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TOO MANY SECRETS: OVERCLASSIFICATION AS A

BARRIER TO CRITICAL INFORMATION SHARING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 24, 2004

Serial No. 108–263

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

DIANE E. WATSON, California

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on August 24, 2004 ........................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Leonard, J. William, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records Administration; Carol A. Haave, Deputy

Under Secretary of Defense, Counterintelligence and Security, U.S.

Department of Defense; Steven Aftergood, Federation of Concerned

Scientists; and William P. Crowell, the Markle Foundation Task Force

on National Security in the Information Age ............................................. 22

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Aftergood, Steven, Federation of Concerned Scientists, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 43

Crowell, William P., the Markle Foundation Task Force on National

Security in the Information Age, prepared statement of ........................... 61

Haave, Carol A., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of .............................................. 36

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 9

Leonard, J. William, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records Administration, prepared statement of ....... 25

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

(1)

TOO MANY SECRETS: OVERCLASSIFICATION

AS A BARRIER TO CRITICAL INFORMATION

SHARING

TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Platts, Kucinich, Ruppersberger,

and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawence Halloran, staff director and counsel;

Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Andrew Su, minority professional staff member.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Too Many Secrets: Overclassification is a Barrier

to Critical Information Sharing,’’ is called to order.

An old maxim of military strategy warns, ‘‘He who protects everything, protects nothing.’’

Nevertheless, the United States today attempts to shield an immense and growing body of secrets using an incomprehensibly complex system of classifications and safeguard requirements. As a result, no one can say with any degree of certainty how much is classified, how much needs to be declassified, or whether the Nation’s

real secrets can be adequately protected in a system so bloated, it

often does not distinguish between the critically important and the

economically irrelevant.

This much we know: There are too many secrets. Soon after

President Franklin Roosevelt’s first executive order on classification in 1940, the propensity to overclassify was noted. Since then,

a long and distinguished list of committees and commissions has

studied the problem. They all found it impossible to quantify the

extent of overclassification because no one even knows the full

scope of the Federal Government’s classified holding at any given

time. Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never

have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as

high as 90 percent.

During the cold war, facing a monolithic foe determined to penetrate our national secrets, overclassification may have provided a

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needed security buffer. But the risk/benefit calculation has changed

dramatically. Against a stateless, adaptable enemy, we dare not

rely on organizational stovepipes to conclude, in advance, who

should have access to one piece of an emerging mosaic. Connecting

the dots is now a team sport. The cold war paradigm of ‘‘need to

know’’ must give way to the modern strategic imperative, ‘‘the need

to share.’’

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States, referred to as the 9/11 Commission, concluded that, ‘‘Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excess

compartmentation of information among agencies. Each agency’s

incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks—criminal, civil, and

internal administrative sanctions—but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of overclassifying

information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms—

are substantial.’’

The National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office,

ISOO, reported that in 2003, more than 14 million documents were

classified by the 3,978 Federal officials authorized to do so. They

classified 8 percent more information than the year before. But recently declassified documents confirm the elaborate and costly security applied to some information is simply not worth the effort

or expense. A former dictator’s cocktail preferences and a facetious

plot against Santa Claus are not threats to national security in the

public domain, yet both were classified.

The most recent ISOO report correctly concludes ‘‘allowing information that will not cause damage to national security to remain

in the classification system or to enter that system in the first instance, places all classified information at needless increased risk.’’

Current classification practices are highly subjective, inconsistent

and susceptible to abuse. One agency protects what another releases. Rampant overclassification often confuses national security

with bureaucratic, political or a diplomatic convenience.

The dangerous, if natural, tendency to hide embarrassing or inconvenient facts can mask vulnerabilities and only keeps critical

information from the American people. The terrorists know their

plans. Fewer people classifying fewer secrets would better protects

national security by focussing safeguards on truly sensitive information, while allowing far wider dissemination of the facts and

analysis, the 9/11 Commission says, must be shared.

Any discussion of intelligence reform must include a new approach to classification, one that sheds cold war shackles and

serves the strategic needs to share information. Our witnesses this

morning bring impressive experience and insight to this important

issue and we look forward to their testimony. I welcome each of

them.

At this time, the Chair would recognize the ranking member of

the committee, Mr. Kucinich.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

for calling this very important hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for their attendance and acknowledge the presence of my

colleagues.

The overclassification of Federal materials is a growing problem,

a problem that has been highlighted once again in the final report

of the 9/11 Commission. Overclassification has serious fiscal costs.

It also reduces the accountability and reduces our security. But the

real problem is not the quantity of materials classified and declassified. Thereal problem, I would submit, is the systemic and reflexive secrecy rampant throughout officials in this administration.

But I have to say, as the witnesses certainly know, this problem

of overclassification, of secrecy, has been a problem throughout the

history of this country. And in a book, Mr. Chairman, which you

may be familiar with, Chalmers Johnson, who is a scholar, wrote

a book about secrecy and his relationship to what he calls ‘‘militarism secrecy and the end of the Republic.’’ The book is called

‘‘The Sorrows of Empire.’’ And he was also the person who is the

author of an a book called ‘‘Blow Back,’’ which talks about the consequences of the U.S. foreign policy on what happens here at home.

This book really makes the connections on how secrecy undermines our country. And in a culture of increased military spending,

together with the secrecy, it makes it very difficult for taxpayers

to have any idea what is going on and how their dollars are being

spent; and it really reflects on the priorities of the country.

This problem of secrecy is also something we have to deal with

as Members of Congress. How many so-called ‘‘secret briefings’’ has

the Congress had over the past few years where we were just fed

misinformation for the purposes of being able to gain support in

Congress for things that people otherwise would not have supported. But the meetings were kept secret and that is a way that

you stop a discussion in a free society.

Now, the current situation with this administration—instead of

making information available or sharing information, this administration reversed a trend started in the Clinton administration, a

trend toward openness, the Clinton Executive Order 2958. Under

this order there is a presumption against classification, and this

presumption was used in case of doubt, and where there was doubt

about the appropriate level of classification, the order specified that

the material be classified at the lower level. An interagency security classification appeals panel was established and historical

records were declassified at record rates and on a timely automated

schedule.

In contrast, the current administration has dramatically increased the volume of Federal materials concealed from the American people. Executive Order 13292, issued in March 2003, 18

months after September 11, permitted officials to classify information when there was doubt whether or not to do so, allowed officials

to classify information at the more restrictive level when there was

a question as to the appropriate level.

The order also delayed and weakened the system of automatic

declassification established under the Clinton executive order and

underutilized the appeals panel. As a result, as has been noted earVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:47 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98291.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lier, a record 14 million classification actions were reported last

year, costing U.S. taxpayers an all-time high of $6.5 billion.

The total number of pages declassified by this administration

was the lowest in the last 10 years, annual FOIA requests, Freedom of Information Act requests, have become more tightly controlled, surpassing the $3 million mark last year for the first time

in history and costing the government $325 million.

Secrecy is on the rise throughout the administration. Officials at

the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services now have

been granted classification authority, while the Office of the Vice

President has become exempt from certain mandatory declassification reviews.

The FCC, Federal Communications Commission, recently stated

that outage reports from wireless, line, cable and telecom providers

would be protected from public disclosure because of ‘‘increasing

concern about homeland security and national defense.’’

In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently decided

that information about the physical security of nuclear facilities

would no longer be publicly available or updated on the agency’s

Web site, though this information would be critical for public

health and safety. And I want to say that I am pleased this subcommittee will be holding hearings on this issue of nuclear plant

security in the coming weeks.

Information seems to be arbitrarily and unnecessarily classified.

Last week, the American Civil Liberties Union released court documents showing that the Justice Department tried to file secret affidavits in two civil court cases challenging the USA Patriot Act.

These affidavits can only be viewed by the judge and would not be

seen by the public or even the plaintiffs.

The attack on the civil liberties of U.S. citizens now includes this

new tactic. The Justice Department even attempted to redact

harmless information, such as a quotation from a 1972 Supreme

Court ruling, and general descriptions of a company and the fact

that it did consulting work.

Even more egregiously, we have seen the declassification used as

an excuse to avoid embarrassment to the administration. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on prewar intelligence concerning the Iraqi WMD program was redacted. The entire report of

Major General Antonio Taguba, detailing the mistreatment of Iraqi

prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, was classified, though it did not

reveal intelligence sources or methods.

Even in this committee, we saw how the Pentagon retroactively

classified sections of a report critical of the proposed national missile defense plan by Philip Coyle, Director of the Department of Defense Office of Operational Test and Evaluation. The information

in the report which had been disclosed and widely disseminated

was subsequently withheld from Congress for 8 months. The Pentagon then marked a report ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and classified the

50 specific recommendations stated in Mr. Coyle’s report so it could

not be released to the public for scrutiny.

The final report of the 9/11 Commission confirms what many of

us already know too well. The Bush administration’s excessive use

of classification, delay in declassifying Federal materials and enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:47 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98291.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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croachments on the civil rights of individuals are antithetical to

democratic principle; and it is our responsibility, as Congress, to

provide effective checks and balances, which is really the purpose

of this committee.

Thank you, Mr. Shays.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I join

with members of the public and Members of Congress and, of

course, the September 11 families in hoping that Congress will act

swiftly to implement the unanimous bipartisan recommendation of

the 9/11 Commission Report.

I must say that as we address today’s issue, the Commission’s

strong and unequivocal recommendations that the executive branch

move from treating information on a ‘‘need to know’’ to a ‘‘need to

share’’ basis, I am uncertain that this transformation can occur

within an administration that has overemphasized classification at

the expense of congressional oversight and, in some cases, at the

expense of common sense.

I know during the last administration, in 1995, the President

reset previous default settings, directing classifiers not to shield information of doubtful value and to classify information at the lowest rather than the highest possible level. Reclassification was prohibited if the material had otherwise been properly put in the public domain.

Under this President Bush, his executive order reverts to a

‘‘when it doubt, classify’’ standard, expands classification authorities and categories, and postpones automatic declassification on

some records.

Now, this leads us here today to ask the witnesses, how can the

administration convince a skeptical public that the administration

is committed to changing this culture when, even as we speak, they

are continuing to classify, in some cases retroactively, information

pertaining to our national defense.

One key example was mentioned briefly by Mr. Kucinich, and it

has to do with missile defense. I happen to have a longer history

with this issue, and so I want to take a moment to recount it. And

the chairman has shared this history.

In the context of the 9/11 Commission Report, the most immediate threat is not an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile,

but an act of terror, some biological or chemical agent introduced

in this country, or a dirty bomb delivered in a suitcase. Even our

own intelligence agencies prioritize threats in this manner. So the

public has the right to ask, why is this administration spending

more than $10 billion per year on a national missile defense system

instead of protecting our ports, equipping the Coast Guard or our

local first responders, protecting chemical facilities, our nuclear reactors, and so on down the line—the many things that need to be

done, which are underfunded seriously in the President’s budget

and in the majority’s budget.

The public has the right to an answer.

Do experts and security personnel think this system will work?

The answer is ‘‘no.’’ Forty-nine previous generals and admirals and

other higher retired military individuals speak out against deployment at this point in time. In a letter to the President, they clearly

set out, ‘‘As you have said, Mr. President, our highest priority is

to prevent terrorists from acquiring and employing weapons of

mass destruction. We agree. We therefore recommend, as the militarily responsible course of action, that you postpone operation and

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deployment of the expensive and untested GMD system and transfer the associated funding to accelerated programs to secure the

multitude of facilities containing nuclear weapons and materials

and to protect our ports and borders against terrorists who may attempt to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United

States.’’

