Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

Kenneth H. Poole, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret., 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania and JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow
On the cover. A woman celebrates the Irish Republican Army ceasefire 

while traveling in a cavalcade of cars on Falls Road in Belfast, 31 August 1994. 

Photo by permission of Newscom. 

JSOU Report 08-5

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2008

What Really Happened

in Northern Ireland’s

Counterinsurgency:

Revision and Revelation

Thomas H. Henriksen
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-28-8
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, James Kinniburgh and 

Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise, December 2006, 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community, January 2007, 

Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh
vii

Foreword

The current conflicts facing the United States and its allies around 

the world have brought the discussion of counterinsurgency to the 

forefront of security studies and international politics. Dr. Thomas 

Henriksen’s monograph on Northern Ireland wades into the discussion 

regarding good historical case studies that can best provide insight into 

our current situation. There is a predilection for scholars and professional 

military officers to look at a limited number of case studies, such as Malaya 

and Vietnam, to seek insights about counterinsurgency prowess and ways 

to improve today’s fighting forces. 

Dr. Henriksen’s selection of Northern Ireland provides a rich case study 

of a hotly contested space that represents an ethnic and religious conflict set 

in Western Europe. He provides an excellent, short, historical background 

to frame his analysis. Understanding the historical antecedents of an 

insurgency is a critical element in any case study because insurgencies are 

local, not global events. International issues may influence what occurs in 

an insurgency, but locals rise up in rebellion for their personal grievances 

or desires. 

As you read the monograph, I strongly encourage you to consider the 

case study through the prism of a “whole of government” approach to 

dealing with insurgency. Counterinsurgency is a long-term process that, 

especially in a democracy, requires widespread, sustained political support 

from the broad elements of government. The ultimate goal of this whole of 

government approach is to wean the population away from supporting the 

insurgents. Restrained security force operations provide a secure “space” 

for political and economic opportunities/reforms to “steal the insurgents’ 

thunder.” The execution of a nuanced campaign is the difficult task—that 

is, the devil is in the details. 

Is Northern Ireland a viable or valid model for today’s world? It is, but 

the reader must be careful in drawing quick conclusions. Some underlying 

issues need to be addressed while using this case study, and the key one is 

the role of the United Kingdom’s government. In other words, the U.K. is 

a wealthy, capable, modern, liberal democracy with a well-developed state 

system and civil society. In today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 

local states do not approach the capacity and capabilities of the United 
viii

Kingdom. Is an outside power capable of playing the role of “arbiter” that 

the central government was able to project during the 30-year “Troubles” in 

Northern Ireland? How does an outside power provide the security necessary for political and economic reforms? Can a weaker state support these 

necessary reforms? The answers to these questions will be borne out in the 

coming years. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
ix

About the Author

Dr. Thomas Henriksen is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

Until September 2003, he was the associate director for program 

development at the Hoover Institution. His other administrative 

duties included serving as executive secretary of the National Fellows and 

National Security Affairs Fellows programs, as well as director of the Media 

Fellows Program. Dr. Henriksen also serves as a senior fellow with the JSOU 

Strategic Studies Department. 

His current research focuses on American foreign policy in the postCold War world, international political affairs, and national defense. He 

specializes in the study of U.S. diplomatic and military courses of action 

toward terrorist havens, such as Afghanistan, and the so-called rogue states, 

including North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. He also concentrates on armed and 

covert interventions abroad.

Dr. Henriksen is the author of American Power after the Berlin Wall (Palgrave Macmillan, October 2007). JSOU has published three of his essays: Is 

Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option? (January 2008), The Israeli Approach 

to IW and Implications for the United States (February 2007), and Dividing 

Our Enemies (November 2005). A prior published book is an edited volume 

on competing visions for U.S. foreign policy, Foreign Policy for America in 

the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives (Hoover Institution Press, 2001). 

Other works include Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States

(Hoover Essays in Public Policy 1999) and the edited collection North Korea 

after Kim IL Sung (Hoover Institution Press, 1999). 

He also authored or edited the following books and monographs: One 

Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification (Hoover Institution Press, 

1994); The New World Order: War, Peace, and Military Preparedness (Hoover 

Institution Press, 1992); Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s 

War of Independence (Greenwood Press,1983); The Struggle for Zimbabwe: 

Battle in the Bush (Praeger, 1981); Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations

(Praeger, 1980); and Mozambique: A History (Rex Collings, 1978). 

Additionally, he has written numerous journal articles and newspaper 

essays concerning international politics and security as well as U.S. policy 

toward rogue states in the post-Cold War era. Dr. Henriksen has also received 

research grants from the American Philosophical Society, State University of 
x

New York, National Endowment for the Humanities, and National Defense 

Foreign Language Fellowship Program. His book Mozambique: A History

was chosen for the Outstanding Book Award for African History by Choice. 

During 1982, he traveled to the former Soviet Union as a member of the 

forum for the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

Dr. Henriksen’s education and public service developed in the 1960s, 

specifically earning his B.A. in History from Virginia Military Institute 

(1962) and the M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Michigan State University 

(1966 and 1969). He was selected for membership in Phi Alpha Theta—the 

history honorary society—as a graduate student. During 1963–1965, Dr. 

Henriksen served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Army. He taught history at the State University of New York from 1969, leaving in 1979 as a full 

professor. During the 1979–1980 academic year, he was the Susan Louise 

Dyer Peace Fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

Dr. Henriksen’s national public service includes participation as a member 

of the U.S. Army Science Board (1984–1990) and the President’s Commission 

on White House Fellowships (1987–1993). He also received a Certificate of 

Appreciation for Patriotic Civilian Service from the U.S. Department of the 

Army in 1990. He is a trustee of the George C. Marshall Foundation. 
1

What Really Happened in 

Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency: 

Revision and Revelation

Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than 

conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict 

and undermining an insurgency. 

— The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 1

The cultural characteristics of the British Army set it up for success in counterinsurgency operations. 

— Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army2

The British Army has excelled in small-unit anti-guerrilla warfare as they did 

in other aspects of counterinsurgency. — Thomas R. Mockaitis 3

The idea that the British are masters of counterinsurgency is very dated. 

— Major General Paul Newton, joint head of 

Force Strategic Engagement Cell in Iraq4

The Search for Victorious Models 

The stubborn insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have sparked 

searches for successful counterinsurgent lessons from around the 

world. In addition to studying America’s experience in the Vietnam War, 

most often U.S. students of foreign counterinsurgencies look to European 

powers—particularly Britain, France, and to a much less degree, Portugal—

all of which fought several national liberation fronts or people’s wars against 

non-Western nationalists, guerrillas, or communists across the globe to 

retain their colonies.5 Often this investigation has centered on universal 

“lessons” of counterinsurgency that can be applied anywhere. Other taxonomies have sought out particular techniques to be applied selectively to 

combating irregular warfare, such as resettling the local population out of 
2

JSOU Report 08-5

reach of the guerrillas, securing porous borders, gathering intelligence, and 

meeting peoples’ basic needs.6

By the same token, American students of counterinsurgency (COIN) 

have generally neglected non-Western cases such as Algeria’s suppression of 

Islamist forces during the 1990s, Syria’s crushing of combatants during Lebanon’s civil war, or Israel’s experiences against terrorism and insurgency.7

Instead, American practitioners, scholars, and civilian analysts have 

most often studied British counterinsurgency methods because, in part, 

Britain has fought a number of insurgencies in the 20th century and also 

because British officers and officials (as well as pro-British foreigners) have 

promoted their expertise in waging anti-insurgent campaigns. From its rich 

history, the “British have a better track record in counterinsurgency than 

any other nation.” 8 Before its 20th century low-intensity conflicts against 

insurgents or terrorists, Britain fought many small-scale campaigns in colonial wars in the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, India, and of course in 

North America against its rebellious colonies. Additionally, it turned the 

tables against the French in the Peninsular War in Spain with a smallish 

land force working with Spanish guerrillas in its own version of irregular 

warfare against Napoleon’s occupying army. 

These conflicts together with geopolitical realities contributed to Britain’s predisposition for small wars and imperial expeditions as London 

policed its far-flung empire. Consequently, British history is replete with 

military experiences in suppressing colonial resistance, fighting guerrillas, 

and man-hunting bandits. Some admirers of the British way of war have 

gone so far as to advance the notion that culture and organization “made 

the British Army amenable to changes required to successfully counter 

insurgencies or control internal unrest.” 9 This tradition of successful lowintensity warfare, so it was argued, even transcended the impact of Britain’s 

large-scale conventional conflicts in World War I and II, the Korean War, 

and the Falkland campaign. Even as late as the mid-1990s, another expert 

writing in Parameters concluded: “The experience of numerous small wars 

has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding 

form [counterinsurgency] of conflict.” 10

Several macro-level factors shaped Britain’s military structure. Being 

an island nation, Britain looked to naval forces as its main line of defense, 

lavishing funding on the Royal Navy and consequently scrimping on a 

large standing army. This pattern differed from Britain’s continental rivals, 
3

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

such as Austria, France, and Prussia (the latter of which formed the nucleus 

of a powerful German nation by the 19th century’s end). Revolutionary 

France’s reliance on large massed forces, as distinct from the small 18th 

century professional armies, accentuated Britain’s variance with its adversaries across the English Channel. As the continental powers entered into 

the industrial age, their mass manufacturing capacity enabled them to field 

powerful armies with heavy artillery and then tanks and trucks—all reliant 

on railroad transport. With a different set of geopolitical circumstances, 

Britain hewed to its traditional approach of large fleets, small ground forces, 

and civilian colonial services to police its far-flung imperial holdings. 

During the formative 19th-century small-war environment, Britain 

relied almost exclusively on a slender professional officer corps drawn mostly 

from the lower aristocracy and from volunteers in its enlisted ranks for its 

pocket-sized land force, while its Continental rivals resorted to conscription 

to amass big land armies. The British stuck with volunteers in the regimental 

system, which one admirer characterized as “a quasi-tribal” because of its 

long-term cohesiveness and esprit de corps that isolated the officers and other 

ranks from the “slings and arrows” of the largely unsympathetic civilian 

population.11 But these aficionados of British military institutions missed 

the baronial origins of the regimental system, its subsidy by super-wealthy 

earls and lords, and its dilettante officers who purchased their commissions, 

resulting in such disasters as the destructive charge of the Light Brigade 

“into the mouth of Hell” during the Crimean War.12 Not until after neardecimation of the “noble six hundred” did Britain undertake serious reform 

and professionalization of its regiments. 

Yet the idiosyncratic regimental tradition did not die away in the aftermath of the brief mid-19th century conflict in the Russian Crimea. As late 

as World War II, the noted British novelist Evelyn Waugh wrote tongue-incheek about transforming recruits into regimental tribes: “The discipline 

of the square, the tradition of the mess, would work their magic and esprit 

de corps would fall like blessed unction from above.” 13 These drum beats 

fashioned “tribesmen” from individuals coming from all walks of life, rather 

than larger conventional U.S. Army divisions of the world wars.

Once World War I ended, Britain returned to its pre-war model of small 

forces strewn around the global, relying on Indian manpower to hold the 

subcontinent, to first oust the Turks from Iraq, and then to put down an 

Iraqi insurrection during the late l920s. Empire on the cheap sometimes 
4

JSOU Report 08-5

backfired, however. By relying, for example, on the sweepings of society to 

defeat rebellions they wound up with thugs to fill the ranks, as when the 

infamous Black and Tan units were used to suppress post-World War I Irish 

nationalists rather than deploying a large regular army, as we shall see. 

Elsewhere the spirit of unconventional warfare remained alive. 

Taking a leaf from Lawrence of Arabia’s experiences in World War I, 

the eccentric British officer Orde Wingate imparted guerrilla warfare techniques, not to Arab tribesmen as had T. E. Lawrence but to Jewish residents 

in the Holy Land during the interwar period. He passed along ambush and 

raid tactics in the 1930s to Jewish special night squads against the Arabs in 

Palestine before attaining fame in World War II.14 Later when war broke out 

with Germany and Japan, Wingate was well versed in commando operations 

which he applied in an Asian theater. In Burma, Wingate organized and 

led the fabled Chindits in deep-penetration raids against Japanese communication lines.15

During World War II, many British troops gained experience in smallunit unconventional warfare with the formation of special units, such as 

Special Air Service (SAS), Special Boat Section (SBS), and the Long Range 

Desert Group (LRDG) together with those (resistance operators) commanded 

by the Special Operations Executive (SOE).16 Combining ships, landing 

craft, seaborne infantry, and paratroopers before and after its retreat from 

Dunkirk, Britain launched a series of audacious commando raids in Norway, 

France, Italy, and the Levant prior to the Anglo-American D-Day operation 

on the Normandy coast.17 Even small missions amid the total symmetrical 

warfare in the course of 1939–1945 were dealt with by compact specialized 

units tasked for unconventional operations. These units and experience lent 

themselves to the exigencies of insurgent conflicts after the war.

Another element in Britain’s adaptability to insurrectionists stemmed 

from the paradoxical condition that its counterinsurgency army possessed 

limited resources. In fact, British overseas forces had almost always been 

strapped for troops, equipment, and firepower. The empire, in fact, had 

been ruled cheaply for centuries. In waging wars against saboteurs and 

gunmen, who operate among the civilian population, more often than not 

employing fewer resources is better than using too much power. It compelled 

the military and the police to fight “smarter” rather than rely on massive 

doses of firepower, which often kill collaterally innocent bystanders. British 
5

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

officers are quick to note that the political, psychological, and propaganda 

dimensions count for more than the kinetic element of these largely politicoarmed conflicts. 

The post-World War II operational environment witnessed a profusion 

of low-intensity conflicts as weaker forces, be they anticolonial nationalists, Communist insurgents, or terrorist bands, took on their much more 

powerful adversaries around the world. Many countries underwent these 

less-than-conventional wars. But Britain weathered several of these asymmetrical campaigns in its colonies. Thus, British counterinsurgency practices have received glowing adulation, especially from American students 

particularly of their methods in Malaya.18

The Malaya campaign’s favorable outcome impacted American thinking about peoples’ war first in Vietnam and then beyond. British authors, 

such as Robert Thompson, the Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya, 

in his influential book, Defeating Communist Insurgency, laid out the winning strategy in Malaya.19 From January 1952 to May 1954 the man-on-thespot was General Gerard Templer, an infantry and armor officer who was a 

veteran of both world wars. 

