alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2519. Dispositions of certain life estates

#### (a) General rule

For purposes of this chapter and chapter 11, any disposition of all or part of a qualifying income interest for life in any property to which this section applies shall be treated as a transfer of all interests in such property other than the qualifying income interest.

#### (b) Property to which this subsection applies

This section applies to any property if a deduction was allowed with respect to the transfer of such property to the donor—

(1) under section 2056 by reason of subsection (b)(7) thereof, or

(2) under section 2523 by reason of subsection (f) thereof.

#### (c) Cross reference

**For right of recovery for gift tax in the case of property treated as transferred under this section, see section 2207A(b).**

(Added Pub. L. 97–34, title IV, §403(d)(3)(B)(i), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 304; amended Pub. L. 97–448, title I, §104(a)(3), (7), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2380, 2381.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1983—Pub. L. 97–448, §104(a)(3)(B), amended directory language of Pub. L. 97–34, §403(d)(3)(B)(i), to clarify that this section be inserted at end of subchapter B of chapter 12, rather than at end of subchapter B of chapter 11, and did not involve any change in text.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97–448, §104(a)(3)(A), substituted "For purposes of this chapter and chapter 11, any disposition" for "Any disposition" and "treated as a transfer of all interests in such property other than the qualifying income interest" for "treated as a transfer of such property".

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–448, §104(a)(7), added subsec. (c).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1983 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–448 effective, except as otherwise provided, as if it had been included in the provision of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97–34, to which such amendment relates, see section 109 of Pub. L. 97–448, set out as a note under section 1 of this title.

#### Effective Date

Section applicable to gifts made after Dec. 31, 1981, see section 403(e)(2) of Pub. L. 97–34, set out as an Effective Date of 1981 Amendment note under section 2056 of this title.
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circu mstances set forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fifth Circuit

_____________________________________

No. 97-10004 Summary Calendar

_____________________________________

MAYFAIR DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant-Appellee.

______________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-1594-H)

______________________________________________________ July 17, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM: 1

Mayfair appeals the district court ’s order granting summary

judg ment for the City of Dallas. Mayfair contends that the City

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting a development plan

submitted by Mayfair’s assignee and that the City’s rejection

violated the due process, equal protection, and takings clauses of2

t h e Texas and U.S. Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We

disagree.

This court has explained that municipal zoning decisions are

“sustainable against a substantive due process challenge if there

exists

. . . ‘any conceivable rational basis’” for the decision.

FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin , 93 F.3d 167, 174

(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shelton v. City of College Station

, 780

F.2d 475, 477 (5th C ir.) ( e n banc ), cert. denied

, 477 U.S. 905

(1986)). “Only if such government action is ‘clearly arbitrary

and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public

heal th, safety, morals, or general welfare,’ may it be declared

unconstitutional.” I d. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty

Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). Here, the City Council furnished

a number of reasons for its rejection of the development plan;

given the presumption of validity we accord such findin gs, we

cannot conclude that the City Council lacked a “conc eivable

rational basis” for its action. Therefore, we must conclude that

Mayfair has failed to state a constitutional violatio n, and the

district court’s order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINE JANE ORTEGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-35028

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01988-BR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 7, 2021** 

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Christine Ortega appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the

FILED

SEP 9 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the

district court’s judgment de novo. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1153-54 (9th Cir.

2020). We affirm.

Ortega’s testimony regarding the amounts of sitting, standing, and walking

required in her past relevant work as a delivery driver provided substantial

evidence in support of the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that the

work was sedentary as actually performed. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a),

416.967(a) (defining sedentary work). See also Coleman v. Saul, 979 F.3d 751,

755 (9th Cir. 2020) (defining substantial evidence). Accordingly, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, at Step Four of the sequential analysis, that

Ortega could perform her past relevant work as actually performed, and she

therefore was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv). See also Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149. 

AFFIRMED.

2
### §5387. Agricultural wines

#### (a) In general

Wines made from agricultural products other than the juice of fruit shall be made in accordance with good commercial practice as may be prescribed by the Secretary by regulations. Wines made in accordance with such regulations shall be classed as "standard agricultural wines". Wines made under this section may be cellar treated under the provisions of section 5382(a) and (c).

#### (b) Limitations

No wine spirits may be added to wines produced under this section, nor shall any coloring material or herbs or other flavoring material (except hops in the case of honey wine) be used in their production.

#### (c) Restriction on blending

Wines from different agricultural commodities shall not be blended together.

(Added Pub. L. 85–859, title II, §201, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1386; amended Pub. L. 90–619, §5, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1237; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, §1906(b)(13)(A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 5387, act Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 671, consisted of provisions similar to those comprising this section, prior to the general revision of this chapter by Pub. L. 85–859.

#### Amendments

1976—Pub. L. 94–455 struck out "or his delegate" after "Secretary" wherever appearing.

