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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KEITH BELCHER

(SC 20531)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct

an illegal sentence. The defendant’s lengthy prison sentence had been

imposed in connection with his conviction of kidnapping in the first

degree, sexual assault in the first degree, robbery in the first degree,

burglary in the first degree, and attempt to commit sexual assault in

the first degree. In his motion to correct, the defendant claimed, inter

alia, that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner insofar as

the sentencing court relied on materially false information, namely, a

baseless and subsequently discredited theory alleging the rise of teenage

superpredators who would terrorize society. The defendant specifically

claimed that the sentencing court improperly imposed his sentence on

the basis of its characterization of the defendant as a ‘‘charter member’’

of that group of superpredators. The trial court rejected the defendant’s

claim, concluding, inter alia, that the evidence supported the determination that the defendant fit the definition of a ‘‘superpredator,’’ regardless

of the validity of that theory, and that the sentencing court’s remarks

about the superpredator theory were not central to its sentencing decision. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion,

the defendant claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion

in concluding that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on

materially false information in sentencing him. Held that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to correct an

illegal sentence because the superpredator theory constituted materially

false and unreliable evidence on which the sentencing court substantially

relied in imposing the defendant’s sentence: this court reviewed social

science research and government reports and concluded that the superpredator theory was baseless when it originally was espoused by a

university professor in the mid-1990s and has since been thoroughly

debunked and universally rejected as a myth; moreover, this court determined that, in the context of the sentencing of the defendant, a Black

teenager, the sentencing court’s invocation of the baseless superpredator

theory was especially detrimental to the integrity of the sentencing

procedure, as the sentencing court relied on materially false, racial

stereotypes that perpetuate systemic racial inequities, which historically

have pervaded the criminal justice system, and as the sentencing court

treated the characteristics of youth, namely, impulsivity, submission to

peer pressure, and deficient judgment, as an aggravating, rather than a

mitigating, factor, in violation of the precedent of this court and the

United States Supreme Court; furthermore, the sentencing court substantially relied on the materially false superpredator theory when it sentenced the defendant, as that court gave explicit attention to the theory

when it expressly referenced the defendant’s supposed status as a charter member of the superpredator group prior to imposing the defendant’s

sentence, and the court’s discussion of the superpredator theory throughout its brief sentencing remarks demonstrated that the sentencing court’s

view of the defendant was shaped by the theory that there was a group

of youths, including the defendant, who were destined to live an irredeemable life of violence; accordingly, the trial court’s decision to deny

the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence was reversed, and

the case was remanded with direction to grant the defendant’s motion

and for resentencing.

Argued January 11, 2021—officially released January 21, 2022**

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

two counts each of the crimes of kidnapping in the first

degree and sexual assault in the first degree, and with
one count each of the crimes of robbery in the first

degree, burglary in the first degree, and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and

tried to the jury before Hartmere, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed;

thereafter, the Appellate Court, Foti, Schaller and Daly,

Js., affirmed the trial court’s judgment; subsequently,

the court, Devlin, J., dismissed in part and denied in

part the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant appealed. Reversed; further

proceedings.

Michael W. Brown, with whom, on the brief, was

Alexandra Harrington, deputy assistant public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino,

state’s attorney, and Emily Dewey Trudeau, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The defendant, Keith Belcher, a juvenile

offender, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his

motion to correct an illegal sentence.1 After his conviction, the defendant received a total effective sentence

of sixty years of incarceration. He claims, inter alia,

that the trial court improperly denied his motion to

correct on the basis of the court’s conclusion that the

sentencing court did not impose the sentence in an

illegal manner by relying on materially false information.2

Our review of the record reveals that the defendant

established that the sentencing court substantially

relied on materially false information in imposing his

sentence, specifically, on the court’s view that the

defendant was a ‘‘charter member’’ of a mythical group

of teenage ‘‘superpredators.’’ Therefore, we conclude

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the

defendant’s motion to correct. Accordingly, we reverse

the judgment of the trial court, and the case is remanded

with direction to grant the defendant’s motion and for

resentencing.3

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘The defendant was fourteen years

of age when, on December 24, 1993, he and a companion

approached the victim in front of her apartment in

Bridgeport. The victim was unloading groceries from

her car when the defendant approached her from

behind, pulled out a gun and demanded that she give

him her purse. When she informed the defendant that

the purse was upstairs, he dragged her up to the apartment to retrieve it, all the time holding the gun on her.’’

State v. Belcher, 51 Conn. App. 117, 119, 721 A.2d 899

(1998). While in the apartment, the defendant sexually

assaulted the victim twice, attempted to do so a third

time, and pistol-whipped her. See id., 120.

Soon thereafter, based on the victim’s identification

of him from police photographs, the police arrested the

defendant. Id. Proceedings against him were initiated

in the docket for juvenile matters of the Superior Court.

