39–006 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–101 

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2006 

JUNE 2, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HOEKSTRA, from the Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 2475] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 

referred the bill (H.R. 2475) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 

year 2006 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 

United States Government, the Community Management Account, 

and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill 

as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Classified Annex and Committee Intent ................................................................ 6 

Scope of Committee Review .................................................................................... 7 

Committee Statement and Views ........................................................................... 8 

Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes ........................................................ 23 

Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment ............................. 24 

Title I—Intelligence Activities: 

Section 101—Authorization of Appropriations ............................................... 24 

Section 102—Classified Schedule of Authorizations ...................................... 24 

Section 103—Personnel Ceiling Adjustments ................................................ 24 

Section 104–Intelligence Community Management Account ........................ 25 

Title II—Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System: 

Section 201—Authorization of Appropriations ............................................... 25 

2 

Title III—General Provisions: 

Section 301—Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized by Law ................................................................................................... 25 

Section 302—Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities .................... 25 

Section 303—Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to assign 

individuals to U.S. missions in foreign countries to coordinate and 

direct intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted in that 

country ........................................................................................................... 25 

Section 304—Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming 

authority ........................................................................................................ 25 

Section 305—Approval of personnel transfer for new national intelligence 

center ............................................................................................................. 25 

Section 306—Additional Duties for the Director of Science and Technology ............................................................................................................. 26 

Section 307—Comprehensive inventory of special access programs ............ 26 

Section 308—Sense of Congress on budget execution authority procedures .............................................................................................................. 26 

Section 309—Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level security clearances .............................................................................................................. 26 

Title IV—Central Intelligence Agency: 

Section 401—Clarification of role of the Director of Central Intelligence 

Agency as head of human intelligence collection ....................................... 26 

Oversight Findings and Recommendations ........................................................... 26 

General Performance Goals and Objectives .......................................................... 27 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 27 

Unfunded Mandate Statement ............................................................................... 27 

Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .................... 27 

Changes to Existing Law ........................................................................................ 28 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 32 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Intelligence Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2006’’. (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. 

Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments. 

Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account. 

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM 

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. 

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. 

Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. 

Sec. 303. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to assign individuals to United States missions in 

foreign countries to coordinate and direct intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted in 

that country. 

Sec. 304. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming authority. 

Sec. 305. Approval of personnel transfer for new national intelligence centers. 

Sec. 306. Additional duties for the Director of Science and Technology. 

Sec. 307. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs. 

Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on budget execution authority procedures. 

Sec. 309. Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level security clearances. 

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Sec. 401. Clarification of role of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency as head of human intelligence collection. 

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements 

of the United States Government: 

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency. 

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(3) The Department of Defense. 

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency. 

(5) The National Security Agency. 

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. 

(7) The Department of State. 

(8) The Department of the Treasury. 

(9) The Department of Energy. 

(10) The Department of Justice. 

(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

(12) The National Reconnaissance Office. 

(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 

(14) The Coast Guard. 

(15) The Department of Homeland Security. 

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. 

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL CEILINGS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as 

of September 30, 2006, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 

activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified 

Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2475 of the One 

Hundred Ninth Congress. 

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—The Schedule of 

Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the 

Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the 

Schedule, within the executive branch. 

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS. 

(a) AUTHORITY FOR ADJUSTMENTS.—With the approval of the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 

2006 under section 102 when the Director of National Intelligence determines that 

such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions. 

(b) NOTICE TO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence 

shall notify promptly the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section. 

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT. 

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated 

for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $446,144,000. Within such amount, funds 

identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) 

for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 

2007. 

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 

817 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2006. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management 

Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government. 

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to 

be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 

Community Management Account for fiscal year 2006 such additional amounts 

as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development 

shall remain available until September 30, 2007. 

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized 

by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2006, there are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. 

(d) REIMBURSEMENT.—Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security 

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2006 any officer or employee of the 

United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the 

Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United 

States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 

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officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required 

by the Director of National Intelligence. 

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM 

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2006 the sum of $244,600,000. 

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS 

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental 

amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law. 

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. 

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute 

authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 

SEC. 303. AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIGN INDIVIDUALS TO UNITED STATES MISSIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO COORDINATE AND 

DIRECT INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN 

THAT COUNTRY. 

Subsection (k) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 

403–4a), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform 

Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended—

(1) by striking ‘‘Under’’ and inserting ‘‘(1) Under’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(2)(A) The Director may assign an individual to be a representative of the Director at a United States mission in a foreign country. Any such individual shall oversee and manage all intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted in that 

country by personnel of any element of the intelligence community. 

‘‘(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to supersede the authority of the 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency described in clause (ii), such authority 

being subject to general oversight by the Director of National Intelligence under 

paragraph (1). 

‘‘(ii) The authority referred to in clause (i) is the authority under section 104A(f) 

to coordinate relationships between elements of the intelligence community and the 

intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations generally and the authority under section 104A(d)(3) to provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside the United 

States.’’. 

SEC. 304. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY. 

Paragraph (5)(B) of section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 403–1(d)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence 

Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended by 

striking ‘‘or agency involved’’ in the second sentence and inserting ‘‘involved or the 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence 

Agency)’’. 

SEC. 305. APPROVAL OF PERSONNEL TRANSFER FOR NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS. 

Section 102A(e)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1(e)(1)), as 

added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 

(title I of Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘shall promptly provide notice’’ and all 

that follows through ‘‘paragraph to—’’ and inserting ‘‘may not transfer personnel under subparagraph (A) unless the Director has provided notice of any 

transfer of personnel to be made pursuant to this paragraph and received a response from—’’; and 

(2) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following: 

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‘‘(C) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph (B)—

‘‘(i) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection; 

‘‘(ii) the number of personnel transferred; and 

‘‘(iii) the individual skills and capabilities of the personnel involved.’’. 

SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. 

(a) COORDINATION AND PRIORITIZATION OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED BY ELEMENTS OF

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—Subsection (d) of section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3e), as added by section 1011(a) of the National 

Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 

3643), is amended—

(1) by inserting ‘‘and prioritize’’ after ‘‘coordinate’’ in paragraph (3)(A); and 

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by elements of the intelligence community.’’. 

(b) DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY GOALS.—Section 103E of such Act (50 U.S.C. 

403–3e), as so added, is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph (4); 

(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and 

(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of the community; and’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

‘‘(e) GOALS FOR TECHNOLOGY NEEDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology shall—

‘‘(1) perform systematic identification and assessment of the most significant 

intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and 

‘‘(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research and design 

programs to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely 

support.’’. 

(c) REPORT.—Not later than June 30, 2006, the Director of National Intelligence 

shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy for the development and use 

of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. Such report may be submitted in classified form and shall include—

(1) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the use of technology; 

(2) goals for advanced research and development and a strategy to achieve 

such goals; 

(3) an explanation of how each advanced research and development project 

funded under the National Intelligence Program addresses an identified intelligence gap; 

(4) a list of all current and projected research and development projects by 

research type (basic, advanced, or applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation dates, and estimated completion dates; and 

(5) a plan to incorporate technology from research and development projects 

into National Intelligence Program acquisition programs. 

SEC. 307. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS. 

Not later than January 15, 2006, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the 

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report providing a 

comprehensive inventory of all special access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

U.S.C. 401a(6))). 

SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BUDGET EXECUTION AUTHORITY PROCEDURES. 

It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should expeditiously establish the necessary budgetary processes and procedures with the heads 

of the departments containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence community, and the heads of such agencies and organizations, in order to—

(1) implement the budget execution authorities provided under, and submit 

the reports to Congress required by, subsection (c) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1), as amended by section 1011(a) 

of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 

108–458; 118 Stat. 3643); and 

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(2) carry out the duties and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the transfer and reprogramming of funds under the National Intelligence Program under subsection (d) of such section, as so amended. 

SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES. 

It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should 

promptly establish and oversee the implementation of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to national security. 