In addition, 31 former government officials called the missile defense deployment a ‘‘sham.’’ These are officials who worked for

Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan,

George H.W. Bush, and Clinton, and argued that the missile defense system planned for rollout in September will provide no real

defense, as they called it a ‘‘sham.’’ The officials worked at the Pentagon, the Department of State, the National Security Council, the

Office of Management and Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and their letter accused the administration of

rushing a program into a field that is largely untested and missing

major components.

The fact of the matter is, the public should know whether or not

this President, for political purposes, is satisfying his ideological

extremists by deploying an unproven, inadequately tested system;

and in fact, is he living in the past instead of addressing the concerns that we have in the 21st century. But instead of allowing for

a public examination, this administration has classified relevant

critical reports and facts, even reclassifying some that have been

in the public domain for as much as 4 or 5 years for what can be

argued as ‘‘political purposes.’’

I will not go through the long rendition, Mr. Chairman, of the

many letters we have, but starting back in September 8, 2000, this

subcommittee held a hearing with the then-Director of Operational

Tests and Evaluation, the Pentagon’s own person, Phil Coyle, who

testified about the inadequacies of the missile defense system. And

at that time I asked the subcommittee, and the subcommittee

agreed without objection, to enter his report detailing 50 recommendations for how this system should be tested. And we put

that in the public record.

What occurred after that was a pattern of stonewalling and repeated resistance from the Department of Defense that lasted over

8 months. Finally, on May 31, 2001 the Coyle report was delivered

to Congress. As Mr. Kucinich mentioned, it was first marked ‘‘For

Official Use Only,’’ but when challenged, the Department of Defense was unable to respond to what that category meant and certainly did not indicate that it was classified in any sense.

Finally, Chairman Shays took the lead and decided to make this

information available to the public on June 2001. It was on the

Web site. It was in public documents. And since that point in time,

we have had numerous hearings in this committee. We have had

testimony from experts. We have had poster boards set up with the

information on it. We have had it on our own Web sites.

And finally, I asked the General Accounting Office to prepare a

report to tell us in September 2004 what would the condition of deployment be, especially with respect to the 50 issues by Mr. Coyle.

After fighting for an inordinate period of time, the General Accounting Office was finally able to issue a report. It no sooner hit

my desk than this administration classified that report. You can

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imagine for yourself whether it was a favorable report to their position or unfavorable.

Not satisfied with that, we asked them to go back and look over

every line and tell us what was classified and was not. Having

done that, they issued a classified report and an unclassified report. The unclassified report, in my estimation was damning. You

can imagine what the classified report was. But then the administration took the additional step of going back in, reclassifying all

the previously open, available information upon which those reports were based, none of them previously having been classified,

all of the information having been in the public domain for some

4 years.

You can answer the question better than I can, but why should

this administration be trusted with the recommendation of the September 11 Commission to move toward a culture of ‘‘need to share’’

as opposed to ‘‘need to know?’’

But it is not all about the missile defense system. There is a disturbing pattern in this administration of using secrecy as a means

to defend or advance their political purposes and policies.

When confronted with allegations that the Energy Task Force,

which the Vice President convened, was predominantly comprised

of industry members who would be inclined to favor the status quo

energy policy in this country, the Bush administration refused to

come clean and disclose participants of the task force, arguing that

such inquiries into Federal agencies are off limits to the courts, the

Congress, and thus, the American people.

In June 2003, when the Environmental Protection Agency released a report on the state of the environment, the detailed assessment of climate change, which among other things was to conclude that carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to global

warming, was deleted by the White House and replaced with language that was deliberately vague and disingenuous about the scientific causes of global warming.

After hearing the compelling evidence of defective tires on certain automobiles and the tragedies that ensued on America’s roads,

Congress passed a law making certain that auto safety data be

made available to the public. But this administration’s National

Highway Traffic Administration has decided that such information

regarding unsafe automobiles which may be detrimental to their

companies will remain secret.

And now, according to Friday’s Washington Post, the Department

of Justice in its court battle with the American Civil Liberties

Union over portions of the Patriot Act has attempted to rely on secret evidence. As Mr. Kucinich also mentioned, one aspect of that

was inessential censoring a dozen seemingly innocuous passages on

national security grounds, including an attempt to redact a

quotation from a 1972 Supreme Court ruling that simply said, ‘‘The

danger to political dissent is acute where the government attempts

to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect domestic

security. Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interests, the danger of abuse and acting to protect that interest become apparent.’’

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Now, there is a dangerous statement if I ever heard one. But this

administration’s Department of Justice thought that had to be redacted from a court proceeding.

This reliance on classification and withholding of information

does not just prevent transparency and accountability in public policymaking. It is an act that is fundamentally opposed to the public;

it is opposed to their health, to their civil liberties, to their consumer interests, and most importantly, to their safety.

How can we trust that this administration with this record will

commit itself to implementing the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that we have more transparency, that we move to a culture

of sharing, a ‘‘need to share’’ versus a ‘‘need to know’’? At a time

when it is so important that we put our resources where the dangers appear most and not on some ideological extreme program

that is unproven and untested, hiding the facts is not doing this

country any service. And we have to take the recommendations of

the 9/11 Commission seriously.

I hope these hearings, Mr. Chairman, will move us in that direction of classifying only what needs to be classified and sharing the

rest, so that the American people can make the right choices and

the right priorities for our safety. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Ruppersberger, who

serves on the House Intelligence Committee.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you. We

have a tremendous opportunity at this time in our history to provide for national security as a result of what happened on September 11. I want to first praise the Commission and all of those people involved, including the families of those who died in the September 11 incident.

At this point, it is very, very important that we deal with this

issue in a nonpartisan way. And it is important that we also understand that there are different elements we have to deal with as far

as the 9/11 Commission’s report.

First, it is extremely important that we do have one person that

can hold all the intelligence communities accountable. We have to

make sure that the intelligence communities, all of them, including

the military, the DOD, CIA, NSA, all the intelligence communities,

work as a team and that they integrate the information. We can

be extremely sophisticated in our intelligence community, but if we

do not get to the bottom line and do what needs to be done and

get the right information to the right people, we will not be successful in what is our goal of national security.

Now, the issue we are dealing with today is overclassification as

a barrier to critical information. I think it is extremely important

that we deal with this issue. Just one aspect of this overclassification is also the barrier in getting people cleared and how ridiculous

it is. I have a Federal Times, August 16, ‘‘482,000 Wait For Clearance, Backlog of Security Checks Holds Up Work, Wastes Billions

of Dollars.’’

Now, one of the American intelligence community’s greatest

problems is the cult of classification in which information, both

rare and commonplace, is a safeguard with equal zeal. Both cases

also illustrate the intense political pressures on intelligence and

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counterintelligence agencies, diluting the value of the Nation’s intelligence. These are parts of our system that are broken, the ones

that no one in Washington wants to talk about, but we are going

to have to deal with to fix this testimony.

There is certainly vital information that must be protected from

foreign espionage. These secrets worth saving should be held closely. Far too much effort is being wasted protecting nonsecrets which

allows vital secrets to slip through.

In Washington, classification has led to sort of a game, creating

those ‘‘in the know’’ and those who are ‘‘not in the know.’’ This

game heightens the power of bureaucrats, but so much is classified

that it is impossible for people with security clearances to know

what is derived from a spy satellite and what is plucked out of the

newspaper, which is considered open source.

So what is a secret? Nuclear secrets should be kept secret. The

names of U.S. agents in other countries must be kept secret. Operation capabilities of U.S. weapons should be kept secret. Unlike today’s situation, a secret requires that there not be the slightest

hint that even a secret exists. To do that, the government would

need to follow just a few simple rules instead of the myriad of complexities it has erected. And whether it is a Democratic administration, or a Republican, there is not consistency in what we do as far

as this classification is concerned. And we need consistency. We

need standards.

First, there must be few secrets. Unless you are willing to stash

people, it is easiest to keep a small number of secrets. Second, give

secrets to fewer people. The idea of hundreds of thousands of people wandering around with secrets is absurd. Do not use access to

classified materials as a justification for doing background checks

on military officers. Just do background checks.

Do not classify as secret that which is in the New York Times

and on the Internet. Do not use secrecy as a shield to protect idiotic

political and policy decisions.

I am looking forward to hearing what your recommendations

would be to deal with this very important issue. It is a strong component of what we need to deal with to provide the best national

security for our country.

Intelligence clearly is the best defense against terrorism, but we

need to get our system right, consistent, and focused. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman, especially your comments,

given that you do serve on the Intelligence Committee. I would just

say, I appreciate the gentleman breaking a family vacation to be

here.

I have the opportunity to ask the first questions. I am going to

defer to you to start off, and then we’ll go to Mr. Kucinich, Mr.

Tierney and myself. I ask unanimous consent that all members of

the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in

the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statement in the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

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This is a fairly big document that I have shown the ranking

member. It’s entitled, ‘‘Dubious Secrets: A Briefing Book of Overclassified Documents,’’ prepared by the National Security Archive,

George Washington University. I am going to ask that it be submitted into the record.

Without, objection.

[NOTE.—The report entitled, ‘‘Dubious Secrets: A Briefing Book

of Overclassified Documents,’’ may be found in subcommittee files.

A copy of the title page follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I want to just note that the George Washington Archive maintains a body of documentation demonstrating the inconsistency and the arbitrariness of many classified decisions. They

find documents released by one agency classified in whole or in

part by another, and they track a declassification process they find

to be extraordinarily slow and litigious.

Without objection, we will put that in the record.

At this time, I recognize our witnesses. We have Mr. William

Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National

Archives and Records Administration. We have Carol Haave, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security, Department of Defense; Mr. Steven Aftergood, Federation of

American Scientists; and Mr. William P. Crowell, the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age.

We truly have four experts on this issue. It is not an easy issue

to deal with, and given that we have one panel, we will have the

5 minutes that you may speak; you can trip over a little bit. I’d just

as soon you not take another 5 minutes but you have that right.

Then we will go to 10 minutes of questioning.

At this time, we will swear in our witnesses. Is there anyone else

that has accompanied you that might provide information so they

can stand and be sworn in at this time.

Is there anyone else?

No one else.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses have responded in

the affirmative.

At this time we will begin with you, Mr. Leonard. Thank you for

being here.

STATEMENTS OF J. WILLIAM LEONARD, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES

AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION; CAROL A. HAAVE, DEPUTY

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; STEVEN

AFTERGOOD, FEDERATION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS;

AND WILLIAM P. CROWELL, THE MARKLE FOUNDATION

TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION

AGE

Mr. LEONARD. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kucinich, members of the

panel. I wish to thank you for holding this hearing on security classification and declassification issues. As Director of the Information

Security Oversight Office, I am responsible to the President for

overseeing the governmentwide classification program within both

government and industry.

Executive Order 12958, as amended, sets forth the basic framework by which executive branch agencies classify national security

information. Pursuant to his constitutional authority in this order,

the President authorizes a limited number of individuals to apply

classification to certain national security-related information. While

the order is clear that the employment of classification is based in

large part upon the judgment of an original classifying authority,

in delegating classification authority, the President has established

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clear parameters for its use and certain burdens that must be satisfied.