General Templer devised or 

implemented the political 

policies that led to victory. 

He famously stated that “the 

answer [to the insurgency] 

lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds 

of the people.” 20

Possibly no single catch-phrase epitomized the orientation of the military forces toward their adversaries and, more importantly, the population 

“sea” in which the guerrilla “fish” must “swim,” as Mao Tse-tung so memorably put it. In short, the population must be won over to the government 

side against the insurgents or the military effort will fail. Western armies 

cannot easily adopt the ancient Roman response to rebellion by scorching 

the earth and putting entire towns to the sword as Tacitus noted in Agricola. 

This famous Roman historian recorded a Caledonian (the Latin name for 

Scottish) rebel inciting his followers by cataloging Rome’s devastating barbarity and unforgettably uttering: “They [the Romans] make a desert and 

call it peace.” 21 The mass-murder of insurgents and their population “sea” 

[General Templer] famously stated that 

“the answer [to the insurgency] lies not in 

pouring more troops into the jungle, but 

in the hearts and minds of the people.”
6

JSOU Report 08-5

(whether by Rome or other states) violates American principles. Having 

ruled out extermination, U.S. military forces have turned to ways to win 

over populations while they pursue insurgents. 

Thus American practitioners looked for model and direction to Britain, 

which fought scores of small wars in pursuit of empire and boasted most 

often of its exemplars in Malaya and Northern Ireland. In Malaya, General Templer set about initiating many of the tactics that have since served 

as a model for counterinsurgency. The so-called Malayan Emergency, for 

example, witnessed the resettlement of ethnic Chinese away from jungles 

and outside the reach of the Chinese-dominated guerrilla forces. It also saw 

the direct appeal to all non-Malays, who represented a pool of recruits for 

the Communist insurgents, by granting them citizenship to dry up their 

grievances against their adopted homeland. British troops and their Malay 

auxiliaries were generally restrained in the use of their firepower so as not 

to recruit for the guerrillas by killing innocents. Templer’s efforts have long 

been enshrined in the heraldry of COIN medallions. But on a less lofty level, 

these stratagems were classic divide-and-rule approaches that Britain and 

other colonial officers learned in public school from the readings of ancient 

practitioners of war such as Julius Caesar.22 They used them to great effect 

in the Third World as Caesar did against the quarrelsome Gauls two millennia earlier. 

As it turned out, Anglophiles read much into the history and qualities 

of British fighting forces. Some waxed rhapsodic about Britain’s unique cultural characteristics for combating insurgent-like violence. One enthusiastic 

exponent of Britain’s guerrilla fighting went so far as to contend: “British 

success in counterinsurgency is also attributable to British society, which 

had created an Army ‘ideally suited to counterinsurgency and to cultural 

attitudes about how that Army might be used’.” 23 Given Britain’s extensive 

operational experience in dealing with insurgencies after World War II in 

such places as Palestine, Cyprus, Kenya, Oman, Borneo, and Malaya, it is 

puzzling to confront the fact of how long it took to implement the proper 

tactics in Northern Ireland of the late 1960s and early 1970s, as will be 

sketched below. 

These trumpeters of British counterinsurgency prowess often implied 

criticism of American efforts. They lauded the British army for “employing minimum forces...by inserting small patrols that operate like the 

insurgents, not with airpower and artillery.” 24 This same author went on to 
7

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

contend that: “The British Army does not try to avoid casualties, and it does 

not seem to be averse to taking them.” 25 In surveying British campaigns 

from Malaya to Dhofar, this analyst writing in another work held that: “The 

most salient common characteristic of these campaigns was how successful 

the British Army was in conducting small-scale and medium-scale operations” and by implicit extension how poorly post-World War II American 

forces have fought irregular wars.26

The lavishly praised techniques of the British Army in Northern Ireland 

were deemed applicable to the blast-furnace streets of Iraq. The acclaimed 

British military historian John Keegan opined: “As the entry into Basra 

was to prove, the British army’s mastery of the methods of urban warfare 

is transferable. What had worked in Belfast could be made to work also in 

Basra, against another set of urban terrorists, with a different motivation 

from the Irish Republicans though equally nasty.” 27 Until recently this represents the prevailing consensus about Britain’s counterinsurgency prowess 

in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. 

Nonetheless, it is argued here that U.S. counterinsurgency successes in 

Iraq dating from at least the 2007 “surge,” which employed not only 28,500 

additional combat troops but also sound anti-insurgent tactics and nationwide political astuteness, has earned American forces belated recognition for 

their nonkinetic approaches to winning over Sunni tribesmen and calming 

Iraq’s sectarian bloodshed. This achievement alone disproves much implied 

criticism—both cultural and organizational—contained in references praising Britain’s antiguerrilla practices as being innately and almost exclusively 

a British province. Yet, the British Army’s serious missteps in Northern Ireland had to be overcome, not with organizational culture indoctrination but 

with “a comprehensive training package provided by the Northern Ireland 

Training Team to each and every British infantry battalion that deployed 

to the province from 1972 onwards.” 28

Also in Iraq, Britain’s reputation for waging counterinsurgency operations suffered a body blow in its lengthening Basra campaign, as its troops 

remained aloof while gangs and militias preyed on the citizens of Iraq’s 

second largest city.29 Nor have British efforts in Afghanistan recaptured 

the Malaya luster.30

Rather than dealing with Iraq or Afghanistan, this essay seeks to strip 

away some of the overly varnished veneer from the Northern Ireland example or at a minimum present a deeper understanding of Britain’s much 
8

JSOU Report 08-5

proclaimed counterinsurgency effectiveness in attaining peace and stability. 

Let us look beneath the plaudits for the British Army’s small-unit patrolling and keen intelligence capability to examine what changes took place 

within the society itself to bring about tranquility and peace to that troubled 

corner of Ireland. 

A Bit of History

Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland demands some historical context to make sense of London’s programs and responses in what became 

known as the “Troubles” at the start of the late 1960s. Like many bitter 

internal conflicts, the Irish-British antagonism is imbued with a deep and 

convoluted history. If much of the complex detail has little relevance to the 

Special Operations Forces community, something needs to be written about 

the general picture prior to the Troubles. 

The Anglo-Irish antagonism is rooted in a colonial experience embedded with religious discrimination flowing from an extended chapter in 

Ireland’s history. Even a brief account requires reaching back into Ireland’s 

misty past and its relations with the larger island to its east. England’s first 

large-scale invasion of the land across the Irish Sea dates all the way back to 

the year 1172, when Henry II led a formidable invading force to consolidate 

his hold over earlier waves of Norman adventurers as well as the native Irish 

population. As such, Henry’s intervention constituted a continuation of the 

Norman Conquest of England that originated a hundred years before with 

the battle of Hastings in 1066. More importantly, Henry’s invasion touched 

off a series of conquistadorial enterprises that left the Emerald Isle bloody, 

vengeful, and hate-filled for all things English in the centuries to come. Some 

of these ancient hatreds were mitigated by centuries of intermingling of the 

native Irish and the English interlopers. Succeeding influxes of English and 

Scots settlers were assimilated into the 

broader Irish culture through intermarriage and acculturation. But the 

historical record itself, despite the 

physical incorporation, served the ends of future rebels, who legitimately 

pointed at London’s bloodstained legacy in Ireland. 

...the historical record...served 

the ends of future rebels, who 

legitimately pointed at London’s 

bloodstained legacy in Ireland.
9

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

When the English monarchy under Henry VIII broke with the Pope and 

Roman Catholicism and established a state Protestant church in England 

in the 1530s, the religious difference between Anglo overlords and Irish 

subjects soon threw fresh salt into colonial wounds of the Irish populations 

who witnessed conquest, subjugation, and displacement from their lands. 

Now the conquerors’ religion differed from the conquered, and sectarianism added another ruinous dimension to the relationship. Henry and his 

successor Tudor monarchs (Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth) completed the 

subjugation of Ireland and ensured for nearly 400 years that its government 

would be English. They feared that Ireland, with its anti-English sentiments 

and anti-Protestant beliefs, would open its territory to European enemies of 

the English crown. As history shows, this was a genuine danger. 

The Catholic-Protestant cleavages, however, mattered most in Northern Ireland due to a twist of fate. Political disturbances in and around the 

northern province of Ulster plagued Elizabeth I in the late 16th century. 

Recalcitrant local lords, aided by Catholic Spain and Spanish troops, resisted 

English rule, which ultimately prevailed but only after London’s colonial 

settlements took root. Huge swaths of land were confiscated by the English 

queen, which her successor James I resolved to resettle with a significant 

number of English farmers and Lowland Scots to achieve stability and safety 

from foreign interventions. The cultural and religious differences in Northern Ireland date from this settlement or “planting” of non-Irish peoples in 

what was termed the Ulster Plantation.31

The use of settlers to stabilize unruly regions is a time-polished practice 

seen in lands around the world. As in the case of Northern Ireland, settling 

foreigners on seized territory often sows dragons’ teeth that in time germinate tragedies, exemplified in ethnic cleansing, intersectarian violence, and 

territorial blood feuds spanning the globe. Northern Ireland was a prime 

example of this effect. At inception, the English crown’s grant of territory 

was extremely attractive to Protestant immigrants, who recognized that 

land constituted the source of wealth and the basis of power and prestige. 

To facilitate this “planting” scheme, the London government confiscated 

much of the land in six northern counties—Armagh, Cavan, Coleraine 

(later renamed Londonderry or Derry), Donegal, Fermanagh, and Tyrone—

laying the basis for sectarian strife and the “Troubles” three and a half 

centuries later. It then granted patches of land from one to two thousand 
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acres at inexpensive rents, with the requirements that the recipient then 

settle Protestant tenants to cultivate the soil and build castles to defend the 

surrounding territory. 

Thus began the “plantation” of Protestant settlers from the Scottish 

lowlands and the English countryside, who leveled forests, farmed, built 

churches, schools, and markets, thereby creating a new society that was alien 

to Irish ways. The displaced native Irish populations moved to the worst 

lands and became either tenants of the newcomers or their laborers, losing 

status and income. Naturally, they grew intensely resentful about their fate 

at the hand of the interlopers. Subsequent events, too many and too intricate 

to recount in this summary, entrenched the Protestant hold on wealth and 

power in the northern corner of Ireland that lasted to the present times. 

Religion now infused itself into the tangled Irish landscape adding the 

feature of the Catholic-Protestant conflict to Ireland’s history of opposition 

to English domination. When, for example, English notables invited William 

of Orange (a Protestant monarch from the Dutch principality of Orange) to 

invade England and oust Catholic ruler James II, the conflict spilled over 

to Ireland. After fleeing to France, James resolved to capture Ireland, (with 

aid of his local coreligious brethren) as a bridgehead for a victorious return 

to England. William thus crossed the Irish Sea and attacked the deposed 

king and his Irish Catholic and French troops. William’s army—comprised 

of Protestant troops from Ulster, England, Denmark, and Holland—won 

a decisive battle at the Boyne River in 1690, a victory that is still celebrated 

today by the Orange Order in Ulster by staging provocative annual marches 

through Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast. 

The wearing of the green or the orange in contemporary Ireland, therefore, carries religious and political significance stretching back 300 years to 

a battle fought a century before the United States declared its independence 

from Great Britain. The Protestant-dominated counties surrounding the 

Belfast harbor evolved into a pro-British enclave. There the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority in the northern enclave tensely coexisted, 

being segregated by religion and power as well as loyalties to the English 

crown or to the Roman papacy. 

The remainder of Ireland also suffered under British rule with episodes 

of repression followed by callous neglect. A monstrous example of Britain’s 

studied indifference occurred in the mid-19th century when famine befell 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Ireland. By 1841, two thirds of the Irish people depended on agriculture for 

their livelihood. Most survived as tenant farmers on lands held by landlords, 

who cared little for their renters’ welfare. These impoverished rural populations relied on the abundance of potatoes for their sustenance. Disaster 

struck in 1842, when a fungus partially destroyed the potato harvest. The 

conservative government of Robert Peel responded thoughtfully by subsidizing relief (i.e., welfare) projects to hire destitute farmers, allowing them 

to purchase food. Next the Peel government took the momentous step of 

repealing the corn (i.e., grain) laws in all of the United Kingdom, which for 

centuries prohibited the importation of grain and protected English farmers from cheaper grains produced abroad. This free-trade measure caused 

his government to lose power because the landed interests rebelled at Peel’s 

free-trade policies. The incoming Whig administration of Lord John Russell rigidly applied the prevailing notions of laissez faire, which meant no 

government interference in the nation’s economy. If the Irish peasantry died 

because the British treasury refused to buy food, so be it. The economy’s 

imbalances would be sorted out in due course by market forces alone. 

When the potato harvest wilted again due to another blight in 1846, the 

English government initially stood aside while the Irish starved, perished, 

and faced extinction. When the crown’s officials finally acted in the face of 

prolonged famine, typhus, and epidemic fevers, it was with the callousness, 

parsimoniousness, and self-righteousness that Charles Dickens portrayed 

in his contemporaneous novels.32 The disaster killed a million and a half 

people out of a population of eight million and drove another million to 

the New World, where they settled on the Eastern seaboard mainly in and 

around Boston. From these destitute immigrants sprang an anti-English 

colony within the United States that repeatedly twisted the British lion’s tail, 

aided their fellow countrymen across the Atlantic, and even clandestinely 

funded their arms purchases in the mid-20th century to kill British soldiers 

in the streets of Belfast.33

A complete retelling of this story takes us too far from the intent of this 

essay. Suffice to write that anything as horrific as the great famine could 

not but gravely impact the course of Anglo-Irish relations.34 London’s willful dismissal of its colonial responsibilities, after centuries of misrule, did 

nothing but fan the flames of Irish resistance at a time when European 

nationalism erupted across the continent in the Austrian-ruled Italy and 
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Hungary, the fragmented German states, and the turbulent Balkans. The 

heady brew of nationalism—the desire for ethnic independence and separate 

identity—proved as intoxicating to the Irish as it did to the Tuscans, Lombards, Prussians, Serbians, and Croatians of the same historical period.

