Service Assessment

MARCH 1, 1997, ARKANSAS

TORNADO OUTBREAK

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Silver Spring, MD
Cover: Outline of Arkansas depicting counties that had severe thunderstorm and tornado warnings issued

along with locations of fatalities. Source: Office of Meteorology. 
Service Assessment

MARCH 1, 1997, ARKANSAS 

TORNADO OUTBREAK

September 1997

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Silver Spring, MD
ii

Preface

The primary purpose of this Service Assessment is to document the National Weather Service’s

(NWS) performance in fulfilling its mission of providing timely warnings and accurate forecasts

prior to and during the tornado outbreak of March 1, 1997, in Arkansas. The NWS’s products

and services, used by emergency managers, media, and others, are key to public safety with

regard to severe weather. The warning process is a partnership between the NWS and all

organizations charged with responding to natural hazards. We in the NWS will continue to forge

and nurture these relationships to ensure the best possible warning service for our citizens. 

Robert S. Winokur

Acting Assistant Administrator

 for Weather Services

September 1997
iii

Table of Contents

Page

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Service Assessment Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Storm Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Analysis of Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Facts/Findings/Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Warnings/Predictions (includes watches, statements, forecasts, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Service Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Internal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

External . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

System/Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix A Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
iv

Acronyms

CWA County Warning Area

EAS Emergency Alert System

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

NEXRAD Next Generation Radar

NGM Nested Grid Model

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NWR NOAA Weather Radio

NWS National Weather Service

NWSFO NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office

NWWS NOAA Weather Wire Service 

OSF Operational Support Facility

PUP Principal User Processor

SPC Storm Prediction Center

SRH Southern Region Headquarters

WCM Warning Coordination Meteorologist

WSH Weather Service Headquarters

WSR-88D Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler
v

Service Assessment Team

The NWS assembled this Service Assessment Team to analyze the overall warning process and

to evaluate the services provided by the NWS to the state, county, and local governments; the

media; and the citizens of Arkansas. The team traveled to Arkansas from March 4-8, 1997,

collecting information and interviewing the NEXRAD (Next Generation Radar) Weather Service

Forecast Office (NWSFO) Little Rock staff members; state, county, and local emergency

management personnel; and other officials, media, and the public. Additional information was

collected from the Storm Prediction Center (SPC), Southern Region Headquarters (SRH),

Weather Service Headquarters (WSH) , and the NEXRAD Operational Support Facility (OSF). 

All of the information was then compiled and evaluated culminating in this report. 

The team was comprised of the following five people:

Richard A. Lane, Team Leader, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

Gary Woodall, NWS SRH, Meteorological Services Division, Fort Worth, Texas

Chris Smith, NWS SRH, Public Affairs, Fort Worth, Texas

David Neal, PhD, Director, Institute of Emergency Administration and Planning, University of

North Texas, Denton, Texas

Renee Fair, Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM), NWSFO Little Rock, Arkansas

Other valuable contributors include:

Linda S. Kremkau, Technical Editor, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

William Lerner, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

David Imy, NWS, National Centers for Environmental Prediction’s SPC, Norman, Oklahoma

Allen Lee, NWS, Meteorologist in Charge, NWSFO Little Rock, Arkansas

Joan VonAhn, Meteorologist, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland

Timothy Wugofski, Computer Specialist, WSH, Office of Meteorology, Silver Spring, Maryland
vi

Photograph of old concrete and

block building in downtown

Arkadelphia where major

destruction occurred. Flying

debris knocked holes in the walls

and wooden boards pierced the

side of the building. Courtesy of

Chris Smith, NWS Southern

Region.

Photograph of brick church in

Arkadelphia with major roof

damage and broken windows. 

This church was on the edge of 

the downtown area where major

destruction occurred. Courtesy 

of Chris Smith, NWS Southern

Region.

Substantial buildings, such as

these brick and block buildings,

were completely destroyed from

the devastating tornado that

struck within a few blocks from

downtown Arkadelphia. 

