Left: Enhanced infrared satellite imagery of Hurricane Hugo moving through the U.S.

Virgin Islands, 2AM AST September 18.

Right: Visible spectra satellite imagery of Hurricane Hugo approaching South

Carolina, 330PM EDT September 21.
Natural Disaster Survey Report

Hurricane Hugo

September 10-22, 1989

May 1990

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Dr. John A. Knauss, Administrator

National Weather Service

Dr. Elbet-l W. Friday, Jr., Assistant Administrator
“Mr. President, I have mentioned a number of organizations that have

responded with great shill and dedication to this crisis. Certainly, the

U.S. National Weather Service must be near the top of anyone’s list.

They have performed magnificently before, during and after Hugo. It

was the Weather Service’s accurate and timely forecasts that saved so

many lives and allowed us to avoid even worse destruction. My hat is

off to this superb outfit. It consistently does the Government proud.”

Excerpt from a speech by Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina on the

Senate floor -- October 2, 1989.

ii
PREFACE

Hurricane Hugo, one of the most powerful storms of the century, proved to be a double catastrophe

for the United States. Its course through the Caribbean and the Carolinas caused untold suffering and

the largest economic loss that this country has ever experienced from a hurricane. Our thoughts and

prayers reach out to those courageous individuals who suffered Hugo’s fury and are now struggling to

rebuild their lives. Furthermore, I congratulate all of those in NOAA and the National Weather Service

who, in many instances, disregarded personal concerns to ensure that the warnings and the response

to the storm were of the highest order. Their dedication and professionalism shall ever inspire us.

Dr. Elbert W. Friday, Jr.

May 1990

. . .

111
FOREWORD

This report on Hurricane Hugo was prepared by the disaster survey team after a week of interviews

and visits to damaged areas with commonwealth, state, local and Federal officials in the US. Virgin

Islands, Puerto Rico, Florida, South and North Carolina and the citizens who survived the storm’s

devastation.

The team is grateful to the many state and local officials and representatives of private relief agencies

who took time from urgent duties in helping the injured and the homeless, as well as coping with

Hugo’s havoc, to share their impressions of events before and during the storm’s onslaught. We

appreciate the understanding and courtesy of the many citizens who consented to interviews while still

trying to comprehend and deal with the appalling national disaster that struck their communities. The

team was impressed by their courage, candor and graciousness under conditions of intense stress.

Where the team believed it would serve to clarify the report, we have attributed a specific action or

comment to an identified person. We recognize that many individual acts of professional skill and

judgment and, indeed, heroism are not recorded in this report. While this document is not intended

to chronicle the entire history of the storm and its aftermath, it attempts to assess accurately the

National Weather Service performance to determine whether improvements are possible in forecasting

and preparing for severe storms.

In carrying out our assignment, we acknowledge -- with gratitude and admiration -- the many

individuals who can be justly proud of what they accomplished in concert with others. We salute all

whose participation made the response to Hurricane Hugo such a success.

The Disaster Survey Team

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~i

The Disaster Survey Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Executive Summary ..................................................... xi

Chapter I - Hurricane Hugo: The Event and Its Impact ............................ 1

Chapter II - Summary of Preparedness Actions, Information

and Warning Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter III - Data Collection and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 20

Chapter IV - An Evaluation of the Processing, Interpretation

and Dissemination of NWS Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chapter V - Public Response and User Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter VI - Findings and Recommendations by Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Appendix A - Summary of Recorded and Estimated Wind Speeds

in Hurricane Hugo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-l

Appendix B - Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-l

Appendix C - Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-l

Appendix D - SLOSH Modeling ............................................ D-l

Appendix E - Direction of Damaging (All) Winds ................................ E-l

vi
ACRONYMS

ABT

ADM

AFOS

ALERT

AP

ART

ASL

ASOS

AWIPS

CD

CLIPER

DLM

DOD

EBS

EOC

EPA

EPD

ETV

FAA

FEMA

GDM

GOES

HLS

IFLOWS

MB

MEOW

MIC

MLW

MMT

NAWAS

NESDIS

NEW

NGVD

NHC

NMC

NOAA

NSSFC

NWS

NWWS

OIC

PNS

PPI

QLM

QPF

RFC

SAB

SLOSH

SPE

Auxiliary Backup Terminal

Alphanumeric Display Module

Automation of Field Operations and Services

Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time

Associated Press

Automatic Radiotheodolite

Above Mean Sea Level

Automatic Surface Observing System

Advanced Weather Information Processing System

Civil Defense

Climatological/Persistence Model

Deep Layer Mean

Department of Defense

Emergency Broadcast System

Emergency Operations Center

Environmental Protection Agency

Emergency Preparedness Division

Educational Television

Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Graphics Display Module

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite

Hurricane Local Statement

Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System

Millibar

Maximum Envelopes of Water

Meteorologist in Charge

Mean Low Water

McEntire Air National Guard Base

National Warning System

National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service

Next Generation Weather Radar

National Geodetic Vertical Datum

National Hurricane Center

National Meteorological Center

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Severe Storms Forecast Center

NOAA Weather Radio

National Weather Service

NOAA Weather Wire Service

Official in Charge

Public Information Statement

Plan Position Indicator

Quasi-Lagrangian Model

Quantitative Precipitation Forecast

River Forecast Center

Synoptic Analysis Branch

Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes

Satellite Precipitation Estimate

vii
ssc Shaw Air Force Base

SWIS Satellite Weather Information System

UP1 United Press International

VAS VISSR Atmospheric Sounder

VDUC VAS Data Utilization Center

VISSR Visual and Infrared Spin Scan Radiometer

VITEMA Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency

WPM Warning Preparedness Meteorologist

WSFO Weather Service Forecast Office

wso Weather Service Office

WSR Weather Surveillance Radar

. . . Vlll
THE DISASTER SURVEY TEAM

After a severe weather event, such as a hurricane, a disaster survey team is assigned by the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to evaluate the role played by the National Weather

Service (NWS), provide an objective appraisal and make findings and recommendations. The Hurricane

Hugo team was divided between the Caribbean and the Carolinas.

Team Members

Leader, James W. Brennan, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOM, currently Deputy General

Counsel, NOAA

Coordinator, Linda Kremkau, Program Assistant, Warning and Forecast Branch, NWS

Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands:

R. Augustus Edwards III, Special Assistant to the Deputy

Administrator, NOAA

Edward M. Gross, Chief, Constituent Affairs Office, NWS

Jose G. Meitin, Jr., Meteorologist, Environmental Research

Laboratories, NOAA

Donald R. Wernly, Chief, Warning and Forecast Branch, NWS

The Carolinas:

Mr. Brennan

Gary Ellrod, Meteorologist, Satellite Applications

Laboratory, NESDIS

Dr. Lee W. Larson, Central Regional Hydrologist, NWS

Robert E. Muller, Senior Meteorologist, Transition Program

Office, NWS

Roy S. Popkin, Consultant

Mitchell A. Rosenfeld, Consultant

Dr. Wilson A. Shaffer, Chief, Marine Techniques Branch, NWS

ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Storm

NOAA pronounced 1989’s Hurricane Hugo as the strongest storm to strike the United States in 20

years. The NWS, through its National Hurricane Center (NHC), reported that Hugo smashed into the

Charleston, South Carolina, area minutes before midnight, September 22, with winds estimated at 135

MPH in Bulls Bay north of the city. Four days earlier, the storm crossed the U.S. Virgin Islands and

Puerto Rico with equal force. See Appendix A for a summary of Hugo’s recorded and estimated

surface wind speeds.

During the hurricane’s approach to the Leeward Islands, a NOAA research aircraft east of Guadeloupe

measured winds of 160 MPH and a central pressure of 27.1 inches or 918 millibars (mb). This

qualified Hugo as a Category 5 storm -- the highest -- on the Saffir-Simpson Scale (see Appendix B).

The storm was rated as Category 4 when it pounded the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and South

Carolina. Although rainfall was moderate in the Caribbean and on the U.S. mainland, Hugo produced

record storm tides of up to 20 feet in South Carolina.

The hurricane was the Nation’s costliest in terms of monetary losses but not in lives lost. Forty-nine

directly-related storm fatalities were recorded, 26 in the U.S and its Caribbean islands. Twenty-three

died in other Leeward Islands. NHC estimated more than $9 billion in damages and economic losses

on the mainland, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The mainland alone accounted for $7 billion of

the total.

Services and Benefits

Hugo’s dangerous winds and storm surges had the potential of exacting a heavy death toll in the

Carolinas and the Caribbean, Some 216,000 people evacuated from the coasts before the storm struck.

The key to these evacuations, which undoubtedly saved hundreds of lives, was communications -- long

before Hugo, in the days immediately before the storm and during the event.

Cooperation and coordination among NWS, state, county and local officials developed over the years

provided the basis for the response to the hurricane. Working together, NWS and local officials

conducted broad-based weather awareness programs highlighting hurricane preparedness.

NOAA-produced print and electronic materials were used extensively.

Local relationships should continue to be encouraged. Programs on emergency preparedness and other

educational activities should be expanded. Under conditions of budget constraints, NOAA and NWS

should continue to emphasize public information programs as a very effective way to save lives. Their

contributions in saving lives and protecting property are worthy of dollar and moral support.

Survey team members found that local officials from state to local governments relied primarily on

local NWS personnel in making important decisions. Two striking examples are: the South Carolina

Governor’s decision to call for an early, voluntary evacuation of barrier islands and the Puerto Rico

Governor’s decision to take part in a radio broadcast to emphasize the need for early evacuations and

other precautions as the storm approached. The NWS should encourage all local offices to build

rapport with local emergency managers based on long-term, mutual respect.

xi
Timely, reliable information from the NWS and NHC contributed greatly to the emergency

management and public response. In the crucial hours before the storm’s arrival, local officials said

access to local NWS meteorologists was critical. Despite overloaded telephone circuits, power outages

and difficult working conditions, Weather Service Forecast Offices (WSFOs) and Weather Service

Offices (WSOs) were able, for the most part, to meet local needs. The media also responded well in

using NWS and NHC storm information.

Hugo tested NWS’s aging equipment to the utmost. NWS radar is late 1950s technology. It cannot

measure wind velocity or integrate information horizontally and vertically in storms. Such information

was inferred or missing in warning processes. NWS should continue to develop and implement Next

Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) Doppler Radar as planned.

Low density of surface observations in the Caribbean and the Carolinas proved troubling during Hugo

and after the storm in trying to reconstruct the hurricane’s movement and intensity. As part of

modernization and restructuring, Automatic Surface Observing Systems (AS08 should be implemented

as soon as possible.

The hurricane revealed a deficiency in buildings housing WSFOs and WSOs. Strong winds and rain

caused damage and exposed important equipment to the elements. Emergency generators, supplied

to provide short-run power during outages, were operated in some cases until they failed with other

NWS offices forced to provide backup support. Spare parts, in other instances, were unavailable.

In the midst of these problems, NWS personnel whose families and properties were threatened by the

storm worked under adverse conditions. Toilets failed. Only minimum refrigeration, cooking and

resting facilities were provided. No sleeping or shower facilities were available. Yet, personnel worked

12-hour shifts and longer.

All new construction in hurricane-vulnerable locations should include hardened hurricane-proof areas

for safety. Provision for amenities, such as cots, limited shower and kitchen facilities, refrigerators,

emergency food supplies and backup toilets, should also be considered.

Communications’ deficiencies must be corrected. The National Warning System (NAWAS) is vital to

coordination with external agencies, emergency managers and other NWS offices. In Puerto Rico and

the Virgin Islands, there is no NAWAS Coordination was accomplished by telephone. In the

Carolinas, lack of sufficient NAWAS drops made communication between neighboring states difficult.

The NWS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should investigate the possibility

of a system that allows communications within and without states among NWS and emergency

management agencies.

In Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, limited NOAA Weather Wire Service 0lWWS) drops resulted

in few emergency managers having hard copies of NWS products. The upgraded weather wire should

be implemented in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as soon as practical. The NWS should explore

with FEMA the funding of critical outlets.

Hugo’s experience showed that aircraft reconnaissance will remain a necessary tool in forecasting

hurricanes until other sensing platforms can provide data fields of equal accuracy.

xii
A potentially disastrous error in base elevation was discovered when a high school shelter at a South

Carolina coastal community was inundated by a storm surge. One evacuation document showed the

shelter elevation to be 11 feet higher than it was. Base information on shelters and evacuation routes

should be verified before becoming final. NWS coastal offices should encourage local emergency

management officials to verify shelters’ structural soundness periodically, preferably before the

hurricane season.

Another problem revealed was the difficulty in communicating the threat of hurricane winds to

emergency managers and the public in inland areas. The NWS should develop policy and provide

guidance to NHC and field offices on how to deal with this situation.

Despite deficiencies noted in existing facilities and equipment, the survey team concluded that Senator

Hollings’ speech on the Senate floor accurately portrayed the NWS role. Employees of NWS did

perform nmagniticently before, during and after Hugo.n Those in the path of the storm merit special

praise. They performed coolly and professionally in the face of personal danger.

Cooperation among state, local and Weather Service personnel, coupled with a mutual commitment to

continuing public education, was the key to minimizing loss of life. The coordination between local

Weather Service employees and emergency preparedness people at all levels in the affected

communities and the cooperation of the citizenry could well serve as a model of disaster awareness,

preparedness and execution for all areas of the country. The survey team found extraordinary levels

of mutual respect, trust and ultimately reliance between local and state professionals, on the one hand,

and the professionals at the WSOs and the WSFOs on the other.

The report makes a series of recommendations grounded on the concept that full communication is the

key to maintaining that mutual respect and confidence. With that in mind, it includes

recommendations to recognize and further strengthen the existing cooperation. Even in times of

constrained resources (and perhaps because of constrained resources) the survey team recommends that

NWS continue to dedicate sufficient time and monies to public education and preparedness. Based

upon what the team heard in the Carolinas and Puerto Rico, public education and preparedness will

provide significant payoffs in future weather emergencies.

. . . Xl11

Chapter I

HURRICANE HUGO: THE EVENT AND ITS IMPACT

Hurricane Hugo was the strongest storm to strike

the United States since Camille pounded the

Louisiana and Mississippi coasts in 1969. At one

point east of Guadeloupe, a NOAA research aircraft measured winds of 160 MPH and a central

pressure of 27.1 inches (918 mb) which rated Hugo

as a Category 5 -- the highest -- storm on the

Saffir-Simpson Scale. When Hugo struck the

Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Carolinas, it

was classified as a Category 4. Storm tides of

approximately 20 feet were experienced along part

of the South Carolina coast. These are record

storm tide heights for the East Coast. Although

the highest surges struck sparsely populated areas

north of Charleston, South Carolina, damage was

extensive and lives were lost.

The Historv of the Storm

Hurricane Hugo began as a cluster of thunderstorms which was first detected on satellite imagery

as it moved off the coast of Africa. It became a

tropical depression on September 10, 1989, about

125 miles south of the Cape Verde Islands. The

tropical storm traveled due west over the eastern

Atlantic Ocean along 12 degrees north latitude for

several days. Late on September 13, the circulation

had gained sufficient strength and organization to

be classified as a full hurricane by NHC. At this

time, the storm was located 1,100 miles east of the

Leeward Islands and was continuing due west at 20

MPH.

By Thursday, September 14, Hugo had slowed its

westward movement to 16 MPH while its winds increased to 115 MPH. The storm was 650 miles

east of the Leeward Islands. (See Fig. l-l.) The

next day, reconnaissance aircraft measured winds

of 150 MPH making Hugo a strong Category 4

storm on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. The eye was

positioned 400 miles east of Guadeloupe. A

hurricane watch was posted for Puerto Rico and

the U.S. Virgin Islands. On Saturday, September

16, the hurricane aimed for Guadeloupe and

Dominica with wind speeds reaching 140 MPH.

That afternoon, hurricane warnings were raised for

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. At midnight,

Hugo’s eye passed over Guadeloupe where a surface

pressure of 27.8 inches (941 mb) was reported.

The hurricane approached the Virgin Islands the

next evening when its forward speed began to slow

(Fig. 1-2). This had the effect of prolonging Hugo’s

fury. A couple hours after midnight Monday,

September 18, the hurricane’s eye crossed the

southwestern coastline of St. Croix near

Frederiksted severely damaging this Dutch-style

town. Maintaining 140 MPH maximum winds, the

hurricane destroyed or damaged more than 90 percent of the buildings on St. Croix leaving the island

without power, telephone service or water, No off?

cial wind velocities were recorded on the island.

Weather observers had abandoned the exposed

airport site.

Based on the Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale (see

Appendix 0, damage surveys indicated that there

was widespread upper (Fl) and (F2) straightline

wind damage. Thus, wind speeds as high as 161

MPH were estimated. Some localized damage

appeared to be (F3) but might have been caused by

topographic channel effects or microbursts.

With Hugo’s forward speed slowing to 9 MPH over

the 12-hour period, St. Croix experienced strong

winds both bfore and after the passage of the eye.

From the lie of downed power poles and from the

entire island’s vegetation, which was literally

stripped bare, it was deduced that all of St. Croix

experienced the storm’s maximum winds.