1968—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 90–619 inserted reference to subsec. (a) of section 5382.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1968 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 90–619 effective on first day of first month which begins 90 days or more after Oct. 22, 1968, see section 6 of Pub. L. 90–619, set out as a note under section 5373 of this title.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Ex parte Devin Paul Cole v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-20-00748-CR

Trial court case number: 1693755

Trial court: 184th District Court of Harris County

Appellant, Davin Paul Cole, was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 

The State of Texas v. Devin Paul Cole, cause number 1666250 in the 184th District Court of Harris 

County, Texas. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his pre-trial habeas 

petition seeking release on personal bond. After filing the appeal, the case was resolved by plea 

bargain agreement and appellant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The judgment of 

conviction was signed on February 9, 2021. 

Issues concerning pretrial release are moot after a defendant is convicted. See Martinez v. 

State, 826 S.W.2d 620, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, the district court clerk is directed 

to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s judgment of conviction in cause 

number 1666250. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c). The supplemental clerk’s record shall be filed in the 

First Court of Appeals within 7 days of the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___/s/ Gordon Goodman____________________________________

Acting individually 

Date: __August 10, 2021____________________
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis Panel, Community Clinical Oncology Program.                    

*Date:*                         November 16-17, 2004.                    

*Time:*                         8 a.m. to 6 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         Holiday Inn Select Bethesda, 8120 Wisconsin Ave., Bethesda, MD 20814.                    

*Contact Person:*                         Joyce C. Pegues, PhD, Scientific Review Administrator, Special Review and Logistics Branch, Division of Extramural Activities, National Cancer Institute, 6116 Executive Blvd., 7149, Bethesda, MD 20892. (301) 594-1286,                         *peguesj@mail.nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.392, Cancer Construction; 93.393, Cancer Cause and Prevention Research; 93.394, Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research; 93.395, Cancer Treatment Research; 93.396, Cancer Biology Research; 93.397, Cancer Centers Support; 93.398, Cancer Research Manpower; 93.399, Cancer Control, National Institutes of Health, HHS.)

Dated: September 29, 2004.

LaVerne Y. Stringfield,

Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 04-22413  Filed 10-5-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
No. 98-11411

-1-

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-11411

Summary Calendar

 

JERRY HAROLD BROSEH,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

GARY L. JOHNSON, TEXAS 

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

 Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:98-CV-079-C

- - - - - - - - - -

March 27, 2000

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jerry Harold Broseh, Texas prisoner # 438382, was granted a

certificate of appealability to appeal the issue whether Broseh’s

delay in receiving a copy of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) constituted a state impediment or

warranted equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period.

Relying upon this court’s decision in Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d

710 (5th Cir. 1999), Broseh argues that this lengthy delay

constitutes a rare and exceptional circumstance warranting
No. 98-11411

-2-

equitable tolling. Broseh does not renew his claim that the delay

constituted a State impediment which would toll the limitations

period. Accordingly, that issue is waived. See Yohey v. Collins,

985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993)(arguments not briefed on

appeal are deemed abandoned); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). 

In a recent opinion, this court determined that a prisoner’s

actual ignorance of the AEDPA’s limitations period, even if

attributable to the newly-enacted statute’s complete unavailability

to inmates, can never serve as a basis for equitable tolling.

Felder v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2000, No. 98-

21050), 2000 WL 144178 at *3-*5. Broseh’s equitable tolling

argument is thus foreclosed by Felder. Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Broseh’s motion to file a rebuttal brief is DENIED AS MOOT

because he filed a reply brief. To the extent that Broseh has

moved to strike the appellee’s brief as untimely, that request is

DENIED. Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(4) (legal holidays include any “day

declared a holiday by the . . . state in which is located . . . the

district court that rendered the challenged judgment or order”);

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 662.003(a)(6) (declaring the Friday after

Thanksgiving as a holiday).

AFFIRMED. MOTION TO STRIKE BRIEF DENIED; MOTION TO FILE

REBUTTAL BRIEF DENIED AS MOOT.
§ 3176.3 Scope. ( a ) This subpart is applicable to all onshore Federal and Indian (except Osage Tribe) oil and gas leases when drilling, completing, testing, reworking, producing, injecting, gathering, storing, or treating operations are being conducted in zones which are known or could reasonably be expected to contain H2S or which, when flared, could produce SO2, in such concentrations that upon release could constitute a hazard to human life. The requirements and minimum standards of this subpart do not apply when operating in zones where H2S is presently known not to be present or cannot reasonably be expected to be present in concentrations of 100 parts per million (ppm) or more in the gas stream.
( b ) The requirements and minimum standards in this subpart do not relieve an operator from compliance with any applicable Federal, State, or local requirement(s) regarding H2S or SO2 which are more stringent.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 2:20-CV-14150-MAYNARD

WALTER KROLL, on his own 

behalf and others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

KVZ GOLF, LLC, a Florida Limited,

Liability Company d/b/a PALM COVE GOLF 

AND YACHT CLUB,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

ORDER ON JOINT MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF THE PARTIES’ SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 

THIS CAUSE came before this Court upon the Joint Motion for Approval of the Parties’ 

Settlement Agreement and Dismissal with Prejudice filed by the parties (the “Joint Motion”). The 

Court has reviewed the file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises, and it appears to the 

Court that due cause exists to approve the parties’ settlement and dismiss the case with prejudice. 

