COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Frank 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JOYCE ELIZABETH CZAJKOWSKI 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1981-99-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MARCH 21, 2000 

KENNETH E. LABOWITZ, AS ADMINISTRATOR C.T.A. 

 OF THE ESTATE OF ANTHONY F. CZAJKOWSKI 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Robert A. Payne (Fagelson, Schonberger, 

 Payne & Deichmeister, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Kenneth E. Labowitz (Jason D. Blatt; Dingman 

Labowitz, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from the denial of a contempt citation, Joyce 

Elizabeth Czajkowski contends that the trial court erred in 

holding that a deed to her former husband and herself conveyed 

title as tenants in common, rather than as joint tenants with 

the right of survivorship. Because this holding was not 

embraced by the pleadings within the scope of the parties' 

divorce action, we reverse and vacate the holding without 

prejudice. 

Anthony and Joyce Czajkowski, while married, owned a 

condominium as tenants by the entireties. They separated in 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1988 and lived apart thereafter. On December 26, 1996, they 

executed a marital settlement agreement which provided, in 

relevant part, as follows: 

II. C. The Husband and Wife will retain 

ownership as joint tenants with common law 

rights of survivorship of the condominium 

. . . subject to the following: 

 1. Wife shall have the exclusive 

right to use said condominium as her 

residence. Wife shall be responsible for 

paying the condominium fees of said 

condominium and maintaining the property in 

a habitable condition. 

 2. Wife shall have the sole right 

to sell said condominium. Husband and Wife 

will share the difference equally, if any, 

between the selling price of said property 

and the mortgage principal balance 

outstanding on the date of sale. 

 3. Should Wife desire to obtain 

sole title to the property, Husband shall 

transfer his interest to her for 50 percent 

of the difference between the property's 

fair market value and the mortgage principal 

balance outstanding at that time of 

transfer. 

 By decree entered June 3, 1997, Anthony and Joyce were 

granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. The decree provided, in 

pertinent part: 

[I]t is further . . . 

 ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that the 

Property Settlement Agreement dated December 

26, 1996, is affirmed, ratified and 

incorporated, but not merged in this decree. 

The divorce decree converted the tenancy by the entireties to a 

tenancy in common. See Code § 20-111. On December 22, 1997, 

Anthony and Joyce executed a general warranty deed conveying the 

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condominium to themselves "as joint tenants with common law 

right of survivorship." 

 Anthony died on October 31, 1998. Kenneth E. Labowitz 

qualified as Administrator C.T.A. of his estate. By deed dated 

December 28, 1998, Joyce, "divorced and not remarried, surviving 

joint tenant of Anthony F. Czajkowski, deceased," conveyed the 

condominium to herself. The deed recited: 

The above-named Anthony F. Czajkowski 

departed this life on October 31, 1998, 

. . . leaving Joyce E. Czajkowski as his 

surviving joint tenant. 

 * * * * * * * 

The purpose of this deed is to ratify and 

confirm ownership of Joyce E. Czajkowski 

upon the death of Anthony F. Czajkowski. 

 Labowitz, as administrator of Anthony's estate, petitioned 

the trial court to hold Joyce in contempt for refusing to pay 

Anthony's estate one-half of the equity in the condominium 

pursuant to Part IIC(3) of the marital settlement agreement. By 

decree entered August 4, 1999, the trial court declined to hold 

Joyce in contempt, ruling that 

there being no provision in the Marital 

Settlement Agreement or final decree of 

divorce that has been violated by [Joyce], 

the prayer in the petition filed by the 

Administrator for the entry of a decree 

directing the Defendant, Joyce Czajkowski, 

to show cause why she should not be judged 

in contempt should be, and same hereby is, 

denied . . . . 

That ruling has not been appealed. 

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 The trial court further held: 

[U]pon the entry of the final decree of 

divorce herein, the parties' ownership of 

the subject condominium was that of tenants 

in common and the General Warranty Deed 

dated December 22, 1997 and Deed of 

Confirmation dated December 28, 1998 were 

ineffective to create a joint tenancy with 

survivorship. 

On appeal, Joyce contends that the trial court erroneously 

construed the December 22, 1997 deed. 

 The trial court found no violation of the marital 

settlement agreement or of the divorce decree. See Funches v. 

Funches, 243 Va. 26, 31, 413 S.E.2d 44, 47 (1992); Jackson v. 

Jackson, 211 Va. 718, 719, 180 S.E.2d 500, 500 (1971). That 

ruling was not appealed and is final. That ruling was correct. 

At issue are the rights of the parties under the December 22, 

1997 deed. That Joyce and Anthony executed the deed in 

furtherance of their marital settlement agreement, as approved 

and incorporated in the divorce decree, is of no consequence. 

When they executed the deed, they were no longer married. They 

were legal strangers, free to contract as they thought proper. 

They had the right, upon agreement, to vary the property 

settlement provisions of their marital settlement and the 

divorce decree. We note that on January 29, 1998, they executed 

an amendment to the marital settlement agreement, containing 

provisions not relevant to this case. 

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 "Jurisdiction in divorce suits may not be acquired 

inferentially or through indirection because divorce in Virginia 

is a creature of statutes enacted in clear, detailed language." 

Steinberg v. Steinberg, 11 Va. App. 323, 328-29, 398 S.E.2d 507, 

510 (1990). 

 "A suit for divorce . . . does not 

involve an appeal to the general 

jurisdiction of the equity forum. The many 

limitations, both in respect to jurisdiction 

and procedure, placed upon divorce suits by 

the statute, differentiate the divorce case 

from ordinary suits in equity and render it 

a chancery case sui generis." 

Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 413, 429 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1993) 

(citations omitted). 

[A] decree may . . . be void if "the 

character of the judgment was not such as 

the court had the power to render, or [if] 

the mode of procedure employed by the court 

was such as it might not lawfully adopt." 

Watkins v. Watkins, 220 Va. 1051, 1054, 625 S.E.2d 750, 752-53 

(1980) (citation omitted). 

 The ruling on appeal involved the construction of the 

December 22, 1997 deed, an instrument between legal strangers. 

The issues raised in that ruling did not derive from the 

parties' marriage, their marital settlement agreement, or their 

divorce decree and, thus, were not properly embraced within the 

divorce suit or the administrator's petition. Those issues 

could be addressed only in a court of general law or equity 

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jurisdiction. The trial court, sitting as a divorce court, 

lacked that jurisdiction. 

 Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court's 

holding that the December 27, 1997 deed created a tenancy in 

common. That part of the August 4, 1999 decree is dismissed 

without prejudice to the parties, who may address that issue in 

a proper forum, if they be so advised. 

 Reversed and vacated 

without prejudice. 

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