See id. Following a hearing, the court granted the state’s

motion to transfer the defendant’s case to the regular

criminal docket of the Superior Court. Id., 120–21. The

state charged the defendant with two counts each of

kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B) and sexual assault in the

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)

(1), and with one count each of attempt to commit

sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2) and § 53a-70 (a) (1), robbery

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a134 (a) (2), and burglary in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-101 (a) (1). See

id., 118–19, 121. The defendant was convicted on all
seven counts. Id., 121. The sentencing court imposed a

total effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration.4

In the decades following the defendant’s sentencing,

juvenile sentencing law has undergone significant developments. These changes had their genesis in the decision

of the United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1

(2005). In Roper, the court held that the execution of

persons for crimes committed when they were children

(under eighteen years of age) constitutes disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to

the federal constitution. Id., 564, 568, 575, 578. Children,

the court explained, are different from adults for purposes of culpability and punishment, as certain characteristics of youth are, by their nature, mitigating. See id.,

569–70. Children’s ‘‘ ‘lack of maturity,’ ’’ ‘‘ ‘underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ’’ vulnerability to peer pressure and other outside influences, as well as the transient

nature of their personality traits, led the court to conclude that ‘‘juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be

classified among the worst offenders.’’ Id.

Following Roper, decisions by this court and the

United States Supreme Court have relied on these mitigating characteristics of youth to further define the constitutional limits of juvenile sentencing law. We recently

summarized those limitations. ‘‘Under the federal constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments,

a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the

possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of

adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455,

183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); Casiano v. Commissioner of

Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015),

cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 577 U.S. 1202,

136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016); State v. Riley,

315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied,

577 U.S. 1202, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016).’’

State v. Williams-Bey, 333 Conn. 468, 470, 215 A.3d 711

(2019). Thus, ‘‘[t]o comport with federal constitutional

requirements, the legislature passed No. 15-84 of the

2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84) . . . [which] retroactively

provided parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to more than ten years in prison.’’ (Footnote

omitted.) State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378, 383, 215 A.3d

1154 (2019). In addition, ‘‘[§] 2 of P.A. 15-84 . . . requires

a court to consider the Miller factors [which are the

aforementioned hallmarks of youth] when imposing certain sentences [on] juvenile offenders.’’ Id., 400.

Relying on those changes to juvenile sentencing law,

the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that (1) the sentencing court failed to

consider his youth, as required by Miller and its progeny,

including the decision of this court in State v. Riley,

supra, 315 Conn. 641 (sentencing court must consider
age related evidence in mitigation when deciding whether

to irrevocably sentence juvenile offender to term of life

imprisonment, or equivalent, without parole), (2) his

sentence was disproportionate in violation of the eighth

amendment to the United States constitution, (3) his

sentence was disproportionate in violation of article

first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, and

(4) his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner

because the sentencing court relied on materially false

information, namely, a baseless and subsequently discredited theory alleging the rise of teenage superpredators who would terrorize society.

After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court

initially concluded that the defendant was entitled to

a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Riley. The court

grounded its decision on its finding that the sentencing

court had failed to give ‘‘mitigating effect to the defendant’s young age and its hallmarks.’’ Because the trial

court’s conclusion as to the defendant’s Miller claim

was dispositive, the court did not address the defendant’s remaining three claims. Thereafter, the trial court

stayed its order, pending the resolution of the appeals

in State v. Boyd, 323 Conn. 816, 151 A.3d 355 (2016),

and State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 151 A.3d 345 (2016).

Boyd and Delgado addressed whether the parole eligibility retroactively conferred by P.A. 15-84 remedied a

violation of the defendants’ federal constitutional rights,

as explicated in Miller. See State v. Boyd, supra, 820;

State v. Delgado, supra, 802–804. Answering that question in the affirmative, we held that the trial court properly dismissed those defendants’ motions to correct an

illegal sentence for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

State v. Boyd, supra, 820–21; State v. Delgado, supra,

810–11, 816. Relying on those decisions, the trial court

vacated its order granting the defendant a new sentencing hearing and dismissed, for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the defendant’s claim that the sentencing

court had failed to give mitigating effect to the defendant’s youth in violation of Miller and Riley.

5 The trial

court also rejected the defendant’s remaining three

claims.6

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s ruling

to the Appellate Court. That court stayed the appeal,

pending this court’s disposition of State v. McCleese,

supra, 333 Conn. 378, and State v. Williams-Bey, supra,

333 Conn. 468.7 Following the official release of McCleese

and Williams-Bey on August 23, 2019, and the decision

of the Appellate Court lifting the stay, this appeal was

transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes

§ 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

Relevant to the resolution of this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in

concluding that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on materially false information, in violation

of his right to due process, in sentencing him to a total
effective sentence of sixty years of incarceration. Specifically, the defendant claims that his sentence was

imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing

court relied on the erroneous and subsequently discredited theory of teenage superpredators in making its

sentencing decision. We agree with the defendant and,

accordingly, reverse the trial court’s ruling.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. Prior to the defendant’s sentencing hearing on January 24, 1997, the sentencing

court had reviewed the presentence investigation report

(PSI), which the court stated was thorough and included

school records and psychological reports.8 The court

heard argument from the prosecutor and defense counsel. In his remarks, the prosecutor emphasized the

trauma suffered by the victim, who testified at trial

that she would never be the same. The prosecutor also

highlighted the defendant’s ‘‘extensive juvenile record.’’

In fact, when the defendant committed his crimes, he

was on a holiday furlough from Long Lane School,

which was a facility for delinquent children. School

officials indicated that the defendant showed no remorse

for his prior actions. The prosecutor referred the sentencing court to the PSI, arguing that the information

therein supported a ‘‘substantial sentence . . . .’’

Defense counsel argued in mitigation that the defendant was only fourteen years old when he committed

his crimes, that he came from a ‘‘troubled background,’’

and that this was his first conviction as an adult. Counsel

acknowledged the defendant’s juvenile history but

pointed out that, with the exception of one conviction

for assault in the second degree, that history involved

nonviolent offenses.