Courtesy of Chris Smith, NWS

Southern Region.
1

Service Assessment 

March 1, 1997,

Arkansas Tornado Outbreak

OVERVIEW

The devastating severe weather that occurred on March 1, 1997, in Arkansas and western

Tennessee took 26 lives, injured hundreds, and produced property damage estimated between

$115,000,000 and $120,000,000. Of the 26 fatalities, 25 perished in Arkansas and 1 was killed

in Tennessee. More than 400 people were injured in both Arkansas and Tennessee. This

Service Assessment focused on NWSFO Little Rock’s county warning area (CWA), in which

24 of the 25 Arkansas deaths and most of the injuries occurred. In addition, the bulk of the

destruction occurred in Arkansas, where property damage was estimated over $115,000,000.

STORM SUMMARY

On the afternoon of March 1, 1997, 16 tornadoes tore through Arkansas, devastating

portions of southwest, central, and northeast Arkansas (figure 1). Four of the tornadoes were

responsible for all the fatalities and most of the injuries and property damage. All of the

tornadoes were produced by four supercell thunderstorms (supercell thunderstorms are rotating

storms that are long-lived and typically go through weakening and strengthening phases), and

the four killer tornadoes were spawned by two of the supercell thunderstorms which formed

ahead of a cold front.

During the early morning hours, atmospheric conditions appeared favorable for the

formation of severe thunderstorms and potentially tornadoes. The atmosphere just above the

surface was already moderately unstable with strong southwesterly wind, increasing

significantly in strength aloft. The low-level air mass over Arkansas was warm and extremely

humid for early March, with temperatures mainly between 72 and 75 degrees at 11 a.m. and

dewpoint temperatures around 70 degrees. A line of thunderstorms developed along the cold

front as it moved into northwestern Arkansas during the morning hours. Several of these

storms produced damaging tornadoes. Another line of thunderstorms, including the two

supercell thunderstorms, developed approximately 50 miles ahead of the cold front and moved

northeast (figure 2). 

The first killer tornado produced damage along its 67 mile path. It touched down near

Hope in Hempstead County at 1:55 p.m. and moved northeast through northern Nevada

County (figure 3). It caused considerable damage in rural areas of these two counties but no
2

Figure 1. Outline of Arkansas depicting counties that had severe thunderstorm and

tornado warnings issued along with locations of fatalities and the 16 tornado tracks. 

Source: Office of Meteorology.
3

Figure 2. Cold front moving southeast is located in northwest Arkansas at 12 p.m.,

CST, March 1, 1997. Source: John Lewis, NWSFO Little Rock, Arkansas.
4

Figure 3. Tornado tracks in Arkansas depicting fatalities associated with the

tornadoes in each affected county. Source: Office of Meteorology.
5

fatalities. The tornado continued its northeast track into Clark County, where it produced F4

damage (refer to the Fujita F-scale in appendix A), six deaths, and numerous injuries in the

Arkadelphia area around 2:40 p.m. Five of the deaths occurred in town and one was in a

vehicle on Interstate 30. The tornado continued into Hot Spring County where it produced

significant damage in the Donaldson area. The tornado lifted about 4 miles east of Malvern 

around 3:10 p.m.

The second killer tornado produced a damage path 27 miles long. The same supercell

thunderstorm that produced the first killer tornado spawned this one as well. The tornado

touched down 3 miles southeast of Benton in Saline County around 3:25 p.m. and moved

northeast as it strengthened (figure 3). This tornado was the largest of the day, with a path

width of 8/10 of a mile and numerous areas of F4 damage. Ten fatalities occurred in Saline

County, mostly in the Chicot, Vimy Ridge, Oak Ridge, and Shannon Hills areas. The tornado

continued into southern Pulaski County at approximately 3:35 p.m. It produced F2 and F3

damage and five deaths in the College Station area just south of Little Rock. The tornado

moved into Little Rock around 3:40 p.m. and lifted along I-440 about 4 miles east of Little

Rock. 

The third killer tornado produced a damage path 75 miles long (figure 4). It first

touched down at 3:15 p.m., 10 miles northeast of Searcy in White County, and moved

northeast as it strengthened. The tornado moved quickly into Jackson County, crossing

highway 167 about 3 miles south of Denmark (between Velvet Ridge and Denmark) where it

produced F2 damage. Two people who had fled their mobile home for shelter in a ditch were

killed by a tree falling on them. The mobile home they had been in was also demolished. 

