NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE J. BELTRAN, AKA Javier Beltran 

Aleman, AKA Jose Javier Beltran Aleman, 

AKA Javier Beltran Morales, AKA Jose 

Beltran Morales, AKA Jose Javier Aleman,

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Nos. 16-70437

 16-72019

Agency No. A095-137-464

MEMORANDUM*

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 9, 2020**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. 

In these consolidated petitions, Jose J. Beltran, a native and citizen of El 

Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order 

dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes these case are suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-70437 

application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”) (petition No. 16-70437), and the BIA’s order denying his motion 

to reopen removal proceedings (petition No. 16-72019). Our jurisdiction is 

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s 

factual findings, including determinations regarding social distinction. Conde 

Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de novo the 

legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the 

extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes 

and regulations. Id. We review for an abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a 

motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We 

deny the petition for review in No. 16-70437, and we deny in part and dismiss in 

part the petition for review in No. 16-72019.

As to petition No. 16-70437, substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

determination that Beltran failed to establish his proposed social groups are 

socially distinct. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (substantial evidence 

supported the agency’s determination that petitioner’s proposed social group was 

not cognizable because of the absence of society-specific evidence of social 

distinction). Thus, the agency did not err in concluding that Beltran failed to 

establish membership in a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 

1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular 
3 16-70437 

social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of 

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 

particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). In light of this 

conclusion, we do not reach Beltran’s contentions as to nexus. See Simeonov v. 

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts are not required to decide 

issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

We reject Beltran’s contention that the agency erred in finding that 

resistance to gang recruitment did not constitute a political opinion. See SantosLemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] general aversion to 

gangs does not constitute a political opinion”) abrogated on other grounds by 

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Thus, Beltran’s withholding of removal claim fails. 

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Beltran failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the 

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See Aden v. 

Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (generalized evidence of violence and crime is 

insufficient to meet the standard for relief for CAT). We reject as unsupported by 

the record Beltran’s contention that the IJ failed to address his CAT claim. 
4 16-70437 

As to petition No. 16-72019, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Beltran’s motion to reopen where he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for 

asylum. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The 

BIA is entitled to deny a motion to reopen where the applicant fails to demonstrate 

prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.”). 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or err in denying Beltran’s motion to 

reopen to apply for Temporary Protected Status before the IJ.

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen 

proceedings sua sponte. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(“[T]his court has jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte 

reopening for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions 

for legal or constitutional error.”).

As stated in the court’s May 11, 2016 order, the temporary stay of removal 

remains in place until issuance of the mandate. 

No. 16-70437: PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 

No. 16-72019: PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; 

DISMISSED in part.