The defendant’s claim that his sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner arises from the sentencing court’s

brief remarks prior to imposing the sentence. The court

began by stating that, in arriving at the defendant’s

sentence, it relied on the PSI and the evidence presented

at trial. Of particular import, the court explained, was

the victim’s testimony, which the court found ‘‘most

compelling . . . .’’ On the basis of the evidence, the

court said: ‘‘To say that the conduct here was extremely

serious and egregious is simply to understate the facts

of what happened. The conduct here was just so inhumane as to be considered subhuman. This is despite

the fact that, as disclosed in the [PSI], [the defendant’s]

. . . testing shows average intelligence. He could have

chosen another lifestyle, even at his very young age,

but deliberately chose not to. Professor John [J. DiIulio, Jr.], of Princeton University has coined the term

‘superpredator,’ which refers to a group of radically

impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters who

assault, rape, rob and burglarize. Mr. Belcher, you are

a charter member of that group. You have no fears,

from your conduct, of the pains of imprisonment; nor
do you suffer from the pangs of conscience. I agree

with the [prosecutor], the probation officer, and the

victim, who, incidentally, still suffers physically and

psychologically from your conduct, who all ask for substantial incarceration to ensure the safety of the community.’’ (Emphasis added.)

In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the sentencing

court’s remarks demonstrated that it had substantially

relied on materially false information in sentencing him,

the trial court reasoned that the superpredator theory

did not constitute ‘‘information.’’ Specifically, the trial

court observed that the term ‘‘superpredator’’ is descriptive, rather than factual. Additionally, the trial court

noted that, although the superpredator theory has since

been discredited, at the time of sentencing, the sentencing court had a reasonable basis to rely on the theory.

The trial court finally observed both that the evidence

supported the conclusion that the defendant fit the definition of a ‘‘superpredator,’’ regardless of the truth of

the theory, and that the sentencing court’s remarks

about the superpredator theory were not central to the

sentencing decision. The trial court went on to say that

‘‘[t]he superpredator reference was just a gloss. This

court has no doubt that, had Professor DiIulio repudiated his theory before sentencing, [the sentencing

court] would have imposed the same sentence.’’

We begin by setting forth the legal principles that

govern our review of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal

manner. ‘‘[A] claim that the trial court improperly

denied a defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is [typically] reviewed pursuant to the abuse of

discretion standard . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn.

739, 745, 258 A.3d 14 (2021). We have explained, in

pertinent part, that ‘‘[s]entences imposed in an illegal

manner have been defined as being within the relevant

statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way [that] violates [a] defendant’s right . . . to be sentenced by a

judge relying on accurate information or considerations

solely in the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 839, 992 A.2d

1103 (2010). We have emphasized that the protection

against sentencing in an illegal manner ‘‘reflects the

fundamental proposition that [t]he defendant has a

legitimate interest in the character of the procedure

[that] leads to the imposition of sentence even if he

may have no right to object to a particular result of the

sentencing process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We also have acknowledged that ‘‘[a] sentencing

judge has very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and in exercising that

discretion he may and should consider matters that

would not be admissible at trial. . . . Consistent with
due process the trial court may consider responsible

unsworn or out-of-court information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person’s

life and circumstance. . . . It is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately

conduct an inquiry broad in scope, and largely unlimited

either as to the kind of information he may consider

or the source from which it may come. . . . Finally,

although a trial court’s discretion is not completely

unfettered, and information may be considered as a

basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indicium

of reliability . . . [a]s long as the sentencing judge has

a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on the information which he uses to fashion his ultimate sentence,

an appellate court should not interfere with his discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5, 20–21, 912 A.2d

992 (2007).

To prevail on a claim that the sentencing court violated his due process rights by relying on materially

false information, a defendant cannot merely allege that

the information relied on by the court contained factual

inaccuracies or inappropriate information. ‘‘[T]he mere

reference to information outside of the record does not

require a sentence to be set aside unless the defendant

shows: (1) that the information was materially false or

unreliable; and (2) that the trial court substantially

relied on the information in determining the sentence.’’

State v. Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 321, 507 A.2d 99 (1986).

‘‘A sentencing court demonstrates [substantial] reliance

on misinformation when the court gives explicit attention to it, [bases] its sentence at least in part on it, or

gives specific consideration to the information before

imposing sentence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 843 n.12.

We consider each of these factors in turn. First, a

review of the superpredator theory and its history demonstrates that the theory constituted materially false

and unreliable information. In the mid-1990s, Professor

DiIulio of Princeton University coined the term ‘‘superpredator.’’ J. DiIulio, ‘‘The Coming of the Super-Predators,’’ The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weeklystandard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators (last visited January 20, 2022). DiIulio, whose work the sentencing court referenced specifically, warned that ‘‘the

demographic bulge of the next [ten] years will unleash

an army of young male predatory street criminals who

will make even the leaders of the Bloods and Crips

. . . look tame by comparison.’’ Id. DiIulio predicted

that this coming wave of superpredators would include

‘‘elementary school youngsters who pack guns instead

of lunches’’ and ‘‘have absolutely no respect for human

life . . . .’’ Id. He further warned: ‘‘On the horizon . . .

are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished

juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly capable of
committing the most heinous acts of physical violence

for the most trivial reasons (for example, a perception

of slight disrespect or the accident of being in their

path). They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the

pain of imprisonment. They live by the meanest code

of the meanest streets, a code that reinforces rather

than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality. In

prison or out, the things that super-predators get by

their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money—are their

own immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them.