It, therefore, is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 

The Joint Motion is hereby GRANTED and the Settlement Agreement negotiated and 

entered into by the parties is APPROVED. Based thereupon, this Court hereby dismisses the 

instant action with prejudice, with the Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the 

parties’ Settlement Agreement for a period of 30 days. The parties shall bear their own attorney’s 

fees and costs, except as provided for in the parties’ settlement agreement. All pending motions 

are hereby denied as moot, and this case is CLOSED. 

DONE AND ORDERED in St. Lucie County, Florida on this __ day of ______, 2020.

___________________________________

SHANIEK M. MAYNARD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: Record Counsel

Case 2:20-cv-14150-SMM Document 36-3 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2020 Page 1 of 1
### PART I—DUE PROCESS FOR COLLECTIONS

Sec.
6330.
Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Amendments

**1998**—Pub. L. 105–206, title III, §3401(b), July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 747, added part heading and analysis consisting of item 6330.
#### Ida Fields, Respondent, v. Louis Jordan, Appellant.

Judgment and order entered May 15, 1947, unanimously reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce the judgment as entered to the sum of $20,506.21, in which event the judgment as so modified, and the order insofar as it denies defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, are affirmed, without costs. Order entered October 2, 1947, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Settle order on notice. Present — Peek, P. J., Glennon, Dore, Cohn and Callahan, JJ.
§ 27.14 Definitions. As used in this part: ( a ) The term *Secretary* means the Secretary of the Interior.
( b ) The term *applicant* means one who submits an application for any Federal authorization to which this part applies.
( c ) The term *recipient* means any entity or individual who receives a permit, right-of-way, public land order, or other Federal authorization granted or issued under title II of Public Law 93-153 and its agent or agents.
( d ) The term *contract* means any agreement or arrangement between a recipient and any person (in which the parties do not stand in the relationship of an employer and an employee) in any way related to the activities of the recipient conducted under any permit, right-of-way, public land order, or other Federal authorization granted or issued under title II.
( e ) The term *subcontract* means any agreement or arrangement between a contractor and any person (in which the parties do not stand in the relationship of an employer and an employee) in any way related to the performance of any one or more contracts as defined above.
( f ) The Authorized Officer means the employee of the Department, designated to act on behalf of the Secretary pursuant to the Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way for Trans-Alaska Pipeline or such other person to whom the Authorized Officer redelegates his authority pursuant to the delegation of authority to the Authorized Officer from the Secretary.
( g ) The Department Compliance Officer means that officer of the Department of the Interior so designated by the Secretary.
:. Jan 27, 2016 U.S. Department ofTransportation Docket Management System West Building Ground Floor, Room w12-140 1200 NewJersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590
Re: Addendum ofaircraft for operation under approved Exemption No. 13333, Regulatory DocketNo. FAA-2015-1848 (Exemption Request Pursuant to Section 333 ofthe FAA Reform Act and 14 C.F.R. Part 11ofthe Federal Aviation Regulations) Dear Sir orMadam: WinTec Arrowmaker, Inc. (WinTec) respectfully requests an Addendum for the following UAV platforms to ourpreviously approved exemption

. WinTec will adhere to the same rules and regulation as previously approved for Exemption No. 13333, Regulatory DocketNo. FAA-2015- 1848. Reference approved exemptions: 1. 3DR Solo: Exemption No. 11935 Regulatory DocketNo. FAA-2015-1356 2. 3DR Iris+: ExemptionNo. 12368 Regulatory DocketNo. FAA-2015-1976 3. DJI Inspire 1 Pro: Exemption No. 11463 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-0237 4. DJI Phantom 3 Pro: Exemption No. 12821 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-2592 5. Parrot Bebop Drone: Exemption No. 12396 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-1543 6. TBM X-8 Flying Wing: ExemptionNo. 12646 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-1602 7. TBM Mini Talon: Exemption No. 12646 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-1602 Appendix A: Manufacturer Small Unmanned Aerial System Information



# v; / '""'
T:



# ~ChiefPilot WinTec Arrowmaker MadisonT@arrowmaker.com, (813) 805-2714
Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2016-3983 Directorate Identifier: 2015-NM-009-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If 

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of 

U.S. 

Registered 

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

Modify the RAT 14.0 $1,190.0

0

$0 $1,190.00 84 $99,960.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance: 0

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $99,960

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $0

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours 

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

RAT replacement 18 $1,530.00 $427,301 $428,831.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation:
#### Alojzy Spaczynski, an Infant, by Franc Gorski, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Isaac G. Johnson & Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Present — Jenks, P. J., Burr, Carr, Stapleton and Putnam, JJ.