The tornado continued moving northeast, producing F1 and F2 damage along the way. As it

moved through the Jacksonport area at 3:43 p.m., another person was killed in a mobile

home. The tornado continued to produce F1 and F2 damage as it moved through Craighead

County, passing near Egypt, about 10 miles northwest of Jonesboro at 4:15 p.m. It continued

on its northeast track, passed through the southeast part of Lawrence into Greene County, and

lifted about 18 miles northeast of Paragould.

The fourth killer tornado touched down in the northeast part of Greene County and was

spawned by the same thunderstorm that produced killer tornado number three. This tornado

moved northeast for approximately 20 miles through northeastern Greene County and

southeast Clay County (figure 4). The tornado moved through the center of Marmaduke,

where it produced F3 damage and killed one person. The tornado continued northeast and

lifted near Rector in Clay County.

 All locations where the deaths and most of the injuries occurred were covered by

tornado warnings with lead times of 9 to 28 minutes.
6

Figure 4. Tornado tracks in Arkansas depicting fatalities associated with the

tornadoes in each affected county. Source: Office of Meteorology.
7

ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

Indications of potential severe weather on Saturday, March 1, 1997, came early to NWS

forecasters as well as to media weathercasters in Arkansas. The NWS’s SPC issued its

Convective Outlook and Second Day Severe Storms Outlook products at approximately

12:08 a.m. CST, Friday, February 28. The Day 1 forecast, which covered the period from 

6 a.m. CST, Friday, February 28, to 6 a.m. CST, Saturday, March 1, indicated a slight risk for

severe weather in Arkansas. A moderate risk for severe weather was forecast for much of

Arkansas in the Day 2 product which covered the period from 6 a.m. CST, Saturday, March

1, to 6 a.m. CST, Sunday, March 2. Subsequent updates from SPC maintained this general

forecast. All the Outlooks discussed a higher probability of tornadoes over the area where the

bulk of the subsequent fatalities, injuries, and property damage occurred. SPC issued a

Mesoscale Discussion at 8 a.m. CST, Saturday morning, which highlighted increasing

atmospheric shear and instability over portions of Arkansas. Tornado Watch No. 75 was

issued at 11:34 a.m. CST, which covered western and central portions of Arkansas in

addition to portions of several other states, approximately 2 1⁄2 hours before the first tornado

occurred.

NWSFO Little Rock forecasters were well aware of the potential for severe weather on

March 1, based on the SPC guidance as well as numerical model data on Friday and

Saturday. In addition, the public forecaster used local atmospheric diagnostic tools to give as

clear a picture as possible of the small-scale features which would influence the atmosphere

over Arkansas that Saturday.

All available observational tools were used by the Little Rock forecasters. Prior to and

during the early development stages of the storm system, satellite imagery was very useful in

observing and analyzing larger mesoscale and synoptic-scale features. The Wind Profiler at

DeQueen in southwestern Arkansas was also valuable in observing the evolution of the

vertical wind pattern over Arkansas. Once the storm system had developed, the Weather

Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) at NWSFO Little Rock was used exclusively

and was considered by forecasters the most valuable tool. All of the warnings issued were

based on radar data. Due to intermittent problems with a component of the receiver chain,

which affected reflectivity products, the radar reflectivity display only occasionally indicated

intensities typical of supercell storms. However, the velocity display, not affected by the

attenuator problem, did an excellent job of detecting storm-scale areas of rotation. Other

important factors included the use of innovative Principal User Processor (PUP) color

schemes, severe weather staffing, and staff training.

Trained storm spotters played a vital role during the entire severe weather event. Storm

information flowed from the spotters to the NWSFO and visa versa. The confirmation of

severity received from spotters in Arkadelphia influenced the Little Rock staff’s warning

decisions for the remainder of the event. One side benefit from this was that many people in

rural communities listen to the “ham network” as well as law and fire agencies on scanners

during times of threatening weather to get the latest information regarding their area. 
8