The Birth of Modern Irish Nationalism 

A sense of Irishness and resentment of over-harsh British colonialism 

fused into fervent demands for independence from the crown’s governance. Post-famine Ireland groped failingly at first and then powerfully 

toward a means for independence from Britain’s tyranny. Poverty, backwardness, grievances, and the famine’s memory fueled the island’s majority 

with a passion for liberty. In the northeast corner in Ulster, however, the 

tight-knit Protestant community cherished its union with Britain. Unlike 

the rest of Ireland, Ulster underwent an industrial revolution similar to 

those occurring in Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, and Glasgow. Like England and Scotland, ship building, manufacturing, and linen production took 

root in Belfast reinforcing the religious-political connection with Britain 

through economic ties. The lands beyond the Ulster province stagnated, 

giving rise to explosive independence sentiments. To Ulster’s south, the Irish 

towns and countryside teemed with leagues, brotherhoods, secret military 

organizations, and other nationalist movements to press the case for reform 

of the tenant-landlord laws and ultimately independence from Britain. 

This upwelling of nationalism found expression in demands for home 

rule. From the mid-19th century to the establishment of the Irish Free State 

in the 1920s, Ireland erupted in strife. The struggle for sovereignty pursued 

two separate paths: one road passed through constitutional and parliamentary steps; and the other flowed underground through revolution and 

conspiracy that would, in time, plunge Ireland into bloody conflict. Some 

British governments attempted to preempt burgeoning Irish demands to be 

masters of their own destiny by transferring local powers to an Irish parliament toward home rule (i.e., autonomy). But these late-19th-century concessions foundered on Protestant-dominated Ulster’s insistence on maintaining 

its union with Britain and on British conservative politicians who viewed 

concessions as surrender of imperial interests and betrayal of the loyalists 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

in Northern Ireland. Many twists and turns followed these early efforts to 

address what became known as the Irish Question.35

Ireland seethed with independence fever at the beginning of the 20th 

century. Literary societies infused Irish nationalism with Gaelic literature, 

histories, and poetry. From this fermenting milieu emerged Sinn Fein 

(meaning “We Our Selves”)—a full-fledged separatist movement advocating a total break with any political connections to the British crown. Sinn 

Fein squared off against those Irish politicians seeking merely home rule and 

continued political bonds with Britain. Others joined the Irish Volunteers, a 

militia whose ranks opposed British governance and longed to de-Anglicize 

the whole of Ireland. As a disturbing sign of things to come, more private 

armies also formed in other parts of the country. 

Up north, the Ulsterites fought any notion of home rule for Ireland, 

which envisioned the Northern Ireland enclave controlled by the rest of the 

Irish population to its south. These Orangemen stood up the Ulster Volunteers, a militia, and secured secreted arms from a Germany all too willing 

to cause its British adversary trouble in its own backyard. Despite the rising 

ferment in greater Ireland for its own sovereignty, the outbreak of World 

War I squelched consideration of home rule in London for the duration 

of the war. But in Ireland itself, Britain’s absorption in the conflict against 

Germany and her allies presented a rare opportunity for the Irish to take 

action. These Republicans started preparations for revolution as fighting on 

the Western Front preoccupied London. Militias drilled in Dublin while 

Germany laid plans to supply them with rifles, just as Berlin had earlier 

shipped arms to the Republicans’ enemies in the north. 

The day after Easter Sunday in 1916 a poorly executed insurrection of 

some 1,500 Irish Volunteers and other private military bands took place 

when they marched to the General Post Office building in central Dublin. 

The rebels occupied, defended, and proclaimed an independent republic 

from the post office buildings. In a near-suicidal clash, the rebels held off a 

much larger loyalist force of volunteers and regular British Army troops for 

6 days before surrendering. Their rebellion backfired among many ordinary 

Irish citizens who considered the insurrectionists little more than backstabbers and even traitors because they had relatives and friends fighting 

alongside British regiments in France. 
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Then in a negative “lesson” to all counterinsurgency forces, the British 

snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by meting out firing-squad deaths to 

15 rebel prisoners, including one wounded and chair-bound leader. British 

soldiers also angrily assaulted passers-by in the streets, shot a well-known 

pacifist, arrested 2,000 Republicans and Sinn Feiners, and imprisoned many 

without trials, who were innocent of the insurrection. These acts of revenge 

rather than deliberative justice washed back on the perpetrators. Opinions 

shifted among Ireland’s population, who soon came to see those they had 

considered hooligans and rabble-rousers now as martyred heroes to Irish 

grievances against tyrannical British rule. 

In London, cooler heads soon prevailed, and the British government 

backtracked on the excesses in the wake of the Easter Rebellion. Britain 

needed Irish recruits for the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary 

and for favorable American opinion so as to gain the United States entry into 

the war on the Allied side. To placate the resentful Irish nationalist sentiments, the British released the rebel internees. Among them was Eamon de 

Valera, the only Easter Rising commandant to escape the firing squad. Soon 

afterwards, De Valera as the leader of the Sinn Fein turned his aim against 

the moderate Home Rulers, ending over time any possible maintenance of 

ties between Ireland and Britain. Ireland now moved inexorably toward 

complete independence from Britain, with the Sinn Fein spearheading the 

drive. First, Sinn Fein members won local elections and then asserted their 

cause of Irish freedom. 

Tensions between Irish political figures bent on breaking with Britain 

and the crown’s officials and police finally descended into a shooting war 

of liberation in January 1919. The former Irish Volunteers, who participated 

in the Easter Rebellion, renamed themselves the Irish Republic Army (IRA) 

and initiated an insurgency by shooting soldiers and policemen, ambushing 

military trucks, assassinating suspected spies and informers, and raiding 

government armories in what became known as the Anglo-Irish War. The 

fighting seeped into Ulster, where Protestants, also known as Unionists, 

fought alongside British Army troops to maintain the “union” with the rest 

of the British Isles. 

Rather than responding with classic counterinsurgency practices to 

win over Irish hearts and minds, as so many British officers would later 

advocate in our time, the Army responded ruthlessly to IRA provocations. 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

British authorities decided to meet terrorism with terrorism. They recruited 

unemployed former servicemen and sent them across the Irish Sea to reinforce the beleaguered police force. Uniformed in dark green caps and khaki 

trousers, these counter-guerrilla squads acquired the nickname of the Black 

and Tans and, more importantly, a legendary reputation for savage conduct. 

The Black and Tans tortured and sometimes executed prisoners. These harsh 

tactics soon turned the population totally against the British government. 

Likewise in the Ulster province, assassination was met with assassination 

in a “dirty war” of revenge and counter-revenge. 

The Anglo-Irish War deserves more attention in U.S. military circles, 

for it foreshadowed many of the techniques later employed in peoples’ war 

and insurgencies around the globe. Ireland was the first modern victim of 

British imperialism and colonialism to fight an effective guerrilla war of 

liberation (the American colonies were the first). The IRA cleverly turned 

Britain’s post-World War I policies that favored the dismemberment of the 

Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires against London. It exploited the 

widespread anti-imperialistic impulses during the early interwar years in 

many Western quarters. Within the British Isles themselves, public opinion, 

encouraged by the press, university professors, and some clergymen, swung 

toward acceptance of Irish nationalism. Officials, however, sought to justify 

retention of Ireland, as a domino whose fall would lead to dissolution of the 

entire British Empire. 

Faced with an intractable insurgency and dissolving domestic support, 

British politicians groped for an acceptable settlement for both the Protestant enclave in Northern Ireland and the greater Catholic majority amid 

the gun battles, deadly raids, and street murders. Finally, London negotiated directly with Sinn Fein for a truce in July 1921. Make no bones about 

it—“the British Government had already been forced to accept political and 

moral defeat” even if perhaps the Republicans “were beginning to smell 

military defeat.” 36

The Anglo-Irish treaty ended up dividing 6 counties of Ulster from the 

remaining 26 counties to the south. This satisfied the Ulsterites but not the 

Irish Republicans, who wanted a united Gaelic Ireland entirely free from 

British rule, language, and custom in the North as well as the South. In the 

end the Republicans settled on just the Irish Free State, a Dominion within 

the British Commonwealth, without the Northern Ireland corner. London 
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turned over the instruments of power in the South and withdrew from its 

oldest colony, which it had held for nearly 800 years.37 Later the Irish Free 

State went the full shot by breaking all British ties and becoming the Republic of Ireland. The Irish Question assumed another form, however. 

Despite the historic turn of events, the Anglo-Irish treaty constituted 

little more than a hostile and uneasy truce, for it left unresolved the unity 

of a partitioned Ireland, the continuation of British rule in Ulster, and the 

Protestant dominion over the Catholic minority in the Six Counties. It also 

left the cult of the gunmen as the historical legacy from the 1916–1922 war 

in both Ulster and the Irish Free State. It profoundly shaped the political and economic conditions in Ulster where it bred the conditions for an 

insurgency 40 years later. 

The Northern Ireland Problem

Throughout the 1950s into the early 1960s, Northern Ireland remained a 

fundamentally divided and sectarian society. 

— Thomas Hennessey38

Northern Ireland constituted an odd political configuration for its 

one and a half million inhabitants. At the time of partition from the 

Irish Free State in 1920, Ulster’s Catholic minority comprised 33 percent of 

the population, but within the Six Counties themselves specific localities 

and towns sometimes held lopsided Catholic majorities. Some among the 

Catholic population longed for geographical and nationalistic unity with 

greater Ireland and detested inclusion within the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, and Wales. Conversely, the Protestant majority determined 

through employment practices and political discrimination to drive out the 

minority, or at the least subdue Catholic, or Nationalist, political aspirations. 

Through Unionist imposition of gerrymandering of election districts and 

plural votes for business property, the Catholic minority lost political power 

in electing Ministers of Parliament (MPs or representatives) to Britain’s Parliament in Westminster and to the Ulster parliament at Stormont as well as 

local councils, which allocated jobs, housing, and social welfare. Successive 

Stormont governments gave short shrift to Catholic districts where chronic 

unemployment of near 40 percent persisted for decades, engendering frustration and enmity. 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Unlike disputes in the Balkans or within Israel, land and boundaries 

were less an issue among the religious blocs. But like the black-white friction 

in the United States, tension within Ulster arose over genuine democracy 

and fair access to housing, jobs, and education. In short, the duel revolved 

around equality within the state. Sectarian distinctions overrode social and 

economic issues, undermining the genuine practice of democracy, similar to that witnessed in contemporary Iraq between voting blocs of Shia, 

Sunni, and Kurds. Voters cast ballots for Unionist (Protestant) or Nationalist (Catholic) candidates on the basis of religious affiliation rather than for 

politicians or parties appealing to broad-based constituencies. The majority 

ensured that Northern Ireland, in effect, functioned as a one-party state with 

the Unionist Party in the driver’s seat from 1920 until recent years.

Adding to the sense of political grievance by the minority population 

was the makeup and behavior of the security forces. The Ulster Special 

Constabulary recruited the vast majority of its constables from Protestant 

neighborhoods. The same recruitment measures pertained to the B-Special force (this Class B of the Special constabulary were part-time, largely 

uncompensated volunteers), which supplemented the regular police, but 

which functioned with additional investigative and arrest authority after 

passage of the Special Powers Act to take on the characteristics of a Gestapo 

in the eyes of an oppressed minority.39

By the 1960s, when civil disobedience erupted in Northern Ireland 

cities, the economic picture of the province cast a dire prognosis for peace 

and harmony. Employment in the linen industry had fallen for half a decade 

and decreased 15 percent alone in the three years before 1955. In the 10-year 

period before 1965, the number of positions in plants employing 25 workers 

or more declined to 33,957 from 56,414. In shipbuilding, which accounted 

for one tenth of the province’s 

manufacturing jobs, foreign 

competition from Japan and the 

continent cut the workforce 40 

percent in Belfast from 1961 to 

1964. In agriculture, employment fell to 28,000 workers, or 

by one third, from 1950 to 1960.40 The economic malaise aggravated the 

communal tensions in what had became a de facto apartheid state, where 

Catholics and Protestants lived mainly in their own sections of the country 

The economic malaise aggravated 

the communal tensions in what had 

became a de facto apartheid state, 

where Catholics and Protestants lived 

mainly in their own sections...
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or their own neighborhoods within urban centers. The Protestants formed 

the backbone of most of the business and professional classes, the skilled 

laborers, and largest farms. The Catholic residents, on the other hand, made 

up smaller farmers and the unskilled workers. 

Commissioned by the Northern Ireland government, the Lord Cameron committee investigated and reported on the causes of the disturbances 

of the late 1960s. Among its chief findings, the committee emphasized “a 

rising sense of injustice and grievance among large sections of the Catholic 

population in public housing allocation, local government appointments, 

and manipulation of local elections against them.” 41 Like contemporaneous events in the United States, these complaints had everything to do with 

civil rights and acceptance within the province and much less to do with 

the perennial “Republican” issues of Ulster’s unification with the rest of 

Ireland or with resentment against the British crown. The comparison is 

not as farfetched as it might seem, for Northern Ireland’s civil rights movements explicitly followed and modeled themselves on the American civil 

rights movements marching in Selma and Montgomery. 

Catholic grievances also boiled over in the public housing arena. After 

World War II, Britain initiated public housing projects to address the pressing need for homes. By 1961, some 21 percent of all housing in Ulster was 

government built and rented to the province’s residents. By 1971, the figure 

increased to 35 percent. But the expansion of publicly built residences only 

stepped up the complaints about the sectarian allocation of new homes, 

as Catholics found themselves on the short end of the housing stick in 

some districts. Local councils divvied up government-subsidized housing 

to ensure their electoral advantage.42 With most of these councils controlled 

by Protestants, the distribution of government housing went to kith, kin, or 

other coreligious applicants. 

Even greater under-representation of Catholics occurred in public 

employment. The overall sectarian representation for the allocation of 

employment in government-paid jobs appeared fair. The number of Catholics on the government payroll usually tracked with their percentage of the 

population, which in 1971 stood at 31 percent. But Protestants, or Unionists, 

were overrepresented in the higher grade positions. The Catholics filled the 

ranks with levels around 40 percent, slightly over their proportion of the 

entire population; but held only around 12–15 percent of the senior posts. 

