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S. HRG. 114–689 

REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE SYRIA CONFLICT: 

SYRIA, TURKEY AND IRAQ 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

ROB STRAYER, Majority Chief Counsel

MARGARET TAYLOR, Minority Chief Counsel

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 3 

Blinken, Hon. Antony J., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of 

State, Washington, DC. ....................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Deputy Secretary 

Blinken by Senator Rubio ............................................................................ 26 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Deputy Secretary 

Blinken by Senator Perdue .......................................................................... 30 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE SYRIA CONFLICT: 

SYRIA, TURKEY AND IRAQ 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Rubio, Isakson, Cardin, 

Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 

come to order. 

We welcome our Deputy Secretary of State, Tony Blinken. I 

know he was in Turkey until yesterday evening, and we moved the 

hearing back a day. 

I would note that we have been trying to get Secretary Kerry in 

here for some time. That has not been possible. I do not want to 

diminish your appearance, because we are thankful to have you 

here. But I think for obvious reasons, he has not been willing to 

come. 

I think the focus of today’s hearing will be Syria. I do not think 

anyone here can be proud of the United States’ role in the greatest 

humanitarian disaster of our time and what we have done to enable that to happen. 

As I think about your appearance here today, I think in many 

ways it will be helpful to us as we think about the next administration, the next Secretary of State, the relationship that needs to 

exist between the executive branch and the Secretary of State’s office. I know that you came over from the National Security staff, 

so you were at the White House. Then you moved to the State Department. I know sometimes executive branch folks like to have 

their own people at the State Department, and I know, for instance, you were to appear here yesterday but the President ordered you to Turkey instead. So it speaks to sort of the overlap 

that sometimes exists between the executive branch and the Department of State. 

As an observation, the entire Syrian conflict is again something 

that we are not proud of. I do not think anybody here is proud of 

it. Even though I think they would view the Obama administration’s foreign policy, generally speaking, as a failure, It is interFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

esting that Secretary Clinton has received support from the foreign 

policy establishment because I think it is so well known that she 

tried to counter so much of what happened and what has lessened 

our standing in the world. And I think that is the reason that 

many people have migrated in the foreign policy establishment to 

her and are now supporting her. I think all of us are aware of her 

trying to counter what happened in Iraq, trying to do more to support the rebels. I think that is just widely known. 

What is interesting to me, is Secretary Kerry. He came in with 

a lot of excitement. I mean, people thought he lived his whole life, 

if you will, to be Secretary of State. Even as a young person, he 

was involved in foreign policy. He fought in Vietnam and made his 

name, if you will, on the stage here as a young man. But after 

what has happened in Syria and what happened in Iraq, that 

moved—feelings by many—certainly by me—to anger. To now, we 

had a breakfast with him just a week and a half ago, and to me 

he has become a somewhat sympathetic figure in that he is out 

there trying to deal with, for instance, the situation in Syria. And 

yet there is no Plan B. There is no support from the White House. 

We have had General Allen here—we knew in March of 2015— 

who was on Secretary Kerry’s behalf working hard to create a nofly zone, and talking openly about it. Turkey was supporting that. 

And yet there was no decision from the White House. 

The clearest example of why our foreign policy has been such a 

failure was this weekend. Ben and I were trying to set up a meeting to try to deal with the issue of JASTA, to try to come to some 

other option that might create an outlet for the victims of 9/11 and 

yet not undermine some of our sovereign immunity issues. I know 

I have been talking to the White House for some time just trying 

to get them to engage with us. Over the weekend, I talked to Secretary Kerry twice, and we agreed the best way to resolve this was 

to have a meeting, a meeting with Chuck Schumer, a meeting with 

John Cornyn, a meeting with Ben and myself, a meeting with Senator Reid and Senator McConnell. Just to sit down and see if another option could be developed that might cause us to move in a 

direction that would create an outlet for the people of 9/11 and yet 

not to have some of the adverse consequences that some of us fear. 

Secretary Kerry could not even get the White House to call a 

meeting. Let me say that one more time. The outburst yesterday 

from the White House over what happened is remarkable when 

they would not even sit down to meet with the Secretary of State 

and members of the Senate to try to create a solution to a problem 

that they felt was real. 

So I have to tell you—I know all of you guys write books after 

you leave. I think it is going to be a fascinating walk through what 

I believe to be a failed presidency as it relates to foreign policy. 

There has been an unwillingness to roll up sleeves and deal with 

tough issues, and certainly there is no way to deal with them without conversation—and then to not have a Plan B, where the diplomatic actions cannot be backed up because Russia and Assad realize that there is no Plan B. Never has been a Plan B. 

So I look forward to your testimony. I know I am being a little 

tough on you today, but I think it is in response to just seeing 

again why this failure has occurred, and that is the White House’s 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

inability to sit down, to get involved, to be willing to put forth 

tough consequences when things do not occur. Again, there could 

not be more evidence of that than the unwillingness to even sit 

down and try to propose another way of dealing with the situation 

we dealt with yesterday on the Senate floor. 

So with that, I turn to my good friend, Senator Cardin, and look 

forward to his opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Blinken, thank you for being here. 

Chairman Corker and I have been partners during most of this 

Congress on this committee, and we share very similar views about 

foreign policy and priorities. And we have had an opportunity to 

work together on many, many issues. 

As I was listening to Senator Corker, at the beginning of his 

comments, I thought we were going to be able to continue that with 

his nice comments about Secretary Clinton because I share those 

views on Secretary Clinton’s extraordinary talent to conduct foreign 

policy. 

And I share Senator Corker’s frustration on JASTA. I think that 

was highlighted through circumstances that neither he nor I could 

control, nor could the administration control, and that is, that the 

timing of JASTA required us to take the veto override before the 

recess. I think if we could have had that veto override during the 

lame duck session, we would have had more opportunity to explore 

ways in which we could try to accomplish the needed removal of 

sovereign immunity that stands in the path of the victims of 9/11 

but do it in a way that does not cause the risk factors that this 

legislation causes. 

And neither Senator Corker nor I and, quite frankly, the leadership or the President could affect that timing because the President 

had to act with a certain number of days, the Congress was required to take up the veto message immediately unless we had 

unanimous consent, which was unlikely to be able to be gotten. So 

I think it put us in a position where options were not as robust as 

I would have liked them to have been and that included the President’s option. 

So I am not as critical as Senator Corker of this administration 

or Secretary Kerry. I know Secretary Kerry felt pretty passionately 

about the JASTA legislation. He expressed his views. I had a 

chance to be with Secretary Kerry on a plane for a considerable period of time, and he used that opportunity to explore every opportunity we had here to deal with JASTA. So I very much admire 

Secretary Kerry’s optimism and his unrelenting pursuit of peace in 

every part of the world. And we had a chance to experience that 

firsthand in Colombia, as we saw after 5 decades of civil war, a 

peace agreement signed this past Monday, and I was proud to be 

there with Secretary Kerry. 

Secretary Blinken, welcome back to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee. It is not every day that we have a star from Sesame 

Street with us. For anyone who has not seen Secretary Blinken’s 

guest appearance with Grover, I encourage you to watch him disFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

cuss refugees with everyone’s favorite furry blue monster before the 

President’s summit on refugees during the U.N. General Assembly 

session. 

We know that you have just returned from a trip to Turkey, and 

we look forward to learning about your discussions there given 

Turkey’s critical role in the success of a counter-ISIL campaign, 

ending the conflict in Syria, and for broader regional ability. 

Charged with oversight of the State Department, the members of 

this committee have a fundamental interest in the success of U.S. 

diplomacy and U.S. leadership in the foreign policy arena. Secretary Kerry is correct in his belief that the tools of diplomacy 

should always be the preferred method for stopping violence, saving lives, and restoring stability. 

I want to commend the dedication of Secretary Kerry and yourself and our Nation’s diplomats for the work you have done around 

the clock with both allies and adversaries to forge an agreement to 

end violence in Syria. That is what we need to do. There is no way 

to end that civil war through the use of military force. We need to 

be able to have a negotiated diplomatic solution where all sides respect a government that respects human rights. 

But now we are clearly at an inflection point. The U.S.-Russia 

ceasefire agreement was based on the assumption that Russia 

could compel the Assad regime to ground its air force, that Russia 

would compel the Assad regime to allow immediate and unfettered 

humanitarian access. We have clearly seen that neither of these 

two objectives were achieved. 

Russia strives to be considered a peer, one that is essential to 

solving global problems, but I seriously question the reliability of 

Russia in this regard. We must reevaluate our approach to Russia 

in the Middle East and beyond the Middle East. Russia continues 

to attack Ukraine forces in Donbass. It illegally occupies Crimea. 

It has hacked into our computer system and sought to destabilize 

our electoral process. These are not the actions of a partner. These 

are the actions of an adversary, and I think we have to recognize 

that. 

With our focus on Russia, we cannot lose sight of Iran’s nefarious 

role in Syria and beyond. We know that Iran is backing the Assad 

regime economically and militarily. IRGC commanders have died 

fighting in Syria. Iran has mobilized militia fighters, provided intelligence to support Syria and Russia in targeting, sent in lethal 

aid, and mobilized the Hezbollah. There must be consequences for 

these actions, and there are plenty of tools that we have at our disposal. I reject the utterly false narrative that Iran’s and Russia’s 

activities in Syria constitute counterterrorism. 

I look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Blinken, on what actions 

the United States is considering, what are our options, and how 

can Congress be your partner. 

Turning to Iraq just for a moment, if I might, the counter-ISIL 

fight is just the first step in restoring stability. I am cautiously optimistic that the military operation to push ISIL out of Mosul is 

resourced and planned to achieve its goals. And beyond the military operations, I want to raise the alarm bell about winning the 

peace. I think we will win the war, but can we win the peace? Iraqi 

leaders in Baghdad must get their act together. The past few 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

months of political infighting and mud-throwing instilled no confidence that leaders in Baghdad, Irbil, and other provincial levels 

are prepared to put the Iraqi people first. We know that the Iraqi 

Security Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and other forces 

cannot fight or bomb their way to a stable Iraq. 

What will come after ISIL’s defeat? 

I am not confident that Iraqi leaders are sufficiently engaged to 

respond to the humanitarian crisis coming when hundreds of thousands of civilians flee Mosul. I am not confident that Iraqi leaders 

are effectively in control of the popular mobilization forces to prevent sectarian reprisal violence. I am not confident that Iraqi leaders are committed to recovering stabilization and governance plans 

that will give all Iraqis a stake in the peace. 

Weeks ago, I would have said the situation in the region, particularly Syria, could not be any worse. Now we know that it can. Russia is guilty of war crimes for bombing a humanitarian aid convoy. 

Assad is barrel bombing Aleppo with impunity and using water access as a weapon, as if denying humanitarian aid was not sufficiently deplorable. These are crimes against humanity. The longer 

the Assad regime remains entrenched in Damascus and the longer 

ISIL and the Al Nusra Front remain active in the region, the more 

depraved the situation becomes, the more hopeless are innocent civilians, the more susceptible are vulnerable populations to violent 

extremism, and the more strained are governments in Jordan and 

Lebanon to respond to these pressures. 

At risk is an entire generation of children in the region that have 

only known war and some governments that want to stand with 

them but have been unsuccessful. At risk is an entire generation 

of children who will only know refugee camps, who do not have access to clean water, health care, schools, and employment opportunities. This situation cannot continue. The U.S. must provide more 

decisive leadership to protect the civilian population. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ranking Member, I appreciate your comments. I think this is what we have been saying since about 2011. 

My comments about Secretary Kerry being a sympathetic figure 

are really not negative towards him. He is out there without the 

ability to do diplomacy because everyone knows there is no backup 

plan in the event that diplomacy fails, which is a recipe for disaster. We have known that now for 5 years. So again, it was more 

of an indictment of the President than of our Secretary of State. 

But with that, our Deputy Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, who 

we appreciate being here today as a substitute, we thank you for 

your service, and we look forward to your abbreviated comments. 

Your written testimony, without objection, will be entered into the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANTONY J. BLINKEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me just 

start by thanking you personally, as well as the committee staff, 

for your courtesy in rescheduling this hearing to today. As you 

noted, it was originally going to be yesterday. I very much appreFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

ciate it. It did allow me to make this trip to Turkey, which I am 

happy to talk about. 

And Senator Cardin, thank you for referencing the best bilateral 

meeting I had during the week in New York at the U.N. General 

Assembly. My meeting with Grover was by far the most informative and interesting session. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the civil war in 

Syria and its regional implications. 

Now in its sixth year, the civil war has destroyed the fabric of 

life in Syria. It has killed at least 400,000 people, triggered the 

worst humanitarian displacement crisis since World War II, put 

neighboring countries of first asylum under enormous pressure, exacerbated regional tensions, helped swell the ranks of violent extremist organizations, most notably Daesh and Al Qaeda. 

The conflict continues to be fueled by patrons and proxies with 

very divergent interests and priorities at a time of unprecedented 

upheaval in the wider Middle East, as governments pursue new 

models of political rule and vie for regional influence. In short, the 

Syria conflict presents one of the most complex challenges we have 

faced. 

The United States is clear-eyed about our role and responsibility. 

