks. Once these are assessed and identified, 

actions to improve security and reduce the risks can be chosen from the 

alternatives for implementation. To be effective, however, this process 

must be repeated when threats or conditions change to incorporate any 

new information to adjust and revise the assessments and actions. 

Some elements of risk management have been incorporated into seaport 

security activities. For example, to meet the requirements of MTSA, 

security plans for seaports, facilities, and vessels have been developed 

based on assessments that identify their vulnerabilities. In addition, the 

Coast Guard is using the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool, which is 

designed to prioritize risk according to a combination of possible threat, 

consequence, and vulnerability. Under this approach, seaport 

infrastructure that is determined to be both a critical asset and a likely and 

vulnerable target would be a high priority for security enhancements or 

funding. By comparison, infrastructure that is vulnerable to attack but not 

as critical or infrastructure that is very critical but already well protected 

would be lower in priority. In a homeland security setting, possible uses of 

data produced from risk management efforts include informing decisions 

on where the federal government might spend billions of dollars within 

and between federal departments, as well as informing decisions on grants 

awarded to state and local governments. 

As the nation moves ahead with seaport security efforts, there are plans to 

incorporate risk management as part of the nation’s larger homeland 

security strategy. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued in 
Page 27 GAO-05-448T 

December 2003, charged DHS with integrating the use of risk management 

into homeland security activities. The directive called on the Department 

to develop policies, guidelines, criteria, and metrics for this effort. To meet 

this requirement, the Coast Guard has taken steps to use risk management 

in prioritizing the protection of key infrastructure within and between 

seaports. We are currently in the process of assessing the progress the 

Coast Guard has made in these efforts. In addition, we are reviewing the 

extent to which a risk management approach is being used by other DHS 

agencies, such as the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

Directorate, to evaluate the relative risk faced by key infrastructure within 

seaports and across broad sectors of national activity, such as seaports 

and aviation, to help ensure funding and resources are allocated to where 

they are needed most. Our work is still under way and not far enough 

along to discuss at this time. It is likely, however, that attention to risk 

management will be a key part of the ongoing dialogue about the nation’s 

homeland security actions in general, and its seaport security actions in 

particular. 

Managing the risks associated with securing our nation’s seaports involves 

a careful balance between the benefits of added security and the potential 

economic impacts of security enhancements. While there is broad support 

for greater security, the national economy is heavily dependent on keeping 

goods, trucks, trains, and people flowing quickly through seaports, and 

bringing commerce to a crawl in order to be completely safe carries its 

own serious economic consequences. Striking the right balance between 

increased security and protecting economic vitality is an important and 

difficult task. Considering this, three things stand out as important from 

the work we have conducted: 

• Seaports are not retreating as a homeland security issue. They are an 

attractive terrorist target and are likely to remain so, because by their 

nature they represent a vulnerability that is always open to potential 

exploitation. 

• Seaport security has lived up to its billing as an area in which security 

measures can be difficult to implement. The range of activity in seaport 

areas can be extremely wide, as can the range of stakeholders and the 

fragmentation of responsibility among them. Many of the problems we 

have identified with individual programs and efforts can likely be 

overcome with time and effort, but success is not assured. We are 

already seeing some efforts, such as the TWIC identification card, 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 28 GAO-05-448T 

becoming deeply mired in problems. These activities will thus continue 

to demand close attention. 

• The national dialogue on this issue is likely to focus increasingly in 

trying to determine what we are getting for our efforts and where we 

should invest the dollars we have. Therefore, it is critical that federal 

programs be designed carefully to try to match the priorities and needs 

of all partners—federal, state, local, and private—and use performance 

measures to effectively allocate funds and resources. On this point, 

there is work to do, because agencies such as the Coast Guard 

currently lack a systematic approach for explaining the relationship 

between the expenditure of resources and performance results in 

seaport security, limiting its ability to critically examine its resource 

needs and prioritize program efforts. Providing answers also requires 

an ability to carefully assess what the key vulnerabilities are and what 

should be done to protect them. Only by doing this will we have 

reasonable assurance that we are doing the best job with the dollars we 

have. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may 

have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments 

For information about this testimony, please contact Margaret Wrightson, 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (415) 904-2200, or 

wrightsonm@gao.gov. Other individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include Steve Calvo, Geoffrey Hamilton, Christopher Hatscher, 

Sara Margraf, and Stan Stenersen. 
Page 29 GAO-05-448T 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater 

Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-307T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. 

