______________ THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PR ECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

John Christopher Milton, Petitioner,

v.

Richland County, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000580

ORIGI NAL JURISDICTION

Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-046 Heard May 20, 2015 – Filed August 5, 2015

DISMISSED

Constantine George Pournaras, Kris Hines and Elizabeth Fielding Pringle, all of Richland County Public Defender's Office, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia, for Respondent.PER CURIAM: We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction 1 to determine: (1) whether prolonged de tention of persons incarcerated upon the
issuance of a uniform traffic ticket violates the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution 2 where the county has failed to provide a mechanism for prompt judicial determination of probable cause within a 48-hour period following arrest; and (2) whether, absent a prompt probable cause determination, detention centers may detain persons arrested w ithout a warrant longer than reasonably necessary for booking and processing. Becau se there is nothing in the record to indicate that John Christopher Milton did not receive a probable cause
determination within 48 hours of his arrest, we find Milton has failed to demonstrate a justiciable controversy th at is appropriate for our review. Accordingly, we dismiss this matte r in our original jurisdiction.

I. Factual / Procedural History

On January 23, 2014, a deputy with the Richland County Sheriff's Department arrested Milton for trespassing at a business after notice and issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket ("UTT"). 3 Milton was committed to the Alvin S. Glenn

1 S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ("The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warra nto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and other original and remedial writs."); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-310 (1977) (granting the Supreme Court authority to issue original writs); Rule 245(a), SCACR ("The Supreme Court will not entertai n matters in its original jurisdiction
when the matter can be determ ined in a lower court in the first instance, without material prejudice to the rights of the partie s. If the public interest is involved, or if special grounds of emergency or ot her good reasons exist why the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be exercised, the facts showing the reasons must be stated in the petiti on with supporting affidavits.").

2 U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreas onable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and pa rticularly describing the pl ace to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").

3 S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7 -10 (Supp. 2014) (authorizing la w enforcement officers to
use a uniform traffic ticket to arrest for a ll traffic offenses and for certain specified offenses). Section 56-7-10 was amended effective June 4, 2015; however, thisDetention Center because he could not post the $470 bond set by Richland County Magistrate Metts. On Fe bruary 18, 2014, Magistrate Howard converted the bond from a cash or surety bond to a persona l recognizance bond. As a result, Milton was released from custody and ordered to appear in ma gistrate's court on March 12, 2014. 4

On March 19, 2014, the Chief Pub lic Defender for Richland County ("Petitioner"), on behalf of Milton and othe r similarly situated detainees, petitioned this Court to accept a Complaint within its original jurisdiction. Petitioner
maintained that Milton and other indivi duals, who were arre sted in Richland County pursuant to a UTT and not a warr ant, have been subjected to prolonged detention without a prompt judicial determin ation of probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner sought for the Court to issue an order declaring that: (1) a criminal defendant, who is deta ined as a result of a warrantless arrest,
must receive a Gerstein 5 probable cause determination within 48 hours of his or her arrest; and (2) a criminal defenda nt, who does not receive a judicial determination of probable cause, may not be held by a detention center "longer than reasonably necessary" for booking a nd processing. This Court, despite
mootness, 6 granted the petition.

amendment does not affect the disposition of the instant case as it was amended to
include additional offenses for which a UTT may be issued.

4 On April 17, 2014, Magistrate Maurer dismissed the trespassing charge after the business dropped the charge on the conditi on that Milton would not return to the property.

5 Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."); see Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (interpreting Gerstein and holding that an arrest ee is entitled to a probable
cause determination within 48 hours of arrest absent "a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance").

6 See Curtis v. State , 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S. E.2d 591, 596 (2001) ("[A]n appellate court can take jurisdiction, despit e mootness, if the issue raised is capable of repetition but evading review.").II. Standard of Review

Petitioner seeks a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction. Thus, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the Act") is implicated. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005). Section 15-53-20 of the South Carolina Code identifies the purpose of the Act an d provides that courts "shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal re lations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed." S.C. C ode Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005); see Rule 57, SCRCP ("The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code §§ 15–53–10 through 15–53–140, shall be in accordance with these rules, and . . . [t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not precl ude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."). The Act is to be liberally construed and administered to achieve its intended purpose "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005).

To state a cause of action under the Act, a party must demonstrate a justiciable controversy. Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177 S.E.2d 551 (1970). "A justiciable controversy is a real and s ubstantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute or difference of a contingent, hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at 154, 177 S.E.2d at 553.

III. Discussion

Milton acknowledges that the Richla nd County deputy was statutorily
authorized to arrest him usi ng a UTT rather than a warrant. 7 However, because he was detained pursuant to a warrantless arre st, Milton asserts that he was entitled to a judicial determination of probable ca use within 48 hours of his arrest. Although
Milton admits that he received a bond heari ng within 24 hours of arrest, as required

7 Section 22-3-710 of the South Carolina Code states, "All proceedings before magistrates in criminal cases shall be commenced on information under oath, plainly and substantially setting forth th e offenses charged, upon which, and only which, shall a warrant of arrest issue. " S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-710 (2007). However, this Court has he ld that "[s]ection 56-7-10 pr ovides an exception to the warrant requirement by allowing the issuance of a uniform traffic ticket to initiate proceedings before the magistra te for specified offenses." State v. Ramsey , 409
S.C. 206, 210, 762 S. E.2d 15, 17 (2014).by section 22-5-510 of the South Carolina Code, 8 he claims that at no point during the "bail proceedings" was there a determination of probable cause. In the absence of this determination, Milton argues he wa s detained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

We find that Petitioner has failed to dem onstrate a justiciable controversy. Other than Milton's own assertions, the r ecord contains no evidence that he was denied a probable cause determination. Because Petitioner failed to submit a sufficient record, this case presents nothing more than a dispute of a hypothetical
character. See Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co. , 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005) (noting that a ppellant has the burden of establishing a sufficient record and declining to addr ess the merits of a claim when facts underlying the claim are not included in the record); Rule 210(h), SCACR ("Except as provided by Rule 212 and Ru le 208(b)(1)(C) and (2), the appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Reco rd on Appeal."). Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction as it is not appropriate for our review.

DISMISSED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDG E, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.

8 S.C. Code Ann. § 22-5-510(B) (Supp. 2014) (" A person charged with a bailable offense must have a bond hearing within twenty-four hours of his arrest and must be released within a reasonable time, not to exceed four hour s, after the bond is
delivered to the incarcerati ng facility." (emphasis adde d)). Section 22-5-510 was amended effective June 4, 2015 regardi ng matters to be considered when determining conditions of release on bond . Subsection (B) of section 22-5-510 remained unchanged.