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

AS HEAD OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (d)(3) of section 104A of the National Security Act 

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–4a), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108–458; 118 Stat. 3643), is 

amended by striking ‘‘provide overall direction’’ and all that follows through ‘‘elements of the intelligence community’’ and inserting ‘‘subject to subsection (h), provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of human intelligence 

outside the United States by any department, agency, or element of the United 

States Government’’. 

(b) CLARIFICATION OF ROLES OF DNI AND DCIA WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.—Such section is further amended by adding at the end the 

following new subsection: 

‘‘(h) CLARIFICATION OF ROLES OF DNI AND DCIA WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.—(1) In carrying out subsection (d)(3), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall develop a process for the coordination of the collection 

of human intelligence outside of the United States. Such process shall be subject to 

the approval of the Director of National Intelligence. 

‘‘(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall determine which human intelligence collection activities shall be subject to the process developed under paragraph (1).’’. 

PURPOSE

The purpose of H.R. 2475 is to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for 

Fiscal Year 2006 in order to enhance the national security of the 

United States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United 

States, and to support the President in the execution of the foreign 

policy of the United States. The bill also clarifies certain authorities of the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency. 

CLASSIFIED ANNEX AND COMMITTEE INTENT

The classified annex to this report includes the classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory language. The 

Committee views the classified annex as an integral part of this 

legislation. The classified annex contains a thorough discussion of 

the issues considered by the Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 

Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in the 

classified annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the 

guidance and limitations set forth as associated language therein. 

The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated directly 

into this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for review by all Members of the House of 

Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 13 of rule 

XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of 

7 

the Rules of Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence. 

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA), and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). 

The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, as well as those national foreign intelligence, 

intelligence-related, and/or counterintelligence activities conducted 

by: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security 

Agency; (5) the National Reconnaissance Office; (6) the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (7) the Departments of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force; (8) the Department of State; (9) the Department of the Treasury; (10) the Department of Energy; (11) the Department of Justice; (12) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (13) 

the Department of Homeland Security; and (14) the U.S. Coast 

Guard. The Committee has exclusive legislative, authorizing and 

oversight jurisdiction of these programs. 

The Department of Defense TIARA programs are a diverse array 

of reconnaissance and target acquisition capabilities that provide 

direct information support to military operations within the basic 

military force structure. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program 

that respond to the needs of military commanders for operational 

support information, as well as to national command, control, and 

intelligence requirements. The Committee on Armed Services in 

the House of Representatives shares oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising TIARA with the Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence. 

The JMIP provides integrated program management of defense 

intelligence elements that support defense-wide or theater-level 

consumers. Included within the JMIP are aggregations of similar 

activities, either in intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence 

(SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite 

support, aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) 

the Defense Geospatial-Intelligence Program (DGIP); and (3) the 

Defense General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP). The 

DGIAP includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program 

(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP), (c) 

the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program (DISTP), (d) 

the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program (DICP), and (e) the 

Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP). As with TIARA 

programs, the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives shares oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the 

programs comprising the JMIP with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

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COMMITTEE STATEMENT AND VIEWS

A. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The legislation is the product of the Committee’s comprehensive 

review of the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request, carrying 

out its annual responsibility to prepare an authorization based on 

close examination of the U.S. government’s intelligence programs 

and proposed expenditures. The Committee and, in some cases, its 

component subcommittees, held ten budget-related hearings and 

hundreds of briefings for Members and Staff covering all major intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program, the 

Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence 

and Related Activities accounts. This review also covered all functional capabilities, such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, 

imagery intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism. 

As always, the Committee’s legislative and budgetary actions are 

based on more than these budget-specific hearings and briefings. 

The actions taken in this bill are the result of the Committee’s ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This 

oversight activity includes the scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings, site visits, and fact-finding trips, 

and studies of intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges conducted throughout the year. 

Of particular note is the time and attention the Committee has 

devoted to the creation of an Intelligence Community for the 21st 

Century. Over the past year, the Congress has passed sweeping 

legislation to reform the U.S. Intelligence Community. This included the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 

oversee all aspects of the community. The Committee is committed 

to supporting all efforts that will make the DNI successful in better 

integrating the disparate members of the Intelligence Community 

and creating the best possible intelligence capabilities for America. 

Further, the Committee has been focused on, and will continue to 

commit a great deal of effort to, overseeing the implementation of 

the reform legislation provisions as well as ensuring that specific 

intelligence efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT) are conducted in accordance with established and approved procedures. The tangible results of these efforts are just 

being seen, as the first DNI has recently been sworn in, and specific reform activities are beginning to take place. 

The Committee has conducted its oversight responsibilities, the 

Members and the Staff have had the opportunity to meet and work 

with intelligence professionals throughout the community and 

around the world. The Committee holds in highest regard the work 

accomplished by these dedicated U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. At great sacrifice, often under extreme and intense conditions, and at great personal risk, the men and women of the Intelligence Community continue to perform their missions with great 

energy, and enormous devotion to duty. The Committee commends 

these patriots for their professionalism, integrity and perseverance. 

These honorable people form the first line of our national defense, 

and the freedom and security of our country relies on their success. 

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The U.S. intelligence community—a need for change 

In recent years, U.S. intelligence efforts have been criticized by 

some for specific ‘‘intelligence failures.’’ The Committee’s view is 

that, more rightly, the Intelligence Community’s efforts should be 

recognized as a critical weapon, particularly in the Global War on 

Terrorism. The many reviews of the nation’s intelligence efforts, including the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States (9/11 Commission) and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) have in the past several 

years been harshly but, in many respects, constructively critical of 

the Intelligence Community’s management, operations, and products. It is these reviews that helped spur the reform legislation 

that President Bush signed into law, as the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 

The Committee agrees with many of the recommendations of 

these reviews. The demands and the resources expended for the 

U.S. Intelligence Community have increased dramatically since the 

attacks of September 11, 2001. These increases were critically necessary, particularly when viewed against the historical underinvestment and lack of support in the years preceding the attacks 

on America. Yet, these increases demand results—results in the 

form of better intelligence support to keep the nation safe. Many 

of the reviews provided specific and logical recommendations that 

the Community as a whole has historically resisted. The Committee agrees with the general premise that the Intelligence Community must be more receptive to change. Organizational, operational, and philosophical changes are critical to the future of the 

Community. 

Unfortunately the bureaucratic resistance to change is a cultural 

problem that will take time and focused effort to correct. Over the 

past number of years the Committee has repeatedly made recommendations for correcting known problems. Many of these recommendations have been found correct and/or reinforced by the 

President’s WMD Commission findings. Some of the specific Committee recommendations have included: 

1. The Intelligence Community must have sufficient numbers 

of human intelligence officers and analysts whose skills are 

specifically designed to respond aggressively to the full range 

of modern threats. This includes a robust cadre of case officers 

capable of entering the most austere of environments and acquiring much needed information. The diverse set of analytic 

problems requires an equally robust cadre of expert analysts 

that can sift through the massive volumes of information to 

find the obscure references, and mine the critical information 

nuggets that lead to actionable intelligence. Although much 

can be achieved through technological collection means, the Intelligence Community still requires highly trained personnel 

who bring the cognitive skills to bear that allow the understanding of information nuances, foreign cultures and who can 

speak the languages of the various intelligence targets. Year 

after year, this Committee has insisted that the Intelligence 

Community recruit a more culturally diverse cadre of analysts 

and officers, especially seeking individuals proficient in critical 

languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and, the much less well 

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known languages including Pashtu and Urdu. The Committee 

is heartened by the President’s call to increase, significantly, 

the number of human intelligence and analytic officers in the 

Intelligence Community. Before this Administration call 

though, and on a bipartisan basis, the Committee had repeatedly increased funding to enhance human collection and analysis capabilities by funding language proficiency training, ‘‘cultural immersion,’’ and tradecraft. But only now is the Community witnessing the beginnings of modest change in these diverse areas. 