Discrimination against Catholics ratcheted up in government-owned gas, 
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electricity, and water industries. One study recorded that only 15 percent of 

the workers in those publicly owned services identified themselves as Catholic. Among the most senior government officials—such as MPs, top officials 

in local authorities, and high-level bureaucrats—only 11 percent professed 

Catholic identities.43 It is impossible to escape the conclusions drawn from 

many reports and commissions that widespread discrimination existed in 

Northern Ireland prior to the Troubles. 

Northern Ireland and the United States—Divided Societies

The societal divide in Northern Ireland paralleled American racial divisions that exploded in race riots inside U.S. urban centers during the 

1960s. Mutatis mutandis, what was written in the 1968 Kerner Commission 

report after urban civil disorder hit American cities, “our nation is moving 

toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal,” can 

succinctly sum up Northern Ireland at the same time. Religion and culture 

defined polarity in Ulster, not ethnicity and skin pigmentation. But the divisions held similarities. The outrage and condemnation among the minority in Northern Ireland paralleled that in the African-American minority 

within the United States in the same period. 

The Catholic community underwent changes beginning during the 

1950s. Educated Catholics gravitated toward professions in teaching, 

medicine, and the legal professions because upper-level government jobs 

remained largely in Protestant hands. Foremost, they looked for ways to 

reform the political imbalances within Northern Ireland and to confront 

discriminatory practices in housing, jobs, and local governing bodies. To 

realize these goals, they formed political movements. 

One particularly effective group was the Campaign for Social Justice 

(CSJ). The CSJ asserted that Nationalist politicians in parliaments in Westminster or Stormont were ineffective in attaining reforms. On the other 

hand, the CSJ also held that the violent tactics of the IRA during the 1950s 

were likely to fail by creating a backlash against Catholics. Like civil rights 

groups in the American South that also marched under the banner of “one 

man, one vote,” the CSJ directed its attention at the central government, not 

local political councils. American civil rights groups wanted to involve the 

U.S federal government, and the CSJ sought to impact British public opinion rather than Unionist views, which it deemed impervious to reform. It 
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contended that a Northern Ireland Parliament in the hands of the Unionist 

Party, which barred Catholics, had not given justice to the minority in the 

40 years of its existence. Only British public opinion, if properly mobilized, 

could pressure Stormont for reform, since the British Parliament in Westminster held ultimate responsibility over the Ulster province. 

Arrayed against Catholic groups pressing for reforms were Protestant 

movements determined to preserve the status quo, such as the Ulster Protestant Volunteers and the Ulster Constitution Defense Committee, led by the 

fiery churchman Ian Paisley. And behind these movements was the Ulster 

Volunteer Force (UVF) that fought against the IRA during the Anglo-Irish 

War. Both Catholic and Protestant populations contributed adherents to 

violent underground bands, which endorsed the use of force to attain political ends. Others joined overt groups to demonstrate publicly against their 

religious foes. Religion prevented the members of sectarian communities 

from joining anything but their own religious-based parties. The locked-in 

demographics and political alignments ruled out reforming society at the 

ballot box. Whereas majorities can usually acquiesce to the advancement of 

small minorities up the socioeconomic ladder, they recoil at larger minorities of around one third or more of the total population. The Protestant 

community in Northern Ireland fell into this category. And they protested 

Catholic demonstrations. 

The “Troubles” Begin 

What relighted the fuse in Northern Ireland was the emergence of 

public marches and protests by Catholic civil rights-type movements 

in the late 1960s. Modeled on their counterparts in the United States, the 

marchers and demonstrators courted television and print media attention 

as means to influence political decisions. If these activities got out of hand 

or produced Protestant counterdemonstrations, then disturbances, riots, 

and tense confrontations ensued. These standoffs did result in British governmental pressure on the Unionist-controlled government sitting in Stormont. Its mild reforms in response, nonetheless, fell short of the minority’s 

demands, which embarked on more nonviolent civil disturbances. The antiUnionist, however, did succeed in antagonizing Ulster’s Unionist Party and 

its sympathizers such as Ian Paisley. Agitators on both sides shrunk the 

middle ground and sharpened the edginess in the streets. 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Communal tensions came to 

a head when widespread rioting 

broke out in Northern Ireland in 

July 1969. After a month of sectarian strife, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), a police unit, 

nearly folded in exhaustion, and 

Stormont requested and received 

the deployment of British troops 

within the province to maintain 

order. From the Catholic minority viewpoint, the RUC lacked 

the impartiality of a neutral 

police force. To offset this Catholic distrust, the British subordinated the RUC to its military command. 

This arrangement caused a rivalry between the army and the RUC on the 

operational level until the late 1970s. 

British authorities, more importantly, scrapped the auxiliary police force, 

the notorious B Specials, who were poorly trained reservist police. Neither 

police force had any Catholic officers, which left them open to charges of 

sectarian partiality, if not to deliberate violence against the minority. These 

were necessary but insufficient reforms because they did not go far enough. 

Nor did the minority see British soldiers as a particularly neutral party. 

In fact, the Irish government in Dublin called for United Nations’ peacekeepers, who would be an impartial military to walk Northern Ireland’s 

streets. The idea went nowhere because Britain sat on the United Nations 

Security Council. With the dispatch of the British Army to Ulster’s streets, 

the Northern Ireland imbroglio was transformed from internal civil conflict 

to an intrastate peacekeeping mission that soon evolved into an insurgency. 

The Stormont government, in effect, lost its heretofore responsibility for 

managing the affairs in the now-volatile province. 

At this pivotal point, Britain might have nipped the coming insurgency in the bud had it behaved with the forthcoming responsiveness of 

Washington administrations when faced with civil and racial unrest in 

several American cities during the late 1960s. The Westminster government did issue communiqués and set up commissions to address unfair 

housing and employment allocations. Britain’s Labour government also 

British troops stand guard in Falls Road, 

Belfast during rioting in August 1969 

as a building burns in the background. 

Photo by permission of Newscom. 
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laid the foundations for reconciliation policies. It secured passage of legislation through the Stormont parliament to address community relations, to 

prevent the incitement of hatred among religions in Northern Ireland, to 

centralize public-sector home building and allocation, and to transfer health 

services, water, sewage, and road building from local control to centralized 

allocation. These changes embodied efforts to streamline and rationalize 

delivery of public services as well as lay to rest the minorities’ exclusion, 

which the British directly attributed to the rise in violence. 

However, what followed soon thereafter was a backtracking from these 

early approaches due, in part, to the Conservative Party coming to power 

but also to developments in Ireland 

itself. The Provisional IRA’s embrace 

of a physical-force strategy took the 

steam out of the reform strategy. 

Reformist packages appeared to be 

rewarding bad behavior and disloyalty. The Protestant majority resented 

what it perceived as the appeasement and kid-glove treatment of violent 

culprits. Indeed, by the early 1970s, the emphasis shifted from carrying out 

the announced reforms to condemning the actions of “sinister elements or 

resurgent Republicanism that could not be satisfied by reform.” 44

London’s security answer to rioting and disorder also struck the minority Catholic population as being partial to the Ulster Unionist. Rather than 

banning the provocative Orange parades and marches through the Catholic 

Bogside neighborhood in Belfast in summer 1970, the British authorities let 

them proceed. Additionally, the British Army imposed curfews and weapons 

searches exclusively in Catholic neighborhoods. Kicking in doors, ransacking of homes for weapons, humiliating automobile occupants in searches, 

rough questioning and harassment of pedestrians on the streets—all were 

heavy-handed practices initially employed as British troops rushed into 

Northern Ireland. The conduct alienated the Catholic population from the 

British authorities and ensured a steady stream of recruits to the Provisional 

IRAs. The vaunted British expertise in conducting sophisticated counterinsurgency measures was absent in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. 

Such actions forfeited neutrality and convinced Catholics that London’s 

military was not in Northern Ireland to protect them. The British response, 

indeed, played into the hands of the Provisional IRA, which had begun 

The Provisional IRA’s embrace of 

a physical-force strategy took the 

steam out of the reform strategy. 
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

sniping at Orange rioters and troops alike. By early 1971, British troops and 

RUC officers were being ambushed, machine-gunned, or bombed by a fierce 

underground movement. Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast erected barriers 

rendering them “no-go” areas to the crown’s security forces. This also had 

the effect of denying the government intelligence about the insurgents. 

The upsurge in civil disorder and the British government’s military 

intervention reenergized and, at the same time, divided the hard-core Irish 

nationalist movements on both sides of the border between Ulster and the 

Irish Republic. Different objectives caused splits within the Irish Republican 

Army that saw itself as the heirs to the fighters in the 1919–1921 Irish War of 

Independence. Briefly, the so-called official IRA espoused a Marxist orientation and favored building a nonviolent and class-based alliance between 

Protestant and Catholic working classes in Northern Ireland to undermine 

the partition of Northern and Southern Ireland. This wing adopted early 

on some militant tactics, including shooting at British soldiers, for a short 

time before declaring an indefinite ceasefire in 1972. The traditional IRA 

believed that its violent campaign in the 1950s ended up failing because it 

alienated working-class people among Catholics and Protestants. It resolved 

not to repeat these tactics. 

The so-called Provisional IRA (PIRA or “Provos”) committed itself 

to never accepting partition of the island and to a violent national liberation front strategy against British and Protestant rule in Northern Ireland. 

Thus it harkened back to the Republicanism of the 1916 Easter Rebellion 

that fought for total expulsion of the British crown from all of Ireland. It 

drew support in the South as well as the North because of these historical 

roots. Like the official branch of the IRA, the “Provisionals” also made 

appeals to Ulster Protestants for a nonsectarian society with equal rights 

and opportunities for all religions. But the PIRA’s advocacy of Republican 

ideals and use of violence completely turned off the Protestant majority. 

Instead, its message and means resonated with the Catholic population 

when faced with Protestant hooligan attacks on life, limb, and property. 

The PIRA picked up most of the old Republican networks in the North 

and recruited most of the militant youth who underwent radicalization 

with the 1969 riots. Yet the two wings of the IRA killed each other from 

time to time as their animus deepened. Similar splits took place within the 

Sinn Fein that mirrored the fissures between the armed cadres. Thus, there 
24

JSOU Report 08-5

came into existence an “official” Sinn Fein and a “provisional” Sinn Fein. 

Other splinter factions later surfaced, staged attacks, and complicated the 

counterinsurgency response to spreading paramilitary violence. 

Britain Responds on a Wider Scale

By summer 1971, the PIRA’s shooting and bombing campaign reached an 

unprecedented level. By July, 55 people died violent deaths and another 

600 suffered wounds within a population of only 1.5 million inhabitants. 

Some 320 shooting incidents and over 300 explosions occurred in the first 

six months of the year.

Demands for action prompted the Ulster government after consultation 

with Britain to strike back with a narrowly effective but widely controversial policy of internment without trial of suspected insurgents in Catholic 

areas. The Ulster officials convinced London authorities that no organized 

terrorist networks existed within the Protestant community. Therefore, the 

British concentrated on the Catholics. On 9 August 1971, the British Army 

staged a series of dawn raids to arrest 450 suspects; it actually netted 342 

men, with almost 100 immediately released. Of those still held, many had 

little or no connection to the IRA.45

As a backlash to the internment policy, Northern Ireland’s towns 

exploded in killings, burnings, and displacement of residents, leaving 

2,000 Protestants and 7,000 Catholics homeless. Refugee camps south of 

the border accommodated some 2,500 fleeing Catholics. There were over 100 

fatalities and several hundred injured. Soon allegations of “ill-treatment” 

arose from the arrested prisoners, who contended that detainees endured 

“in-depth” interrogations while hooded, forced to stand for long periods, 

and deprived of sleep. The immediate consequences of the tougher approach 

backfired on the officials. 

Internment and harsh interrogations caused a jump in PIRA numbers. 

Official IRA units went over to the “Provisionals,” and new recruits flocked 

to the underground movement. Internment also occasioned a change in 

PIRA operations. It widened its target list, homing in on Protestant-owned 

factories, shops, working-class pubs, and other economic facilities. It also 

zeroed in on the RUC and the Ulster Defense Regiment by assassinating its 

members whether unarmed, uniformed, or off duty as well as when they 

manned their posts. Even worse, internment led moderate and cooperative 
25

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Catholic politicians, officials, and prominent figures to resign their positions or withdraw their cross-sectarian participation. In their eyes, British 

actions did nothing but defend the Unionist power and privilege in Northern Ireland. 

Finally, Catholic reactions to internment sparked a counter-reaction 

among the Protestant community. Disparate Protestant vigilantes and paramilitary formations merged into the Ulster Defense Association in autumn 

1971. Like the older Ulster Volunteer Force, the UDA settled on the term 

“loyalist” rather than “unionist” to identify their cause; but the two are 

used interchangeably despite the confusion for the unfamiliar observer. 

They were loyal to the connection with Britain and prided themselves on 

allegiance to the crown and the Union Jack. The UDA membership reached 

over 40,000 at its peak in 1972, but the bulk of membership held full-time 

day jobs. The UDA and the UVF usually rallied for marches or to the barricades in defensive roles. A hard core, however, moved beyond Protestant mob violence to solo revenge murders, often carried out randomly 

against uninvolved Catholics walking home from work or a pub. In short, 

the internment policy deepened the Troubles as Northern Ireland spiraled 

into widespread sectarian bloodshed. 

Worse, much worse, arose. The joint Stormont-Westminster alliance 

reached a watershed in the wake of the notorious Bloody Sunday incident 

on 30 January 1972. As 

demonstrators from a 

banned civil rights march 

in Derry descended into 

a melee, British troops 

used rubber bullets and 

water cannons to contain rowdy youths. In the 

chaotic scene, the storied Parachute Regiment 

reportedly responded to 

sounds of gunfire with its 

own rifle shots. When the 

firing stopped, 13 civilians lay dead (an additional one died later) and 17 suffered bullet wounds. 