Classification authority is not without limits. The President has

spelled out some very clear prohibitions with respect to the use of

classification. Specifically, in no case can information be classified

in order to conceal violations of law or prevent embarrassment to

a person, an organization, or an agency. Unfortunately, there have

been instances giving the impression that information has been

classified in violation of the order. In each case I am aware of, I

have found that this often arises due to lack of proactive oversight

within agencies or a lack of effective training and awareness provided to some cleared personnel.

I believe that the overall policy for security classification as set

forth in the current executive order is fundamentally sound. While

I and others, including the 9/11 Commission, have advocated revisions to basic concepts such as the ‘‘need-to-know’’ principle, the

order as currently configured is replete with measures to ensure

the classification system’s continued effectiveness. Many agencies

are excelling at fulfilling these requirements; others are not.

It is no secret that the government classifies too much information. Many senior officials will candidly acknowledge the problem

of excessive classification. This is supported in part by agency

input to my office that indicates that overall classification activity

is up over the past several years.

What I find most troubling, however, is that some individual

agencies have no idea how much information they generate is classified, whether the overall quantity is increasing or decreasing,

what the explanations are for such changes, which elements within

their organization are most responsible for the changes, and most

importantly of all, whether the changes are appropriate.

The identification of baseline information such as this is essential for agencies to be able to ascertain the effectiveness of the classification efforts.

My current concerns extend to the area of declassification as

well. It’s disappointing to note that declassification activity has

been down for the past several years. In some quarters, when it

comes to classification in times of national security challenges,

when available resources are distracted elsewhere, the approach toward classification and declassification can be to err on the side of

caution. Yet the classification system is too important and the consequences resulting from improper implementation too severe to

allow error to be the part of any implementation strategy.

Both too little and too much classification is not an option. Too

much classification unnecessarily impedes effective information

sharing. And inappropriate classification undermines the integrity

of the entire process. Too little classification can subject our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our

interactions with foreign nations to potential harm.

Proactive oversight by agencies of their security classification

program and involvement by senior leadership is crucial.

The security classification system is permissive, not prescriptive.

It identifies what information can be classified, not what information must be classified. The decision to classify information or not

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fication authorities. The problem, however, with all due apologiesto

John Donne, is that no agency is an island.

The exercise of agency prerogative to classify certain information

has ripple effects throughout the entire executive branch, as well

as the Nation as a whole. It can serve as an impediment to sharing

information with another agency or with the public who have a

genuine need to know about the information.

The 9/11 Commission has recommended that information procedures should provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. The administration

is currently developing guidelines and regulations to improve information sharing both among Federal departments and agencies and

between the Federal Government and State and local entities.

On August 2 of this year, President Bush announced that he will

be issuing a directive requiring all relevant agencies to complete

the task of adopting common data bases and procedures so that intelligence and homeland security information can be shared and

searched effectively, consistent with privacy and civil liberties.

I thank you for inviting me here today Mr. Chairman. I will be

happy to answer any questions you and the committee may have.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Leonard.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Haave.

Ms. HAAVE. Good morning, Chairman Shays, Mr. Kucinich, and

members of the panel.

I appreciate the chance to speak with you today about the protection of classified information within the Department of Defense. My

opening statement will be brief, as I believe the time we have here

can best be spent in direct dialog.

Protection of classified information is one of the most important

priorities of the Department. No one wants to provide information

outside of proper channels that would do our servicemen and

women, as well as our civilian coworkers harm. Nor does anyone

want to give away what is our economic and military advantage by

providing information about advanced science and technology,

sources or methods of our operations.

The question becomes, how do we balance the risk of disclosure

and its often incalculable consequences against the public’s desire

to know? The issue before us today is overclassification and whether it is an impediment to information sharing.

I have not found within the Department of Defense that people

are intentionally overclassifying. That’s not to say that it doesn’t

and isn’t happening. More, I have found that these problems stem

from time-driven, operational circumstances and a misunderstanding of classification guidance. In the end, people simply don’t want

to make mistakes that could have both personal and national security consequences.

Does this impact information sharing? Sometimes it does.

We in DOD are working to ensure our policies are clear about

when and how to classify information, as well as ensuring personnel know and understand their responsibilities in sharing with

those who must have the information.

Much data that is transported on DOD networks is protected by

classification guidance provided by other government organizations.

We adhere to that guidance, but we certainly can improve the way

we do it. For example, how do we deal with originator-controlled

documents in an electronic environment?

The 21st century is about information technology. It is about the

seamless availability of information across security domains consistent with the governance strategy that ensures people are properly vetted and trained.

The collectors of information and also, normally, the original

classifiers can never know the myriad ways that their information

might be used for good purpose. Therefore, we have to migrate to

a user-driven environment to support true competitive intelligence,

to ensure the warfighters and policymakers have the information

that they need to make good decisions, and to mutually support

other organizations and agencies in successfully accomplishing

their missions as well.

We must break down the functional stovepipes and institutional

barriers in favor of a more horizontally integrated collaborative enterprise characterized by cooperation and incentivized, shared

goals. We must make better use of all-source analysis to blur the

origin of information and right to release using automated terror

lines.

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‘‘Need to know,’’ while still a valid concept that drives information security, must now also include the need to share information

more broadly at multiple classification levels, as well as in the unclassified public domain.

Technology is not the problem. The technology we need is here

today, or is being developed, and there are any number of initiatives that are moving us collectively in the right direction. Instead,

I would offer that the problem is institutional and cultural, and no

agency or organization is immune. Change is always difficult and

fear of making a mistake precludes people from moving forward in

ways that are consistent with technology and business process improvements.

In the end, this is a discussion about risk. How much risk is the

Nation willing to endure in the quest to balance protection against

the public’s desire to know? It is a complex question that requires

thought and, ultimately, action.

The Department of Defense has been taking that action with respect to information that it alone controls. As stated in my formal

statement, the Department has embraced a network-centric enterprise with common standards and protocols and a robust information assurance and protection schema. But this architecture and

enterprise are not cheap, and when extended to other governments,

as well as State, local and other organizations, the costs are high.

We are working closely with the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, and others to extend the enterprise, to facilitate the collaboration and cooperation that the public

deserves, and we are better for it.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Ms. Haave.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Haave follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Aftergood.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was going to begin by attempting to document for you the state

of the classification system as it is perceived from outside the government. I was going to explain to you that classification policy is

often arbitrary, inconsistent, that classifiers sometimes classify

contrary to their own rules. Sometimes, as in the case of the

Taguba report, they use classification to conceal criminal activity,

and the classification system is, in other ways, unsatisfactory.

I have documented some of those rather serious charges in my

formal testimony. I know from your opening statements that all of

you already are aware of many of these problems.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask how long would it take for you to do that.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. I can do it very quickly.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like it to be part of the public record. So you

have the time to do it. In the course of your presenting those documents, it gives us something to question everybody with.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. OK. I will do that briefly.

Mr. SHAYS. We will start the clock over again.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think the witness ought

to feel very comfortable in going over this material with the committee, and we eagerly await your recitation of your report.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. Thank you very much. I have selected not quite

at random, but a cross-section of cases that have come into my

hands that include several anomalies in classification policy.

The recent Senate intelligence report on prewar intelligence on

Iraq included abundant redactions, that is, removals of information

from the report that in some cases were inconsistent or inexplicable.

On one page attached to my testimony it was stated that Iraqi

agents agreed to pay up to a ‘‘deleted’’ amount for certain aluminum tubes. This is a point of controversy having to do with

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. But on another page of the same

report, CIA reviewers included the very same information: Iraqi

agents agreed to pay up to $17.50.

At a minimum, this is inconsistent. It shows a lack of professionalism in classification; but more than that, I think it shows an

improper attempt to withhold information that has no business

being classified. Obviously, the Iraqis know what they paid. The

vendors know what they paid. They know that we know. There is

nothing sensitive that’s being concealed here, but it held up the release of the report, and it helped turn it into a kind of Swiss

cheese.

A second example is the Taguba report on abuses of prisoners at

Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. As you can see from the title page of

the report, which is also appended to my testimony, the whole report was classified as Secret. That is, the Secret classification level

means that its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

If you look at page 16 of the report, you can see that several individual paragraphs of the report were also classified Secret, such

things as a finding that numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and

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ping and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet and so on.

These individual findings were classified Secret.

That is not only inappropriate, it actually is a violation of the

rules governing the classification system itself. Those rules state in

President Bush’s executive order that in no case shall information

be classified in order to conceal violations of law. Yet it appears

that is exactly what happened here. When agencies violate their

own classification rules, one thing that tells you is that oversight

is inadequate.

A third example that I pulled from my written statement is, to

me, the most extreme example of overclassification, and that has

to do with CIA’s insistence on classifying historical intelligence

budget data. In 1997 and 1998, the CIA declassified, under pressure of litigation, the total intelligence budget for those years, for

1997 and 1998. But in 2000 they said that similar information from

50 years earlier is still properly classified.

To state the obvious, that is a logically incoherent position. There

is no national security construct that permits the declassification of

the 1997 budget, but prohibits the declassification of the 1947

budget.

What that tells me is that the CIA has completely lost its bearings when it comes to classification of budget information, and that

there is no one to stop them from arbitrary and mistaken classification actions.

There are many other examples. The document you entered into

the record, Mr. Chairman, ‘‘Dubious Secrets,’’ from the National Security Archive, is filled with other cases. I imagine that anyone

who has had dealings with the national security system, either as

a government employee or as a concerned citizen, has their own

horror stories to tell. Certainly the public is increasingly becoming

concerned.

I am a member of the steering committee of a new coalition of

politically diverse organizations under the rubric

openthegovernment.org, that has come together to try to remedy

this situation.

I would just like to say one final word about what is in a way

the most important aspect of this hearing. That is, what’s the solution? The solution is not a broad policy critique. I don’t think the

solution is to try to fix the whole system at a single blow. I think

the solution was identified by the 9/11 Commission. That is start

with a very specific, tangible change. Start with declassification of

intelligence budget information. There is no other category of information that has been as vigorously maintained as Secret for so

long with so much energy as intelligence budget information. If we

can fix that, then the road becomes clear to fixing a whole range

of other erroneously or improperly classified categories of information; and that’s the point I wanted to stress.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Aftergood.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aftergood follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Crowell. I want to say it correctly. Is it Crowell?

Mr. CROWELL. It’s Crowell. That’s to avoid getting confused with

a certain admiral that I’m always confused with.

Good morning, Chairman Shays, Mr. Kucinich, and members of

the subcommittee. I would like to thank you for this opportunity

to testify this morning on recommendations that are made by the

Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age.

I think you will find that our observations are in agreement, Mr.

Chairman, with your opening statement of the problem. The

Markle Foundation Task Force is seeking, though, to outline and

propose a new strategy of information sharing that can benefit our

war on terrorism.

Information and information sharing are key to fighting terrorism and enhancing our security. Today, our government still does

not have all of the information it needs to fight terrorism, and the

information it does have is sometimes isolated in different agencies, and therefore it is more difficult to see its significance.

While the discussion about how to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to restructure the intelligence community is

important, another key 9/11 Commission recommendation that is

creating and implementing a trusted information network to facilitate better information sharing among our intelligence and law enforcement organizations at the Federal, State and local levels could

actually make America safer today.