2. The Intelligence Community’s technical collection architecture has, for a number of years, been in need of a coherent 

strategic plan. There is no question that technical collection 

programs are critical to the nation’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Satellite systems, airborne reconnaissance aircraft, 

ships and land-based technical collection systems form a system of systems to collect imagery, signals, and other technical 

information not necessarily accessible by human sources. However, such technical collection systems satisfy only a part of the 

overall information needs, and must be backed up by worldclass human intelligence collection and analysis. Unfortunately, the Committee finds that the funding levels of effort in 

the budget request are weighted far too heavily toward expensive technical systems. The Committee has repeatedly called 

for a rationalized technical architecture that appropriately balances the depth and breadth of these systems with both the 

human collection and analysis requirements and their funding 

across the Community. Again, the Community has resisted terminating even badly flawed major systems acquisitions and investing the resulting savings in human capabilities. The Committee’s position in this year’s authorization makes a number 

of recommendations to significantly reposition funding from 

technical programs to human intelligence and analysis. The 

Committee recognizes these are significant changes, but believes strongly that these major decisions must be made. 

3. Recognizing the need for better and more productive intelligence on terrorist financing, in the fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act, the Committee established a Treasury Department Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Interrupting the flow of money to terrorists and proliferators is a 

self-evident first response to the threats of the 21st Century. 

Yet, the response to this direction was slow, and only now is 

this office being created. 

4. The Committee has been deeply concerned since at least 

the mid-1990s about the security at the National Laboratories. 

The labs are the site of some of the nation’s most sensitive research. The Committee’s security and counterintelligence concerns have repeatedly been given short shrift, and important 

safety precautions have gone under-funded or even unfunded. 

This clearly needs to be corrected. 

These are just examples of a large number of problems the Committee has repeatedly identified. These problems can be solved, but 

only with great effort. That effort will necessarily require the Intelligence Community’s leadership to develop, implement, and maintain a strategic plan that is long-term in nature, but that is also 

11 

flexible enough to accommodate and react to temporal change in 

the world’s threat environment. The Committee specifically addresses in the general provisions section of this report several 

issues with respect to strategic planning. 

Finally, the Committee notes that with the passage of the Intelligence Reform bill the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s importance to the overall security of the nation will grow dramatically. 

The Committee believes strongly that the FBI must be fully integrated into the Intelligence Community if its information and resources are to be fully applied to efforts to combat terrorism and 

protect the homeland. To ensure this is a successful effort, the FBI 

must clearly define its intelligence activities and conduct them in 

a manner consistent with other national intelligence activities, including full coordination with the Director of National Intelligence 

and enhanced reporting to Congressional intelligence committees. 

The Committee will also carefully review the recommendations of 

the President’s Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction that 

a single National Security division be created within the Department of Justice. 

Understanding the threat 

Unquestionably, those entrusted with the nation’s security must 

have the best possible intelligence information. That information— from its many sources—must be fully integrated to form the clearest possible picture of the myriad day-to-day ‘‘tactical’’ threats, as 

well as the longer-term ‘‘strategic’’ threats facing America. To that 

end, on December 17, 2004, the President signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the first major reorganization of the Intelligence Community since 1949. The purpose 

of this landmark legislation is to promote an integrated Intelligence Community capable of responding to the complex range of 

threats that the United States now faces. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union did not usher in an era of peace 

and stability as many had expected. Rather, the end of the Cold 

War actually set the stage for many ideological, political, and military upheavals that even now continue to unfold into conflicts or 

armed threats—threats to America and its allies everywhere. As 

the Intelligence Community looks to the future, it finds potential 

threats that include: new global and regional powers who may be 

anxious to test the boundaries of the existing balances of power; 

elements that may not recognize the legitimacy of their local governing authorities and therefore attack it; and other non-governmental entities, including terrorist organizations that may attempt 

to acquire and use weapons that cause indiscriminate death and violence. It is a future where scientific and technological breakthroughs may produce rapid shifts in the power structure, and 

where shortages of basic resources (energy, water, arable land) 

could cause nations to rethink their commitment to the rule of law. 

In this new environment, threats such as terrorism and the risk of 

attack with weapons of mass destruction have assumed a much 

more lethal and immediate reality. 

As the international community continues to ‘‘globalize,’’ there 

will be nations that are ‘‘winners’’ and those that are ‘‘losers.’’ The 

National Intelligence Council points to India and China, Brazil, 

and Indonesia, as states with potential to emerge as global powers. 

12 

The combination of economic growth, sustained military spending, 

and a strong sense of national identity point toward an increasingly prominent global role for such emerging powers. It will be the 

Intelligence Community’s responsibility to provide the accurate 

forecasts to enable the nation’s political leaders to know whether 

these emerging powers are friends or potential adversaries. These 

leaders must also know whether former foes have truly become 

lasting partners. In addition, the Intelligence Community must recognize the threats and opportunities posed by obvious potential enemies, as well as any other adversary that may emerge. In sum, 

the United States must have an accurate understanding of the capabilities and intentions of the nations with whom we interact. 

This is the task of the Intelligence Community. This task will require a proper balance between long-range intelligence analysis for 

the policymaker and the more ‘‘tactical’’ analysis for the employed ‘‘warfighter.’’ While focusing on nation-states is crucial, the Community must 

at the same time remain vigilant about the threat posed by emerging non-nation state actors. As is made abundantly clear in the 

9/11 and WMD Commission reports, our enemies are varied, intelligent, dedicated and determined. Terrorists have demonstrated the 

ability to strike within the United States, and the threat of terrorist attack will remain for the long-term foreseeable future. The 

worldwide drug trade and the emergence of global criminal networks will continue to pose a fundamental threat to the United 

States. The willingness of criminal organizations and others to traffic in human beings, materials of all sorts, and possibly even dualuse components associated with weapons of mass destruction increases the likelihood that chemical, biological or radiological weapons could become weapons of terror inside America. In the face of 

such wide-ranging non-traditional threats, our Intelligence Community must be able to predict and respond with increasing agility. 

The Committee addresses this issue specifically in other parts of 

this report. 

The task of the Intelligence Community is made even more complicated by the need to identify mass political movements that 

could negatively affect U.S. interests. Population changes, the rising cost of raw materials, and technological advances all continue 

to deepen the divide between the ‘‘haves’’ and the ‘‘have nots’’, our 

political leaders need information that distinguishes legitimate social reform from the movements that give rise to the next Usama 

bin Laden or Fidel Castro. 

Clearly, the 21st Century is likely to include far greater risks 

than this nation has ever faced. The task of the Director of National Intelligence is to adapt the Intelligence Community to those 

challenges, and the challenges as yet unanticipated. 

Responding to the threat 

As stated, the Intelligence Community must fully understand the 

nature—both depth and breadth—of the threats to the nation. 

Once these threats are understood, the Community must then be 

well-postured to collect, analyze, and produce accurate information 

and estimates on those threats. Our capabilities must be tailored 

to those threats. The Community must understand what its current and projected capabilities are to provide needed information, 

13 

and, perhaps more importantly, what they are not. Only armed 

with that knowledge, can informed decisions be made with respect 

to overall community-wide funding allocations. This is the strategic 

approach the Committee used to evaluate and respond to the fiscal 

year 2006 budget request, and this is a strategic approach that the 

Committee hopes the new Director of National Intelligence will 

provide to the Intelligence Community. 

As the United States grapples with the myriad threats posed to 

national security through both state and non-state actors that wish 

to inflict harm, it is the Intelligence Community’s responsibility to 

optimize its full range of intelligence capabilities to provide policy 

makers, lawmakers and other key customers the quality intelligence they need to proactively make national security decisions. 

The Committee notes that the creation of the position of the Director of National Intelligence was meant to provide an Intelligence 

Community ‘‘Chief Executive Officer’’ whose responsibilities include 

making the intelligence agencies to work collectively to leverage all 

collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities to develop the 

most effective intelligence capabilities possible. The Committee 

fully intends that this individual will lead and manage the Community with complete support from each Intelligence Community 

agency and department head. As stated previously, it is the Committee’s position that it will fully support the DNI in his efforts to 

coordinate the Intelligence Community’s efforts to provide quality 

information to the various U.S. government users. 