So for as long as their youthful energies hold out, they

will do what comes ‘naturally’: murder, rape, rob,

assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.’’ Id.

These dire predictions centered disproportionately

on the demonization of Black male teens. DiIulio

warned readers that, although ‘‘the trouble will be greatest in [Black, inner city] neighborhoods,’’ those in other

areas should expect a ‘‘spill over’’ of morally impoverished, ‘‘crime-prone young males.’’ Id. A few months

later, in an article about race, crime and law enforcement, DiIulio wrote: ‘‘[N]ot only is the number of young

[B]lack criminals likely to surge, but also the [B]lack

crime rate, both black-on-black and black-on-white, is

increasing, so that as many as [one] half of these juvenile

super-predators could be young [B]lack males.’’ J. DiIulio, ‘‘My Black Crime Problem, and Ours,’’ City Journal,

Spring, 1996, available at https://www.city-journal.org/

html/my-black-crime-problem-and-ours-11773.html

(last visited January 20, 2022).

Extensive research data and empirical analysis

quickly demonstrated that the superpredator theory

was baseless. In fact, contrary to DiIulio’s assertion,

even at the time that he coined the term in the mid1990s, juvenile offense rates already had dropped significantly from their peak across demographic groups. The

falsity of DiIulio’s claim was demonstrated in a 2000

bulletin of the United States Department of Justice,

which provided a data-driven assessment of juvenile

crime patterns through the 1990s. See Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Challenging the Myths, 1999 National Report

Series: Juvenile Justice Bulletin (February, 2000), available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178993.pdf

(last visited January 20, 2022), adopted from H. Snyder

& M. Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice,

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report

(September, 1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/

html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html (last visited January 20, 2022). The bulletin revealed that, although serious juvenile offense rates did peak in the late 1980s

into the early 1990s, ‘‘by 1995, the rate had returned to

its traditional level.’’ Id., p. 2. The bulletin concluded

that, therefore, ‘‘[r]ather than providing evidence for

development of a juvenile superpredator, the . . . data

indicate that, despite a temporary increase, the rate of

serious juvenile offending as of the mid-[1990s] was
comparable to that of a generation ago.’’ Id.

In 2001, the United States Office of the Surgeon General

labeled the superpredator theory a myth. See U.S. Dept.

of Health & Human Services, Youth Violence: A Report

of the Surgeon General (2001) c. 1, p. 5, available at https://

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44297/?report=reader

(last visited January 20, 2022) (‘‘There is no evidence

that young people involved in violence during the peak

years of the early 1990s were more frequent or more

vicious offenders than youths in earlier years. . . .

There is no scientific evidence to document the claim of

increased seriousness or callousness . . . .’’ (Citation

omitted.));9

see also, e.g., F. Zimring, American Youth

Violence (1998) pp. 61–63 (critiquing use of temporal

spike in youth violence to predict future trends); F.

Zimring, ‘‘The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality?,’’ 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 727, 728 (1998) (challenging predictions of ‘‘ ‘coming storm’ ’’ of juvenile superpredators as distortion of statistics and ‘‘fundamentally

unscientific’’ guesswork). We conclude that the superpredator theory was baseless when it originally was

espoused and has since been thoroughly debunked and

universally rejected as a myth, and it therefore constituted false and unreliable information that a sentencing

court ought not consider in crafting a sentence for a

juvenile offender.

In the context of the sentencing of the defendant, a

Black teenager, the court’s reliance on the materially

false superpredator myth is especially detrimental to

the integrity of the sentencing procedure for two reasons. First, reliance on that myth invoked racial stereotypes, thus calling into question whether the defendant

would have received as lengthy a sentence were he

not Black. Second, the use of the superpredator myth

supported treating the characteristics of youth as an

aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor. To fully

appreciate how the use of this term was not simply a

gloss but, rather, an inappropriate sentencing consideration, some historical and sociological context is

needed.10

The superpredator theory tapped into and amplified

racial stereotypes that date back to the founding of our

nation. Specifically relevant to the present case, the

dehumanization of Black children pervades this country’s history. In 1776, when Thomas Jefferson, a slave

owner, declared ‘‘all men are created equal,’’ in many

of the colonies, Black adults and children were property

and ‘‘were not legally considered human . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) J. Bell, W. Haywood Burns

Institute for Youth Justice Fairness & Equity, Repairing

the Breach: A Brief History of Youth of Color in the Justice

System (2015) p. 1, available at https://burnsinstitute.org/

wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Repairing-the-Breach-BI_

compressed.pdf (last visited January 20, 2022).

As one legal scholar has observed, throughout the
history of our country, our policies have reflected that

only some children—white ones—have deserved societal protection. See K. Nunn, ‘‘The Child as Other: Race

and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System,’’ 51 DePaul L. Rev. 679, 679–82 (2002). Professor

Kenneth B. Nunn explained that the mid-nineteenth century saw the birth of the concept of ‘‘adolescence,’’

resulting in a shift from the understanding of children

over the age of ten as a labor resource for families to

a class of persons deserving of societal protection. Id.,

679–80. A particular part of this shift arose from concerns regarding a rise in childhood poverty and a perception of increasing crime among children. See, e.g.,

T. Birckhead, ‘‘The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and

the Role of the Defense Attorney,’’ 58 B.C. L. Rev. 379,

395–96 (2017). Those concerns prompted social reforms,

grounded in the doctrine of parens patriae,11 aimed at

directing ‘‘ ‘wayward youth’ ’’ to reform schools rather

than incarcerating them with adult prisoners. Id., 396–

97. Notably, the protections and progressive social innovations afforded by these reforms were not provided

to Black children, who were considered ‘‘ ‘unsalvageable and undeserving’ ’’ of the ‘‘citizen-building ideals’’

that had prompted the changes. Id., 398; see, e.g., G.