The eye missed the island of St. Thomas as it continued through the channel between Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands. Although St. Thomas was

buffeted by hurricane-force winds, it fared far

better than St. Croix. Even so, St. Thomas experienced extensive damage to structures, utilities and

vegetation. Maximum wind readings were unavailable for St. Thomas. Two days after Hugo’s

passage, St. Thomas sustained additional flooding

from rainbands associated with Tropical Storm Iris.

Subsequent to its Virgin Islands course, Hugo

shifted slightly northward. After sunrise Monday,

September 18, the hurricane increased its forward

speed as it crossed over the Puerto Rican islands of

Vieques and Culebra and skirted the northeast tip

of Puerto Rico near Fajardo. As the eye passed

over Vieques, maximum winds were estimated at

132 MPH. At Culebra just north of Vieques, an

unofficial gust of 170 MPH was reported by the

1
b

Figure l-l

b

2
\

J?igurf3 1-2

3
yacht, Night Cap. Storm surges of 7- to &feet

were estimated. Culebra Island sustained major

damage. Structures, as well as many boats which

sought refuge, were destroyed.

On Puerto Rico proper, peak gusts at Roosevelt

Roads Naval Air Station, 10 miles south of Fajardo,

were recorded at 120 MPH. Sustained winds hit

98 MPH. The hardest hit areas were Fajardo and

Luquillo Beach on the northeast coast where damage paralleled that of St. Croix. The larger ships

at Roosevelt Roads left well before conditions

worsened. Smaller vessels, which remained in port,

were piled against the seawall.

By noon Monday, the eye was positioned north of State and local governments ordered evacuation of

San Juan moving to the northwest at 15 MPH. barrier islands and beach areas from Georgia to

San Juan International Airport reported wind gusts southern North Carolina. Hugo continued to move

of 92 MPH around 8 AMI that day. Sustained relentlessly toward the northwest with’ its forward

winds of 77 MPH were clocked. San Juan, in- speed increasing to 25 MPH. Landfall of the eye

cluding the “old city,” fared well although power was expected by late night or early morning along

and water were out in many areas for more than the South Carolina coast close to the time of

a week. The lowest surface pressure reading from normal high tide. NHC bulletins alerted coastal

Puerto Rico was 27.94 inches (946 mb) at residents of tides 12 to 17 feet above normal and

Roosevelt Roads. rainfall of 5 to 10 inches in the path of the storm.

Hugo weakened after its encounter with Puerto

Rico. By the morning of September 19, the eye of

the storm had become poorly defined in satellite

images (Fig. 1-3) and the strongest sustained winds

had diminished to 100 MPH. As it continued to

move out over the open Atlantic, however, the

storm slowly began to regain strength. Hurricane

warnings were in effect for the southern Bahamas

as Hugo resumed a northwestward track at 12

MPH.

On September 20, Hugo had become better

organized with a well-defined eye once more. By

late in the day, forward speed increased to 18

MPH. The storm was entering a strong southeasterly current of air which was sandwiched

between an upper level high centered north of

Bermuda and an upper low in the northeastern

Gulf of Mexico. Hugo appeared to be taking aim

at the southeastern United States. Hurricane

watches were issued for the coast from Fernandina

Beach, Florida, to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.

Meanwhile, the threat to the Bahamas and south

Florida had diminished.

On September 21, Hugo reached the Gulf Stream

current. Air Force reconnaissance and NOAA research aircraft reported falling central pressures

throughout the day. Maximum sustained winds increased to 138 MPH by evening which qualified

Hugo again as a Category 4 storm. Hugo

developed an enormous eye (Fig. 1-3) more than 40

miles in diameter. Hurricane warnings were issued

at 6 AM from Fernandina Beach to Cape Lookout,

North Carolina.

The eye crossed the coast near Charleston minutes

before midnight, September 22, at a forward speed

of nearly 30 MPH. Winds increased rapidly as the

eye wall moved over land. Maximum sustained

winds were estimated at 135 MPH in Bulls Bay

north of Charleston while wind gusts to 137 MPH

were recorded on the 118 foot anemometer at the

Charleston Naval Station. Gusts to 125 MPH were

observed by Navy ships in Charleston Harbor. An

unofficial observer reported a minimum pressure of

27.68 inches (937 mb) in the eye. Hurricane-force

winds extended nearly 100 miles to the northeast

along the coast and 50 miles to the southwest.

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base reported gusts to 76

MPH with unoflicial reports of 110 MPH gusts at

the oceanfront.

Electrical power was lost in most areas as uprooted

trees, broken limbs or debris severed power lines.

Roofs were peeled off many buildings and homes.

The Ben Sawyer swivel-bridge connecting Sullivans

Island to the mainland near Charleston was severely damaged and became stuck in the open position

1 Atlantic Standard and Eastern Daylight Times coincide.

4

A storm tide of up to 20 feet inundated coastal

sections from around Charleston northward to

Myrtle Beach. In McClellanville, a small fishing

village 35 miles northeast of Charleston, residents

taking shelter in a school had to clamber on top of

tables and chairs to escape the rising waters.

The eye of Hugo passed just to the east of

Columbia, 100 miles inland, shortly after 3 AM,

September 22. At Shaw Air Force Base near

Sumter, 30 miles east of Columbia, winds gusted to

109 MPH. The minimum pressure of 28.73 inches

(972.9 mb) set an all-time record for Columbia.

By sunrise the same day, Hugo was downgraded to

a tropical storm after it had passed just west of

Charlotte, North Carolina. Peak winds at the

Charlotte Airport had reached 87 MPH a few hours

earlier. High winds resulted in a nearly

50-mile-wide swath of downed trees and power

lines in this portion of North Carolina. Pleasure

boats on Lake Norman, north of Charlotte, were

piled into a heap like toys.

Hugo then swept northward across southwest

Virginia reaching Charleston, West Virginia, by

midday. The Appalachian Mountains began to

weaken the storm rapidly but not before winds in

excess of 60 MPH and locally-heavy rains pounded

southwest Virginia. By that evening, the remnants

of Hugo turned northeastward across western New

York and exited the United States less than 25

hours and 600 miles from where it had come

onshore.

Hurricane-induced Tornadoes

No tornadoes were observed in the Virgin Islands

or Puerto Rico although damage surveys suggested

possible microbursts on St. Croix, Culebra and

Vieques. Residents, including personnel at the

Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, believed that

some tornadoes did occur although none could be

confirmed,

The National Severe Storms Forecast Center

(NSSFC) received several unconfirmed reports of

tornadoes in the interior of South Carolina and

westcentral North Carolina. The most likely

tornado events occurred near Florence and Sumter

about 2 hours after landfall and northwest of

Hickory, North Carolina, after sunrise, September

22. Other tornadoes were suspected in Georgetown

and Cherokee Counties in South Carolina and

Union and Mecklenburg Counties near Charlotte.

Aerial surveys in South Carolina could not observe

tornado-like damage signatures with any certainty

since there was such widespread destruction resulting from straightline winds.

Rainfall with Hugo

The rapid forward movement of Hugo greatly

reduced the maximum rainfall potential and thus

the threat of severe flooding other than from the

storm surge. Rainfall of 5 to 9 inches was reported

in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands with a maximum of 13.55 inches recorded at the Lower Rio

Blanco rain gauge in the mountains of northeastern

Puerto Rico. Some flash flooding occurred at

Luquillo in northeast Puerto Rico.

Rainfall of 4 to 6 inches was common along coastal

sections of South Carolina diminishing to 2 to 4

inches inland. On the coast at Edisto Beach, a

maximum of 10.28 inches was observed. Some

small stream flooding occurred as far north as

southwest Virginia and western North Carolina

where orographic effects caused by the

Appalachians produced local rainfall totals of more

than 6 inches.

Casualtv and Damage Statistics

Hugo was the Nation’s costliest hurricane in terms

of monetary damage but not in lives lost. NHC

estimated more than $9 billion in damages and economic losses to the mainland, Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands. The mainland accounted for $7

billion of the total.

Although the death toll was kept low by excellent

weather information, planning and evacuations,

Hugo’s ferocity resulted in 49 directly-related

fatalities; 26 in the U.S. and its Caribbean islands

and 23 in other Leeward Islands. (Directly-related

deaths are those actually resulting from weather

conditions as opposed to fatalities, such as

electrocutions and automobile accidents which are

considered indirectly related to the storm’s effects.)

6
Hard-hit South Carolina suffered the greatest toll

with 13 lives lost. Other fatalities included: Puerto

Rico, 2; Virgin Islands, 3; Virginia, 6; North

Carolina, 1; and New York, 1. In comparison, a

total of 256 hurricane-related deaths were recorded

in 1969 when Camille struck the mainland.

The American Red Cross Disaster Services reported

79 hurricane-related deaths in the Carolinas, Puerto

Rico and the Virgin Islands. Fifty deaths were

recorded in the Carolinas, most in South Carolina.

No separate records were kept on the individual

Carolinas or states where the Red Cross did not

establish disaster operations. Of the 29 deaths in

the U.S. Caribbean islands, 22 were recorded on

Puerto Rico. Five died on St. Croix; two deaths

were reported from St. Thomas and St. John.

The Red Cross totaled more than 200,000 families

that were affected by the hurricane with homes

destroyed or damaged. The figure was expected to

rise as new tallies were reported from Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands. In the Carolinas, initial

reports showed 129,687 families were affected while

in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the total

reached 87,700.

7

Chapter II

SUMMAR,Y OF PREPARtEDNESS ACTIONS, INFORMATION AND

WARNING SERVICES

PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS

The true measure of a warning program’s effectiveness is the degree of response that the warning

elicits from the public and local officials. Social

scientists repeatedly point out that individuals must

be able to assess adequately their risk before they

are willing to take action. To do this; a timely

stream of credible and consistent information must

flow from the Weather Service, emergency management community and the media.

The NWS must work closely with emergency

managers, officials and the media to gain their

trust and to ensure that their needs for technical

information are met, Similarly, active public

awareness campaigns conducted with the media

and local officials foster heightened awareness of

local weather hazards in the general population.

Local weather office personnel thus have a critical

role to play. They are recognized by local decisionmakers as part of the local community, providers of

local information and as an educational resource on

technical matters.

Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

WSFO San Juan has a dedicated warning and preparedness individual assigned to the station. This

office conducted comprehensive warning coordination and hazard awareness programs. Almost

100 preparedness meetings were conducted in May,

June and July by the office staff including

Meteorologist in Charge (MIC) Israel Matos and the

Warning and Preparedness Focal Point, Francisco

Tories. During the first 6 months of the year,

meetings and office tours reached upwards of 2,000

people. For the Virgin Islands, hurricane

preparedness conferences were held for local

government officials at St. Thomas and St. Croix in

May. During that month, a hurricane drill was

conducted by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

using materials prepared by WSFO San Juan. The

Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management

Agency (VITEMA) participated as an observer.

In June, the Puerto Rican Department of Natural

Resources held its annual Hurricane Conference

that included a presentation on the hurricane

season by Matos as well as an explanation on the

use of hurricane probabilities. Media covered this

session that was attended by more than 100 persons. In July, three hurricane workshops were

conducted for radio station managers and Civil

Defense (CD) personnel at San Juan, Ponce and

Quebradillas, all in Puerto Rico.

Also in June, MIC Matos critically reviewed the

evacuation plan for San Juan that had been developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for

FEMA. The WSFO staff used this plan and its

“decision arc” (see Fig, 2-1) methodology to advise

Commonwealth CD personnel on times necessary to

begin evacuation to ensure an effective public

response.

In July, WAPA-TV, Channel 4, one of Puerto Rico’s

major television stations, began allocating 15

minutes each Wednesday morning to the WSFO

San Juan staff for presentations on hurricane

awareness through the end of the most active

portion of the hurricane season,

This effort on the part of the San Juan office to

improve coordination and awareness resulted in a

high level of community preparedness and culminated in one of the largest evacuations, 30,000

people, ever experienced in Puerto Rico.

North and South Carolina

Extensive preparedness and drill activities also had

been conducted by all coastal offices in both

Carolinas prior to the hurricane season. In addition, an active public awareness campaign was

orchestrated in both states.

The Raleigh and Columbia Management Areas each

has a Warning Preparedness Meteorologist (WPM)

assigned to its station. Both of these individuals

conducted Hurricane Awareness Weeks for the

9
POSITION OF

STORM WHEN

EVACUATION HAS

TO BE FINISHED

BECAUSE OF

HIGH WINDS

POSITION OF STORM

WHEN EVACUATION

HAS TO BE STARTED

BASED ON TIMES

NEEDED TO

EVACUATE OF

4-8-12 HOURS

20MPH STORM

MUNICIPIO OF SAN JUAN

Figure 2-1. Decision arc methodology for evacuation planning in Puerto Rico.
public. They also worked closely with state, county

and local coastal emergency management

coordinators as well as their respective state

government offices. In addition, a number of

workshops and discussions took place that were led

by the MIC at Charleston, Richard Shenot; the MIC

at Wilmington, Albert Hinn; the Official in Charge

(OIC) at Cape Hatteras, Wallace DeMaurice; and

the two Warning Preparedness Meteorologists --

Dennis Decker, WSFO Raleigh, and Mary Jo

Parker, WSFO Columbia. Participating were the

media, private industry, local decision-makers,

state, city and county officials, law enforcement

officers from coastal areas, voluntary relief agencies

and the public.

During Hurricane Awareness Weeks conducted at

the beginning of the hurricane season, all offices in

the eastern Carolinas, including the forecast offices

at Baleigh and Columbia, provided public information releases on the NWWS and NOAA Weather

Badio (NWR) dealing with hurricane safety,

hurricane climatology and historical facts and

information for local areas.

Mailings were made to the media and others.

Print media releases in the two-state area during

Hurricane Awareness Week included articles dealing with the potential dangers of hurricanes to the

areas and historical storms. Some newspapers

included evacuation routes and maps showing

shelter areas designated by the respective governments. NWS offices in the Carolinas participated

extensively with on-air interviews with local

television and radio stations including a number of

on-site television interviews from weather offices.

An extensive 2-day hurricane conference was held

in June for all coastal law enforcement agencies,

local and county decision-makers and the Emergency Preparedness Division (EPD) of South

Carolina. Representatives from the FEMA regional

office at Atlanta, Georgia, were among the 150

persons who attended. During the conference a

scenario type of hurricane exercise was conducted.

Decision-makers used a computer program to assist

them in deciding what actions would be needed

following receipt of locally prepared hurricane drill

bulletins.

In July, a Coastal Zone Conference was conducted

in Charleston. Attendees included representatives

of NOAA, Department of the Interior, Sea Grant

organizations, the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), NWS oftices in South Carolina and Emergency Preparedness Directors from the coastal

counties. Presentations were made by the WSFO

Columbia MIC, Bernard Palmer; NHC Director, Dr.

Bobert Sheets; NWS Techniques Development

Laboratory Scientist, Dr. Wilson Shaffer; and the

Beaufort County Emergency Preparedness Director,

William Winn. This conference was aimed at

coastal management issues and addressed the Sea,

Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes

(SLOSH) (see Appendix D) model that had been

prepared for the Charleston basin.

Furthermore, local decision-makers were apprised

of how the Maximum Envelopes of Water (MEOW S)

could be factored into evacuation planning. SLOSH

results allowed the local officials of the five coastal

South Carolina counties to design suitable evacuation zones from the various storm scenarios and

to study potential storm surge effects on evacuation

routes and emergency shelters.

Similarly, North Carolina had just completed its

comprehensive hurricane evacuation plan. This

plan was a cooperative effort by the North Carolina

Division of Emergency Management, FEMA, the

Corps of Engineers, NHC, WSFO Baleigh and the

19 coastal counties in the state. During the plan’s

formulation, there were numerous meetings with

state, county and local officials; the NHC Director

or hurricane forecasters and SLOSH experts; state

emergency management coordinators and planners;

and personnel from the NWS offices at Baleigh,

Wilmington and Cape Hatteras. These were conducted to train officials on the use of the SLOSH

model and to show them examples of damage in

their areas from various record storms. Vulnerable

areas were located, shelters defined and evacuation

routes developed for the entire eastern areas of the

St&?.

North Carolina state, county and local officials

were taught to use the “decision arc” and hurricane

11
strike probabilities to aid them in making evacuation decisions. This comprehensive evacuation

plan and the technique were also tested thoroughly

in a full-scale, 2-day exercise conducted by NWS

and the state of North Carolina in June. It

involved the 19 coastal counties and the inland

counties that would be involved in providing

evacuation routes and shelters.

The Hugo evacuation was successful due in large

part to the thorough planning and testing that had

been done in both of the Carolinas. More than

90,000 people were moved to 400-plus shelters in

the two states, and another 96,000 found shelter

with families or friends.

NWS REGIONAL OFFICES

At the start of the hurricane season, the NWS

Eastern and Southern Regional Headquarters

assessed their coastal offices to determine staffmg

patterns, critical equipment needs and facilities.

When it became apparent that Hugo would pose a

threat to the islands and the mainland, both

regional offices put their contingency plans into

effect to ensure that offices in vulnerable areas had

the resources necessary to meet responsibilities.

Personnel were detailed to offices in the Carolinas,

Georgia and northern Florida to augment staffs

where necessary. Similarly, Eastern Region

dispatched a needed part for the aging radar at

Cape Hatteras to guarantee its continued operation.

