Research for Practice

 COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Managing Calls to the Police With 911/311 Systems 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

FEB. 05 

National Institute of Justice 
This and other publications and products 

found at: 

of the National Institute of Justice can be 

National Institute of Justice 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

Tracy A. Henke 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

Sarah V. Hart 

Director, National Institute of Justice 
FEB. 05 

This Research for Practice 

is based on “Managing 

Citizen Calls to the Police: 

An Assessment of NonEmergency Call Systems,” 

final report by the authors 

to the National Institute of 

Justice, October 2001, 

NCJ 199060, available at 

www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ 

nij/grants/199060.pdf. 

Also see Calling 311: 

Guidelines for Policymakers, NIJ Research for 

Policy, 2005, NCJ 206257, 

available at www.ncjrs.org/ 

pdffiles1/nij/206257.pdf. 

Managing Calls to the Police 

With 911/311 Systems 

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the 

authors and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice under 

grant number 98–IJ–CX–0067. Additional support was provided through a 

transfer of funds to NIJ from the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services. 

NCJ 206256 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

ABOUT THIS REPORT 

Many 911 systems are overwhelmed with calls, most of 

them not emergencies. In the 

mid-1990s, some jurisdictions 

introduced the 311 nonemergency number to relieve overburdened 911 systems. Calls 

can be switched instantaneously between 311 and 

911 call centers and forwarded to other city agencies. 

Do 311 systems effectively 

reduce nonemergency calls 

to 911 operators and free 

more time for police officers 

on neighborhood beats? A 

1998 National Institute of 

Justice study compared 311 

systems in four U.S. cities, 

focusing primarily on Baltimore’s police-managed and 

-operated 311 call system.1 

What did the 

researchers find? 

Accompanied by an effective 

public awareness campaign, 

a 311 system can greatly reduce the 911 call burden. In 

Baltimore, calls to 911 decreased by almost 5,000 per 

week after 311 was implemented.2 However, even 

though the 311 system appeared to free time for patrol 

officers, most officers did not 

notice an increase in discretionary time. The researchers 

recommend that agencies 

adopting a 311 call system 

also consider a dual-dispatch 

policy—generally not dispatching patrol units in response to 

311 calls, but instead following up with a communityoriented, problem-solving 

approach. 

What were the study’s 

limitations? 

Data about pre-311 citizen 

satisfaction were unavailable; 

researchers derived levels of 

citizen satisfaction with 311 

from user surveys. 

ii 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

Lorraine Mazerolle, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, 

Christine Famega, and John E. Eck 

Managing Calls to the Police 

With 911/311 Systems 

About the Authors 

Lorraine Mazerolle, 

Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of 

Criminology and Criminal 

Justice, Griffith University, 

Australia; Dennis Rogan, 

Ph.D., is President, Statistical Analysis for Law 

Enforcement Strategies; 

James Frank, Ph.D., is 

Associate Professor in the 

Division of Criminal Justice at the University of 

Cincinnati; Christine 

Famega, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor in the 

Department of Criminal 

Justice, California State 

University, San Bernardino; and John E. Eck, 

Ph.D., is Professor of 

Criminal Justice at the 

University of Cincinnati. 

Few technological innovations 

have revolutionized police activities as much as the emergency 911 call system. Any 

U.S. citizen can mobilize 

police or other emergency 

resources by simply picking 

up a phone and dialing 911. 

This capability, which most 

Americans take for granted, 

has been referred to as a cornerstone of policing in modern democratic countries.3 

Perhaps most remarkable, 

citizens who call 911 involve 

themselves in the policing 

process. Police action is often 

precipitated by a citizen’s call 

to 911; in turn, that citizen 

generally expects a quick 

response. In essence, 911 

has increased the degree to 

which police departments 

and citizens rely on each 

other to fight crime. 

Today, however, nonemergency calls often overload 

911 systems’ technical and 

human resources. Citizens 

complain that the police are 

slow to respond to requests 

for service, and police contend that responding to nonemergency calls placed to 

911 hampers their ability to 

solve the problems that often 

lead to emergency calls in the 

first place. 