Ward, The Black Child-Savers: Racial Democracy and

Juvenile Justice (2012) pp. 52–62 (discussing role of

race in differential treatment of white and Black juveniles during antebellum period); see also, e.g., id., 52

(noting that, during antebellum period, ‘‘[e]arly . . .

reformatories were typically first open exclusively to

whites’’). As a result, by 1850, rather than being sent

to reform schools, ‘‘a disproportionate number of Black

youths were jailed in cities with majority white populations.’’12 T. Birckhead, supra, 398.

At the time that adolescence was being recognized

as a distinct developmental stage for white children,

many Black children remained enslaved and were

viewed as subhuman. See, e.g., K. Nunn, supra, 51

DePaul L. Rev. 680. In contrast to white children in

their teens, Black children could be separated from

their parents, bought and sold like chattel. See, e.g., id.;

see also, e.g., J. Bell, supra, p. 6. The nascent concept

of adolescence, therefore, did not apply to them. See,

e.g., K. Nunn, supra, 680. The historical fiction that

Black adolescents are not actually ‘‘children,’’ meriting

societal protection, stems from the dehumanization of

Black Americans and is one of the roots of the disparate

treatment of Black teens by the justice system. See,

e.g., P. Goff et al., ‘‘The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children,’’ 106 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 526, 526–29, 539–41 (2014) (documenting connection between dehumanization of Black

male children, perception that they are older and less

innocent than white peers, and disparate treatment of

Black male children in juvenile justice system); see

also footnote 14 of this opinion (illustrating disparate
treatment).

Against this backdrop, the superpredator myth

employed a particular tool of dehumanization—portraying Black people as animals. See, e.g., P. Goff et

al., supra, 106 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 528 (documenting historical dehumanizing association of Black

people, including first Black president of United States,

with nonhuman primates). A ‘‘predator’’ is defined as

‘‘one that preys, destroys, or devours,’’ or ‘‘an animal

that depends on predation for its food . . . .’’ Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 1785. The

superpredator metaphor invoked images of packs of

teens prowling the streets. The news coverage in the

mid-1990s, which depicted ‘‘young Black males, showing them [handcuffed] and shackled, held down by [the]

police, or led into courtrooms wearing orange jumpsuits’’; T. Birckhead, supra, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 410; left little

doubt that the ‘‘packs’’ were Black teens.

The superpredator myth triggered and amplified the

fears inspired by these dehumanizing racial stereotypes,

thus perpetuating the systemic racial inequities that

historically have pervaded our criminal justice system.

Looming on the apocalyptic horizon were tens of thousands of these fabricated, subhuman superpredators,

who would ‘‘do what comes ‘naturally’: murder, rape,

rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.’’

J. DiIulio, ‘‘The Coming of the Super-Predators,’’ supra.

A threat on this scale called for a response. And the

response came in the form of a public panic and media

frenzy, prompting nearly every state in the country to

step up the sentencing and punishment of juveniles.

See, e.g., J. Short & C. Sharp, Disproportionate Minority

Contact in the Juvenile Justice System (2005) p. 7

(‘‘[b]etween 1992 and 1999, [forty-nine] states and the

District of Columbia passed laws making it easier for

juveniles to be tried as adults through statutory exclusion, mandatory waiver, direct file by prosecutors, or

presumptive waiver legislation’’);13 see also, e.g., F.

Zimring, ‘‘The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer:

A Mildly Revisionist History of the 1990s,’’ 71 La. L.

Rev. 1, 8 (2010); D. Bishop, ‘‘Juvenile Offenders in the

Adult Criminal Justice System,’’ 27 Crime & Just. 81

(2000). This shift in the law subjected ‘‘juvenile offenders to sentencing regimes that were originally conceived

for adults . . . .’’ Miller v. Alabama (No. 10-9646),

United States Supreme Court Briefs, October Term,

2011, Amici Curiae Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al., pp. 7–8.

And the consequences of the changes to juvenile justice

fell disproportionately on Black teens.14

The second reason the superpredator myth constituted particularly harmful materially false information

for sentencing purposes is because it turns upside down

the constitutional mandate of Roper and its progeny.

By labeling a juvenile as a superpredator, the very characteristics of youth that should serve as mitigating fac-
tors in sentencing—impulsivity, submission to peer

pressure, deficient judgment—are treated instead as

aggravating factors justifying harsher punishment. The

superpredator theory and the correspondingly harsh

punishment of juvenile offenders cannot be reconciled

with the recognition in Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543

U.S. 551, that the medical and social science research

demonstrates that ‘‘the signature qualities of youth are

transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and

recklessness that may dominate in younger years can

subside.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 570;

see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 477 (requiring that, in sentencing juveniles to life without possibility of parole, courts must consider in mitigation child’s

‘‘chronological age and its hallmark features—among

them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate

risks and consequences’’); State v. Riley, supra, 315

Conn. 659–60 (applying Miller to sentence of functional

equivalent of life imprisonment without possibility of

parole and holding that Miller applies to discretionary

sentencing schemes, as well as mandatory ones).