Controversy still swirls around whether the fault for the shootings lies with 

Demonstrators and British troops face each other 

on Bloody Sunday, 30 January 1972. Photo by 

permission of Newscom. 
26

JSOU Report 08-5

the paratroopers or members of the Official IRA, who may have first fired on 

the “paras.” Bloody Sunday galvanized fierce anti-British emotions within 

the Catholic community on both sides of the Irish border. In Dublin to 

the south, rioters burned the British embassy. In Northern Ireland, a wave 

of bombings killed and maimed shoppers and restaurant-goers. Violence 

spread to Britain itself where Irish bombers detonated explosions near the 

barracks of the Parachute Regiment, killing 7 civilians. In all, 467 people 

died in 1972, the worst year of the Troubles. 

When the Westminster government, in response to the violent contagion, demanded that the Stormont Parliament turn over control of the local 

security forces to British authority, the parliamentary body refused in spite 

of its inability to halt the rising tide of attacks. Then, Prime Minister Edward 

Heath suspended the Northern Ireland government in March 1972 initially 

for one year but as it turned out for over two decades. Britain decided to 

govern directly the unruly province and vested Ulster’s powers in a newly 

created Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. This meant that Britain 

could implement policies unfiltered by the political establishment in Ulster. 

It is little commented on, but the new dispensation also subordinated all 

the security forces to British governmental control, meaning political ends 

trumped strictly military measures. In short, Britain’s direct rule of the 

chaotic Six Counties resulted in a quasi-colonial form of government, which 

London attempted to balance with a Northern Ireland advisory council to 

provide input on local matters. Direct British rule brought no end in the 

violence, however. Other more imaginative steps were needed. 

The antidotes to the virus of insurgency proved to be powerful societyaltering measures, which have too often gone unappreciated—or under 

appreciated—by soldiers and students of counterinsurgency, who became 

mesmerized by the facile techniques of counterinsurgency. These proponents 

or observers saw the surface tactics of the British Army patrolling in small 

units on foot, donned in soft berets (not helmets), or riding in opened top 

vehicles (not buttoned-down tanks). They missed the vastly deeper and 

broader societal reordering and diplomatic forays that transformed the 

nature of the insurgency and delivered peace. 
27

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Terrorism and Response 

For 20 years a low-intensity conflict washed over Ulster, occasionally 

spilling into the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. More 

than 3,600 people died from political violence in Northern Ireland from 

1969 and 1998. To confront the escalating violence, London fielded more 

security personnel to the peak amount of 30,000 in 1972—a time of spiked 

violence. It should be noted that the ranks of Britain’s security personnel 

included officers from the homegrown RUC and Ulster Defense Regiment 

(that replaced the notorious B Specials). Gradually as conditions permitted, 

London scaled down its security presence. At the time of the IRA ceasefire 

in 1994, the declining troop level reached 17,000. By mid-2007, only some 

5,000 British troops remained garrisoned in province. By most accounts, 

the insurgent numbered less than 500 at one time and at their peak.46

Much has been written about British military techniques utilized to 

combat bombings, sniping, and assassinations. The bulk of the assessments 

have stressed the changeover in tactics from a heavy-handed, clumsy, rigid 

militarized occupation to a deft, agile, intelligence-informed unconventional 

force. Known as the “soft approach,” the British strategy gradually centered 

on nonaggressive reactions to attacks. It emphasized interaction with the 

locals to present a nonthreatening posture and to tease out intelligence. 

British officers touted this stability-by-civility course of action. Rather than 

the “full-battle rattle” of other counterinsurgency armies, such as the U.S. 

military, small British foot patrols wore the soft beret, not weighty Kevlar 

helmets and bulky full-body armor. They patrolled on foot, not in vehicles. 

British authorities have not been shy in advocating these procedures over 

the years to their American counterparts. Even advisability of removing 

sunglasses when talking with Iraqis was held up as British virtue.

In the course of the Iraq insurgency, British officers were free with 

advice for “shoulder-holster wearing” American generals with a “strong 

streak of Hollywood” to emulate the behavior of Britain’s servicemen who 

“were undemonstrative, phlegmatic, and pragmatic.” 47 Much of this tacticallevel advice proved to be on target, such as dialing down an over reliance 

on heavy firepower in crowded streets, stepping up thorough intelligence 

gathering with up-to-the minute analysis, and turning to community-based 

policing methods rather than conventional attritional warfare in build-up 

areas that redounded against a liberating occupation force. 
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JSOU Report 08-5

Among the advertised British success stories, Northern Ireland usually 

stood near the top. It was in the rainy climes of the Ulster pocket that the 

British Army touted one of its counterinsurgency triumphs. Knowledgeable officers pointed out specific British units and lessons to their American counterparts. Britain’s 14 Intelligence Company enlisted informers as 

well as inserted bugging and tracing equipment in intelligence-gathering 

operations. The elite Special Air Service (SAS) used with great affect wiretapping, night-vision equipment, massive surveillance of suspects, and the 

high-velocity bullet, rather than wide-radius explosives, to dispatch a single 

terrorist. The SAS formed a “symbiotic relationship” for tip-offs with RUC’s 

Special Branch, which possessed a network of informers in the Catholic 

community.48

The SAS’s lethal zeroing in on IRA operatives with deadly force resulted 

in the insurgents labeling it the “Special Assassination Squad” out of fear. 

Its methods did much to curb terrorism in Six Counties, but they were not 

without controversy. Even SAS officers were said to have backed a shootto-kill policy, although units did take prisoners on occasion. SAS troops 

killed some 28 IRA members from 1987–1992 in ambushes and assaults.49

Moreover, a SAS hit team gunned down three unarmed IRA operatives 

on the streets of Gibraltar in 1988—an incident that set off a firestorm of 

controversy in the European press. The SAS’s lethality did undercut the 

avowed governmental policy of “police primacy” while it strove to keep the 

lid on IRA attacks. 

The SAS record combined with other less deadly counterinsurgency 

practices contributed to the British Army’s reputation for winning low-intensity conflicts. These methods established the British Army’s place within 

the pantheon of victories over guerrillas and terrorists.50 John Keegan, the 

British military historian, wrote: “Irish Republicans hate those they call 

‘Crown forces’ for their professionalism, since it blocked their ambition to 

control the Northern Irish cities themselves.” 51

In Northern Ireland, one British officer noted: “It is doubtful whether 

any other Army could have coped without resorting to massive retaliation.” 52 Indeed, British troops behaved with remarkable restraint after the 

Bloody Sunday incident. While civilian casualties made up the bulk of the 

more than 3,600 killed, British Army casualties soared three to one over 

paramilitary deaths, at about 1,000 security personnel to 300 insurgents 

killed. Of the security forces, two thirds of their deaths came from the 
29

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

ranks of local personnel from 1976 to 1990, compared with one third from 

1971–1975.53 Rather than heavy retaliation for lost security forces, the British 

authorities practiced restraint and precisely targeted strike backs against 

individual PIRA members. Thus the same British officer-author writing 

in 1985 reported: “During the [first] 16 years of the Emergency, the Security Forces have reduced violence and the potential of the IRA to achieve 

damage, disruption and destruction, to a degree that in the dark days of the 

early 1970s often seemed impossible.” 54

Even the noted military author Martin Van Creveld bought into “the real 

secret behind the British success: extreme self-control.” The Israeli expert 

added: “Whatever else might happen, the British did not allow themselves 

to be provoked. . . By showing restraint, the British did not alienate people 

other than those who were already fighting them.” 55 How this “reduced violence” came about was due not just to Army restraint, skill, and doggedness 

but also to political actions to lessen the economic and political marginalization of the Catholic minority, as this essay seeks to demonstrate. 

Patience ranks near the top of qualities for counterinsurgency, but it is 

trumped by political action. Restraint could make the Army no enemies, 

but it also could make it no friends; jobs, housing, and education programs 

could win over the uncommitted to grudging acquiescence of continued 

British rule. It is an established fact that the British governments were not 

only able to adapt the military COIN measures; they changed their policy 

prescriptions too. This essay is focused on the political steps that secured 

peace in Northern Ireland. But it should, briefly, acknowledge the purely 

martial counterinsurgency formula for stabilization. These include urban 

foot patrols, painstaking and frustrating surveillance of suspects, instant 

checkpoints or reactions to incidents, bomb-disposal methods, redundant 

radio networks to maintain communications in a crisis, improved searching 

techniques, and, most important, enhanced intelligence gathering.

The British also stepped away from much overt patrolling in early stages 

of the insurgency to more covert operations by the mid-1980s as more effective to combat the terrorists’ element of surprise. Fewer troops on the streets 

also meant a less intrusive reminder of the British presence. When the IRA 

shed its battalion-size organization for cellular structure to elude detection, 

it required the British to also adapt with the four-man “brick” as the standard patrol unit. The IRA cell apparatus also necessitated greater reliance 

on police work and intelligence to combat the dispersed network. The most 
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JSOU Report 08-5

controversial British approach involved the use of the Protestant or loyalists 

paramilitaries. This policy included more than just passing intelligence to 

British handlers; it sometimes meant loyalist bombings of Catholic pubs 

or assassination of Catholics alleged to be IRA members in a sectarian 

“dirty war.” 56 British forces and the loyalist gangs shared the mutual goal 

of eliminating the IRA. The collaboration may have helped facilitate the 

containment of PIRA violence, but it allowed the paramilitaries to depict 

the British forces as little more than allies of the Protestants. 

The lethal-force incidents by both sides did, in fact, first taper off and 

then end completely. The debate, however, centers on the cause of the decline 

in the killings and maiming. Too many thoughtless writers, analysts, and 

simply pundits credit the tactical-level COIN steps almost exclusively or at 

the least overemphasize them in their findings. Standard military accounts 

emphasize the success of tactics, while making little, if any, mention of civicaction measures. For example, one book series on the history, organization, 

and equipment of famous fighting forces that soldiers would be inclined to 

read actually proposed: “The Security Forces [in Northern Ireland] estimate that through a combination of their overt patrolling and undercover 

intelligence-gathering operations they prevent more than two thirds of all 

planned terrorist attacks.” Without explanation, this author went on to 

note: “Each year the level of PIRA activity drops and its support in the 

Catholic community is gradually reduced.” 57 The reader concludes wrongly 

that military operations alone achieved a containment of terrorism. There 

is no mention of other factors, such as political reconciliation measures, 

improved socio-economic conditions, or diplomatic accommodations with 

the Republic of Ireland to the south. 

The Arsenal of Victory: Local Government, Jobs, Houses, 

and Education 

Britain’s nonmilitary responses to the paramilitary violence played the

major role in the eventual pacification, far outweighing the counterinsurgency measures of small-unit foot patrols, intelligence gathering, and 

minimal use of force. Whereas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and 

Marines carry out—or at least ensure—the bulk of the civic action type 

programs among the populations, in Northern Ireland the British civilian 

authorities took responsibility for such “hearts and minds” programs. 
31

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Early on, the British government implemented some remedial programs 

to address long-standing grievances within Northern Ireland that contributed to the PIRA’s insurgency against Britain’s governance. Catholics had 

long felt disadvantaged and discriminated against in jobs, housing, and 

education compared to the non-Catholic population. Their sense of exclusion from societal amenities fueled their support for the PIRA with a pool 

of recruits, a ready-made intelligence network, safe houses, and financial 

or human resources. By lessening Catholic alienation and anger, the British 

authorities banked on separating the bulk of this non-Protestant population 

from radical members who directly enabled the PIRA insurgency. 

Once Britain suspended the Stormont Parliament and directly ruled 

Northern Ireland, it correctly identified the long-term solution to the Troubles as social reform. It also reduced the number of British troops by 6,000 

from its 1972 levels at the end of 1976. London directed the political process 

and allocation of resources to the beleaguered enclave. In the decade following direct rule, public spending drastically increased. Social security outlays 

for example spiked by 102 percent to cope with the rise in unemployment, 

violence, and underdevelopment. 

How the London government dealt with violence emanating from 

Protestants will be covered below in the Community Relations and Education section. Suffice here to note that the Protestant majority—who often 

benefited more than the Catholic minority from access to public housing, 

jobs, and education—concentrated on their established alliance with the 

United Kingdom. Once the Protestant community realized that it would 

not be abandoned to any scheme to enfold the Ulster province within the 

rest of Ireland, they generally moved away from attacks on British security 

forces. Protestant gunmen did kill Catholics in revenge killings, which kept 

Northern Ireland in turmoil. But generally the London government identified Catholics for their social service enticements, although Protestants 

also benefited indirectly by the rise in prosperity and government benefits. One illustration of Britain’s spiraling outlays in the embattled province was the noteworthy growth in retirement pensions, unemployment 

benefits, and healthcare benefits, which jumped to £257,458,000 (approximately 772,374,000 in 1980 U.S. dollars) in 1978 from £66,129,000 (about 

198,387,000 in 1980 U.S. dollars) in 1969, nearly a fourfold increase.58

The Provisional IRA and other murderous gangs drew their recruits 

from working-class Catholics, the most aggrieved cross-section of the 
32

JSOU Report 08-5

minority. Others within the Catholic community preferred the nonviolent 

approach of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, one of the constitutional parties of Northern Ireland that contested elections and held seats 

in the Stormont parliament. British civilian officials strove to drain away 

manpower, intelligence, and financing from the paramilitaries, while trying 

to channel disgruntled members of the minority into recognized political 

parties to resolve their grievances and attain their goals. Hence, London 

devoted attention and money to three major sectors in Northern Ireland 

society—jobs, housing, and education. Each will be briefly analyzed. 

Local Government Reform

I

t took longer than anticipated to reform local government after the imposition of direct rule, but in spring 1973 the first District Council elections 

were held under revised procedures. These reformed provisions provided 

new boundaries for the District Councils, voting systems, and enfranchisement. A return to proportional representation, which had been scrapped in 

1929 to ensure Protestant political victories in local, provincial, and Westminster elections through the gerrymandering of voting districts, enabled 

the Catholic minority parties to win more seats than under the old discriminatory system. This reform thus brought more Catholic representation to 

District Councils, which held resources and powers over employment in 

government service jobs. 