In the mid-1990s, authorities 

began encouraging use of 

a nationally recognizable 

number—311—to alleviate 

the burden of nonemergency 

calls flooding 911 systems. 

Advantages and 

disadvantages 

for police 

Installing a nonemergency 

call system offers some clear 

advantages: the relative ease 

of marketing and remembering 311, a decrease in 911 

calls, and the less measurable effect of empowering citizens to decide whether a call 

should be considered an 

emergency. It reinstates, to 

some degree, the true function of 911. 

Disadvantages include high 

implementation costs and 

the lack of caller or location 

identifiers for 311 calls. Most 

911 systems assign these 

1 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

identifiers, known as Automatic Number Identification 

(ANI) and/or Automatic Location Identification (ALI). 

But, unlike 911 calls, 311 calls 

usually arrive to the operator 

“blind”—most systems do 

not assign ANI/ALI numbers. 

This anonymity sacrifices the 

ability to call back if the connection is lost, even if the call 

is switched over to a 911 operator. It also loses potentially 

useful data for communityoriented policing. The researchers hypothesize, however,

that caller anonymity may have 

contributed to the increase in 

reporting of certain crimes in 

Baltimore (see “Patterns of 

Citizen Reporting”). 

Other disadvantages that surfaced in Baltimore resulted 

from unanticipated problems 

such as failure to record information, underuse of neighborhood policing resources, and 

a common dispatch policy for 

both 311 and 911 systems. 

With careful planning, these 

problems can be avoided. 

P CITIZEN REPORTING 

Introduction of 311 in Baltimore fundamentally 

changed how citizens reported certain crime 

and disorder incidents to 911. For example, 

before 311, police received about 700 calls per 

week regarding family disturbances. After 311, 

family disturbance calls to 911 declined by 

about 200 per week. Citizen reports to 911 of 

juvenile disturbances, parking violations, suspicious persons, auto accidents, and destruction 

of property also declined. 

Call migration. More intriguing is the 87 percent 

decline in citizen loud noise complaints to 911a 

even though the total number of loud noise 

complaints increased—most of those placed to 

311. Many citizen reports for narcotics, motor 

ed assault migrated from 911 to 311, and the 

overall volume of calls in some of these categories also increased. The researchers speculate that 311 call anonymity may be a factor in 

call volume increases.b It appears that the 311 

system adopted about 30 percent of the calls 

previously made to 911. 

Frequent callers. Researchers found that 

approximately four out of five citizens had 

found that many callers to 311 had also called 

911. When the researchers analyzed citizen 

surveys by whether they had called 311 or 911, 

they found that 91 percent of 911 callers had 

also called 311, and 88 percent of 311 callers 

had also called 911. A majority of callers surveyed appeared to be multiple users of both 

more likely than 311 callers to call 311 more 

than once.c 

a. From 266 calls per week to 34 calls per week. 

b. See Mazerolle, L., D. Rogan, J. Frank, C. Famega, and J. 

Eck, “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: The Impact of BalCriminology and Public Policy 

2(1)(November 2002): 117, 119. 

c. See Mazerolle, L., D. Rogan, J. Frank, C. Famega, and J. 

Eck, “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: An Assessment of 

Non-Emergency Call Systems,” final report to the National 

Institute of Justice, October 2001, NCJ 199060: 7-8. 

ATTERNS OF 

vehicle theft, gambling, larceny, and aggravatcalled 911 at some point in that year. They also 

systems, but, interestingly, 911 callers were 

Notes 

timore’s 3-1-1 Call System,” 

2 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

Results in Baltimore 

Baltimore’s 311 nonemergency 

call system was intended to 

reduce the response burden 

on police and improve the 

quality of policing. The study 

found considerable potential 

for meeting these goals. Researchers noted a 34-percent 

total reduction in calls to 911 

(see exhibit 1) and widespread 

community acceptance of 

311 as an alternative number. 

Most low-priority calls moved 

from 911 to 311. Certain types 

of calls in particular migrated 

from 911 to 311, such as 

reports of larceny, parking 

violations, and loud noise 

complaints. These positive 

results do not tell the full 

story, however. 