In summary, by invoking the superpredator theory

to sentence the young, Black male defendant in the

present case, the sentencing court, perhaps even without realizing it, relied on materially false, racial stereotypes that perpetuate systemic inequities—demanding

harsher sentences—that date back to the founding of

our nation. In addition, contrary to Roper and its progeny, in relying on the superpredator myth, the sentencing court counted the characteristics of youth as an

aggravating factor against the defendant. Although we

do not mean to suggest that the sentencing judge

intended to perpetuate a race based stereotype, we

cannot overlook the fact that the superpredator myth

is precisely the type of materially false information that

courts should not rely on in making sentencing decisions. Whether used wittingly or unwittingly, reliance

on such a baseless, illegitimate theory calls into question the legitimacy of the sentencing procedure and the

sentence.

Having concluded that the superpredator doctrine

was materially false information, we next must determine whether the sentencing court substantially relied

on the materially false and unreliable superpredator

theory in arriving at the defendant’s sentence. In other

words, we review the record to determine whether the

sentencing court gave explicit attention to the superpredator theory, whether that court based its sentence

at least in part on it, or whether that court gave specific

consideration to the theory before imposing sentence.

See State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 843 n.12. Because

the test is framed in the disjunctive, any of the three

conditions would suffice. We conclude that the sentencing court did all three.

We already have observed that the sentencing court’s
remarks were brief—the court’s comments occupied

less than one and one-half pages of the sentencing transcript. The court expressly referenced the defendant’s

supposed status as a ‘‘charter member’’ of the superpredator group, and the court’s comments regarding

the superpredator theory comprised a substantial portion of its brief remarks. Given that the court’s brief

remarks were heavily directed at and shaped by the

superpredator theory, it is evident that the court gave

explicit attention to the theory, gave specific consideration to it and also based its sentence, in part, on the

fact that it considered the defendant a superpredator.

Furthermore, the sentencing court’s discussion of the

superpredator theory throughout its brief remarks demonstrates that the court’s view of the defendant was

shaped by this theory that there was a group of youths

who were destined to live an irredeemable life of violence and that the defendant was a ‘‘member’’ of that

group. The sentencing court described the superpredator group as ‘‘a group of radically impulsive, brutally

remorseless youngsters who assault, rape, rob and burglarize.’’ Echoing DiIulio’s description of superpredators, the court stated to the defendant: ‘‘You have no

fears, from your conduct, of the pains of imprisonment;

nor do you suffer from the pangs of conscience.’’ The

court went further and called the defendant a ‘‘charter

member’’ of that fictitious group. This was more than

a mere gloss or broad statement. The court’s reliance

on the superpredator theory, and its view that it had

to protect society from a charter member of this

remorseless group, dominated its sentencing remarks.

The superpredator theory, and the court’s application of

that theory to the defendant, was central to the court’s

sentencing determination. It was the prism through

which the court viewed this defendant. The sentencing

court’s explicit attention to the superpredator theory

demonstrates that the court substantially relied on that

baseless and now debunked theory when sentencing

the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Parker, supra, 295

Conn. 843 n.12. Consequently, we conclude that reliance

on the false and pernicious superpredator theory in

the present case so infected the sentencing that the

sentence was imposed in an illegal manner.

It is axiomatic ‘‘that [t]he defendant has a legitimate

interest in the character of the procedure which leads

to the imposition of sentence . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 839. We conclude that, because

the superpredator theory constituted materially false,

and, therefore, unreliable, evidence on which the sentencing court substantially relied, the trial court abused

its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant’s sentence was

imposed in an illegal manner, in violation of his right

to due process.

The trial court’s decision is reversed and the case
is remanded to that court with direction to grant the

defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence and

for resentencing.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller. Thereafter, Justice McDonald was added to the

panel and has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording

of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

** January 21, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the

Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

We note that the trial court dismissed in part the defendant’s motion to

correct. We are concerned only with the trial court’s denial of that motion;

see footnote 3 of this opinion; and our reversal of the trial court’s ruling

pertains to the denial rather than the dismissal in part of that motion.

2 The issue of whether a sentencing court has imposed a sentence in an

illegal manner by relying on materially false information frequently has arisen

when the court relied on factually inaccurate information in a presentence

investigation report in imposing a defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., State v.

Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 832, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010). Our decisions, however,

have used the phrases ‘‘inaccurate information,’’ ‘‘false information’’ and

‘‘misinformation’’ interchangeably for purposes of applying the standard.

See, e.g., State v. Ward, 341 Conn. 142, 156, A.3d (2021) (‘‘inaccurate

information’’); State v. Parker, supra, 832 (‘‘misinformation’’); id., 844 (‘‘inaccurate information’’ and ‘‘materially false’’ information (internal quotation

marks omitted)); State v. Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 319, 507 A.2d 99 (1986)

(‘‘false information’’). We recognize that there is a distinction between the

inaccuracy of facts set forth in a report and the falsity of a theory. Both

share, however, the core defect that renders a sentence illegal—in each

instance, the sentencing court has relied on something that is not true. In

the present case, we believe that the phrase ‘‘false information’’ is the best

fit for the sentencing court’s reliance on a false theory.