Looking at the Community as a whole today, the Committee 

finds continuing gaps in capabilities and fundamental flaws in the 

management of resources and personnel that should ultimately 

remedy those gaps. To the extent that these concerns may be outlined in an unclassified manner, the Committee has, in part, addressed them in the ‘‘Areas of Special Interest/General Provisions’’ section immediately following. A complete discussion of the Committee’s specific oversight findings and recommendations is contained in the classified annex to this report. This legislation, along 

with its accompanying report and classified annex, contains the 

Committee’s specific recommendations as to where the U.S. Intelligence Community should be heading, how it can posture itself for 

strategic superiority, and how the fiscal year 2006 intelligence 

budget should be invested. 

B. LEGISLATION

The bill and accompanying classified schedule of authorizations 

includes the Committee’s recommended authorizations for the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2006 budget request. This includes an authorization for the intelligence portion of the expected Fiscal Year 

2006 supplemental funding requirement for the world-wide effort 

against terrorism and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

Committee views these funds as an integral part of the fiscal year 

2006 budget and has decided to specifically authorize these activities for the full year in this legislation. 

The Committee applauds the President for requesting, in the 

base budget request, a large portion of the surge funding that is 

expected for the Global War on Terrorism for fiscal year 2006. The 

Committee understands that this does not obviate the total funding 

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tice—begun in earlier administrations—of funding critical operational intelligence and military requirements via supplemental appropriations. Funding by supplemental is a practice the Committee 

has addressed in great detail in past reports, and one that it believes should end. 

H.R. 2475 provides strategic and substantial enhancements in 

funding for critical world-wide intelligence capabilities. As stated, 

the Committee believes there is an urgent need to better balance 

funding for human capabilities and technical collection systems. 

For a number of reasons fully explained in the classified annex, the 

Committee has made some specific and major recommendations to 

realign funding. These changes include: 

Increased investment in U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) 

activities, including training, infrastructure, and global capabilities; 

Improvements to intelligence analysis: training, coverage 

and depth; 

Reductions or eliminations of funding for redundant or unjustified technical collection systems; 

Improvements to the structure and management of the disparate elements of the intelligence community’s information 

technology systems; and 

Increases to U.S. counterintelligence resources and capabilities. 

In addition to authorization for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, the bill includes provisions intended to clarify certain authorities of the Director of National Intelligence and of the 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. These provisions are 

intended to further refine and strengthen the authorities provided 

to the DNI in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 with the goal of ensuring that the Director has full authority to oversee, coordinate, and manage the activities of the Intelligence Community. 

The Committee reported this legislation favorably to carry out 

the results of its intensive research into the many functions, operations, and acquisition programs of the Intelligence Community. 

These actions are, in many respects, a departure from the norm as 

they are neither minimalistic nor timid ‘‘nibbling at the edges.’’ The 

recommendations made by the Committee are bold and decisive 

and are intended to begin a process of fundamental change for the 

Intelligence Community. Although the Committee expects some 

discomfort within the Intelligence Community with respect to some 

of the provisions, it agrees with numerous outside observers that 

the Intelligence Community requires external assistance to affect 

meaningful change. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2006 is intended to provide such assistance. 

C. ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

The Committee’s legislative recommendations are only part of its 

responsibility for overseeing the nation’s intelligence efforts. The 

reforms recommended by the 9/11 and WMD Commissions were intended to improve the intelligence capabilities of the nation—regardless of branch of government. Based on that intent, the Committee has taken a number of steps to improve overall Community 

management and congressional oversight. 

15 

Recommendations for change, for example, also included congressional oversight. To improve its ability to more effectively oversee 

the Intelligence Community, the Committee has created a Subcommittee on Oversight. The Oversight Subcommittee is tasked 

with general oversight of the activities of the Intelligence Community, and will place special emphasis on overseeing the implementation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004. The Subcommittee is also focused on ensuring the IC properly aligns collection, analysis, and dissemination efforts against 

known and expected future threats. The Subcommittee aims to assist in transforming the IC into a collaborative and effective community, in the truest sense. 

The Subcommittee has also begun to review issues that suggest 

the possibility of pervasive problems that require review or discrete 

recommendations for resolution. One such example is information 

sharing. The Committee believes that methods and procedures 

must be put into place to properly share and assure access to information for the people who need it, regardless of the specific agency 

to which they belong. Information ‘‘ownership’’ must be a concept 

of the past, not the future. 

The Committee believes that a way to effectively ensure the necessary reforms discussed here is through a strategic planning process developed by the DNI for the entire community. Elsewhere in 

this report, the Committee recommends that the Director of National Intelligence create a formalized, periodic, structured review 

process for the Intelligence Community, much like the Department 

of Defense’s Quadrennial Review Process. 

D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST/GENERAL PROVISIONS

In this section, the Committee highlights areas of concern that 

it believes must be addressed with a high priority by the Director 

of National Intelligence (DNI), as the leader of the Intelligence 

Community, if intelligence sufficient to protect our national security is to be obtained and provided to policy makers. The Committee places particular emphasis on issues that impact the Intelligence Community as a whole or that involve several programs. 

Strategic planning process 

The Committee believes that achieving the necessary reforms of 

the Intelligence Community will only occur through a strategic 

planning process. The Committee notes that a formalized, periodic, 

and structured review, much like the Quadrennial Defense Review 

process used by the Department of Defense, could be a model for 

the Intelligence Community. Such a strategic review, and the resulting forward-looking strategy, could identify the breadth and 

depth of the threats, the capabilities existing and needed to combat 

those threats, and better identify the alignment of resources, authorities, and personnel needed to support those required capabilities. Such a review could enable the Intelligence Community to 

more readily make and accept change, infuse flexibility into its 

management and operational structures, and would enable the Director of National Intelligence to gain insight over the intelligence 

and intelligence-related resources throughout the United States 

government. 

16 

Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Director of National Intelligence develop a process for a Quadrennial Intelligence 

Review by the end of fiscal year 2008. The Committee requests the 

DNI provide the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate 

a plan for initiating and conducting this review. With the help of 

this review, the DNI should develop and periodically adjust a National Intelligence Strategy that would inform the types of information needed to support national priorities and objectives. Determination could then be made about which intelligence discipline, or 

disciplines, can best provide the required information. Those decisions could in turn flow down to the development and tasking of 

specific capabilities. Once this is completed, the DNI would be better postured to allocate the funding for the various capabilities 

needed and to project future budget resources required by the various intelligence disciplines. 

Comprehensive inventory of Department of Defense intelligence programs 

The Committee notes and appreciates that the Department of 

Defense is working with the Committee and the Intelligence Community to provide greater visibility into those intelligence-related 

programs funded within the Department. The Committee understands that Department has initiatives underway to develop a Military Intelligence Program (MIP) that will provide greater visibility 

for congressional committees with oversight responsibility. Unfortunately, the Committee believes that it does not have full visibility 

over some defense intelligence programs that do not clearly fall 

into the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) or under Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) categories. Specifically, the Committee notes that individual services may have intelligence or intelligence-related programs such as science and technology projects or information operations programs related to defense intelligence that are embedded in other service budget line 

items, precluding sufficient visibility for program oversight. Greater transparency into these programs and projects will enhance congressional oversight and permit identification of potentially duplicative programs in other services. 

The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 

with the Director of National Intelligence, where appropriate, to 

provide to the armed services and intelligence committees a comprehensive inventory of Department of Defense intelligence and intelligence-related programs and projects. It is not intended that 

this inventory encompass military operations or military activities. 

This inventory shall abide by existing procedures for the handling 

of special access programs referenced in Section 119 of title 10, 

United States Code and applicable Department of Defense directives. 

This report will be delivered to the congressional committees 

within 180 days of the enactment of this bill. 

Budget execution authority 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

gave the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) significant new 

budgetary responsibilities and authorities, particularly in relation 

to budget execution. The DNI is now responsible for the effective 

17 

execution of the annual intelligence budget. The legislation gave 

the DNI a number of budgetary tools to accomplish this through 

the funding process. For example, The Director of Management and 

Budget apportions the appropriations for the annual National Intelligence Program (NIP) at the exclusive direction of the DNI. The 

DNI has the legal authority to direct the allocation and allotment 

of NIP funding to each intelligence organization through the departmental secretaries. Each departmental comptroller provides 

funds to the individual intelligence organizations based on the 

DNI’s direction in an ‘‘expeditious manner.’’ Once the funds are 

transferred to an intelligence organization, it is the responsibility 

of the DNI to monitor the implementation and execution of that 

budget. And, finally, the DNI is required by law to notify Congress 

each time he discovers that a departmental comptroller has not followed his explicit direction. 