The 9/11 Commission embraced the recommendations for creation of a System-wide Homeland Analysis and Resource Exchange,

the acronym SHARE, network, made last December by the Markle

Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information

Age.

The Markle Foundation Task Force consists of leading national

security experts from four administrations, as well as widely recognized experts on technology and on civil liberties. The SHARE network concept represents a virtual reorganization of government by

fundamentally altering how people in the many organizations ask

to fight terrorism, how they share information to facilitate better

and faster decisionmaking.

Such an approach when paired with strong divide lines that govern the system is also the best way to protect privacy and civil liberties. The SHARE network is aimed at moving us from our current need-to-know system into the need-to-share culture that

you’ve been describing. However, one of the barriers to enabling

that move involves classification and information-security practices.

Decisions about sharing intelligence in the Government today are

still made largely in the context of a system of classification that

was developed during the cold war. During the cold war, the use

of information was dominated by a culture of classification and

tight limitations on access in which information was shared only on

the need-to-know basis.

The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in

advance who needs to know particular information and that the

risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information sharing. The results of the incentives

currently in place to protect information results and far more inforVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:47 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98291.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mation being classified initially and remaining classified than is

necessary or appropriate.

Another problem with the current system is that each agency has

its own classification practices which leads to cultural tensions

when agencies attempt to share information with each other. This

cold war mindset of classification, sanitization and tight limits on

sharing information is ill-suited to today’s homeland security challenge. While certain information, particularly about sources and

methods, must be protected against unauthorized disclosure, the

general mindset should be one that strives for broad sharing of information with all of the relevant players in the network.

The Markle Foundation Task Force approach is to develop new

concepts of operation and to use new technology to achieve a sharing culture. The SHARE network concept is a decentralized, loosely

coupled, secure and trusted network that sends information to and

pulls information from all participants in the system. Such an approach empowers all participants, from local law enforcement officers to senior policymakers.

Our approach combines policy and technical solutions to create

a network that would substantially improve our ability to predict

and prevent terrorist attacks. The SHARE network is based upon

the right to share concept. By taking steps, by creating tear-line reports, it moves us from a system of classification to one that is

based on authorization and encourages reports that contain the

maximum possible amount of shareable information.

In addition, SHARE would use existing technologies that can facilitate the sharing of sensitive information with inappropriate

channels and with protections for privacy. Screening tools can be

used to help the redaction process to create less classified reports

and can also tell us when sensitive information is about to be sent

to parties who lack the proper permission to receive it.

To address the need for information about reliability of a source

without having to rely on classified descriptions, we recommend the

use of reputation meters, similar to those that are used today to

rate sellers in e-bay in formats, and also to use standard formats

for intelligence documents.

Auditing technology could be deployed to track the flow of information to different players and to record how the information is

used, which could help deter leaks. Information-rights management

technologies when combined with digital certificates can also help

by allowing agencies to create self-enforcing rules about who can

have access to particular documents, how they can be used and

how long the documents can be viewed before access expires.

Finally, information can be accompanied by clear, more specific

handling requirements and dissemination limitations.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, information sharing itself is not

the goal. Rather, it is the means by which we can effectively enhance security and protect privacy, by maximizing our ability to

make sense of all of the available information. To accomplish this,

particularly in fighting terrorism, we must shed our current cold

war need-to-know mentality and replace it with a culture based on

need-to-share. Information security is a legitimate concern, but it

can be appropriately addressed in the ways that I’ve outlined

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above. What is needed now is the leadership by both Congress and

the President to get the information flowing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowell follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Crowell.

Let me just make a few observations before Mr. Ruppersberger

begins the questions, and one is that I carry a basic view that

when the executive branch gets more power, it must be accompanied with more legislative oversight. I also take the view that

classification practices impede oversight by Congress for the public.

I have read, in my 17 years in Congress, confidential—in terms

of the rates of classification, confidential documents, secret documents, top secret documents, and then we have compartmentalized

with code-word access and special access and so on, but much what

I’ve read under confidential and secret and, in some cases, top secret, but not obviously as often, it has been information I have

wondered why it has been classified.

In a meeting I had with the chairman of the 9/11 Commission,

Governor Kean said to me his biggest surprise was reading hours

of information, wondering why in the world was this classified.

Just another observation, that yesterday we were talking about

fighting a network called Al Qaeda. We were told we need a human

and a communication network. This was in public diplomacy, and

I’m hearing today, no, we need to break out of our stovepipes and

have a data network. It’s just interesting that the word network

keeps showing up.

Finally, to conclude my observation, we have nearly 4,000 people

classifying information, 14 million documents, but some of those

documents could, literally, have been a book. They could be extensive. So even when I think of 14 million, the document could be

small, you know, just bit of information, or it could just be pages

and pages and pages of information.

So, in the end, I’m interested in is learning what the solution is.

That’s my interest, and we’ll start with Mr. Ruppersberger.

You have 10 minutes. If you need to run over, we can be informal

with this.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Leonard, in your opening statement, you said that

each agency has its own classification criteria, but no agency is an

island. This creates both confusion and inconsistency that impedes

the necessary bounds for national security and transparency in a

democracy.

My question is this, do you believe a National Security Intelligence Director would help to solve part of this problem if that person had the authority both—also budgetary control to implement

the policies that are necessary, some of the recommendations in the

9/11 Commission Report, but especially as it deals with the issue

we’re talking about here today, overclassification, making sure that

what is classified needs to be classified and what is not is not?

Mr. LEONARD. Thank you, Congressman.

One thing I don’t want to do is to presuppose any particular outcomes, but let me address it along these lines.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I’m asking your opinion. I know this is in

debate now. The President has recommended a National Security

Director. The issue of budgetary still is not there. We’re trying to

get information.

Let me say this. The reason I’m asking these questions and we’re

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thing very positive as it relates to our national security and intelligence, and it’s very important that, based on your expertise, we

get your opinion.

Mr. LEONARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know you are not speaking for the administration, but I’m asking, from your expertise, what your opinion

would be as far as a National Security Director, as far as the budgetary issues are concerned, so that person might be able to implement what we’re talking about here today.

Mr. LEONARD. Yes, sir. Let me address that along these lines.

One of the most significant challenges we have, I think, in this

area is that we do have a basic framework for classification, as I

mentioned, but superimposed upon that are multiple variations of

the system which are all designed to achieve the same end. So, for

example, currently, the DCI has his own unique authorities with

respect to protecting sources and methods. The Secretary of Energy

has his own unique authorities with respect to protecting atomic

energy information. The director of NSA has his own unique authorities with respect to protecting communication security information. The Secretary of Defense has his own unique authorities

with respect to protecting NATO-related information, and the list

goes on and on and on and on.

Those variations are, I think, significant impediments to information sharing. When it comes to protecting information, I see it

as a binary state: Either it’s protected or it isn’t protected. And we

have all these variations on the system that have minor nuances

and differences in terms of how we protect information, how we

credit systems, how we mark them and things along those lines.

If a single individual had the authority, had the authority to

overcome the existing statutory and regulatory authority that allows multiple agencies to come up with their own nuances and

variations on the system, yes, I think that would be a good thing.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In your opinion, do you feel that person

would need budgetary control, also, of those agencies?

Mr. LEONARD. Let’s put it this way, Congressman, it’s one thing

to have the authority to write regulations. There always has to be

consequences for noncompliance with regulations. I find budgetary

authority is one of the best means in which to get people’s attention with respect to compliance and noncompliance of the regulations.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I guess you need the power to do what you

need to do, I guess.

Mr. LEONARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Aftergood, there was an intelligence

open hearing, I believe last week or the week before, where they

talked about the intelligence budget, and you addressed that in

your testimony as far as whether or not that needs to be public.

And I think there’s a bipartisan consensus that there is a lot in the

intelligence budget that could be made public, but there also was

a concern that some of that should not be made public, and I think

in your report you seem as if the whole budget.

I would be concerned that, line by line, could be very dangerous

to both our military and to some of our CIA people or NSA people

throughout the world. Could you give me your opinion on whether

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or not you think that the whole budget should be out front and

open or whether or not we should focus on the areas which could

cause some type of problem to our people who are fighting and

working for our national security?

Mr. AFTERGOOD. Yes, sir. I do believe that there are portions of

the intelligence budget that should remain classified. I would be

guided by the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission which said

that the total, the top line number, as well as the individual agency

budget totals should be made public but nothing beyond that. I

think that’s a reasonable middle ground that would provide oversight. It would break the logjam of secrecy in this area, but it

would keep sensitive programs protected.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. I’m going to ask—I don’t know how

long I have. It’s a broad question to the whole panel, but the 9/11

Commission endorsed the creation of a decentralized, technologically advanced, trusted information network to make threat information more widely accessible and to reverse cold war paradigms and cultural biases against information sharing. The Commission noted such a network had been described in a task force

report commissioned by the Markle Foundation, Mr. Crowell, but

the concept has not yet been converted into action.

My question to the whole panel if we have time—and I know it’s

a broad question, but I would like your point of view—what would

you recommend to Congress as to how you would start to implement the changes that need to be done in order to effectuate the

issue that we’re talking about here today, overclassification, needto-know? I mean, there are many issues that need to be classified

in that question. But we have a tremendous amount of volume. We

have a lot of agencies.

Part of the problem in intelligence is just getting this enormous

amount of volume on Internet and all that we get and then analyzing it and then getting it to the right people so they can implement

and use it to protect our national security.

You have to remember now, we’re focused on this. The country

is focused. How would you begin to implement the changes that

need to be made? You want to start with Mr. Crowell and then go

down that way. Thanks.

Mr. CROWELL. Thank you very much. Let me start by saying that

we have just concluded a preliminary session at the Aspen Institute in Colorado in which we were addressing the very issue that

you raised, which is, what are the next steps for implementing a

SHARE concept network? It’s a very difficult problem, and it’s a

long kind of effort because it’s a very large undertaking.

We believe that it begins with legislation that would essentially

outline the kind of network that the Congress would like to see,

based upon some of the principles which I will very briefly describe,

and that the President then put together the cross-agency kind of

implementing process that is necessary, because once you begin

working across agencies, funding and management of large undertakings like this become very, very difficult and very complex.

All of this to be done with a short deadline, so that we can move

this along, using existing technology, not inventing new technologies.

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We think that this concept can be fleshed out. I’d like to just add,

before I mention the characteristics of the network, that the larger

problem in trying to achieve the balance that was described earlier

is to not only have a network which encourages sharing but also

to have the kind of guidelines and policy that encourage sharing;

that we train people in sharing concepts and in classification concepts; and that we have metrics and auditing capabilities so we can

see whether or not they’re following the policy and guidance.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And standards. You need standards.

Mr. CROWELL. Yes, and we need standards. We need compliance

enforcement, both for protecting information that needs to be protected but also for sharing information that will benefit the public,

the public good.

Just one last quick thing, some of the concepts that we believe

are important then are concepts that have flexible access controls,

authentication authorizations, so people trust the system; that they

have a publish-and-subscribe capability in which people can say, I

want to be able to get certain kinds of information to assist me in

doing my mission or to assist me in doing my analysis, and they

will get it; that it be a distributed system in which it’s a system

of systems. You don’t build it centrally and manage it centrally

from some place in the U.S. Federal Government. There’s a longer

list——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I understand. We have other witnesses. I

just want to make sure that we understand that we have done so

much in identifying the problem; let’s get to the implementation.