Problematic factors. Study 

findings were confounded by 

three factors: 

■ The number of priority 1 

calls increased by more 

than 27 percent after the 

introduction of 311. Researchers believe this 

increase was unrelated to 

implementation of the system. Their analysis revealed 

that priority 1 calls for specific categories of serious 

crime (particularly rape, robbery, and burglary) began 

increasing several months 

before the 311 system was 

installed. 

■ The large reduction in 

priority 5 calls to 911 

(see exhibit 1) was partly 

offset by an increase in 

Exhibit 1. The impact of 311 on calls to the police 

Pre-311 implementation Post-311 implementation 

Call priority 911 only 911 only 311 only 911 + 311 

1 417,728 470,263 62,534 532,797 

2 902,565 633,706 184,931 818,637 

3 415,133 177,967 138,722 316,689 

4 201,043 66,169 103,878 170,047 

5 111,500 375 50,454 50,829 

Total 2,047,969 1,348,480 540,519 1,888,999 

Note: Preintervention period was 730 days, from October 1, 1994, to October 1, 1996, excluding February 29, 1996 (leap year). 

Postintervention period was 730 days, from October 2, 1996, to October 1, 1998. 

3 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

nonemergency calls referred to other city agencies.4 

But researchers speculate 

that citizens may have been 

dissuaded from calling the 

police about low-priority 

matters because the Baltimore Police Department 

stopped dispatching patrol 

cars in response to priority 

5 calls after the introduction of 311.5 

■ Unrecorded calls were estimated to be about 8 percent 

higher after the introduction 

of 311—a small but significant increase that may have 

been due to a greater inclination on the part of 311 

operators than their 911 

counterparts to handle calls 

about nonpolice matters 

without recording them.6 

Impact on policing. Many 

elements of Baltimore’s 

approach were successful— 

the overall burden on 911 was 

reduced, and citizen use of 

and satisfaction with calling 

311 was high. For some categories of crime and disorder, 

citizen complaints increased 

(see “Patterns of Citizen Reporting”). The 311 system’s 

impact on policing was muted 

because the department’s response and dispatching protocols were not changed when 

the system was implemented. The researchers noted three 

key areas that the 311 system was expected to have affected that actually showed little 

impact: 

■ 

Response times. Response 

times for priority 1 calls to 

911 were not lowered; 

rather, patrols were dispatched a bit more slowly following the introduction 

of 311. The increase in total 

number of priority 1 calls 

may account for this. Overall, after implementation 

of 311, police responded 

to most categories of 911 

calls in the same manner 

as before. 

■ Dispatch policy. After 311 was implemented, Baltimore police continued dispatching officers for all calls, 

whether 911 or 311 (except 

priority 5 calls). Officers 

either did not know or were 

indifferent about whether a 

call had been placed through 

911 or 311.7 

■ Officer discretionary time. Researchers discovered 

only a marginal gain in uncommitted blocks of time experienced by patrol units. 

Almost two-thirds of the officers surveyed did not perceive a change in how much 

discretionary time they had 

available, most likely because time gains were 

4 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

spread out over shifts and 

obscured by the failure to 

dispatch 311 and 911 calls 

differently. Officer perceptions were about equally 

split on whether 311 implementation had changed 

their work routine. Sector 

managers, on the other 

hand, were certain that 311 

had decreased their patrol 

officers’ 911 call response 

load. 

Despite these mixed results, 

researchers were able to 

draw conclusions as to how 

linking 311 call technology 

with changes in policy and 

practice can advance a 

department’s communityoriented policing agenda. 

Considerations for 

practice 

Baltimore’s experience suggests that 311 call systems 

can help police better manage citizen calls and determine the appropriate police 

response. By calling 311, citizens are in effect prescreening the call for the police, 

indicating that their problem 

does not require immediate 

patrol response. 

More than 90 percent of 

callers surveyed in the study 

viewed 311 services favorably, 

even though the majority felt 

that the reported problem still 

existed. Citizens generally 

agreed that 311 improves 

police-community relations. 