STORM SURGE MODELING AND

EVACUATION PLANNING

In the early 19SO’s, the NWS embarked on an

effort to apply the SLOSH model to the entire U.S.

Gulf and Atlantic coastlines. The SLOSH model

takes into account an area’s bathymetry and

terrain features in a manner commensurate with

the model’s resolution for that area. The model

aids forecasters in making real-time forecasts of

hurricane storm surge and is useful for determining

areas that could flood in various hurricane

scenarios. Such information is the first step in

developing a comprehensive hurricane evacuation

plan for an area.

The Carolinas

The Charleston area was among the first areas

modeled by SLOSH. An 80 x 100 grid (Fig. 2-2)

extends over South Carolina from Hilton Head Island in the south to Myrtle Beach in the north.

The geography of the area includes coastal barrier

islands, extensive areas of marshland, rising terrain

from the edge of the marsh inland and complex

river/sound systems. Later in the SLOSH modeling

effort, the Myrtle Beach/Wilmington and Hilton

Head areas were covered with additional basins.

MIC Shenot, together with the Coastal Council of

South Carolina, encouraged NHC to do a SLOSH

simulation study for the Charleston area with funding from South Carolina and various Federal

agencies. The result was an atlas containing predicted flooding from each of the simulated storms

to assist in making evacuation decisions. From

that study a comprehensive hurricane evacuation

plan was completed for the Charleston area in

1986. The plan details the evacuation procedures to

follow preceding a hurricane and gives recommended evacuation routes and designated shelter

locations. Each of the area’s emergency managers

and many local officials have copies of this

document.

In the village of McClellanville, the Lincoln High

School was used as an evacuation shelter. The

evacuation plan listed the base elevation of the

school as 20.53 feet National Geodetic Vertical

Datum (NGVD). Many of the residents took shelter

in this school. During the height of the storm,

water rose outside the school and eventually broke

through one of the doors. Water rushed in and

continued to rise inside the school reaching a depth

of 6 feet within the building. A resident with a

videocassette recorder documented people climbing

on tables and bleachers to escape the rising water.

As the water reached its maximum height, children

were lifted onto the school’s rafters. Fortunately,

everyone survived the event although not without

considerable anxiety.

Later examination revealed that the base elevation

of the school was 10 feet, not the 20.53 feet listed

on the evacuation plan. This school should not

have been used as a shelter for any storm greater

than a Category 1 hurricane.

12
Figure 2-2. 80 x 100 grid point SLOSH model for the Charleston, South Carolina, basin.

13
Puerto Rico and Viwin Islands

A coarse mesh SLOSH model was developed in

1982 to cover Puerto Rico. Dr. Aurelio Mercado of

the University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez, under

contract with FEMA for the Department of Natural

Resources, has modified the model to run on the

university’s computer. Dr. Mercado has run many

simulation studies; however, they are not of the

magnitude of simulation studies done on the

mainland and have not been folded into a comprehensive evacuation study. On the Saturday before

Hugo struck, Dr. Mercado provided WSFO San

Juan a copy of the only simulation study pertinent

to a landfalling storm of Hugo’s characteristics.

This study predicted a surge of 8 to 9 feet for the

southeast coast. Information from this study was

shared with emergency managers and was instrumental in the evacuation of affected persons along

Puerto Rico’s southeast coast.

FINDING 2.1: Errors in base elevation information on shelters or evacuation routes could result

in loss of life as evacuees move to unsafe shelters

or through unsafe evacuation routes.

FINDING 2.2: A comprehensive evacuation study

has not been undertaken for Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands.

WARNING SERVICES

Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

NHC’s goal is to issue a watch approximately 36

hours before a hurricane’s eye makes landfall and

a warning about 24 hours before the eye crosses

the coast. Hurricane watches were issued for the

Virgin Islands and all of Puerto Rico at 6 PM

Friday, September 15. Hurricane warnings were

posted for the Virgin Islands and all of Puerto Rico

at 3 PM Saturday, September 16. Partly as a

result of the slowing of Hugo’s forward motion,

lead times for the hurricane watches were 56 hours

for St. Croix, 62 hours for the Puerto Rican island

of Vieques and 63 hours for the big island of

Puerto Rico. Similarly, the hurricane warning lead

times were 35 hours for St. Croix, 41 hours for

Vieques and 42 hours for the big island. (See Fig.

2-3,) Although lead times of this magnitude helped

local decision-makers and the public in taking

adequate precautions, it did pose some problems for

the Red Cross which was required to provide shelters for longer periods of time than ordinarily

planned for hurricanes.

NHC is also responsible for issuing forecast storm

positions out to 72 hours as well as hurricane

strike probabilities. As in all forecasts, the forecast

storm position has an associated error for each

forecast period. The NHC average 24-hour forecast

position error is approximately 100 miles. Position

error is the distance between the forecast position

and the actual observed position.

Due to the uncertainties involved in hurricane

forecast positions, emergency managers and the

media have been advised not to focus their sole

attention on the forecast track. Hurricane

probabilities were developed to assist in interpreting

the forecast track by including the average forecast

position errors. Hurricane probabilities give the

probability in percent of a storm center passing

within 75 nautical miles to the left or 50 nautical

miles to the right (looking out from the beach) of

the coastal location within the forecast period.

Decision-makers are urged to use both the forecast

track and the probabilities to assist in defining the

coastal areas most at risk.

During much of Sunday, the storm’s forecast track

suggested a landfall on Puerto Rico’s southeastern

coast. By 6 PM, the track suggested the southwest

coast but targeted the southeast coast by midnight.

Six hours before landfall, the track focused on

eastern Puerto Rico. The island of Puerto Rico is

only about 40 miles wide and a little over 100

miles long which is approximately the size of

NHC’s 24-hour average hurricane forecast error.

NHC advisories through this whole period indicated

that Hugo would move over the island of Puerto

Rico implying that all areas were equally at risk.

WSFO San Juan’s Hurricane Local Statements

14
=I=

u

E

L

D

c

.-

s

b

3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5%

&j

.......................

.......................

........ . . t .............

Figure 2-3

15
(HLSs), however, mentioned the potential landfall

positions as suggested by the forecast tracks.

This could have posed problems for evacuation

decisions by CD officials. In coordination calls to

the emergency managers, WSFO San Juan emphasized the uncertainty in track predictions and

stressed that the forecast tracks could be off as

much as 60 miles. Interviews with CD directors of

the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico and San Juan, and the Mayor of San Juan

indicate that the changes in potential landfall

locations were not that significant to their

planning. They essentially prepared for a direct

hit.

Hurricane strike probabilities for Puerto Rico were

always higher at San Juan than at Ponce. That

landfall probabilities were so close, usually with

differences of 10 percent or less, reflected the fact

that chances for landfall on the northeast or south

coasts were practically the same. Local officials

and media representatives interviewed mentioned

that they used hurricane probabilities and did not

concentrate on the forecast track. Survey team

members were left with the impression that frequent coordination with the WSFO served to

encourage that tendency.

Emergency managers and the Governor of Puerto

Rico were concerned that the public’s response to

evacuation might be negatively influenced by recent

memories of Hurricane Dean. This did not appear

to be the case. In August, Dean aimed directly for

Puerto Rico when at the last minute it stalled and

made an abrupt turn to the north missing the

island.

The constant coordination between WSFO San

Juan, the emergency managers and elected officials

ensured that all decision-makers kept current with

the evolving scenario. This resulted in the

Governor of Puerto Rico taking a lead role along

with the Commonwealth CD Director and the

WSFO MIC in a critical Sunday night broadcast to

the entire island over the Emergency Broadcast

System (EBS) Network. As a result, 30,000

persons were evacuated. This included the

impoverished northern coastal community of La

Perla which evacuated for literally the first time in

memory. Government officials claim that this was

one of the best evacuation responses ever. Similar

actions occurred in the Virgin Islands where EBS

was activated and live broadcasts were made by the

Governor and the Civil Defense Director.

The Carolinas

After passing over Puerto Rico, Hugo continued on

a west-northwest to northwest track and maintained a steady course for the next 4 days. A

hurricane watch was issued at 6 PM Wednesday,

September 20, from St. Augustine, Florida, to Cape

Hatteras. At 6 AM Thursday, a hurricane warning

was posted from Fernandina Beach, Florida, to

Cape Lookout. This afforded a lead time of 30

hours for the watch and 18 hours for the warning.

This is somewhat less than the ideal but approximated the NHC average (see Fig. 2-3).

The potential for a hurricane watch being posted

along a portion of the East Coast was mentioned in

the NHC advisories 3 hours before the watch went

into effect. Similarly, the potential for upgrading

the watch to a warning was highlighted 12 hours

before the warning was issued. This heightened

awareness in the threatened areas and was a

critical factor in the consultations between WSFO

Columbia’s MIC Palmer and the Governor of

South Carolina. The Governor’s highly successful

voluntary evacuation order, issued in anticipation of

the warning, resulted from his discussions with

Palmer.

In the hurricane advisory issued at 3 PM Thursday,

NHC extended the hurricane warning from Cape

Lookout to Oregon Inlet, North Carolina. The

advisory also stated that Hugo was expected to

make a gradual turn to the north within the next

12 hours.

The barrier islands require more than 12 hours to

evacuate, and by mid-afternoon Thursday when the

warning was extended, surface winds had increased

to a point that precluded ferry boat operations.

This extension of the warning posed a dilemma to

emergency managers. Furthermore, the advisory

gave no reason for the gradual turn to the north so

that emergency managers and the media did not

know and could not share with the public the

reasons for the forecast change.

The extension of the warning to the north and the

forecast of a gradual turn to the north were linked

16
by some local officials and residents. Concern was

heightened when a local television station stressed

the turn to the north.

The reasoning behind the extension of the warning

and the forecast turn to the north was discussed by

NHC with local NWS offices over the Hurricane

Hotline. When the local offices shared this

information with the emergency managers, it was

apparent to them that the area would be on the

fringe of the hurricane and that evacuations would

not be required. To assuage public concerns,

however, North Carolina officials opened three

shelters on the coast even though they were

convinced that evacuations were not necessary.

Table 2-1 lists the probabilities for the southeast

coast Thursday afternoon and evening. The

segment of the coast from Morehead City to Cape

Hatteras corresponds to the area where the

warning was extended at 3 PM. The probabilities

show a change in forecast track to the north at 3

PM although the magnitude of the values still

suggest that the area of greatest

between Wilmington and Charleston.

threat was

TABLE 2-1

HURRICANE HUGO PROBABILITIES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

Noon 3 PM 6PM 8PM

Savannah, GA 37 10 7 25

Charleston, SC 48 56 69 99

Myrtle Beach, SC 35 63 69 62

Wilmington, NC 17 48 53 6

Morehead City, NC 5 20 24 X

Cape Hatteras, NC 1 5 6 X

The storm’s track, after Hugo made landfall, was

further west than the NHC forecast 24 hours

before landfall. Later forecasts adjusted the track

to the west.

Hurricane-force winds were forecast well inland

with this strong storm. Marine advisory #41,

issued about 24 hours bfore the storm crossed the

coast, forecast sustained winds of near 60 MPH

with gusts to 75 MPH as far inland as Charlotte.

Marine advisory #46, issued at 11 PM Thursday

when the eye was near the South Carolina coast,

forecast the storm center to move within 30 miles

of Charlotte and to reach southwestern Virginia by

7 PM Friday with wind gusts to 86 MPH. The

extent to which hurricane-force winds would extend

inland was not emphasized in the public advisories,

and many inland residents were surprised to be

awakened by hurricane-force winds as far inland as

200 miles from the point of landfall of the storm.

Because the public advisories did not highlight the

extent of high winds inland, it was left to the local

NWS offices to emphasize the threat to emergency

managers in vulnerable areas. On Thursday,

September 21, Ronald Kuhn, OIC of WSO

Charlotte, discussed with the local emergency

coordinator, Wayne Broome, the possibility that

Charlotte might suffer high winds, flooding and

perhaps tornadoes particularly if the gradual turn

to the north did not materialize, Kuhn advised

him that if these possibilities matured into

probabilities, the appropriate response would be to

close schools, alert power companies and set up

traffic control and road clearance procedures. In

short, respond as though it were a winter storm.

At 3 AM, September 22, the WSO advised the local

emergency coordinator of imminent high winds.

The official issued emergency orders immediately.

High winds struck at 4 AM and continued through

the morning. Wind gusts of 90 MPH were reported

at the control tower in Charlotte before it was

evacuated. Wind damage exceeded $500 million in

all of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Closer

to the coast, wind gusts of nearly 110 MPH

destroyed 200 homes and heavily damaged 1,000

others at the Air Force Base in Sumter.

Taken all together, this illustrates how important

it is that NHC communicate fully as possible on a

level understood by the public. When updating

advisories, NHC must ensure that all language is

clear and all information properly conveys its true

intent. Furthermore, NHC cannot assume that the

public has knowledge of all previously released

information.

The timing of NHC bulletins sometimes posed

problems for local NWS offices in keeping all

17
forecast and warning products current and

consistent. One example was when the hurricane

watch was posted at 6 PM Wednesday. Public forecasts for the East Coast are issued between 3 and

4 PM. This meant that all forecast products had

to be reworded and reissued following the posting

of the warning. Although all offices were apprised

of this possibility from an earlier Hurricane Hotline

conference call, it still required considerable work.

The need for frequent updates is unavoidable.

Unfortunately, local offices do not have the

interactive product formatting (word processing)

capability which would expedite rapid revisions of

forecasts.

FINDING 2.3: In its HLSs, WSFO San Juan

referenced potential landfall sites with a degree of

specificity that was greater than current forecast

capabilities allow. Frequent coordination calls with

users kept decision-makers from overly focusing on

the forecast track.

FINDING 2.4: In both the Caribbean and the

Carolinas, hurricane probabilities were used in

varying degrees by decision-makers to incorporate

forecast uncertainties in their planning efforts.

FINDING 2.5: In two hurricane advisories, the

addition of two significant changes without reasons

for these changes created some problems for

emergency managers and the media.

FINDING 2.6: The lack of emphasis in NHC

public advisories for the Carolinas on inland high

winds left the media and local officials with little

guidance on how to respond.

18

Chapter III

DATA COLLl3CTION AND COMMUNICATIONS

DATA COLLECTION

Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands

Surface observations throughout the Caribbean are

sparse. WSFO San Juan takes hourly observations

at the International Airport and receives hourly

observations from three additional sites in Puerto

Rico and one each from St. Croix and St. Thomas.

During the height of the storm, observations were

only available from the WSFO and the Navy base

at Roosevelt Roads. Attempts to assess peak winds

in the islands have been seriously hampered by the

lack of surface observational data.

WSFO San Juan radar is a WSR-74s band system

that is located on the International Airport

grounds. The radar signal is partially blocked from

the east through the southwest by a mountain

range that extends east to west across Puerto Rico.

WSFO San Juan does not have a drop on the

Roosevelt Roads radar. Blocking, however, was not

a problem during Hugo.

The radar was in operation throughout the storm

even when air conditioning was lost. Fans were

positioned to keep the console cool enough to

operate.

Upper air observations were taken twice a day

until Sunday afternoon, September 17, when

conditions deteriorated to a point where balloon

launching was too difficult. As the storm swept

across the northeastern portion of the island, the

radome was damaged and the doors were blown off

the inflation shelter. Fortunately, the automatic

radiotheodolite (ART) was not damaged. Launchings were resumed Tuesday evening following

recalibration of the equipment and installation of a

barrier created from a carport to keep winds away

from the inflation area.

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite

(GOES) information is available to WSFO San Juan

through the Satellite Weather Information System

(SWIS). Up to 200 of these images can be

displayed on the SWIS which has animation and

color enhancement capability. WSFO San Juan

received infrared, water vapor and daylight visible

images with few interruptions during Hurricane

Hugo.

Water vapor imagery is a relatively new tool.

When animated, water vapor images show

mid-tropospheric motion which affects the steering

of tropical storms even in cloud-free areas. No

images were transmitted from 1 to 2 AM each day

because of the “eclipse” period in which the GOES

is unable to recharge its solar cells. This system

functioned well throughout the storm. After the

storm was over, however, the SWIS had to be

cycled on and off to prevent overheating. This

meant that continuous satellite imagery was not

available after Hugo when Tropical Storm Iris

threatened heavy rains.

A series of satellite precipitation estimates (SPEs)

produced at the Synoptic Analysis Branch (SAB) of

the National Environmental Satellite, Data and

Information Service (NESDIS) in Camp Springs,

Maryland, were transmitted on Automation of Field

Operations and Services (AFOS) while Hugo was

over Puerto Rico. SPEs are rainfall estimates for

periods of an hour or more based on satelliteobserved cloud-top temperatures, cooling rates and

movements of convective cells.

WSFO San Juan has access to an automatic rain

gauge network known as Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time (ALERT) system. The system

consists of 31 automated rainfall gauges

strategically located around the island with

information sent by radio to four base stations

periodically on demand. Two of the gauges also

are equipped with wind and temperature sensors.

20
These gauges are located at Puerto Rico’s highest region extends inland 50-100 miles. During the

peak, La Puma, and at Maricao where the NWR height of the storm, several observations from

transmitter for western Puerto Rico is sited. In Charleston were not transmitted due to a problem

addition to WSFO San Juan, the other three base with the auxiliary backup terminal (ABT) which

stations are located at the Commonwealth Office, was being used in lieu of the AFOS system.

the Department of Natural Resources and the U.S. Otherwise, no significant data losses were reported

Geological Survey. for any stations.