Finally, the Committee recognizes that the DNI has just recently 

been sworn in and taken on the responsibilities of the new position, 

but believes that he should begin immediately to establish the 

budgetary processes and procedures, in consultation with the department secretaries and each intelligence organization, to carry 

out these budgetary oversight responsibilities and authorities. 

These authorities will be one of the DNI’s most important management tools with which to drive reform across the Intelligence Community. In the Committee’s view, it is essential that the DNI begin 

exercising these authorities as soon as possible. There remains 

some concern that there will be resistance on the part of some to 

develop the necessary processes to instantiate these statutory responsibilities. The Committee urges the departments and Intelligence Community agencies to move quickly to develop the procedures and processes the DNI needs to effectively exercise his budget authorities. The Committee requests that copies of departmental 

and agency procedures developed to respond to DNI budgetary 

process requirements be delivered to the intelligence authorization 

committees as soon as they become available. 

The Committee recognizes that the DNI is in the midst of establishing the Office of the DNI and that he will need to increase the 

number of staff with Intelligence Community budget execution expertise. The Committee believes that the Office of Management and 

Budget should assist the DNI in establishing this functional component within the Office of the DNI. 

Integrated intelligence enterprise 

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 

States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) recommended the creation of an ‘‘integrated collection enterprise’’ to ensure that the decentralized Intelligence Community collection capabilities could be managed in a coordinated way so as to 

address the many intelligence priorities. According to the report, 

such integration would occur only by managing the Intelligence 

Community ‘‘above the stovepipes’’ using ‘‘mission managers.’’

These mission managers would develop cross-discipline collection 

and analysis strategies. Such strategies would require that individual agencies fully share information across the intelligence enterprise and that ‘‘information ownership’’ becomes a concept of the 

past. 

18 

The Committee agrees with the WMD Commission that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should focus on integrating 

the Intelligence Community so that it acts as a single enterprise 

with unity of action against the highest priority intelligence issues. 

The WMD Commission’s report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the confirmation of the DNI 

present a unique opportunity for this necessary reform to proceed. 

The Committee also agrees that the concept of mission managers 

appears to be sound and that this should build on the excellent 

work done by the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and the Collection Concept Development Center. 

From the Committee’s perspective, the ADCI/C did not have sufficient funding or personnel to truly drive collection across all the 

top priority targets, despite that fact he consistently worked to develop an Intelligence Community collection strategy for the most 

important targets. The ADCI/C’s efforts resulted in some success to 

conduct collection in an integrated fashion and to develop new 

strategies that included highly innovative collection techniques. 

The ADCI/C’s efforts were, however, limited with respect to incorporating the Department of Defense’s Joint Military Intelligence 

Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs 

and capabilities by the extent to which the DoD was willing to participate. The Committee believes that all components of the Intelligence Community must be responsive to the Collection Concept 

Development Center, and that the DNI should build on the 

ADCI/C’s previous integration efforts by creating mission managers 

for each priority intelligence target. 

The WMD Commission envisioned the mission managers cataloging what the Intelligence Community knows about a target, 

what the Intelligence Community needs to know about a target, 

and what collection capabilities can potentially do against a target, 

including sensitive collection capabilities. The Committee believes 

creation of mission managers could allow for the chairing of a ‘‘target development board’’ consisting of target experts, both analysts 

and representatives from each of the collection disciplines, who 

would create strategies to conduct rationalized collection by the appropriate application of HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, Open Source, 

and MASINT capabilities. Such a strategic approach could assign 

collection responsibility to the capabilities that best provide the 

needed information. If none of the existing ‘‘stovepiped’’ capabilities 

could address the need, then the mission manager and board would 

develop/propose new processes and methods to address collection of 

the needed information. 

The strategies developed by mission managers should be end-toend, focusing on analyst-driven collection through information dissemination, allocating analytic responsibility so that all aspects of 

priority intelligence issues are addressed. The mission managers 

could also develop the analytic standards and strategies for the 

mission, identifying the skills and experience that are necessary for 

the analysts and drive their training and career development. Allocation of analytic responsibility should also factor in the need for 

independent analysis and unique departmental analytic requirements. The Committee is convinced that mission managers and coordinated target development are important pieces of the overall 

integration of the Intelligence Community. 

19 

Finally, the Committee believes that the DNI and the mission 

managers must facilitate analysts’ access to all necessary information. The DNI should establish a community-wide information access approval process to enable full access based on mission roles 

and defined security methodologies. Access to information should 

be based on roles and mission, not the agency for which a particular analyst works. Again, data ownership within the Intelligence Community must become a concept of the past. Access 

should be subject to the DNI’s determination, balancing the need 

to protect sources and methods with the analysts need to access 

relevant data. For extremely sensitive collection capabilities, the 

Committee believes that the DNI should develop specific methods 

for ensuring necessary data is available to the analyst cadre, but 

that such restrictions should balance security with the accomplishment of mission. Collected intelligence belongs to the U.S. Government, not to individual collection agencies. Simply stated, the DNI 

must empower the Intelligence Community, through firm policies 

and directives, to increase information integration. 

Therefore, the Committee believes the DNI should establish mission managers for priority intelligence targets, some of which will 

be transitory in nature and eliminated as missions change. The 

Committee agrees with the various commission reports that better 

integration of the disparate agencies and entities within the Intelligence Community is the most important challenge facing the DNI. 

Finally, to ensure the most optimum intelligence capabilities for 

the future, the DNI and the Secretary of Defense must ensure that 

the intelligence and intelligence-related activities within the Department of Defense are seamlessly integrated into the DNI’s processes. 

Intelligence analysis 

One of the most important emphasis areas on which the Committee has focused is analysis. The Committee feels strongly that 

analysis must be the keystone of the Intelligence Community. Because effective intelligence production requires putting together 

puzzles without all the pieces, and the collection of intelligence is 

an imperfect art rather than a science, it is imperative that the 

data collected through the nation’s various collection capabilities be 

analyzed in a timely, accurate manner. The needs of the analytic 

corps and the production of substantive finished intelligence reports must drive collection efforts and associated funding. Decision 

makers rely on analysis to enable strategic responses to threats as 

well as tactical efforts to preempt attacks. Indeed, analysis must 

identify threats and enemies, inform about the specific intentions 

of those enemies, and equip the nation to better combat these identified threats. 

U.S. Intelligence Community analysts are the best in the world, 

but the analysis they produce is not always as good as is needed. 

A number of shortcomings continue to limit the Intelligence Community’s ability to give our national decision makers sufficient insight into complex issues and warning of over-the-horizon threats. 

No one can reasonably expect perfect knowledge, but the Committee expects the DNI, using authorities provided by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, to address 

shortcomings that prevent analysis from playing a more central 

20 

role in Community activities. The Committee applauds the creation 

of a Deputy DNI for Analysis (DDNI/A) position within the DNI’s 

office as this indicates the priority that will be given to this issue. 

Notwithstanding the positive steps already taken, the Committee 

believes that there are a number of additional steps the DNI 

should take to improve Community analytic quality: 

(1) Demand more strategic analysis of medium and longterm threats. The DNI should encourage analysts to identify 

critical factors and potential variables for their consumers, possible outcomes, potential ‘‘leverage points’’ and information 

gaps related to problems under analysis. The Director also 

should make sure that the analytic community is not ‘‘short 

changing’’ support mid-level and junior consumers. 

(2) Develop a well-trained, experienced analytic corps that is 

large enough to drive the rest of the Intelligence Community’s 

actions. The DNI must create new recruitment and utilization 

strategies that make best use of the highly-transitory 21st 

Century workforce and strengthen retention to the maximum 

extent possible by creating incentives for career analysts to become substantive experts. The CIA’s Senior Analytic Service 

encourages strategic intelligence, rewards sound tradecraft, 

and recognizes in-depth expertise; the Deputy DNI for Analysis 

should look into creating a Community-wide program modeled 

on it. Moreover, the workforce must be large enough to allow 

analysts to develop expertise on a particular issue, instead of 

being ‘‘surged’’ from one crisis to the next. 