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170, Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker 

Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December 

10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective 

Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and 

Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. 

GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New 

Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed. 

GAO-04-695. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 

2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 
Page 30 GAO-05-448T 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting 

Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Coast Guard Programs: Relationship between Resources Used and 

Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: 

March 22, 2004. 

Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs 

Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-

380. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 

Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 16, 2003. 

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04-

315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, 

D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 

Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of 

Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor 

Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003. 
Page 31 GAO-05-448T 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It 

Transitions to the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 12, 2003. 

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2002. 

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 

2002. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in 

Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. 
Page 32 GAO-05-448T 

Agency/program GAO recommendations 

Coast Guard GAO Recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard 

Automatic Identification 

System (AIS) 

• To seek and take advantage of opportunities to partner with organizations willing to develop AIS 

systems at their own expense in order to help reduce federal costs and speed development of AIS 

nationwide. (GAO-04-868) 

Deepwater acquisition • Take the necessary steps to make integrated product team (IPT) members effective, including (1) 

training IPTS in a timely manner, (2) chartering the sub-IPTs, and (3) making improvements to the 

electronic information system that would result in better information sharing among IPT members 

who are geographically dispersed. (GAO-04-380) 

• Follow the procedures outlined in the human capital plan to ensure that adequate staffing is in place 

and turnover among Deepwater personnel is proactively addressed. (GAO-04-380) 

• Ensure that field operators and maintenance personnel are provided with timely information and 

training on how the transition will occur and how maintenance responsibilities are to be divided 

between system integrator and Coast Guard personnel. (GAO-04-380) 

• Develop and adhere to measurable award fee criteria consistent with the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy’s guidance. (GAO-04-380) 

• Ensure that the input of contracting officer’s technical representatives (COTR) is considered and set 

forth in a more rigorous manner. (GAO-04-380) 

• Hold the system integrator accountable in future award fee determinations for improving the 

effectiveness of IPTs. (GAO-04-380) 

• Establish a time frame for when the models and metrics will be in place with the appropriate degree 

of fidelity to be able to measure the contractor’s progress toward improving operational effectiveness. 

(GAO-04-380) 

• Establish a total ownership cost (TOC) baseline that can be used to measure whether the Deepwater 

acquisition approach is providing the government with increased efficiencies compared to what it 

would have cost without this approach. (GAO-04-380) 

• Establish criteria to determine when the TOC baseline should be adjusted and ensure that the 

reasons for any changes are documented. (GAO-04-380) 

• Develop a comprehensive plan for holding the system integrator accountable for ensuring an 

adequate degree of competition among second-tier suppliers in future program years. This plan 

should include metrics to measure outcomes and consideration of how these outcomes will be taken 

into account in future award fee decisions. (GAO-04-380) 

• For subcontracts over $5 million awarded by Integrated Coast Guard Systems LLC (ICGS) to 

Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, require Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to notify 

the Coast Guard of a decision to perform the work themselves rather than contracting it out. 

(GAO-04-380) 

• To update the original 2002 Deepwater acquisition schedule in time to support the fiscal year 2006 

Deepwater budget submission to DHS and Congress and at least once a year thereafter to support 

each budget submission, which should include the current status of asset acquisition phases, interim 

phase milestones, and the critical paths linking the delivery of individual components to particular 

assets. (GAO-04-695) 

Appendix II: Previous GAO 

Recommendations 
Page 33 GAO-05-448T 

Agency/program GAO recommendations 

MTSA security plans • Conduct a formal evaluation of compliance inspection efforts taken during the initial 6-month surge 

period, including the adequacy of security inspection staffing, training, and guidance, and use this 

evaluation as a means to strengthen the compliance process for the longer term. (GAO-04-838) 

• Clearly define the minimum qualifications for inspectors and link these qualifications to a certification 

process. (GAO-04-838) 

• Consider including unscheduled and unannounced inspections and covert testing as part of its 

inspection strategy to provide better assurance that the security environment at the nation’s seaports 

meets the nation’s expectations. (GAO-04-838) 

Multi-mission station 

readiness 

• Revise the Boat Forces Strategic Plan to (1) reflect the impact of homeland security requirements on 

station needs and (2) identify specific actions, milestones, and funding needs for meeting those 

needs. (GAO-05-161) 