The election returns in 26 District Councils led to minority views and 

votes. In the first election after the reforms, the Unionist Party (Protestant) 

had a clear majority on only one District Council. For their part, the main 

Catholic parties controlled no single Council. This outcome, nevertheless, 

built in a healthy give-and-take process among Council members, who now 

had to form voting coalitions to pass bills, allocate resources, and accomplish agendas. In short, the minority views and concerns now counted in the 

negotiations in ways unheard of before the British reforms. The hegemony of 

the Unionist Party, therefore, suffered a setback. Like any political reform, 

this one had drawbacks in that it led not to immediate political miracles, 

since sectarianism did not suddenly evaporate. Yet, Catholic politicians 

for the first time in 44 years sensed an elevation in their participation in 

local government and decision-making. Therefore, the political structure 

underwent a substantial overhaul.59
33

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Along with local governmental reforms, various London governments 

attempted to bring province-wide political parties to the negotiating table. 

In fact, there were even talks with the PIRA representatives that punctuated 

truces between paramilitary and British security forces. Mainly, however, 

London sought to engage the so-called constitutional parties in discussions 

about the devolution of its power back to Northern Ireland. These British 

initiatives often failed abjectly, as Catholic and Protestant parties boycotted 

the talks or presented programs irreconcilable with those of other parties, 

leading to complete breakdowns in negotiations. Some wanted one legislature; others favored two. Catholic leaders wanted integration into the 

Republic of Ireland. Protestant politicians favored complete incorporation 

of Ulster within the United Kingdom. How the control of the security forces 

would be divvied up plagued the talks. In short, there was little or no consensus among the parties. But an electoral process presented an alternative 

to the bomb and bullet. Over time, this political approach took hold and 

led to the end of sectarian violence in the province. 

One unforeseen political development of enormous import grew out of 

the election of imprisoned PIRA members to representative bodies in the 

early 1980s. Bobby Sands, one of ten incarcerated and self-martyring PIRA 

men, led a hunger strike that turned out to be a propaganda coup. Before 

his death from self-inflicted starvation, Sands won a by-election (special 

election) for a vacant seat in the Westminster Parliament. Two other PIRA 

prisoners won election to the Republic of Ireland’s parliament in Dublin. If 

imprisoned PIRA militants could win elections from prisons, then a political 

strategy, rather than a likely fruitless terrorist campaign, might attain the 

political ends for which the Catholic rebels so desperately and menacingly 

bombed and assassinated. This realization—made possible in part by the 

reforms—dawned on Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, and orientated 

him toward a political settlement that took 15 years to come to fruition. 

Britain’s openness to political reform and acceptance of its sworn enemies 

to election victories displayed a strategic flexibility. There are even hints that 

British officials intrigued in IRA politics to bring about a faction favoring 

elections and a political resolution.60 Be that as it may, Sinn Fein went on 

to be the largest party in Northern Ireland and won seats in Westminster, 

Dublin, Belfast, and the European Parliament by the early 21st century. 
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JSOU Report 08-5

Housing for the Minority 

Government, or public, housing assumes a greater portion of dwellings in Northern Ireland than in the United States where the private 

sector, aside from city or federally built inner-city residences, dominates. 

Some of this government intervention is an outgrowth of socialist-style 

governments across the Atlantic, and some stems from the rebuilding of 

destroyed housing stock during World War II. By 1971, some 35 percent of 

the homes in Northern Ireland were public-rented accommodations. British governments supplied funds for housing construction, but it never met 

demands. Shortages of homes still existed throughout the province before 

and during the Troubles. 

This expansion of the government’s role in home building led to fresh 

charges of discrimination, for many newly constructed homes went to Protestants. Not all areas of Northern Ireland witnessed housing allocation 

unfair to the Catholic minority, but enough instances took place to cause a 

sense of grievance that found its confirmation in other forms of sectarianbased denial. 

It was, in fact, the discriminatory allocation of housing by local authorities that spurred the civil rights protests in the late 1960s. Local councils, 

as indicated above, worked to gather Protestant voters in their districts and 

confine Catholics in their segregated neighborhoods. This segregation policy 

also locked in Protestant residents nearer to employment opportunities. 

Thus the overall practice reproduced Unionist-controlled local councils in 

a form of a residential apartheid. At the start of the Troubles, the London 

government established a centralized authority, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE), in place of existing bodies and the 67 local authorities. Like other service boards in health, education, and libraries, the NIHE 

embodied the mission of eliminating the grounds for complaints in order 

to reduce the basis of underlying disaffection “behind violence and ensure 

future viability and well-being.” 61

Under the NIHE’s auspices, housing starts initially spurted to over 

9,000 homes in 1971, two years after its startup, but then declined to only 

4,000 units three years later before it leaped again to over 9,000 in 1976. 

This uneven production curve was traceable to changes from a Labour to 

a Conservative government in London and to civil disorder within Northern Ireland. Sentiments in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom also 
35

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

impacted British policies. Protestants and others believed that government 

rewards to Catholic home-seekers, in effect, were little more than pandering 

to those guilty of perpetuating violence. Consequently, London’s housing 

and other “hearts and minds” projects were prey to fluctuations induced by 

the outlook of politicians and their constituents. 

But even the coming to power of the Conservatives in 1979, who were 

philosophically opposed to the expansion of the role of government in 

housing, saw another aberration in the usual policy of the governing party. 

Unexpectedly, the Conservatives spared cuts in housing expenditures in 

Northern Ireland that hit the rest of the United Kingdom. Two years later, 

in fact, the per capita housing expenditure in the Six Counties stood at 

almost four times the amount in England and Wales.62 This departure in 

Conservative principles prudently came about for the practical matter of 

reducing Catholic bitterness, not an overall change in views. 

A unique institution, the NIHE became the United Kingdom’s first comprehensive housing authority. In addition to government funds, it gained 

money from rental income and sales of homes. From its founding until 

2001, it “built over 80,000 new homes, housed more than 500,000 people, 

improved 350,000 homes in the private sector, sold over 90,000 homes to 

sitting tenants.” 63 The sheer breadth of its housing activities had a substantial 

impact on making more homes and rentals available in Northern Ireland, 

thereby dramatically impacting the availability of living accommodations 

to Catholics and Protestants alike. 

Employment for the Discriminated

Employment discrimination constituted another sector that caused hostile feelings of inequality through barriers that disadvantaged the Catholic minority. These inequalities smacked of religious bias in both public and 

private sectors. Among government jobs, the Catholic job-holders occupied 

positions commensurate with their percentage of the population, according 

to independent studies. But discrepancies appeared in higher level positions, where Protestants filled senior posts in numbers disproportionate 

to their province-wide numbers. Top civil servants, however, argued that 

Catholics lacked the education standards for the uppermost slots or they 

simply did not apply for them. Nongovernment job prospects presented 

another dismal picture. In the private sector, Catholic workers usually held 
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JSOU Report 08-5

the manual laboring jobs, while Protestants occupied the managerial or 

executive positions. 

Compounding the disturbing employment portrait was the overall worsening of Northern Ireland’s economy. Foreign competition eroded the province’s once-prosperous shipbuilding and textile industries. So British efforts 

to alleviate unfairness in the workplace had also to concentrate on spurring 

overall economic development. London established the Local Enterprise 

Development Unit in 1971 to direct aid toward small firms in rural districts 

to expand manufacturing plants. Two other agencies replaced it, each with 

a broadened mandate and funds to stimulate industrial development. 

Later in 1982, Britain replaced these agencies with the Industrial Development Board that embraced several functions to revitalize industries, 

transfer technology, and increase production. All these efforts, and others, 

aimed to alleviate unemployment, which hovered around 14 percent compared with 10 in the rest of the United Kingdom by the 1990s. Earlier unemployment figures in shipbuilding, agriculture, and textile manufacturing 

pushed into the 50 percent range as these traditional industries collapsed 

in the face of foreign competition. These precipitous declines fed Catholic 

perceptions of job discrimination, although non-Catholics suffered as well. 

But still Catholic workers fared worse, being 2.6 times more likely to be 

jobless.64 The labor problems, therefore, contributed to the insurgency. And 

the beginnings of the insurgency only deepened the economic plight and 

worsened employment figures in a vicious cycle downward. 

To combat employment discrimination, the British government established the Fair Employment Agency in 1976. Its investigations revealed that 

in civil service, banking, universities, and large engineering companies, a 

disproportionate number of Protestants were hired, pointing toward a pattern of discrimination. It determined that employers must provide equality 

of opportunity to the minority population. Next, it set up regulations, not 

unlike the affirmative action programs in the United States aimed at getting 

African Americans into the workplace, which pressured employers to attain 

a sectarian balance. The Fair Employment Act imposed no formal quotas, 

but it strengthened the Fair Employment Commission, which oversaw hiring 

practices. The act and the commission made discrimination unacceptable 

among employers by requiring employers to monitor the composition of 

their workforce.65
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Even Conservatives, when they took power again at Westminster in 

1979, recognized the necessity of financial subsidy of private industrial 

development along with public-sector industries. Because Conservatives are 

not wont to lavish taxpayer funds on public work schemes, their turnaround 

is proof that they recognized the need to address violence across the Irish 

Sea. The high degree of their support to government funding for Northern Ireland’s dismal unemployment problem differed in lower amounts for 

outlays in England, Scotland, and Wales because of the overriding security threat posed by IRA attacks. Conservative MPs funded the declining 

manufacturing sector but also moved to embrace the new technology sector 

and service sector, as ultimately a better bet to lessen unemployment in the 

province. Despite all government funds during the 1980s, unemployment 

remained in the double-digit percentiles because of the accelerated decline 

of Northern Ireland shipbuilding and manufacturing industries.66

Progress in changing the discriminatory pattern against Catholic workers was slow but an unmistakable and steady improvement took place. The 

Fair Employment Commission reported in 1995 that the gap between Catholic and Protestant employment had been narrowed in the private sector, 

although the minority still lagged. Catholics were still two times as likely 

to be unemployed. But the Catholic portion of the work force had narrowly 

expanded by 2 percent from 1990 to 1996.67

However, in the public sector of employment, where direct British 

rule held much more sway over hiring, Catholic employment leapt ahead 

of the pre-Troubles period. What facilitated the increased participation of 

the minority in civil service jobs was vast expansion of that workforce. The 

British transferred social services from local districts, and largely Protestant 

control, to an array of agencies, such as the newly formed Housing Executive, health and personal services, education and library boards, and other 

civil service functions. Only 12,000 people worked in Northern Ireland’s 

government sector at the end of the 1960s. In 1991, the expanded civil service 

apparatus employed over 50,000 Catholic workers, which constituted 36 

percent of the entire government employment (excluding security forces)—a 

percentage commensurate with the size of Northern Ireland’s Catholic population. Catholic representation in the senior-most positions still lagged at 24 

percent, but it amounted to a significant rise over the past two decades.68

The enlargement of the public sector and consequent expansion in 

employment produced a stabilizing effect. But this surge in government 
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JSOU Report 08-5

jobs resulted in an economic downside over time. By the early 21st century, it 

became recognized in the Ulster province that big government with its large 

bureaucracy could place a drag on future economic growth in the private 

sector.69 Still, there are few detractors of the overall approach. 

Household income for the entire Ulster province rose during the two 

decades to figures comparable to those in Scotland and Wales, although less 

than in England itself.70 Once again, however, Catholic households underperformed Protestant families in overall income but with smaller disparities 

than during the 1960s. Women’s employment also underwent fundamental 

shifts as the female proportion of workers went to 48 percent in the 1990s 

from 36 percent in the early 1950s, with particular employment gains for 

married women. Creating jobs for Catholics and Protestants alike put people 

to work and lessened intersectarian tension. Unemployment, the bane of 

Northern Ireland’s economy for a decade, greatly lessened. At its peak of 

17 percent in 1986, the unemployment rate fell steadily to 5.7 percent in 

2002, which compared favorably with the average 8.4 percent in the European Union, though it was still high by American standards.71 With jobs 

and income, the average person’s life improved, reducing the drift toward 

sectarian conflict. 

Spending on job creation came also from the International Fund for 

Ireland, an independent organization established by the British and Irish 

government in 1986. Funding came from those two countries along with 

the United States, European Union, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 

By 2001, Washington alone had donated $100 million to the International 

Fund of Ireland. In 2008 the total gifts over the years reaches over $1 billion. The International Fund concentrated on the Six Counties and the five 

counties located in Ireland that bordered Northern Ireland. Millions of 

dollars were raised and expended to build business and employ people. 

President Bill Clinton’s representative to the International Fund, James 

Lyons, stated during his tenure from 1993 to 2001, that the organization 

put about 20,000 people to work and funded some 400 projects. Lyons also 

concentrated on expanding small businesses like auto mechanics, beauty 

parlors, and housing-remodeling firms. The International Fund also worked 

to invigorate community colleges and vocational training.72 By the early 21st 

century, Northern Ireland’s economy, while still fragile, had demonstrated 

rising prosperity, falling unemployment, and reduced emigration from the 

province. 
39

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

Community Relations and Education 

Another crucial initiative to facilitate intersectarian reconciliation lay 

in the British government’s intervention into the community relations arena. This activity is less quantifiable than employment figures and 

income levels but equally important to social harmony among bitterly 

and deeply divided groups. The cynical might view these projects as too 

“warm and fuzzy” for real soldiers, but in reality they represent another 

front in the “hearts and minds” campaign. Not unlike similar policies in 

the United States to break down interracial stereotypes, Britain set out to 

step up contacts between Catholics and Protestants, who often lived in 

near-apartheid separation, to foster tolerance and cultural pluralism. It 

also clearly announced its policies of nurturing equal opportunity for all 

Northern Ireland’s citizens. To institutionalize these policies, it established 

an agency within the office of the Secretary of Northern Ireland, Britain’s 

key political figure in the province. Three years later in 1990, it formed a 

Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (NICRC). That same year 

witnessed the passage of legislation for educational reforms, which will be 

addressed below. 

It must be emphasized that the official community relations efforts built 

on many nongovernmental initiatives dating from early 1960. These private 

contacts among groups expanded at the end of that decade with the onset of 

rioting and intercommunal attacks. These reconciliation groups pioneered 

techniques and influenced school education and youth work programs. 