My yellow light has gone on so the quicker you can go, but I

probably will not be able to ask you any more questions.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. Very quickly, a couple of points. The problem

will never be fixed; it will never be over. It will always require continuing oversight, continuing refinement. Therefore, I would say,

don’t attempt to do too much. Do attempt to get the process started.

The other point I would just like to mention quickly is, when I

hear trusted information network, I get concerned that, when barriers go down between agencies, they’re going up between the Government and the public. So I would say keep in mind the question

of public access. Keep in mind the option of allowing a way for the

public to gain access to information that it needs sometimes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would say this, we always sometimes

have a tendency to overreact, and we still have to keep our eye on

the ball and make sure that information, which can be very dangerous to this country or to the people working for this country,

needs to be classified. And really there is an issue that hasn’t been

discussed, and I think if you can’t trust the people with the information, then they shouldn’t be in that position.

Ms. Haave.

Ms. HAAVE. The first thing that we have to do is to ensure that

people are properly classifying information. What you find is,

where there are seams, there’s friction. So, as you’re trying to create a trusted information network that spans the different Government agencies, local, State, etc., what we need are common standards and protocols.

69

For example, the Department of Defense and CIA have recently

come to agreement on a metadata standard. Metadata is important

so that computers can do for us what takes us a long time to do,

and that is parse information with respect to security classifications in a way that people get the information that they are entitled to and not information that they’re not.

Cross-domain security systems that allow accreditation across

domains, not necessarily making one generic network, but having

separate networks where the cross-domain security, that governance strategy, is already mandated and agreed to by all, will facilitate that movement of information across the network.

There are a number of things that we can do, automated tearlines, etc., and I think we are down the path of looking at doing

all of those things. The DCI runs an Information-Sharing Working

Group. There are number of congressionally directed actions that

we are looking at with respect to that, and we are making progress

toward that.

In the end, however, what it requires is that all of us come together with the common standards and protocols to facilitate that

sharing, and that’s an issue that’s above any one Department.

Mr. LEONARD. Very quickly, sir, the one thing I would recommend being addressed is, as I alluded to before, the issue of

unique agency prerogatives, especially those that are legislatively

based. We currently have what I refer to as a patchwork quilt of

various information protection and sharing regimes, not just in the

classified arena but in the unclassified arena as well. We have literally dozens of unclassified—of protection regimes for controlled,

unclassified information, many of which date back to the cold war,

that we’ve never revisited. And we add to them every year.

We now have controlled critical infrastructure protected information. We have sensitive security information in the transportation

field. We have sensitive homeland security information. All these

are unique regimes that are being created and unique rules that

are being written that will definitely impede when people then try

to fuse all these various types of information in a network environment.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much.

I would first like to speak to the testimony of Mr. Aftergood. In

part three of your testimony, you speak of the classification of the

historical intelligence budget data, and you also get into the discussion, which Mr. Ruppersberger alluded to, about whether or not intelligence budgets ought to be classified.

This is not an arcane question or one that actually can be left

solely to the Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence

Agency. This is a constitutional matter. We take oaths, not to defend the CIA or the Defense Department; we take an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. So to provide an appropriate frame for this discussion, let me cite Article I, Section 9,

Clause 7 of the Constitution, ‘‘No money shall be drawn from the

Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and

a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures

of all public money shall be published from time to time.’’

70

The Constitution of the United States makes it very clear, you

can’t have secret budgets. Our Founders anticipated that the only

way to protect a democracy was to have it be open and that we

know exactly how the taxpayers’ money is being spent.

Now, I alluded at the beginning of this hearing to a book called

The Sorrows of Empire by Chalmers Johnson. Here’s what he says

about this article, about Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution. He says, ‘‘This article is one that empowers Congress and

makes the United States a democracy. It guarantees the people’s

representatives will know what the State apparatus is actually

doing, and it authorizes full disclosure of these activities. It has not

been applied to the Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence Agency since their creation. Instead, there’s been a permanent policy of ‘‘don’t ask don’t tell.’’ The White House has always

kept the intelligence agencies budget secret, and deceptions in the

Defense budget date back to the Manhattan Project of World War

II and the secret decisions to build atomic bombs and use them

against the Japanese.

‘‘In 1997, then Senator Robert Torricelli, a Democrat of New Jersey, proposed an amendment to the 1998 Defense Authorization

Bill requiring that Congress disclose aggregate intelligence expenditures. He lost, but he was able to make the point that the intelligence agencies spend more than the combined gross national

products of North Korea, Libya, Iran and Iraq, and they do so in

the name of the American people, without any advice or supervision from them,’’ from Chalmers Johnson.

Now, I want to go a little bit more into this discussion, Mr.

Aftergood. What about this? I mean, we are talking about something that is key to the survival of our democracy, are we not?

Mr. AFTERGOOD. We are talking about fundamental principles.

It’s easy to look at this, and think, oh, this is a detail, who really

cares anyway. It’s a fundamental principle.

Budget disclosure is one of only two categories of Government information whose publication is required by the Constitution, and as

you correctly say, Government officials don’t take oaths to particular agencies. They take oaths to uphold and defend the Constitution.

In this area, most Government officials have been derelict. I

would add that it’s not simply the White House. It’s not simply the

Bush administration. It’s the Clinton administration. It’s past administrations. It’s the Congress. The last time the matter was

voted on in the Congress in 1997, majorities in both the House and

Senate voted against budget disclosure. I consider it a serious

lapse.

I should say that the Constitution doesn’t say that everything

must be open and must be published right now. It says it must be

published from time to time, and that allows the possibility that

things could remain secret for a period of time. But when the CIA

says that 50-year-old intelligence budgets must remain secret, that

tells me that they are acting in bad faith. When the Justice Department defends the CIA, as they are doing now, in Freedom of

Information Act litigation against having to disclose such historical

information, that tells me they are also acting in bad faith and not

in accord with constitutional values.

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Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you.

I want to move on to Ms. Haave.

Today’s headline, Washington Post, Iraqi Teens Abused At Abu

Ghraib, Report Finds; Officials say inquiry also confirms prisoners

were hidden from aid groups. The article goes on to say among

other things that speaking on the condition of anonymity, because

the report has not been released, other officials at the Pentagon say

the investigation also acknowledges that military intelligence soldiers kept multiple detainees off the recordbooks and hid them

from international humanitarian organizations.

Now, Ms. Haave, there have been several examples given today

of instances where the Department of Defense has acted questionably in classifying information. These include large sections of the

Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on Iraq’sWMD program and

the report of General Taguba on Abu Ghraib prison. Did your office

make the decisions to classify those reports?

Ms. HAAVE. Sir, my office did not make those decisions. Original

classification authorities make those decisions as documents are

being prepared. The review for security declassification is also

made by the original classifying authority.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, this morning’s Post that I just pointed out

to you points that you have several of these new reports on the Abu

Ghraib prison abuse; they’re near completion. This one report by

Major General Fay describes the use of dogs to attack and frighten

detainees, including Iraqi teenagers.

So let me just ask you, for the record, will this report be made

public, unclassified, in whole, and what about the report of the

independent commission led by former Defense Secretary James

Schlesinger that is also pending?

Ms. HAAVE. Sir, I have not seen Mr. Schlesinger’s report, so I

can’t answer that question. With respect to the Taguba report, for

example, I know there were places where information was classified, and there were other places in the report where that same information was not classified. There is a security review being undertaken today that should be done in the next couple of weeks,

and so that security review and its results will be made available

to you.

With respect to the General Fay report, I also have not seen that

report in its entirety. I think large portions of it are unclassified,

but again, I have asked, as a result of the interest in these reports,

that the original classifying authorities go back and review and be

sure that they are classifying properly those portions of the report

that are classified, if they are.

Mr. KUCINICH. Have you ever been involved in keeping things

classified as a way of protecting the administration from any embarrassment?

Ms. HAAVE. Sir, I have not.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, these instances that we just discussed occurred recently in regard to operations in Iraq, Mr. Tierney pointed

out earlier—and he and I have had the opportunity to work together on the issues relating to the testing at the Department of

Defense—how you had results withheld from this committee for 8

months relating to the planned National Missile Program, and the

report and all 50 recommendations it made were then reclassified,

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though the report had been publicly available and disseminated before. Do you have any idea why this was done?

Ms. HAAVE. Sir, I don’t. I only just learned of this instance yesterday when my staff brought it to my attention. What I am willing

to do, however, is to go back and review it, pull the information as

best I can and have a conversation with you about what the results

are after I do an independent assessment. I know that’s not probably satisfying to you.

Mr. KUCINICH. How long have you been involved in this particular assignment that you have?

Ms. HAAVE. In this assignment, as a deputy under, for about 1

year, sir, and then, prior to that, I was a deputy assistant secretary

for security and information.

Mr. KUCINICH. Are you familiar with the challenges which this

committee made to the administration over gaining access and public release of materials with respect to the Missile Defense Program?

Ms. HAAVE. Sir, not always. Typically, what happens——

Mr. KUCINICH. Is that a yes or a no?

Ms. HAAVE. Sometimes, I am. For example, with respect to Abu

Ghraib right now, I am aware of those things.

With respect to missile defense, what happens is that the original classification authority, which in this case is probably the Missile Defense Agency, would handle those. I would not necessarily

be apprised of those.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you have any oversight over them at all? Do

you look at their classification decisions?

Ms. HAAVE. We do have oversight over the Department. Most of

that is conducted at multiple levels, decentrally, and so they have

a responsibility to assure that their people are properly trained.

They have a responsibility to conduct self-inspections and to report.

We often will answer questions for them, and we sometimes go and

visit. I cannot remember the last time that we had a conversation

on this subject with the Missile Defense Agency.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, the question that I think needs to

be asked here is, who has the final word on classification? I mean,

you can chase this thing around a tree forever. Who has the final

word on classification, let’s say, on the Missile Defense Program?

Do you have the final word or don’t you?

Ms. HAAVE. No, sir. The Missile Defense Agency has the final

word, to the best of my knowledge. What we have done inside the

Department, that is a recent change, for example, with respect to

the habeas cases at Guantanamo is that we have convened a group

of people, for example, from Guantanamo, from SouthCOM, from

the office of the Secretary of Defense in order to take on these classification/declassification issues. And where there are impasses,

where people cannot come to agreement, those things will now be

brought forward to me, and I will make the final classification decision. That is new in the Department of Defense.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Haave, I don’t mean to pick on you, but I do want to followup on this line of thought. First of all, I’m grateful for your offer

73

to look at that information and get back to us. I presume you will

do that within a week or two.

Ms. HAAVE. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’ll tell you why, because I think the public needs

confidence that this classification system is not being used for political purposes, that it’s not being used to demonize somebody or to

avoid embarrassment. We have serious issues here, and they are

how we’re going to apportion our resources and whether we’re

going to apportion them fighting the cold war and looking backward with a National Missile Defense System that’s unproven and

untested, or whether we’re going to acquire resources for the most

immediate threat according to our own intelligence agencies and almost every other independent body that has looked at what our

needs are at this point in time.

You heard my rendition of how we press this matter, and I want

you to know that Mr. Waxman, who is the ranking member of the

full Committee on Government Reform, and I sent a letter as far

back as March 25th of this year, March 25th to Secretary Rumsfeld

objecting to his reclassification of already public information, as

well as his classification of a report based on that.

