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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case No. 20-cv-21984-DPG

AARON SILBERMAN, an individual, and )

AMJ MISIL AB LLC, a Florida limited liability ) 

company, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

 vs. ) 

PREMIER BEAUTY AND HEALTH LLC, a ) 

Florida limited liability company, JORGE HANE, ) 

an individual, and FLORENCIA HANE, an ) 

individual, jointly and severally, ) 

 ) 

Defendants, ) 

__________________________________________/ 

PREMIER BEAUTY AND HEALTH LLC, a ) 

Florida limited liability company, ) 

 ) 

 Counter-Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) 

AARON SILBERMAN, an individual, )

 ) 

 ) 

 Counter-Defendant. ) 

__________________________________________/ 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

LAUREN F. LOUIS

Plaintiffs, AMJ Misil AB LLC (“AMJ”) and Aaron Silberman (“Silberman”), by and

through their undersigned counsel and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), 

hereby file this Motion to Disqualify The Honorable Magistrate Judge Lauren F. Louis, and in 

support thereof, state as follows: 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. On March 11, 2024, the parties appeared before United States District Court 

Magistrate Judge, The Honorable Lauren F. Louis (“Magistrate Judge Louis”) for a settlement 

conference (“Settlement Conference”). 

2. Undersigned counsel, Anthony Hevia, Esq., appeared at the Settlement 

Conference on behalf of Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendant Silberman, along with the Plaintiffs. 

3. Richard Wolfe, Esq. (“Attorney Wolfe”) and Felipe Rubio, Esq. (“Attorney 

Rubio”), appeared at the Settlement Conference on behalf of the Defendants, along with the 

Defendants. Attorney Wolfe is counsel of record for the Defendants. Attorney Rubio is counsel 

of record for Defendant Florencia Hane.

4. Alejandro O. Soto, Esq. a/k/a Alex Soto (“Attorney Soto”), who is neither 

counsel of record for Defendants nor an expert in this case, nor a member of either Attorney 

Wolfe or Attorney Rubio’s respective firms, also appeared at the Settlement Conference along 

with the Defendants.1

5. After the parties had reached an impasse at the Settlement Conference, Attorney 

Hevia and the Plaintiffs entered the courtroom to listen to Attorney Soto give an “opening 

statement”. Attorney Soto gave an “opening statement” in the courtroom while Attorney Wolfe, 

Defendants’ actual counsel of record, sat at counsel’s table silently, and while Magistrate Judge 

Louis sat in the jury box. Attorney Rubio and the Defendants were not in the courtroom when 

Attorney Soto gave his “opening statement”. There are numerous other facts regarding what 

1 CM/ECF D.E. 459 states as follows: “PAPERLESS Minute Entry for proceedings held before 

Magistrate Judge Lauren Fleischer Louis: Settlement Conference held on 3/11/2024. Impasse 

reached. Total time in court: 3 hour(s) : 30 minutes. Attorney Appearance(s): Anthony Carlos 

Hevia, along with his clients (Aaron and Sophia Silberman), appeared at this conference. Richard 

Charles Wolfe, Felipe Rubio, along with their clients (Jorge and Florencia Hane), appeared at this 

conference. Alex Soto also appeared with Defendants. (aw)” (emphasis added). 

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took place at the Settlement Conference that are material to this motion. Those material facts are 

set forth in affidavits in support of this motion, and relate to the extent of Magistrate Judge 

Louis’ colleagueship with Attorney Soto, the manner in which Magistrate Louis conducted the 

Settlement Conference, certain statements made by Magistrate Judge Louis to Plaintiffs and 

Attorney Hevia at the Settlement Conference, and certain statements made by Attorney Soto in 

his “opening statement”. However, in light of Magistrate Judge Louis’s Settlement Conference 

Order decreeing that all representations and statements made at the Settlement Conference 

remain confidential (see ECF No. 457 at ¶ 6), Plaintiffs cannot file the aforementioned affidavits 

(unless they are filed under seal) or set forth those material facts in this motion. In order to avoid 

running afoul of Magistrate Judge Louis’s Settlement Conference Order, Plaintiffs will file a 

motion to file the affidavits in support of this motion under seal pursuant to Local Rule 5.4(b)(1). 

6. On March 13, 2024, two (2) days after the Settlement Conference, Defendants 

filed additional proposed jury instructions based on “Defendants’ Defense of Exemption”. See 

ECF No. 461. Aside from being untimely, Defendants’ additional proposed jury instructions 

completely and curiously dismiss Magistrate Judge Louis’s January 26, 2024 Order on Plaintiffs’ 

motion in limine, wherein Magistrate Judge Louis decrees that “...Defendants shall not advance 

evidence or argument to support an unpled affirmative defense that the investment, if it was a 

security, was exempt from registration." See ECF No. 402 at pg. 8. 

