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Filed 12/15/20 P. v. Cason CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON LAMONT CASON,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B303938

(Super. Ct. No. NA057126)

(Los Angeles County)

Brandon Lamont Cason appeals from the trial court’s 

denial of his petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.95.) 

He contends the court erred when it denied his petition because: 

(1) it relied on hearsay, (2) it applied the wrong standard of proof, 

and (3) there was insufficient evidence that he acted with 

reckless indifference to human life. We affirm. 

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying crimes

In October 2000, Cason and four other members of a 

Los Angeles criminal street gang were at a friend’s house. 

(People v. Cason (Mar. 26, 2007, B187189) [nonpub. opn.] 2007 

WL 891292 at p. *2 (Cason).) After talking about committing a 

robbery, Cason and three others left, saying that they were going 

to a nearby liquor store. (Ibid.) The fifth gang member briefly 

followed, but then turned around and returned to the friend’s 

house. (Ibid.)

Ten minutes later, one of the gang members shot and 

killed the owner of a liquor store as the victim tried to drive away 

in a van, ripping the victim’s wallet from his pants pocket in the 

process. (Cason, supra, 2007 WL 891292 at pp. *1-2.) A witness

in a nearby car heard the gunshots and saw two men who had 

been sitting at a bus stop outside the liquor store—Cason and 

another gang member—run toward him. (Id. at p. *1.) Cason

yelled, “Get him!”2 (Ibid.) They shot at his car as he sped away, 

hitting his left shoulder. (Ibid.) The witness survived the 

shooting. (Ibid.) 

Cason and the others ran back to their friend’s house 

and tried to force their way inside. (Cason, supra, 2007 WL 

891292 at p. *2.) She refused to let them in and called 911 

instead. (Ibid.) During a subsequent interview, the friend told 

police that Cason and four other gang members had been at her 

house that night. (Ibid.) They ran down the street after 

2 While our prior opinion did not make clear who yelled 

this, Cason now concedes that he did. We accept the concession. 

(Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 555.)
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gunshots were fired. (Ibid.) She did not tell police that Cason 

and the others had discussed a robbery. (Ibid.) 

Several witnesses reported hearing the gunshots and 

seeing young men flee from the liquor store. (Cason, supra, 2007 

WL 891292 at p. *2.) Police detained Cason and two others, but 

no witness was able to identify them that night. (Ibid.) The 

witness who was shot as he drove away later identified Cason

from the clothes he was wearing. (Ibid.)

After he was arrested for robbery and murder, Cason 

told a detective that he was a junior gang member who was 

required to do “street level” crimes for the gang. (Cason, supra, 

2007 WL 891292 at p. *2.) He initially denied that he was 

involved in the murder of the liquor store owner, and claimed 

that he and the other gang members were at their friend’s house 

when the shooting occurred. (Ibid.) 

Cason later admitted that he and three of his fellow 

gang members were responsible for the shooting at the liquor 

store. (Cason, supra, 2007 WL 891292 at p. *2.) The four had 

planned the crime together, but one of the others was the 

“mastermind.” (Ibid.) Cason said that he acted as the lookout 

during the shooting, but refused to describe anyone else’s role. 

(Ibid.) He later recanted his admission and said that he wanted 

to stick with the first version of events he told the detective. 

(Ibid.) 

Trial and appeal

A jury convicted Cason of first degree murder (§§ 187, 

subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)), second degree robbery (§ 211, 212.5, 

subd. (c)), and attempted murder (§ 664/187, subd. (a)). (Cason, 

supra, 2007 WL 891292 at p. *1.) The jury also found true a 

robbery-murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. 
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(a)(17)(A)), and allegations that Cason committed his crimes for 

the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and that 

a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm 

causing great bodily injury or death (§12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). 

(Cason, at p. *1.) The trial court sentenced him to life in state 

prison without the possibility of parole on the murder, a 

consecutive seven years on the attempted murder, and a 

consecutive 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement. (Ibid.)

On appeal, we rejected Cason’s request to vacate the 

jury’s true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance 

allegation due to insufficient evidence that he acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. (Cason, supra, 2007 WL 891292 at p. 