And essentially, we found that this is important information.

What he is doing is preventing a public debate on this. We can always debate whether that’s a system that’s necessary or not, but

we do need a debate on whether or not it should be going to the

field unproven or untested and how much money we are going to

spend or how we’re going to spend $10 billion. And that’s something that the American people need confidence that those decisions are being made.

He has not responded yet. So you should know, we can give you

a copy of that letter, but since March 25th, they haven’t had any

hesitation in going forward and saying that they’re going to deploy

this system and making a big political hullabaloo about it for those

that they’re interested in satisfying, but they haven’t found time to

respond to, I think, very legitimate instances.

Let me share with you one other aspect you may want to investigate when you look at this. Theodore Postol is a Professor of

Science and Technology and National Security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. At one point in time, he wrote a letter

to the White House that described how the Missile Defense Agency

had doctored results of the National Missile Defense test to hide

the fact that they could not tell the difference between simple decoys and warheads. He described how the Agency had altered its

entire test program to hide that flaw.

Subsequently, two General Accounting Office reports issued in

March 2002 verified the facts that he had written about to the

White House.

The way the Agency responded to that was by claiming that it

was classified. What it did beyond that was it then sent three

agents to deliver a letter to Mr. Postol that was classified as secret.

The letter contained nothing more than publicly available information deemed classified by the Government, in his words, so that the

Agency could claim that he would be violating security agreements

if he continued to speak on the matter of national security. That’s

pretty extraordinary.

74

That’s going to a pretty extreme length, and that’s just not a

matter of oversight for somebody making a bad decision about that.

That’s a conscious decision to try and muzzle somebody who had

very specific and worthwhile information for the public to know

and for us to make determinations on how we’re going to allocate

our resources.

So I hope you will also look into that matter. We can send you

some information on that. Will you do that?

Ms. HAAVE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. That should make every American concerned about just how these decisions are being made.

So with that in mind, and I note, Mr. Aftergood, you had a very

nice thought in your report that congressional oversight is necessary and important, but you say it need not be arduous or an

elaborate undertaking; it can be as simple as posing a question to

the Pentagon. That’s not so. We have been posing this question for

years and getting stonewalled on it.

So I think what we might discuss here is beyond—now, that’s the

way Government should work and that’s the way we’d like this administration to work. They clearly are not working that way, given

the lengths to which they go to get Mr. Postol quieted and the fact

that we haven’t had an answer from March 25th. It took us to 2000

to get this information first to the public domain and then reclassified.

What’s a better way for congressional oversight—and that’s the

question I pose to each of the members of the panel—after we have

the challenge or the classification determination made within the

administration by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals

Panel, ISCAP, which is nothing more than executive officers looking it over, although they have had a pretty good record of ordering

some declassification that’s not a 100 percent when they don’t

agree with the public, when the public raises a question about reclassification, and as to declassification, where do they go? What

should be Congress’ role? How do we get some decent oversight

that sticks to what we are trying to do here and not go beyond

that?

Mr. Leonard, I’ll start with you and maybe go left to right.

Mr. LEONARD. If I understand your question correctly, sir, is,

where would the public go after, for example——

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, when Members of Congress who says we’d

like have this declassified, the executive says no, then you have

Mr. Aftergood’s recommendations, have a nice letter saying, please

reconsider and let us know what your thoughts are, and they basically send you off into ether space somewhere.

Mr. LEONARD. Basically, pursuant to the order right now, you’ve

identified one of the two primary routes individuals have. One is

to go through the courts, through the Freedom of Information Act

process.

Mr. TIERNEY. What’s the record been on that? Is anybody familiar with any court——

Mr. LEONARD. My understanding is that almost without exception the courts will always defer to the executive branch.

Mr. TIERNEY. Exactly.

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Mr. LEONARD. And the other process that you alluded to, that’s

provided for in the Executive order, is to go to this administrative

appeals process, to this interagency group which does have at least

somewhat of a more favorable record with respect to releasing the

information.

My experience has been that, when a group of agency representatives get together rather than just the owner of the information,

you get a less parochial view of the situation, a more holistic assessment, and I believe, off the top of my head, the historical

record is that, approaching 60-some odd percent of the time, the

panel will override an agency’s determination in whole or in part.

Mr. TIERNEY. I appreciate that account.

Now, we get to the point where, in instances, the decision back

to thepetition, whether it be a Member of Congress or a member

of the public in general, is unsatisfactory, Congress should have a

role to play here. That’s our oversight responsibility. We’ve had

hearings here. We get stonewalled left and right. So what you’re

saying, our only response is to subpoena and beat it out of them,

and in that sense of the word, ought there to be some statutory

change? What’s your opinion where we should go from here?

Mr. LEONARD. The challenge there is that, by and large, the exercise of classification authority has primarily been pursuant to the

President’s constitutional Article II authorities, and that, of course,

would complicate any sort of legislative remedy with respect to ultimate decisions along those lines.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you’re saying, nowhere, we’re stuck?

Mr. LEONARD. I do believe that there can be more responsive

means by which to resolve disputes. I believe the ISCAP process

can be enhanced. I believe——

Mr. TIERNEY. How would you do that?

Mr. LEONARD. One of my concerns is the ISCAP process right

now is primarily—and I’m not trying to be disparaging here—but

is primarily a hobby horse for historical researchers. And again,

that’s important that they get that kind of information, but I believe that process can be used for more relevant, more timely information as well, and I believe it can be stepped up, possibly with

some sort of specific time limitations for action and with consequences if action is not taken; for example, absent of a decision,

such and such would occur. Those types of remedies at least provide for a responsiveness and provide for some consequences if attention and resources are not devoted to that topic.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Haave, since that’s in a Presidential Executive

order, would you recommend to the President that he take that

kind of action and step it up, as Mr. Leonard says, or what would

be your remedy for Congress and the American public?

Ms. HAAVE. I think there are a number of things that we can do

that are different from how we’ve been doing this in the past. The

first step I just described, within the Department of Defense, for

this limited classification review for these reports, but that’s not to

say that we shouldn’t put in place a process whereby that information comes to me or comes to whoever sits in my position or in a

different position as decided by the Secretary and is an adjudicator

within the Department. That may, in fact, facilitate and speed

some of the questions and answers that you appear to want.

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I think the ISCAP could, in fact, be expanded a bit beyond its

typical historical base to do those kinds of adjudication when the

Congress is feeling that it’s not getting the information that it

needs.

On that committee sit representatives from each of the agencies.

We review the information that’s in question. We research it, and

we make our decisions. And that could, in fact, for your information, be provided to you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is my understanding correct that right now ISCAP

does not do that? For instance, if the Secretary ever decided to respond to our March 25, 2004, letter, and we wanted to appeal that

to ISCAP, we’d be thrown in the pile and maybe never reached at

all.

Ms. HAAVE. Mr. Leonard could probably answer this. I don’t

know that the Congress has ever come to ISCAP and asked for

that.

Mr. LEONARD. There’s no reason why that could not be processed

according to those procedures.

Mr. TIERNEY. With respect, of course, that then those executives,

which would include the Department of Defense Secretary, would

then want to respond from that body where they haven’t responded

individually.

Mr. LEONARD. That’s correct.

If I could make one further point, Mr. Congressman, that I neglected to make. There is currently on the statutory books since

2001 a Public Interest Declassification Board. This is an outgrowth

of Senator Moynihan’s Secrecy Commission. It was his legacy. It

does exist on the books, as I say.

The administration has taken action to look to appointing some

members, but quite frankly, there has been no action from the legislative branch that I’m aware of to appoint their members. And

this is an existing forum that does exist that will allow for some

of these issues that you addressed to be worked out in such manner.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Aftergood.

I’m taking license here, Mr. Chairman, for the last two of these.

Thank you.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. There’s a pending proposal that’s been introduced in the House and the Senate. In the House, it’s H.R. 4855,

to create an independent National Security Classification Board,

which I believe is intended to serve as a forum to mediate these

kinds of disputes. In several ways, it really replicates the Public Interest Declassification Board that Mr. Leonard mentioned, but it’s

something that’s maybe worth considering.

To answer your question directly, what to do, I think look at

what works and strengthen it. ISCAP works on a small scale. It

has led to the declassification of all or part of the majority of disputed cases it has worked on.

ISOO, Mr. Leonard’s organization, if he will forgive me, works.

A couple of months ago, I faxed him, Mr. Leonard, a letter pointing

out the Taguba report seemed to be improperly classified. He responded to me the very same day, initiating an investigation and

carrying on some work he already had underway. I thought it was

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an extraordinary response from a Government agency. Nobody responds like that.

But ISOO is a tiny organization, particularly when it’s compared

to the vast expanse of the Government classification system.

But look at what works and strengthen it. I would even say that

your questions that have been stonewalled are not without effect.

I don’t think Ted Postol would say that you have accomplished

nothing. I would think he would say you have accomplished a great

deal by standing up for his interests over a period of years.

Regular hearings are very important. I think, perhaps when Mr.

Leonard’s organization puts out his annual review of the classification system, it might be an opportune time to hold regular oversight hearings on what’s going on in the classification system,

what’s going right, what’s going wrong.

Harness the courts. The scope of judicial review has shrunken

over the years to the point that courts now routinely defer to executive branch agencies. They say, if you say it’s classified, that’s all

we need to know, we’re not going to look further. That is not what

Congress intended when it enacted the Freedom of Information

Act. I think if there is the political will, it would be very desirable

if Congress could say our intention is that the courts do real review

of classification decisions. That doesn’t mean overturn them all the

time. It means look at them and see if they make sense. Do not

defer. Exercise your judicial function. If that can be accomplished,

then a great deal will have been done.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Crowell.

Mr. CROWELL. Mr. Tierney, I think, in fairness to the Markle

Foundation, I should say that they have not studied this issue, and

I cannot represent them on it, but I do have personal views.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, let me hear your personal views.

Mr. CROWELL. First of all, I participated in the Commission on

Secrecy that Senator Moynihan conducted, and as a result of some

of that participation, I have seen large numbers of Government

documents released and declassified.

My personal belief is that we have to start with the policies that

currently exist and the guidelines that currently exist at the department and agency levels, and we have to refine them and redefine them in some ways in which we emphasize what needs to be

released to the public and what must be shared with other agencies

in order to conduct the fight on terrorism, as opposed to the current

mechanism which is owing it toward what must be protected.

Second, guidelines that are completely inconsistent with those

policies should be developed in each agency. Each agency has a

unique problem that they have to deal with in terms of substance

and so on, but they should be refined even further to—and issued

in each agency and then reviewed by those departments to make

sure they are consistent with the policies of release and of sharing.

Third, there should be metrics and audits that are conducted, as

many of them as possible conducted in automated means, which

means that you actually look at trends that were discussed here by

the committee, and each agency expected to review those audits

and those trends and make reports.

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Finally, there should be a compliance mechanism which says,

here are the consequences of not following these policies.

And I said finally, but I think the final thing is that there should

be reports to Congress which essentially say how the policies and

guidelines are being followed and how consistent the practices and

conformance is across the entire Government. I think that’s at least

a fair way in which we can approach the problem.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s very helpful.

I thank all of you for your testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

I want to just first start out by saying, I have this impression

that the President’s in charge, and then it degenerates into 4,000

people who then make the decision. I used the word degenerate,

but I mean, in other words, it goes down to 4,000 people. Is that

a right impression or a wrong impression?