3 The defendant also raises two other claims. First, he claims that the trial

court incorrectly denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence because

his sentence is disproportionate, in violation of the eighth amendment to

the United States constitution. Second, the defendant asserts that the trial

court incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his claim that,

in light of evolving standards of decency, his sentence was disproportionate,

in violation of article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution.

Because our resolution of the defendant’s claim that the sentencing court

relied on materially false information requires us to remand the case for

resentencing, resolution of these additional claims is not necessary to

this appeal.

4 The court sentenced the defendant, on the first count, for kidnapping

in the first degree, to twenty years, on the second count, for kidnapping in

the first degree, to twenty years, on the third count, for robbery in the first

degree, to ten years, on the fourth count, for sexual assault in the first

degree, to twenty years, on the fifth count, for sexual assault in the first

degree, to twenty years, on the sixth count, for attempt to commit sexual

assault in the first degree, to ten years, and, on the seventh count, for

burglary in the first degree, to ten years. The court further ordered counts

two, five and six to run concurrently to count one, and counts three, four

and seven to run consecutively to count one, for a total effective sentence

of sixty years of imprisonment.

5 We emphasize that our holding today is grounded solely on the sentencing

court’s imposition of the defendant’s sentence in an illegal manner by relying

on materially false information. That is, we do not ground our holding on

the sentencing court’s failure to give mitigating effect to the defendant’s

youth and its hallmark features. As we have explained, our decisions have

held that such a pre-Miller failure would not require resentencing. See State

v. Williams-Bey, supra, 333 Conn. 470; State v. Delgado, supra, 323 Conn. 804.

6 Specifically, the trial court held that, in light of the gravity of the underlying offenses, the defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate, in violation

of the eighth amendment. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction

over the defendant’s claim that the passage of No. 15-183 of the 2015 Public

Acts—which bars, but for one narrow exception, the transfer of fourteen
year olds to the regular criminal docket—demonstrated that contemporary

standards of decency dictated that sentencing a fourteen year old to sixty

years of incarceration was disproportionate, in violation of article first, §§ 8

and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. Finally, the trial court rejected the

defendant’s claim that, by stating in its ruling that the defendant was a

‘‘charter member’’ of an alleged demographic group of teenage ‘‘superpredators,’’ the sentencing court relied on materially false information in sentencing him.

7 Both decisions held that the parole eligibility granted retroactively by

P.A. 15-84, § 1, remedies a Miller violation under the Connecticut constitution. See State v. Williams-Bey, supra, 333 Conn. 470, 472–73, 477; State v.

McCleese, supra, 333 Conn. 381, 383, 387.

8 The PSI revealed that the defendant had an extensive juvenile delinquency history, including an incident in which he shot his younger sister.

The PSI also revealed that the defendant had rejected ‘‘any efforts at rehabilitation’’ and had been diagnosed with ‘‘ ‘severe conduct disorder.’ ’’

9 By the late 1990s, after a steady decline in juvenile crime, DiIulio recanted

his theory and expressed regret that he had promulgated it. See, e.g., E.

Becker, ‘‘As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets,’’

N.Y. Times, February 9, 2001, p. A19 (‘‘DiIulio said, while praying at Mass

on Palm Sunday in 1996, that he had an ‘epiphany’ . . . . He tried, he said,

to put the brakes on the superpredator theory, which had all but taken on

a life of its own. ‘I couldn’t write fast enough to curb the reaction . . . .’ ’’).

He admitted, on more than one occasion, that his views had turned out to

be completely wrong. See, e.g., id. (‘‘DiIulio . . . conceded today that he

wished he had never become the [1990s] intellectual pillar for putting violent

juveniles in prison and condemning them as ‘superpredators’ ’’).

Notably, in the landmark case of Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460,

DiIulio signed on to an amici curiae brief filed in support of the petitioners,

which denounced the superpredator theory as a ‘‘myth’’ grounded on ‘‘baseless’’ predictions. Miller v. Alabama (No. 10-9646), United States Supreme

Court Briefs, October Term, 2011, Amici Curiae Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et

al., p. 8. The United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with the juvenile

offenders, writing that a young person’s immaturity reduces his or her

accountability and that juveniles have an inability to assess consequences,

are often rash, and prone to risk-taking—mitigating factors that should be

considered at sentencing. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 471, 476–77.

10 We do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of the relevant

historical background of the ideas underlying the superpredator myth.

Instead, we highlight some aspects of that background that are particularly

helpful to understanding why the superpredator theory constitutes materially false information for purposes of sentencing. For thorough discussions

of the historical underpinnings of the disparate treatment of Black children

in the juvenile justice system, see G. Ward, The Black Child-Savers: Racial

Democracy and Juvenile Justice (2012), and Our Children, Their Children

(D. Hawkins & K. Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).

11 ‘‘Parens patriae’’ literally means ‘‘ ‘parent of the country’ ’’ and ‘‘refers

traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under

legal disability, such as juveniles . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 1114.

12 We recognize that the protections afforded to adolescents in the juvenile

justice system have not followed a direct trajectory. That is, the recognition

of adolescence as a stage of human development has not guaranteed that

teenagers receive an ever increasing, or even stable, level of protection

under the law. Instead, it is widely acknowledged that juvenile justice has

swung in a pendulum between the goals of rehabilitation and punishment.