From 12:04 p.m. to 6:52 p.m., NWSFO Little Rock issued 57 severe weather

warnings—34 were tornado warnings and 23 severe thunderstorm warnings. In addition,

flash flood warnings, numerous statements, and short-term forecasts (Nowcasts) were

issued. The most active time occurred between 2:04 p.m. and 3:54 p.m., when 14 tornado

warnings and 2 severe thunderstorm warnings were issued. This averages one warning

product approximately every 5 minutes. All severe weather events occurred in areas

covered by the tornado watch and nearly all were under warnings. The average warning

lead time for all events was 18 minutes. For the four counties in the Little Rock CWA

where the 24 deaths and the bulk of the injuries occurred, tornado warning lead times

ranged from 6 to 20 minutes. However, lead times for tornado warnings for the

communities within these counties where all the deaths and the majority of the injuries

occurred was 9 to 28 minutes. The other death in Arkansas occurred in Greene County

which is in the NWSFO Memphis CWA. NWSFO Memphis issued a tornado warning 7

minutes before the tornado touched down in Greene County and 22 minutes prior to the

tornado striking Marmaduke where the fatality and five injuries occurred.

All indications are that NWSFO Little Rock provided excellent service to their CWA

in Arkansas. The media; state, county, and local government agencies; and the entire

emergency management community credited the timely warnings from the NWS with

saving many lives. The NWS’s direct warning process worked well as did the overall

warning process. Media broadcasters provided constant updates to the public with the

latest information available. Sirens were sounded in a timely manner in areas where they

existed. The tornado warning provided such a long lead time to Clark County that the

sirens were sounded a second time, and continuously, when the tornado was sighted as it

bore down on Arkadelphia. Sirens were sounded in Pulaski County when the warning was

received, and even though the College Station community did not have a siren, residents

heard the sirens from Little Rock, about 1 1⁄2 miles away, 15 to 20 minutes prior to the

tornado arriving in College Station.

Three potential problem areas have been identified within the overall warning system. 

First, an apparent problem with the Emergency Alert System (EAS) was identified in the

areas south of Little Rock. Broadcasters indicated that they did not get EAS information in

Clark and Saline Counties. Reasons for this are unclear; however, potential areas of failure

exist with the transmitters, receivers, and programming of equipment at the receiving

stations. Second, although there was no failure of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) Weather Wire Service (NWWS) provided by GTE to customers

during the event, it was noted by the media and the state government customers that the

system had failed earlier that morning. They indicated that they frequently have this

problem and have to call the company to get their systems restarted. There is no alert

which indicates a problem, and the only way they have of knowing that the system has

stopped is to physically check it. Third, even though long lead-time warnings were given,

and an active severe weather education effort has existed in Arkansas for many years,

numerous residents still did not respond properly to the warnings. These areas are

addressed in the findings and recommendations section.
9

This photograph shows the tornado damage in the Vimy Ridge area of Saline County. All of the homes

were damaged and nearly all of the mobile homes and frame houses were destroyed. Pictured is a

destroyed home with only a chimney and parts of two walls remaining. Courtesy of Chris Smith, NWS

Southern Region.
10

This photograph shows a broad view of the tornado destruction in a section of College

Station, Arkansas. Courtesy of Chris Smith, NWS Southern Region.

Following the devastating tornado at College Station in Pulaski County, a cleanup crew

works on this home across the street from the church where 20 to 30 people were holding

choir practice when the tornado struck. None of the people in the church were injured. 

Courtesy of Chris Smith, NWS Southern Region.
11

Facts/Findings/Recommendations

OBSERVATIONS

Fact 1: NWSFO Little Rock used Micro-SWIS to view and interpret

satellite data and found it very useful in observing important cloud

features as they developed and moved into and across portions of

Arkansas. Satellite data was of limited value once severe weather

began in Arkansas. 

Fact 2: Wind Profiler data, from DeQueen, Arkansas, was used to evaluate

the vertical wind profile over Arkansas during the morning and to

observe the evolution of the vertical wind pattern preceding and

during the severe weather episode. The SPC used Wind Profiler

data from DeQueen and Okolona, in northeast Mississippi, in

combination with WSR-88D wind profile information from radars

in several states to assess the three dimensional wind field. This

aided them in determining that a tornado watch would be

necessary. 

Fact 3: Confirmation of the massive destruction, fatalities, and injuries

from spotters in and near Arkadelphia influenced the forecasters’

warning decisions for the remainder of the severe weather episode. 

Forecasters issued tornadoes warnings based on similar radar

signatures throughout the afternoon. Forecasters continued to rely

on spotter reports for ground truth verification that warning

decisions based on radar data were correct.

