J-S34032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.L.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: O.L.E., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 329 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Orphans’ Court at No. 063 of 2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: October 20, 2023

O.L.E. (Father) appeals from the order granting the petition of the 

Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (WCCB) and terminating Father’s 

parental rights to J.L.D. (Child).1 We affirm.

Child was born in March 2009. Father lived with Child and Mother in 

Pennsylvania for seven months, from 2018 to 2019. N.T., 2/2/23, at 73; 

Mother’s Brief at 5. Father had moved to Pennsylvania from South Carolina. 

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1 Child’s mother, T.L.D. (Mother), voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. 

See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 1-2. Mother “indicated through her 

counsel that she intended to consent to Child being placed for adoption,” and 

executed her consent to termination on June 15, 2022. See id. at 1; N.T., 

2/2/23, at 8.
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Id. In March 2019, Father moved back to South Carolina, where he continues 

to reside.

2

 N.T., 2/2/23, at 73-74.

A little more than a year later, the WCCB sought

emergency custody of the Child and her siblings in early June 

2020, after Mother indicated to the WCCB that she was unable to 

provide appropriate care for the physical wellbeing of the children, 

was facing mental health issues, and had recently been charged 

criminally with possession of drug paraphernalia. The Order of 

Adjudication, dated July 21, 2020, indicated that Father resided in 

South Carolina, worked two jobs and did not have housing suitable 

for the Child. At the time of disposition of the dependency matter, 

Father indicated that he wished to have custody of the Child, but 

that he was working approximately more than 12 hours per day 

at two different jobs and was renting a single room in a mobile 

home from another couple who already had children living in the 

home. Father acknowledged as early as October 2, 2020, that he 

needed to rectify his housing situation in order to obtain custody 

of the Child. Father’s housing situation remained unchanged 

during the Permanency Review Hearings on March 3, 2021, 

October 26, 2021, April 11, 2022, and October 3, 2022. The 

WCCB petitioned for involuntary termination on August 31, 2022, 

and a hearing was set for November 16, 2022. At that time, 

Father indicated that he wished to contest the petition, and a full 

hearing was scheduled for February 2, 2023. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 3.

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2 Father testified he found Mother “with another man ... and I was thrown out 

of the house. I had nowhere to go, so I had to move back to South Carolina.” 

N.T., 2/2/23, at 85. 
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February 2, 2023 Termination Hearing

At the termination hearing, Stephen Crevak represented Father, who

participated by telephone from South Carolina. N.T., 2/2/23, at 13, 33-34. 

Attorney Dorean Petonic represented Child’s best and legal interests.3

WCCB Caseworker

WCCB caseworker Jeffrey Knox testified to working with the family since 

July 16, 2020. N.T., 2/2/23, at 7. Mr. Knox stated that he sent Father the 

family service plans, and called Father to discuss “what they entailed.” Id. at 

35. Mr. Knox identified lack of “stable housing” as Father’s greatest parenting 

impediment. Id. at 42. According to Mr. Knox, Father had at least three 

residences in the past three years. Id. at 51. He described Father as currently

“living with roommates,” which would require Child to share a room with 

Father “if she was to move in with him.” Id. at 38.

As to Child, Mr. Knox stated that Father and Child had “communicated 

by phone and video” in the past, but their communication ceased around April 

2022, when Child “indicated she did not want to speak” with Father. Id. at 

36-37.

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3 Attorney Petonic “placed into the record ... that Child’s legal and best 

interests were not such that [Attorney Petonic] would be conflicted in

representing them to the [orphans’ c]ourt.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/24/23, 

at 1; see also N.T., 2/2/23, at 6.
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At the time of the hearing, Child had been in WCCB’s custody for 32 

months. Id. at 8, 34. Mr. Knox relayed that Child was in “stable kinship 

placement [with her aunt and uncle] ... in the state of Maryland.” Id. at 46. 