The civil war in Syria is not about us, nor can it be solved solely 

by us. But it challenges our security and strategic interests and our 

moral values. So we are working to leverage our country’s unique 

capacity to mobilize others to end the civil war and contend with 

its consequences, even as we lead the international coalition to 

counter and ultimately defeat Daesh. We are also working to facilitate aid to millions of Syrian civilians, both in Syria and outside 

of Syria, to try to reduce the human suffering the civil war has engendered. 

Our primary task is to defeat Daesh, which poses the most immediate threat to our citizens, to our country, to our allies and 

partners. We have built an international coalition with 67 partners. 

We devised a comprehensive strategy to attack Daesh at its core 

in Iraq and Syria; dismantle its foreign fighter, financing, and recruitment networks; stop its external operations and confront its 

affiliates. We are aggressively implementing that strategy. And we 

are succeeding. 

Our comprehensive campaign is systematically liberating territory from Daesh and denying its sanctuaries, cutting off its financing, stemming the flow of foreign fighters, combating its narrative, 

allowing citizens to return home, gutting the twisted foundation on 

which Daesh’s global ambitions rest. 

We have deprived Daesh of about 25 percent of the territory it 

once controlled in Syria and more than 50 percent of the territory 

it once controlled in Iraq. 

And we now face a moment of both strategic opportunity and urgency. 

The opportunity before us is to effectively eliminate Turkey’s 

physical caliphate by taking back the last big pieces it holds: Mosul 

in Iraq and Raqqa and Dabiq in Syria. With support from the coalition, local forces are preparing to launch these operations in the peFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

riod ahead. These battles will be hard, but the consequences to 

Daesh will be devastating, both practically and psychologically. 

But this opportunity is matched by urgency. As the noose around 

Daesh is tightening, we have seen them try to adapt by plotting or 

encouraging indiscriminate attacks in as many places as possible. 

This puts a premium on destroying Daesh’s external operations 

network, especially in Raqqa where many of these operations are 

plotted, planned, and directed. 

In Iraq, Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago and then in Turkey this 

week, I held discussions with our partners on the campaign plan 

to liberate Mosul, Dabiq, and Raqqa. It requires extraordinary coordination not just militarily but also to ensure that we meet the 

humanitarian, stabilization, and governance needs of newly liberated territory. It will be this effort that ensures that Daesh, once 

defeated, stays defeated. 

And, Senator Cardin, I think you are exactly right that in a 

sense the harder questions are almost what follows the military defeat of Daesh in Iraq and certainly in Syria. Ultimately we will not 

fully succeed in destroying Daesh until we resolve the civil war in 

Syria, which remains a powerful magnet for foreign terrorist organizations that thrive in war’s ungoverned spaces and draw strength 

from Assad’s destruction of his own nation. 

The objectives and processes that we agreed to earlier this month 

with Russia were the right ones: a renewal of the cessation of hostilities, the immediate resumption of unhindered aid deliveries, the 

degradation of and focus on Daesh and Al Qaeda in Syria, the 

grounding of the Syrian air force over civilian populations, the beginning of a Syria-led negotiating track that can provide a pathway 

out of the conflict and make possible the restoration of a united, 

peaceful Syria. 

The actions of the Assad regime and Russia, aided and abetted 

by jihadist spoilers, now risk fundamentally undermining this initiative, destroying what was the best prospect for ending the civil 

war. The September 19 attack on the U.N. humanitarian aid convoy in Big Orem near Aleppo was unconscionable. It has been followed by the regime and Russia renewing a horrific offensive in 

Aleppo that includes the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians 

and apparently intentional attacks on hospitals, the water supply 

network, other civilian infrastructure. 

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Kerry informed the Foreign 

Minister of Russia that unless Russia takes immediate steps to end 

the assault on Aleppo and restore the cessation of hostilities, the 

United States will suspend U.S.-Russia bilateral engagement on 

Syria, including the establishment of the Joint Implementation 

Center. At President Obama’s direction, we also are actively considering other options to advance our goal of ending the civil war 

and starting a political transition in Syria. We continue to maintain close links to the moderate opposition to support their viability. 

It is important, as always, to remember how this crisis in Syria 

began, not with barrel bombs or chlorine, but with peaceful protests of citizens who were calling for peaceful change. The humanitarian catastrophe that we bear witness to is a direct outgrowth of 

Assad’s vengeance against his own people, and indeed, the cost is 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

rising every day for the region, for Europe, most of all for the Syrian people. 

We will continue to work with the coalition we built to defeat 

Daesh, and we will explore and, as appropriate, pursue every option to end the civil war in Syria and bring about the political transition that the Syrian people want and deserve. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blinken follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTONY BLINKEN

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee—thank 

you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss the civil war in Syria 

and its regional implications. 

Now in its sixth year, the crisis has destroyed the fabric of life in Syria, killed 

at least 400,000 people, triggered the worst human displacement crisis since the end 

of World War II, put neighboring countries of first asylum under enormous pressure, 

exacerbated regional tensions, and helped swell the ranks of violent extremist organizations, most notably Daesh and al-Qaeda. 

The conflict continues to be fueled by patrons and proxies with divergent interests 

and priorities at a time of unprecedented upheaval across the wider Middle East, 

as governments pursue new models of political rule and vie for new positions of regional influence. In short, the Syrian conflict presents one of the most complex challenges we have faced. 

There is no way to look at what is happening on the ground in Syria and not feel 

profound grief and horror. In the midst of such tragedy, it is tempting to want a 

neat answer that ends the civil war and eases suffering overnight. But the challenges before us defy silver bullet solutions. 

The United States is clear-eyed about our role and responsibility. The civil war 

in Syria is not about us, nor can it be solved solely by us. But it challenges our 

security and strategic interests—and moral values. So we are leveraging our country’s unique capacity to mobilize others to end the civil war and contend with its 

consequences, even as we lead the international coalition to counter and ultimately 

defeat Daesh. We are also harnessing the power of diplomacy to facilitate aid to millions of Syrian civilians and reduce human suffering in any way that we can. 

DEFEATING DAESH

Our primary task is to defeat Daesh, which poses the most immediate threat to 

our citizens, our country, and our allies. We built an international coalition with 67 

partners. We devised a comprehensive strategy to attack Daesh at its core in Iraq 

and Syria; dismantle its foreign fighter, financing and recruitment networks; stop 

its external operations and confront its affiliates. We are aggressively implementing 

that strategy. And we are succeeding. 

Two years ago, Daesh was expanding its territory, building its status online as 

an irresistible magnet for budding violent extremists, and threatening to overrun 

even Baghdad and Erbil. 

Today, momentum in the fight to defeat Daesh has shifted dramatically. 

Our comprehensive campaign is systematically liberating territory from Daesh 

and denying its sanctuaries, cutting off its financing, stemming the flow of foreign 

fighters, combatting its narrative on social media, allowing citizens to return home, 

and gutting the twisted foundation on which Daesh’s global ambitions rest. 

Daesh has not had a major battlefield victory in well over a year. We’ve eliminated tens of thousands of fighters and more than one hundred mid-to-senior level 

leaders. We’ve destroyed thousands of pieces of equipment and weapons. We’ve deprived Daesh of about 25 percent of the territory it once controlled in Syria and 

more than 50 percent of the territory in Iraq. 

Now, we face a moment of strategic opportunity and urgency. 

The opportunity is to effectively eliminate Daesh’s geographic caliphate by taking 

back the last big pieces it holds: Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa and Dabiq in Syria. With 

support from the coalition, local forces are preparing to launch these operations in 

the period ahead. It will not be easy. The enemy is dug in and desperate, but the 

consequences for Daesh will be devastating—practically and psychologically. It will 

lose critical havens from which to organize, plot and prosecute attacks. It will be 

deprived of critical resources that finance its activities. It will be denied key destinaFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

tions for foreign fighter recruits. And it will lose the entire foundation of its narrative—the building of a physical caliphate. 

This opportunity is matched by urgency. As the noose around Daesh closes, we’ve 

seen them try to adapt by plotting or encouraging indiscriminate attacks in as many 

places as possible: a market in Baghdad, a nightclub in Orlando, a promenade in 

Nice, a cafe in Dhaka, a bustling airport in Istanbul. Potential recruits are being 

told to stay home and attack there. Surviving foreign fighters are being pushed out 

of Iraq and Syria and back to where they came from. This puts a premium on destroying Daesh’s external operations network—especially in Raqqa, where many of 

these operations are plotted, planned, and directed. 

In Iraq two weeks ago and in Turkey this week, I held discussions with our partners on the campaign plan to liberate Mosul, Dabiq, and Raqqa. It requires extraordinary coordination not only militarily, but also to ensure that we meet the humanitarian, stabilization and governance needs of newly liberated territory. 

Moreover, the fight to hold ground, rebuild cities, restore services, clear schools 

and clinics of IEDs, care for displaced children, help families return home, hold 

Daesh accountable, provide genuine security, re-establish the rule of law—in other 

words, the fight to provide for the basic needs of a nation and prevent the emergence of Daesh 2.0 is only just beginning. The way we’re doing this—working not 

only with a broad international coalition but also with local partners on the ground 

who know the territory and have a stake in stabilizing and governing it—helps ensure that Daesh’s defeat will be sustainable and lasting. 

As Iraqi forces and humanitarian workers prepare for the liberation of Mosul, this 

task must be matched by steps towards inclusive political and economic progress. 

We strongly support Prime Minister Abadi’s leadership on reform and reconciliation. 

He has begun critical outreach to Sunnis, announced ‘‘zero tolerance’’ for human 

rights abuses, and reached an agreement with the Kurds to restart oil exports from 

Kirkuk. 

All Iraqis—be they Sunni, Shia, Christian, Arab, or Kurd, or any other—have to 

be convinced that the state that they’ve been asked to fight for will stand up for 

their rights and their equities, that they can advance their interests more effectively 

as citizens of a united Iraq than as supplicants of other regional powers or members 

of isolated competitive blocs in a fractured and weakened state. It will be this effort 

that ensures that Daesh once defeated stays defeated. 

RESPONDING TO SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Ultimately, we will not succeed in fully destroying Daesh until we resolve the civil 

war in Syria, which remains a powerful magnet for foreign terrorist organizations 

that thrive in the war’s ungoverned spaces and draw strength from Assad’s brutal 

destruction of his own nation. 

We know from history and experience that civil wars end in one of three ways. 

First, one side wins. That is unlikely in Syria because as soon as one side gets the 

advantage, the outside patrons of the other side intensify their engagement to right 

the balance. 

Second, the parties exhaust themselves. Typically, that takes a decade—or longer 

when a multiplicity of actors are involved. The civil war in Syria is entering year 

six, and it features a broad array of internal and external actors with different priorities. 

Third and finally, civil wars end when external powers intervene either militarily 

or politically. But military intervention typically adds fuel to the fire, extending before ending the conflict and suffering. In the case of Syria, short of a wholesale invasion that no outside power has the interest to undertake, military intervention is 

not likely to be decisive. That leaves a political intervention, with key outside powers and patrons shaping, supporting and imposing a resolution. That is the effort 

we have been engaged in with Russia and other members of the International Syria 

Support Group, building on the foundation of the Geneva communiques and U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. 

The objectives and the processes we agreed to earlier this month were and are 

the right ones: a renewal of the cessation of hostilities, the immediate resumption 

of unhindered aid deliveries, the degradation of and focus on Daesh and Al-Qaeda 

in Syria, which is also known as Nusra, the grounding of the Syrian air force over 

civilian populations and the beginning of a Syrian-led negotiating track that can 

provide a pathway out of the conflict and make possible the restoration of a united 

and peaceful Syria. The United States, as Secretary Kerry has said, will make absolutely no apology for going the extra mile to try to stop the violence and ease the 

suffering of the Syrian people. It would be diplomatic malpractice to close the door 

on our larger goal of keeping alive the prospect of a political accommodation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

Tragically, the actions of the Assad regime and Russia, aided and abetted by 

jihadist spoilers, now risk fatally undermining this initiative—destroying the best 

prospect for ending the civil war. The September 19 attack on a U.N. humanitarian 

aid convoy in Big Orem near Aleppo was unconscionable. It has been followed by 

the regime and Russia renewing a horrific offensive in Aleppo that includes the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians and apparently intentional attacks on hospitals, the water supply network, and other civilian infrastructure. 

Yesterday, Secretary Kerry informed the Foreign Minister of Russia that unless 

Russia takes immediate steps to end the assault on Aleppo and restore the cessation 

of hostilities, the United States will suspend U.S.-Russia bilateral engagement on 

Syria—including the establishment of the Joint Implementation Center. At President Obama’s direction, we also are actively considering other options to advance 

our goal of ending the civil war and starting a political transition in Syria. We continue to maintain close links to the moderate opposition to support their viability. 

RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN DISASTER

The humanitarian catastrophe is a direct outgrowth of Assad’s vengeance against 

his own people, and the human and financial cost of the conflict rises every day— 

for the region, for Europe, but most of all, for Syrians. 

Eighty-one percent of Syria’s population requires humanitarian assistance—6.5 

million Syrians are displaced in their own country. And 4.8 million Syrians have 

fled to neighboring countries—straining the capacity of generous host communities 

in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. 