Fact 4: NWSFO Little Rock used WSR-88D data as the primary tool for

examining and interpreting atmospheric conditions and issuing

warnings based on the information provided by the radar. 

Although reflectivity data only occasionally showed supercell

indications, velocity data combined with innovative PUP color

schemes did an excellent job of detecting storm-scale rotations. 

GUIDANCE

Fact 5: Although all of the numerical models were in good agreement, the

Nested Grid Model (NGM) output provided the best information to

the Little Rock forecasters regarding potential for severe weather a

day in advance as well as the day of the outbreak. The NGM and

guidance products from SPC enabled the forecasters to include
12

severe thunderstorms in their forecasts for March 1 in the Friday

afternoon, February 28, and Saturday, March 1, zone forecasts.

Fact 6: The SPC found the ETA model most valuable in developing their

products. The SPC provided outstanding guidance in their

convective weather outlook, severe weather outlook, and

mesoscale discussion products. The outlooks from Friday,

February 28, and Saturday, March 1, both provided advanced

information regarding the potential for severe weather to NWS and

private forecasters. The outlooks discussed the probability of

stronger tornadoes over the area where the bulk of the subsequent

fatalities, injuries, and property damage occurred. A mesoscale

discussion was issued at 8 a.m., Saturday, March 1, indicated that

atmospheric shear and instability were ripe for severe

thunderstorms to develop in the next few hours. The SPC issued a

tornado watch at 11:34 a.m., 2 1⁄2 hours prior to the first severe

weather occurrence.

WARNINGS/PREDICTIONS (includes watches, statements,

forecasts, etc.)

Fact 7: The potential of severe weather occurrence in Arkansas was

advertised well in advance. The SPC had forecast the risk of

severe weather the day before with the early morning release of the

Convective Outlook and Severe Weather Outlook for Day 2 on

Friday, February 28.

Fact 8: The SPC issued Tornado watch No. 75 for western and central

Arkansas at 11:34 a.m., more than 2 1⁄2 hours prior to the first

occurrence of severe weather in Arkansas. Gary Jones of the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VI

Headquarters stated that the watches issued by the SPC enabled

FEMA to place many assets on standby in preparation for the

potential catastrophic tornadoes that affected the area. FEMA

immediately opened lines of communication with the state

Emergency Operations Center, enabling FEMA to deploy an

advanced team to the stricken area within hours of the event.

Fact 9: Prior to the development of the severe thunderstorms, NWSFO

Little Rock issued Special Weather Statements and a summary

alerting the public to the potential of severe weather. The Special

Weather Statements, issued at 10 a.m. and 12:05 p.m., and the

11:25 a.m. Arkansas Area Weather Summary, indicated that severe
13

thunderstorms would produce large hail, damaging wind, and

isolated tornadoes. These statements also urged people to stay

informed of developing weather and to stay tuned to media for the

issuance of watches, warnings, and other statements.

Fact 10: NWSFO Little Rock issued a county redefining statement (a

companion statement to the SPC Tornado Watch No. 75) at

approximately 11:40 a.m.

Fact 11: NWSFO Little Rock issued 57 county warnings for severe

thunderstorms and tornadoes, 34 of which were tornado warnings. 

Average lead time for all warnings was 18 minutes. Lead times for

tornado warnings ranged from 6 to 20 minutes for all five Arkansas

counties in which the 25 deaths and nearly all of the injuries

occurred. However, lead times for tornado warnings for the

communities within these counties where all the deaths and the

majority of the injuries occurred was 9 to 28 minutes. This

includes the warning issued by NWSFO Memphis for Greene

County.

SERVICE COORDINATION 

Internal

Fact 12: The potential for severe weather later that day and the resultant

staffing needs were discussed by NWSFO Little Rock staff during

the morning. This enabled them to arrange for extra people to be

on duty to handle the WSR-88D PUP and other duties throughout

the expected time of the event.

Fact 13: Several phone conversations between SPC and Little Rock were

held to discuss the potential for severe weather development and

the formation of tornadoes. This contributed to the preparations

for additional staffing made by the NWSFO in advance of the

tornado outbreak. Other coordination calls were held to discuss the

issuance of the two tornado watches that affected Arkansas that

day.