Several weeks before September 18, personnel of

the Department of Natural Resources were performing field maintenance on the ALERT

equipment. Three of eight rain gauges had been

inoperative in the Rio Grande de Loiza Basin. Out

of 30 ALERT gauges across the island of Puerto

Rico, 25 were operational.

The upper air station at Charleston sustained

damage to the inflation shelter during the storm

and was not able to perform the normal radiosonde

release at 8 AM, September 22. The Cape

Hatteras site was unable to repair an electronics

problem that resulted in manual rawinsonde operation that contained no wind data. Other upper air

stations operated normally.

The ALERT system functioned throughout the

storm although the repeater for the Loiza River

basin failed on Sunday night, September 17.

WSFO San Juan previously attempted to set up a

similar ALERT system in the Virgin Islands with

financial support from FEW. The Virgin Islands

CD was unable to support the system so the project

was never implemented.

Fifty-three river and rainfall gauges are available to

the WSFO through the GOES system. These functioned normally throughout the event. A number

of amateur radio operators on the KP4 HAM net

provided rainfall reports to a base station at 7 PM

daily. The reports were telephoned to WSFO San

Juan.

In the southeastern mainland areas most affected

by Hugo, NWS operates network radars (10 centimeter (cm) wavelength WSR-57s) at Charleston,

Wilmington and Cape Hatteras, and inland at

Athens, Georgia. Local warning radars (5 cm

wavelength WSR-74s) are located at Columbia,

Charlotte, and Augusta, Georgia. The radar

systems performed well during the storm and were

invaluable in tracking the storm inland during the

early morning hours.

The Carolinas

The plan position indicator (PPI) scope at Hatteras

was inoperative beginning at 8 PM, September 20,

A spare part from Wilmington was shuttled to Cape

Hatteras by North Carolina Highway Patrol

vehicles, and the radar was functional by 4 PM,

September 2 1. The Charleston radar was out

briefly when rain began leaking through the roof

during the height of the storm.

Stations reporting surface weather conditions over

the southeastern United States are shown by the

map (Fig. 3-1). Most of these stations operate on

a 24-hour basis staffed by personnel of the NWS,

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Department of Defense (DOD). Some of the stations with

limited operating hours, such as McEntire Air

National Guard Base (MMT), South Carolina,

provided supplementary observations during

Hurricane Hugo. MMT was directly in the path of

the storm and estimated sustained winds of 58

MPH with a peak gust to 79 MPH. There are no

stations between Charleston and Myrtle Beach, a

distance of 90 miles, the segment of the coastline

most severely affected by Hugo. The data-void

WSFOs Raleigh and Columbia both had access to

SWIS and satellite products, such as satellite

precipitation estimates, throughout the storm.

WSOs Charleston and Charlotte do not have any

satellite image display capabilities.

A variety of river and rain gauges are available in

the Carolinas. These include gauges from

cooperative programs with other Federal and state

agencies as well as automated systems, such as the

Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System

(IFLOWS), in western North Carolina and NWS

gauges over the state. There were no significant

outages of these gauges during the storm.

21
-2 .

#E -*

IIMT

OSSI d

cl

X

X

NWS Surf ace

FAA Surface

Military Surface

Upper Air

NWS Network Radar

NWS Local Warning Radar

C-Man Stations
FINDING 3.1: The density of surface observations

in the Caribbean and the Carolinas is extremely

low. This posed a significant problem to

forecasters trying to obtain information during the

storm.

FINDING 3.2: A dedicated connection to the

Roosevelt Roads radar would ensure full radar

coverage for WSFO San Juan.

FINDING 3.3: A fully operational ALERT system

for the Virgin Islands would assist the WSFO staff

in preparing flood related warnings and assist

VITEMA in responding to flood situations.

COMMUNICATIONS

Automation of Field Operations and

Services (AFOS)

The main communications system for National

Weather Service offices is the AFOS system.

Puerto Rico

Basically, AFOS functioned well during the storm

with only a minor loss late Friday evening,

September 15, when the system went down for 2

hours. This resulted in WSFO San Juan missing

the 9 PM NHC hurricane advisory. Problems with

AFOS became pronounced after the storm due to

excessive heat build-up in the office. Fans were

placed throughout the work area and directed at

graphic display modules (GDMs) which generated

most of the heat.

Finally, the GDMs were turned off to reduce heat

build-up and the alphanumeric display modules

(ADMs), which are used for message composition,

were cycled on and off to keep operating temperatures at acceptable levels. Although thw

actions were taken, the hard disks developed

problems that required an exhaustive software

rebuilding effort over 3 days.

The Carolinas

In South Carolina, AFOS at both Columbia and

Charleston operated throughout the storm, but the

communications data line between the two offices

was out for 6 hours beginning about 11:45 PM,

September 21. During that period, HLSs normally

issued by the Charleston office were provided by

Columbia. No serious AFOS problems were

reported at WSO Charlotte.

NOA Weather Wire Service UVWWSJ

The primary external dissemination system for

National Weather Service products is NOAA

Weather Wire. A national program is underway to

upgrade the system to utilize satellite transmission

capabilities for all NWWS products. Puerto Rico

and the Virgin Islands, however, still are served by

the old weather wire, a land line system. Raleigh

and Columbia drive a NOAA Weather Wire for

their respective states and both systems have been

upgraded to a satellite system. Both states are also

served by a land line system until the full national

upgrade is completed. NWS offices in the

Carolinas can transmit directly onto the NOAA

Weather Wire through AFOS.

The San Juan NOAA Weather Wire consists of two

separate circuits. The first circuit is bilingual and

goes to the Puerto Rican Communications

Authority which distributes it to the media and to

the Commonwealth CD. Only one television station

in Puerto Rico, Channel 11, has NOAA Weather

Wire as does WKAQ radio (the EBS station) and

the San Juan CD. The Commonwealth CD fans

out weather information to the 78 principal CDs.

The other NOAA Weather Wire circuit to the

Virgin Islands is in English. Primary customers

are VITEMA and marine radio station WAH in St.

Thomas. The NOAA Weather Wire functioned

throughout the storm in Puerto Rico and until

shortly before landfall in the Virgin Islands.

23
NOAA Weather Radio (NWR)

NWR is the other primary means of distributing

NWS products to emergency managers and the

general public. NWR transmitters normally serve

an area within 40 miles of the antenna.

In San Juan one console drives two transmittem

that essentially cover the island. Broadcasts are

bilingual.

The transmitter for eastern Puerto Rico, including

the islands of Vieques and Culebra as well as

portions of the Virgin Islands, remained operational

throughout the storm. The Maricao transmitter,

which covers western Puerto Rico, failed at 9:22

PM Sunday and fluctuated in operation after the

storm until early October.

The NWS has been working with marine radio

station WAH in St. Thomas to begin broadcasts of

NWR in English to the Virgin Islands. Software

problems at WAH have slowed implementation

efforts. WAH was not broadcasting NWR information over the NWR frequency allotted to it

during the storm.

In South Carolina, the network was exposed to

extensive outages that began about midnight

Friday, September 22, and lasted from 6 hours to

a week. The transmitter at Mount Pleasant, South

Carolina, which repeats WSO Charleston broadcasts, was destroyed. Other transmitters

experiencing outages were Florence, Columbia,

Sumter, Green Pond and Conway.

NWR broadcasts from WSFO Columbia were interrupted only Friday from 2 to 6 AM. These

interruptions resulted from sporadic failure of the

WSFO emergenw generator and the failure of

commercial power at the transmitter site which is

collocated with South Carolina Educational

Television (ETV) station. A 2 to 4 AM interruption

resulted from failures of power and the emergency

generator at the WSFO. The ETV station has an

emergency generator, but personnel must activate

the generator manually. This was not done until

6 AM, September 22, when ETV staff returned to

work. WSFO Columbia was not made aware that

there was no automatic switchover to backup power

for NWR, an important requirement during a

weather emergenq.

North Carolina escaped with no major interruptions

and the NWR system performed well.

Hurricane Hotline Internal

Coordination Svstem

The NWS uses a dedicated land line telephone

system in the eastern and southern US. for

conference calls. The system accommodates most

WSFOs in these areas plus, NHC, NSSFC, National

Meteorological Center (NMC) and regional and

national headquarters. On September 21, a late

morning malfunction of the hotline resulted in

NHC being unable to communicate with any office

other than NMC. The malfunction came at a

critical time; hurricane and tropical storm watches

were being extended further up the East Coast.

The NMC duty forecaster, however, managed to

patch the NHC forecaster through another phone

system allowing other offices to hear NHC’s

presentation. No two-way exchange was possible.

By afternoon, the malfunction was corrected.

WSFOs Raleigh and Columbia are on the Hurricane

Hotline, and they both coordinated with NHC on

thii system throughout the period of the storm.

Coastal Weather Service Offices are not included on

this circuit. Coordination information must be

passed to these offices by their parent WSFO.

WSFO San Juan is not included on the Hurricane

Hotline. Communications between it and NHC

must be conducted over normal phone lines. The

WSFO lost communication before noon Sunday,

September 17. As a result, no San Juan

information was available for formulating the

official hurricane forecast track from that time on.

National Warning Svstem (NAWASJ

NAWAS circuit is not available in Puerto Rico or

the Virgin Islands. Accordingly, there is no

dedicated hotline circuit connecting emergency

management officials with the WSFO.

All NWS offices in the Carolinas are on the

NAWAS system, but there are separate circuits for

the two states. WSO Charlotte has recently

acquired a drop on the South Carolina NAWAS

24
circuit, but it is not possible for South Carolina

NWS offices to contact any other North Carolina

office on the NAWAS system. This forces these

offices to rely on conventional telephone use for

warning coordination. Emergency management

and law enforcement officials near the North and

South Carolina border cannot exchange severe

weather reports directly to the neighboring state

NWS or emergency management offices on the

NAWAS system.

Other Communications Svstems

Several other communications channels are

available to WSFO San Juan for collecting and

disseminating information. The Antilles

Meteorological Circuit links all of the Caribbean

islands for surface observations. The circuit went

down at lo:15 PM Friday, September 15, and

remained down throughout the storm.

Direct radio links are maintained to the

Commonwealth CD in San Juan and to VITEMA

headquarters in St. Thomas. Both organizations

relay information to their local CD offices. A direct

radio link also is in place to the Puerto Rican

Water Authority (Acueductos).

Some communications systems in the Carolinas

depended on microwave antennas. The force of the

winds rotated these antennas, which are highly

directional, thus knocking out microwave reception

at many locations.

An amateur radio operator was brought on station

at Columbia Thursday evening, September 21, and

remained through the night to receive and relay

storm reports and spotter information. The HAM

weather network in the state had been activated on

Thursday and was fully operational across the area

by that afternoon.

At WSFO Raleigh and in North Carolina, the HAM

radio net was functioning with an amateur radio

operator at many NWS offices in the state and in

the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) from

Thursday afternoon through Friday evening.

FINDING 3.4: Limited NOAA Weather Wire drops

in Puerto Bico and the Virgin Islands resulted in

few emergency managers having hard copies of

Weather Service products. This increased the need

for coordination efforts at the local WSFO.

FINDING 3.5: NWR reception is poor in the

Virgin Islands.

FINDING 3.6: WSFO San Juan and most coastal

WSOs are not on the Hurricane Hotline.

Accordingly, they cannot participate in routine

coordination calls with NHC, NMC and other

coastal WSFOs.

FINDING 3.7: Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands

have no dedicated coordination line between

emergency managers and the WSFO. In the

Carolinas, lack of NAWAS drops from adjacent

states hampered coordination efforts across state

boundaries.

25

Chapter IV

AN EVALUATION OF THE PROCESSING, INTERPRETATION

AND DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION

NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER

Operations

NHC has access to nine numerical models for predicting hurricane tracks. Data from up to four

models are available to the forecaster at any one

time. Although each model has its own strengths

and weaknesses, no one model consistently

outperforms another over the life of a storm.

The numerical models may be broken into two

categories -- statistical and dynamical. Statistical

models, as their name implies, are based on

statistical relationships and tend to perform best in

the deep tropics where storms tend to maintain a

persistent track. Dynamical models, which attempt

to model physical atmospheric pm, tend to

perform better at higher latitudes where storms

recurve. This was born out in Hurricane Hugo

when NHC83, a dynamical and statistical model,

performed well overall while CLIPER, a

climatological/persistence model, worked best in the

tropics.

The predicted movement of Hugo was based on a

combination of model output and forecaster

experience. It takes an experienced forecaster to

decide on the performance of each model before

selecting a “future track” for each hurricane baaed

on how the models are initialized and whether each

run can handle the input data.

The statistical models can supply track positions to

NHC within 10 minutes after initialization, yet, the

Quasi-Lagrangian Model (QLM) takes approximately 6 hours to run. NHC83 and the statistical

tracking models are run every 6 hours. The

dynamical models are run every 12 hours at

standard observation times.

Key ingredients needed by the models are initial

storm position, motion and intensity. Current

satellite capabilities for assessing storm motion and

intensity do not equal the accuracy of aircraft

reconnaissance measuremenm. These parameters

can be measured by reconnaissance aircraft

penetrating the storm and can be inferred from

satellite imagery. The latter is used to track the

centers of tropical cyclones over remote ocean

areas. When storms approach islands or coastlines,

aircraft reconnaissance planes are employed.

Satellite position estimates obtained from low

resolution infrared are within an average of 25

miles of the reconnaissance position measurements

for all tropical storm cloud pattern types

improving to 16 miles for storms which have eyes.

Differences between satellite estimates and

reconnaissance measurements of 50 miles are not

uncommon, however, with occasional differences

exceeding 100 miles. Satellite intensity estimates

are derived from the temperature difference

between the eye and the surrounding eye wall

combined with an empirical cloud pattern recognition technique. hother empirical relationship is

used to estimate minimum sea level pressure and

maximum wind speed from these temperature

differences.

An example of the differing capabilities of the two

methods; as Hugo approached the Leeward Islands,

satellite-based estimates of surface winds were 115

MPH in contrast to the first aircraft penetration

that measured flight level winds of 165 MPH and

surface wind speeds of 135 MPH.

Aircraft reconnaissance is especially valuable in

defining the wind fields of the storm -- a capability

not yet present with satellites. Only aircraft can

provide high density data on storm wind fields.

Asymmetries in the wind fields detected by aircraft

can be factored into the SLOSH model runs to

assist in defining warning areas and the timing of

evacuations. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate the

wind field data provided to NHC by NOAA

research aircraft in the Caribbean and off the

Carolinas. During Hurricane Hugo, NOAA or Air

Force aircraft were monitoring the storm on an

average of every 2.1 hours.

Finally, SAB provides NHC forecasters with an

analysis of the steering currents in which the storm

is embedded. This product, the deep layer mean

(DLM) steering wind, is derived primarily from

satellite imagery. It is a composite of GOES cloud

motion, water vapor motion, VISSR atmospheric

sounder WAS) soundings and radiosonde wind data.
n

18.5

Hi&<) (19891 STM-RELATIVE C00RDS 700 MB

WIND BRRBS CM Sm-11

09/17/B9 20 UTC - 09/18/89 6 UTC LVL=l3

XYDCWL=f 0.42, 0.401 1 KBCTYP=~21.21.21.21~ XYBCWL=t 0.4. 0.4. 0.4. 0.41

11 IllI 1 Iill 1 ill I IllI Ill

18.0

16.5

16.0

6S.S 65.0 64.5 64.0 63.5 %I

Oll/lHRO.P0WELL.SPLtlfiPlSDEV.OfbT

Figure 4-1. !l?wo dimensional wind field at ‘700 mb of Hugo as it approached Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands. Direction of wind indicated by direction of wind barb. Speeds given as follows: flag

50 meter&x, large barb 10 meter&%x, small barb 5 meter&w.

28
HUG0 (19891 STM-RELRTIVE C00RDS 700 MB

WIND BQRBS tM Sxx-11

09121189 22 LJTC - 09/22/89 8 UK LVL=l3

XYDCWL=i 0.53. 0.451 KBCT~P=~21,21,2l,2l1 XYBCWL=( 0.5. 0.5. 0.4. Cl.‘?1

-

81 %O

IIll/ ~HRD.POWELL.SPLM~P~c~~~V.DfIT

Figure 4-2. Two dimensional wind field at 700 mb of Hugo as it approached Charleston, South

Carolina.

29
The DLM is fed through a data line to NHC’s VAS

Data Utilization Center (VDUC) computer. An example of the DLM for the evening of September

21, which graphically illustrates the probable track,

is shown in Fig. 4-3.

FINDING 4.1: Aircraft reconnaissance is a

necessary tool in hurricane forecasting.

NHC Forecasts

Table 4-1 lists the official track forecast &rors

along with the errors of several guidance models,

The official errors were quite small for Hurricane

Hugo. For example, the 24-hour average forecast

error of 65 nautical miles during Hugo compares

with the previous lo-year average official error of

109 nautical miles. The 72-hour Hugo error of 154

nautical miles compares with the previous lo-year

average of 342 nautical miles. It should be noted

that some of the guidance models also had small

errors.