Across the region, more than three million children are out of school, and many 

of their parents do not have access to legal employment. As a result, refugees are 

putting themselves at risk and traveling farther and farther afield in pursuit of a 

hope shared by parents the world over: a better future for their children. 

The United States—as the world’s leading humanitarian donor—has worked with 

heroic partners on the ground, including U.N. agencies and NGOs, to help strengthen the resilience of refugees as well as the communities that host them. 

Since the start of the crisis, we have provided over $5.9 billion in humanitarian 

aid to the response inside Syria and across the region, in addition to development 

assistance to Jordan and Lebanon, and we have worked with the World Bank to develop new types of affordable loans for middle-income countries grappling with protracted crises. We have provided nearly $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance to 

Iraq since 2014—including a recent tranche of funding to preposition food supplies 

and basic relief items ahead of Mosul’s liberation. 

Last week, President Obama convened 52 countries and international organizations for a summit during the U.N. General Assembly, where the nations made 

measurable commitments to increase humanitarian contributions by $4.5 billion; 

double the number of refugees who are offered resettlement or other legal forms of 

admissions; and increase the number of refugee children in school globally and refugee adults working by one million each. 

Galvanizing these resources is vital to helping shore up an international response 

system that, for all its extraordinary efforts, is overstretched, overburdened, and 

overwhelmed. 

CONCLUSION

It is important, as always, to remember how the crisis in Syria began—not with 

barrel bombs and chlorine, but with peaceful protests of citizens calling for change. 

When nations squeeze out moderate voices, they create a vacuum filled by extremists. When people feel shut out, their sense of alienation and marginalization sharpens divisions that extremists love to exploit. 

That is why the United States is working for a settlement in Syria that will give 

people viable choices other than supporting Assad for fear of terrorists or terrorists 

for fear of Assad. 

That is why we support a peace process for Yemen that reunites the country rather than deepening sectarian divisions that have already left the nation vulnerable 

to exploitation by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Daesh. 

It is why we are supporting Prime Minister al-Sarraj’s efforts to achieve national 

reconciliation and build a unity government that represents all Libyan people and 

unites them against Daesh. Under Prime Minister al-Sarraj’s leadership, Libyan 

ground forces have made significant progress against Daesh in recent months. The 

United States responded to the Prime Minister’s request for help in this effort, conducting over 170 counter-Daesh airstrikes under Operation Odyssey Lightning. 

Daesh now holds less than one square kilometer of Sirte’s city center. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

It is why we have urged greater space for peaceful dissent in Egypt, as we offer 

assistance to increase Egypt’s capabilities to counter a Daesh-affiliated insurgency 

in Sinai. 

It can be hard to look back on the events in this region in the last few years and 

feel a great deal of optimism. But we must persist, and we intend to work with the 

coalition we’ve built to defeat Daesh, end the civil war in Syria, and bring about 

the political transition that the Syrian people want. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I am just going to ask one question and then may interject as 

we go along. 

From your perspective, having been both at the White House and 

now the State Department in important roles, is it your observation that the only way for our foreign policy endeavors and for the 

Secretary of State to be successful is for there to be a close relationship between the White House and the Secretary of State and 

that the Secretary have the knowledge that the White House will 

back up the initiatives that he or she endeavors to achieve? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I think, Mr. Chairman, in any administration you 

certainly want—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a yes. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. A close relationship among—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We have had, I know, a number of proposals 

from the State Department, including the no-fly zone in the northwest triangle of Aleppo and the air exclusion zone along the Turkish-Syrian border that the Turks supported. Why is it that in that 

case, in the case right now where Secretary Kerry is out there on 

a tether—you just mentioned that we are going to cut off bilateral 

negotiations on Syria. I just have a feeling that is just not much 

of a price to pay from Russia’s standpoint. 

So there have been discussions of Plan B. Secretary Kerry talked 

to several of us in Munich in February about the cessation discussions, and there was going to be a Plan B if they failed. I have 

never seen signs of a Plan B. I know Russia does not believe there 

is a Plan B. Assad does not believe there is a Plan B. Iran does 

not believe there is a Plan B. So when I say that and refer to Secretary Kerry as a sympathetic figure, I say that because how can 

a Secretary of State have any chance of success in ending the murder, the torture, the rape, the bombing of innocent people, the killing of young people when the White House is unwilling at any level 

to have a backup if diplomacy fails? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, on all of these issues, including 

Syria, we work through a very deliberative process involving all of 

the agencies relevant to the issue at the NSC, with the State Department, with the Pentagon, with the intelligence agencies, et 

cetera. And we try to work through these things deliberately and 

make the best possible assessment of the best way to advance our 

objectives and our interests and to evaluate both the benefits and 

risks of any course of action. And that is what we have done in this 

case. And the policy that emerges is the product of these deliberations that the Secretary of State is very much fully a part of. 

In the case of Syria, it is useful to step back and ask ourselves 

this question: How do civil wars typically end? And we know from 

history and experience that they end in one of two ways. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want a history lesson. I would like to 

understand what Plan B is, the mysterious Plan B that has been 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

12 

referred to since February, the mysterious Plan B that was supposed to be leverage to get Russia to quit killing innocent people, 

to get Assad to quit killing innocent people. Just explain to us the 

elements of Plan B. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Two things, Mr. Chairman. 

In the first instance, Plan B is the consequence of the failure, as 

a result of Russia’s actions, of Plan A in that what is likely to happen now, if the agreement cannot be followed through on and Russia reneges totally on its commitments—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Which it has. 

Mr. BLINKEN [continuing]. Which it appears to have done. This 

is going, of course, to be bad for everyone, but it is going to be bad 

first and foremost—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to hear about Plan B. I understand all the 

context here. 

Mr. BLINKEN. I think, sir, this is important because Russia has 

a profound incentive in trying to make this work. It cannot win in 

Syria. It can only prevent Assad from losing. If this now gets to the 

point where the civil war actually accelerates, all of the outside patrons are going to throw in more and more weaponry against Russia. Russia will be left propping up Assad in an ever-smaller piece 

of Syria. 

The CHAIRMAN. All of us understand that. What is Plan B? Give 

me the elements of Plan B. 

Mr. BLINKEN. So two things. Again, the consequences I think to 

Russia, as well as to the regime, will begin to be felt as a result 

of Plan A not being implemented because of Russia’s actions. 

Second, as I indicated, the President has asked all of the agencies to put forward options, some familiar, some new that we are 

very actively reviewing. When we are able to work through these 

in the days ahead, we will have an opportunity to come back and 

talk about them in detail. But we are in the process of doing that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So let me just say what we already know. 

There is no Plan B. When I referred to Secretary Kerry as a sympathetic figure, I said that because he gets up every day, without 

any support. Some say he should resign over lack of support or at 

least threaten to. It is impossible to be successful in negotiating an 

agreement with someone if there are no consequences. In this case, 

the consequences that you are laying out is that Russia will fully 

determine the future of Syria. 

Mr. BLINKEN. I think Russia is going to bear very significant consequences over the failure of this—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So far, that has not been the case, and I know 

that is what the President said when they came in and stepped 

into the vacuum a year ago. 

So, I rest my case. Diplomacy without any plan of failure is 

something that cannot be successful. Again, based on my experiences this weekend with an administration that is unwilling to 

even sit down and talk about a solution with the people who are 

involved because they think this is bad for our country, but unwilling to sit down and talk about a possible option just leads me to 

believe that we will continue to have non-success in Syria, non-success in other areas. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

Again, all of us have tremendous sadness over the fact that our 

country has idly sat by after encouraging the people of Syria. If you 

remember, Ambassador Ford was cheering these people on—cheering these people on. We made commitments to the opposition, 

which General Idris—I remember meeting with him in Turkey. We 

could not even get him the trucks that we committed. 

So it is a statement without a plan. It is the statement of redlines without follow-up. Again, I fear that more bad results are 

going to occur. 

With that, I will turn it to Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me thank the ranking member for yielding time. We 

have had a train derailment in New Jersey with fatalities, so I 

need to get back. So I appreciate the opportunity. This is an incredibly important topic. 

So I think we had a lot of missed opportunities when this committee passed not unanimously but a strong bipartisan vote to 

train and to assist the vetted Syrian rebels, moderate Syrian rebels 

at the time that that could be done and gave the President the 

power and the wherewithal to do that. It was not done then. 

Then when it was done, it was done so feebly that those who we 

trained were largely eliminated. 

And then instead of having a safe zone, which many of us called 

for, which would have given individuals the opportunity to have an 

ability for security and maybe to organize those who might want 

to fight for their country, that was not done. 

And so I move forward and I see what has happened to date. Of 

course, your written testimony is much longer, but there is one 

paragraph of it that I think is incredibly important to talk about. 

You talked about Daesh, but you say in your statement on page 3: 

‘‘Ultimately we will not succeed in fully destroying Daesh until we 

resolve the civil war in Syria, which remains a powerful magnet for 

foreign terrorist organizations that thrive in the war’s ungoverned 

spaces and draw strength from Assad’s brutal destruction of his 

own nation.’’ And I fully agree. That is the problem here, having 

missed opportunities and now creating a vacuum where Russia 

comes in. 

I know that I keep hearing the equation that Russia will ultimately come to an understanding that it is paying very large consequences for its participation. That has not changed their calculations at all. As a matter of fact, they avoid Assad in this process. 

I think that the temporary truce that was created, from the Russian perspectives, never had a real calculation to actually effectuate the results of what Secretary Kerry intended, which of course 

I would have applauded. But it was to give Assad the ability to 

rearm and reorganize, and then immediately the incredible, despicable attacks made against humanitarian convoys. 

So my question is this. I would have asked what Plan B is, too. 

I do not get a sense that there is one, and that worries me. I do 

not think we should wait for the next President to start devising 

something that moves in that direction. And I understand that Secretary Kerry has threatened to end bilateral talks with Russia over 

Syria. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

But I cannot fathom, for the life of me, what those talks are producing anyhow. I mean, Russia seems to agree only for the purposes of giving Assad time to rearm and regroup. What leverage do 

we really have? What are we doing here to Russia to change its calculation? Because now, whether we like it or not, they are the 

major player here. And I have had a totally different view that 

Russia does not share our end goals here. It does not have the 

same interests as we do. It has a very different set of interests. 

So understanding that, give me a sense specifically of what leverage do we have. Why are we still engaged in a conversation in 

which we have a, quote/unquote, partner that continues to undermine our purposes in Syria, as well as that of the international 

community, which is why I understand some British and French 

counterparts walked out of a meeting recently at the U.N. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Two things. 

First, we believe that the effort that we have made to reach this 

agreement with Russia was the best way to effectively move toward 

ending the civil war because had it succeeded—and, indeed, it still 

can succeed and I think we will know in the hours ahead whether 

Russia is responsive or not—the cessation of hostilities would be 

restored, humanitarian assistance would flow. You would get the 

Syrian air force out of the skies over civilian populated areas. Russia would be focused, as it claims it has been on Daesh. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So we understand the benefit if it had succeeded. Let us presume for argument’s sake that it is not going to 

succeed because Russia does not want it to. 

Mr. BLINKEN. So, again, I know that this may not fully resonate, 

but, first, Russia escalated its engagement in Syria because it has 

been there all along. It has been there for years—precisely because 

it was at risk of losing its only foothold in the Middle East. And 

it came in harder in order to save Assad from falling at a time 

when it looked like he would, although I think that assessment was 

probably overly optimistic. It is now in a position where, having 

gotten in, it is very, very hard to get out because Assad cannot win. 

They can prevent him from losing, but he cannot win. So they are 

stuck. 

In the first instance, the leverage is again the consequences for 

Russia of being stuck in a quagmire that is going to have a number 

of profoundly negative effects. 

First, they are going to be bearing the brunt, if the civil war escalates as a result of their actions, of an onslaught of weaponry 

coming in from outside patrons. 

Second, they will be seen in their own country and throughout 

the world and in the region as complicit with Assad, with 

Hezbollah, and with Iran in the slaughter of Sunni Muslims—5 

percent of their own population is Muslim. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But do we agree they are already complicit 

on that? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Indeed, but this is only going to get worse if the 

civil war gets worse as a result of their actions. 

Any efforts that they have been making to peel away countries, 

for example, on Ukraine I think the international disgust at the acFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

tions that they are taking in Aleppo will make that even more difficult than it already is. So all of these consequences are there. 

But as I said in response also to the chairman’s question, we are 

also very actively looking at additional options that we can bring 

to bear to advance our objectives in Syria. And those objectives are 

ending the civil war and getting a political transition. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I know what the objectives are. I just do not 

see that the consequences that you are suggesting can be leveraged. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I know Senator Rubio is here, but he wants to get adapted. If you 

could go ahead, that would be great. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Blinken, again. 

What has happened has happened, and I think history will reflect decisions that were made and whether they were the right decisions at the time. We need to learn from the past and decide how 

to move forward. 

There is no question that there is an urgent need to protect 

human life, civilian life, in Syria, and the United States needs to 

act boldly. 