*8.) Cason admitted to the detective that he planned the robbery 

of the liquor store with his fellow gang members. (Ibid.) And 

that robbery was “committed while [the liquor store owner] was 

driving away in his van, making it more likely that deadly force 

would have to be used to effectuate the taking of any property.” 

(Ibid.) Additionally, Cason either shot or aided and abetted the 

shooting of the primary witness to the robbery-murder. (Ibid.) 

From this evidence a reasonable jury could infer that Cason was 

“at the very least recklessly indifferent to human life.” (Ibid.) 

We nevertheless vacated the jury’s finding. (Cason, 

supra, 2007 WL 891292 at p. *9.) To find the special 

circumstance allegation true, the jury was required to conclude 

that Cason either had the intent to kill or acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. (Id. at p. *7.) But the trial court’s 

instruction on the allegation omitted any reference to reckless 

indifference. (Ibid.) The jury could thus have made a true 

finding if it determined that Cason simply “aided and abetted a 

robbery that resulted in the death of a human being.” (Id. at p. 
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*8.) Such a finding was not permitted, and the error could not be 

deemed harmless: Even though the jury could infer that Cason 

acted with reckless indifference by helping to plan and carry out 

the liquor store robbery, the evidence “was not so overwhelming”

that it conclusively showed that he did. (Ibid.)

Section 1170.95 proceedings

The trial court issued an order to show cause and 

held a formal hearing on Cason’s petition for resentencing 

pursuant to section 1170.95. After reviewing the parties’ moving 

papers as well as this court’s opinion on direct appeal, and after 

hearing arguments from counsel, the court concluded that Senate 

Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437)—the legislation that added section 

1170.95 to the Penal Code—was constitutional. It then found 

that Cason acted with reckless indifference to human life and 

denied his petition. 

DISCUSSION

Section 1170.95 resentencing

In 2018, the Legislature enacted S.B. 1437 to “amend 

the felony murder rule . . . to ensure that murder liability is not 

imposed on a person who [was] not the actual killer, did not act 

with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 

life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish these 

goals, S.B. 1437 redefined “malice” in section 188, and narrowed 

the classes of persons liable for felony murder under section 189. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3.) It also added section 1170.95, 

which permits those convicted of felony murder to petition to 

have their murder convictions vacated and to be resentenced on 

any remaining counts. (Stats., ch. 1015, § 4.)
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A convicted defendant may petition for resentencing 

where the information allowed prosecutors to proceed under a 

theory of felony murder, the defendant was convicted of first or 

second degree murder, and the defendant could not now be 

convicted of murder under the amendments to sections 188 and 

189. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) If the defendant files a petition 

declaring that they meet these requirements (id., subd. (b)(1)(A)), 

the trial court must determine “whether [they have] made

a ‘prima facie showing [that they] “fall within the provisions” of

the statute.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

588, 596-597, alterations omitted; see § 1170.95, subd. (c)). If the

defendant makes that showing, the court must appoint counsel, if 

requested, and permit the prosecution to respond to the petition. 

(Offley, at p. 597.) If the moving papers show that the defendant 

may be eligible for relief, the court must “issue an order to show 

cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to grant the 

petition and resentence [them].” (Id. at p. 597.)

At that hearing, prosecutors must prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the defendant is ineligible for 

resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) In doing so, they “may 

rely on the record of conviction or offer new or additional 

evidence.” (Ibid.) If they do not meet the standard of proof, “the 

prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached 

to the conviction, shall be vacated and the [defendant] shall be 

resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)

Hearsay statements

Cason first contends the trial court erroneously 

denied his resentencing petition because it relied on hearsay 

statements in our opinion on direct appeal. We disagree. Cason 

did not object to the court’s reliance on our opinion during the 
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proceedings below. His contention is therefore forfeited. (People 

v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333.)

In any event, a trial court may look to a prior 

appellate opinion when ruling on a section 1170.95 resentencing 

petition. (See, e.g., People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1, 16, 

review granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264033.) And if Cason believed 

that that opinion misstated the facts, he could have raised that 

issue in a petition for rehearing. (People v. Guilford (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 651, 660.) He did not do so. Thus, even if our 

opinion were “hearsay,” it was sufficiently reliable to be 

considered in the proceedings below. (Cf. id. at pp. 660-661 

[proper to rely on prior appellate opinion when ruling on section 

1170.126 resentencing petition].)