TAESLE 4-1

Hurricane Hugo Average Track

Forecast Errors (Nautical Miles)

Forecast Period Hours

Model 12 24 36 48 72

official 33 66 98 122 164

CLIPER 37 73 119 161 216

NHC83 38 61 88 106 178

QLM 81 90 119 172 268

SANBAR 28 66 92 141 302

Figure 4-4 is a graphical representation of the

24-hour forecast position errors. From the figure,

one can discern the slowing of the storm as it

approached the islands and its acceleration as it

approached the mainland. Biases in the forecast,

either to the left or right of the actual track, can

be noted.

There was a left bias to the official forecasts for

the period when Hugo was turning from westnorthwestward to northwest. This occurred as

Hugo reached Puerto Rico and continued for the

following 2 days. This is a normal bias for NHC

track forecasts in this area during recurvature

situations. There was a slight right bias for two

forecasts on Thursday, September 21, just before

landfall. This caused the hurricane probabilities to

peak at Myrtle Beach during that afternoon.

This was also a situation where a tropical cyclone

went from a Category 2 to a Category 4 hurricane

on the Saffir-Simpson Scale during the 30 hours

prior to landfall. Forecasts of intensity changes

proved particularly difficult while Hugo was

approaching the Carolinas. For the 24 hours

beginning 5 PM Wednesday, September 20, the

highest sustained winds increased from 105 to 135

MPH. During this period, the wind forecast

contained in all of the public advisories was “little

significant change in strength is likely.” The

numerical model guidance contained no definitive

information on potential strengthening. Satellite

imagery suggested intensification which would

indicate decreasing central pressure which is

usually accompanied by increasing winds. Actual

changes in storm intensity were gathered from

aircraft reconnaissance data. It is important for

users of NHC information to appreciate the

limitations in tropical cyclone intensity forecasting.

During Hugo, storm surges of up to 8 feet were

predicted for exposed coastal areas in the Virgin

Islands and Eastern Puerto Rico. Storm surges of

6 feet were estimated on the south short of St.

Croix and 4 feet on the north shore. Though no

ground surveys were conducted on either St.

Thomas or St. John, the bathymetry suggests

surges should have averaged no more than 4 feet.

For Puerto Rico, estimates ranged from 4 to 8 feet

on the northeast coast and 3 to 6 feet on the

southeast coast with the maximum value of 8 feet

occurring at Luquillo Beach on the northeast coast.

Storm surge values of 7 to 8 feet probably occurred

on the island communities of Vieques and Culebra

especially at Ensenada Honda on the south side of

30
Figure 4-3. Deep Layer Mean flow streamlines (solid) and isotachs (dashed) in meters/see. for 0000

UTC, September 22, as Hugo was approaching the South Carolina coast.

31
kl @a i

I

Figure 4-4. Track forecast errors for the 24-hour forecast position of Hurricane Hugo. The forecast

location and the verif*ng actual position are connected by a line.

32
Culebra where the maximum wind on the east side

of the eyewall rushed seawater inland.

The forecast for the Carolina coast was for surges

from 14 to 17 feet. East of Charleston, surges of

16 to 18 feet were measured with a high storm

tide (storm tide is the storm surge plus the

astronomical tide) of 20.4 feet.

Measured High Water Levels

Astronomical tides for the periods around landfall

in the Charleston area indicated that high tide

would occur about 2 AM Friday, September 22.

With landfall expected around midnight, the

astronomical tide level at that time would be about

a foot above mean sea level (ASL).

If Hugo made landfall over Sulhvans Island, storm

surges should have peaked to the right at approximately the storm’s radius of maximum wind.

Aircraft reconnaissance showed the radius of

maximum wind to be about 30 miles during most

of Thursday afternoon, September 21, but dropping

to some 20 miles just before landfall.

With this radius of maximum wind, the highest

surges should have occurred in Bulls Bay, a

sparsely populated area between Charleston harbor

and Cape Romain.

After most major hurricanes, the Corps of

Engineers surveys high water marks caused by the

hurricane and maps areas inundated by salt water.

Both the U.S. Geological Survey and the Corps

surveyed high water marks from Hugo’s surge.

Some preliminary high-water marks were obtained.

The tide gauge at Charleston measured 11.3 feet

mean low water (MLW), approximately 9.5 feet

NGVD. This observation is questionable, however,

since there was roughly a foot of water inside the

gauge-house. At the Custom House only a hundred

yards or so away, a high-water mark of 11.5 feet

was measured. At McClellanville, high-water marks

of 16 to 18 feet were measured. The highest surge

appeared to be at Awendaw, just a few miles

southwest of McClellanville, where a value of 20.4

feet was measured. Figure 4-5 illustrates the

spatial distribution of the storm tide while Figure

4-6 shows the storm tide as estimated along the

immediate coast.

WEATHER SERVICE OFFICES --

LOCAL STATEMENTS AND

WARNINGS

Puerto Rico/Viwin Islands

WSFO San Juan has no subordinate Weather

Service offices. Therefore, the WSFO issues all

HLSs for the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

HISS usually are issued immediately after NHC

advisories. When a storm nears the coast, NHC

advisories normally are issued every 3 hours.

During Hugo, NHC began to issue 3-hour interval

advisories at 9 PM Friday, September 15. WSFO

San Juan followed suit by issuing 3-hour interval

HLSs. To ensure that information was available as

soon as possible, WSFO San Juan disseminated

NHC advisories on NWR in English and Spanish

immediately on receipt. Anticipating the first NHC

advisory, a draft HLS already had been prepared in

AFOS which then required only a limited editing

before dissemination in English and Spanish over

both NOM Weather Wire and NWR.

The HLSs issued from San Juan contained

numerous action-provoking statements. Starting at

midnight Friday, September 15, residents of the

Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were advised to

prepare to implement their action plans and to

evacuate if advised by CD or other government

agencies. Particular emphasis was placed on St.

Croix.

Potential flooding, storm surge and beach erosion

also we= highlighted. At 3 PM Sunday, September

17, coastal flood warnings were issued for the

Virgin Islands and eastern Puerto Rico along with

a heavy surf advisory for the northern, southern

and eastern portions of Puerto Rico. Later that

evening, coastal flood warnings and heavy surf

advisories were expanded even further.

The midnight Sunday morning HLS urged Virgin

Islands residents to heed evacuation orders and to

contact VITEMA for more information about evacuations. This statement was included as MIC

Matos had just been in contact with VITEMA. He

stressed the need to begin preparations immediately

so that orderly evacuations could commence by

33
Figure 4-5. Spatial distribution of storm tides computed with the SLOSH model. The SLOSH model

was run with preliminary “best fit” track and storm parameters several days after Hugo. Some

preliminary high water marks are shown within triangles. All values of water level refer to National

Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).

34
_

TIDE PROFILE

SLOSH I Tl DE MODEL

COASTAL STORM TIDE PROFILE

I RADlU@

_ LA+ALL _ ._ “r

I I I I I

5 V 3 I” + I5 20 25 30 35 40

1 I

1

1 F , 1

: !

A 1 L 1 * 1 1

SO)TH ALON! CO$T --f &TA&E (STAT”+ +LEV &---

L

: : FORTH ALONG COAST -;

: :t : :

: ; : :

.
SIllWiSe. The 3 AM Sunday HLS urged Virgin

Islanders to complete their emergency action plans

by the afternoon and mentioned that shelters would

open at 7 AM.

In the same advisory, Hugo’s track was compared

to Hurricanes San Felipe in 1923 and Betsy in

1956 both striking Puerto Rico. San Felipe

severely affected the island. Both storms are well

remembered and reinforced the urgency of taking

appropriate action.

The 9 AM HLS also gave information on the

opening of Puerto Rican shelters and contained

vivid detail used to spur the public to action.

If the eye of Hugo moves across

Puerto Rico as forecast, we can

expect a SO-mile-wide path of

extensive to extreme damage to occur.

The storm surge will decimate the

coastal section where it comes

onshore. Then, hurricane-force winds

will destroy wooden structures and

uproot trees. Roofs could be removed

and loose objects will become lethal

airborne projectiles.

Although NHC continued issuing advisories every

3 hours throughout the storm’s passage over the

islands, WSFO San Juan switched to issuing HI&

every 1 1/2 hours starting at midnight Monday,

September 18. This effort, not trivial considering

that separate versions had to be prepared in both

English and Spanish, ensured that timely information on the storm and current evacuation

information were available to citizens of the Virgin

Islands and Puerto Rico.

When WSFO San Juan switched to 1 1/2 hour

releases, information on the effects of the storm

were included. Providing all this information

resulted in long statements and a concern that the

specific action statements might be lost due to

their length. Accordingly, two public information

statements (PNSs) were issued before the storm

made landfall on Puerto Rico to ensure that critical

information was readily available.

Finally, persons were urged to stay indoors

following the wrath of the storm as downed power

lines and mudslides would continue the threat.

Individuals were also encouraged not to use their

vehicles as roads would be impassable and their

presence could impede disaster relief efforts.

WSFO San Juan’s HLSs contained a high degree of

specificity to give users as much information as

possible. As mentioned in an earlier chapter,

however, the inclusion of potential hurricane landfall areas for an island as small as Puerto Rico

implied an accuracy greater than present forecast

capabilities allow. This could have posed a problem

with local decision-makers had not the WSFO

coordinated so well with its users.

South Carolina -- WSFO Columbia

WSFO Columbia began highlighting the hurricane

watch in the public and marine forecasts at 6 PM

Wednesday, September 20, and to heighten awareness, a PNS was also issued. Shortly thereafter,

the Governor’s recommendation for a voluntary

evacuation was aired on NWR.

A flash flood watch was posted for the coastal

zones and the midlands of South Carolina at 4 AM

Thursday. A hurricane warning for the entire

coast was included in the 6 AM public and marine

forecasts as well as in a 5 AM PNS while a high

wind warning was issued for the midlands. At 8

AM, a flood potential outlook for most of the state

was issued along with a PNS relaying the

Governor’s evacuation order for the South Carolina

coast. Just before 2 PM, the flash flood watch was

extended to include all of South Carolina+

The WSFO began issuing HLSs approximately

every 4 hours beginning at 3 PM, Thursday,

September 21, emphasizing high wind warnings and

the flood potential. The HLSs specified watches in

effect at the time including tornado watches that

had been issued by the NSSFC.

At midnight, WSFO Columbia began issuing HLSs

for WSO Charleston following a power failure

there. The WSFO continued to issue separate

HLSs for both its own county warning area and

that of WSO Charleston throughout the night.

Emphasized were high winds and the dangerous

situation that existed with downed trees and power

lines. Backup support to WSO Charleston also

consisted of preparing Charleston’s HLSs as well as

36
relaying weather observations and providing

supplementary radar surveillance.

WSFO Columbia provided quantitative precipitation

forecast (QPF) support to the River Forecast

Center (RFC) in Atlanta. In return, RFC Atlanta

furnished contingency river forecasts to WSFO

Columbia based upon its QPFs.

lines remained in operation. The station had to

implement backup operations with WSFO

Columbia. All other equipment was still operating

and the staff was able to phone observations to

Columbia for entry into the AFOS system.

Shenot maintained contact with emergency

management officials and the media as the storm

approached the coast and continued so long as

communications were available.

WSO Charleston

MIC Shenot began preparations for hurricane

operations as early as Monday, September 18.

Additional hydrogen for balloon runs and fuel oil

for the generator were ordered. Supplies for the

station, such as water, flashlights and batteries,

were checked. New telephone handsets were placed

on the NWR monitoring line and the upper air telephone line so they could be used as telephones

when not needed for dedicated use.

North Carolina -- WSFO Raleigh

Amateur radio operators were alerted to begin

regular operations at the Weather Service offices

around the state and to set up the HAM network

on Thursday, September 21. The North Carolina

Division of Emergency Management assigned a

liaison to WSFO Raleigh for 48 hours before and

after the storm.

On Wednesday, September 20, HAM operators were WSFO Raleigh is responsible for providing QPF

requested to set up operations while the office’s support to the RFCs at Slidell, Louisiana, and

Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) telephone Atlanta. These QPF amounts were based on preline was dedicated for incoming emergency calls. vious hurricane tracks across North Carolina but

Finally, the airport was notified to secure windows were overestimated in the east when the track bore

in the Weather Service Office. All preparations further west than forecast by NHC. These QPFs

were completed on Thursday as the station were also factored into contingency river forecasts

switched to emergency power. by the RFCs in WSFO Raleigh.

WSO Charleston issued its first HLS at 6:30 PM

Wednesday when the watch became effective. This

was done primarily to provide information to residents of the area on actions needed to prepare for

the storm later in the week. Additional statements

followed at 9:30 and 1l:lO PM.

The WSO began issuing HLSs every 3 hours at

550 AM Thursday when the warning went into

effect for the South Carolina coast. Statements

accentuated the need for action to prepare for

hurricane landfall in the next 12 to 24 hours. As

the day progressed, HLSs began to contain more of

an urgent flavor and highlighted risks and types of

hazards involved. The fmal two statements were

issued at 9 and 1l:lO PM as the storm neared and

crossed the coast.

The Acting MIC and the Warning Preparedness

Meteorologist each worked 12-hour shifts as the

WSFO hurricane coordinator for the state since

both are familiar with the state hurricane plan.

This coordinator was also responsible for contacting

the other two coastal offices and briefing them on

the hurricane coordination calls with NHC. One

additional forecaster was scheduled to work all

shifts to assist in disseminating information and in

preparing analyses and forecasts. Two meteorology

student volunteers from North Carolina State

University worked at night to assist with telephones and NWR.

Shortly after midnight, the dedicated AFOS

telephone line went down, but all other telephone

A flash flood watch was issued at 6 AM Thursday

covering the state for that night and Friday. This

was followed by a flash flood statement at 1:30 PM

that also dealt with the possibilities of tornadoes

and high winds over the state’s central and southeastern sections. Similar statements were issued at

5:30 and 9:15 PM. A high wind warning was

37
issued at 10 PM for the east-central portion of the

state again based on the forecast turn to the north.

The high wind warning was extended at 3: 15 AM

into the western sections of the state as it became

obvious that the storm center was tracking further

west than expected.

Although the storm’s center was tracked by radar

at Columbia and Charleston, this equipment is a 5

cm surveillance (conventional) radar and is not

capable of determining radial velocity. In addition,

the storm’s track traveled through a data-sparse

area of South Carolina. The high winds thus were

not anticipated as far inland as they occurred.

Figure 4-7 shows the path of Hugo through the

Carolinas and the resulting damage swath.

Appendix E illustrates the direction of the

damaging winds across the Carolinas from Hugo as

determined from a post storm aerial survey by Dr.

Ted Fujita of the University of Chicago.

Had the planned NEXRAD been available, it could

have provided wind information on the storm as it

moved through the Carolinas. ASOS planned for

this area would have provided forecasters with

continuous accurate rainfall, weather conditions and

wind velocity observations on a real-time basis in

data-sparse regions.

FINDING 4.2: NWS radars neither have the capability of measuring wind velocity nor can they

integrate information horizontally and vertically in

storms. This meant that much information had to

be inferred or was not available for the warning

process when Hugo moved over data-sparse areas.

WSO Charlotte

OIC Kuhn contacted emergency management coordinators in his ll-county area of responsibility on

Thursday. He alerted them to the possibility of

high winds, heavy rains and tornadoes if the storm

tracked into North Carolina’s southern Piedmont.

Further, Kuhn advised officials to use a winter

storm plan or winter storm contingency if there

were no specific plans for high wind warnings in

their counties. Coordinators received additional

briefings shortly after 2 AM Friday to alert them to

high winds. Special weather statements were

issued at 2 and 4 AM focusing on the high wind

threat. A number of additional statements were

issued to keep the public informed of the situation

through the morning on a l- to 3-hour basis.

The Mecklenburg County emergency management

coordinator reported to the Emergency Operations

Center at 3 AM, an hour after receiving the high

wind threat alert. The hour’s lead time enabled

the city to mobilize road crews, cancel school,

assign police to traffic control and dispatch power

trucks to critical areas.

Wind gusts of more than 87 MPH and sustained

winds of more than 65 MPH toppled trees over

much of Charlotte. Damage was extreme as power

outages became widespread and roads blocked.

Emergency management estimated $750 million in

damages in Mecklenburg County alone. The EBS

failed shortly after 4 AM due to the high winds.

Before this incident, warnings and statements were

issued on EBS and NWR as well as NAWAS. NWB

was used extensively in disseminating warnings in

the county.

Other North Carolina WSOs

WSO Wilmington issued HLSs following the NHC

bulletins. The staff briefed local coordinators and

provided information to coastal decision-makers.

Coastal area coordinators used NWR extensively to

monitor the storm’s progress. Several commented

that the amount of information broadcast on NWR

compelled them to listen for long periods of time

until they obtained the latest coordinates to be used

in their “decision arc” techniques.

WSO Asheville issued five flash flood and special

weather statements for high winds in its county

warning area. The staff also issued two flash flood

warnings for the several counties in the North

Carolina mountains. Rains over 6 inches fell in

some areas resulting in several streams exceeding

bankful and washing out several bridges. The

warnings and the watch proved accurate and helpful in the mountain counties. There were reports

of several tornadoes in the mountains and widespread trees down due to high winds. wso

Greensboro issued two urban and small stream

flood warnings for the northern mountains

38
Figure 4-7. Track of storm center of Hurricane Hugo inland across South Carolina and western North

Carolina. Hatch area is approximate area of significant damage resulting from storm.