They viewed 311 as a positive 

alternative and did not feel 

they were getting a secondrate response. Thus, police 

departments adopting a 311 

system may not need to go 

to great lengths to discourage citizen calls to 911. 

More importantly, if the police 

trust citizen assessments of 

reported incidents—if they 

accept the apparent citizen 

decision that the call placed 

to 311 does not require a priority response—a tacit partnership between police and 

citizens is created whereby 

citizens in effect classify and 

direct calls themselves. 

Police departments adopting 

311 can capitalize on these 

citizen decisions by using a 

dual-dispatch or split-force 

model of policing8 that dispatches differently to 911 and 

311 calls. 

The 311 technology allows 

police to focus their emergency and patrol response 

capacity on high-priority incidents while applying a more 

long-term, problem-solving 

approach to calls that citizens 

consider nonemergencies. In 

Baltimore’s 

experience 

suggests that 

311 call 

systems can 

help police 

better manage 

citizen calls and 

determine the 

appropriate 

police response. 

5 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

this way, the referral of 311 

calls to neighborhood or departmental community policing resources can be an 

opportunity to “institutionalize” 

community-oriented, problemsolving policing.9 At the same 

time, the disparity in perception between patrol officers 

and their supervisors as to 

how much discretionary time 

officers had available may 

indicate a need for closer 

supervision of discretionary 

activities. Police departments may want 

to consider whether they would substantially benefit 

from an absolute reduction in 

calls. When citizens are encouraged to report criminal 

activities, the police arguably 

have a more accurate picture 

of where, when, and what types of crimes are being 

committed. This information 

is crucial for scanning and 

analysis activities associated 

with the community-oriented 

approach to reducing neighborhood problems. But if a 

nonemergency call system 

does not automatically identify 

311 calls by number or location (ANI/ALI), the opportunity 

to use data from those calls for problem solving may be 

limited. 

Implementing a 311 

system The researchers offer several 

recommendations for police 

departments considering 

whether to establish a 311 

nonemergency call system. 

Review all goals and options. 

System objectives should be 

clearly articulated and the 

technological options10 carefully weighed. For example, 

should the 311 system be a 

police only or a citywide government approach that seeks 

to better coordinate the delivery of city services—including 

police? (See “311 Systems in 

Two Cities.”) 

Ensure that all technological and human resources 

are in place. Hidden costs 

and resources are associated 

with implementing complex 

call systems, such as net­ working with local police districts, creating phone links 

with other government communications systems, and 

ensuring adequate backup 

systems to handle emergency and rollover situations. 

A well-trained staff is a primary concern. Surge capability may be needed to handle 

increases in priority 1 calls. 

All officers and staff need to 

understand the 311 system’s 

objectives. 

6 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

Advertise the system. A 

public awareness campaign 

is needed to explain to the 

community what should be 

reported to 311 and what 

should be reported to 911. 

During the first 2 years of the 

311 operation in Baltimore, 

many callers used the number 

incorrectly—62,000 priority 1 

emergency calls were placed 

to 311. Police also need to 

communicate clearly to citizens 

what followup they should 

expect; for example, that a 

patrol car will not respond if 

the call is handled in the context of a community policing 

response. 

Review and modify priorities/ 

dispatch policies for 311 

calls. As noted earlier, a principal lesson learned from the 

study is that unless 311 calls 

are handled differently from 

911 calls, officers will not realize time savings. Given that 

there are better and more 

cost-effective ways to respond to recurring crime problems (e.g., problem-solving 

activities), a dual-dispatch or 

split-force approach is recommended, especially if community policing resources are 

already in place. 

Build an interface between 

311 and community policing. If one of the goals of a 

311 system is to free officer 

time for problem solving, a 

police agency must implement organizational structures and policies that 

translate the increased discretionary time into such 

activities.11 

Carefully monitor caller 

satisfaction. Organizational 

changes to accommodate 

a 311 system will alter how 

police deal with citizen complaints. Police need to develop 

such systematic mechanisms 

as routine callbacks or surveys 

to monitor citizen attitudes and 

perceptions.12 Monitoring and 

callback procedures should 

be balanced with the need to 

protect police intelligence or 

undercover operations and 

to protect some citizens’ anonymity, as in domestic violence cases. 