Standard of proof

Cason next contends the trial court applied the wrong 

standard of proof when it determined that he acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. But again, Cason forfeited his 

contention by failing to raise it in the proceedings below. (In re

Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412.)

And even if there were no forfeiture, we would reject 

the contention. We presume the trial court was aware of and 

applied the correct standard of proof when it ruled on Cason’s 

resentencing petition. (Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 

899, 913-915.) Cason does not attempt to rebut that 

presumption, but instead claims that even if the court applied the 

correct standard of proof it applied that standard to the facts set 

forth in our prior appellate opinion—facts that were “ascertained 

. . . under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review” rather 

than proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But when ruling on 

Cason’s petition, the court stated that it was sitting as a “trier of 
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fact.” And all parties agreed—both in their moving papers and at 

the hearing—that the court had to find that prosecutors proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cason could still be convicted of 

murder under the amended versions of sections 188 and 189 

before it could deny his resentencing petition. That the court 

relied on our prior opinion when it made that finding does not 

show that it applied the wrong standard of proof. (See People v.

Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 936, 951-952 [parties’ arguments

and trial court comments show court applied correct standard].)

Sufficiency of the evidence

Finally, Cason contends there was insufficient 

evidence that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. 

This contention lacks merit.

A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human 

life if they are “‘“subjectively aware that [their] participation in 

[a] felony involve[s] a grave risk of death.”’ [Citations.]” (People

v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807, alterations omitted.) This 

requires the defendant to be “aware of and willingly involved in 

the violent manner in which [a] particular offense is committed.” 

(Id. at p. 801.) To determine whether the trial court correctly 

concluded Cason acted with such awareness and willingness, “we 

look to whether the prosecution . . . introduced sufficient evidence 

of ‘“‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value’”’ to ‘support a finding 

beyond a reasonable doubt’” that he did. (People v. Clark (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 522, 618 (Clark).) In making our determination, we 

consider factors such as: (1) how many firearms were used 

during the robbery, whether Cason knew that they would be 

used, and whether he personally used one; (2) whether Cason was 

present during the robbery and, if so, whether he helped to 

restrain the crime or aid the victim; (3) the duration of the 
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robbery; (4) whether Cason knew that one of his fellow gang 

members would likely kill; and (5) Cason’s efforts, if any, to 

minimize the possibility of violence during the robbery. (Id. at 

pp. 618-623.) “‘[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor 

is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 

618.)

Here, four of the five factors delineated in Clark

support a finding that Cason acted with reckless indifference to 

human life. First, at least two firearms were used during the 

robbery-murder: one to shoot the liquor store owner, and another

to shoot the witness in a nearby car. Cason may have used the 

latter firearm to shoot the witness. (See Cason, supra, 2007 WL 

891292 at p. *6.) But even if he didn’t, it is rationally inferred 

that he knew that it would be used: An expert testified at 

Cason’s trial that his gang “functioned by selling drugs and

committing shootings, burglaries, and robberies.” (Id. at p. *3, 

emphasis added.)

Second, Cason was present during the robberymurder, but did not seek to restrain his accomplices’ crimes. 

Instead, he furthered their ability to rob and shoot the liquor 

store owner by acting as a lookout and working to eliminate a 

potential witness. He then failed to render aid to the victim, 

despite his ability to do so. 

Third, it is rationally inferred that Cason knew of his 

accomplices’ propensity to kill given his active role in planning 

the robbery and the expert’s testimony that shootings were one of 

his gang’s primary activities. 

Finally, Cason did not make any efforts to minimize 

the possibility of violence during the robbery-murder. To the 

contrary, he increased the level of violence when he instructed his 
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fellow lookout to “get” a nearby witness and then chased after the 

man. 

Considered together, these factors provide sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Cason acted with 

reckless indifference to human life. (See, e.g., People v.

Law (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 811, 825, review granted July 8, 2020, 

S262490; In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 52-55.) Denial of 

his resentencing petition was accordingly proper.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Cason’s petition for 

resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, entered January 6, 

2020, is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
Judith L. Meyer, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Mark D. Lenenberg, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Ryan M. Smith, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.