Many of the lessons from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were 

incorporated into official bodies like the NICRC. The British officials, for 

example, instituted proposals for police accountability to the community 

and transferred other NGO experiences to educational institutions. The 

central government borrowed, amplified, and instituted policies to foster 

social harmony. It conducted audits of government agencies for compliance 

with mutual tolerance measures. It appointed community relations officers 

for each of the province’s 26 local districts, promoted intercommunity contact projects, created intersectarian youth service agencies, and installed 

antisectarian and antidiscrimination programs with the trade unions.73

Hesitantly, the British government also ventured into the educational 

system in Northern Ireland. Again, individuals and private organizations 

preceded governmental policy and provided a foundation for official steps. 
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JSOU Report 08-5

In 1982, a decade after teachers and academicians advocated curriculum 

changes to enhance tolerance, the authorities produced a circular entitled 

The Improvement of Community Relations: The Contribution of Schools,

which argued that teachers and administrators have “a responsibility for 

helping children learn to understand and respect each other.” 74 After this 

initial effort, the government, seven years later, issued the Education Reform 

(Northern Ireland) Order, which specified “education for mutual understanding.” 75 These tentative steps paved the way for a more dramatic departure in official educational policy.

The British government inaugurated religiously integrated schools, 

which enrolled about equal numbers of Catholic and Protestant children. 

Three years later, in 1993, the government operated 17 primary and 4 postprimary schools with some 3,500 pupils—which made up just 1 percent of 

the school-aged population. Despite the tiny attendance, the government’s 

initiative traveled uncharted territory in the sharply sectarian landscape of 

Northern Ireland, where Catholic- and Protestant-dominated schools were 

an integral part of Northern Ireland life. 

Accessibility to higher education for Northern Irish teens figured prominently in London’s pacification policies. Teenagers enrolled in university or 

vocational schools learned a profession 

or trade, which led to hope for gainful employment, rather than to the 

terrorist cells. Having been barred or 

restricted from post-secondary schooling or training for decades, Catholic, 

as well as Protestant, youth enjoyed greater entry to education after the 

Troubles began and the British governments removed hurdles by providing 

monies. For example, grants to Northern Ireland’s universities increased 

to £31,357,000 (approximately 94,071,000 in 1981 dollars) in 1981 from 

£15,126,000 (approximately 45,378,000 in 1981 U.S. dollars) in 1978, thus 

nearly doubling funding.76 Total university full-time students increased by 

75 percent overall and doubled for women attendees from 1966 to 1975.77

Along with the well-established premier higher education institutions 

such as Queen’s University and the University of Ulster, the Open University 

expanded university places for residents. Established in 1971, Open University, a United Kingdom-wide college, functioned somewhat like American 

Teenagers enrolled in university 

or vocational schools learned a 

profession or trade, which led 

to hope for gainful employment, 

rather than to the terrorist cells. 
41

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

community colleges. The majority of the students attended part time and 

tended to be in their mid-20s rather than in their late teens. 

It is unique within the British educational system in that it has no entry 

requirements, making it accessible to students without mainstream university requirements. Thus, it appealed to young people wishing to better their 

present employment with more education. 

Vocational training jumped substantially for males and females after the 

start of British direct rule. A sampling of figures demonstrates the swelling 

of students enrolled in vocational training, while the overall population 

remained static. The numbers of male students shot up to 22,366 in nonadvance programs in 1980 from 18,342 in 1974. Women’s enrollment saw a 

corresponding increase to 19,597 students in nonadvance programs in 1980 

from 14,170 in 1974.78 Along with educational outlays, health services also 

witnessed far more government attention. 

Government expenditures for health services in Northern Ireland more 

than doubled in the early l980s from those in the late 1970s. Total outlays 

to hospitals, general medical services, and health administration went to 

£409,243,000 (approximately 1,227,729,000 in 1980 U.S. dollars) in 1981 

from £202, 400,000 (approximately 607,200,000 in 1980 U.S. dollars).79

By the mid-1990s, it became an accepted fact that government investments in housing, education, and job programs had tilted heavily toward 

Catholic areas because British officials believed that long neglect of the 

minority had bred the problems for law and order. London attention alleviated some of the Catholics’ smoldering resentments, which contributed to 

the tamping down of PIRA attacks—the goal of its economic and political 

programs. London’s approach, on the other hand, disgruntled Protestant 

loyalists, who felt betrayed by the object of their allegiance. The pro-British Ulsterites dissented from what they viewed as concessions, rewarding 

Republican violence. They rankled at the too-soft approach by the RUC, 

which under its new dispensation tried to be a nonaligned police force by 

recruiting Catholic officers. 

British civilian officials sought to reassure the Protestant majority 

through political statements and actions. The bulk of the non-Catholic population warily greeted London’s assurances. A fringe element, however, took 

vengeance against PIRA killings. Protestant vigilante-type paramilitaries 

matched, and even exceeded, PIRA attacks by targeting republican activists 
42

JSOU Report 08-5

or randomly killing Catholics. One Protestant politician—John Taylor, then 

the deputy leader of the Ulster Unionists—attributed the PIRA’s ending its 

insurgency to loyalists’ killings. Taylor held that loyalist paramilitaries had 

“begun to overtake the IRA as being the major paramilitary and terrorist 

organization in Northern Ireland.” 80 With the prospect of further sectarian warfare and a welcome political and economic change by the British 

government, the PIRA declared victory and decided to make peace. 

In the end, London’s policies constituted a balancing act to alleviate 

Catholic animosity and alienation without incurring Protestant disaffection 

and backlash. The peace and stability enjoyed in Northern Ireland during 

the past decade indicate a qualified success for British civilian governments’ 

approach. The Six Counties at the least entered a new chapter in their history and in London’s relations with the province. History never stands still 

and the political gains could still be disrupted as Ulster is capable of sliding 

backwards. Yet, each passing year of peace affirms the correctness of the 

path taken by London governments. 

Diplomacy 

British policy in Northern Ireland became a focal point for media 

scrutiny. Like America’s contemporaneous war in Vietnam, Britain’s 

handling of the conflict in Ulster received abundant print and television 

reportage and commentary. British governments therefore operated with an 

eye to the international press corps’ coverage. The public relations aspects of 

policies and actions often framed the parameters of discussion and planning 

phases of its actions. Besides, with a cherished political culture of liberal 

democracy, Britain was precluded from adopting extreme measures, such 

as those implemented by Argentinian authorities in the “disappearances” 

of political opponents during the 1970s. A South American military dictatorship might be able temporarily to carry out a “dirty war” against its dissidents, but a well-established democracy and with extensive international 

relationships could not do so. 

Although the international media had to be taken into account by 

London in its responses to IRA attacks, its impact was not just some distant and vague concern that might be managed by clever spin operations on 

the world stage. Events within the northern Six Counties and their media 

reportage cast a direct spell over London’s most important international 
43

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

partner—the Republic of Ireland—in the Six Counties crisis. Sharing an 

ill-defined border with the Ulster province, the Republic loomed as the most 

crucial foreign determinate of events in Northern Ireland. True enough, 

Irish-Americans in the United States and their partisans in elected office 

exercised political leverage from time to time over British politicians. Some 

even clandestinely funneled money that purchased IRA arms. Nevertheless, Americans of Irish descent never constituted the key outside variable 

in Britain’s calculations. The Irish Republic did. 

Defeating terrorism depended upon the greater Ireland’s cooperation 

in cross-border security and extradition of suspected gunmen. The Irish 

public and their governments were mightily affected by Britain’s handling 

of their Catholic brethren on the northeastern shoulder of the island to a 

much greater degree than Irish Americans. Therefore they scrutinized and 

agonized over British policy and behavior in Northern Ireland. Quite simply, 

British goals in Northern Ireland hinged disproportionately on productive 

relations with Ireland. As a consequence, London had to forge cooperative 

relations with Dublin or watch the Republic of Ireland become a permanent 

insurgent sanctuary. 

The Republic of Ireland and Britain established a Joint Law Enforcement 

Commission, composed of members of the judiciary from both countries 

in 1974, to sort out the disputes occasioned by suspected terrorists claiming political status in the Republic to escape extradition from the South. It 

should come as no surprise to observers of international law and legal disputes that the commission disagreed among itself, and its recommendations 

encountered determined opposition in Dublin and London. Surrendering 

sovereignty either by extraditing alleged terrorists to stand trial in Northern 

Ireland or by allowing the Republic of Ireland to try them in its courts of 

law never gained acceptance in the respective countries. But the negotiations signaled a willingness on the part of both parties to discuss the fine 

points of domestic and international law and customs about terrorism and 

crimes committed abroad. 

A decade later, however, the Republic of Ireland softened its opposition 

because it had gained formal input in Northern Ireland policy. For this 

change of heart, it took the London government to compromise on Dublin’s 

influence north of its border. The Irish politicians thus could “sell” a revised 

policy on the emotional subject of extradition of terrorist suspects to British 

custody. Additionally, the savagery of terrorism in Northern Ireland upended 
44

JSOU Report 08-5

the southern Irish courts’ affinity to claims of political status barring extradition of perpetrators involved in particularly heinous bombings.81

The pact that brought about these improved relations between London 

and Dublin was the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985. This agreement provided consultative rights for the Irish government over British 

policy on Northern Ireland. While it did not fundamentally alter British 

policies within the Six Counties, it did secure better cross-border security 

arrangements for Britain—a critical factor given the mostly porous border. 

The Protestant loyalist faction interpreted the agreement as a blow to its 

interests, although it has not turned out that way. Still, loyalist violence 

picked up in the immediate years following the agreement. The agreement 

laid the groundwork for Anglo-Irish cooperation because it set up a channel for resolving disputes between the two capitals—that is, set in place a 

mechanism for calling meetings to discuss issues. This was a breakthrough 

of sorts, for it helped dispel the lingering animosities of bygone decades. 

The agreement also paved the way for the European Parliament, which 

backed it, to launch an investigation into anti-Catholic discrimination in 

the province in 1992. The European Parliament gained input into Northern Ireland affairs during the 1990s with the infusion of substantial peace 

funds. Funding underwrote reconciliation programs, economic development, and cross-border cooperation. One funding program for peace and 

integration supplied 1.33 billion euros from 1995 to 2006 north and south 

of the border. Even more European Union monies went to peace programs 

within Northern Ireland.82

Northern Ireland Politics and a Peace Agreement

The political climate within Northern Ireland proved to be difficult to 

change. British and European funds improved the lives of Catholics 

and Protestants with jobs, education, housing opportunities, and political 

representation at district level. Diplomacy brought together ancient rivals 

by framing a cooperative agreement between the United Kingdom and the 

Republic of Ireland to defuse conflict in Northern Ireland. But the feelings of 

resentment and fear resisted amelioration. For too long, parties in Northern 

Ireland drew backers and built themselves up from the aggrieved in each 

community. What did change—along with the formation of new political 
45

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

parties—were the attitudes of the two sectarian communities toward their 

predicament and any resumption of violence in the province. Both Catholics 

and Protestants experienced a rising standard of living along with prospects 

for even more improvement in their lives. 

These Ulster citizens also took note of the rapid and enormous economic growth in the Republic of Ireland to their immediate south. The 

Celtic Tiger, as Ireland became known, resembled the heady industrialization and economic liftoff that characterized the so-called Asian Tigers 

dating from the 1960s. A number of factors contributed to Ireland’s stellar 

development, including favorable tax policies for foreign investment, an 

educated and receptive labor force, government spending on infrastructure 

projects to further private sector growth, and, of course, European Union 

(formerly the European Economic Community) funds and export opportunities.83 Not wanting to be left behind, 

people on both sides of the sectarian 

divide in Northern Ireland longed 

for a share in the material betterment 

that their southern brethren enjoyed. 

That hope—and with the prospect of 

fulfillment—constituted one of the 

intangible drivers for a change in attitude in Northern Ireland that laid the 

groundwork for an end to hostilities. 

Working with Dublin, the British Labour Prime Minister Tony 

Blair issued a declaration allowing 

in 1993 any political party participation in elections and governing, if it 

renounced the use of violence. This 

declaration paved the way for a cessation of violence. 

The shaky truce since 1994 played 

a role in convincing populations on 

both sides of the sectarian divide that 

peace was better than three decades of 

killings and bombings in their midst. 

A Republican woman celebrates the 

IRA ceasefire in Belfast, August 1994. 

Photo by permission of Newscom. 
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JSOU Report 08-5

American involvement in the negotiations between Britain, Ireland, and 

Northern Ireland parties became an additional factor in leveraging pressure 

on each to resolve their differences. 

Once Bill Clinton settled into the White House, his administration 

turned to nurturing peace in strife-torn Northern Ireland in fulfillment of 

one of his campaign promises. Washington interfered in British-Northern 

Ireland negotiations, raising the ire of Prime Minister Blair, by entertaining 

visits to the White House by Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams. Clinton also pressured Adams to step away from violence.84 Laborious negotiations, prodded 

along by President Clinton’s representative former Senator George Mitchell, 

finally bridged the multifaceted differences in the Good Friday Agreement 

(also known as the Belfast Agreement), which was signed by Britain and 

the Republic of Ireland and endorsed by most of the political parties in the 

Six Counties on 10 April (Good Friday) 1998. It granted Northern Ireland 

self-rule within the United Kingdom and established a National Assembly. 

It assured greater civil liberties to the Catholic community along with a 

reformed judiciary and police service to safeguard the rights. 

The complex, 60-page agreement then went before the voters in the 

Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; the results of the referenda overwhelmed expectations, with 71 percent in the North and 94 percent in the 

South voting yes to it.85 Elections within Northern Ireland ultimately took 

place for the assembly; a government formed; and British direct rule of the 

province came to an end. In the decade since the 1998 agreement’s signing, 

occasional threats, provocations, and even bloodshed disturbed the tranquility in Northern Ireland but the overall stability and peace held. 

Peace, if not reconciliation, came to Northern Ireland with the 1998 

Good Friday agreement, which grew out of a truce with the mainstream 

PIRA and enjoyed papal and American support. Hardcore republicanism 

since the late 1960s had been an urban working-class movement. This PIRA 

base eroded with the introduction of equality laws and welfarism, which 

lessened the “ghetto mentality” of working-class Catholics. Electoral politics 

offered a peaceful, yet unstinting, outlet for Catholic grievances and republican protest that seemed much more attractive than paramilitary violence. 