I am encouraged, Secretary Blinken, by your comments that 

there will be very significant consequences for Russia’s actions. I 

look forward to seeing how that is translated into U.S. policy and 

U.S. international leadership, working with other countries. We 

need bold U.S.-led actions to protect civilian lives. We need that 

now, and I look forward to reviewing with you the options that are 

being considered and the actions that are taken to protect civilian 

life and the significant consequences concerning Russia. 

I want to ask you a specific question. Could Russia have stopped 

the Assad regime from what it has done in the last several weeks? 

And does Russia have enough influence over the Assad regime to 

change their behavior? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I believe the answer is yes. 

Senator CARDIN. Number two, Iran has been extremely engaged 

in Syria. I have not seen the U.S. take action or work with the 

international community to take action against Iran in regards to 

their support of terrorism in Syria. Are we restricted because of the 

JCPOA? My understanding is that the terms of the JCPOA do not 

restrict us, but have there been diplomatic restrictions as a result 

of the JCPOA that has limited our ability to hold Iran responsible 

for its actions in Syria? 

Mr. BLINKEN. The answer is no, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. So why have we not taken action against Iran? 

Mr. BLINKEN. We have, and indeed we continue with regard to 

Iran—— 

Senator CARDIN. With regard to their activities in Syria? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Yes, sanctioned activities, entities that have—— 

Senator CARDIN. New sanctions have been imposed? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Sanctions have been imposed on entities in Iran 

that have sought to do business or support the regime. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand we have sanctions that are related 

to their nefarious actions other than the nuclear activities, but I 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

am not aware that we have increased those sanctions or have 

looked at ways in which we can apply more pressure against Iran. 

It is my understanding we have been pretty guarded in these activities. 

Mr. BLINKEN. We put in place at the very outset of the crisis, you 

know, various sanctions with regard to Syria to isolate and put 

pressure on the regime, and those sanctions also include sanctioning individuals or entities who do business in various ways 

with the regime, with the military, et cetera. And in that context, 

my understanding is that Iranian entities and individuals have 

been sanctioned. 

Senator CARDIN. You had said that we are looking—the President instructed to look at all options in regards to the current crisis 

in Syria. Is part of that taking action against Iran? 

Mr. BLINKEN. I do not want to get ahead of where we are in our 

discussions. But Iran is clearly, along with its proxy, Hezbollah, the 

most serious impediment to ending the civil war in that its support 

for the regime is the most significant of all. Now, as I said at the 

outset, I believe that given the support that Russia has provided, 

support that has gotten greater since Russia increased its engagement in Syria, it too has the capacity to change the actions of the 

regime. But there is no question that Iran and Hezbollah are arguably the most important outside supporters of the regime. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I think you would agree with me that 

since the JCPOA has been agreed upon, Iran has shown no slowing 

down of their activities in Syria. So I would hope that we would 

see some aggressive U.S. leadership to make it clear that that conduct does not get a free pass because of the JCPOA. So I would 

hope that that would be part of the options that are being considered. 

And let me also say in regards to Russia, it is not an isolated 

problem we are having with Russia. Russia has attacked America 

through cyber, trying to compromise our electoral process. Russia 

has violated the Minsk agreements and is causing Ukraine to be 

compromised today. And I could list a lot of other activities that 

Russia is participating in. 

So as we look at very significant consequences that Russia will 

face as a result of their failure to live up to the ceasefire agreements, I hope that in that equation will go these other activities 

so that there is a very clear message to Russia that U.S. leadership 

will not tolerate that type of conduct, and we are prepared to take 

unilateral action. We are also prepared to work with the willing to 

make sure there is a price to be paid for their activities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. I am sure that 

there will be more said. I would love at some time, if there is a 

Plan B, to have a classified briefing if that is what it takes. I think 

we all understand that it is nonexistent, and the only thing that 

is existent is words. 

Senator Rubio? 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Secretary Blinken, for being here. 

In your statement, you mention Russia six times, as you should. 

They are clearly involved, but there is an omission. I do not believe 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

that in your testimony you mention Iran a single time. And in fact, 

until Senator Cardin just raised it, I am not sure it had been discussed yet in terms of Iran’s role in this region. 

Earlier this month, you said you could not guarantee to the 

American people that the funds that Iran has received, as a result 

of the payments that were made and of the JCPOA, have not been 

used for terrorism. I think it is common sense that in fact they 

would do that. We have seen, for example, press reports that Iran’s 

Guardian Counsel instructed its central bank to transfer $1.7 billion to the military of Iran. And by the way, I do not think that 

number is a coincidence. So we have see the top IRGC commander 

last week say that the IRGC and its allies supply intelligence for 

Russian airstrikes in Syria. 

And so I think the first thing we have to point to here is the fact 

that these pallets of taxpayer dollars that have been allowed to 

Iran have ultimately helped them help Russia target innocent Syrians in this quest to increase their dominance in the region or their 

role in the region and to prop up Assad. 

Again, I do not know how we justify the transfer of all of these 

funds to the Iranian regime knowing that the Iranian regime is 

deeply involved in propping up the Assad regime and in the process 

providing assistance to all these atrocities that are now being committed by both Assad and the Russians. How do we justify that? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you, Senator. 

First, as you know, because you have been so focused on this for 

many years, Iran has been engaged in the support of terrorism and 

destabilizing activities, including in Syria, for a long time during 

sanctions, in other words, before the nuclear agreement, during the 

negotiation of the agreement, and indeed, since sanctions have 

been lifted in the context of that agreement. So their conduct has 

been consistent throughout. And, again, they were doing this before 

when we had the sanctions regime in place because of their nuclear 

program. 

The one thing that has changed is we have taken a nuclear 

weapon off the table far into the future, which is profoundly good 

for our interests and the interests of our partners and allies. 

But as we have said all along, we fully expected that they would 

continue to take these actions in various ways in various places 

after the agreement. That is why we have worked very hard to continue and, indeed, to increase our efforts to counter them. 

So we have worked very closely, as you know, with the Gulf partners building up their capacity. We just signed a record-breaking 

MOU with Israel to make sure that they have in place over the 

next decade what they need for their security, and we continue to 

implement sanctions against Iranian entities. 

Senator RUBIO. So the one thing has changed that basically they 

were involved in terror before, they are involved in terror now— 

and I consider their support of Assad to be part of that—that the 

only thing that has changed is that now we have made it harder 

for them to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. 

I would say a second thing has changed. They now have access 

to millions and millions of dollars they did not have access to before. So you have the world’s key sponsor of terrorism now has millions of dollars more than they once did. There is no evidence that 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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they are using it to build hospitals, bridges, roads, orphanages, 

sponsor food programs around the world. We do not see aid convoys 

from Iran providing food and medicine to people suffering in Syria. 

What we see is an increased amount of support for the Assad regime and the sponsorship of terrorism. 

So one of the things that has changed is they now have access 

to millions of dollars they did not have a year and a half ago. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Senator, our best assessment—— 

Senator RUBIO. Billions. I apologize. Billions. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Our best assessment is that given Iran’s very significant economic difficulties, the vast bulk of the resources that 

they have had access to as a result of the agreement or as a result 

of The Hague settlement—these funds have been dedicated to the 

domestic economy, not to regional activities. Under the nuclear 

agreement, we believe that they now have access to roughly $50 

billion that had been frozen or restricted in foreign accounts. They 

need half a trillion dollars to meet their investment needs, government obligations, propping up their currency, et cetera. And as I 

said, they have engaged, alas, in these activities before, during, 

and after. And also, unfortunately, a lot of support that they are 

providing to terror to proxies is not very resource-intensive. So that 

is why even as we have implemented the agreement, which in our 

judgment is a very good thing for our security and that of our allies 

and partners, we have worked to intensify our efforts to counter 

these activities. 

Senator RUBIO. But even if we assume what you said is true, 

that the money has been used to prop up their domestic economy, 

ultimately if that were the case, that domestic economy would then 

produce more revenue that they could use to fulfill the funding 

needs of their priorities, which is terrorism and the propping up of 

Assad. 

I guess the point for the average American who is watching this 

issue here is the bottom line. You have the world’s supreme sponsor of terrorism who now has billions of dollars more than they 

once did as a result of this, and we are somehow supposed to believe that the bulk of it is being spent to improve the way their 

economy functions and that somehow, because funds are fungible, 

that this is not being used to increase their other aims that they 

have around the world and that includes the propping up of this 

extraordinarily vicious regime of Assad and their enablers in Russia. 

So, again, I think this is just another example of how this deal 

and everything that surrounds it has now provided more resources 

to the Iranian regime to continue to do what they did. And one of 

the things they do with the money that they have been given is 

they are able to fund their intelligence gathering capabilities that 

allow them to help the Russians with their airstrikes, and those 

are the airstrikes that struck a convoy a week ago. Those are the 

airstrikes that are decimating Aleppo and creating a situation on 

the ground that we have not seen in decades anywhere in the 

world. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Blinken, thank you for being here 

this morning. 

Sadly, I have to say that I share my colleague’s views that despite the best intentions that our policies in Syria have contributed 

to where we are today. There was a news report that just came 

over that Russia has rejected our demands for a resumption of a 

Syrian ceasefire and that they vowed today to press ahead with 

their operations in Syria. So I guess that says to me—and I think 

the news has been very clear—that Russia has escalated the civil 

war in Syria and they intend to continue to do that and Assad intends to continue to do that no matter what the expense is to his 

own people. 

So I am not going to beat the Plan B horse because I appreciate 

that you have not been able to share with us what might be being 

considered. And maybe you are not able to talk about what options 

are being discussed that we might still have in Syria. But it seems 

to me that we need to look at all of those options because the current effort is not working. And I appreciate the arguments you are 

making. I just do not think they are working. 

So let me go on to a couple of other areas where I am interested 

in what you can share with us. 

On the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, I thought your appearing 

on Sesame Street was a good thing. It is nice to let young people 

know what is going on. 

But can you talk about which states have been particularly generous, what has come out of that summit, what is being looked at 

to implement the commitments that have been made at the refugee 

summit? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

As you know and as the committee knows, we are facing the 

largest single wave of human displacement since World War II. 

Syria, of course, is what is generating a lot of it, but it is actually 

a global problem, a global crisis because we see forced migration 

of one kind or another virtually on every continent. In Africa alone, 

there are about 12 countries where people are, in effect, forcibly 

displaced by conflict. Central America, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

around the world. 

So the President brought together countries and leaders from 

around the world at this summit in New York on the margins of 

the General Assembly to take action, not just to talk about the 

problem, but to do something about it. And that is exactly what we 

did and what he did. 

There were three objectives that we had going into the summit. 

One was to get more resources from around the world into the 

humanitarian support system because, as the committee knows, 

unfortunately, it is significantly underfunded and it is basically 

overmatched by the scale and scope of the problems that we are 

facing. So we wanted to get more resources in, and we wanted to 

get countries that had not participated as much to participate or 

to do more. And we succeeded. We have got countries, all told, to 

put in for this next year, about 30 percent more than they did in 

2015. So we are looking at billions of additional dollars for the humanitarian system. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

Second, we were looking for countries to make additional commitments to resettle refugees, and we sought to basically double 

the number of legally resettled persons around the world over the 

next year. That objective, based on the commitments that were 

made, was also achieved. 

Third and finally, we wanted to help build the resilience of countries that are receiving refugees, basically the country of first refuge and asylum, in the case of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, which as the committee knows, have borne extraordinary burdens with millions of refugees. We wanted to increase support to 

them, but we also wanted them to make additional commitments 

to make sure that children could go to school and adults could go 

to work because, as Senator Cardin said, we do risk a lost generation of children from these conflicts if they are not able to go to 

school. We now have commitments over the next year for there to 

be an additional 1 million places in schools around the world for 

refugee children and another 1 million jobs, legal jobs, around the 

world. So these are significant. These are real. These are concrete. 

That said, ultimately, the answer to a lot of this has to be resolving the underlying conflicts that are causing people to flee, to leave 

their homes, to leave their families in some cases, to put their lives 

and their children in jeopardy. We recognize that, and that, of 

course, is why it is so important to work to end this conflict in 

Syria. 

But we did make a major advance. Now the critical thing will be 

to make sure the countries make good on their commitments, and 

we will be looking at that very carefully. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. My time is up. So I will wait for 

the next round for other questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us today. 

A comment and then a question. 

So at the heart of the most spectacular U.S. foreign policy failures of the last 50 years is hubris, is this idea that there is a U.S. 

solution, usually a U.S. military solution, to every problem in the 

world. You can read Vietnam and Iraq and Libya through that 

lens. And this idea that is sort of being proffered on this committee, frankly by both sides of the aisle, but there are these clear 

alternatives to the current policy in Syria or Iraq that would lead 

to a radically different reality on the ground is fantasy. I hate the 

place that we are in today. It is an ongoing global tragedy. 

But this idea that there was a magical moment in 2012 where 

we could have parachuted arms to the Syrian rebels and they 

would have overrun Assad is not true. Russia and Iran have had 

for a very long time equities in that country that are unequal to 

ours. They were always going to come to the defense of Assad with 

ferocity. 

This idea that a safe zone would magically change the reality on 

the ground is a fantasy as well. Our own military leaders have 

thrown cold water on this idea because it would involve some major 

ground forces to make it meaningful, and there are very few people 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

in this Congress who are willing to support the major deployment 

of U.S. ground forces. 