7. Magistrate Judge Louis is scheduled to preside over the jury selection process at 

trial on April 9, 2024. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 

 In Guo v. Rosen, 21-13823, 2023 WL 2125959 (11th Cir. 2023), the Eleventh Circuit stated

as follows: 

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“Recusal is governed by two federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455...[u]nder 

§ 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. § 455(a). The test under § 455(a) 

is “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts 

underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant 

doubt about the judge's impartiality.” Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 

1524 (11th Cir. 1988). Under § 455(a), “a judge has a self-enforcing obligation to 

recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist.” Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 

1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, bias sufficient 

to disqualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources. Hamm v. Members of 

Bd. of Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). However, an exception exists 

where a judge's remarks in a judicial context demonstrate pervasive bias and 

prejudice against a party. Id. 

As it relates to the application of the concept of extrajudicial sources to the federal recusal 

statutes, the United States Supreme Court held as follows in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 

553-555 (1994): 

“Similarly, § 455(b)(1), which addresses the matter of personal bias and prejudice 

specifically, contains the “extrajudicial source” limitation—and that limitation 

(since nothing in the text contradicts it) should govern for purposes of § 455(a) as 

well...[f]or all these reasons, we think that the “extrajudicial source” doctrine, 

as we have described it, applies to § 455(a). As we have described it, however, 

there is not much doctrine to the doctrine. The fact that an opinion held by a 

judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is not a necessary 

condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since predispositions developed 

during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is it a 

sufficient condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since some opinions 

acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's 

view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice. Since neither 

the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the 

absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be 

better to speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) 

“extrajudicial source” factor, than of an “extrajudicial source” doctrine, in 

recusal jurisprudence.” (emphasis added)

In other words, “...the presence of an extrajudicial source is merely a thumb on the scale 

in favor of finding either an appearance of partiality under § 455(a) or bias or prejudice under 

§ 455(b)(1). See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554–56, 114 S.Ct. 1147.” Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1005

(6th Cir. 2005). 

In that regard, In In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009), the 

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Eleventh Circuit states as follows with respect to a judge’s disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 

455(a): 

A party may file a Recusal Motion when a Judge's impartiality may reasonably be 

questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 

United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned.”). “The inquiry of whether a judge's 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) is an objective 

standard2 designed to promote the public's confidence in the impartiality and 

integrity of the judicial process.” Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1332 n. 12 (11th 

Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the court looks to “the perspective of a 

reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and 

circumstances.' ” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 

924, 124 S.Ct. 1391, 158 L.Ed.2d 225 (2004) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United 

States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302, 121 S.Ct. 25, 147 L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000)); see also 

Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir.1988) (“...the test is whether ‘a 

reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the 

judge's impartiality.’” (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 938 (10th 

Cir.1987))). (emphasis added) 

It should be noted that the application of the foregoing legal standard to the facts set forth

by Plaintiffs in support of this motion should be preceded by a recognition that “...cases within § 

455(a) are extremely fact driven ‘and must be judged on their unique facts and circumstances more 

than by comparison to situations considered in prior jurisprudence.’” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 

351 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1995)). 

B. Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) 

“Recusal under § 455(b)(1) is mandated whenever a federal judge ‘has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding.’ Thus, § 455(b)(1) duplicates the grounds for recusal set forth in § 144, but it makes

2 See also United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017)(“In other words, a judge's 

subjective state of mind is irrelevant; what matters is whether “the public might reasonably believe 

that [the judge] knew” of “facts creating an appearance of impropriety.”... “[i]n conducting this 

review, we must ask how these facts would appear to a well-informed, thoughtful and objective 

observer,” who is “an average member of the public,” not a “hypersensitive, cynical, and 

suspicious person.”)(citations omitted). 

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the grounds applicable to all federal judges and places the obligation to identify the existence of 

those grounds upon the judge herself. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548. Furthermore, similar to § 144, 

the standard for recusal under § 455(b)(1) “is whether an objective, fully informed lay observer 

would entertain significant doubt about the judge's impartiality.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 

1324, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).” United States v. Catalano, 8:04-CR-348-T-24 

TGW, 2010 WL 3394714 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2010). 

“While Subsection 455(a) addresses the appearance of impropriety, Subsection 455(b) 

‘addresses the problem of actual bias by mandating recusal in certain specific circumstances where

partiality is presumed,’ ” including personal bias or prejudice towards a party to the litigation.

Hoffenberg v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting United States v.

Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000)); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The extent of Magistrate Judge Louis’ colleagueship with Attorney Soto, the 

manner in which Magistrate Louis conducted the Settlement Conference, 

certain statements made by Magistrate Judge Louis at the Settlement 

Conference, and certain statements made by Attorney Soto in his “opening 

statement” warrant Magistrate Judge Louis’s disqualification from this action

under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and 28. U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)

Plaintiffs respectfully submit to this Honorable Court that the unique facts3 supporting this 

motion, which are set forth in paragraphs 1 through 6 in Section I. (Factual Background) herein:

a) would cause an objective, disinterested, lay observer to entertain significant doubts about 

Magistrate Judge Louis’ impartiality in this action. See Guo; In re Evergreen Sec; Nichols; and 

b) have caused Plaintiffs to believe that Magistrate Judge Louis is actually biased against them.

3 As previously noted, there are numerous facts regarding what took place at the Settlement 

Conference that are material to this motion that are set forth in affidavits in support of this motion. 

In light of Magistrate Judge Louis’s Settlement Conference Order decreeing that all 

representations and statements made at the Settlement Conference remain confidential (see ECF 

No. 457 at ¶ 6), Plaintiffs shall file a motion to file the affidavits in support of this motion under 

seal pursuant to Local Rule 5.4(b)(1).

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Plaintiffs respectfully submit to this Honorable Court that an objective observer who is an 

average member of the public would believe that the facts set forth herein and the additional facts 

set forth in the affidavits in support of this motion, which Plaintiffs seek to file under seal, create 

an appearance of impropriety4 that warrant Magistrate Judge Louis’s disqualification from this 

action. See Guo; In re Evergreen Sec; Nichols; Wells. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request 

that Magistrate Judge Louis be disqualified from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and be 

precluded from presiding over any further proceedings in same.

Plaintiffs also respectfully submit to this Honorable Court that Magistrate Judge Louis is 

actually biased against them and that the facts set forth herein and the additional facts set forth in 

the affidavits in support of this motion, which Plaintiffs seek to file under seal, demonstrate 

Magistrate Judge Louis’s actual bias, which warrants Magistrate Judge Louis’s disqualification 

from this action. See Christo; Catalano; Hoffenberg. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request 

that Magistrate Judge Louis be disqualified from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) 

and be precluded from presiding over any further proceedings in same.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, AMJ Misil AB LLC and Aaron Silberman, respectfully request

that this Honorable Court grant their instant motion and the relief requested herein, along with

such other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems just, equitable, and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

IAG LAW, PLLC HEVIA LAW FIRM

4 Whether or not Magistrate Judge Louis is actually biased against Plaintiff is irrelevant under 28 

U.S.C. § 455(a). The relevant question is whether there is an appearance of bias. See Liteky v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994); White v. Nat'l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009); 

see also United States v. Pulido, 566 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The statute ‘forbids not only the 

reality of partiality but its objective appearance as well.’ United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 45 

(1st Cir.2000) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 

474 (1994)).”).

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 320 Seven Springs Way Of Counsel to IAG LAW, PLLC 

 Suite 250 2525 Ponce De Leon Blvd. 

 Brentwood, Tennessee 37027 Suite 300 

 Telephone: 629-895-3324 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 

 Telephone: 786-441-5120 

 /s/ I. Albert Gonzalez

 I. Albert Gonzalez, Esq. /s/ Anthony C. Hevia 

 FBN: 695971 Anthony C. Hevia, Esq. 

 Email: iag@iaglawpllc.com FBN: 41148 

Email: anthony@hevialawfirm.com

Email: susy@hevialawfirm.com

 /s/ Courtney A. Salas 

 Courtney A. Salas, Esq. 

 FBN: 1010412 

 Email: courtney@hevialawfirm.com

 Email: susy@hevialawfirm.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the 

Court using CM/ECF on March 20, 2024. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 

served this 20th day of March, 2024, on all counsel of record on the attached Service List via 

transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF. 

/s/ Anthony C. Hevia 

Anthony C. Hevia, Esq. 

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SERVICE LIST

Aaron Silberman, et al. v. Premier Beauty and Health LLC. et al. 

CASE NO. 20-CV-21984-DPG

Richard C. Wolfe, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 355607 

Wolfe Law Miami, P.A., 

175 SW 7th Street, Suite 2410 

Miami, Florida 33130 

Telephone: 305.384.7370 

Email: rwolfe@wolfelawmiami.com

Attorney for Defendants 

 

Felipe Rubio, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 123059 

Rubio & Associates 

8950 SW 74 Ct, Suite 1804 

Miami, FL 33156-3177 

Telephone: 786.220.2061 

Email: frubio@rubiolawyers.com

Attorney for Defendant Florencia Hane 

 

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