IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2014-CP-00139-COA

LONNIE MASSEY A/K/A LONNIE GENE MASSEY A/K/A KENNETH BALL A/K/A LONNIE G. MASSEY APPELLANT

v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/27/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LONNIE MASSEY (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DENIED DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/19/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND FAIR, JJ. ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. In 2014, Lonnie Massey f iled a m otion f

or records and tra n s c r i p t s i n t he Madison County Circuit Court, which, in ef f ect, was a m otion f

or postconviction relief (PCR). Af ter reviewing the PCR m otion, the circuit court f ound that the m otion was b arred as a subsequent writ. Finding no error, we af f irm

. DISCUSSION ¶2. Massey f

aced crim i nal charges stem m ing f r om two separate inci d e n t s i n 2 0 0 9. OnDecem

ber 6 , 2010, he pleaded guilty to three of f enses—two c o u n t s of p ossession of a weapon b y a convicted f e lon a nd one count of aggravated assault. Massey received the f ollowing sentences pursuant to a plea agreem ent: ten y ears’ im prisonm ent on each possession charge, to be served concurrently to each other, and twenty y ears’ i m prisonm ent on the aggravated-assault charge, with all but one day suspended. ¶3. Massey f

iled t he instant P CR m otion, af te r h i s i n itial PCR w a s f

ound t o be without

m erit and a second P CR m o t ion was f ound to be a successive writ. See M assey v. State , 144 So. 3d 204 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); Massey v. State , 131 So. 3d 1213 (Miss. C t. App. 2013). “W e review the dism issal of a PCR m otion under an abuse-of -discretion standard.” W

illiams

v. State , 110 So. 3d 840, 842 ( ¶11) (Miss. C t. App. 2013). R e v e rsal is proper only “if the circuit court' s decision was clearly erroneous.” I

d

. ¶4. The trial c ourt, in its ruling on the second PCR f iling, warned Massey that any “f urther f ilings could be deem ed t o be f r i volous and could result in t he loss of a ccrued earned tim e.” As a result of this m ost r e cent f iling, which w as also dism i ssed, the trial c ourt stated that in “considering [ Massey ]’s f u ll range of conduct bef

ore this [ c]ourt and on appeal, the m otions f iled h erein are f

rivolous and t hat pursuant to [ M ississippi] Code [ A nnotated section] 47-5- 138(3) [ (Rev. 2015)] . . . [ Massey ]’s accrued earned tim e shall be f orf eited.” ¶5. In h is latest PCR m otion, Massey asserted t hat he had been threatened and p ressured
to plead guilty and that the transcripts and records h e r e q u e s t e d w ould aid in his ef f orts to
prove that his plea was not voluntarily m ade. However, the r ecord ref lects t h a t M assey pleaded guilty both in the s worn plea petition h e f iled and by his sworn testim o ny at the plea

2hearing. W e quote the releva n t p a s s a g e s f rom Massey , 131 So. 3d at 1216-17 (¶¶12-16): Massey ’s written plea petition states the f actual basis f

o r his guilty p lea. It provides, in relevant part: My lawy er advises m e and I understand that the charge to which I a m pleading guilty in cause/count num ber 2010 – 483/2 is a ggravated assault. The elem ents of t hat crim e are tha t I d i d willf ully , unlawf

u lly , f eloniously , [ and] knowingly attem pt to cause bodily injury to Ande Daniel by shooting at him w i th a deadly weapon[ ,] a f

irearm

.

. . . . In his plea colloquy , Massey testif ied:

. . . . THE COURT: Have y ou been unduly inf luenced, pressured, inti m i dated, threatened, f o rced, coerced or prom ised any hope of reward to plead guilty , Mr. Massey ? DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: W ho m ade the decision to enter the plea o f guilty in y our case, Mr. Massey ? DEFENDANT: I did. THE COURT: Are y ou absolutely sure, Mr. Massey ? DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. ¶6. W e have previously addressed the dilem m a f a c ed by an appellant claim i ng that a prior version of his testim ony under o a th was untrue but that the version on a ppeal is true. See Boyd v
. S mith , 797 S o . 2 d 3 5 6 , 363 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). W e point out that the

m ovant has "been glaringly untruthf ul to at least one court of

law[ , thereby

rendering] him

. . . com pletely without credibility ." Id . at (¶16). More specif ically , we stated:

3If a m ovant could, at a later date, successf ully contra d i c t h i s own assertions m ad e u n d er oath at his plea[ -]acceptance hearing, then there would be no purpose i n conducting the hearing at a ll. “Truth” would be c o m e a n illusory concept m eaning n othing m ore than what the declarant asserted it to be at any particular point in tim e. Id

. ( citation om itted). The trial court was e ntitled to rely o n Massey ’s s worn testim ony that he w as not pressured or inappropriately induced i n any way to support t he f inding that Massey ’s guilty

plea was voluntary , knowing, and intelligent. ¶7. Furtherm ore, because it was apparent f rom the f a ce of Massey ’s PCR m otion that the

m otion was successive-writ barred and without m erit, no hearing was necessary . See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015). Finding no error, we af f irm

. ¶8. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E M A D I S O N C O U N T Y C I R C U I T C O U R T DENYING THE MOTION F O R POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY

. LEE, C .J., IRVING A ND GRIF FIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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