Facilitate program evaluation. Agencies may want to 

implement their nonemergency call systems in such a 

way that analysts can readily 

identify their impact. Postfacto assessments of nonemergency call systems can 

be confounded by changes in 

call-taking policies, dispatch 

policies, call classification 

systems, or organizational 

structures. 

Organizational 

changes to 

accommodate 

a 311 system 

will alter how 

police deal 

with citizen 

complaints. 

7 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

To achieve the best conditions for evaluation, departments can— 

■ Design call systems to adequately track 911 and 311 

originating calls, as well 

as calls diverted to other 

agencies and calls handled 

directly on the phone, to 

monitor call-taker workloads. 

■ Before the system is implemented, capture baseline 

information on how calls 

are dispatched and on citizen satisfaction with police 

responses. Also collect 

field data on officer discretionary time. 

The bottom line 

The Baltimore experience 

suggests that a 311 nonemergency call system can 

both relieve an overburdened 

911 system and provide the 

opportunity to improve and 

expand community-oriented 

policing. To best accomplish 

the latter, a department must 

be willing to consider changes 

in methods and policies— 

specifically, a dual-dispatch 

approach, reallocation and 

close supervision of patrol 

resources and activities, and 

the requisite organizational 

changes. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to track the system’s 

impact on police and/or other 

city services. Through this 

type of comprehensive approach, police departments 

can take full advantage of the 

many benefits 311 technology 

offers. 

8 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

311 S TWO CITIES 

Baltimore 

was the first large city in the Nation to establish a 311/911 system, in October 1996. At the 

time, the Baltimore Police Department was 

percent of which were nonemergency calls. 

The system studied comprises 9 telephone 

lines for 311 and 16 lines for 911, routed through 

a Nortel DMS 100 Intelligent Call Processing 

distribution switch. Implementation cost approximately $1.3 million,a including public education campaigns, hardware, software, and 

were handled by trained limited-duty sworn 

officers. Nearly all 311 calls were entered into 

the police Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 

system, except for calls that were referred to 

other city agencies, which were not recorded. 

Calls that should have been placed to 911, i.e., 

life-threatening emergencies or a crime in 

progress, were immediately switched through 

a single-button transfer to dispatch. 

A holistic approach in Dallas. The main goal 

emergency call system in Baltimore was to 

reduce the burden on 911. In Dallas, the goal 

for the 311 system also included better management of city services and improved customer service. 

Implemented in December 1997, the Dallas 311 

system provided easy access to eight city departments, including the police, by integrating 

them into one system. Emergency calls that 

came in on 311 were immediately transferred 

to 911 dispatch. Like the Baltimore system, 311 

calls were not assigned an ANI/ALI identifier or 

otherwise tracked. Call handlers were trained 

to handle either 311 or 911 calls as well as calls 

for other agencies. 

Researchers found that implementation of the 

citywide approach to handling nonemergency 

calls (including police matters) did not translate 

into additional discretionary time for officers to 

engage in community policing. The Dallas system was not designed to improve police services, and it did not appear to do so.b 

In March 2002, Baltimore switched to a format that integrates nonemergency calls to police with calls for other 

city services (resembling the Dallas system, but 

City). The 311 system is now part of a citywide 

call-tracking and management system.c Although 311 calls for police are routed to police 

call handlers, they are not usually entered into 

CAD or dispatched. They are recorded, but the 

record is kept only for 90 days. The Baltimore 

follows up on calls that required an emergency 

response or where a victim or witness may 

have endured some physical or emotional trauma. The Quality Compliance Unit monitors all 

311 calls to ensure that proper procedures are 

being followed and call handlers are assessing 

police have increased since the study period to 

a. Funded in part by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

b. For a more complete description of the Dallas 311 system, 

see Mazerolle, L., D. Rogan, J. Frank, C. Famega, and J. Eck, 

“Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: An Assessment of NonEmergency Call Systems,” final report to the National Institute 

of Justice, October 2001, NCJ 199060: 2-11 to 2-14 and 8-1 to 

8-23. 

news/citistat/index.html. 