See, e.g., J. Radice, ‘‘The Juvenile Record Myth,’’ 106 Geo. L.J. 365, 378–83

(2018) (providing historical overview of shifts between rehabilitative and

punitive purposes of juvenile justice system); C. Loomis-Gustafson, ‘‘Adjusting

the Bright-Line Age of Accountability Within the Criminal Justice System:

Raising the Age of Majority to Age 21 Based on the Conclusions of Scientific

Studies Regarding Neurological Development and Culpability of Young-Adult

Offenders,’’ 55 Duq. L. Rev. 221, 225–27 (2017) (same). Through each swing

of the pendulum, however, Black children always have been seen as less

capable of rehabilitation than white children because of the pervasive view

of Black children as subhuman. See, e.g., K. Nunn, supra, 51 DePaul L.

Rev. 679–81.

13 Like many other states, in the mid-1990s, Connecticut revised its laws

to make it easier to try juveniles as adults. See, e.g., Public Acts 1995, No.

95-225, § 13 (revising juvenile transfer provision to allow automatic transfer
to regular criminal docket for child charged with commission of capital

felony, class A or B felony, or violation of General Statutes § 53a-54d; previous language required court to make written findings, after hearing, that

probable cause existed to believe child committed charged crime prior to

such transfer).

14 In 1999, the United States Department of Justice reported: ‘‘Overrepresentation of [B]lack juveniles occurs at all stages of the juvenile justice

system. In 1996–97, while 26 [percent] of juveniles arrested were [B]lack,

they made up 45 [percent] of cases involving detention. Thirty-two percent

of adjudicated cases involved [B]lack youth, yet 40 [percent] of juveniles

in residential placement are [B]lack. Even recognizing the overrepresentation of [B]lack juveniles involved in violent crimes reported by victims (39

[percent]), they still accounted for a disproportionate share of juvenile

arrests for violent crime (44 [percent]) and confinement (45 [percent]).’’

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice,

Minorities in the Juvenile Justice System, 1999 National Report Series: Juvenile Justice Bulletin (December, 1999) p. 2, available at https://www.ojp.gov/

pdffiles1/ojjdp/179007.pdf (last visited January 20, 2022), adopted from H.

Snyder & M. Sickmund, supra.

Particularly relevant to the present case were the racial disparities in the

sentencing stage. Specifically, in 1998, the Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention reported that ‘‘[j]uvenile court judges [were] more

likely to place [Black] youth in residential placement facilities, and less

likely to place [Black] youth on probation in comparison to similarly situated

white youth. Although 32 [percent] of cases adjudicated delinquent involved

[Black youth], a larger proportion of those cases (36 [percent]) were ordered

into residential placement facilities than received probation (31 [percent]).

Overall, white youth were underrepresented among cases receiving residential placement and overrepresented among cases receiving probation. The

disparity between white and Black children [was] present across all offense

categories . . . .’’ (Footnotes omitted.) K. Nunn, supra, 51 DePaul L. Rev.

686.

Connecticut reported similar disparities within the state’s juvenile justice

system during the relevant time period. See E. Hartstone & D. Richetelli,

An Assessment of Minority Overrepresentation in Connecticut’s Juvenile

Justice System (1995), available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization

/155321NCJRS.pdf (last visited January 20, 2022). In order to comply with

the 1988 amendment to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109, the state of Connecticut

commissioned a study to evaluate overrepresentation of minority children

in secure facilities. Id., p. 1. The study evaluated data from 1990 to 1992.

See id., pp. 14, 20, 21. Although 1990 census data reflected that roughly 11

percent of Connecticut’s population of ten to sixteen year olds were Black,

Black youth accounted for approximately 28.6 percent of youths referred

to the court of juvenile matters for instant offenses, including felonies,

misdemeanors, violation or status charges, 46 percent of youths placed in

detention for such offenses, and 46.6 percent of youths placed in Long Lane

School for such offenses. See id., p. 21 (figure 2).

In Bridgeport specifically, where the defendant committed his offenses,

although white juveniles accounted for 61 percent of the 10 to 16 year old

population, they comprised only 27 percent of those referred to court, 10

percent of those placed in detention, and less than 6 percent of those placed

in Long Lane School. Id., p. 28. By contrast, Black juveniles accounted for

less than 20 percent of the 10 to 16 year old population, yet comprised 40

percent of those referred to court, 52 percent of those placed in detention

and 54 percent of those placed in Long Lane School. Id.

The Connecticut study revealed that, ‘‘[f]or all types of offenses, Black

juveniles were several times more likely than [w]hite juveniles to be placed in

detention.’’ Id., 41. Furthermore, those Black juveniles charged with serious

juvenile offenses remained in detention longer than white juveniles charged

with similar offenses. See id., 65. This disparity was particularly notable in

Bridgeport. Id.

Black juveniles charged with nonserious juvenile offenses were more

likely than white juveniles charged with similar offenses to be handled

judicially. Id. Black juveniles charged with serious juvenile offenses were

more likely than white juveniles charged with similar offenses to be adjudicated for serious juvenile offenses. Id., 66. The report clarified that ‘‘[r]ace/

ethnicity was found to indirectly impact this decision, as race/ethnicity

significantly predicts detention decisions and detention predicts [a serious

juvenile offense] adjudication.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id. Similarly, ‘‘race/
ethnicity was found to be an indirect predictor of court commitment to

Long Lane School’’ because ‘‘race/ethnicity significantly predicts detention

decisions and detention predicts commitment to Long Lane School.’’ Id.