Fact 14: NWSFOs Little Rock and Memphis discussed the severe weather

threat as the storms were moving from the Little Rock CWA

toward the Memphis CWA portion of northeastern Arkansas. This

helped the NWSFO Memphis staff make decisions, regarding type

and timing of warnings they issued.
14

External

Fact 15: A long-term relationship between the NWS and local media

weathercasters, which included frequent informal contacts, led to a

very good working relationship between the media, in general, and

the NWS. This strengthened and enhanced the warning process. 

Because of the trust established by this close working relationship,

the media broadcast NWS information very quickly and stressed

the messages’ importance to their listeners and viewers.

Fact 16: Little Rock forecasters discussed the severe weather threat with the

Arkansas WeatherNet, Inc. Group and asked that the spotter (Ham

radio) network be activated upon issuance of the watch 3 to 4 hours

before severe weather started occurring in NWSFO Little Rock’s

CWA. Arkansas WeatherNet personnel came into the office to

operate the Ham radio equipment and to maintain a flow of

information to and from the NWS office.

Fact 17: Little Rock staff made phone calls and used the National Warning

System to inform the emergency operations personnel and the

Adams Field Airport personnel in Pulaski County, regarding the

expected tornado path through the county. These direct contacts

resulted in tornado sirens being activated immediately and

ultimately saved many lives.

DISSEMINATION

Finding A: Cable viewers watching “out of region” stations were more likely

to not see or hear warnings since local cable providers either do not

use or have override for non-local channels.

Recommendation A: Cable providers should have and use the cable override feature to

ensure that all of their viewers are made aware of impending

danger.

Finding B: In at least one instance, the sirens were sounded when the warning

was received. The siren was sounded again when the tornado was

spotted. However, this may have been confusing to some residents

because during tornado drills the second siren blast indicates an

“all clear” signal.
15

Recommendation B: The NWS WCMs should work with emergency managers,

regarding the methods used to alert the public and make

recommendations that will help avoid confusion during

emergencies.

Finding C: The EAS system reportedly worked quite well in a number of

locations, primarily in Little Rock and areas north. Several radio

stations south of Little Rock reported that the EAS system did not

work. Media outlets affected by the EAS problems had other

means of receiving NWSFO Little Rock’s warnings, thus no direct

connection can be found between EAS problems and any loss of

life or injuries.

Recommendation C: Little Rock transmitters, frequencies, and procedures should be

inspected to ensure the EAS signals are being transmitted properly. 

Little Rock staff should work with broadcasters to ensure that their

receivers are properly tuned and programmed to receive NWS

warning products.

Finding D: Although not a factor in this event, several users noted problems

with their NWWS downlinks earlier in the morning prior to the

severe weather outbreak. There is no alarm on the system to alert

the customer that the system has failed, thus if it fails, no data will

be received until discovered by an employee. When these failures

occur, customers must contact the NWWS contractor and ask to

have their downlink unit reconfigured in order to have service

restored. Reportedly, this happens several times each week, and

one customer stated that it was nearly a daily occurrence. This

instability problem could have had disastrous consequences had the

downlinks failed during the event. To compound the problem,

most of the customers normally have smaller and less-experienced

weekend staffs.

Recommendation D: NWS should work with the NWWS contractor to address the

stability issue.

Fact 18: The strongest link in the warning process was between the NWS

and various other public agencies (e.g., emergency managers,

Arkansas Crime Information Center, which distributes information

to 650 Law Enforcement and Fire department workstations across

the state), and the media (e.g., TV, radio). The weakest link of the

warning process was between local warning components (e.g.,

sirens, TV messages, radio messages) and the public (receipt of or

reaction to warnings).
16

Fact 19: In general, it was shown that many people felt that sirens were an

effective tool in the warning system. Many people in areas without

sirens felt that having sirens would have improved the warning

system in terms of getting the information to more local residents.

Fact 20: Radio and TV station representatives stated that they found the

NWS warnings timely, helpful, and effective. The media obtain

their information from a variety of sources, and many rely on more

than one source. NWWS was the most widely used among TV and

larger radio stations. Smaller market radio stations rely on a wider

variety of sources, including EAS, NOAA Weather Radio (NWR),

The Weather Channel, Data Transmission Network, AP Wire

Services, and local TV stations’ broadcasts.