I just say this because maybe, just maybe every bad thing that 

happens in the world is not a fault of failed U.S. policy. And 

maybe, just maybe there are times and there are places where 

there is not always a U.S. answer. Now, I think we can be incredibly helpful. I think that we can work with partners to try to make 

this situation better. 

But I read the last 3 years as a continued ramp-up, albeit it very 

slowly, of U.S. military engagement in Syria and the situation on 

the ground for the Syrian people getting worse and worse and 

worse, not better and better and better. And I think history should 

probably teach us that those two things are likely not a coincidence. 

I reject the idea that there are easy, clear alternatives that the 

administration just is not looking at. This is a hard problem with 

no easy solutions, and we should operate from an assumption that 

there are not always U.S.-led solutions to terrible, intractable problems in the world. 

Let me ask you a question about where this failing of hubris 

could get us in trouble in the coming weeks and months, and that 

is in Mosul. So a new announcement that we are going to put 600 

more U.S. military personnel on the ground to help retake Mosul, 

not an announcement that we are going to make a diplomatic surge 

in and around Mosul to try to solve some of the governance problems in that city. So share with us, maybe share with me in answer to my skepticism that a military surge in Mosul is ultimately 

going to solve the political problems that you correctly identify as 

the most intractable. We do not have a military quagmire in Iraq. 

We could solve the military problem in a heartbeat by putting another 200,000 U.S. troops back in. We have a political problem. 

And so Mosul seems to me to be an example of where you have 

responded to pressure to try to make progress by announcing a 

military surge. I have no doubt that with 600 or 1,200 or 1,400 

U.S. troops we will get the military objective that we want in 

Mosul. But how does that get us the political solution? Nineveh is 

an incredibly diverse province and what allowed for ISIS to overrun Mosul in the first place was not a military vacuum. It was a 

political vacuum in that city. So how do we make sure that there 

is a political component here so that our military hubris that we 

often have does not get us in the same, exact situation that it has 

over and over again in that region? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Senator, if I have a chance, I would like to come 

back to your opening comment, but I want to answer your question. 

Mosul is and will be the culmination in the Iraq side of the theater of the counter-ISIL or counter-Daesh campaign. And as I said 

at the outset in my opening remarks, it is a vitally important opportunity to deny ISIL its physical or geographic caliphate, which 

has been at the heart of its narrative and at the heart of its ability 

to project success. So it is vitally important. 

But your comments are also vitally important because you are 

exactly right, that this cannot be and, indeed, is not just a military 

effort. We are working along multiple tracks at the same time in 

a coordinated fashion. On the military piece, making sure that all 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

of the forces are coordinated under one plan with Iraqi leadership, 

but bringing in all of the critical elements to include the Iraqi Security Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and critically tribal elements from Nineveh. There is now an objective of raising about 

15,000 members from the tribes, and we are well on track to do 

that. That is part one. 

Part two is making sure that we have in place all of the capacity 

we need to deal with what are likely to be the humanitarian consequences of seizing Mosul and, in particular, internally displaced 

persons. The U.N. is projecting that there could be up to a million 

people forced to flee Mosul as a result of the effort to liberate it. 

We are working very hard with the U.N., with the Iraqis to put in 

place everything that they need to care for these people with food, 

with shelter, with medicine. And that also is on track. It is challenging, but it is on track. We have raised the money to do it. We 

are prepositioning resources. 

Third, stabilization of Mosul itself after it is liberated so that 

people have something to go back to as quickly as possible. There 

too we have raised significant resources. We have a plan in place 

to do that, to restore basic services, basic security. 

Fourth and finally, you are exactly right. Governance—because 

unless the basic governance structure is in place and everyone 

agrees to it, we are going to have problems after the liberation. We 

have worked very hard with the Iraqi Government, with the Kurds, 

with other actors to make sure there is basic agreement on what 

governance will look like in Mosul and in Nineveh more generally, 

centered on the governor, who is the constitutionally appropriate 

person for the province, the provincial council, but also persons 

designated by Baghdad and by Irbil to support them and the city 

itself, in effect, divided up into eight quadrants with sub-mayors to 

make sure that, as much as possible, those making decisions are 

very closely representative of the people for whom they are making 

decisions. 

So this is a coordinated effort. And you are exactly right. It has 

to bring in all of these elements, and that is exactly what we are 

working on. 

We have also tried to learn lessons from the past. In Fallujah, 

when it was liberated, as you know, we saw some reprisal atrocities committed by the Shia PMF, popular mobilization forces. We 

have made sure that for Mosul there will be no southern or Shia 

PMF going into Mosul City, similarly no Kurdish Peshmerga going 

in, and as I said, a significant hold force comprised of members of 

Sunni tribes from the region, both in the security forces and in the 

police. So we have tried to learn from that. And also, as IDPs leave 

Mosul and are screened before they go to find refuge provided to 

them by the government and by the United Nations, we want to 

make sure that that process is done as quickly as possible, keeping 

families together, and again without any of the divisive elements 

being part of it, including the Shia PMF. So we very much have 

that in mind. 

Just very quickly on your initial comment. I do think it is very 

important that we not be bound by history but we be informed by 

it. And in the case of Syria, we do know this. Civil wars throughout 

history have ended basically in one of three ways. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

One side wins. That is not likely to happen anytime soon in 

Syria because the dynamic that we have seen is that as soon as one 

side gets the advantage, the outside patrons of the other side come 

in with more and right the balance. And that has been what has 

happened. So what the dynamic is outside patrons can make sure 

that no one loses in Syria, but it is very, very hard to make sure 

that one side wins. 

The second way these things end is the parties exhaust themselves. Tragically what we see in history at least is that that takes 

on average 10 years. Syria is in year 6. And when there are a multiplicity of actors involved, it takes even longer. 

The third way these things end is some kind of outside intervention, either military or political. Military intervention of the scale 

necessary to actually end the conflict is technically possible, but 

then whoever does that is going to be left holding a very, very 

heavy bag with all of the unintended consequences that will flow 

from that. And I do not think the United States nor, for that matter, Russia or any other actor is prepared to do that. That leaves, 

in effect, outside powers, the United Nations and others trying to 

put in place and, as necessary, impose some kind of political resolution. That is what we have been working on because we have seen 

that as the best way to try to end this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I always appreciate my friend, Senator Murphy’s comments and 

perspective,. and I think hubris certainly is something that can be 

the downfall of us all. 

I will say that hubris also, from the standpoint of making big 

statements about what the United States is going to do, raises people’s expectations. I think we certainly have made bold statements 

about what we were going to do relative to Syria that were followed 

up with almost nothing. And in that case, we have caused the sons 

and daughters and brothers and uncles and sisters of those in the 

Syrian opposition to be slaughtered as they waited for those things 

that we stated we were going to do but never did. 

Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Secretary Blinken, last October, former President Jimmy Carter 

wrote in the New York Times that since 2011, the United States’ 

precondition that, quote, Assad must go, has reinforced escalation 

of Syria’s civil war and inhibited serious discussion about compromise solutions. 

Last Wednesday, President Carter published a follow-up piece in 

the Times calling on the entire international community to focus 

for now on just one imperative: stop the killing. He wrote that the 

discussions should focus on a goal of temporarily freezing the existing territorial control without the government, the opposition, or 

the Kurds giving up their arms. Additionally, measures should be 

agreed upon to stabilize conditions in territories controlled by these 

belligerents with guarantees of unrestricted access to humanitarian 

aid. 

Secretary Blinken, what do you think about that proposal? The 

United States could advance that even in the absence of Russian 

or Syrian agreement by proposing a Chapter 7 United Nations Security Council resolution requiring all parties to immediately stop 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

the killing, stabilize civilian populations, and ensure full access to 

humanitarian relief for all victims of this war. Russia’s ongoing 

atrocious behavior in Aleppo makes it clear that they would not 

support such a resolution. However, it would put them on notice 

that at the United Nations we were about to have this global discussion of the need to just stop the killing. 

Can you talk about President Carter’s proposal, what you think 

about it, and putting aside the ‘‘Assad must go’’ movement for the 

time being so that we can just begin to put an end to this humanitarian crisis? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Senator, thank you very much. And forgive me because I have not read it. So I would like to be able to read it in 

detail, but I heard your description of it. 

First, in effect, what we have been trying to achieve, with Russia’s support, is a cessation of hostilities that would, in effect, end 

the violence, the provision of humanitarian assistance to people 

who need it in besieged areas, and as I said as well, taking the Syrian air force out of the skies over civilian populated areas and getting everyone to focus on the common enemy, which is Daesh and 

Al Qaeda, Al Nusra, in Syria. So, in effect, those were the first 

steps that we thought were so critical. 

Now, if we were able to take those steps, we would then have in 

place the conditions under which all of the parties could begin to 

negotiate a political transition in Syria. 

Senator MARKEY. But it is broken. So what do you think about 

taking it to the U.N., taking it to a Chapter 7, escalating this thing 

to a point where everyone is going to be forced to sit down and discuss it, Syria and Russia might not like it, but at least we are 

going to be focusing upon the core problem of stopping the killing? 

Mr. BLINKEN. So we are very actively looking at what more can 

be done at the United Nations. 

Senator MARKEY. Would that include a Chapter 7? 

Mr. BLINKEN. Sure, except that, of course, Russia would almost 

certainly veto a Chapter 7. 

Senator MARKEY. And that is all right. Let us have Russia veto 

it. Let us have Russia be—let us pin the tail on the donkey. Let 

us have the culpable parties be put in place. Let us not allow 

them—I just think there is such an atmosphere of ambiguity. It is 

just so complex in Syria, in Aleppo. There are so many parties involved that it is just very difficult for the world to understand who 

has the capability—— 

Mr. BLINKEN. Well, you are exactly right, Senator, and that has 

added to the complication because we have a multiplicity of actors, 

all of whom have different priorities. Our priority has been in the 

first instance Daesh because that poses the most immediate threat 

to us and to our interests. Russia’s priority has been to keep Assad 

in place or at least to maintain its foothold in Syria. The priority 

of the Turks has been actually dealing with the Kurds and preventing them—— 

Senator MARKEY. Exactly. All of that is true. 

Mr. BLINKEN. The Saudis have been most interested in checking 

Iran. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

So in all of these ways, because people come to this with different 

interests and different priorities, it makes it even more complicated. 

That said, I think you are right that further turning up the heat 

at the United Nations is something that we have to very closely 

look at. 

Senator MARKEY. The administration announced that this week 

it would increase the supply of arms to Kurdish militant groups in 

Syria to enable them to play a leading role in a future offensive to 

take Raqqa, a Sunni city, back from ISIS. What are the risks of relying on a Kurdish force for military operations in a Sunni Arab 

city? And did you discuss this with the Turkish government before 

you made that announcement? 

Mr. BLINKEN. In fact, I was in Turkey just this week, and we are 

looking with our Turkish partners and allies very closely at how we 

continue the campaign in Syria to take territory away from Daesh. 

Senator MARKEY. What was their perspective on using Kurdish 

troops aided by the U.S. in Raqqa? 

Mr. BLINKEN. As you know, Senator, we have worked in northern 

Syria with something called the Syrian Democratic Forces, the 

SDF. That has several components. One is the Syrian Arab coalition, so predominantly Arab forces. And it also includes Kurdish 

forces, in this case the YPG. And the Turks have not been comfortable with support to this Kurdish element of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and it has obviously caused some tensions. But it has 

resulted in taking back Manbij, which was a critical transit point 

for Daesh in and out of Syria and in and out of Turkey. A treasure 

trove of information about their external plotting came from that. 

And so we need to be able to work with effective actors on the 

ground in Syria. That is what we have done. That is what we will 

continue to do. But we also need to do it in a way that respects 

the concerns and interests of our Turkish allies. So we are in the 

midst of conversations with them about the best way to move forward, including on Raqqa. 

Senator MARKEY. And if I could, just going back up to Mosul 

again in terms of your statement that it will be Sunni government 

officials, Sunni police that will be in charge of Mosul, does the government in Baghdad agree with that? Have they signed off on that? 

Are they going to keep the Shia militia out? 

Mr. BLINKEN. That is their commitment, just as it is the Kurdish 

commitment to keep the Kurdish Peshmerga out of the city, and 

the core of the force that liberates Mosul will be the Iraqi Security 

Forces, backed by the coalition with the support of the Peshmerga. 

The tribal elements that are being trained, equipped, brought onboard with the goal of getting 15,000 of them will predominantly 

be the holding force once the city is liberated. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Our ranking member for closing comments. 

Senator CARDIN. I just want to thank our Secretary for your help 

here. Just keep us involved on the options being considered in regards to Syria. 

In regards to Mosul, it could be a wonderful advancement because militarily things look like they are in place. I share Senator 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

Markey’s concerns that in practice we do not see the ethnic reprisals that we have seen happen so often when territory has been reclaimed from ISIS’s grips. So I think that is going to be more difficult in getting the confidence necessary. So I would just urge us 

to work together. 

In regards to Turkey, I would enjoy talking to you, not through 

questioning here, as to how successful we are in getting our NATO 

partners constructive participation in keeping the border closed but 

also dealing with the Kurdish issues that do not distract us from 

dealing with ISIS. 