Mr. LEONARD. The one thing I would modify that with, Mr.

Chairman, is the critical role that agency heads play. The President, in his executive order, directs agency heads to take personal

involvement to ensure the commitment of senior management.

Mr. SHAYS. So how many people do we think it would be? In

other words, if the President wanted to delegate to one person and

say we need to change this and I want to get everybody together,

you’re not going to get 4,000 people together. How many people

would the President need to get together with?

Mr. LEONARD. You would need to get together those agency

heads with original classification authority, as well as especially

those agencies with other unique statutory or regulatory authorities in this related area. You’re talking dozens. I can’t give you an

exact count, but it is——

Mr. SHAYS. It would be just dozens?

Mr. LEONARD. I’m sorry, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. It would just be dozens? It would be under 100?

Mr. LEONARD. Yes, sir. I firmly believe that those 4,000 original

classifiers can respond very effectively to the leadership of their individual agencies. That’s where the tone is set. That’s where, that’s

where——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say, where I think the tone is set is at the

very top, and I have this general view that most Presidents, but

particularly this administration, believe that the less known, the

better. I happen to believe the more known, the better. I think they

draw on experiences of past Presidents, Iran Contra, you go

through this list of it, and there’s this general view that I hold that

you don’t talk, you don’t tell, you don’t discuss, you don’t disclose.

That’s a view I hold as a Republican about, frankly, a Republican

administration.

At any rate, the tone is set to the agency heads, and you believe

that, ultimately, agency heads set the tone for the various people,

the 4,000 people that work under them.

Mr. LEONARD. Absolutely, sir. Secrecy is an important tool, especially in time of war, but it is a tool that comes at a price.

There’s a consequence to secrecy, and my frustration is that I do

not believe that this Government, through its agencies, consistently

approaches the issue of to classify or not as a deliberate process,

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as an informed process; that secrecy in some quarters is almost a

fundamental first response.

Secrecy can be a fundamental issue, and it should be. It’s a fundamental tool, but it should never be an automatic first response,

because there are consequences to it, and that’s what we have to

instill, from my perspective, a more informed and more deliberate

process in terms of to classify or to not.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me get into that in a second, but Ms. Haave, do

you disagree with the general view that it’s the President down to

agency heads and then 4,000 people?

Ms. HAAVE. Clearly, there’s a framework that we work to that is

executed by the agency heads through the Department. I will say

that, with respect to a number of the reports that are coming out

now and because of the interest in them, that the timeframe by

which we would do these security reviews normally has been shortened, and in fact, the Department has had actually a good history

of declassifying large amounts of information. In fact, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy has initiated a tiger team, if you

will, to look at documents pertaining to pre-Iraq and Afghanistan,

as to whether or not they can now, in fact, be declassified.

So I think there is no doubt that, at the top, the tone is set, and

I think that is executed through the Department. We have somewhere on the order of 2 million cleared personnel. That’s equivalent, roughly, I think, to the population——

Mr. SHAYS. What’s that mean?

Ms. HAAVE. People who have clearances, confidential, secret, top

secret. That’s roughly equivalent, I think, to the population of the

State of Rhode Island. So it’s not an inconsequential effort that we

go through, the way that the Department does it, that it’s decentralized.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t know what that says to me. You’re saying, 2

million people can look at classified documents. How does that relate to the issue of overclassification?

Ms. HAAVE. What it says is that how we conduct our training,

how we conduct our oversight, we probably are the largest organization that has classified information.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand, but I don’t gain any comfort from that

or not because, once something is classified, I don’t have the right

to talk about it.

Ms. HAAVE. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t have the right to talk about it. I have oversight of the Department. I can’t talk about it, and I have 17 years

now of experience and some huge disagreements with your Department, and, I mean, my own Government’s Department of Defense.

I’m grateful for what the Department of Defense does. But I can

go back to 1991 where I had an Inspector General who said they

classified a study. Our study was that we had determined that 40

percent of the masks were basically leaking. These are the chemical masks, and nobody’s doing anything about it, and it’s classified.

So they came to me. I went to Senator Riegle at the time, who also

knew about this, to say, what do we do about this? And there was

this play on two different parts. One is we didn’t want to disclose.

First off, the Army disagreed that they were vulnerable and that

they leaked. So we debated for 6 years on whether the Inspector

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General’s report was accurate, which for the most part was, and we

had this issue of, well, do we declare that we’re vulnerable. But

then I had this knowledge that the men and women who were putting these things on were putting on masks that didn’t basically

work. They didn’t know it.

Now, the Department was saying, well, it’s still a debate. It

didn’t seem to me we should have debated for 6 years whether this

Inspector General’s report was valid, and yet we finally outed this

report when we started to talk about Gulf war illnesses because it

happened to relate to it, and then it was made public by the Department of Defense. They put it on the Internet, and then they

took it off.

I mean, that’s just one experience that I’ve had, and frankly, I

just, for the life of me, don’t know how to have dealt with it. I

couldn’t disclose it, and yet I knew about it.

I’d like to know—Mr. Aftergood first, why don’t you just start—

is this a President to executive heads to potentially 4,000 people?

Mr. AFTERGOOD. My perception is that it’s the agency head level

that is the most important, perhaps even more important in some

ways than the President. If you look back over the past decade,

what you see is that openness and transparency flourish where the

agency head cares about the subject and wants it to happen. They

care about it, it happens. If they are indifferent, it doesn’t happen.

In the Clinton administration, we had former Energy Secretary

Hazel O’Leary who, in fact, got way out in front of her own administration with an openness initiative. Some people said she declassified to a fault. I don’t necessarily agree with that, but the point

is, she cared about the issue. She made it a priority. It happened,

even over the resistance of her own agency.

In the first Bush administration, DCI Robert Gates had his own

modest openness initiative in the intelligence community. It’s the

agency heads who really make stuff happen.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t want us to be naive. I don’t want us to be foolish, but I just really believe when I look at the documents that I’ve

seen, my number comes closer to the 90 percent overclassified than

the 10 percent because I would tell you, page after page, slide after

slide, I would look at the Army folks, the Marines, the Air Force,

the Navy folks who would give these briefings, whether in Iraq or

anywhere else, and I’m saying, is this classified? And it would

have, you know, some classification, and I would be dumbfounded

as to why. Collectively, when I start to think about it, I can hardly

think of a few things that I felt were classifiable material.

Let me ask you, Mr. Crowell, your view of the President, the

agency heads and then the 4,000. Is that the way you view it?

Mr. CROWELL. Again, this is a personal answer and not

reflective——

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, it’s an answer based on the fact that I read your

bio.

Mr. CROWELL. I have gotten the experience.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, you have a hell of a lot of experience, and that’s

not secret.

Mr. CROWELL. I would agree, first of all, that the overall tone is

set in policies that come from the Presidents to Departments, but

I would also agree with the members of the panel that the agency

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heads really set the tone for what happens on the day-to-day basis,

on whether or not people are properly trained, properly oriented

and whether or not there are any consequences whatsoever for

classifying something improperly.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this. Let me ask this one other question,

then go to Mr. Tierney.

You get the quote for the day, Mr. Leonard. You said, for example, ‘‘it is no secret that the Government classifies too much information.’’

What is a secret to me is whether it’s 10 percent or 90 percent.

I’m going to ask each of you to give me your best estimate of

whether you think we classify, overclassify too much to the level

of 10 percent or closer to the level of 90 percent. I’m going to give

you an opportunity to answer last. You had the quote of the day.

Mr. Crowell, I want you to give me the answer. What is the secret to me is whether it’s 10 percent or closer to 90 percent.

Mr. CROWELL. In all fairness, Mr. Chairman, I have to put some

context around the question. I realize you framed it carefully. I’d

like to frame the answer carefully.

I believe, with regard to advanced technologies and weapons systems and so on, it would be more favorable to proper classification

initially, but it would remain classified for a longer period of time

than most people might consider appropriate when you look at the

pace of technology today.

Mr. SHAYS. So, on the technology side, you would be closer that

we overclassify over 10 percent or less, but over time, it’s still classified, and then you could maybe make the argument that it is closer to the 90 percent over time?

Mr. CROWELL. That’s correct, sir. With regard to sources and

methods in the intelligence field, I would have the same general,

although I’d make it an 80/20 cut.

Mr. SHAYS. At the end?

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. It would be 80 percent properly classified to

protect a source or a method in the beginning, and then over time

that source and method goes away and it doesn’t get declassified.

Mr. SHAYS. And it should be, in your judgment.

Mr. CROWELL. With regard to information——

Mr. SHAYS. It should be—over time be declassified.

Mr. CROWELL. Yes. With regard to information, that is the essence of conclusions either of analysis or whatever, I think it tends

to be overclassified quite heavily because people fear that sources

or methods will be revealed when, in fact, if they did their own

careful analysis, they would find that a lot of information, just set

as information without saying where it came from and who produced it, would be unclassified.

Mr. SHAYS. You know what, this is a longer answer than what

I am expecting.

You want to jump in?

But they’re good answers. It’s not a reflection on you, these are

excellent helpful responses. Mr. Aftergood.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. My personal access to classified information is

very limited and entirely unauthorized. I don’t feel qualified to answer that in any detail. I would say that your question is prediVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:47 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98291.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cated on a correct assumption that classification decisions are subjective.

Mr. SHAYS. Could I ask you a question? Based on your answer,

are you saying you’re like Woodward, you just basically get all this

information but——

Mr. AFTERGOOD. That’s not the way I would put it, but I would

say sometimes I stumble on stuff, sometimes people send me stuff.

That’s just the way it is. Classification is a subjective matter. You

know, I might have my opinion, others will have their opinion.

What do you do about it? I think if there are 4,000 people in the

executive branch who are out there classifying information, maybe

we need, if not 4,000, then at least dozens of individuals or entities

distributed throughout the executive branch whose job it is to oversee and to look for overclassification, many ISOOs planted throughout the executive branch that function like antibodies to counter inappropriate classification. Just as classification authority is widely

distributed, maybe we need to find a way to widely distribute declassification authority, people whose only job is to look for overclassification.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. You’re getting to me like Alan Greenspan, you’re

talking in tongues a little bit for me. My original question was the

10 percent/90 percent.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. And my original answer was I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. But you used that as a wonderful opportunity. I

didn’t catch on right away.

Ms. Haave.

Ms. HAAVE. I agree with that. I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. No, you do know. You do know more than most.

Ms. HAAVE. I do believe that we overclassify information. I do believe that it is extensive not for the purpose of wanting to hide anything, but I will tell you that with respect to military operations,

people have a tendency to err on the side of caution and so therefore may in fact classify things, and at the time they could, in fact,

be classified. Military operational data tends to be perishable. So

after the operation much of that can be declassified.

There are clearly things that will continue to take place in an

operational environment that we do not want to release. And those

are—you know, have to do with sources and methods and——

Mr. SHAYS. So you’re basically saying it’s greater than 10 percent, but you’re not suggesting how much greater.

Ms. HAAVE. How about if I say 50/50?

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That’s significant. Someone in your experience

would say we tend to do it 50/50. I think that’s quite significant.

Thank you.

Mr. Leonard.

Mr. LEONARD. Two approaches. One is information that shouldn’t

be classified in the first place is ineligible to be classified. That’s

a number that, quite frankly, from my perspective over the past

year, is disturbingly increasing, where information is being classified that is clear, blatant violation of the order.