(3) Ensure that analysts have training and related resources 

to prepare them for their responsibilities. Analysts and their 

supervisors should also be taught to use structured analysis, 

and should be given a thorough understanding of intelligence 

collection methods, procedures and systems. 

(4) Create a corporate enterprise of analysts across the Intelligence Community. Analysts need information technology tools 

to help them collaborate and share information virtually, but 

more importantly they need to be taught that their counterparts at other agencies are not rivals. The DNI should initiate 

activities to strengthen ties among analysts across the Intelligence Community. These activities could include regular 

roundtables—both physical and virtual—where analysts covering specific issues can meet one another and exchange ideas, 

the creation of analytic community-of-interest mailing lists, Intelligence Community-wide seminars and lectures, and off-site 

retreats where analysts from across the Community can build 

professional networks. The Committee also expects the DNI to 

develop and enforce Intelligence Community-wide standards 

for analytic tradecraft and training. 

(5) Break down the walls between analysts and collectors. 

The DNI should develop Mission Managers and/or Centers of 

analysts and collectors from across the Intelligence Community 

to direct intelligence collection to best meet the highest priority 

requirements and fill analytic gaps. 

(6) Enable the Intelligence Community to better harness 

open source information and outside expertise to complement 

and enhance clandestine sources of information. In addition to 

spurring the development of technology tools to drive use of 

21 

open sources, the DNI needs to push the Intelligence Community to reinvigorate its libraries, hire researchers to help analysts sort wheat from chaff, and train analysts on the value 

and use of available alternative resources. The DNI should also 

review security policies and legal restrictions across the Intelligence Community with the aim of enabling analyst interaction with outside peers—particularly scientists and engineers 

who could help assess the significance of technology information and programs. 

The DNI and the DDNI/A are inheriting a talented analytic 

corps. However, several key recommendations regarding analysis 

must be implemented. The Committee has recommended additional 

funds for the Intelligence Community in fiscal year 2006 to hire 

more analysts, develop analytic tradecraft and tools, and evaluate 

its training capacity. The Committee expects the DNI to use these 

funds to act decisively to correct the Community’s analytic problems and hopes to see progress before the next fiscal year. The 

Committee will fully support the DNI in the pursuit of this goal. 

Improper disclosures of classified information 

The Committee is concerned about continuing instances of improper disclosure of classified information and shares the conclusion of the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 

of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction that 

‘‘a persistent inability to protect human and technical collection 

sources and methods has substantially damaged U.S. intelligence 

capabilities.’’ As the Commission noted and discussed in greater detail in the classified version of its report, authorized and unauthorized disclosures have compromised critical signals interception and 

satellite imagery programs, as well as hard-earned human intelligence sources. The Committee is also concerned about several recent such incidents not discussed in the Commission’s report. 

The Committee will continue to focus careful attention on this 

issue, and it encourages the Department of Justice to place a higher priority on investigating and prosecuting illegal disclosures of 

classified information. As the Commission noted, hundreds of 

‘‘leaks’’ have been reported to the Department over the past ten 

years, without a single indictment or prosecution. The Committee 

also will seek to ensure that the DNI and individual agencies within the intelligence community are aggressively pursuing whatever 

administrative remedies may be available to them to deal with unauthorized disclosure of classified information. 

Protecting analytic integrity 

As stated previously, consumers of intelligence must be confident 

that the intelligence assessments on which they rely reflect the 

best judgments of knowledgeable analysts. The Committee notes 

that Section 1020 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Director of National Intelligence to 

identify an individual within the Office of the DNI who shall be 

available to analysts with respect to issues relating to analytic 

tradecraft and the objectivity of intelligence analysis. The section 

also requires a report to Congress on the implementation of this 

provision within 270 days after the effective date of the Act. Although this report is not yet due for submission, the Committee 

22 

stresses its continuing interest in the DNI’s implementation of Section 1020. 

Increased use of open source intelligence 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

noted the critical value of open source intelligence (OSINT) and 

stated Congress’s belief that all elements of the Intelligence Community should make extensive use of open source information. The 

Act recommended that the DNI explore the possible establishment 

of a center for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, producing, and 

disseminating open source intelligence. The President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction echoed these sentiments, adding that 

the Intelligence Community must make use of new technologies 

that can retrieve, store, translate, search, prioritize, and otherwise 

exploit the vast amounts of open source information available. 

The DNI has expressed to the Committee his view that OSINT 

is important for the future of intelligence and that he intends to 

determine how best to pursue the best use of unclassified data. The 

Committee notes its continued interest in this issue and in receiving additional information with respect to the DNI’s plans to more 

fully collect and utilize OSINT. 

Accountability reviews 

The Committee notes its continued interest in two matters related to potential accountability issues within the Intelligence Community. The first is the CIA’s ongoing review relating to the accountability, if warranted, of any individuals who may have failed 

to meet professional standards related to the identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the 9/11 attacks. 

The second is the recommendation of the President’s Commission 

on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction with respect to accountability. The 

Committee expects the Intelligence Community to provide a timely 

response to its inquiries with respect to these matters, as it does 

with all Committee inquiries. 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

The Committee believes that one of the key responsibilities of the 

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is to improve the quality of 

intelligence related to the security of the homeland. The DNI will 

have to ensure that intelligence and law enforcement agencies go 

in and produce reliable and actionable information regarding a 

wide variety of threats, including the trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons—activities that may support terrorist actions, 

undermine the social fabric, or attack the economic vitality of our 

nation. 

The Committee notes the important role that the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) plays in providing information on such 

threats to the Intelligence Community and to Federal, State, and 

local law enforcement agencies. EPIC’s operations-oriented intelligence initiatives support the interdiction and disruption of illicit 

activities along the nation’s southwest border, thereby playing a 

critical role in countering possible acts of terrorism and mitigating 

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23 

nity in focusing more attention to the Central and South American 

areas is addressed extensively elsewhere in this report. 

Although authorization for the activities at EPIC is not within 

the Committee’s jurisdiction, the Committee recommends that the 

DNI leverage EPIC’s expertise, endorse greater information-sharing between EPIC and the Intelligence Community, and encourage 

a closer and more collaborative working relationship between EPIC 

and members of the Intelligence Community. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND ROLLCALL VOTES

On May 24, 2004, the Committee met in open and closed session 

and ordered the bill H.R. 2475 favorably reported, as amended. 

OPEN SESSION

In open session, the Committee considered the text of the bill 

H.R. 2475. 

Chairman Hoekstra offered an amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 2475, which was adopted by voice vote after consideration of the following amendments to the amendment in the 

nature of a substitute. The contents of the amendment in the nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section analysis 

and the Explanation of Amendment. 

Ms. Harman offered an amendment to strike Section 305 of the 

amendment in the nature of a substitute, which clarifies existing 

language requiring personnel transfers for new National Intelligence Centers to be conducted ‘‘in consultation with’’ the committees of jurisdiction. 

A recorded vote on this amendment was taken, and the Members 

present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman)— no; Mr. LaHood—no; Mr. Cunningham—no; Mr. Everett—no; Mr. 

Gallegly—no; Ms. Wilson—no; Ms. Davis—no; Mr. Thornberry—no; 

Mr. McHugh—no; Mr. Tiahrt—no; Mr. Rogers—no; Mr. Renzi—no; 

Ms. Harman—aye; Mr. Hastings—aye; Mr. Reyes—aye; Mr. Boswell—aye; Mr. Cramer—aye; Ms. Eshoo—aye; Mr. Holt—aye; Mr. 

Ruppersberger—aye; Mr. Tierney—aye. Therefore, on a vote of 9 

ayes and 12 noes, the amendment was rejected. 

Ms. Eshoo offered and, after debate, received unanimous consent 

to withdraw an amendment to establish an Inspector General hotline. 