• Develop measurable annual goals for stations. (GAO-05-161) 

• Revise the processes and practices for estimating and allocating station personal protection 

equipment (PPE) funds to reliably identify annual funding needs and use this information in making 

future funding decisions. (GAO-05-161) 

Obtaining security 

clearances 

• Develop formal procedures so that local and headquarters officials use the Coast Guard’s internal 

databases of state, local, and industry security clearances for area maritime committee members as 

a management tool to monitor who has submitted applications for a security clearance and to take 

appropriate action when application trends point to possible problems. (GAO-05-394) 

• Raise awareness of state, local, and industry officials about the process of applying for security 

clearances. (GAO-05-394) 

Port security assessment 

program 

• To define and document the geographic information system (GIS) functional requirements. 

(GAO-04-1062) 

• Develop a long-term project plan for the GIS and the Port Security Assessment Program as a whole 

(including cost estimates, schedule, and management responsibilities). (GAO-04-1062) 

Resource effectiveness • To develop a time frame for expeditiously proceeding with plans for implementing a system that will 

accurately account for resources expended in each of its program areas. (GAO-04-432) 

• Ensure that the strategic planning process and its associated documents include a strategy for (1) 

identifying intervening factors that may affect program performance and (2) systematically assessing 

the relationship between these factors, resources used, and results achieved. (GAO-04-432) 

Seaport exercises • To help ensure that reports on terrorism-related exercises are submitted in a timely manner that 

complies with all Coast Guard requirements, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should review the 

Coast Guard’s actions for ensuring timeliness and determine if further actions are needed. 

(GAO-05-170) 

Department of Energy GAO Recommendations to the Department of Energy 

Megaports Initiative • Develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of the Initiative that includes, at a 

minimum, (1) performance measures that are consistent with DOE’s desire to install radiation 

detection equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies to determine how many 

and which lower priority ports DOE will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty 

installing equipment at the highest priority ports, (3) projections of the anticipated funds required to 

meet the Initiative’s objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively spending program funds. 

(GAO-05-375) 

• Evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15 million, make any necessary 

adjustments to the Initiative’s long-term cost projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the 

long-term cost projection for the Initiative. (GAO-05-375) 
Page 34 GAO-05-448T 

Agency/program GAO recommendations 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection 

GAO recommendations to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Container Security Initiative 

(CSI) 

and 

Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 

• Develop human capital plans that clearly describe how CSI and C-TPAT will recruit, train, and retain 

staff to meet their growing demands as they expand to other countries and implement new program 

elements. These plans should include up-to-date information on CSI and C-TPAT staffing and 

training requirements and should be regularly used by managers to identify areas for further human 

capital planning, including opportunities for improving program results. (GAO-03-770) 

• Expand efforts already initiated to develop performance measures for CSI and C-TPAT that include 

outcome-oriented indicators. These measures should be tangible, measurable conditions that cover 

key aspects of performance and should enable agencies to assess accomplishments, make 

decisions, realign processes, and assign accountability. Furthermore, the measures should be used 

to determine the future direction of these Customs’ programs. (GAO-03-770) 

• Develop strategic plans that clearly lay out CSI and C-TPAT goals, objectives, and detailed 

implementation strategies. These plans should not only address how the strategies and related 

resources, both financial and human, will enable Customs to secure ocean containers bound for the 

United States, but also reinforce the connections between these programs’ objectives and both 

Customs’ and the Department of Homeland Security’s long-term goals. (GAO-03-770) 

• Use its resources to maximize the effectiveness of its automated targeting strategy to reduce the 

uncertainty associated with identifying cargo for additional inspection. (GAO-04-557T) 

• Institute a national inspection reporting system. (GAO-04-557T) 

• Test and certify CBP officials that receive the targeting training. (GAO-04-557T) 

• Resolving the safety concerns of longshoremen unions. (GAO-04-557T) 

Transportation Security 

Administration 

GAO recommendations to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 

Transportation worker 

identification card (TWIC) 

• Develop a comprehensive project plan for managing the remaining life of the TWIC project. 

(GAO-05-106) 

• Develop specific, detailed plans for risk mitigation and cost-benefit and alternatives analyses. 

(GAO-05-106) 

Source: GAO. 

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