RESPONSE

Finding E: The long lead time of warnings created problems with some

people’s perception of the threat. The lack of immediate visual

confirmation were misinterpreted by many people, and they did not

respond immediately to the warnings. Examples: In a College

Station church, a woman in choir practice heard the sirens, went to

the door, and looked out. It was still bright outside so the choir

continued to practice. About 15 minutes later her son informed

them that debris was falling outside, and it was very dark and

windy. They all took shelter in the back of the church. There were

several reports of people hearing the warnings and driving to a

relative’s home, arriving just seconds before the tornado.

Recommendation E: With improved warning capability and the resultant increase in

warning lead time, the NWS must undertake a study to determine

the most effective method of conveying threat information to the

public to ensure an effective and timely response.

Finding F: SPC's forecast of possible severe weather the day before assisted

the emergency management community in contingency planning

although not all media outlets made effective use of the

information.

Recommendation F: WCMs should take the necessary steps to apprise the office’s

partners in the warning process of the utility of the outlook

products.
17

Fact 21: Mobile homes continue to be a very hazardous place to remain

during severe weather events. Of the 25 Arkansas deaths, 14 (56

percent) were in mobile homes. Four people (16 percent) were

killed in single dwelling houses, while 3 persons (12 percent) were

killed in non-residential buildings. Two fatalities (8 percent)

occurred in vehicles, and 2 (8 percent) occurred outdoors.

Fact 22: The day of the week (Saturday) and time of day (early afternoon)

can make people more vulnerable to receiving warnings through

radio or TV due to varied activities.

PREPAREDNESS

Fact 23: Little Rock maintains a very pro-active outreach program. A

Severe Weather Awareness Week is held annually with state and

county government organizations being active participants. The

Governor has issued public proclamations, regarding Severe

Weather Awareness Week, for the past 24 years in coordination

with the NWS. Little Rock has been very active in storm spotter

recruiting and training. The four counties where the deaths and

injuries occurred have had 1 to 2 spotter training sessions within

one year of this major event.

SYSTEM/INFRASTRUCTURE

Finding G: NWSFO Little Rock has developed two velocity color schemes

which were very effective and enabled forecasters to quickly pick

out the strongest velocity couplets. The “normal” and “gray” color

scales use bright colors to highlight the approximate velocity

criteria for tornadic mesocyclones and minimal mesocyclones,

respectively.

Recommendation G: NWS Regions and the OSF should encourage Weather Forecast

Offices to develop alternate color schemes that will make

identification of important features easier to identify for most staff

members than the preset color schemes. 

Finding H: Transmission of warnings on NWR was a laborious task. The

Little Rock NWR operator broadcast 31 warnings, requiring 39

separate transmissions from 12 noon to 5 p.m. Multiple

transmissions were necessary because several warnings needed to

be broadcast on two or more transmitters. Although the NWR
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operator was experienced, it took 2 to 3 minutes to complete each

transmission (it typically takes 2 1⁄2 minutes per recording). During

a period from 2:04 p.m. to 3:54 p.m., a total of 16 warnings were

issued, requiring 23 individual transmissions. The NWR operator

remained in the NWR room throughout this time with a perpetual

backlog of three warnings awaiting transmission.

Recommendation H: Work in progress to streamline some of the NWR Specific Area

Message Encoding functions should be accelerated. The Console

Replacement System deployment strategy should be reevaluated to

ensure that severe weather-prone areas (hurricane, tornado, etc.)

are among the earliest systems deployed.
A-1

Appendix A

Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale

Category Definition-Effective

(F0) Gale tornado (40-72 mph): Light damage. Some damage to

chimneys; break branches off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees;

damage sign boards.

(F1) Moderate tornado (73-112 mph): Moderate damage. The lower limit

is the beginning of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile

homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos pushed off

the roads.

(F2) Significant tornado (113-157 mph): Considerable damage. Roofs

torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over;

large trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated.

(F3) Severe tornado (158-206 mph): Severe damage. Roofs and some

walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in

forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off ground and thrown.

(F4) Devastating tornado (207-260 mph): Devastating damage. Wellconstructed houses leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off

some distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.

(F5) Incredible tornado (261-318 mph): Incredible damage. Strong frame

houses lifted off foundations and carried considerable distance to

disintegrate; automobile sized missiles fly through the air in excess of

100 yards; trees debarked; incredible phenomena will occur.