39
in its county warning area. A number of statements were issued on the high wind warning that

covered most of the area Thursday night and

Friday.

Statements were issued by WSO Cape Hatteras

frequently during the storm although there was no

serious threat to this area from Hugo. A few

decision-makers used voluntary evacuation in some

counties when northeast winds brought high waters

to several coastal communities Thursday afternoon.

Flooding

Despite Hugo’s fury that made it the most

damaging storm of this century, rainfall amounts

were such that flooding was relatively minor.

Rainfall totals averaged between 4 to 9 inches both

in the Caribbean and over the U.S. mainland with

isolated amounts in excess of 10 inches. Most

major flood damage was inflicted on coastal areas

as a consequence of storm surges and not rainfall.

Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

Rainfall reports in Puerto Rico ranged from 5

inches in Arecibo on the north coast to 10.6 inches

at Fajardo and to a maximum of 13.55 inches at

the Lower Rio Blanco gauge in the northeastern

mountains (Fig. 4-8). About 7 inches were

measured at WSFO San Juan. The winds there,

however, were strong enough that the gauge may

not have collected all of the rainfall.

Rainfall across the Virgin Islands was difficult to

assess as many of the rain gauges were damaged or

missing. Available data from cooperative observers

indicated rainfalls of 6 to 9 inches in the U.S.

Virgin Islands with a maximum of 11.2 inches at

Ham Bluff Lighthouse on the northwest coast of St.

Croix. Other significant amounts were 9.08 inches

at Caneel Bay Plantation in northwestern St. John

and 5.2 inches at Water Isle off the south coast of

St. Thomas. The Water Isle reading appears to be

an underestimate when viewing the radar imagery

for that area.

Concerning rivers in Puerto Rico, information from

the U.S. Geological Survey showed that historical

peak flows at a number of sites were exceeded.

The Rio Fajardo (drainage area 15.9 square miles)

probably peaked above the October 24, 1974,

historical maximum of 19,600 cubic feet per second

(cfs) .

Another gauge, the Rio Mameyes near Sabana

(drainage area 6.88 square miles), peaked at

approximately 20,000 cfs exceeding the September

4, 1973, peak by about 200 cfs. Three other

stream gauging stations in the nearby basins of Rio

Espiritu Santa, Rio Sabana and Rio Icacos had

peak discharges that ranged between 38 and 90

percent of former peaks of record. All of these

rivers are located in northeast Puerto Rico just east

of San Juan (Fig. 4-9).

Flash flooding was reported along the Rio Pita

Haya and the Rio Espiritu Santo in northeastern

Puerto Rico.

A major killer in Puerto Rico is the mudslides

which can occur after heavy tropical rains.

Although the potential for mudslides during

Hurricane Hugo was great, none was reported.

Advisories from NHC began highlighting the threat

of 5 to 10 inches of rain at 6 PM Friday,

September 15. By 6 PM the next day, the

potential for large amounts over higher terrain was

mentioned. The threat of flash floods and

mudslides was introduced in advisories at 6 AM

Sunday, September 17, and were slowly escalated

until, as the storm was making landfall, NHC

advisories targeted Hugo as presaging upwards of

15 inches of rain and extensive flash floods and

mudslides.

Rivers in Puerto Rico are short, steep and prone to

flash floods, Little more than 6 hours is needed for

a crest to develop in the mountains and reach the

ocean. Accordingly, no specific stage forecast

values are generated as the crest would most likely

occur before a specific forecast could be produced.

WSFO San Juan is not directly supported by an

RFC. Accordingly, the WSFO must generate its

own flash flood guidance values. The numerical

model used to generate its flash flood guidance is

run on a weekly basis. The flash flood guidance

40
IS

I I

Atlantic Ocean

Caribbean Sea SC&

I I

I

-- - -- - GG_rl b,.” bb.2 --.-

8.0
1

Figure 4-9. Major river systems of Puerto Rico.

42
available to the office was run September 8. It

indicated that most areas were saturated and that

3 inches of rain in a 3-hour period would be

sufficient to cause flash flooding.

Flash flood watches were posted about 7 hours

before heavy rains began in the Virgin Islands and

about 15 hours before heavy rains began in Puerto

Rico. Flash flood warnings were timed to begin

shortly before the heavy rains moved over the

watch areas. After heavy rains persisted for 4

hours or more, flash flood warnings were converted

to flood warnings. Mudslides were highlighted in

the statements although not to the extent NHC

advisories did.

The Loiza River, one of the larger rivers in Puerto

Rico, drains the northeastern sections of the island

and f& the Carraizo Dam whose reservoir is San

Juan’s water supply. After the ALERT systems’

repeater failed, the WSFO staff maintained contact

with the Carraizo Dam personnel to keep them

apprised of Loiza Basin rainfall from the gauges

that remained available. As it was, water flooded

pumps that resulted in a loss of water to San Juan

and the airport, including WSFO San Juan, for

more than a week.

South Carolina

Hugo came ashore at Charleston minutes before

midnight Friday, September 22. The storm moved

quickly to the northwest, passing to the east of

Columbia about 3 AM Friday and then just west of

Charlotte 3 hours later.

Rainfall amounts ranged from 6-plus inches near

the south coastline to 2 to 4 inches over most of

the rest of the state (Fig. 4-10). A maximum of

10.28 inches was recorded along the coast at Edisto

Island. Charleston recorded 5.84 inches of precipitation and Columbia recorded 2.98 inches.

Flash flood watches were issued some 16 hours

prior to landfall. Numerous HLSs, flood potential

outlooks, river statements and flood forecasts were

issued from early on September 21 through September 26 alerting the public to the dangers of

flooding and issuing forecasts for specific locations.

North Carolina

Hugo entered North Carolina west of Charlotte

around daybreak on September 22. It moved

quickly northwest across the state, exiting over the

northern mountains by noon. Rainfall totals

generally ranged from 1 to 2 inches in eastern and

western North Carolina to 3 to 5 inches in westcentral North Carolina. Fig. 4-11 shows 48-hour

rainfall totals for Hugo for the state.

Some individual rainfall totals, as measured by the

IFLOWS gauges, approached 7 inches. Boone,

North Carolina (Watauga County), measured 6.91

inches while Cone Ridge, North Carolina (Yancey

County), measured 6.23 inches.

There was no major river flooding in North

Carolina from Hugo -- rainfall totals simply were

too small. There was, however, some minor

flooding in the northern mountains of North

Carolina, east and north of Asheville. Minor

highway flooding occurred in Allegheny, Wilkes,

McDowell, Mitchell, Surry, Stokes and Watauga

Counties. Rises to near bankful occurred on the

Roanoke River at Williamston.

Twenty-four hours before the storm’s advent, a

flash flood watch covered all of North Carolina.

WSOs Asheville and Greensboro issued flash flood

warnings that emphasized the possibility of heavy

rainfall from Hugo and the flood dangers expected.

Viwinia

In southwestern Virginia, small stream flood

warnings were issued for 12 counties in the WSO

Roanoke service area. Although the flooding was

minor, the Virginia IFLOWS backbone communications network for southwestern Virginia failed.

The IFLOWS communications network piggybacks

on the Virginia State Police intrastate

communications system. During the storm, one

line-of-site repeater tower was toppled eliminating

communications both for IFLOWS and the State

Police. The Virginia State Police are investigating

this incident to develop a fail-safe system.

43
d

2

-

I-4

Figure 4-10. Hugo Precipitation Totals for South Carolina.
Figure 4-11. North Carolina Precipitation.

45
Local Office Working Conditions

Before, during and after the storm, NOAA

personnel set aside their personal concerns to

ensure that critical warning information was

available to local officials and the general public

and that local offices and equipment remained

operational. This meant that they were away from

their loved ones and property for an extended time

without information about their safety. This was

especially so in the cases of WSFO San Juan and

WSOs Charleston and Charlotte where personnel

were subject to considerable danger when high

winds and rain struck their respective areas.

As the storm battered San Juan, rain was driven

through the hurricane shutters posing an electrical

shock hazard from the equipment. Windows began

to bow from the winds and file cabinets were

pushed up against them to keep them in place.

The water supply failed shortly after the eye

brushed the coast causing a loss of air conditioning

and rest room facilities. This situation lasted for

more than a week and caused extremely difficult

working conditions.

At WSO Charleston, the station experienced

damage to the roof when the main fasteners gave

way as the winds increased to hurricane force. The

roof began to buckle and MIC Shenot asked employees and visitors in the office to remain in the

interior hallways away from the upwind side of the

building. Glass on the doors at the northeast

corner of the building were bowing inward from the

wind pressure. It was feared that the glass would

shatter and spray shards into the operations area.

When the eye passed over the station, it was

possible to observe the damage to the building.

The roof had buckled at many points. The

inflation building was severely damaged and the

door had been blown in. Winds shifted after the

passage of the eye driving rain into the building

through the weakened roof and into the operations

area of the office. The staff used plastic sheeting

to cover the radar and the AFOS equipment as well

as the forms and logs that were being maintained

on station.

Safe fresh water was not available and the lack of

water pressure disabled pressure-valve flush toilets

in the office for several days after the storm.

In both WSFO San Juan and in the Carolinas,

hurricane duty meant working long hours without

a break. All available personnel reported for duty

and stayed on station for the duration of the storm.

Weather offices do not contain facilities or

sufficient area for sleeping so individuals rested or

napped anywhere convenient. WSFO San Juan is

located within the airport hotel building. Rooms

were provided for the staff during Hugo although

no water, rest rooms or air conditioning were

available. Shifts were frequently 12 hours or more

in length with no days off for up to 10 days. When

individuals returned to their homes, some found

them in considerable disarray. Fortunately, no

employees or members of their families suffered

serious injury.

FINDING 4.3: In all offices affected by the storm,

employees remained on duty with only a minimum

of food storage facilities, cooking and refrigeration

capabilities and virtually no personal hygiene facilities or temporary sleeping area. Most oflices did

not contain a safe and secure area for the protection of employees from high winds.

RESPONSE OF THE MEDIA

Coverape of NHC

NHC responded to a multitude of requests for

storm information from local, national and foreign

electronic and print media. The initial wave of six

television cameras and crews from the Miami area

grew to a flood of news interests that descended on

NHC on Sunday, September 17, when Hurricane

Hugo smashed Guadeloupe and the British and

U.S. Virgin Islands. All TV networks, along with

major news providers, were represented. Interviews

were conducted at 5minute intervals through a

busy l&hour period.

Dr. Sheets and key NOAA personnel called for a

local, regional and network pool that became

effective by 5 AM Monday, September 18. Working

smoothly and cooperatively, the pool ended when

Hugo dissipated inland late Friday night,

September 22.

46
During 8 days of coverage, a total of at least 700

spots originated from NHC. Dr. Sheets handled 70

percent of them while the rest were handled by

hurricane forecasters. Interviews were restricted to

5-minute segments with exceptions only for special

network hurricane programs.

Meriting special mention was coverage by Spanishlanguage stations, WLTV-23 and WSCT-TV, serving

Greater Miami and through their networks,

Univision and Telemundo, serving Spanish-language

stations throughout the country. Their effective

coverage was aided by the NHC in providing

Spanish-speaking meteorologists whenever possible.

LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE

Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

While not equipped with as much sophisticated

equipment and weather information sources available on the U.S. mainland, electronic and print

media organizations on Puerto Rico and the US.

Virgin Islands provided extensive coverage of Hugo.

Media concentrated all-out coverage 2 days before

the hurricane made landfall at St. Croix and Puerto

Rico.

Television coverage was provided by the four

stations on Puerto Rico and the four in the Virgin

Islands. None has a professional meteorologist.

Most stations do not use NOAA Weather Wire

relying mainly on the Associated Press (AP) and

the United Press International (UPI) wires.

With nearly 100 stations operating on Puerto Rico,

radio played a key role in keeping citizens advised

on hurricane developments. WKAQ, which has

access to the NOAA Weather Wire, is designated as

the EBS station for the island and also covers the

Virgin Islands. WSTX, St. Croix, and WVWI, St.

Thomas, also serve as EBS stations.

WKAQ, which must request EBS activation through

the Commonwealth CD, did so eight times before

Hugo made landfall. Once activated, WKAQ’s EBS

broadcasts were broadcast by other radio stations.

WKAQ provided timely and credible information to

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

In preparing for Hugo’s arrival, the hub of activity

was WSFO San Juan. Three TV channels dispatched camera crews to WSFO San Juan while

one channel elected instead to send a crew to the

Commonwealth CD office. In addition, several

radio stations broadcast from the WSFO. No

camera or equipment pooling arrangements were

made and interviews with the WSFO staff were

conducted on an as-needed basis. The office is

short on space and lacks a good location to

accommodate the cameras and equipment for the

media. The spirit of cooperation between the two

groups ensured amicable and effective operations.

About 150 interviews were conducted by the WSFO

San Juan staff with media representatives

throughout the islands and on the U.S. mainland.

MIC Matos and John Toohey-Morales, who were

interviewed the most, stressed that errors up to 60

miles were possible in the forecast track for Hugo.

Their statements helped keep Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands at their highest readiness.

A significant EBS broadcast took place Sunday

around 11 PM. That broadcast included Rafael

Hernandez Colon, Governor of Puerto Rico;

Heriberto Acevedo, Commonwealth CD Director;

and MIC Matos. Matos presented the

meteorological situation and introduced the

Governor who urged all individuals to take the

warning information seriously. The Governor then

introduced his CD Director who outlined the

appropriate response actions.

The Governor’s timely action reflected his faith in

the forecasts and information provided by the

NWS. Coordination among the Governor, local

emergency management officials and the NWS

resulted in one of the most successful evacuations

ever conducted in Puerto Rico. Public response

was also heightened in the Virgin Islands due to

EBS activation and live broadcasts by Alexander

Farrelly, Governor of the Virgin Islands and

William Harvey, Civil Defense Director.

Most TV stations signed off around midnight

Monday morning, but Channel 24 remained on the

air with 15-minute updates until it went off the air

at 7 AM Monday. WKAQ and two radio stations

broadcasting from WSFO San Juan stayed on the

air throughout the hurricane. In the Virgin

Islands, 24 hour coverage throughout the storm was

47
provided by radio station WSTA St. Thomas which performances. His network services 57 stations or

can be received in St. Croix. more than half of those in the state.

Media representatives did not attempt to second

guess the NWS. NHC advisories and HLSs were

available to them, and they reported developments

without putting “a twist” or “a spin” on them.

Media personnel relied heavily on telephone contact

with the NWS staff. They regarded NWS at WSFO

San Juan and the NHC as authoritative and

reliable.

The Carolinas

As South Carolina braced for Hugo’s landfall, the

broadcast media continued to air the NHC bulletins

but local stations began to shift emphasis more to

local NWS sources. HLSs, bolstered by NHC

advisories, were monitored carefully.

There are four Charleston area commercial

television channels. One employs its own

meteorologist. Most media representatives were

assigned on the day of Hugo’s landfall to

Emergency Preparedness Headquarters which was

in constant communication with WSO Charleston.

One TV channel camera crew aired storm coverage

from WSO Charleston until less than 90 minutes

before Hugo’s arrival.

Media representatives were satisfied with the

quality of NWS weather information especially

noting NOAA Weather Wire and NHC’s use of

hurricane probabilities. They reserved their most

eloquent praise for local Weather Service staff.

This emphasis underscored their confidence in NWS

employees (who lived and worked in communities

under Hugo’s threat) as intrinsic to full and

accurate coverage of the storm.

For example, News Director Jack Jones said the

South Carolina Radio Network relied heavily on

NWS information. He said the NWS and NHC

reports especially were important in covering Hugo

since the network provides 5-minute broadcasts

updated on the hour. Jones lauded NWS and NHC

Educational Television (ETV) stationed camera and

crew at the Emergency Operations Center and used

NW’S and NHC weather information extensively in

their broadcasts and updates. It provided pool

coverage for the Governor’s office and broadcast

the Governor’s evacuation orders. Besides feeding

commercial TV, ETV operates eleven TV and seven

radio transmitters. News and Public Affairs

Director Tom Fowler praised the quality of NWS

weather information and noted that an ETV artist

used graphics prepared from NWS data for TV

charting of Hugo’s track.

In South Carolina, the NWS is authorized to

activate the EBS during weather emergencies.

WSO Charleston activated the system at 5:52 AM

Thursday, September 21. WXTC in Charleston is

the primary station and rebroadcasts to other

commercial outlets.

MIC Shenot said normally there is only one

activation. After that, stations receive weather

information through their usual channels and

broadcast at their discretion. Shenot said a major

development in the weather situation could lead to

NWS activating this system again. This was

unnecessary during Hugo.

Two events -- one national and the other local --

departed from the otherwise excellent media

coverage. An incident concerning Hilton Head

Island drew the most criticism. A network evening

newscast portrayed island residents as dismayed

and frightened by lack of evacuation planning. A

local Hilton Head Island reporter dismissed the

account and noted that the evacuation was

successful and without incident.