Mr. Knox testified:

[Child] is doing very well. Actually, she’s thriving. Her grades 

have improved. She’s engaged in therapy. She’s attending school 

regularly, [and participating in] extracurricular activities. She 

started playing basketball. She’s adjusted well since her move [to 

kinship care approximately 13 months prior]. She’s able to speak 

to her aunt and uncle[, who are her foster parents,] and therapist 

about ... what’s going on.

....

[Child] sounds happier. She’s willing to tell me what she’s doing. 

She presents and reports to me, as well as the Maryland 

caseworker, that she is bonded to her aunt and uncle.

Id. at 47-48.

Mr. Knox reiterated that Child “doesn’t want to talk to [Father] at this 

time.” Id. at 49. He explained:

[T]hey argued at one point. They’re upset about things. [Child] 

wrote a therapeutic letter to herself about her needs. The aunt 

had given it to [Father]. They kind of fought over it because 

[Child] wanted to be adopted in th[e letter] and wants to move on 

and have this finished.

Id.

Father

Father testified that he has lived in South Carolina since March 2019. 

Id. at 73. According to Father, after he returned to South Carolina, Child’s 

Mother “moved somewhere else,” and he “wasn’t able to get in contact with 
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[M]other.” Id. at 74. Consequently, Father lost contact with Child from March 

2019 until June 2020, when WCCB obtained custody of Child. Id. Father 

stated he “did not have the full understanding of what conditions [Child] was 

living in” with Mother. Id. at 75. Father testified he “immediately contacted 

[Child’s] grandmother, and [Mother’s] sister answered the call and told 

[Father that Child] would live with them ....” Id. at 74. Father stated that he 

got Child a phone “when she landed in foster care.” Id. at 75. When counsel 

for the WCCB asked Father about Child not wanting contact with him, Father 

replied, “Yes. I am aware of that.” Id. Father expressed, “I need to talk to 

[Child] and spend more time with her, if I’m allowed to by others.” Id. at 76.

Father confirmed that he participated remotely in the permanency 

review hearings. Id. at 77. He testified that he did not visit Child when she 

was in foster care because his job denied him time off. Id. at 78. Father also 

testified to previously working long days, from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., as a 

laborer and at a restaurant. Id. at 67. Although he got two days off, it was 

not enough time “to drive from South Carolina to Pennsylvania and back.” Id.

at 79. Father stated he “needed at least one more extra day, and my job 

denied me the days off.” Id.

Father subsequently obtained a better paying “tree job.” Id. at 80. On 

July 1, 2022, Father was seriously injured by a falling tree. Id. at 70, 80.

Father’s work injury included broken bones in his neck and spine. Id. at 70.

Father testified that as a result of the injury, he “was stuck in bed for two 
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months [and] couldn’t do anything for two months.” Id. at 81. Father also 

lost his car. Id. at 84. Father currently works at a gas station. Id. at 70, 

81. 

Father acknowledged that throughout the case, the WCCB has advised 

him about the inadequacy of his housing. Id. at 68. Father testified to living 

at the same address for a year. Id. at 65. He explained:

Where I am right now is a two-bedroom. I rent the room [from] 

a female friend of mine and her son, who is 13 years old. She has 

a room with her kid. I have my own room.

Id. at 69. Father confirmed he does not have room for Child. Id. at 77. He 

stated he did not have appropriate housing for Child “at the moment,” and 

was “working on that.” Id. at 84.

Father also confirmed he last communicated with Child in April 2022. 

Id. at 71. From June 2020 to April 2022, Father spoke with Child every “two 

or three days,” and “anytime she needed to contact me, she could call.” Id.

at 71-72. Father stated he “just want[s] to talk to [Child] again.” Id. at 72. 