But I thank you very much for your service and look forward to 

continuing this discussion. 

The CHAIRMAN. I too want to thank you for appearing today and 

thank you for your service and mostly for your responsiveness. 

I do want to say that I think history does teach us a lot. I think 

basing your foreign policy on not doing what the last person did 

leads us to a place that is very negative for U.S. national interests. 

And what I hope is going to happen as people have watched the 

results of this strategy, is that we understand that foreign policy 

is much more complex—it takes more engagement than just creating a policy of not being what your predecessor was. I am hopeful 

that the next President and the next Secretary of State can learn 

from the failures that we have witnessed and hopefully in some 

form or capacity, what you have learned from this will be helpful 

in that regard as well. 

Mr. BLINKEN. Mr. Chairman, I would welcome the opportunity 

actually to pursue that conversation at another time whenever it 

is convenient to you. I have to tell you from my experience we are 

more engaged in more places and more ways than we ever have 

been before. I think there is a debate about the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a negative trend. 

Mr. BLINKEN. No. I think there is a lot of positive too, but I 

would be happy to pursue that conversation. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would welcome that and would welcome that 

with Secretary Kerry and others also, which I know has been difficult to achieve. 

But with that, the meeting is adjourned. 

The record will remain open through the close of business Monday. If you could fairly promptly, with all the other responsibilities 

you have, respond to those. We thank you for being here. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO DEPUTY SECRETARY BLINKEN BY SENATOR RUBIO

Question. A top IRGC commander last week said that the IRGC and its allies supply intelligence for Russia’s airstrikes in Syria. Given that the IRGC and Russia are 

working closely in Syria, why would this administration ever agree to share intelligence and targeting priorities with the Russian military? 

Answer. The United States has not been sharing intelligence information or targeting priorities with the Russian military and would never share information with 

Russia in support of the regime. On September 9, Secretary Kerry and Russian ForFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

eign Minister Lavrov reached an arrangement that would have eventually resulted 

in the establishment of a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) for closer coordination 

specifically to counter al-Qaida in Syria and Daesh, which remain significant 

threats. The arrangement included several pre-conditions designed to test the veracity of Russia’s commitments before establishing the JIC, which Russia has so far 

failed to honor. 

Question. A press report stated that the Obama administration wired $850,000 in 

July 2015 to an account for Iran in the Netherlands. 

♦ Can you confirm this wire transfer took place? 

♦ Is it fair to say that wire transfer occurred during a period of heightened sanctions against Iran? 

♦ Can you confirm the administration wired the $8.6 million payment to Iran for 

the heavy water transfer? 

♦ Why did the President and others say that the $1.7 billion ransom payment to 

Iran had to be in cash because of the inability to wire money to Iran? 

Answer. The July 2015 payment you are referring to was the result of an award 

from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague (‘‘the Tribunal’’) to Iran for less 

than $1 million. The award was paid via wire to an account of the Iranian Center 

for International Legal Affairs, or CILA, in the Netherlands. CILA is the Iranian 

office responsible for representing Iran before the Tribunal. No direct transfer was 

made from the U.S. to Iran. Iran asked us to wire the award payment to that account in the Netherlands, as CILA was able to absorb the funds for purposes of paying Iran’s Tribunal and litigation expenses. 

As the President said, U.S. banks do not have direct banking relationships with 

Iran. Iran has encountered problems with a wide variety of payments prior to sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and, even after 

Implementation Day, prior to Iran’s reconnection with SWIFT and some European 

banks. The payments in January 2016, which were made as part of a settlement 

of a long-standing claim before the Tribunal, and did not constitute a ransom payment, occurred before Iran reestablished these banking connections. The payments 

were structured to provide Iran access to the funds and avoid the otherwise certain 

delay and immobilization of the funds prior to banking reconnections, which was essential to closing the settlement agreement and saving the U.S. taxpayer potentially 

billions of dollars.Regarding the heavy water payment, in the months following the 

lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA, Iran began to gain incremental access to the 

international financial system, which opened up more options for executing transactions, such as the heavy water transaction you referenced. Even this transaction 

took several months to complete, however. 

Question. Several administration officials have justified these payments to Iran 

coinciding with release of hostages by claiming that there were three separate negotiations happening at the same time (JCPOA implementation, release of U.S. hostages, and resolution of the Iranian claim), which naturally converged on January 

17. 

♦ If there were three separate tracks, can you confirm that three separate U.S. 

officials negotiated these issues in the run-up to January 17, 2016? 

♦ Did three separate U.S. officials sign documentation on JCPOA implementation 

including the treatment of Bank Sepah under the JCPOA, release of the U.S. 

hostages, and resolution of the Iranian claim? 

♦ If not, what U.S. official signed the bilateral documents between Iran and the 

United States resolving these three tracks? 

♦ What is the name of the Iranian official who signed the documents committing 

to Iran’s effort? What is his affiliation? What group does he work for? 

♦ Was the transfer of the cash timed in any way to coincide with the release of 

the hostages? 

♦ Given all of these facts: how was this not a ransom payment? 

Answer. The President and the Secretary have made clear, the United States 

transferred funds to Iran to effectuate the settlement of a long-standing claim at 

the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal at The Hague. The timing of the Hague settlement 

was a consequence of the United States taking advantage of the opening of diplomatic opportunities with Iran on several fronts simultaneously, including the opportunity to minimize litigation risk with respect to Iran’s contract claims arising 

under the U.S.-Iran Foreign Military Sales (‘‘FMS’’) Program. Implementation Day 

of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the release of several American 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

citizens unjustly imprisoned in Iran, and the settlement of the Hague claim were 

all made possible by this intensified diplomatic engagement, but all were resolved 

on their own merits. 

Regarding the allegations that this settlement constituted ransom to free American citizens who were released from prison in Iran on January 17, the administration has repeatedly made it clear since January, and President Obama recently reiterated, that this settlement did not constitute ransom and that the United States 

has not and will not pay ransom. Upon Iran’s release of several unjustly detained 

Americans, the United States provided relief to certain Iranian citizens charged 

with primarily sanctions-related crimes, several of whom are dual U.S.-Iranian nationals, as a one-time reciprocal humanitarian gesture. 

Question. In June of this year, 51 State Department officials submitted a memo 

through the Department’s ‘‘dissent channel’’ in which they called for the United 

States to carry out military strikes against the Assad government in order to stop 

its cease fire violations. They wrote that if the Obama administration continued to 

allow the Assad government and its backers to attack Syrian civilians with impunity, the situation in Syria will ‘‘continue to present increasingly dire, if not disastrous, humanitarian, diplomatic, and terrorism-related challenges.’’ Do you agree 

with these diplomats within your Department that the failure of the administration’s efforts has indeed allowed the situation Syria to deteriorate, leading to the 

consequences which they warned of? 

Answer. There is no way to look at what is happening on the ground in Syria and 

not feel profound grief and horror. In the midst of such tragedy, it is tempting to 

want a neat answer that ends the civil war and eases suffering overnight. But the 

challenges before us defy silver bullet solutions. These are extremely tough issues: 

How to get a successful cessation of hostilities; how to ensure full, unimpeded humanitarian access to all Syrians in need; and how to bring about a genuine political 

transition in accordance with the Geneva Communique. We are working all-day, 

every day to defeat Daesh in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. We have regular, frank discussions about how best to go about it. We are very focused on reducing the violence 

and providing humanitarian assistance to the still millions of Syrians in need. 

We do not believe there is a military solution to this conflict, so we are working 

to bring about a political resolution, which includes a transition away from Assad. 

Question. As Ambassador Samantha Power told the United Nations Security 

Council Sunday, ‘‘The Assad regime believes only in a military solution. It says it 

is going to conquer militarily every last square inch of Syria.’’ And ‘‘Instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad make war. Instead of helping get life-saving aid to 

civilians, Russia and Assad are bombing the humanitarian convoys, hospitals, and 

first responders who are trying desperately to keep people alive.’’ Does this behavior 

indicate at all that Moscow or Damascus is interested in pursuing a political transition in Syria? How would you rate the prospects of achieving any durable ceasefire 

agreement in the near future, in light of recent events? 

Answer. We are alarmed by the devastation inflicted on Syrian civilians, most recently in Aleppo, at the hands of the Syrian regime and its allies. We regret that 

Damascus has not signaled a serious intent to engage in talks aimed at a political 

settlement to the Syrian conflict. We remain committed to pursuing a durable resolution to the conflict, including an enduring cessation of hostilities by the Syrian regime and its allies. 

We know from history and experience that civil wars end in one of three ways. 

First, one side wins. That is unlikely in Syria because as soon as one side gets the 

advantage, the outside patrons of the other side intensify their engagement to right 

the balance. 

Second, the parties exhaust themselves. Typically, that takes a decade or longer 

when a multiplicity of actors are involved. The civil war in Syria is entering year 

six, and it features a broad array of internal and external actors with different priorities. 

Third and finally, civil wars end when external powers intervene either militarily 

or politically. But military intervention typically adds fuel to the fire, extending before ending the conflict and suffering. In the case of Syria, short of a wholesale invasion that no outside power has the interest to undertake, military intervention is 

not likely to be decisive. That leaves a political intervention, with key outside powers and patrons shaping, supporting and imposing a resolution. That is the effort 

we have been engaged in with Russia and other members of the International Syria 

Support Group (ISSG), building on the foundation of the Geneva communiques and 

U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Question. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said this week that the ‘‘diplomatic process is still the best option we have.’’ In light of Secretary Kerry’s statement Monday that ‘‘the Assad regime statements are almost meaningless at this 

point in time,’’ upon what basis can the administration hope that it can negotiate 

Assad, Russia or Iran into limiting their slaughter of the Syrian people? 

Answer. The Assad regime continues to prove that it is not a legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and its statements are almost meaningless at this point. 

Nevertheless, the diplomatic process known as the International Syria Support 

Group (ISSG) currently remains the best option for reducing violence and helping 

create conditions for U.N.-led intra-Syria talks on a political solution to move forward. Since the causes of the Syrian war can only be addressed through a political 

solution, even if we augment our efforts with elements of other options, we and our 

partners must continue undertaking some form of diplomacy along the lines of the 

ISSG process in pursuit of the goals elaborated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2254. 

Question. Would you agree that Russia was responsible for the September 19 attack on the humanitarian aid convoy and that this attack was deliberate? What evidence can you provide this committee to corroborate that? 

Answer. The regime was almost certainly aware of the convoy’s route, since Syrian authorities had signed facilitation letters at the urging of the International 

Syria Support Group (ISSG)’s Humanitarian Access Task Force, which includes Russia. As co-chair of the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force, Russia bears at least indirect responsibility for failing to prevent the regime’s attack on the convoy. 

Question. The Daily Beast reported earlier this week that the U.S. special envoy 

to Syria Michael Ratney was warned that the Assad regime was planning to attack 

the Aleppo facilities of the Syrian Civil Defense. 

♦ Do you deny that the U.S. was warned of the pending Assad regime attack? 

♦ If you knew about the attack beforehand, why did we stand by to allow the 

Assad regime to attack? 

Answer. The September 23 attacks on the Syrian Civil Defense (‘‘White Helmets’’) 

positions were an especially egregious example of the kind of barbarity the Assad 

regime has displayed over the past five years of war. There can be no excuse for 

bombing facilities and supplies used to help the victims of violence. No one in the 

U.S. government, including Special Envoy Michael Ratney, received any warning 

specific to the attack on the White Helmets. 

Question. The New York Times reported last week that ‘‘The Obama administration is weighing a military plan to directly arm Syrian Kurdish fighters combating 

the Islamic State, a major policy shift that could speed up the offensive against the 

terrorist group but also sharply escalate tensions between Turkey and the United 

States.’’ 

♦ Can you confirm that the administration is indeed considering providing Kurdish forces with small arms and other equipment? 

♦ How will providing these arms enable the Kurdish forces to advance against the 

Islamic State? 

♦ Why is the administration using the Syrian Democratic Forces as its primary 

proxy group in the conflict? Can you estimate the breakdown of ethnic groups 

within the alliance? 

♦ Does the administration believe that the alliance can hold territory that is liberated from ISIS? In light of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ strong Kurdish element, do you believe it is wise to use this force to continue to push into territory 

that is traditionally not Kurdish and what is your assessment about how they 

will be received by the local population? 

♦ How does the administration weigh the risks of further exacerbating tensions 

with Ankara and reclaiming territory from ISIS? Can you identify other groups 

in Syria at the moment that the United States can support with equal measure? 

Answer. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multi-ethnic Syrian alliance 

comprising Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, Christian, and Muslim groups 

united in their fight against Daesh. The SDF has been a proven and valuable partner in the counter-Daesh fight and has liberated 25 percent of the terrain Daesh 

once controlled in Syria in 2014. We are now evaluating what role the SDF can play 

in the next phase of the counter-Daesh campaign in Syria. 

We have not, to date, provided U.S. ammunition or weapons to the Kurdish elements of the SDF under the program established by section 1209 of the National 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The Department of Defense has 

provided equipment to vetted Arab elements of the SDF under section 1209. This 

has been a valuable contribution to the counter-Daesh mission, as it supports a vetted force’s efforts to secure the region from terrorist control. 