The other event involved a TV channel in eastern

North Carolina where its meteorologist emphasized

the prediction of a more northward course for

Hugo. Lower coast residents, responding to the TV

presentation, pressured officials into opening public

shelters, Local officials described the unnecessary

opening of the shelters as a good test of their

sheltering capabilities.

48
RESPONSE OF THE EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY

Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands

All elected officials and emergency managers

interviewed, including the Governor of Puerto Rico,

the Mayor of San Juan and CD Directors of the

Commonwealth, San Juan and St. Croix, categorically stated that the coordination between them

and the WSFO San Juan was outstanding. This

coordination ensured that local officials had the

information needed to make prompt, effective

decisions. Properly informed leaders meant that

the public was provided authoritative information

on appropriate procedures to safeguard their lives

and property.

Both the Commonwealth CD and San Juan

Municipio CD offices have NOAA Weather Wire

and NWR. They also receive NWS broadcasts on

their portable radios they carry with them in the

field. Commonwealth CD Director Acevedo Ruin

also has NWR in his car.

Most other municipio CDs do not have a drop on

the weather wire or on NWR. The city of Ponce

on the south coast, however, is one of the few other

municipios that does have NWR. The Commonwealth CD office fans out weather information to

the municipio CDs by a radio link.

VITEMA headquarters are located in Charlotte

Amalie, St. Thomas, the capital. On St. Croix, the

Vice Governor and VITEMA offices are located in

Christiansted. Information from NWR is relayed

by radio to St. Croix from VITEMA headquarters

in St. Thomas. NOAA Weather Wire is also

available.

During the storm, WSFO maintained frequent

telephone contact with the Commonwealth and San

Juan CD offices and VITEMA headquarters. All

CD officials interviewed by the survey team

mentioned that direct contact with WSFO staff was

most important in helping them to assess the

impact of the storm on the area.

For the highly successful EBS broadcasts in Puerto

Rico, the WSFO had to request activation through

the Commonwealth CD office. The working relationship with CD in Puerto Rico allowed the

dramatic inclusion of the Governor into the

broadcast.

Active discussions with CD also ensured that timely

evacuation orders were formulated. Shortly after

midnight Sunday, September 17, Matos advised

Commonwealth CD that planning should begin then

to ensure an effective evacuation order by 6 AM.

Similarly, government officials on St. Thomas, St.

Croix and St. John were advised at 9:15 PM Saturday that evacuation needs should be addressed and

evacuations be completed by 10 AM Sunday. CD

Director Harvey stated that an evacuation order

was issued and that the people took it seriously.

Communications were maintained to all CD offices

throughout the storm. Those to St. Croix, however,

were lost during the height of the storm shortly

after midnight Monday, September 18.

The Carolinas

Key officials and emergency managers in the path

of Hurricane Hugo received much of their weather

information through the NOAA Weather Wire,

NWR and by monitoring broadcast news media.

Direct personal contact coupled with the confidence

and trust that these local officials place in the

NWS cannot be overstated. Emergency management coordinators and most decision-makers lauded

actions of NWS offices and the Weather Service in

general. Among comments was that Hugo was the

best-handled hurricane they experienced. South

Carolina’s Adjutant General offered glowing praise

as did the North Carolina State Emergency

Operations Officer.

Starting Tuesday, September 19, WSFO Columbia

maintained regular contact with the State

Emergency Preparedness Division and briefed the

county EPD directors on Hugo’s expected path.

Thus, state and county officials could begin their

own alert and planning processes. Further, WSFO

Columbia notitied the American Red Cross’

Hurricane Watch District in Columbia.

In North Carolina after initial briefings with the

Governor’s staff on September 20, WSFO Raleigh’s

acting MIC met separately with the Secretary of

49
Crime Control and Public Safety and Director of

Emergency Management. Ultimately, the state

emergency agency put a full-time liaison into

WSFO Raleigh.

Emergency management agencies, in turn, used

NWS information to guide preparations tying them

to evacuation planning, public information and

decisions on when and where to open shelters, to

position police and National Guard troops on

evacuation routes and to make other assignments.

One dramatic example of how the NWS worked

with elected officials and emergency managers was

when MIC Palmer in Columbia talked with

Governor Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., of South

Carolina on Wednesday evening, September 20.

During that discussion, he suggested that the

Governor call for a voluntary evacuation before the

hurricane warning was posted. Palmer advised him

that the warning would be issued the next morning,

that landfall would take place Thursday night and

that the hurricane probably would be higher than

Category 2.

Acting on Palmer’s advice, the Governor issued a

voluntary evacuation recommendation for all South

Carolina beach communities. He urged local

officials to help arrange voluntary evacuation and

provided National Guard assistance. The Governor

also asked that persons in shelters closer to the

coast be moved further inland since a high storm

surge was expected. These actions eased traffic

problems when the mandatory evacuation order

was issued the following morning.

Emergency managers also attested to the value of

how well the “decision arc” program worked in their

planning efforts. However, most of them

commented that though objective methods such as

these were valuable, they still contacted their local

NWS meteorologists to confirm their conclusions.

When confronted by conflicting information,

whether from the objective schemes or from outside

sources, they turned to their local NWS office for

guidance.

A coastal community police chief in northern South

Carolina told survey team members, “Thursday

afternoon, I heard on a North Carolina TV station

that the storm was coming ashore between Myrtle

Beach and Murrells Inlet. I called Dick Shenot

(Charleston MIC) and he told me that the storm

was still coming at Charleston. I put my faith in

Dick Shenot’s advice.’

In Charlotte, the County Emergency Management

Coordinator pointed out the value of the Thursday

phone call by Charlotte’s OIC. His call on the high

winds provided an hour’s lead time so Charlotte

officials could mobilize. Further, the official said

the forecast of heavy rains was used by the power

company to release water from the hydroelectric

dam reducing flood risk in the area. Sue Myrick,

the Mayor of Charlotte, also commented on the

importance of NWS weather information to her

city.

The only known criticism from government officials

or emergency coordinators came from the Mayor of

McClellanville (the town which was swamped by a

huge storm surge). Although many of the residents

evacuated before Hugo hit, the Mayor wanted to

know why NWS did not warn of the hurricane’s

danger. The Mayor is a member of the Local Area

Emergency Council but did not attend the meeting

the night before the storm arrived.

The Mayor was among several hundred who took

shelter at the high school that was inundated by

storm surge waters. Unfortunately, this shelter --

as described previously -- was the one listed with

the erroneous elevation. Flesidents managed to

remain above the waters until they subsided.

Several other shelters suffered roof and wall

damage.

FINDING 4.4: The public receives most of its

warning information from the media. During

Hugo, both NHC and the local offices worked

exceptionally well with the media. This ensured

that timely, consistent and credible information was

iSSUd.

FINDING 4.5: In both the Caribbean and the

Carolinas, emergency managers coordinated

frequently with their local NWS offices. They

initiated calls to gather additional information, to

corroborate their own decisions and to receive

guidance.

FINDING 4.6: NWS offices in the affected areas

served a most important role in saving lives. The

personnel of these offices knew local conditions and

50
local emergency managers. They interpreted for

these emergency managers the implications of NHC

advisories and the appropriate local response. The

best public response occurred where there was the

strongest working relationship between the NWS

and the local emergency management community.

Participation by the Governors of Puerto Rico and

South Carolina in the evacuation decisions and in

broadcasts resulted from the close working relationship between the NWS office and the Governors’

offices.

FINDING 4.7: The EBS in Puerto Rico can only

be activated through the Commonwealth CD. In

many other EBS areas, the local NWS office may

directly request activation of the EBS system for

weather emergencies.

51

Chapter V

PUBLIC RESPONSE AND USER BENEFITS

OVERVIEW local officials and emergency management agencies,

people moved when told to do so. By and large,

The successful public response during Hurricane

Hugo is a result of efforts begun in 1974 when

NWS created its disaster preparedness program

throughout the Nation. Together with the NOAA

Public Affairs Office, awareness materials in the

form of brochures, films, slides and public service

announcements were created and distributed

widely. Annual preparedness meetings were conducted in coastal communities with local emergency

managers, the media and citizens’ groups. These

activities, sponsored regularly over the past 15

years, were greatly responsible for public response

in evacuations as Hugo neared and, hence, for the

low loss of life. Previous Category 4 hurricanes,

striking the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the

U.S. mainland, have resulted in loss of life by the

hundreds.

they found evacuation routes cleared and shelter

facilities ready and available if they sought them.

In a life-saving sense, the NWS/emergency

management relationship had come of age.

PUBLIC RESPONSE

Puerto Rico/Virtin Islands

Governor Colon of Puerto Rico, along with Hector

Luis Acevedo, the Mayor of San Juan, and Luis

Island, the San Juan Civil Defense Director,

proclaimed the public’s response to warnings for

Hugo as a success story. The NWS shared the

evacuation burden with local emergency managers

both in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. At

9:15 PM Sunday, September 17, WSFO San Juan

asked VITEMA to begin planning so evacuations

could start at sunrise. Similar scenarios took place

in Puerto Rico with the Commonwealth CD and

San Juan CD Directors.

The successful evacuations and low casualty rates

reflect the growing sophistication and team efforts

of the NWS and the emergency management community. Years of coastal planning and development

of SLOSH models and the building of evacuation

plans around them have created a mutual trust and

credibility. These cooperative efforts of NWS, the

Corps of Engineers, FEMA and regional and local

groups have been buttressed by awareness campaigns and exercise drills, which have resulted in

the high degree of public responsiveness.

A critical factor in the success of warning and

evacuation efforts in both the Caribbean and the

Carolinas was the fact that Matos, MIC at San

Juan, and Palmer, MIC at Columbia, were able to

talk directly to the respective Governors and key

aides as well as to state and county emergency

managers. As a result, they were able to provide

the timely guidance needed for evacuation-related

decision making.

Guided by timely, understandable NWS

information, news media that did not second guess

official information, and knowledgeable and credible

The close association between WSFO San Juan and

local government was mirrored by the WSFO and

media relationship. A constant stream of weather

information was provided to the public and

decision-makers in both Spanish and English.

Weather and official evacuation instructions and

other pertinent information were issued by the

NWS, the Commonwealth CD and VITEMA to the

media for public dissemination.

Government and media representatives said the

Hugo evacuation was the beat coordinated weather

event they could recall. The fact that at least

30,000 people evacuated in Puerto Rico, including

areas such as San Juan’s La Perla, is a credit to

everyone involved. Citizens obviously had been

convinced of the danger. A total of 217 shelters

were opened in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

An official Red Cross tally put shelter population at

more than 161,000.

53
The Carolinas

As was so in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,

the combination of a timely and credible

forecast-warning system, coupled with close NWS

cooperation with emergency managers, was cited as

the key to successful evacuations in advance of a

powerful storm. The voluntary evacuation begun

on Wednesday evening, September 20, was credited

to Dr. Wayne Beam of the South Carolina Coastal

Council as saving lives on the vulnerable barrier

islands.

The result: thousands of people began moving

inland that evening more than 24 hours before

Hugo’s landfall. Charleston County EPD Director,

Dennis Clark, recalled that by midnight Wednesday,

a full day before the storm crossed the coast, an

endless stream of headlights could be seen crossing

the Cooper River Bridge into Charleston as people

left coastal towns and barrier islands. They were

responding both to the Governor’s widely broadcast

statement and corollary official public information.

At 6 AM Thursday when a hurricane warning was

posted for the South Carolina coast, the Governor’s

evacuation order for the barrier islands and the

coast became mandatory. Charleston County was

excepted. The Governor specified that evacuation

be completed by 3 PM.

More than 186,000 persons left their homes. Only

a few diehards stayed behind. Evacuations took

place from Hilton Head Island to Myrtle Beach.

Only two persons were believed drowned in their

homes, a remarkable fact considering the depth of

the storm surge.

Charleston residents actually responded to the

voluntary evacuation of the Governor. A subsequent mandatory evacuation was issued by

Charleston Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr. Fearing a

tremendous storm surge, Riley ordered evacuation

of all one-story buildings.

Survey team members visiting Sullivans Island and

the Isle of Palms a week after Hugo’s landfall

found extensive damage. The surge had destroyed

many houses and poured over the pews in the

Stella Maris Roman Catholic Church. A woman

who evacuated came back to see what was left of

her home. Looking at neighbors trying to salvage

remains, she said of the NWS, “These people are

alive because of you.” Similar sentiments were

expressed by many other residents of stormbattered areas.

Although Charleston coastal areas had not

experienced a major hurricane in at least a decade,

public reaction in evacuating so expeditiously was

a tribute to the continuing awareness efforts of

WSFO Columbia’s Preparedness Meteorologist and

the MICs of Columbia and Charleston. It served

also as a tribute to the continuing awareness and

preparedness efforts at the county EPD and local

Red Cross chapters.

Supporting public reaction to Hugo warnings was

a media-driven awareness of what the storm had

done in the Caribbean and saturation warnings

through the media. An indicator of public

acceptance of NWS and emergency management

information supplied by the media is illustrated by

the Public Hurricane Hotline ( 1-900-4 lo-NOAA).

In 1985, Hurricane Gloria resulted in 587,000 calls.

In 1988, Hurricane Gilbert produced 140,000 calls.

In contrast, Hurricane Hugo drew only 94,000 calls.

Generally, county emergency managers planned for

the worst. Typically, they laid plans on the basis

of a storm a category higher than the one predicted

officially.

At Myrtle Beach, people moved from one shelter to

another on higher ground long before the tidal

surge arrived. If there was any criticism of the

warning information by emergency managers and

public officials, it was that, at one point, the

probabilities for Myrtle Beach were higher than for

Charleston and that the storm never did move

north along the coast.

In both Carolinas, the response of emergency

managers and public officials was overwhelmingly

positive to NWS forecast information. Again, the

emphasis on hurricane probabilities of Hugo’s

landfall was cited frequently as helpful. Working

relationships between state and local officials, and

the NWS were perceived as excellent. This perception included many rural counties that obtained

weather information through NOAA Weather Radio,

CD or the media rather than from personal contact

with NWS staff.

54
The most vocal example of this working

relationship came from Charleston County EPD

Director Clark. He told the survey team that he

accepted his job because of his belief in the support

he would receive from Shenot, MIC at Charleston.

The Bed Cross, for example, credited timely

weather information with impelling its opening of

hurricane watch offices that coordinate responses of

local chapters. Ultimately, the organization opened

397 shelters in the Carolinas accommodating some

80,000 evacuees for at least a night.

The Charleston Port Authority, whose operations

were severely affected by the storm, was joined by

other organizations in praising the NWS weather

information. Included in issuing the plaudits were

the South Carolina Climatology Oflice which

assigned two staff members to act as weather

liaison at EOC and the Governor’s command post,

the South Carolina Coastal Council and the

military.

Perhaps, the most telling comments came from two

South Carolina officials. Warren Tompkins, the

Governor’s Chief of Staff, said, “The information

we received was key to helping the Governor decide

to urge early evacuation.” Governor Campbell’s

official evacuation statement was included in all

subsequent NWS issuances. The State Adjutant

General, T. Eston Marchant, who commands the

National Guard and Emergency Preparedness

Department, said, “On a scale of 1 to 10, you are

a 10. If the Governor hadn’t made that decision,

we could have lost 3 to 5 thousand people.... The

warnings and evacuation couldn’t have been done

any better.”

Several emergency managers and public officials

remarked that, even with the successful evacuation,

there were problems in getting escape routes

adequately policed and shelters supplied and staffed

in time for the first evacuees. They suggested that

announcing a hurricane warning usually is the

action that triggers state and local evacuation

decision making (a voluntary evacuation in South

Carolina preceded the mandatory order) and urged

that NWS warnings be issued with longer lead

times. These officials said this would permit more

timely preparations for the evacuation.

Unfortunately, the present state of the science is

such that hurricane forecast errors preclude the

issuances of warning with longer lead times. Local

decision-makers must use hurricane probabilities in

connection with their evacuation plans to determine

when actions need to be taken. If their areas

require a long evacuation time, preparations for

evacuations may have to be taken before a warning

is issued. Local emergency managers rely heavily

on weather information from local NWS offices.

Modernization of NWS will ensure that areas

served by future NWS offices will have the

technology and meteorological capabilities to

provide even more site specilic information directly

to emergency managers. This should enhance the

decision-making capabilities of public officials.

Finally, although watches and warnings were timely

and information on the storm was readily available,

some persons still could not fathom the magnitude

of the danger. Even though storm surges of 12 to

17 feet were forecast along the South Carolina

coast, frequent responses from local residents were,

“We didn’t think it (Hugo) would be this bad!”

Regardless, most people understood that Hugo was

going to hit their communities even if they did not

anticipate its magnitude.

FINDING 5.1: Even though much information is

made available to the public, people still cannot

adequately appreciate what the forecast conditions

mean until they have lived through a storm.

User Benefits

As in other hurricane episodes, the greatest user

benefit from NWS was public safety. The storm

was a potential killer of thousands. Early,

informative advisories and serious public response

nullified much of the storm’s dangers to lives.

In analyzing further the response to Hugo, it was

evident that the continued fine-tuning of the NWS

hurricane forecast process and the Weather

Service’s working relationship with emergency

managers, the media and the public produced the

eventual payoff when the hurricane came ashore.

The storm was in and the people were out -- out of

danger.