In response to questions from Attorney Petonic, who represented Child’s best 

and legal interests, Father testified that Child’s foster mother keeps him 

informed. Id. at 84. Father stated:

I’m aware [Child] is playing basketball. Her foster mother sent 

me a video of her playing basketball. [Foster mother] has great 

communication with me about her doing well and how she’s doing 

in school and that she’s doing really well and that she’s going to 

therapy.

Id.
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Child’s Attorney

Attorney Petonic stated that Child “is in a very good place” with her 

“kinship foster family.” Id. at 141. She opined, “it is certainly in [Child’s] 

best interest to remain [with the kinship family] and to be adopted.” Id. 

Attorney Petonic explained:

[Child] very much wants to be adopted and wants her legal 

parents to be [her aunt and uncle, who] she now calls mom and 

dad. ...

This family has promoted the relationships [between Child, her 

siblings] and [M]other. They have followed all the requirements 

of the agency. [Child] is secure. [Child’s] mental health needs 

are being met. ... [Child] takes part in activities outside of school. 

... That’s where [Child] wants to remain.

I certainly believe it’s in [Child’s] best interest.

Id. at 141-42.

The orphans’ court concluded the WCCB presented “sufficient evidence 

to justify termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), (2)

and (8) of the Adoption Act. Additionally, the [c]ourt found that termination 

would serve the best interest of the Child under Section 2511(b).” Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 7. The orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental 

rights on February 9, 2023. Father timely filed a notice of appeal and concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i).

Father presents the following questions for review:
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1. Was clear and convincing evidence presented to show that 

termination was warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Sections 

2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(8), and § 2511(b)?

2. Did the trial court err in terminating Father’s parental rights 

despite evidence Father made efforts towards reunification to 

the best of his abilities, considering his situation and 

circumstances?

Father’s Brief at 4.

Father combines his two issues in one argument. See id. at 8-13; see 

also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as 

there are questions to be argued”). Father claims “the record clearly reflects 

the [WCCB] failed to satisfy the required burden of proof to establish the legal 

grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1), § 2511(a)(2), § 2511(a)(8), and § 2511(b).” Father’s Brief at 7.

Discussion

We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012).

[O]ur standard of review requires [us to] accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an 

abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As [the Supreme Court] discussed in In re: R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse 

of discretion standard of review .... [U]nlike trial courts, appellate 

courts are not equipped to make fact-specific determinations on a 
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cold record, where trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, 

as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead, we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual 

findings are supported by the record and the court's legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.

Id. at 826-27 (some citations omitted). The petitioner has the burden to 

provide clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for 

termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Termination of parental rights is subject to Section 2511 of the Adoption 

Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Under Section 2511, 

the orphans’ court must engage in a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted).

Father argues the WCCB “provided insufficient testimony and evidence” 

and improperly terminated Father’s parental rights “solely on the basis of his 

housing situation.” Father’s Brief at 10.
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The WCCB argues otherwise, stating that it “satisfied the evidentiary 

requirements” and presented clear and convincing evidence of grounds for 

termination which would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. WCCB’s Brief 

at 9. The WCCB states Father “had not acted in a parental role,” and “made 

little to no progress in remedying” his failure to parent Child. Id. at 11. Child’s 

guardian ad litem/attorney and Mother agree with the WCCB. See, e.g., 

Guardian Ad Litem’s Brief at 6; Mother’s Brief at 7.

Section 2511(a) - Grounds for Termination

To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree

with the orphans’ court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

We examine Father’s challenge under Subsection 2511(a)(2), which 

provides for termination when

[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). The petitioner must prove “(1) repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 

443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Grounds for termination “are not 
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limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, the orphans’ court explained:

Throughout the history of the dependency case, Father has 

consistently maintained contact with the Child through texting and 

phone calls, but he has never taken steps toward addressing his 

inadequate housing nor taken any steps toward growing his 

relationship with the Child by relocating somewhere closer to 

Pennsylvania.