YSTEMS IN 

Baltimore’s initial 911/311 system. 

handling about 1.4 million calls a year, nearly 60 

training. During the study, incoming 311 calls 

of the police-managed and -operated 311 nonBaltimore’s system today. 

modeled after the system used in New York 

Police Department’s Community Affairs Division 

the situation correctly. Levels of 311 calls to 

approximately 600,000 annually. 

Notes 

c. More information can be found at www.baltimorecity.gov/ 

9 
RESEARCH FOR PRACTICE / FEB. 05 

Notes 

1. The other cities studied were Buffalo, New York; Dallas, Texas; and 

Phoenix, Arizona. A preliminary assessment revealed that data from 

these cities were unsuitable for this 

evaluation. 

2. See Mazerolle, L., D. Rogan, J. 

Frank, C. Famega, and J. Eck, “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: An 

Assessment of Non-Emergency Call 

Systems,” final report to the National 

Institute of Justice, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Justice, National 

Institute of Justice, October 2001, 

NCJ 199060: 4-33. 

3. See Bayley, D.H., What Works in 

Policing, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1998. Also discussed in 

Sparrow, M.K., M. Moore, and D.M. 

Kennedy, Beyond 9-1-1: A New Era 

for Policing, New York: Basic Books, 

1990. 

4. Referrals to agencies other than 

police were not recorded. See 

Mazerolle, L., D. Rogan, J. Frank, 

C. Famega, and J. Eck, “Managing 

Citizen Calls to the Police: The 

Impact of Baltimore’s 3-1-1 Call System,” Criminology and Public Policy 

2(1)(November 2002): 108. 

5. Concerning the Baltimore Police 

Department’s change in policy regarding these calls, see Mazerolle 

et al., “Managing Citizen Calls to 

the Police: An Assessment of NonEmergency Call Systems”: 4-8. 

6. Calls that did not require police, fire

department, or ambulance response, 

and that were typically referred to 

another city agency or service, were 

designated “type 79” calls and not 

entered into the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. To quantify 

these nonemergency, nonpolice 

calls, the researchers arranged for a 

32-day sample period during which 

Baltimore police call takers entered 

“type 79” calls into CAD. See Mazerolle et al., “Managing Citizen Calls 

to the Police: An Assessment of 

Non-Emergency Call Systems”: 2-8 

and 5-3; and Mazerolle et al., “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: The 

Impact of Baltimore’s 311 Call System”: 104–108. 

7. A small percentage of 311 calls 

about general neighborhood problems were entered into a database 

and forwarded to neighborhoodbased community policing centers 

for followup. Because of the common dispatch policy, these calls 

were double dispatched. 

8. See Tien, J.M., J.W. Simon, and 

R.C. Larson, An Evaluation Report 

of an Alternative Approach to Police 

Patrol. The Wilmington Split Force 

Experiment, Cambridge, MA: Public 

Systems Evaluation, Inc., 1977. 

9. This model assumes that police 

personnel have effective problemsolving skills and that 911 calls and 

311 calls emanate from the same 

locations, which generally appears 

to be the case. See Mazerolle et al., 

“Managing Citizen Calls to the 

Police: An Assessment of NonEmergency Systems”: 10-8. 

10. For a description of the 311 technological options available in 2001, 

see ibid., chapter 2. 

11. For a more detailed discussion, 

see ibid.: 10-5 to 10-8. 

12. For specific suggestions for system monitoring and evaluation, see 

ibid.: 11-4. 

10 
MANAGING CALLS TO THE POLICE WITH 911/311 

Additional reading 

The Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS) has several publications about 311 call systems 

available for download from 

www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

Call Management and 

Community Policing: A 

Guidebook for Law Enforcement by T. McEwen, 

D. Spence, R. Wolff, J. 

Wartell, and B. Webster, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office 

of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, February 

2003. 

311 for Nonemergencies: 

Helping Communities One 

Call at a Time, COPS Fact 

Sheet, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 

updated August 2003. 

Building a 3-1-1 System for 

Non-Emergency Calls: A 

Process and Impact Evaluation, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 

June 2004. 

11 
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