Other than that, as Mr. Aftergood pointed out and as I pointed

out in my testimony, this is an act of discretion. It is an application

of judgment by an original classifier. To give some empirical basis

to my answer, I serve as the executive secretary for the appeals

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panel. And at least in that environment, in those instances where

the panel still votes to uphold the classification, based upon my

over 30 years of security and counterintelligence background, my

personal opinion, my personal judgment, is even that is overclassified. And so from that point of view, I would put it almost even beyond 50/50 in terms of when it comes to applying judgment, there’s

over 50 percent of the information that, while it may meet the criteria for classification, really should not be classified in terms of

what we lose. The price we pay for classification outweighs any

perception, any advantage we perceive we gain.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. Haave, when a document comes from the Department of Defense and is marked on it ‘‘For Official Use Only,’’ who creates that

designation and what exactly does it mean?

Ms. HAAVE. ‘‘for Official Use Only’’ is not a classification level.

It’s an exemption, if you will, from public release for certain types

of information that may have to do with privacy, it may have to

do with proprietary information, it may have to do with law enforcement information. There are categories of information. ‘‘for Official Use Only’’ does not mean, however, that is releaseable to the

public.

Mr. TIERNEY. So let’s take an example of the situation where a

director of operations, in testing an evaluation, issues a report that

he is required by statute to make, comes before the Government

Reform Committee and testifies orally as to the content of that report in significant detail without objection from the Department of

Defense. There are charts, there is written testimony, it’s on C–

SPAN, it’s recorded and replayed on C-span. That information is

put on Web sites, remains on Web sites for an extraordinary

amount of time. Groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists and

other outside experts review the information and put opinions out

with respect to it.

And then months later, in answer to a request of this committee

that the report be issued out, all those things being in the public

domain for almost a year, the committee gets a document saying

‘‘For Official Use Only.’’ How does that fit in with the classification

or with the description that you just gave me? What category does

that fall under?

Ms. HAAVE. Without knowing the substance of the report, sir, it’s

hard for me to—and I won’t look at the substance of the report.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I can tell you the substance of the report was

public for almost a year, but it was publicly stated it is a statutory

report.

Mr. SHAYS. Will the gentleman suspend? Let me tell you this is

the challenge that we face as a subcommittee. Part of our responsibility is to—in the context of a public hearing—is to disclose what

we’ve learned. When we get documents ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ we

don’t know if that’s classified or not classified. Frankly, the way I

treat it is you would prefer whoever sends it that it not be publicized, but we have every right to publicize it. That’s kind of the

way I interpret it.

Mr. TIERNEY. With all due respect, it goes beyond that for me,

as you know. It’s to the point of ludicrous. When you put it out

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there in the public domain for that, the Department does not object

to its—nobody came in and said this individual shouldn’t testify.

It’s a statutory report. Then to try and put some sort of designation, which admittedly is not a classification, smacks to me of just

an attempt to put this on and hope they don’t put it out, because

we’d like to keep it secret, and then some years later when that

information is used for the foundation for a very critical report on

something that a group of people want to politically do, it’s classified retroactively. That’s the challenge.

I don’t expect you to answer this now. I don’t want to be unfair

to you or anything like that. But that’s the challenge I want you

to take back with you on that. Because that is an insult to the

American people, to the public, to this institution of Congress

which continually struggles with the way in which it’s going to do

its oversight. If I have to be critical of all the things with this particular Congress, the last of this 108th, 107th, it’s an absolute abdication of our responsibility for oversight. A lot of it is not the fault

of Congress but the fault of a totally uncooperative administration

that will not be forthcoming and will not cooperate and will not

work with Congress to allow it to do its job and feels that the executive—the prerogative surpasses any responsibility to Congress

and doesn’t allow or want Congress to do its constitutional functions.

I think we’ve got to redraw that balance. Congress has to have

the ability to have oversight. It should be strong oversight if we’re

going to have a successful government here, particularly in view of

the 9/11 Commission Report.

If we have, as we do have, the challenge of homeland security

and protecting these people or whatever, and if we want to give

more authority to a national intelligence director and to a center

on counterterrorism, then we had better have an equally aggressive

congressional oversight, or it’s going to lead to an executive that is

out of control, taking this country in a direction we may not want

to go. So it has to be corresponding—for to us do the job we need

to do against terror, we have to have that national intelligence director, I believe, and a counterterrorism center. But that only

works if, correspondingly, we have a strong congressional oversight

authority that goes in line with what our constitutional responsibilities are, and that means getting this issue of classification under

control and not having that kind of a situation where you get ‘‘For

Official Use Only’’ nonsense sent up here after it has been in the

public domain, and then a reclassification just because a report is

critical and doesn’t let you go off in some ideological path here to

try to satisfy one element of your supporters on that.

So I thank you. I won’t ask you for an answer on that because

it really was more rhetorical than anything. But please do get us

your review of that. Let us know. We do need to get the bottom

of that particular issue.

Thank you, each and every one of the witnesses, for the valuable

contributions you have made here today.

Mr. SHAYS. I agree with the gentleman. You have been a wonderful panel and very helpful.

I am going to ask another question that I am wrestling with. I

don’t expect necessarily I’m going to get definitive answers. But in

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my capacity of chairman of the National Security Subcommittee,

we oversee Defense, State Department, and the Department of

Homeland Security, for programs, waste, abuse, fraud, how well

are they running the program and how well they are not. So we

have a keen interest in the notification system. The country has

been at yellow, which is elevated alert. Everybody thinks we’ve just

been at general alert, because that’s the way we feel. But we’re at

elevated. When we kick into orange, which is high alert, that’s

quite significant.

We kicked into high alert last December, and we kicked into high

alert because we were basically told planes might be hijacked from

Europe to the United States and a concern that at a high-profile

event a dirty weapon might be used. Now, there was more detail

to that. The public had a general basis to understand it was something like that.

So when people called and asked should their kids fly to Europe

during Christmas when they heard we went to orange, I said well,

I wouldn’t have my daughter fly to Europe because she’d have to

fly back. The flying back was the concern.

When I had groups say, well, if we went to an event like New

Year’s Eve in New York, would it make sense to bring my kids?

I said, well, I sure as heck wouldn’t bring my child. In fact, I would

think twice before going because it is at a potential target.

Now, in the process of having Admiral Loy come before us, the

Deputy of Department of Homeland Security, I asked him what

was the threat? He said to me, I can’t disclose this in an open

forum, and I am thinking to myself, let me get this straight: The

terrorists know that they’re going to hijack a plane and the terrorists know they want to do the following, and the government

knows, but the public doesn’t know that may go to those venues.

I just find that absurd to the point of wondering how could he

have said no. He did say no. He said no more than once when I

requested it. Walk me through his best argument as to why he

would say that. It may be a very good one, and you can wipe the

smile off my face, but tell me the best argument that you would

know for not disclosing this information when the terrorists knew

and the committee knew and certain privileged people knew.

By the way, I want to say this to you. Every staff person and

every Member who got that briefing told me they wouldn’t fly to

Europe and they wouldn’t go to a venue like New Year’s Eve in

New York. So they knew. The public didn’t know, and so tell me

the best argument here.

Mr. LEONARD. Without knowing the specifics myself, sir, the best

argument that I could articulate is concern possibly that what we

knew, how we knew it, the specificity that we knew it, and whatever might reveal sensitive sources and methods that was used to

collect that information.

At the same time, though, I would like to make one very important point. As you know, the President amended Executive Order

12958 just last year. One of the things we specifically included in

that order was that when it comes to homeland security, when it

comes to imminent threat to life or to property with respect to

homeland security, and there is classified information that individVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:47 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\98291.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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uals need to have, the absence of a security clearance shall not

serve as an impediment to the sharing of that information.

Mr. SHAYS. So, for instance, if the chief of police of New York

needed this information, he could get it.

Mr. LEONARD. Exactly. Just a couple of months ago I had a rather senior official come up to me and say—this was post-Madrid

bombing—he said, I was in this environment, I had some senior

private sector individuals there, I was telling them what they needed to do post-Madrid, they wanted specifics; I felt compelled that

I had to give them specifics, so I disclosed classified information to

them.

The reason he was bringing it up to me, he turned to me, he

said, Leonard, am I going to have problems with my polygraph the

next time I take one? I was able to assure him absolutely not, because that is exactly what that revision of that policy was intended

to address, those types of situations.

The challenge now for agencies—and not all agencies are there—

is to implement this provision within their own implementation

regulations so as to empower their rank and file to be able to have

that same confidence. He did it not because he knew about the policy, he did it because he had the rank that gave him the confidence. But we need to empower people. That was the intent behind that policy revision. It was very important, and we need to

move out on implementing it.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for sharing that. Is there any question we

should have asked any of you that you might have prepared that

for, that you think needs to be part of the record? Frankly, sometimes that question elicits some of the most important information

we get from a hearing. Is there anything that we need to put on

the record, anything you feel guilty about that wasn’t.

Mr. AFTERGOOD. I might add one quick thing. This whole subject

has been investigated by a congressional commission led by Senator Moynihan, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. They took a year or more, couple of million dollars, produced an excellent report, a whole series of recommendations. It essentially went nowhere.

I think one of the lessons of that is that one should not be overly

ambitious in trying to fix this whole problem at a single blow. And

that’s why I think it is of particular importance that the 9/11 Commission recommendation to start with intelligence budget declassification is such an astute one, because it is a finite, specific,

achievable goal that will have positive consequences throughout

the system.

Mr. LEONARD. If I could reiterate one point, Mr. Chairman—I alluded to it before—but speaking of Senator Moynihan again, there

is his legacy, the Public Interest Declassification Board. That is legislation that was passed several years ago. It’s on the books. It’s

never come to fruition. I personally would urge you, to the extent

you can, to confer with leadership in the legislative branch to see

if there’s a way to move forward with that. It’s not a silver bullet,

it’s not a solution, but it is a tool that’s out there right now that

provides for legislative executive branch interaction on this issue.

And I know from my understanding, I believe the executive branch

is ready to make some nominations to serve on that board.

87

Mr. SHAYS. That’s interesting as well. Thank you.

Ms. HAAVE. I also would like to say that I think the discussion

really needs to be about risk and how much risk we’re willing to

take. For example, if another organization has information that is

relative to the Department of Defense and the protection of lives,

and we would like to have that information released to protect our

forces, is it that one person could be saved, 10 people could be

saved, 100 people, 1,000, 10,000? At what point does that risk decision come into play and how do we make that risk decision in the

best interest of the Nation?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. OK. Thank you. Mr. Crowell, did you have any?

Mr. CROWELL. I would just like to underscore some of the things

that were said earlier about the contributions of Senator Moynihan

and his Commission on Secrecy, but also about the book he wrote

afterward which was called ‘‘Secrets,’’ which is a remarkable study

of the history and the impact of decisions that have been made by

people throughout history, both positively and negatively on the

country and our well-being.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. I also want to thank Mr.

Leonard, Ms. Haave, as government officials to be able to have you

sit on the same panel with nongovernment officials, it helps us do

our job better. I appreciate you not making that an issue. This was

really a very interesting panel. I learned a lot. We got our work cut

out for us but I think it’s important work. I thank you all for the

work you all do. Thank you.

With that, this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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