Additionally, Mr. Jeffrey Knox, caseworker for the WCCB, 

testified that, in order for more specific recommendations 

regarding the fitness and appropriateness of Father in terms of

reunification, Father would need to first demonstrate that he was 

able to obtain adequate housing. Once such housing was in place, 

a county agency in South Carolina would be able to assess Father’s 

fitness for reunification. By keeping Father informed of the status 

of the dependency case and informing Father of the initial issues 

that needed to be resolved before an assessment for reunification 

could be achieved, the Agency did use reasonable efforts toward 

reunification.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 7.

The court further found:

In examining the facts ... Father has failed to perform 

parental duties for at least six months. During the entirety of the 

Child’s placement in foster care and kinship care, Father has never

completed an in-person visit. Father has never taken steps 

toward addressing his deficient housing situation, which was a 

necessary first step toward obtaining an evaluation by his local 

county agency for appropriateness to reunify with the Child. ... 

[T]he record reflects that these same conditions have 

continued to exist since the inception of the dependency 

case and will not be remedied in a timely fashion, as housing 

conditions were consistently identified as the barrier to 

reunification with Father. Lastly, the Child has been in custody of 

the WCCB for 32 months as of the time of the termination hearing, 

with the same circumstances preventing the Child from returning 
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to Father’s care. 

Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).

We discern no error or abuse discretion, as the record supports 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). This Court has recognized that a 

Child’s life “cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to ... assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of 

progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Because the evidence supports termination under 

Section 2511(a), we next examine Child’s needs and welfare pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511.

Section 2511(b) - Needs and Welfare

When the court finds grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(a), 

it must then consider Child’s needs and welfare:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “The plain language of Section 2511(b) clearly 

mandates that, in assessing the petition to terminate parental rights, the 

‘primary consideration’ must be the child’s ‘developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare.’” Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023).

This Court has stated repeatedly that intangibles “such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare 
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of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently stated, 

courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, 

placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare above concerns for the parent. See C.M., 255 A.3d [343,]

358 [(Pa. 2021)] (“A parent’s right to make decisions concerning

the care, custody, and control of his or her children is among the 

oldest of fundamental rights. [However, t]he time-tested law of 

the Commonwealth requires that we balance this intrinsic parental 

interest within the context of a child’s essential needs for a 

parent’s care, protection, and support.”) (citations omitted); In

re H.S.W.C.-B, 575 Pa. 473, 836 A.2d 908, 911 (2003) (In 

termination proceedings and appeals, “the best interest of the 

children is always paramount[.]”). Cf. In re R.I.S., 614 Pa. 275, 

36 A.3d 567, 579 (2011) (plurality opinion) (Baer, J., concurring) 

(“It is incumbent upon the judicial system to be child-focused. 

Regardless of the heartbreak to a parent, children are entitled to 

every opportunity for a successful life, and a permanent, loving 

parental relationship greatly fosters that opportunity.”).

Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105.

Father references his history of communicating with Child and claims 

the WCCB’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that termination was in 

Child’s best interest. Father’s Brief at 12-13. Again, the WCCB, Child’s 

guardian ad litem/attorney, and Mother disagree. See WCCB’s Brief at 13-

15; Guardian Ad Litem’s Brief at 8; Mother’s Brief at 11-14.

Our review reveals no error or abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court’s

consideration of Child’s needs and welfare. At this writing, Child is 14 years 

old. There is no evidence Father has parented Child, who has expressed her 
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desire to remain in pre-adoptive placement with her aunt and uncle. The 

orphans’ court summarized:

The Child is placed in a kinship foster home in the State of

Maryland and is reportedly thriving, participating in extracurricular

activities, doing well in school, and addressing mental health

concerns in the foster home. The foster family has indicated that

they are a pre-adoptive resource, which provides the Child with

stability on the horizon.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 5.

Consistent with the foregoing evidence and law, the orphans’ court 

properly considered Child’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

As the court did not err, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.

Date: 10/20/2023