What began as a cloudy image on a satellite photo

had become a stream of headlights crossing

Charleston’s Cooper Biver Bridge or leaving
low-lying areas of San Juan well before wind and

heavy rain signaled it was too late.

For the emergency management community, the

suc!cess of Hugo evacuations set a new standard for

further planning and awareness efforts. Some day,

with improved building standads, land-use laws

and regulations and continuing evacuation

planning, even fewer will perish when other

hurricanea cross our coasts.

,

56

Chapter VI

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY CHAPTER

CHAPTER II: SUMMARY OF

PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS, INFORMATION

AND WARNING SERVICES

FINDING 2.1: Errors in base elevation

information on shelters or evacuation routi could

result in loss of life as evacuees move to unsafe

shelter or through unsafe evacuation routes.

RECOMMENDATION 2.1: Coastal offices should

encourage local emergency management officials to

verify periodically the elevation and structural

soundness of shelters prior to the onset of the

hurricane season.

FINDING 2.2: A comprehensive evacuation study

has not been undertaken for Puerto Rico and the

Virgin Islands.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2: A comprehensive

evacuation study should be conducted for Puerto

Rico and the Virgin Islands in concert with FEMA

and the Corps of Engineers. Because of

bathymetry of the area, a wave study should be

part of this project.

FINDING 2.3: In its HLSs, WSFO San Juan

referenced potential landfall sites with a degree of

specificity that was greater than current forecast

capabilities allow. Frequent coordination calls with

users kept decision-makers from overly focusing on

the forecast track.

RECOMMENDATION 2.3: In preparing HLSs,

WSFOs should ensure that references to potential

landfall areas realistically reflect the uncertainties

involved.

FINDING 2.4: In both the Caribbean and the

Carolinas, hurricane probabilities were used in

varying degrees by decision-makers to incorporate

forecast uncertainties in their planning efforts.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4: At annual workshops RECOMMENDATION 3.1: ASOS should be

NHC should continue to emphasize to emergency implemented as a part of the modernization and

managers current forecasting capabilities and restructuring program to provide cost-effective,

limitations. reliable observations in data-sparse areas.

FINDING 2.5: In two hurricane advisories, the

addition of two significant changes without reasons

for these changes created some problems for

emergency managers and the media.

RECOMMENDATION 2.5: NHC should include in

its advisories underlying reasons for significant

forecast changes. Understanding what the forecast

means and reasons underlying forecast changes

would increase the confidence of emergency managers and the media in the advisories used by

NHC, thereby, enhancing vital cooperation between

local NWS offices, local officials and the media. It

also would heighten public awareness to changes

which require additional public response.

FINDING 2.6: The lack of emphasis in NHC

public advisories for the Carolinas on inland high

winds left the media and local officials with little

guidance on how to respond.

RECOMMENDATION 2.6: NHC should include in

its public advisories sufficient plain language

information on significant potential inland impacts

contemplated to ensure a properly coordinated

response by emergency managers and the media.

Bearing in mind that local coordination is the key

to effective local response, the NWS should develop

policy and provide guidance to NHC, other national

centers and field offices on how to provide timely,

adequate information on the inland affects of

hurricanes to WSFOs and to emergency managers.

CHAPTER IIk DATA COLLECTION AND

COMMUNICATIONS

FINDING 3.1: The density of surface observations

in the Caribbean and the Carolinas is extremely

low. This posed a significant problem to forecasters trying to obtain information during the

storm.
FINDING 3.2: A dedicated connection to the

Roosevelt Roads radar would ensure full radar

coverage for WSFO San Juan.

RECOMMENDATION 3.2: The NWS should

investigate acquiring a dedicated drop on the

Roosevelt Roads military radar for WSFO San

Juan.

FINDING 3.3: A fully operational ALERT system

for the Virgin Islands would assist the WSFO staff

in preparing flood-related warnings and assist

VITEMA in responding to flood situations.

RECOMMENDATION 3.3: The NWS, in concert

with FEMA and VITEMA, should again explore the

establishment of an ALERT system in the Virgin

Islands.

FINDING 3.4: Limited NOAA Weather Wire drops

in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands resulted in

few emergency manage= having hard copies of

Weather Service products. This increased the need

for coordination efforts at the local WSFO.

RECOMMENDATION 3.4: The NWS should work

with FEMA to explore funding of additional critical

outlets on the upgraded NOAA Weather Wire in

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

FINDING 3.5: NWR reception is poor in the

Virgin Islands.

RECOMMENDATION 3.5: The NWS should work

with other interests in the Virgin Islands to

establish an English-language NWR transmitter to

provide broadcasts for the Virgin Islands.

FINDING 3.6: WSFO San Juan and most coastal

WSOs are not on the Hurricane Hotline. Accordingly, they cannot participate in routine

coordination calls with NHC, NMC and other

coastal WSFOs.

RECOMMENDATION 3.6: The NWS should

explore replacing the current land line Hurricane

Hotline with a satellite coordination system that

could link WSFOs, WSOs within 300 miles of the

coast and national centers.

FINDING 3.7: Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands

have no dedicated coordination line between

emergency managers and the WSFO. In the

Carolinas, lack of NAWAS drops from adjacent

states hampered coordination efforts across state

boundaries.

RECOMMENDATION 3.7: The NWS should

request FEMA to investigate the possibility of a

communications system that would allow interstate

as well as intrastate coordination between and

among NWS offices and emergenq management

agencies.

CHAPTER IVZ AN EVALUATION OF THE

PROCESSING, INTERPRETATION AND

DISSEMINATION OF NWS INFORMATION

FINDING 4.1: Aircraft reconnaissance is a

necessary tool in hurricane forecasting.

RECOMMENDATION 4.1: Aircraft reconnaissance

should be continued until other sensing platforms

can provide data fields of equal accuracy and

density.

FINDING 4.2: NWS radars neither have the

capability of measuring wind velocity nor can they

integrate information horizontally and vertically in

storms. This meant that much information had to

be inferred or was not available for the warning

process when Hugo moved over data-sparse areas.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2: The NWS should

continue to develop and deploy the NEXRAD

Doppler Radar.

FINDING 4.3: In all offices affwted by the storm,

employees remained on duty with only a minimum

of food storage facilities, cooking and refrigeration

capabilities and virtually no personnel hygiene

facilities or temporary sleeping area. Most offices

did not contain a safe and secure area for the

protection of employees from high winds.

RECOMMENDATION 4.3: Construction of future

NWS offices in hurricane-prone areas should have

hardened hurricane-proofed areas for personal

safety. Reasonable amenities should also be

provided including cots, limited shower facilities,

kitchen facilities, refrigerators, emergency food

supplies and backup toilet facilities.

59
FINDING 4.4: The public receives most of its

warning information from the media. During

Hugo, both NHC and the local offices worked

exceptionally well with the media. This ensured

that timely, consistent and credible information was

issued.

RECOMMENDATION 4.4: NWS offices should

continue to work with the media to ensure that

each has an understanding of the other’s

responsibilities and requirements in the warning

Process.

FINDING 4.5: In both the Caribbean and the

Carolinas, emergency managers coordinated

frequently with their local NWS offices. They

initiated calls to gather additional information, to

corroborate their own decisions and to receive

guidance.

RECOMMENDATION 4.5: Direct two-way links,

that are not susceptible to outage during critical

weather situations, should be provided between

NWS and emergency management communications

systems.

FINDING 4.6: NWS offices in the affwted areas

served a most important role in saving lives. The

personnel of these offices knew local conditions and

local emergency managers. They interpreted for

these emergency managers the implications of NHC

advisories and the appropriate local response. The

best public response occurred where there was the

strongest working relationship between the NWS

and the local emergency management community.

Participation by the Governors of Puerto Rico and

South Carolina in the evacuation decisions and in

broadcasts resulted from a close working

relationship between the NWS office and the

Governors’ offices.

RECOMMENDATION 4.6: The NWS should

encourage local oftices to maintain the close

relationship with state and local emergency

managers including the Governor and state staff,

the Mayors and the local and area emergency

management coordinators. NHC advisories and

Hurricane Hotline discussions should encourage

that mutual respect and trust which proved so

valuable during Hurricane Hugo.

FINDING 4.7: The EBS in Puerto Rico can only

be activated through the Commonwealth CD. In

many other EBS areas, the local NWS office may

directly request activation of the EBS system for

weather emergencies.

RECOMMENDATION 4.7: WSFO San Juan

should investigate the possibility of acquiring

authority to request EBS activation directly.

FINDING 5.1: Even though much information is

made available to the public, people still cannot

adequately appreciate what the forecast conditions

mean until they have lived through a storm.

RECOMMENDATION 5.1: The NWS should

continue to work with other agencies, the media

and the private sector to increase the impact of

hurricane awareness program by vividly portraying

the devastating power of hurricanes and how to

survive a hurricane.

60

Appendix A

SUMMARY OF RJZCORDED AND ESTIMATED SmACE WIND

SPEEDS IN liWRJZICAN-E HUGO

Recorded Surface Wind Speeds

Roosevelt Reads Naval Station, PR

Date = Sept. 18

Anemometer Ht. = 23 ft.

Peak Gust = 120 mph @ 7:58 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 98 mph

Max. lo-Min Mean Speed = 76 mph @ 9:20 AM

WSFO San Juan, PR

Date = Sept. 18

Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.

Peak Gust = 92 mph @I 7:52 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 77 mph @I 7:50 AM

Max. lo-Min Mean Speed = 61 mph @ 7:50 AM

Charleston Naval Station, SC

Date = Sept. 21-22

Anemometer Ht. = 118 ft.

Peak Gust = 137 mph @ 11:30-11:45 PM, Sept. 21

Max. Sustained Speed = N/A

Max. 15-Min Mean Speed = 74 mph @ 1 AM, Sept. 22

Charleston (City Site), SC

Date = Sept. 21

Anemometer Ht. = 25 ft.

Peak Gust = 108 mph @ 11:40 PM

Max. Sustained Speed = 87 mph @ 11:30 PM

WSO Charleston Airport, SC

Date = Sept. 22

Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.

Peak Gust = 98 mph @ 12:59 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 78 mph @? 1:03 AM

Max. lo-Min Mean Speed = 59 mph @ 1:lO AM

Myrtle Beach AFB, SC

Date = Sept. 22

Anemometer Ht. = 15 ft.

Peak Gust = 76 mph @ 1:55 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 52 mph @I 1:55 AM

A-l
Shaw AFB, SC

Date = Sept. 22

Anemometer Ht. = 15 ft.

Peak Gust = 109 mph @ 2:46 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 67 mph @ 255 AM

WSFO Columbia, SC

Date = Sept. 22

Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.

Peak Gust = 70 mph @ 3:27 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 48 mph @ 350 AM

Max. lo-Min Mean Speed = 46 mph @ 3:20 AM

WSO Charlotte, NC

Date = Sept. 22

Anemometer Ht. = 20 ft.

Peak Gust = 87 mph @ 5:20 AM

Max. Sustained Speed = 46 mph @ 5:51 AM

Max. lo-Min Mean Speed = 38 mph @ 6:20 AM

courtesy of

R. D. Marshall

Research Structural Engineer

National Institute of

Standards and Technology

A-2
ESTIMATED SURFACE WIND SPEEDS

Estimated as a reduction of aircraft obeervations and

700 mb analyeee to surface valws and

inferred speeds due to damage patterns

Location Suetained (MPH) Guets (MPH)

St. croix 132 161

Sts. Thomas/John 98 121

Viequea 109 132

Culebra 121 150

courtesy of

Joeeph Golden

Senior Meteorologist

Office of the Chief Scientiet

NO&I

ESTIMATED SURFACE WIND SPEEDS

Location Sustained (MPH) GUStJ3

14“31’N$l”35’W 160’ WA

(East of Guadeloupe)

Bulls Bay

South Carolina

1352 N/A

courte8y of

Robert Sheets

Director, National Hurricane Center

NOM

1 E&mated using step frequency micro wave radiometer aboard NOM Reaear& A&raft.

2 Eistimatad ikom a reduction of observed flight level win& and the empirical preaeure wind relationship.

A-3
Appendix B

SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE

This can be used to give an estimate of the potential property damage and flooding expected along the

coast with a hurricane.

Category

ONE

THREE

FOUR

FIVE

Definition -- Effects

Winds 74-95 MPH or storm surpe 4-5 feet above normal. No real damage to building

structures. Damage primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery and trees. Also,

some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

Winds 96-110 MPH or storm surge 6-8 feet above normal. Some roofmg material, door

and window damage to buildings. Considerable damage to vegetation, mobile homes

and piers. Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2-4 hours before arrival of center.

Small craft in unprotected anchorages break moorings.

Winds 111-130 MPH or storm surge 9-12 feet above normal. Some structural damage

to small residences and utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures.

Mobile homes are destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller structures with

larger structures damaged by floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 feet

ASL may be flooded inland 8 miles or more.

Winds 131-155 MPH or storm surge 13-18 feet above normal. More extensive

curtainwall failures with some complete roof structure failure on small residences.

Major erosion of beach areas. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the

shore. Terrain continuously lower than 10 feet ASL may be flooded requiring massive

evacuation of residential areas inland as far as 6 miles.

Winds greater than 155 MPH or storm surge meater than 18 feet above normal.

Complete roof failure on many residences and industrial buildings. Some complete

building failures with small utility buildings blown over or away. Major damage to

lower floors of all structures located less than 15 feet ASL and within 500 yards of the

shoreline. Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground with 5-10 miles of

the shoreline may be required.

B-l
Appendix C

FUJITA TORNADO INTENSITY SCALE

Category Definition -- Effects

m Gale tornado (40-72 MPH): Light damage. Some damage to chimneys; break branches

off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees; damage sign boards.

m Moderate tornado (73-112 MPH): Moderate damas. The lower limit is the beginning

of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations

or overturned; moving autos pushed off the roads.

m Significant tornado (113-157 MPH): Considerable dama*. Roofs torn off frame

houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees snapped or uprooted;

light-object missiles generated.

Severe Tornado (153206 MPH): Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn off

well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy cars

lifted off ground and thrown.

Devastating tornado (207-260 MPH): Devastating damape. Well-constructed houses

leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off some distance; cars thrown and large

missiles generated.

Incredible tornado (261-318 MPH): Incredible dama=. Strong frame houses lifted off

foundations and carried considerable distance to disintegrate; automobile sized missiles

fly through the air in excess of 100 yards; trees debarked; incredible phenomena will

occur.

C-l
Appendix D

SLOSH MODELING

Most segments of coastline have experienced few, if any, landfalling hurricanes. Intense hurricanes

are rare. During this century, only two Category 5 hurricanes made landfall in this country -- the

1935 Labor Day Hurricane in the Florida Keys and 1969 Hurricane Camille which made landfall at

Pass Christian, Mississippi. Massive devastation occurred in each area. What could happen in an area

like Charleston from a major hurricane? How much flooding could be experienced? How far inland

would flooding extend.3 These are some of the questions that can be asked of a numerical model.

The first step of a SLOSH simulation study is to choose representative hurricanes. The climatology

of hurricanes that came within 50 nautical miles of Charleston was examined to choose representative

hurricane characteristics, directions and forward speeds. Hurricane track directions were chosen as

west, north, northwest and northeast. For each track direction, a series of parallel tracks were

determined making landfall approximately 15 to 20 miles apart along the entire coast. One forward

speed was selected for each of the track directions. For example, a 12 MPH forward speed was chosen

for hurricanes moving in a northeasterly direction. Hurricanes of Saffir-Simpson Scale Categories 1

to 5 were simulated in the study. A total of 214 hurricanes were simulated in the Charleston

simulation study.

The SLOSH model creates a large volume of data from each “forecast” of a hurricane. In order for

the model’s results to be useful and practical, the massive amounts of data generated by a simulation

run needed to be condensed. One such way is to composite the output from several similar SLOSH

runs forming one “output” or map from many individual runs. This was done by producing MEOW

maps. This composite is formed as the highest surge height at each SLOSH grid-square generated by

any of the composited runs. Typically, a MEOW is created for all runs of a given category and track

direction. For example, a MEOW is created from all northerly tracks of Category 2 moving at 20

MPH. The result is an overestimate for the flooding of any single hurricane of these characteristics

but represents the potential flooding from this type of hurricane.

The MEOW concept has proven extremely useful in evacuation planning. When evacuation decisions

need to be made -- roughly 18 to 24 hours in advance of the storm’s landfall -- the NWS’s forecast

position has an average error of roughly 100 miles. NWS cannot say with precision that, in the next

24 hours, a hurricane will strike Charleston, Savannah or Myrtle Beach. The MEOW concept now

takes on great significance. By evacuating for the MEOW, or potential flooding, the emergency

manager is relatively certain that the proper segment of coastline is evacuated.

In reality, either of two conditions is examined to determine when an evacuation should be completed:

when winds get to tropical storm force (40 mph) or when roadways become flooded. Tropical storm

force winds are typically the cutoff for moving vehicles (especially those with large cross-sections) over

bridges. The second condition -- flooding -- poses an obvious threat to vehicles moving through water.

In most instances, tropical storm force winds are encountered first.

D-l
Appendix E

Direction of Damaging (All) Winds

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*Ll.S.G.P.O:1991-281-559:40002 E-l