Mr. Ruppersberger offered and, after debate, received unanimous 

consent to withdraw an amendment relating to the security clearance process for state and local officials. 

CLOSED SESSION

Ms. Harman then moved that the Committee close the meeting 

on the ground that public discussion of the classified portions of the 

bill could endanger national security. 

A recorded vote was taken, and the Members present recorded 

their votes as follows: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman)—aye; Mr. Everett—aye; Mr. Gallegly—aye; Ms. Wilson—aye; Ms. Davis—aye; Mr. 

Thornberry—aye; Mr. McHugh—aye; Mr. Rogers—aye; Ms. Harman—aye; Mr. Boswell—aye; Mr. Cramer—aye; Ms. Eshoo—aye; 

Mr. Ruppersberger—aye. Therefore, on a vote of 13 ayes and 0 

noes, the meeting was closed. 

24 

Mr. Reyes offered an amendment to modify the funding level for 

a program contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 

that was adopted by voice vote. 

Mr. Everett offered and, after debate, received unanimous consent to withdraw an amendment to modify the funding level for a 

program contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. 

Ms. Harman offered and, after debate, received unanimous consent to withdraw an amendment to modify the funding level for a 

program contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. 

The Committee then adopted the classified Schedule of Authorizations, as amended, by voice vote. 

OPEN SESSION

By unanimous consent, the Committee returned to open session. 

By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the Chairman 

to favorably report the bill H.R. 2475 to the House as amended 

with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT

The provisions of the Substitute are as follows: 

Section 1—Short Title and Table of Contents 

Section 1 contains the short title for the bill and the Table of 

Contents. 

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101—Authorization of Appropriations 

Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of these elements of the 

United States Government: The Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (including the National Counterterrorism Center), the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Department of 

State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance 

Office, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Coast 

Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security. 

Section 102—Classified Schedule of Authorizations 

Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the accompanying 

classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the President. 

Section 103—Personnel Ceiling Adjustments 

Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the authorized number when the DNI determines that it is necessary to the 

performance of important intelligence functions and promptly notifies the congressional intelligence committees. 

25 

Section 104—Intelligence community management account 

Section 104 authorizes specified funds, as well as classified 

amounts, for the Intelligence Community Management Account 

and provides that personnel detailed to that staff from other agencies are detailed on a reimbursable basis. 

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND

DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201—Authorization of appropriations 

Section 201 authorizes funds for the CIA Retirement and Disability System. 

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 301—Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law 

Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased to 

provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by law. 

Section 302—Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities 

Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in this act 

does not constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States. 

Section 303—Authority of the DNI to appoint overseas representatives 

Section 303 authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to assign an individual to be a representative of the DNI to support 

each Chief of Mission in a foreign country. The DNI’s representative shall oversee and manage all intelligence and intelligence-related activities in that country. Section 303 also clarifies that this 

authority does not supercede the authority of the CIA Director to 

coordinate human intelligence collection overseas, but that the CIA 

Director’s authority to do so is subject to the DNI’s broader coordination, oversight and management authority. 

Section 304—Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming authority 

Section 304 provides a technical clarification that the authority 

to concur in DNI reprogramming of funds in excess of the statutory 

limitations may only be made by the head of an executive department or (in the case of the CIA only) by the Director of the CIA. 

Section 305—Approval of personnel transfer for new National Intelligence Center 

Section 305 clarifies that the DNI’s authority to transfer personnel in conjunction with establishment of a new National Intelligence Center is subject to a response from the congressional committees of jurisdiction with respect to notification. This provision is 

intended to clarify existing language requiring such transfers to be 

conducted ‘‘in consultation with’’ the committees of jurisdiction. The 

provision does not apply to the DNI’s general personnel transfer 

authorities. 

26 

Section 306—Additional duties for the DNI Director of Science and 

Technology 

Section 306 provides that the DNI Science and Technology Committee shall prioritize research and development related to intelligence (in addition to coordinating such research and development), including identification of basic, applied, and advanced research programs to be carried out by the intelligence community. 

The DNI’s Director of Science and Technology is also directed to assist the DNI in establishing goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet its technology needs. Section 306 further provides for a report to Congress by the DNI containing a 

strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community through 2021. 

Section 307—Comprehensive inventory of special access programs 

Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees by January 15, 2006, a classified comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted within the National Intelligence Program. 

Section 308—Sense of Congress on budget execution procedures 

Section 308 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI should 

expeditiously establish the necessary processes and procedures 

with the heads of executive departments and agencies to carry out 

the budgetary execution authorities in the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. 

Section 309—Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level security 

clearances 

Section 309 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI should 

promptly establish and oversee the implementation of a multi-level 

security clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage skills of individuals proficient in foreign languages. 

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 401—CIA coordination of human intelligence 

Section 401 provides two clarifications with respect to the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate intelligence overseas. First, it clarifies that the authority extends to all human intelligence collected overseas by any department, agency, or element of the United States Government. Second, 

it clarifies that the Director of the CIA shall develop a process for 

such coordination, subject to the approval of the DNI. The DNI also 

may determine which activities will be subject to the process. 

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee held 10 hearings and 

briefings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 2475. 

Testimony was taken from senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Community Management Staff; the Department of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of the Army, 

27 

Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the Department of 

Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of Homeland Security; and the U.S. Coast 

Guard. Such testimony related to the activities and plans of the Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and authorizations, 

both classified and unclassified, of the ‘Intelligence Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2006.’ The bill, as reported by the Committee, 

reflects conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity. 

GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the Committee’s performance goals and objectives are reflected in the descriptive portions of this report. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 

States government are carried out to support the national security 

interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed 

forces of the United States, and to support the President in the 

execution of the foreign policy of the United States. 

Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ‘Congress shall have power * * * to 

pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; * * *’; ‘to raise and support Armies, 

***’ ‘to provide and maintain a Navy; * * *’ and ‘to make all 

laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 

thereof.’

UNFUNDED MANDATE STATEMENT

Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104–4) requires a statement of whether the 

provisions of the reported bill include unfunded mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee has received a letter 

from the Congressional Budget Office included herein. 

BUDGET AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST

ESTIMATE

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of 

the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of 

3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of Representatives and section 402 

of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate for H.R. 2475 from the Director 

of the Congressional Budget Office: 

28 

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, May 31, 2005. 

Hon. PETER HOEKSTRA, 

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of 

Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2475, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, Director. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 2475—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

H.R. 2475 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for 

intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 

Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS). 

This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. 

CBO cannot obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs 

for the entire bill because some parts are classified at a level above 

clearances held by CBO employees. For purposes of this estimate, 

CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by October 1, 2005, and 

that the necessary amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 

2006. Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns. 

The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense). 

Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $446 million for 

the Intelligence Community Management Account, which provides 

the principal source of funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost 

$268 million in 2006 and $442 million over the 2005–2010 period, 

assuming appropriation of the specified amounts. 

Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $245 million for 

CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military service 

and various unfunded liabilities. The appropriation to CIARDS is 

considered mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would 

be the same as assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate 

does not ascribe any additional cost to that provision. The bill 

would not affect revenues. 

H.R. 2475 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock. This 

estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

29 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

* * * * * * * 

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 102A. (a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(d) ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN TRANSFER

AND REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS.—(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(5)(A) * * * 

(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 

a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph (A) if the 

transfer has the concurrence of the head of the department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the 

case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The authority to provide 

such concurrence may only be delegated by the head of the department øor agency involved¿ involved or the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency) 

to the deputy of such officer. 

* * * * * * * 

(e) TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL.—(1)(A) In addition to any other authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first twelve 

months after establishment of a new national intelligence center, 

the Director of National Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and in consultation 

with the congressional committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of the intelligence community to such center. 

(B) The Director of National Intelligence øshall promptly provide 

notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to this paragraph to—¿ may not transfer personnel under subparagraph (A) unless the Director has provided notice of any transfer of personnel to 

be made pursuant to this paragraph and received a response from— (i) the congressional intelligence committees; 

(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the 

House of Representatives; 

(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the 

Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of 

the Senate and the House of Representatives; and 

(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on the Judiciary of the 

Senate and the House of Representatives. 