From the liberation of Kobani until the liberation of Manbij, the SDF’s fighting 

force of Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, Christian, and Muslim and other populations has been essential in recapturing significant territory from Daesh and in denying Daesh access to large portions of northern Syria. I cannot go into the specifics 

of the composition of the SDF. 

Despite mounting multiple SVBIEDs and counterattacks, Daesh has been unable 

to reclaim any territory lost to the SDF.A core principle of our counter-Daesh campaign in Iraq and Syria is that local forces should hold and secure terrain liberated 

from Daesh. We are applying this principle in Manbij, the city most recently liberated by the SDF, and we will seek to apply it in Raqqa. 

Most recently, the SDF force that liberated Manbij comprised Kurdish and Arab 

elements, including Arab groups from Manbij. When the SDF seized central Manbij 

on August 12, we saw widespread jubilation among the local population. Within a 

day of the city’s liberation, thousands of IDPs began returning to the city, and 

70,000 have returned to date. While challenges persist in Manbij, local forces are 

providing security, people are returning, and the local economy is regenerating. 

Daesh will seek to generate hostility among Raqqa’s population against any counterDaesh force advancing on the city. Counteracting and mitigating the threats caused 

by such Daesh propaganda campaigns is key component of our plan to liberate 

Raqqa. 

The United States remains focused on the counter-Daesh Coalition to degrade and 

defeat Daesh. An important part of this effort is denying Daesh access to Syria’s 

border, to prevent attacks in Turkey, Europe, and against the Homeland. Turkey 

is a key partner in the counter-Daesh Coalition, and we will continue to work with 

Turkish officials to discuss our mutual goal of defeating Daesh and to coordinate 

our counter-Daesh campaign. Since August 24, the Coalition has made significant 

progress in driving Daesh off the border between Syria and Turkey. We are going 

to work with Turkey and our counter-Daesh coalition partners to focus on that fight 

ahead as we continue to isolate Raqqa. As we accelerate our campaign and move 

toward the next phase in the isolation of Raqqa, it is critical that we are closely 

linked with partners on the ground to coordinate both military and diplomatic efforts to sustain the positive momentum that has been gained in recent months. The 

coalition will work with all of our partners to achieve our common goal—the lasting 

defeat of Daesh. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO DEPUTY SECRETARY BLINKEN BY SENATOR PERDUE

Question. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Special Envoy Brett 

McGurk signed three documents in Geneva, Switzerland on January 17, 2016. One 

of these documents reportedly committed the U.S. to support the immediate sanctions delisting of two Iranian banks, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International, 

who were not to be delisted until 2023. Both of these banks were designated by 

Treasury in 2007 for their role in backing Iran’s missile program. The designation 

was silent on any role the banks played on Iran’s nuclear program. How do you justify the delisting of Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah international, given the administration told us that the JCPOA sanctions relief would only be related to nuclear designations? Since Special Envoy McGurk works on the Counter-ISIL portfolio, why 

was he the one to sign these documents with Iran? Could you provide the three documents signed on January 17, 2016 to me and my staff for review? Why were these 

three documents kept from Congress in the first place? 

Answer. The documents you request were provided to the Senate on September 

9 and are available for review by you (and your staff holding appropriate security 

clearances) in the Office of Senate Security. 

By January 2016, the U.S. government had already made the determination that 

it would remove Bank Sepah from our domestic Specially Designated Nationals and 

Blocked Persons (SDN) list on Implementation Day—a decision that was outlined 

clearly in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself in July 2015. We 

made this determination after a careful review of the activity of all individuals and 

entities—including Bank Sepah—that would be removed from the SDN list as part 

of the JCPOA. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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The United Nations Security Council decided to delist Bank Sepah in January— 

a public act that was reported at the time. It has long been U.S. practice to support 

delistings at the U.N. that match up, or synchronize, the U.S. and U.N. lists. Given 

the U.S. government’s removal of Bank Sepah from our SDN list pursuant to the 

JCPOA, we were comfortable with its removal from the U.N. sanctions list as well. 

As we have said previously, we have the ability to quickly reimpose U.S. sanctions 

if Bank Sepah or any other entity engages in activities that remain sanctionable. 

Special Presidential Envoy McGurk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Iraq and Iran from August 2013 until November 2015 and in that capacity was 

asked to lead the discussions with Iran regarding unjustly detained Americans in 

Iran. As the Deputy Special Presidential Envoy on the Counter-Daesh campaign, he 

retained his position as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran. When 

President Obama appointed Mr. McGurk as the Special Presidential Envoy in November 2015, he continued the sensitive talks with Iran regarding the unjustly detained Americans until they were released in January 2016. He was also the senior 

U.S. official present in Geneva during the discussions in which a number of strands 

of diplomacy related to Iran were concluded with the Iranians. 

Question. I have previously written to the State Department regarding the $1.7 

billion in cash payments provided to Iran this year. Unfortunately, in the reply from 

the State Department several of my questions went unanswered. I will repeat them 

here, and appreciate your thorough and direct answers to these questions: 

♦ Why did the administration not disclose information about this payment to Congress? 

♦ Upon making this payment, did you have any monitoring systems in place for 

the end-use of this cash? 

♦ Did you receive any assurances from the Iranians that this payment would not 

be used to fund terrorism, the Assad regime in Syria, or other Iranian efforts 

to further sow instability in the region? 

♦ Can you assure us that U.S. taxpayer dollars—specifically the hard currency 

provided in the January 2016 shipment—have not been used to fund terrorism? 

Answer. This issue of the January settlement of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

Trust Fund claim at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was openly addressed in January 2016, including by the President and by Secretary Kerry, and the administration made multiple offers to brief Members at that time. One Member of Congress 

accepted the offer of a briefing, and it was provided in April. 

On September 6, we provided two closed briefings on this issue to House and Senate staff, and we have made every effort to answer questions that Members have 

asked. For both the payments to settle the dispute (one covering principal and the 

other covering the compromise on interest), no direct transfer was made from any 

U.S. account to Iran. The transactions that were made to effectuate the payments 

complied with U.S. sanctions laws and did not require a unique license, waiver, or 

any other form of authorization. The Department of the Treasury’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations explicitly authorizes ‘‘[a]ll transactions necessary. 

to payments pursuant to settlement agreements entered into by the United States 

Government’’ in a legal proceeding in which the U.S. is a party, which would include 

settlements of claims before the Tribunal. 

We have no information to indicate that the $1.7 billion went to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or was used to support terrorism. If we determine Iran has 

used any of its funds for purposes that are sanctionable, such as support for terrorism, we retain the ability to take aggressive steps to counter these activities 

using a range of tools—including with sanctions. Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties 

make it hard to divert large portions of these settlement funds away from its domestic economy and toward its regional activities. We estimate that Iran needs about 

half a trillion dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations 

and it is our assessment that Iran has used most of the funds it has gained access 

to since the JCPOA to address these domestic economic needs. 

Question. In addition to the questions previously asked on the $1.7 billion in cash 

payments, I would appreciate clarification on why the administration deemed it necessary to make these payments in cash. Although President Obama stated on August 4 ‘‘the reason that we had to give them cash is precisely because we are so 

strict in maintaining sanctions and we do not have a banking relationship with Iran 

that we couldn’t send them a check and we could not wire the money,’’ we now know 

that on at least two different occasions the administration wired money to Tehran 

(July 2015 for the settlement of a claim and April 2016 for the payment for removal 

of excess heavy water). Why could the funds not be wired to Iran in January 2016, 

when wire payments were made last year? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Answer. The July 2015 payment you are referring to was the result of an award 

from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague (‘‘the Tribunal’’) to Iran for less 

than $1 million. The award was paid via wire to an account of the Iranian Center 

for International Legal Affairs, or CILA, in the Netherlands. CILA is the Iranian 

office responsible for representing Iran before the Tribunal. No direct transfer was 

made from the U.S. to Iran. Iran asked us to wire the award payment to that account in the Netherlands, as CILA was able to absorb the funds for purposes of paying Iran’s Tribunal and litigation expenses. 

As the President said, U.S. banks do not have direct banking relationships with 

Iran. Iran has encountered problems with a wide variety of payments prior to sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and, even after 

Implementation Day, prior to Iran’s reconnection with SWIFT and some European 

banks. The payments in January 2016, which were made as part of a settlement 

of a long-standing claim before the Tribunal occurred before Iran reestablished these 

banking connections. The payments were structured to provide Iran access to the 

funds and to avoid the otherwise certain delay and immobilization of the funds prior 

to banking reconnections, which was essential to closing the settlement agreement 

and saving the U.S. taxpayer potentially billions of dollars. 

Regarding the heavy water payment, in the months following the lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA, Iran began to gain incremental access to the international 

financial system, which opened up more options for executing transactions, such as 

the heavy water transaction you referenced. Even this transaction took several 

months to complete, however. 

Question. Secretary Kerry appeared before this committee in February and said 

‘‘Assad himself is going to have to make some real decisions about the formation 

of a transitional governance process that’s real.’’ If he did not meet this test of facilitating a political transition, we were told there would be ‘‘Plan B options being considered.’’ The administration did not enact a Plan B after the target date of August 

1. Why did President Obama fail to enforce his own policy again? In light of the 

collapse of the truce, the attack on the U.N. aid convoy, and the ongoing siege of 

Aleppo, is the administration now conducting any discussions at all about finally enacting Plan B measures? If not, why would the administration give the Syrian people hope for 6 months that it would finally intervene on their behalf? 

Answer. Since the Secretary’s appearance before the committee in February, there 

have been two more rounds of U.N.-led talks with Syrian opposition and regime negotiators in Geneva to explore ways forward for negotiations on Syrian political 

transition. On February 22, the United States and Russia announced the Cessation 

of Hostilities (CoH). In its initial months, our approach appeared to be working as 

the CoH significantly reduced violence and facilitated unprecedented humanitarian 

access inside Syria. As the August 1 target date approached, the United States and 

Russia were engaged in intensive negotiations of an arrangement that would have 

strengthened the CoH and thereby created conditions on the ground in Syria to 

allow Syrian opposition to return to a fourth round talks in Geneva by or soon after 

the August 1. Secretary Kerry concluded that arrangement with Russian Foreign 

Minister Lavrov on September 9 with the intention of garnering the endorsement 

of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) at the ISSG ministerial on the 

margins of the U.N. General Assembly meeting on September 20. Unfortunately, 

Russia failed to meet its commitments under the CoH and the September 9 arrangement by, among other things, failing to prevent the September 19 attack on the 

U.N. convoy and other acts of regime aggression in Aleppo and elsewhere in Syria. 

The administration is now evaluating other options. 

Question. What is the United States’ overall strategy toward the Syria conflict? 

Answer. The United States’ overall strategy toward the Syrian conflict aims to 

achieve three fundamental objectives: 1) defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL), or Daesh; 2) promote Syria’s peaceful democratic political transition 

away from the Assad regime; and 3) ease the suffering of the Syrian people. Accordingly, the United States initiated the diplomatic process known as the International 

Syria Support Group (ISSG) to reduce violence and help create conditions for U.N.- 

led intra-Syria talks on a political solution to move forward. 

Unfortunately, Russia thus far has not lived up to its commitments as a co-chair 

of the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force to pressure the Assad regime to abide by the 

terms of the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) announced by the United States and 

Russia on February 22, 2016, or by those of the U.S.-Russia arrangement for 

strengthening the COH reached by Secretary Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister 

Lavrov in Geneva on September 9, 2016. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

Since the causes of the Syrian war can only be resolved through a political solution, even if we augment our efforts with elements of other options, we and our 

partners will continue to consult work together to put pressure on Russia and undertake diplomacy along the lines of the ISSG process in pursuit of the goals elaborated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254. 

Question. Should Russia and Syria not come to the table, will the administration 

reconsider bolstering support for moderate opposition forces? 

Answer. Should Russia and Syria not be willing to comply with their commitments under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and related resolutions, the administration will evaluate a wide range of options—including various kinds of additional support to moderate opposition resisting the Assad regime to augment the 

non-lethal support we have provided to date. In evaluating these options, we must 

also consider the political-military implications for other U.S. interests inside Syria, 

including our campaign to defeat Daesh, as well as in neighboring countries and 

surrounding regions. 

Question. What leverage do we have in Syria to make Russia change its calculus 

and considerations for supporting Assad? Could Russia have stopped Assad from intensifying the conflict, as he has done over the past few weeks? 

Answer. We are continually evaluating the types of leverage available to us to 

persuade Russia to press the Assad regime to comply with its commitments under 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and related resolutions—including various 

kinds of additional support to moderate opposition resisting the Assad regime to 

augment the non-lethal support we have provided to date. 

On February 22, the United States and Russia announced the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH). In its initial months, our approach appeared to be working as the CoH 

significantly reduced violence and facilitated unprecedented humanitarian access inside Syria—seemingly in large measure due to Russia’s influence over the regime. 