Thus, the Sinn Fein opted for elections, seats in parliament, and electoral 

gains rather than an island-wide republican agenda.86 Still, the PIRA resisted 

decommissioning (i.e., disarmament) of its weapons until October 2001, 

when American and world opinion hardened against terrorism after the 
47

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

9/11 attacks against the Twin Trade Towers and the Pentagon. Not wanting to be perceived as a terrorist outfit in the new political climate figured 

powerfully in the PIRA’s thinking. Still, this decommissioning process took 

another four years to complete. 

Conclusions

I

t is the thesis of this narrative that British civic action programs, political arrangements, and the diplomatic initiatives with the Republic of 

Ireland brought about a cessation of conflict in Northern Ireland. As 

one astute observer reported: 

By the early 1990s most of the issues on which the Civil Rights Movement had campaigned had been addressed, in part or whole, and the 

only remaining grievance was that of the nationalists for a united 

Ireland, a position which even Dublin appeared to be distancing 

itself from. It may therefore be argued that by the 1990s the British government was, at some level, winning the hearts and minds 

campaign.87

The nonmilitary approaches made a much greater long-range contribution than military counterinsurgency practices of the British Army and its 

elite units. Readers of the strictly military and counterinsurgency accounts 

may well place too much emphasis on tactics pursued by the British Army 

without considering the broader political, economic, social, and diplomatic 

factors that combined to defuse the violence. 

Paul Arthur, a student of the Northern Ireland conflict, wrote that the 

fighting that began over issues of sovereignty and territory was displaced 

by politics “more concerned with equity issues.” 88 And Jonathan Tonge, 

another academic observer, noted that “Under an equality agenda, parity 

of esteem and respect for different identities have displaced the old argument over partition. . . After 3,600 deaths in that conflict, republicans [i.e., 

Catholics] shelved territorial demands for equality in a state that the IRA 

sought to dismantle.” 89 By addressing the roots of Catholic discontent and 

discrimination, British governments siphoned off enough anger, enticed 

enough collaborators, and neutralized enough opposition that it undermined much of the minority’s support for IRA violence and led to a peaceful 

political resolution. The Sinn Fein leadership realized it could not win if its 
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JSOU Report 08-5

blood-loyal rank-and-file began drifting away to new homes, educational 

opportunities, and steady jobs.

A cessation of sniping, bombing, and assassinations in Northern Ireland is an enormous achievement after more than 30 years of bloodshed. 

No one should minimize the attainment of stopping the conflict. But also 

no one should exaggerate the return to total normalcy. The end of murder 

and mayhem in Ulster’s streets has brought forth a cold peace. Genuine 

reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants in the province is still a 

work in progress. To underscore this point, it is noteworthy to acknowledge 

that the so-called peace walls separating and demarcating the two sectarian 

zones are now twice as long as they were when the Good Friday agreement 

was signed in 1998. Lengthening concrete barriers is hardly a positive sign 

of new-found amity. It demonstrates a fragile, truce-like quality rather than 

blossoming brotherhood among the two communities. Too much distrust 

and enmity remain for quick healing. It is also a reminder to outsiders about 

the intractableness of sectarian battles and the obstacles to attaining genuine 

reconciliation, after the end of a hot and protracted conflict. Additionally, 

a few PIRA members and some Protestant loyalists, once peace had been 

restored, fell back on criminality, such as protection rackets, bank robbery, 

thuggery, racketeering, and the counterfeiting of currency, watches, and 

DVDs. And three PIRA members were apprehended for their training of 

Marxist guerrillas in Colombia. However, the Sinn Fein party broke with 

violence and pursued a political path to participation in elections and governance with genuine earnest. 

A second and perhaps more fundamental point is the uniqueness of 

Northern Ireland, its history, its culture, and finally its resolution of the 

internecine fighting. Lessons, techniques, tactics, and strategies that led to 

the present-day nonbelligerency cannot be applied wholesale to other insurgencies except in the broadest fashion. It would be the height of folly to apply 

a Northern Ireland template to insurgencies a world away. The common language and culture of counterinsurgency forces and paramilitary forces, the 

protagonists common roots in Western civilization and modernization, the 

small population of only 1.5 million residents, and the mostly cooperative 

assistance from the one neighboring country—the Republic of Ireland—all 

point to a limited case study in successful counterinsurgency. 

Still, the overall picture of the prominence given by British governments 

in the Northern Ireland case to political settlements, economic incentives 
49

Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

(homes, jobs, and education), and amicable relations leading to diplomatic 

breakthroughs with the adjacent Republic of Ireland—all offer intriguing 

outlines for the resolution of other insurgencies. Most telling, they point up 

that economic, political, social, and diplomatic factors—managed by civilian 

authorities—were in the final analysis the keys to stability and peace. 

Endnotes

 Many thanks to Diane Raub for her editing assistance. 

1. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University 

of Chicago, 2007), page 54. 

2. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture,” Military Review (May-June 2005), 

page 56. 

3. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (New York: St. Martins 

Press, 1990), page 146. 

4. Major General Paul Newton, joint head of Force Strategic Engagement Cell in 

Iraq, quotation from Colin Freeman, “British General ‘to talk to Iraqi insurgents’,” 

Telegraph.co.uk, 12 November 2007. Downloaded from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

main.jhtm?xml=/news/207/11/11wiraq111.xml; accessed 13 November 2007. 

5. A few classic books, such as Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: 

The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966); David Galula, 

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); and 

Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of 

Independence, 1964-1974 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983) and 

for the less studied rural conflict in then-Rhodesia, Lewis H. Gann and Thomas 

H. Henriksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (New York: Praeger 

Publishers, 1981).

6. Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 

2005), pages 8-12.

7. Thomas H. Henriksen, The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implication 

for the United States, JSOU Report 07-3 (2007).

8. Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the 

Present, and Planning for the Future,” series from the Amery War College Strategic 

Studies Institute (February 2007), page 19. Downloaded from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB754.pdf; accessed 25 August 2008.

9. Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006), page 92.

10. Gavin Bulloch, “Military Doctrine and Counter-Insurgency: A British Perspective,” 

Parameters 26 (Summer 1996), page 4.

11. Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of 

Culture,” Military Review (May-June, 2005), page 55.
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12. Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why: The Story of the Fatal Charge of the Light 

Brigade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), page 116.

13. Evelyn Waugh, Sword of Honour (London: Penguin Books, 1965), page 34.

14. For one easily accessible biography of Wingate, see Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes 

to War (London: Arthur Barker, 1955).

15. Michael Calvert, Chindits: Long Range Penetration (New York: Ballentine Books, 

1973), pages 10-11.

16. J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British 

and American Experiences (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001), page 7.

17. No author but a foreword by Louis Mountbatten, Combined Operations: The Official 

Story of the Commandos (New York: Macmillan Co., 1943). 

18. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 

Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), pages 192-197.

19. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and 

Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

20. Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: Paladin Grafton, 1985), page 224. 

21. Cornelius Tacitus, Agricola and Germany, translated by Anthony R. Birley (Oxford, 

United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1999), page 22.

22. Caesar: The Conquest of Gaul, translated by S. A. Handford (London: Penguin 

Books, 1951), pages 60 and 64.

23. Mockaitis, “Low-Intensity Conflict: The British Experience,” Conflict Quarterly, 

page 8.

24. Robert Cassidy, “British Army and Counterinsurgency,” page 56.

25. Ibid., 59.

26. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, page 89.

27. John Keegan, The Iraq War (London: Hutchinson, 2004), pages 175-176.

28. Warren Chin, “Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine 

by the American Army in Iraq,” Small Wars and Insurgency, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March, 

2007), page 22. 

29. Stephen Farrell, “Divining A Lesson In Basra,” New York Times, 25 May 2008, section IV, page A1.; John Burns, “Britain Debates Army’s Delay at Basra, New York 

Times, 7 August 2008, page A12; Michael Evans, “Sidelined British Soldiers ‘itched 

to join’ U.S. fight for Basra,” London Times, 7 August 2008, page 1; Jonathan Finer, 

“An End to the Soft Sell by the British in Basra,” Washington Post, 26 February 

2006, page A16; Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks, “As British Leave, Basra 

Deteriorates,” Washington Post, 7 August 2008, page A1; and Deborah Haynes and 

Richard Beeston, “Time To Go Home, Iraqi Leader Tells Britain,” London Times, 

3 October 2008, page 3.

30. Carlotta Gall, “Optimism Grows as Marines Push against Taliban,” New York Times, 

27 May 2008, page A1.
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

31. Aidan Clarke, “The Colonisation of Ulster and The Rebellion of 1641,” in The Course 

of Irish History, eds. T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin (Cork, Ireland: Mercier Press, 

1984), pages 190-193.

32. E. R. R. Green, “The Great Famine,” in The Course of Irish History, ed. T. W. Moody 

and F. X. Martin (Cork, Ireland: Mercer Press, 1984), pages 273-274.

33. Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British 

Intelligence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pages 172, 177, and 

210 and Kevin Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (Westport, 

Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1982), pages 135-136 and 277.

34. Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849 (New York: Signet 

Books, 1962).

35. Walter L. Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. 

Heath and Company, 1971), pages 237-380. 

36. Charles Townsend, British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of 

Political and Military Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), page 

206. 

37. Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Ireland from Colony to Nation State (Englewood Cliffs, New 

Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pages 148-150.

38. Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland, 1920-1996 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1997), page 115.

39. McCaffrey, Ireland from Colony to Nation State, page 175.

40. Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon, and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland, 1921-1994: Political 

Forces and Social Classes (London: Serif, 1995), pages 115-118.

41. Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Committee Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), pages 

88-89. Download from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.htm; accessed on 19 

August 2008. 

42. Hennessey, A History of Ireland, pages 129-130.

43. Paul Arthur, Special Relationships: Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland Problem

(Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), page 36.

44. Michael J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989: 

Its Nature and Execution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), page 

25.

45. Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding

Northern Ireland (London: Athlone Press, 1993), page 197.

46. J. Bowyer Bell, “An Irish War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 

1990), page 124. 

47. Thomas Harding, “British Brigadier Attacks American’s John Wayne Generals,” 

London Daily Telegraph, 19 April 2006, page 1.

48. Geraghty, The Irish War, pages 74-76 and 116-119.
52

JSOU Report 08-5

49. Raymond Murray, The SAS in Ireland (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1990), pages 426-430 

and 441-443.

50. One recent article from a British officer offered a more balanced assessment of the 

political and economic aspects of securing reconciliation. See, John Clark, “Northern Ireland: A Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration,” 

Military Review (January-February 2008), pages 37-49.

51. John Keegan, Iraq War, page 175.

52. Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour 

Press, 1985), page 228.

53. Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 

2006), page 71.

54. Dewar, British Army in Northern Ireland, page 223.

55. Martin Van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne 

to Iraq (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006), pages 233-234.

56. Tonge, Northern Ireland, pages 85-88.

57. Tim Ripley, Security Forces in Northern Ireland, 1969-1992 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1993), page 8.

58. Digest of Statistics Northern Ireland, No. 51 (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 

March 1979), page 87.

59. Mike Tomlinson, “Relegating Local Government,” in Liam O’Dowd, Bill Rolston, 

and Mike Tomlinson, Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War (London: 

CSE Books, 1980), pages 116-117.

60. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin Press, 2002), pages 

241-243.

61. Sean Kennedy and Derek Birrell, “Housing” in John Darby and Arthur Williamson, 

eds. Violence and the Social Services in Northern Ireland (London: Heinemann, 

1978), page 99.

62. David Singleton, “Northern Ireland Housing: Number One Priority but for How 

Much Longer?” in Housing Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1986), pages 48-49.

63. Michael McKernan, editor, Northern Ireland Yearbook 2003: A Comprehensive Reference Guide to the Political, Economic, and Social Life of Northern Ireland (Belfast: 

BMF Publishing, 2002), page 282.

64. John Henry Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 

pages 55-56.

65. Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice (New York: Penguin 

Books, 1994), pages 45-46.

66. Michael J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989; 

Its Nature and Execution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), page 

159. 

67. Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1993-1996: A 

Chronology (London: Serif, 1996), page 141. 

68. Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland, page 240.
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Henriksen: What Really Happened in Northern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency

69. McKernan, Northern Ireland Yearbook 2003, page 331.

70. Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland, pages 240-241.

71. McKernan. Northern Ireland Yearbook 2003, page 382.

72. James Lyons, “Economic Development and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,” 

public lecture, Stanford Law School, 28 February 2008.

73. Derick Wilson and Jerry Tyrrell, “Institutions for Conciliation and Mediation,” in 

Seamus Dunn, editor, Facets of the Northern Ireland Conflict (New York: St. Martins 

Press, 1995), pages 230-233 and 241-243.

74. Alan Smith, “Education and the Conflict in Northern Ireland,” Facets of the Conflict 

in Northern Ireland, edited by Seamus Dunn (London: Macmillan, 1995), pages 

172-173. 

75. Ibid, 178-179.

76. Table 2.2 “Current expenditures on social services and housing by the central 

government,” Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics (Belfast: Her Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1982), page 15.

77. Digest of Statistics, Northern Ireland, No. 51 (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 

March 1979), page 25.

78. FN: Table 4.7 “Further Education: Vocational Courses; students and teaching staff,” 

Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationery 

Office, 1982), page 44.

79. Table 2.2 “Current expenditures on social services and housing by the central 

government,” Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics (Belfast: Her Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1982), page 15.

80. Peter Taylor, Loyalists: War and Peace in Northern Ireland (New York: TV Books, 

1999), page 234. 

81. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-89, page 207.

82. Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 

2006), page 36.

83. Ray MacSharry and Padraic A. White, The Making of the Celtic Tiger: The Inside 

Story of Ireland’s Boom Economy (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2000), pages 147-161.

84. Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pages 578-581.

85. The Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland Office site, www.nio.gov.uk/theagreement. Downloaded 2 September 2008.

86. Tonge, Northern Ireland, page 128.

87. Collin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army’s Way in Warfare, 1945-1995

(London: Brassey’s, 1996), page 169.

88. Paul Arthur, Special Relationships: Britain, Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Problem

(Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), page 249.

89. Tonge, Northern Ireland, page 37.