ø(C) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph 

(B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies 

the requirements of this subsection.¿ 

30 

(C) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph 

(B)— (i) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection; 

(ii) the number of personnel transferred; and 

(iii) the individual skills and capabilities of the personnel involved. 

* * * * * * * 

(k) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.—(1) Under the 

direction of the President and in a manner consistent with section 

207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the coordination of the relationships between elements of the intelligence community and 

the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related 

to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through 

clandestine means. 

(2)(A) The Director may assign an individual to be a representative of the Director at a United States mission in a foreign country. 

Any such individual shall oversee and manage all intelligence and 

intelligence-related activities conducted in that country by personnel 

of any element of the intelligence community. 

(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to supersede the 

authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency described in clause (ii), such authority being subject to general oversight by the Director of National Intelligence under paragraph (1). 

(ii) The authority referred to in clause (i) is the authority under 

section 104A(f) to coordinate relationships between elements of the 

intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of 

foreign governments or international organizations generally and 

the authority under section 104A(d)(3) to provide overall direction 

for and coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside 

the United States. 

* * * * * * * 

DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SEC. 103E. (a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(c) DUTIES.—The Director of Science and Technology shall—

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(4) assist the Director on the science and technology elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; øand¿ 

(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the elements 

of the intelligence community to meet the technology needs of 

the community; and 

ø(5)¿ (6) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by 

the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law. 

(d) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE.—(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

31 

(3) The Committee shall— (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research and development related to intelligence; and 

* * * * * * * 

(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify 

basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out 

by elements of the intelligence community. 

* * * * * * * 

(e) GOALS FOR TECHNOLOGY NEEDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science 

and Technology shall—

(1) perform systematic identification and assessment of the 

most significant intelligence challenges that require technical 

solutions; and 

(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of research 

and design programs to meet the requirements of the intelligence community for timely support. 

* * * * * * * 

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 104A. (a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(d) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency shall—

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3) øprovide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States 

through human sources by elements of the intelligence community¿ subject to subsection (h), provide overall direction for and 

coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside the 

United States by any department, agency, or element of the 

United States Government authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or 

elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is 

taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in 

such collection; and 

* * * * * * * 

(h) CLARIFICATION OF ROLES OF DNI AND DCIA WITH RESPECT

TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.—(1) In carrying out subsection (d)(3), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 

develop a process for the coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside of the United States. Such process shall be subject 

to the approval of the Director of National Intelligence. 

(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall determine which 

human intelligence collection activities shall be subject to the process developed under paragraph (1). 

* * * * * * * 

(32) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

The Intelligence Authorization bill for FY 2006 is the first authorization bill to be considered since the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–458) became law last 

December. The reforms undertaken last year, in the aftermath of 

two intelligence failures, created a Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) and dramatically reshaped the Intelligence Community. This 

authorization bill will therefore help define the authorities, priorities and direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 

and the entire Intelligence Community. 

We strongly support many aspects of this bill, which provides the 

resources for the brave men and women of the Intelligence Community who stand on the front lines in defense of our country. We salute their courage and dedication. 

This year, the President sent to Congress a budget that again fell 

short in counterterrorism funding, requesting just 40% of the community’s counterterrorism requirements for FY 2006. We are 

pleased the full Committee took the step in this bill to authorize 

100% of the Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism funding 

needs. This is in significant contrast to the FY 2005 Intelligence 

Authorization bill which funded only 26% of intelligence 

counterterrorism requirements. 

Fully funding counterterrorism represents bipartisanship and 

good policy. The terrorist threat is not a temporary emergency; it 

is going to be with us for the foreseeable future. It is vital that we 

fund operations in a way that allows our field officers to plan 

ahead. 

This legislation also encourages the Intelligence Community to 

recruit and clear qualified personnel with the language skills and 

ethnic background that will make it easier to understand—and 

penetrate—the hard targets. This bill urges the DNI to establish 

a multi-tier security clearance system to help patriot Americans 

with relatives in foreign countries obtain security clearances to 

work in the Intelligence Community. This provision is identical to 

H. Res. 173, which all nine (9) Democrats on the Committee introduced on March 17, 2005. 

There are also important new investments in human intelligence 

and other intelligence activities that, if administered properly, will 

help us penetrate terrorist cells, proliferation networks, and secretive regimes where our intelligence has been deficient. 

Despite these positive attributes, the legislation reported to the 

House contains a few provisions with which we disagree—one of 

which is so damaging to the authority of the DNI that it threatens 

to undermine the very reforms passed by Congress last year. 

Under Section 305 of this bill, congressional committees, including the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, are given 

33 

a ‘‘pocket veto’’ of the proposed personnel transfers by the DNI. We 

oppose this provision. 

Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act enacted and signed into law by the President last year, the DNI is 

required to ‘‘promptly provide notice of any transfer of personnel’’

to congressional committees of jurisdiction. Section 305 would substantively alter this requirement to prohibit the DNI from transferring personnel to intelligence centers ‘‘unless the Director has provided notice of any transfer of personnel * * * and received a response from’’ the congressional committees of jurisdiction. Thus, if 

a committee chairman wished to block the transfer, all he or she 

would have to do is withhold indefinitely a response. 

This provision effectively guts a careful bipartisan compromise 

struck by House and Senate—and supported by the Chairman of 

this Committee—in its consideration of the intelligence reform legislation last year. It waters down that transfer authority to the 

point where it is virtually eliminated. 

This provision is opposed by the DNI. When the identical provision was proposed as an amendment to the FY 2006 Defense Authorization bill at the May 18 markup, a spokesman for the DNI 

told the New York Times that Ambassador Negroponte’s office was 

‘‘aware of the provisions being considered, and we would be opposed to any legislation that would restrict the DNI’s authority.’’

During the intelligence authorization markup, the Ranking Member offered an amendment to strike Section 305. Several members 

of the Committee voiced strong support for this amendment. However, the amendment was defeated on a party-line vote. If this 

issue is not resolved in some other way in advance of floor action, 

it is our intent to offer our amendment on the floor—and we believe we will be successful. To the families of the victims of 9/11, 

who fought so hard for these reforms, we owe nothing less. 

On a separate matter, we expressed concern regarding the Committee’s cuts to certain classified technical programs, which cannot 

be discussed in this unclassified report. (The classified transcript of 

the closed portion of the markup reflects our concerns.) As a general matter, we support the efforts to confront hard choices in technical programs. However, we think it is unwise to make sudden, 

drastic cuts to programs absent a more thorough technical review. 

These cuts could cause a gap in our capabilities and diminish the 

industrial base so critical to fielding the technology against current 

and future threats. We intend to work with the majority to review 

these cuts and arrive at a solution that protects our intelligence capabilities. 

CONCLUSION

This Committee’s highest priority must be to ensure the success 

of the DNI and the thousands of professionals who work for the 

U.S. Intelligence Community. We support the robust funding for 

the Intelligence Community provided by this bill, and we especially 

support full-funding for counterterrorism. With a combination of resources and new authorities, we have placed the Intelligence Community on the right track to avoid the many mistakes that occurred in the past. This progress will be impeded if the DNI’s auVerDate Aug 04 2004 06:10 Jun 03, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR101.XXX HR101
34 

thorities are undercut. For the sake of our nation’s security, we 

cannot let this happen. 

JANE HARMAN. ALCEE L. HASTINGS. SILVESTRE REYES. LEONARD L. BOSWELL. BUD CRAMER. ANNA G. ESHOO. RUSH HOLT. C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER. 

(35) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

I concur with the minority’s views regarding the need to remove 

Section 305 concerning a diminution of DNI transfer authorities 

and the support for full funding of counterterrorism. While I agree 

with much of what those views state concerning funding of systems, there exists some discreet differences in degree and proposed 

remedy. Similarly, comments that seem to indicate that all funds 

are otherwise being spent entirely appropriately seem overbroad 

and cannot be supported without clarification which is best left for 

any classified section of this report. 

JOHN F. TIERNEY. 

Æ