During August and September 2016, the United States and Russia were engaged 

in intensive negotiations of an arrangement that would have strengthened the CoH 

and proven the extent of Russia’s ability and willingness to restrain the regime’s 

military, especially its air force. Secretary Kerry concluded that arrangement with 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on September 9 with the intention of garnering 

the endorsement of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) at the ISSG ministerial on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly meeting on September 20. Unfortunately, Russia failed to meet its commitments under the CoH and the September 9 arrangement by failing to prevent the September 19 attack on the U.N. 

convoy and other regime aggression in Aleppo and elsewhere in Syria. The administration is evaluating other options for leverage over Russia and the Assad regime. 

The cost of maintaining this war in support of Assad as well as its shaming by the 

international community is another deterrent to Russia for maintaining its destructive role in Syria. As time goes on, the costs will only increase for Russia. 

Question. What leverage do we have to change the behavior of the Assad regime? 

Can we exert any additional pressure on the Syrian government? Is this administration willing to do so? 

Answer. We are continually evaluating the types of leverage available to us to 

press the Assad regime to comply with its commitments under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and related resolutions—including various kinds of additional 

support to moderate opposition resisting the Assad regime to augment the non-lethal support we have provided to date. Besides support for the moderate opposition, 

we have sought to bolster our leverage on the regime through the International 

Syria Support Group (ISSG) process, which includes Russia and Iran and more than 

20 other countries and entities with influence over the parties, to focus international 

pressure on the regime. While the administration willing to exert additional forms 

of pressure, we must also consider the political-military implications for other U.S. 

interests inside Syria, including our campaign to defeat Daesh, as well as in neighboring countries and surrounding regions. 

Question. The New York Times reported last week that ‘‘The Obama administration is weighing a military plan to directly arm Syrian Kurdish fighters combating 

the Islamic State, a major policy shift that could speed up the offensive against the 

terrorist group but also sharply escalate tensions between Turkey and the United 

States.’’ Can you confirm that the administration is indeed considering providing 

Kurdish forces with small arms and other equipment? How will providing these 

arms enable the Kurdish forces to advance against the Islamic State? 

Answer. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a multi-ethnic Syrian alliance 

comprising Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, Christian, and Muslim groups 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

united in their fight against Daesh. The SDF has been a proven and valuable partner in the counter-Daesh fight and has liberated 25 percent of the terrain Daesh 

once controlled in Syria in 2014. We are now evaluating what role the SDF can play 

in the next phase of the counter-Daesh campaign in Syria. 

In his testimony during the week of September 19, Secretary Carter noted no decisions have been made to arm Syrian Kurds to conduct counter-Daesh operations. 

We have not, to date, provided U.S. ammunition or weapons to the Kurdish elements of the SDF under the program established by Section 1209 of the NDAA for 

Fiscal Year 2015. The Department of Defense has provided equipment to vetted 

Arab elements of the SDF under Section 1209. This has been a valuable contribution to the counter-Daesh mission, as it supports a vetted force’s efforts to secure 

the region from terrorist control. 

Question. Why is the administration using the Syrian Democratic Forces as its 

primary proxy group in the conflict? Can you estimate the breakdown of ethnic 

groups within the alliance? Does the administration believe that the alliance can 

hold territory that is liberated from ISIS? In light of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ 

strong Kurdish element, do you believe it is wise to use this force to continue to 

push into territory that is traditionally not Kurdish? 

Answer. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been a proven and valuable 

partner in the counter-Daesh fight; it a capable, resilient, and committed force and 

has liberated 25 percent of the terrain Daesh once controlled in Syria in 2014. From 

the liberation of Kobani until the liberation of Manbij, the SDF’s fighting force of 

Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian, Christian, and Muslim and other populations 

have been essential in recapturing significant territory from Daesh and in denying 

Daesh access to large portions of northern Syria. I cannot go into the specifics of 

the composition of the SDF. 

Despite mounting multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 

(SVBIEDs) and counterattacks, Daesh has been unable to reclaim any territory lost 

to the SDF. 

A core principle of our counter-Daesh campaign in Iraq and Syria is that local 

forces should hold and secure terrain liberated from Daesh. We are applying this 

principle in Manbij, the city most recently liberated by the SDF, and we will seek 

to apply it in Raqqa. 

Most recently, the SDF force that liberated Manbij comprised Kurdish and Arab 

elements, including Arab groups from Manbij. When the SDF seized central Manbij 

on August 12, we saw widespread jubilation among the local population. Within a 

day of the city’s liberation, thousands of IDPs began returning to the city and 

70,000 have returned to date. While challenges persist in Manbij, local forces are 

providing security, people are returning, and the local economy is regenerating. 

Daesh will seek to generate hostility among Raqqa’s population against any counterDaesh force advancing on the city. Counteracting and mitigating the threats caused 

by such Daesh propaganda campaigns is key component of our plan to liberate 

Raqqa. 

Question. How does the administration weigh the risks of further exacerbating 

tensions with Ankara and reclaiming territory from ISIS? Can you identify other 

groups in Syria at the moment that the United States can support with equal measure? 

Answer. The United States remains focused on the counter-Daesh coalition to degrade and defeat Daesh. An important part of this effort is denying Daesh access 

to Syria’s border, to prevent attacks in Turkey, Europe, and against the United 

States. Turkey is a key partner in the counter-Daesh coalition and we will continue 

to work with Turkish officials to advance our mutual goal of defeating Daesh and 

to coordinate our counter-Daesh campaign. Since August 24, the counter-Daesh coalition has made significant progress in driving Daesh from the border between Syria 

and Turkey. Recently, President Obama had the chance to discuss with President 

Erdogan our support for Turkey as both a NATO ally and a key partner in the fight 

against Daesh . Still, there are several areas in northern Syria that are deeply important to Daesh. We are going to work with Turkey and our counter-Daesh coalition partners to focus on that fight ahead as we continue to isolate Raqqa. As we 

accelerate our campaign and move towards the next phase in the isolation of Raqqa, 

it is critical that we are closely linked with partners on the ground to coordinate 

both military and diplomatic efforts to sustain the positive momentum that has been 

gained in recent months. The coalition will work with all of our partners to achieve 

our common goal—the defeat of Daesh. 

Over the last few weeks, the counter-Daesh coalition has removed Daesh from the 

Syria and Turkey border. We view this effort as a critical aspect of our campaign 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

to defeat Daesh and prevent attacks in Turkey, Europe, and the United States. 

Looking forward, there remain several areas near the border that must be liberated 

from Daesh control. To help achieve this objective and building on the air strikes 

we have provided thus far, U.S. special operations forces are accompanying Turkish 

and vetted Syrian opposition forces as they continue to clear territory from Daesh 

near the border. The United States will continue to support the counter-Daesh fight 

across northern Syria with our partners. 

Question. As Ambassador Samantha Power told the UNSC on Sunday, ‘‘the Assad 

regime believes only in a military solution. It says it is going to conquer militarily 

every last square inch of Syria instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad make 

war.’’ In light of Syria and Russia’s behavior, is the administration considering a 

serious change to our policy towards how to end the conflict? Is a military solution 

being considered? 

Answer. We are alarmed by the devastation inflicted on Syrian civilians, most recently in Aleppo, at the hands of the Syrian regime and its allies. We regret that 

Damascus has not signaled a serious intent to engage in talks aimed at a political 

settlement to the Syrian conflict. We remain committed to pursuing a durable resolution to the conflict, including an enduring cessation of hostilities by the Syrian regime and its allies. Russia failed to uphold its commitments under U.N. Security 

Council resolutions, and potentially its obligations under international humanitarian law, to ensure Syrian regime adherence to the arrangements to which Moscow agreed. We continue to press for a resolution to the Syrian conflict, including 

through the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). 

Question. As you’re aware, in June, 51 State Department officials submitted a 

memo through the Department’s ‘‘dissent channel’’ in which they called for the U.S. 

to carry out military strikes against the Assad regime in order to stop its ceasefire 

violations. They wrote that if the Obama administration continued to allow the 

Assad government and its backers attack Syrian civilians with impunity, the situation in Syria will ‘‘continue to present increasingly dire, if not disastrous, humanitarian, diplomatic, and terrorism-related challenges.’’ Do you agree with these diplomats within your Department that the failure of the administration’s efforts has 

indeed allowed the situation in Syria to deteriorate, leading to the consequences 

they warned of? 

Answer. These are extremely tough issues: How to get a successful, cessation of 

hostilities; how to ensure full, unimpeded humanitarian access to all Syrians in 

need; and how to bring about a genuine political transition in accordance with the 

Geneva Communique. We are also working all-day, every day to defeat Daesh in 

Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. We have regular, frank discussions about how best to go 

about it. We are very focused on reducing the violence and providing humanitarian 

assistance to the still millions of Syrians in need. 

We do not believe there is a military solution to this conflict, so we are working 

to bring about a political solution, which includes a transition away from Assad. 

Question. Is the administration willing to consider humanitarian no-fly zones to 

help stop the loss of life in Syria? If so, how would you plan to enforce it? If not, 

why? 

Answer. Let me assure you that the entire administration is constantly evaluating 

the pros and cons of new strategies and policies with regards to Syria. We look for 

new strategies that will help us come to a political transition in Syria, but we also 

want to make sure that any new potential benefits outweigh any risks for the American people, particularly American lives. 

I know there is deep interest in a no-fly zone and we have examined this issue 

and we will continue to do so, but, at this time, we do not believe the potential benefit outweighs the great risk and the resources constraints and tradeoffs involved. 

Any kind of zone would require dozens of American pilots and would be a huge 

strain on resources. 

No-fly, buffer, or safe zones entail significant logistical questions about where 

such zones would be, how they would be protected on the ground, and what resources would be needed to ensure that we could achieve our intended objective. At 

this moment, we do not believe that the creation of a no-fly zone would be successful 

or promote a resolution of the crisis in Syria. 

Question. Since the nuclear agreement, Iran has dramatically expanded its presence in Syria and increased its military cooperation with Moscow, including at one 

point, even allowing Russian planes to use air bases in Iran. Do you view this as 

a violation of UNSCR 2231? If so, what actions are being taken to punish Iran and 

Russia for this violation? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 prohibits the ‘‘supply, 

sale, or transfer to Iran, or for the use in or the benefit of Iran’’ of certain conventional arms, including combat aircraft, absent U.N. Security Council approval. We 

continue to call on all Member States to fully implement UNSCR 2231, including 

its provisions regarding arms transfers to Iran. 

Russian refueling on Iranian territory raises concerns regarding its compliance 

with this provision. We are looking at this very carefully and we continue to gather 

information regarding these events. However, our most urgent concern with regard 

to Russia’s actions in Syria is its ongoing support to the Syrian Regime and their 

offensive actions, particularly in Aleppo, which have been devastating to the Syrian 

people, and which have led us to suspend U.S. participation in bilateral channels 

that were established to sustain the Cessation of Hostilities. 

Question. Would you agree that Iranian aid has enabled the Syrian regime to prolong the war? Can you affirm that Iran has not used any of the money it received 

under the JCPOA to finance its military and economic support for the Assad regime? 

Answer. Nuclear-related sanctions were always intended to secure a verifiable 

deal that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. An Iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be able to project even more power in the region—that is one 

of the reasons a comprehensive, long-term deal that prevents Iran from acquiring 

a nuclear weapon makes the United States and the region safer. As a result of many 

years of U.S. and international sanctions, even after the lifting of nuclear-related 

sanctions, it is our assessment that Iran continues to prioritize its immediate economic and budgetary needs. 

Iran’s ongoing economic difficulties make it harder to divert large portions of its 

financial gains from sanctions relief away from its domestic economy and toward its 

regional activities. We estimate that Iran needs about half a trillion dollars to meet 

pressing investment needs and government obligations and it is our assessment that 

Iran has used most of the funds it has gained access to since the JCPOA to address 

these domestic economic needs. 

Question. What more can we do to punish Iran for their involvement in the Syrian 

conflict? Are more options being pursued now to do so? 

Answer. The President has asked all of the federal agencies to put forward options 

for how to respond to recent developments in Syria. Some of the options are familiar, some are new; we are very actively reviewing the options. 

Regarding Iranian activity, we continue to work extensively with our partners to 

deter and detect Iranian threats in the region. We also have numerous domestic authorities—including sanctions—to counter Iran’s support for terrorism or other destabilizing activities. We will continue to vigorously enforce our ongoing sanctions, 

including those related to Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the 

region, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. 

Question. Can you speak to what our Gulf allies are doing to assist in dealing 

with the refugee crisis created by the civil war in Syria and ISIS violence? What 

is this administration doing to encourage nations like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or 

others to shoulder a greater burden with refugees or foreign aid? 

Answer. Throughout the Syrian crisis, we have actively engaged our partners in 

the region—including those participating in the counter-Daesh coalition and International Syria Support Group (ISSG)—to request aid for Syrian refugees and other 

humanitarian assistance. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced it has provided 

$100 million for Syrian refugees, raising its total aid to $780 million since 2011. The 

United Arab Emirates announced at the Fourth Donors Conference for Syria on 

February 4, 2016 that it would contribute $137 million. Qatar announced a $100 

million, five-year education initiative for Syrian refugee children at the U.N. General Assembly last month and also announced that their total contribution to Syrian 

refugee relief totaled up to $1.6 billion. We will continue to request all of our 

counter-Daesh and ISSG partners jointly care for the suffering of the Syrian people. 

Æ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER