JSOU Report 09-3 Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

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JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

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men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

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JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

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Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon, U.S. Air Force, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force 

SOF Chair, Naval Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow
On the cover. A U.S. Special Forces soldier conducts Security Assistance 

Training for members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in March 

2003, on the Zamboanga Peninsula of the Philippine Island of Mindanao. 

This training—to help Philippine forces refine their counterterrorism 

capabilities—was provided as part of Operation Enduring FreedomPhilippines (OEF-P). U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer First Class Edward 

G. Martens. 

JSOU Report 09-3

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2009

Contemporary

Security Challenges:

Irregular Warfare and

Indirect Approaches

Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-31-8
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise, December 2006, 

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community, January 2007, 

Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Nortern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency, 

October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing 

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line, 

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 
vii

Contents

Foreword................................................................................ix

James D. Anderson

The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare ............................................. 1

Richard D. Newton

Expanding the American Way of War: Working “Through, 

With, or By” Non-U.S. Actors .............................................. 19

Travis L. Homiak

Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century ............................... 39

Kelly H. Smith

Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces..... 55

Isaac J. Peltier

Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare ....................................... 85

D. Jonathan White

ix

Foreword

The JSOU Press presents this collection of writings from five current 

and former practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. The writers 

delve into the concept of surrogate warfare, defined as a substitute 

force acting on behalf of the interests of another as well as its own interests. 

For many special operators, the concept of unconventional warfare provides 

the paradigm for working “through, with, or by” other forces to achieve strategic objectives. Here the authors expand the concept by exploring “surrogate 

warfare.” This volume provides insights into this aspect of modern warfare 

and should be considered by senior military leaders and policymakers. 

Drawing upon their recent experiences in the field, the authors provide 

practical lessons for their colleagues’ consideration.

The first offering in this collection was contributed by Mr. Richard 

Newton, a JSOU faculty member and a retired air commando. Mr. Newton 

outlines the increased use and ramifications of indirect approaches, made 

essential by the post-World War II rise of the two superpowers, the United 

States and the former Soviet Union. His account of three 20th century uses 

of the through, with, or by concept (Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan) makes clear that this type of conflict is often strategically pragmatic 

and effective at achieving U.S. as well as host national objectives. 

Major Travis Homiak, U.S. Marine Corps, defines the ideas of working 

through, with, or by surrogate forces to achieve national security objectives. 

He offers three historical examples to illustrate the added value of indirect 

approaches, including the nonpromotion of “hegemonic intent.” Major 

Homiak posits that the “through, with, or by” principles are critical to U.S. 

SOF, but applicable to conventional forces as well. 

Major Kelly Smith, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, provides an 

analysis of surrogate warfare, mandating changes in policy and doctrine 

to include “comprehensive guidance” from the U.S. government to develop 

and employ this capability. MAJ Smith outlines several advantages to the use 

of surrogates, including decreased demand on U.S. forces, gaining political 

legitimacy, and providing capabilities that U.S. forces lack. He also highlights 

the benefits of a “holistic approach,” including conventional forces’ linkage 

to surrogates as well as SOF. Smith offers finite methods to integrating these 

concepts into U.S. policy and doctrine. 
x

Major Isaac Peltier, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, examines in detail 

two recent historical operations, illustrating success in leveraging surrogate forces. His position is Army Special Forces-centric and concludes that 

cultural/regional expertise, not familiarity, was the single most important 

factor in these successes. MAJ Peltier also calls for improvements in the 

ability of U.S. SOF to establish and function as an operational-level joint 

headquarters in order to plan, execute, and support an unconventional 

warfare campaign. 

Mr. D. Jonathan White, a retired Special Forces officer, discusses many 

salient points of surrogate warfare, including legitimacy of allied regimes, 

commonality of interests between the United States and host nations, and the 

effects of human rights considerations on the legitimacy of the relationships 

involved. The “cautionary notes” Mr. White examines in this essay must be 

analyzed by any prudent planner regarding surrogate warfare operations. 

American military forces have served alongside host-nation forces 

throughout history and across the globe. The surrogate relationships forged 

are critical to the continued defense against modern threats, and the points 

put forth in this volume will contribute to operational and strategic successes 

in future campaigns. These writings all amplify the need for developing and 

refining expertise in the use of surrogate forces in modern warfare. I believe 

the military professional will benefit from reading and understanding the 

various opinions offered in this volume.

James D. Anderson, Director of Research

JSOU Strategic Studies Department
1

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

Richard D. Newton

The tenets of surrogate warfare as described in the following essays 

by Majors Peltier, Smith, and Homiak—advising, assisting, and training indigenous forces in order to achieve the sponsor’s goals—

were developed, tested, and perfected during the U.S.-Soviet Union 

proxy wars of the Cold War. This essay examines three of those conflicts: Philippines from 1947–1952, El Salvador from 1977–1989, and 

Afghanistan from 1979–1989. They serve as examples of combat 

development laboratories where the principals of “through, with, 

or by” were perfected—principles that a new generation of SOF 

leaders would apply to surrogate warfare in the 21st century. 

Introduction

I

n July of 1969, President Richard Nixon articulated a new approach to 

U.S. national security objectives. As a newly elected president who had 

inherited an unpopular war, President Nixon’s vision was to pursue 

American national security goals through partnership with friends and 

allies of the United States. That announcement, afterwards known as the 

Nixon Doctrine, affirmed to the world that the United States would keep 

all of its treaty commitments and in the case of aggression short of nuclear 

confrontation, the U.S. would furnish military and economic assistance but 

would look to the host nations to assume the primary responsibility for furnishing the manpower to defend themselves.1

 The Nixon Doctrine, allowing 

advice and assistance, but eschewing direct military involvement, has been 

reaffirmed by every U.S. President since, albeit to differing degrees. More 

importantly for the purpose of this volume, however, Nixon’s 40-year-old 

pronouncement provided the policy basis for modern surrogate warfare.

Mr. Rick Newton retired from Air Force Special Operations Command in 

1999 after 21 years as an air commando and combat rescue pilot. He is 

currently a faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University and 

serves as an adjunct faculty member at the U.S. Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies and the NATO School. 
2

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Throughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union 

used a collection of surrogates to further their political, and by extension 

their military, agendas around the world. In an era of mutual nuclear deterrence, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union chose to support surrogates in 

a series of proxy wars. Over 50 years of indirect confrontation between 

the superpowers manifested itself in scores of limited conflicts in Africa, 

the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central America, and South 

America.2 The Soviets and the U.S. confronted each other for influence 

and access on the periphery of what both considered the main arena—the 

central plains of Europe. The unexpected (perhaps unintended) result of 

five decades of indirect superpower confrontation was that U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) developed the skills, attitude, and ethos they 

later needed for the very successful surrogate warfare campaigns waged in 

Afghanistan (2001) and northern Iraq (2003).

The seeds to modern surrogate warfare, at least in the U.S. version, go all 

the way back to before the Revolutionary War. The Special Forces’ philosophy of conducting operations “through, with, or by” indigenous populations 

has its origins in the beginning of the Republic.3 Both the British and the 

French enlisted native American surrogates in their frontier battles of the 

17th and 18th centuries. During the westward expansion before and after 

the Civil War, the Army recruited or coerced Indians to fight against those 

Indians who opposed the settlers, ranchers, and miners moving west. In 

1901, after the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Army organized friendly 

Filipinos into the Philippine Constabulary to fight and pacify the indigenous 

groups opposed to the U.S. occupation. Throughout World War II, the U.S.

Army Office of Special Services, the forerunner to today’s Special Forces 

and the Central Intelligence Agency, used surrogates in Southeast Asia to 

fight against the Japanese and in Europe to fight against the Axis powers. 

It was only natural, then, for the U.S. to continue using native surrogates 

during the Cold War to counter Soviet aspirations.

After the Allied victory in World War II many former European colonies 

in Asia and Africa saw an opportunity to assert their native nationalism and 

gain independence from the colonial powers. The Soviet Union used these 

independence movements as opportunities to export the Communist form 

of socialism and to gain international supporters as a counter to the U.S. and 

its European allies. The U.S., flush with victory but tired after years of war, 

sought a low cost means of supporting its treaty commitments, assisting its 
3

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

allies, and countering the spread of Communism. As the U.S. government 

provided equipment and funds, training indigenous forces and advising 

friendly foreign governments and their armed forces became the Special 

Forces raison d’être. 

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force retained their organizational, training, procurement, and planning efforts to a near-exclusive focus on peer 

versus peer, conventional warfare.4 Both the Army and Air Force left the 

uncomfortable and often “messy” environment of limited warfare, guerrilla 

warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterrevolutionary warfare, and irregular warfare to their respective SOF.

5,6

This division of labor was not necessarily a bad thing. While the “big 

green” Army and the “big blue” Air Force focused on what the national 

leadership perceived to be the most dangerous threat to the U.S. national 

survival—deterring direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, SOF conducted economy-of-force activities on the periphery of the main arena. For 

over five decades, the U.S. Army Special Forces, and to a lesser extent, the 

Air Commandos of the U.S. Air Force, quietly practiced and perfected the 

regional, cultural, diplomatic, and trainer skills so necessary for success in 

surrogate warfare. Their quiet efforts in the far-flung regions of the world 

bred a cadre of special operators comfortable with surrogate warfare, away 

from the comfortable and robust infrastructure of the conventional Army 

and Air Force based primarily in central Europe.

Although these “low intensity conflicts” 7 were the most prevalent form of 

conflict the United States engaged in during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, they 

were decidedly an economy-of-force effort. Small SOF teams would deploy 

for months at a time to remote 

locations; their focus was to train, 

assist, and advise the indigenous 

forces and governments that 

supported U.S. national goals. In 

addition to the small-unit tactical 

skills they employed and taught 

their hosts, Special Forces training included a healthy dose of regional familiarity, local languages, cultural acumen, and instructor development. A Special Forces soldier had to 

become part anthropologist, part diplomat, part organizational developer, 

and part cultural attaché as well as being an excellent soldier and trainer. 

Small SOF teams would deploy for 

months at a time to remote locations; 

their focus was to train, assist, and 

advise the indigenous forces and 

governments that supported U.S. 

national goals. 
4

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Operating embedded with or alongside their native hosts around the world, 

the Special Forces became this nation’s principal tool to recruit, organize, 

train, and lead surrogate forces sympathetic to U.S. national interests. 

The Special Forces operational methodology—embedding with their 

host-nation counterparts, speaking the hosts’ languages, and using the hosts’ 

equipment—proved to be relatively inexpensive for the United States to 

sustain, kept the American presence to a minimum in areas that may have 

political aversion to foreign involvement, and improved the ability of the 

host forces to provide for their nations’ defenses. In return, U.S. Special 

Forces gained tactical skills related to the native environment (e.g., jungle 

warfare or desert warfare) they were able to bring home and teach to their 

U.S. counterparts. The lessons learned in scores of anti-Communist campaigns around the world were applied with great success during the unconventional warfare campaigns in Afghanistan (2001) and in northern Iraq 

(2003). The seeds of 21st century surrogate warfare were sown during those 

five decades of anti-Soviet experiences and cultivated to maturity by the 

Special Forces core purpose and core values—accomplishing their assigned 

missions through, with, or by indigenous forces.8

The Philippines, 1946–1954

By 1942, the Hukbalahap (People’s Anti-Japanese Army in Tagalog, nicknamed the Huks)—the military arm of the Communist Philippines Party 

(PKP)—was actively attacking Japanese outposts and units in Luzon to gain 

weapons and supplies. Americans who had refused General MacArthur’s 

surrender order and took to the hills helped the Huks organize their units, 

set up training camps, and served as advisors to the tactical units fighting 

a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. When MacArthur and the U.S.

Sixth Army landed on Luzon, they met a large, highly organized indigenous military force led by U.S. advisors. The 20,000 Filipino guerrillas 

had effectively contained the Japanese to a series of coastal forts—thereby 

providing a safe and secure, anti-Japanese environment for the populace.9

The PKP, meanwhile redistributed lands from absent large landowners to 

the peasants, set up schools, and formed local governments to manage the 

villages.10

After the war, when the government of the Philippines returned 

from exile, it failed to address the single greatest issue plaguing Filipino 
5

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

society—land reform.11 When the government, the wealthy landowners, 

and the industrialists returned after the war, they reasserted their historical 

claims to the land and returned to the 400-year-old plantation and tenant 

farming system that had been originally set up by the Spanish and maintained by the Americans and then the Filipino oligarchy. It was an unfair 

system that gave the PKP and the Huks the cause they needed, “land for the 

landless,” to oppose the government.12

The Huks did not initially oppose the return of the popular and powerful American military. Also, the Truman Administration had committed 

to Filipino independence and was pumping reconstruction aid into the 

islands. This quiet period gave the PKP time to organize itself and gain 

control of the many disparate socialist and Communist groups throughout 

the Philippine archipelago. The PKP, with Chinese and Soviet assistance, 

reoriented itself against the pro-Western government of President Manuel 

Roxas and began a Maoist-style, protracted popular war to take over the 

country. From 1946 to 1949, the Philippine government’s “mailed fist” tactics and heavy handed anti-Huk policies failed to address the root causes of 

the insurgency and drove many disaffected peasants into the ranks of the 

insurgents.13 Philippine Army leaders and their American advisors fighting 

against the Huks noted the success of the Huks’ integrated civil-military 

programs, but their reports were ignored by conventional military leaders 

who had been trained to fight against other organized armies in Western 

staff schools and were focused exclusively on a military solution.14

President Roxas was succeeded by President Elpidio Quirino. He recognized that a new strategy was needed to counter the Huks and in 1949 began 

a series of financial and land reforms. President Quirino appointed a new 

secretary for national defense in 1950, Ramon Magsaysay, a gifted and charismatic former guerrilla leader who had fought against the Japanese with 

the U.S. Army Forces Far East, to lead the security effort. Also in 1950, the 

U.S. recognized how close the Filipino government was to collapse. President 

Truman committed the United States to support the Philippines’ efforts 

against the Communist-supported Huks. The Joint U.S. Military Advisory 

Group (JUSMAG) Philippines was expanded, and aid and assistance began 

to flow. In addition to money, equipment, and training, American advisors helped the Philippine government develop a comprehensive assistance 

program to complement the military, political, and social reforms being 

instituted by Magsaysay.15
6

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Almost immediately after assuming his duties, Magsaysay began an 

intense effort to reform the Army of the Philippines, weeding out corrupt 

or inept senior leaders, demanding accountability for human rights abuses, 

and promoting officers who supported his views on winning the support 

of the populace. Magsaysay was tireless in his efforts to change the people’s 

perception of the Philippine Army and National Police, spurred in part 

by his close friend and advisor, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Edward 

Lansdale. 

Lt Col Lansdale led the American program to assist Magsaysay. It is 

interesting to note that U.S. efforts in the Philippines were constrained by 

some very fortunate circumstances. First, the U.S. military was committed 

to the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and also to the war in Korea. 

There were no conventional U.S. Army units available for a counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines. Second, all arms and materiel given to the 

Filipinos were taken from excess World War II stocks—the weapons were 

familiar to the Filipinos, the arms and ammunition were plentiful and were 

essentially free, and they were fairly easy to maintain. And third, Lansdale’s 

leadership style and close friendship with Ramon Magsaysay encouraged 

the Filipinos to take responsibility for the success or failure of their war 

against the Huks. 

The American advisors in the Philippines, from the battalion level to 

President Magsaysay, advised their counterparts on counterguerrilla tactics 

and encouraged them to form local solutions. During an interview after he 

had retired from the Air Force, Lansdale noted that, “the Filipinos best knew 

the problems, best knew how to solve them, and they did it—with U.S. aid 

and advice, but without U.S. domination of their effort.” 16 American advisors were instructed to take a back seat and give their Filipino counterparts 

credit for successes. 

U.S. military trainers began teaching patrolling skills, especially night 

patrolling, squad and platoon tactics off the main lines of communications, and the same hit-and-run tactics used by the Huk guerrillas.17 More 

important than teaching tactics, U.S. trainers imparted Magsaysay’s passion for improving the Army’s treatment of the civilian population, and 

they helped reorganize the Army of the Philippines (AFP) into lighter and 

more mobile battalion combat teams. They also built a functioning logistics 

system to sustain the units and equipment.18 U.S. trainers were prohibited 

from accompanying AFP units as advisors and observers during combat 
7

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

operations, however. The thought was that the Americans would take over 

or be thrust into a de facto leadership role at the tactical level and the Huks 

would turn the presence of the Americans against the government by advertising their cause as a fight to expel another foreign occupier. Despite the 

advisors’ desire to get into the field with their units, at the strategic level, 

this restriction proved to be sound. 

In 1953, though, an important change took place in the U.S. philosophy—American military advisors were finally permitted to accompany and 

observe, but not actively participate in, AFP combat operations. Whenever 

advice was shared, it was given directly to the tactical Filipino leader who 

needed it, as low in the organization as possible, and given by an advisor 

who the recipient knew and trusted. In addition, the advisors/observers 

took note of the tactics employed, the effect military actions were having 

on the populace, and the how the U.S.-supplied equipment was used. When 

the advisors/observers returned to their base camps, these real-time lessons 

were used to update and improve training programs.

Even though the U.S. government provided most of the material, arms, 

and money to fund the AFP and provided advice when it was needed, it was 

Filipinos who fought the battles against the Communist-sponsored Huks 

and ran the social and economic programs. By 1954, Filipino police, military, 

and civilian officials, along with their American trainers and advisors, had 

successfully neutralized the Huks through a coordinated military and civilian campaign, addressed the peasants’ social, economic, and educational 

grievances, and restored the legitimacy of the government. The Filipinos, 

with the help of American advisors, had taken back their country from the 

Communist insurgents.19

El Salvador, 1977–1992

In 1969, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, then the secretary-general of El 

Salvador’s Communist Party (PCES), recommended starting a Maoist-style 

protracted popular war to overthrow the most recent military junta governing El Salvador. This position was rejected by the PCES, and Cayetano 

Carpio was expelled from the Party. In 1971, though, Cayetano Carpio and 

a group of El Salvadoran Communists returned from years of training and 

indoctrination in Cuba and Vietnam to organize the country’s first guerrilla 

movement, the Farabundo Marti Popular Forces of Liberation.20 Through 
8

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

the 1970s, competing dissident groups fought the successive corrupt, often 

incompetent, and repressive governments and each other, struggling for 

control of a nation racked by poverty, corruption, violence, and disease. 

Human rights abuses by both the rebels and the government forces were 

common. By 1979 at least five major insurgent groups were seeking to impose 

a Communist-style socialist government in El Salvador. 

The government’s internal problems, its string of human rights abuses, 

and the failure to address the root causes of popular dissatisfaction—

unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, desperately needed land 

reform, and rampant government arrogance—caused disaffected young 

men to flock to the rebels’ cause. Even priests in the normally noncommittal 

Roman Catholic Church began to defy their superiors’ counsel to remain 

neutral and took a more activist stance against the government. In 1979, the 

PCES finally accepted armed struggle as the only means of changing the 

government in El Salvador...a position first recommended 10 years earlier 

by Cayetano Carpio.21

In December 1979, the five major Salvadoran revolutionary groups 

gathered in Havana, Cuba at Fidel Castro’s invitation to organize into a 

single, coordinated effort. Although the groups had disparate goals and 

backgrounds, the common theme was their desire to impose a Communiststyle government in El Salvador to rectify the missteps and abuses of centuries of colonial, then military, rule. In 1980, the Farabundo Martí National 

Liberation Front (FMLN) asserted itself as the single revolutionary party in 

El Salvador. The FMLN was able to secure economic and military aid, financing, and training from the Soviet Union, Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua, and even 

radical groups in the United States to support its revolutionary goals. 

Although purporting itself to be the single voice of revolutionary change 

in El Salvador, the FMLN was an inherently weak organization. The FMLN

had tenuous control at best of the various rebel groups.22 More a loose confederation of local guerrilla organizations than a strong, united revolutionary 

front committed to new El Salvador, the FMLN was never able to reconcile 

the diverging and usually competing strategies employed by the different 

factions.23 For example, a Cuban-style “foco” model employed by an urbanbased group often conflicted with the Maoist popular war strategy used by 

a rural group. The result was contradictory political, social, and military 

FMLN operations over the course of the war that gave the government much 
9

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

needed time to adjust its own social and economic programs, change its 

military tactics, and address its internal deficiencies. 

In January 1981, the FMLN called for a “final offensive,” a Maoist-style 

Stage 3 effort to defeat the government using conventional military force. 

The move was premature, however, and the army defeated the rebels and sent 

the insurgents into the mountains for sanctuary. The Carter Administration 

in the United States reacted to this FMLN/Communist threat by restoring $5 

million in military aid. In 1982, the newly elected Reagan Administration 

committed the U.S. to political, economic, and military assistance in El 

Salvador to counter Soviet-sponsored Communist expansion in the Western 

hemisphere.24

Remembering the recent lessons of Vietnam, the size of the U.S. contingent was limited to 55 military advisors and trainers. The Americans 

set up training camps in El Salvador and in neighboring Honduras; they 

also sent two to three officers or NCOs to live and work with each of the six 

Salvadoran brigades. The mission of these assigned advisors was to reinforce 

the lessons taught in the training centers, provide assessments of the units’ 

effectiveness, and change the El Salvadoran Army’s historically terrible 

human rights record. 

More like the American experience in the Philippines than in Vietnam, 

advisors were prohibited from engaging in combat operations in order to 

maintain the perception that this 

was an El Salvadoran war to be 

won or lost by the El Salvadorans. 

Another consequence of the small 

U.S. presence was the ease by which 

U.S. advisors and the accompanying aid package could be withdrawn from those units not actively correcting their human rights problems. The Army’s treatment of noncombatants, 

innocent civilians, and prisoners radically and quickly improved because 

of this “carrot and stick” approach to behavior modification.

Changing the El Salvadoran Army’s attitude towards its civilian population allowed the government to begin focusing on the root causes of the 

insurgency—land reform, the lack of educational opportunities, a sickly 

economy, and a corrupt electoral process. Basing U.S. military aid on demonstrated social and political improvements was beginning to pay off as 

More like the American experience 

in the Philippines than in Vietnam, 

advisors were prohibited from 

engaging in combat operations...
10

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

popular support for the FMLN began to swing to the government. But in 

1983, FMLN guerrillas adjusted their tactics and sent small, highly trained 

teams of commandos to execute a series of successful raids against heavily defended El Salvadoran bases. U.S. advisors also adjusted quickly and 

reoriented the training and advisory programs to focus on small-unit tactics more appropriate to a counterguerrilla style of warfare.25 More importantly, however, the changes in tactics, attitudes, and treatment of civilians 

that resulted from the actions of U.S. trainers and advisors supported the 

larger, longer-term efforts of El Salvador’s multifaceted national campaign 

for defeating the FMLN. 

As the El Salvadoran Army changed its tactics, its attitude, and its track 

record, the climate for political change improved too. In March 1984, José 

Napoleón Duarte—a previous mayor of the capital, San Salvador, a graduate 

of Notre Dame, and the president of El Salvador from 1980 to 1982—was 

reelected to the presidency on a platform of social and economic reforms, 

eliminating human rights abuses, and negotiation with the FMLN. Duarte’s 

election, El Salvador’s first free election in 50 years, was marred by the fact 

that El Salvador was in near full civil war. Over the next few years, Duarte 

was unable to institute most of his promised economic and social programs 

due to intransigence by both the insurgents and the hard-liners in his own 

administration. In 1989 Duarte’s Christian Democratic Party was defeated 

by Alfredo Christiani and the ARENA party, the first peaceful transfer of 

power to an opposition candidate in El Salvador’s history.26

The Soviet Union’s troubles at home and abroad contributed to changing the FMLN’s reluctance to negotiate. The Soviets were trying to extricate 

themselves from Afghanistan, were dealing with nationalist independence 

movements among their client states in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 

Pact, and had a failing economy at home. In neighboring Nicaragua, the 

newly elected Violeta Chamorro government had decided to focus on internal problems; they also stopped supporting the FMLN insurgents. With the 

insurgents’ external military, economic, and financial support reduced to a 

trickle, and the U.S. Congress threatening decreased support to the government, both sides came to the negotiating table in 1990. By 1991, negotiations 

with the FMLN produced a truce that ended the war in 1992, created a new 

Constitution, established a civilian police force, and transformed the FMLN

into a legal political party. 
11

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

The government of El Salvador and its military and police forces—with 

the aid, advice, and assistance of the United States and the U.S. military 

advisors—had defeated the Communist-sponsored FMLN insurgency.

Afghanistan, 1979–1989

Afghanistan sits astride the crossroads of civilizations. For over two millennia, trade routes from China and India to Europe and Arabia have passed 

through this mountainous and often barren land. Great invading armies—

from Alexander to the Mongols, the British, the Soviets, and now the U.S.

and its European allies—have had to deal with the quandary that was and 

is Afghanistan. 

Throughout its thousands of years of history, Afghanistan has maintained its traditional tribal and familial culture. When Islam arrived with 

Arab invaders in the 7th century, it provided a loose sense of pseudo-nationalism, giving the tribes a sense of culture, morality, and tradition that would 

normally have come from a shared development and common history. But 

when faced with stress or conflict, Afghans normally reverted to their families, clans, and tribes for security, safety, and comfort. The Soviets, during 

their 50 years of involvement with Afghanistan during the Cold War, failed 

to address this key trait of Afghan society and culture.

As early as 1919, just after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union 

was funneling money, arms, and training to support Afghan rebels fighting the British in India (present day Pakistan). According to Dr. Stephen 

Blank at the U.S. Air Force Air University, “Soviet involvement had turned 

Afghanistan into a virtual client state.” 27 By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union 

was sending millions of dollars each year in economic, military, and political 

aid to Afghanistan. Soviet investment in Afghanistan guaranteed they held a 

strategic position between two U.S. allies in the region, Pakistan and Iran.

In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan became the first president of 

Afghanistan after overthrowing the monarchy of Zahir Shah in a bloodless 

coup. Daoud was a Pashtun who supported an independent Pashtunistan. 

This position ensured the U.S. would not look favorably on supporting 

Afghanistan against the Soviets, as an independent homeland for the 

Pashtuns would require the U.S. ally, Pakistan, to give up major portions 

of its territory. In an effort to secure his position in the region, faced with 
12

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

a complex and unstable internal political situation, and recognizing that 

Afghanistan was one of the poorest, least educated, and backward societies 

in the world, Daoud continued Zahir Shah’s policies of accepting Soviet aid, 

advice, and assistance.28 In 1977, however, Daoud began to move away from 

the Soviet Union and the Cuban-led nonaligned movement. With U.S. support and concurrence, he requested and received training from Egypt and 

aid from both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Daoud began the process of shifting 

Afghanistan’s orientation towards the oil-rich and pro-Western nations of 

the Arabian Gulf.29

In August 1978, a group of Soviet-trained Afghan officers and the proSoviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized control of 

the government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. 

President Daoud was assassinated and a Marxist, Nur Taraki, was installed 

as president.30 Unfortunately, the PDPA was not ready to govern such a 

large and diverse country as Afghanistan. With its urban base, its MarxistLeninist orientation, and with the concurrence of its Soviet advisors, the 

PDPA attempted to change Afghan traditions.31 The PDPA’s Marxist-Leninist 

antipathy towards both religion and the peasantry resulted in misguided 

policies regarding land reform, female emancipation, language, and religious 

observances. These unpopular changes were strongly resisted by the local 

political and religious leaders and resulted in open rebellion against the 

PDPA-led government. 

With entire units defecting and the Afghan army down to half its 

strength, the Afghan government looked to the Soviet Union for help to 

quell the rebellion. In July 1979, the Soviets sent an airborne battalion to 

Bagram Air Base to protect President Taraki. Shortly thereafter, the Taraki 

government requested an additional two motorized rifle divisions and an 

airborne division be deployed to Afghanistan. While the Soviets were anxious to keep Afghanistan in their sphere of influence, they were not in a 

hurry to honor the Taraki government’s requests for a large commitment 

of troops and equipment, however. 

By December 1979, the situation in Kabul had deteriorated to the point 

that the Soviet General Staff sent a group of specialized airborne and intelligence troops to help “liberate” Afghanistan. The Soviets installed Babrak 

Karmal into power.32 In the spring of 1980, Soviet ground troops deployed 

to Afghanistan and an airborne division deployed to Bagram Air Base. The 

Soviet incursion had the opposite of the desired effect—instead of calming 
13

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

or controlling the rebellion, the Soviets’ presence incited an unexpected 

feeling of Afghan nationalism. It was as if the only thing the disparate tribes 

would agree on was that they did not want foreigners in their country.

From 1980 to 1985, the fight in Afghanistan devolved into a classic guerrilla campaign. The Soviets and their Afghan clients occupied the cities and 

controlled the main transportation arteries, while 80 percent of the countryside was controlled by the opposing tribes.33 By 1985, over 110,000 Soviet 

troops were deployed to Afghanistan to combat approximately 100,000 

mujahideen fighters—significantly short of the doctrinally recommended 

ratio of 10 soldiers for every guerrilla combatant.34

Almost as soon as the Soviets began their deployment to Afghanistan, 

the United States sought ways of countering the Soviet incursion. President 

Carter and then President Reagan both authorized intelligence and aid 

packages to assist the Afghan guerrillas. President Reagan increased the 

pressure on the Soviets by encouraging U.S. allies and regional partners to 

provide arms, money, and training to surrogates willing to challenge the 

Soviet’s growing influence and presence in South Asia. 

U.S. support of the Afghans was intentionally low key. Although the 

Carter and Reagan administrations were keen to challenge Soviet expansion 

in South and Southwest Asia, they had to be mindful of national and cultural sensitivities in the region and of provoking the Soviets to expand the 

conflict by engaging their own proxies in the region—India, Iraq, and Syria. 

The U.S. supported Middle Eastern surrogates from Saudi Arabia, the United 

Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Iran to supply military, humanitarian, and financial aid to the mujahideen, through Pakistan.35 The external aid consisted of 

modern light infantry weapons, primarily from the Soviet Union and the 

Warsaw Pact, and the training provided built upon the Afghans’ traditional 

fighting methods—ambushes and raids against the vulnerabilities inherent 

in the Soviet’s mechanized, conventional style of warfare. These were the 

same guerrilla techniques the Afghans’ forefathers had employed in the 19th 

century against British conventional battalions. 

From sanctuaries outside of Afghanistan, primarily in Pakistan, advisors and trainers worked with the Afghan resistance on individual and 

small-unit skills. More importantly, though, they developed communications techniques and fostered coordinated operations between tactical/

tribal units—an inherent deficiency in the Afghan’s clan-based and familial 

traditions. With a supply of familiar arms and ammunition assured from 
14

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

external sources, the Afghans learned to integrate modern heavier weapons such as machine guns, wired-guided antiarmor missiles, and rocketpropelled grenades in a supporting role, yet still retaining their traditional 

fighting methods. 

The Soviets countered improved Afghan guerrilla tactics with air mobility and aerial fire support to great effect. Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-25 

attack aircraft offset the Afghans’ inherent mobility, knowledge of the terrain, and improved weapons.36 In 1986, though, the U.S. changed the equation again in favor of their surrogates by providing Stinger antiaircraft 

missiles and training to the Afghans.37 The threat of the Stingers neutralized the Soviet’s heliborne advantage, and the war returned to its previous 

unpopular, costly, and near stalemate conditions. 

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the prime minister of the Soviet Union 

in 1988, he promised to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan within the 

year. The first Soviet units began their withdrawal by the spring of 1988, and 

the entire Soviet Army had left Afghanistan by February 1989.38 The Soviet 

Union paid a terrible price for its adventure in Afghanistan—in lost confidence in the Communist ideology at home and among its client states, in 

tens of thousands of physical and psychological casualties, and in lost power 

and prestige worldwide. Though it was not one of the expected outcomes of 

U.S. actions in Afghanistan at the time, U.S. surrogates and their American 

advisors helped force the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Conclusion

The war in Vietnam officially ended in April 1975 when North Vietnamese 

armored columns defeated the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam, 

although U.S. involvement had ended in 1973 with the signing of the Paris 

Peace Accords. In the aftermath of Vietnam, America’s officer corps reoriented itself away from those activities they perceived had failed to win in 

Vietnam.39 Among their frustrations was that despite years of military assistance, the South Vietnamese Army had been unable to eliminate Viet Cong 

insurgents in the South or to stem the invasion by North Vietnamese regular 

forces attacking from the north. 

The Nixon Doctrine reflected the President’s frustration and the nation’s 

determination to not place large bodies of American soldiers in harm’s way 

again, defending another nation against an internal or an external aggressor. 
15

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

Though the series of proxy wars over the next three decades was widespread 

and frequent, these politically uncertain, unconventional, irregular, and/or 

low intensity conflicts provided a persistent and unwanted distraction from 

the Department of State and Department of Defense’s main task of deterring direct conflict with the Soviet Union. Conventionally minded Defense 

leaders happily passed responsibility for the U.S. military’s response to the 

Soviets’ proxy wars to the nation’s SOF. That force evolved into a low cost 

and low footprint unconventional force—organized, trained, and equipped 

to advise, assist, and train U.S. surrogates in distant regions and to counter 

Soviet-sponsored aggression in the developing world. 

Over the course of the Cold War’s proxy wars, the U.S. had to relearn 

that indigenous opposition groups were rarely unified. They, like constituent groups in every country, had personal agendas and specific goals. 

Successful U.S. advisors studied and learned as much as they could about 

their opponents’ objectives, ideologies, cultures, motivations, heritage, and 

traditions—this was the anthropologist, diplomat, and cultural attaché part 

of their advisory role. Special operations advisors exploited those differences 

and sensitivities when helping their hosts develop, implement, and adjust 

the social, economic, political, and security programs needed to counter 

insurgents around the world. Those young Special Forces officers held onto 

the lessons they learned during these surrogate/proxy conflicts around the 

world; and as they became senior leaders and mentors, they passed those 

lessons on to the next generations of special operations advisors. 

The Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan are three of the major 

instances where U.S. military advisors developed and refined the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for successful surrogate warfare. The Kennedy 

and Johnson Administrations seemingly ignored the lessons learned in the 

Philippines, “Americanized” the South Vietnamese Army into a modern 

conventional force, and thus the U.S. and their South Vietnamese allies 

failed to defeat the Communist North Vietnamese.40 In El Salvador and 

against the Soviets in Afghanistan, political restrictions kept the U.S. presence small, but the U.S. took great advantage of SOF’s unconventional warfare skills in physically and politically risky environments. The indigenous 

surrogates, with the economic and military aid and the corresponding 

training originally promised by the Nixon Doctrine and implemented by 

Presidents Carter and Reagan, defeated the Soviets and Soviet-sponsored 

adversaries. 
16

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

By the time U.S. and Afghan Northern Alliance forces had defeated 

the Taliban, the Soviet Union had died and the ideological motivation had 

changed. In the Philippines, El Salvador, and Afghanistan, U.S. advisors 

and trainers developed and perfected the principles of “through, with, or 

by” described in the essays by Majors Homiak, Peltier, and Smith. The doctrine and the integrated social, political, economic, and military tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for surrogate warfare these officers and their 

contemporaries applied as combat leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq are the 

product of five decades of uncomfortable, politically difficult, and often 

messy proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 

Endnotes

1. Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” 3 November 

1969; available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2303 (accessed 

on 10 December 2008). 

 Also Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary 

Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), 7. 

2. After the end of the World War II, and once the Soviets gained nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver those weapons onto U.S. soil, the two superpowers 

engaged in over five decades of surrogate confrontation. In proxy wars from 

Vietnam to Angola, El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Yemen (and the list goes on), 

the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. armed, equipped, trained, and at times lead the soldiers 

and the guerrillas of “3rd World” nations, seeking to bring or retain those nations 

in their competing “camps” of democracy or communism. 

3. COL Mark Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” Special 

Warfare, Summer 1998, 36.

4. A conventional American general told an interviewer from the Rand Corporation 

in 1970, “I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, it 

doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.” Quoted 

in Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London: 

Routledge, 2001), 24.

5. GEN John Galvin, as the commander of U.S. Southern Command, coined the 

term “Uncomfortable Wars” when referring to this environment in the winter 

1986 edition of Parameters, the U.S. Army War College professional journal. 

6. Air Force Manual 2-5, Tactical Air Operations—Special Air Warfare (Washington, 

DC: HQ Air Force, 10 March 1967), 1. “Basically, the task of Air Force COIN forces 

is to provide advice, training, and assistance to indigenous forces.”

7. Low intensity conflict was a pseudonym used in the 1970s and 1980s to refer to the 

conflicts usually fought by guerrillas, most often revolutionaries and insurgents, 

seeking to change the political status quo. Unfortunately, the term is misleading, 
17

Newton: The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare

as combat may have been contained to a particular country or region, or by the 

destructive capacity of the weapons involved, but it was rarely of low intensity. 

8. Boyatt, 37. The Special Forces core purpose is to accomplish its missions through, 

with, or by indigenous populations, and their core values are unconventionalism, 

strength of character, doing what is right, and making a difference.

9. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Vol. 1 (New York: 

William Morrow and Co, 1994), 386–387.

10. Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London: 

Routledge, 2001), 97–98. 

11. Asprey, 529.

12. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1984), 291–292. “Potentially, the Huks had even greater peasant appeal 

than had either the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists; they had laid the broad 

foundations for it during the war on the dual count of fighting the invader and 

their insistence on a just redistribution of the land.”

 13. Beckett, 99. 

14. Napoleon D. Valeriano, “Counter-Guerrilla Seminar at Fort Bragg, NC,” 15 June 

1961; received from www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/hukcampaign15june1961I.htm (accessed on 16 December 2008). COL Valeriano led the Filipino 

7th Battalion Combat Team against the Huks.

15. MAJ Lawrence M. Greenberg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a 

Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987), 100. 

16. Greenberg, 98. 

17. Greenberg, 108. Luis Taruc, leader of the Huks, noted that American aid and 

advice was causing the tide of battle to change as the Philippine government 

was changing its tactics and addressing the social and economic causes of the 

insurgency. 

18. Greenberg, 107. 

19. Ibid., 150. 

20. Asprey, 1095–1097. 

21. Ibid., 1097. 

22. Ibid., 1098. 

23. O’Neill, 48. 

24. Ibid., 9. 

25. Aprey, 1101. 

26. www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/El-Salvador-History.html (accessed on 

19 December 2008). 

27. Dr. Stephen Blank, “Soviet Russian and Central Asia,” in Low-intensity Conflict in 

the Third World, Lewis B. Ware, editor (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 

August 1988), 55. 
18

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

28. Asprey, 1202. 

29. Blank, 58.

30. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen 

Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Studies and 

Analysis Division, no date), vxi. 

31. Anthony J. Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency 

(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 67. 

32. Asprey, 1205. 

33. Beckett, 211. 

34. Joes, 177. 

35. Grau, xviii. 

36. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2004), 48. 

37. Beckett, 211 and Clarke, 49-50. Clarke goes on to quote Assistant Secretary of 

Defense, Richard Perle, as insisting that the U.S. Army advisors conduct all Stinger 

training from bases in Pakistan. 

38. Clarke, 50. 

39. The Economist, “After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers,” no author given, 27 

October 2007, 33–36. 

40. Joes, 230–231. 
19

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

Expanding the American Way of War: 

Working “Through, With, or By” 

Non-U.S. Actors

Travis L. Homiak

The indirect method of “through, with, or by” seeks to use relationships with non-U.S. actors and shared recognition of a common 

problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. This indirect 

approach supports achieving U.S. operational objectives without promoting perceptions of U.S. hegemony. Consequently, this 

method offers the combatant commander a viable alternative to 

traditional, direct applications of U.S. military power.

The U.S. is widely perceived as emphasising military power as a tool 

of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and 

other forms of ‘soft’ power. 

— Francois Heisbourg, “American Hegemony? Perceptions 

of the U.S. Abroad,” Survival, (Winter 1999–2000), 13

Introduction

The United States has unparalleled national power and global reach. 

Logic dictates that such power should facilitate the United States 

achieving its national objectives. America’s national power has real 

limits in what it can achieve, however.

The United States currently has no peer competitors able to realistically challenge them in a conventional military conflict. As a result, the 

Major Travis Homiak is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence officer currently 

serving as the Plans Officer, Marine Forces Special Operations Command. 

He submitted this paper while attending the School of Advanced Warfighting 

(Quantico, Virginia) where he was pursuing his M.S. in Operational Studies. 

He would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Abati, U.S. Army, for 

acting as his mentor during this project and Messrs. Wade Ishimoto and Mark 

Boyatt for reviewing earlier drafts.
20

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

U.S. increasingly chooses direct applications of military power to achieve 

national security objectives.1 The direct use of military power (or the threat 

thereof) is one element of the nation’s “hard” power and constitutes a traditional approach to employing military force.2

 The invasions of Afghanistan 

in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are both examples of America’s traditional employment of hard power.

Yet, U.S. military power, applied traditionally in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

has proven incapable of achieving its intended policy goals. Particularly in 

the case of Iraq, one can argue that America’s decision to directly apply military power—notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. arguably acted unilaterally—has significantly hampered 

its ability to realize stated policy 

objectives. This example illustrates 

a concern upon which this paper 

is based—that the direct application of military power to achieve a 

policy objective, at the expense of 

less obtrusive military alternatives 

and balanced employment of national power, may retard rather than enable 

the realization of those objectives.

According to Robert Kagan, America’s preeminent military power spawns 

a proclivity for direct, unilateral action in pursuit of its policy goals. Kagan 

maintains that it is precisely America’s vast military power relative to the 

rest of the world that makes its direct use so difficult to sanction.3 Moreover, 

the direct, unbalanced employment of military power tends to paint the 

United States as a hegemon vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Consequently 

other nations, to include potential partners, feel threatened by America’s 

actions and tend to oppose them as a counterbalance.4

If America’s preeminent military power makes direct applications of 

military power problematic—specifically, traditional applications of military 

power—the United States must develop an alternative approach. Such an 

alternative must include a less intrusive, indirect method that emphasizes 

nontraditional applications of military power. Unlike the oft ill-perceived 

direct approach, this indirect technique should focus on building mutually 

beneficial relationships with other agents or actors—namely, relationships 

that enhance our partners’ capacity and will to take actions that promote 

the realization of U.S. national security goals.

...the direct application of military 

power to achieve a policy objective, at the expense of less obtrusive 

military alternatives and balanced 

employment of national power, 

may retard rather than enable the 

realization of those objectives. 
21

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

It is useful to consider unconventional warfare (UW), a facet of military 

operations that emphasizes indirect methods while seeking to define and 

develop an indirect alternative to the traditional, direct approach. A key 

component of UW focuses on working “through, with, or by indigenous 

or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 

directed in varying degrees by an external source.” 5 Working “through, 

with, or by” non-U.S. actors offers combatant commanders an indirect 

method for resolving dynamic, highly complex problems and achieving 

operational-level objectives—a method that, depending on circumstances, 

can be politically more palatable and practically feasible than employing a 

traditional, direct approach. This paper will explore “through, with, or by” 

as a methodology: defining the terms, discussing the methodology’s application at the operational level, and considering the associated implications 

at the combatant-command level. 

What is Really Meant by the Phrase 

“Through, With, or By?” 6

The phrase “through, with, or by” can be explained by examining different 

relationships between two notional actors (i.e., Actor A and Actor B) and 

their relative capacities and will for undertaking action. In broad terms, 

working “through, with, or by” refers to the idea that Actor A directly or 

indirectly builds Actor B’s capacity and will to take action to address a 

given problem, the resolution of which benefits both parties. Within this 

construct, capacity refers to an actor’s ability to undertake action in a given 

situation, while will refers to an actor’s ability to decide his own actions. Will 

has three components: recognition of the problem, desire to take action, 

and determination to see that action through to completion. For clarity, the 

terms “through, with, or by” will be addressed from most to least visible 

with regard to the overt nature of underlying interactions, rather than defining them in the order in which they appear in the Joint UW definition. 

“With” is the most overt association in the methodology, necessitating 

a physical presence and associated interaction between Actors A and B. 

“Accompanied by or accompanying” best defines the concept of working 

“with” another agent. 7 In a relationship defined as working “with,” Actor A 

works alongside Actor B to address a given problem while providing Actor B 

with the capacity, will, or both required to act. In this relationship, Actor A 
22

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

works side by side with Actor B, while facilitating the resolution of a mutual 

problem.8 Working “with” another actor is an on-the-scene activity where 

Actor A is physically present with Actor B—that is, sharing ideas, providing 

advice, and combining resources. 

A special operations assistance mission whereby Actor A trains and 

equips (builds capacity) in Actor B and then fights alongside him (provides 

will) demonstrates working “with” in terms of a military task. An excellent 

historical example is provided by Special Operations Executive/Office of 

Strategic Services (SOE/OSS) operatives who equipped and fought alongside 

Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II. SOE/OSS operatives 

built the partisans’ capacity for action through aerial-delivered equipment, 

bolstered their will through their presence as representatives of the Western 

Allies (at least initially), and fought side by side to defeat the Germans in 

the Balkans.9

The second of the three relationships in order of observability is working 

“through” and refers to achieving an objective “by means of.” 10 Working 

“through” implies a relationship in which Actor A works behind the scenes 

to provide Actor B with the capacity, will, or both to take action against a 

given problem, the resolution of which benefits both actors. The key component to working “through” is Actor A’s reduced level of direct involvement 

in efforts to address the shared problem. In a “through” relationship, Actor 

A employs Actor B as a surrogate, enabling actions intended to resolve a 

shared problem by precursor counsel, training, equipping, or combination 

thereof. 

According to this definition of “through,” capacity building is not 

restricted to increasing physical capability, but can also apply to empowering the actions of other actors. If Actor B possesses the physical capability 

to take action but lacks the freedom to do so, and Actor A can sanction 

Actor B’s actions, then Actor A is working “through” Actor B by granting 

Actor B permission to act. Furthermore, in contrast to working “with,” 

working “through” necessitates sharing ideas and providing advice without overtly taking action against the common problem. While “through” 

demands cooperation between the actors, it has no requirement for combined action.11

In terms of military tasks, “through” can best be illustrated by advising 

and training missions that fall under the aegis of foreign internal defense 

(FID). Since 2002, the U.S. has performed multiple FID missions, working 
23

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

“through” several countries. Specifically, a low-visibility FID mission was 

conducted in Yemen in mid-2003, providing their security forces with 

enhanced capacity.12 In June of that same year, Yemen used its increased 

capacity to eliminate elements of the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA), an 

Al Qaeda affiliate linked to the bombing of the USS Cole.

13 Thus, by working 

“through” Yemen to eliminate a terrorist threat, the U.S. enhanced Yemen’s 

internal security while concurrently supporting the war on terrorism. 

“By” is the third and final relationship of the indirect context, promoting 

achievement of a desired outcome “through the agency or instrumentality 

of” another.14 “By” assumes that an actor, who possesses the capacity and 

will sufficient to address a given problem, is going to engage that problem. 

The essence of “by” is that Actor B takes action to achieve an objective 

desired by Actor A, without Actor A necessarily prompting Actor B to do so. 

One can reasonably expect Actor B to address the problem, because Actor 

B recognizes the problem and has both the capacity and will to undertake 

action toward resolving it.

When the relationship of “by” is operative in a system composed of 

at least three actors, the system can be considered to be “self-regulating” 

because no input is required from Actor A to elicit action on the part of 

Actor B. What is required for “by” to function is that both actors recognize 

the problem and perceive that solving it will yield a beneficial outcome. “By” 

is the least obtrusive of the three relationships because it may not require 

any initiating action on the part of Actor A. Actor B simply acts because 

he recognizes the benefit. In Actor B’s mind, it may be merely coincidental 

that Actor A also benefits from B’s actions. On the other hand, a relationship characterized as “by” can be the result of having previously worked 

“through” and “with” an actor, building the capacity and will required for 

the future action. Thus, working “through” and “with” may be viewed as 

stepping stones to creating a self-regulating system in which actors take care 

of problems that affect the entire system without the prompting or direct 

involvement of others to do so.

The Iranian role in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1962–1975) is an 

excellent example of the U.S. working “by” another actor. Beginning in 1959 

and continuing into the late 1970s, the U.S. worked “through” Iran in an 

effort to contain the Soviet Union.15 During this period, America provided 

the Pahlavi monarchy with significant military assistance against external, notably communist, threats.16 In 1973, Iran used its increased military 
24

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

capacity—without America prompting—to intervene in the Sultan of Oman’s 

ongoing counterinsurgency campaign against the communist People’s Front 

for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). “Iran’s military and economic support 

made an indispensable contribution toward turning the tide in Oman.” 17

This case demonstrates working “by” because the Shah of Iran independently took action against a mutual problem. In fact, America’s previous 

efforts to build Iranian capacity to counteract regional Soviet influence—

activities conducted under a “through” relationship—enabled a subsequent 

“by” relationship in which Iran achieved U.S. objectives, while pursuing its 

own interests.

What Makes “Through, With, or By” 

a Compelling Alternative to Direct Action?

The strategy of “‘through, with, or by” relies on the proposition that an actor, 

possessing or provided with sufficient capacity and will to act upon a given 

problem, can be reasonably expected to address that problem. The actor’s 

motivation for action is the perceived beneficial outcome that will result 

from solving the problem. Perceived benefit is also the motivating factor in 

cases where Actor A supplies capacity or will to Actor B. In the latter case, 

both parties engage in a relationship that will yield an outcome perceived as 

being mutually beneficial. In other words, both actors cooperate with one 

another to achieve a better endstate than that achievable by acting alone.

At a minimum, three prerequisites must exist for a mutually beneficial 

exchange to occur between two actors: each actor must have information 

about the other, each must believe that the exchange will bring about an 

advantageous result, and each must be willing to enter into a relationship 

with the other. More directly stated, Actor A—whether an individual, organization, or nation state—must be aware of Actor B’s existence and have 

some idea of B’s capacity for action. Without both actors having information 

or awareness of the other, a relationship would have no basis to develop. 

Information about the other actor becomes particularly important at the 

international level or in cross-cultural exchanges. Cultural knowledge facilitates identifying points of commonality between different actors that, when 

exploited, might yield a mutually beneficial result.

Second, each participant in the exchange must believe, or have reasonable assurance, that the exchange will result in a beneficial outcome (i.e., the 
25

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

actor will be better off in the end). This implies that each actor is rational 

and will choose the option that benefits him most from a range of possibilities.18 Understanding the other actor’s rationale, although desirable, 

is not required to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange. Indeed, many 

conflicts are the result of difficulties inherent in understanding the rationale of another nation or culture. Each actor must merely acknowledge 

that the other actor is making the best choice for himself and is, therefore, 

acting rationally.19 What really matters is that the two actors are aware of 

one another and have recognized that cooperation will result in a mutually 

beneficial exchange.

In order to cooperate, the two actors must enter into a relationship with 

one another. Therefore, the building and maintaining of relationships is 

another key component of generating a mutually beneficial outcome. To 

function effectively, these relationships must be based upon trust and reciprocity. Trust is a vital component in any relationship. Building trust is a 

straightforward concept at the interpersonal level; trust results when each 

actor’s expectation that the other will perform or act as expected is satisfied over time. However, trust is not so easily achieved across nation states 

and cultures, diverse entities with a myriad of conflicting interests and 

divergent viewpoints. Pre-existing relationships, interpersonal relationships between the actors’ representatives, and recurrent exchanges between 

actors are mechanisms for creating and maintaining the trust required to 

cooperate in such cases. 

“Through, With, or By” at the Operational Level

How are the principles of “through, with, or by” applied at the operational 

level? Could combatant commanders employ “through, with, or by” to 

achieve operational-level goals? This section will address this question, illustrating the application of the methodology with three historical examples. 

When applied at the operational level, “through, with, or by” is an 

indirect method by which the combatant commander can achieve desired 

endstate conditions or operational objectives that directly contribute to 

campaign goals. This indirect approach is not a panacea. Instead, it provides 

combatant commanders with an alternative method, diversifying the locus 

of possible employment options. “Through, with, or by” can serve as the 
26

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

cornerstone method of a campaign’s operational design, or it can support 

another method that more directly applies U.S. military power.20

The indirect nature of “through, with, or by” emphasizes causal relationships (i.e., cause and effect), complementing the doctrinal idea that 

logical lines of operation (LOOs) link nodes and decisive points to achieve 

the desired endstate “when positional reference to the enemy has little relevance.” 21 In its most basic form, the methodology is nothing more than a 

group of actors (i.e., nodes) that recognize a common problem and share a 

desire to resolve the problem (i.e., links). Under this approach, harnessing 

surrogate desires and resultant actions is essential to achieving the desired 

endstate. In fact, the ability to tie “through, with, or by” into a logical LOO

will be determined primarily by the surrogate actors’ respective capacity 

and will, as well as the strength and depth of underlying relationships with 

those actors.

“Through, with, or by” has application not only as a primary or supporting method of a logical LOO but also within the concept of operational 

phasing as described in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning and 

illustrated in Figure 1.22 As depicted, the level of direct military effort varies 

Figure 1. Notional Operation Plan Phases vs. Level of Military Effort 

(Joint Publication 5-0)
27

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

across operational phase, rising and falling in accordance with phase-dependent intermediate objectives and the associated logical LOO. Depending 

upon specific operational requirements (e.g., time horizons, acceptable 

risk, and asset availability/applicability), working “through, with, or by” 

other actors can have applicability in multiple operational planning phases 

and LOOs. For example, a FID mission with a regional partner in Phase 0 

could contribute directly to deterrence goals in Phase I, raising a partner’s 

capacity and will to defend against the actions of a potentially hostile third 

party. Furthermore, surrogate assets, created via “through, with, or by” in 

Phases I and II to support Dominating Activities, could be employed in 

Phases IV and V to support both Stabilizing and Enabling Civil Authority 

Activities.

“Through, with, or by” can create significant value for operational planning when conducted during Phase 0 or Phase I operations. Local- and 

theater-shaping activities undertaken indirectly can produce effects that 

transcend Shaping Activity objectives, contributing directly to Deterrence 

and/or Dominating Activity goals. Additionally, employing “through, with, 

or by” approaches during Phase 0 could minimize the direct military effort 

required in subsequent operational phases, acting as a force multiplier while 

addressing targeted problems.

Historical Examples of “Through, With, or By”

As previously stated, America’s employment of military force is not traditionally associated with an indirect approach. The United States—for a 

variety of cultural, historical, and economic reasons—often chooses direct 

confrontation and relies on technologically advanced conventional forces 

to wage short, sharp conflicts to defeat opponents. However, in the past, the 

U.S. military has employed indirect approaches in support of more direct 

methods. In some instances, success has validated the use of the indirect 

approach. In other instances, the indirect approach was mistakenly applied 

and failed to produce the desired outcome. 

During World War II, the Western Allies employed an indirect approach 

while working “with” Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia. Although the Western 

Allies successfully employed this approach in the Balkans in support of 

larger efforts to defeat Germany, indirect methods had the unintended consequence of frustrating their postwar position in Europe. Small OSS/SOE
28

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

teams parachuted into occupied Yugoslavia and worked “with” Partisan 

groups to achieve a dual purpose. Militarily, they tied down the maximum 

possible number of German units in the Balkans, hindering movements of 

German troops and assets to other fronts. Politically, these teams provided 

the Partisans and local population with tangible evidence of the Western 

Allies’ support for their cause, thereby building Yugoslav will.23

Franklin Lindsay, one such OSS operative, parachuted into Slovenia in 

May of 1944 and operated in Yugoslavia through the end of the war. His 

specific mission was to “cut German rail lines connecting Austria, Italy, 

and the Balkans.” 24 To accomplish his task, Lindsay worked with a Partisan 

group in the Stajerska region, building their capacity for offensive action 

through regular airdrops of Allied weapons and supplies.25 The fact that the 

Germans launched a multi-division, anti-Partisan sweep through Stajerska 

in late 1944 illustrates Lindsay’s success in attaining the military purpose 

of the mission—to tie-up German units in the Balkans.26

On the surface, the Western Allies’ indirect approach in Yugoslavia 

appears to have been a success. However, the capacity for action provided 

by the Allies’ substantial airdrops produced unintended consequences even 

before the Germans’ defeat. Instead of directing all of his energy against the 

Germans, Tito used his newly acquired military capacity to eliminate Draža 

Mihailović’s Chetniks—the prime threat to a postwar Yugoslavia under 

communist rule.27 Likewise, Tito sparked the first Cold War clash in May 

1945, when he tried to use his Allied-equipped forces to expand the borders 

of pre-war Yugoslavia by occupying Trieste and portions of Austria.28

This example provides several lessons. First, capacity for action, once 

supplied, has application beyond the scope of the problem it was furnished 

to solve. Furthermore, the Western Allies and Tito, despite a shared recognition of the necessity of defeating the Germans, had widely divergent 

motives for entering into a relationship with the other.29 Finally, the Western 

Allies would have done well to fully appreciate Tito’s long-term goals and 

underlying motives prior to equipping the Partisans. 

The second historical example illustrates a successful application of 

working both “through” and “with” indigenous forces to achieve operational 

goals. From 1971 until 1973, the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training 

Group (UITG) undertook “one of the least known, but most effective FID

missions conducted by U.S. Special Forces.” 30 The mission’s purpose was to 

build the newly installed Khmer government’s military capability against 
29

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

communist insurgency.31 Operating under its initial mandate to train 

the Forces Armee National Khmer (FANK), U.S. Special Forces trained, 

equipped, and operated alongside 78 Cambodian battalions at facilities 

in South Vietnam.32 In May 1972, UITG’s mandate expanded to include 

retraining elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after its 

near collapse during the 1972 Easter Offensive. Employing only 150 Special 

Forces trainers, the UITG retrained 64 ground maneuver battalions—40 

percent of the ARVN’s ground force.33 “Although both South Vietnam and 

Cambodia were overrun by their enemies, Special Forces enabled the end 

to be significantly delayed.” 34

The UITG experiences offer multiple lessons. The most obvious is that by 

working “through” and “with” the Cambodians, the U.S. employed minimal 

manpower to create a large, relatively effective force to combat communist 

insurgency. Moreover, resulting Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces 

allowed the U.S., at least for a time, to retard the regional spread of communism. The UITG example also highlights the importance of personal 

relationships in working “through, with, or by” other actors. The Special 

Forces trainers created a strong rapport with their trainees by learning local 

languages and incorporating other culturally relevant means.35 While such 

grassroots actions may seem unimportant at the operational level, they are 

integral to overcoming cultural differences, building goodwill, and cementing relationships necessary for future cooperation between organizations, 

groups, and countries.

The final historical example deals with maritime security in the Strait 

of Malacca. This illustration highlights the negative response attendant to 

a perceived U.S. direct approach, thereby reinforcing the need for a viable 

alternative. One third of the world’s shipping and half of the world’s oil 

transits through the strait each year, making this choke point of vital interest 

to the United States and regional nations.36 Coupled with frequent acts of 

local piracy—325 attacks occurred in 2004—and the region’s known links 

to radical Islamic fundamentalists, it is no surprise that the U.S. was and 

remains concerned over the potential for terrorist attacks against commercial shipping in the strait.37

In March 2004, the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to address this 

problem. Admiral Thomas Fargo, the USPACOM commander, described 

RMSI as an initiative to work with regional partners against “transnational 
30

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs, and 

piracy.” 38 Unfortunately, when asked how he would resource RMSI, Admiral 

Fargo chose to emphasize U.S. actions over those of its regional partners. 

Specifically, during Congressional testimony, he stated that USPACOM

was exploring “putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, 

putting, potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels...to conduct effective 

interdiction.” 39

The regional response to Admiral Fargo’s comments was both negative 

and immediate. Both Malaysia and Indonesia responded that “the security 

of the Malacca strait is for Indonesia and Malaysia to shoulder. Therefore, 

we will not accept any policies...that are inconsistent with this reality.” 40

Although envisioned as an indirect approach to work “with” regional partners, RMSI was interpreted internationally as yet another instance of direct 

U.S. unilateral action. This example reinforces the perception abroad that 

the U.S. has a “pre-emptive unilateralist approach to conflict resolution.” 41

Furthermore, it illustrates that working indirectly “through, with, or by” 

other actors can be a viable method of achieving otherwise unattainable 

objectives.42

Considerations for the Indirect Approach

Cost is a chief consideration in deciding to employ an indirect approach 

such as “through, with, or by” in lieu of more traditional, direct approaches. 

At first glance, cost can be measured in terms of resources expended, estimated likelihood of success (i.e., expected value of gain), expenditures of 

goodwill required to initiate working relationships with other actors, and 

the longevity of support from the American public and key decision makers. 

Currently, the cost of employing an indirect versus a direct approach is high. 

Institutionally, the U.S. military has neither the mindset nor the organizational structure to effectively work “through, with, or by” other actors on a 

large scale.43 The U.S. military is not, however, devoid of leaders who understand and embrace the efficacy of indirect approaches. Unfortunately, such 

leaders are the exception, rather than the rule. Consequently, this methodology is not mainstream and is typically accomplished by a small specialized force—namely, regionally specific Special Forces Groups for whom the 

indirect approach is their raison d’être.

44
31

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

The U.S. military can lower the cost of the indirect approach by improving its ability to operate “through, with, or by” other actors. In practical 

terms, deployable personnel at all levels will require more cultural and language training to facilitate building relationships. Cultural training should 

focus less on simple customs and more on how other cultures view situations 

and interpret underlying issues.45 Such cultural appreciation is necessary in 

discerning points of commonality between actors, building effective relationships, and identifying mutually beneficial outcomes. As a corollary, 

tours of duty should be lengthened for individuals in billets having frequent 

contact with foreign governments and their militaries. Longer tours facilitate enhanced appreciation for a specific culture and, more importantly, 

build the personal relationships that underlie the “through, with, or by” 

concept.

Given the capacity to work “through, with, or by” others, the indirect 

approach has significant force multiplier implications for the U.S. military. 

Employing other actors to achieve our aims expands the locus of resources 

available to resolve a given situation. Moreover, building the capacity and 

will of other actors reduces tasks the U.S. would otherwise have to undertake 

with its own finite assets, thereby permitting employment of U.S.-unique 

capabilities in other applications.

Working “through, with, or by” others also reduces the likelihood of 

conflict for the United States. Building the capacity and will of other actors 

to solve mutual problems during Phase 0 (Shaping) and Phase I (Deterrence) 

may resolve problems early, reducing the potential of ensuing crisis and 

obviating the need for direct U.S. involvement. Ideally, the U.S. would use 

other actors to address problems before they metastasize. At worst, operating indirectly through relationships will build consensus for follow-on 

multilateral solutions, disarming Robert Kagan’s concern over the unilateral use of direct U.S. military power and its accompanying international 

opprobrium.

Regardless of results gained via the indirect approach, U.S. leaders must 

appreciate the primacy of the approach’s enabling relationships and the 

fundamental fact that “empowered” non-U.S. actors achieve desired results. 

Granting non-U.S. actors ownership of achieved results legitimizes their 

actions and resource expenditures, demonstrates “buy-in,” and strengthens 

relationships with the U.S. In so doing, the U.S. validates the actor’s decision 
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship, increasing the likelihood of 

recurrent exchanges. Furthermore, by establishing and maintaining a tradition of reliable partnerships, U.S. leaders increase the value of our country’s 

“brand name,” strengthening existing relationships and expanding the locus 

of actors willing to work on our behalf.46 Consequently, when working “indirectly” with non-U.S. actors, U.S. leaders should eschew short-term gains 

that could jeopardize long-term relationships (e.g., misrepresenting the value 

and difficulty of projects to garner and exploit short-term participation). 

As with any method, the indirect approach has disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the U.S. will not have direct control over actions, making 

the assessment of the overall strategy performance and effectiveness much 

more difficult. Moreover, the need to depend on the actions of others can 

retard timely response, especially in flashpoint or crisis situations where 

requisite relationships do not exist. Additionally, unintended consequences 

from an actor’s increased capacity and will can be a thorny issue, as illustrated by Tito’s unforecasted offensive actions in Yugoslavia.47

Conclusion

In a world in which America is increasingly perceived as “favoring policies 

of coercion rather than persuasion [and]...punitive sanctions over inducements,” the U.S. military must overcome its “psychological bias” toward 

direct rather than indirect solutions.48 The traditional, direct application 

of America’s military power in today’s globalized, international structure 

increasingly thwarts vice facilitates the realization of operational objectives. 

The U.S. military must expand its “institutional repertoire” and embrace 

other solutions.49 The indirect methodology of “through, with, or by” offers 

combatant commanders another option—an approach that focuses on 

mutually beneficial interactions and, as a result, does not promote perceptions of hegemonic intent. 

Unlike direct applications of military power, this indirect methodology 

seeks to use relationships with other actors and shared recognition of a 

common problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Such relationships provide a context in which combatant commanders furnish actors 

with the capacity and will to resolve mutual problems, directly supporting 

achievement of U.S. operational objectives. This method can be the basis 

for an entire campaign or support a more direct application of U.S. military 
33

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

power. Hence, “through, with, or by” arms the combatant commander with 

a nontraditional, indirect alternative for realizing operational objectives in 

a global environment where the direct approach is increasingly counterproductive and costly. 

Endnotes

1. In this context, the word “direct” connotes the manifest use (or threatened use) 

of American military power to achieve policy goals. For example, “boots on the 

ground”—troops committed overseas—in support of American policy objectives 

falls under the rubric of “direct” applications of military power. 

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 

Public Affairs, 2004), 5. Joseph Nye breaks down a nation’s power into two broad 

categories: “hard” and “soft” power. Hard power is typically applied directly and 

“rests on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’).” Typically, a nation’s hard 

power stems from its military, economy, or the influence thereof. Soft power, on 

the other hand, is defined by Nye as “the second face of power.” “It is the ability to 

get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises 

from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” 

3. Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review no. 113 (June and July 2002): 

10-15. The majority of Kagan’s piece focuses on explaining the nature of divergent American and European world views since the end of the Cold War. Kagan 

attributes this gulf to two factors:

 The strength of the United States versus the relative weakness of Europe—

“American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. 

Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to 

the exercise of military power.” 

 A strong United States continues to deal with security challenges using traditional 

power politics, whereas “Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system [which stresses] diplomacy, engagement, [and] 

inducements over sanctions...” 

4. Nye, 26-27, 81. The French-led, anti-U.S. bloc in the run up to the 2003 invasion 

of Iraq is an example of counterbalancing perceived U.S. hegemony. 

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 12 April 2005 

and as amended through 5 January 2007), 562. 

6. Mark Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” Special Warfare

(Summer 1998): 37; J. H. Crerar, “Special Forces Core Purpose: A Second Opinion,” 

Special Warfare (Winter 1999): 16. The concept of working “through, with, or by 

indigenous populations” is viewed by many within the Special Forces community as being a core purpose of Special Forces. However, neither the joint nor the 

Special Forces communities have a codified definition for “through, with, or by,” 

nor is the concept linked to tactical tasks in their respective doctrine. As a result, 

the concept of working “through, with, or by” means different things to different 
34

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

people. Thus, defining “through, with, or by” has value in that it promotes development of a common understanding. 

7. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. “with.” Coming up with 

distinct dictionary definitions for “through,” “with,” and “by” is difficult because 

the terms tend to be used to define one another. If nothing else, this fact indicates 

the ambiguity between the terms and the need to identify their differences. 

8. The concept of “with” also clearly applies to the relationship present between 

formal allies or coalition partners. However, in this paper the definition of “with” 

is confined to its applicability to working indirectly through surrogates and 

proxies. 

9. Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 

11-12. Not only does the example of SOE/OSS operations with Tito’s Partisans 

superbly illustrate that mutually beneficial outcomes are integral to working 

“with” another actor, it also demonstrates that both sides’ motives do not necessarily need to be coincident to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. The OSS 

operatives were operating alongside the partisans to ensure that the maximum 

number of German divisions were tied down in the Balkans and unavailable for 

commitment elsewhere. The Partisans, on the other hand, were fighting both 

to liberate Yugoslavia from the heel of German occupation and secure political 

power after the war. 

10. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. “through.”

11. This is not meant to imply that the relationships developed in working “through” 

another are fleeting or short-termed in nature. Two actors can conceivably develop 

a deep, long-term relationship with one another based purely on a relationship 

characterized as “through.” 

12. This statement is based on the author’s experiences while commanding the detachment that conducted the FID mission. 

13. “Militants Killed’ by Yemeni Forces,” BBC News, U.K. Edition, 25 June 2003, 

available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east /3019746.stm (accessed 

6 February 2007); Michael Clark, “In the Spotlight: The Islamic Army of Aden 

(IAA),” Center for Defense Information, 23 November 2004, available from www.

cdi.org/program/document.cfm? DocumentID=2679&from_page=../index.cfm 

(accessed 6 February 2007). 

14. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. “by.” 

15. Alvin J. Cottrell, “Iran’s Armed Forces under the Pahlavi Dynasty,” in Iran Under 

the Pahlavis, edited by George Lenczowski (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 

1978), 398, 401. 

 Noteworthy is that America’s decision to work indirectly “through” Iran can 

be traced directly to the Nixon Doctrine—itself an indirect strategy, albeit at 

the strategic level. Jeffrey Kimball, author of “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of 

Misunderstanding,” identifies the key tenet of the doctrine as America’s reliance 

on its allies to shoulder the primary burden of defending themselves against 

communist encroachment, while America limited its involvement to providing 

military and economic assistance as well as advice. 
35

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

16. Cottrell, 418-425. 

17. Ibid., 407-408. Iran intervened in the Dhofar Rebellion in 1973 at the request of 

Sultan Qaboos of Oman. According to Calvin H. Allen Jr’s Oman Under Qaboos: 

From Coup to Constitution 1970-1996, direct Iranian military involvement in 

Dhofar lasted until 1979. At the height of their involvement, the Iranian commitment numbered anywhere from 1,500 to 2,000 men with rotary-wing, fixed-wing, 

and naval support. 

18. Scott S. Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1997), 13. Gartner describes the behavior of a rational actor as “not just intelligent 

behavior, but...behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a 

calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value 

system.”

19. Rationality, in this case, relates more to beliefs and value systems than it does to 

logic. As long as the actor believes that he is acting in his best interest according 

to his belief system, then he is acting rationally. For example, a suicide bomber 

who chooses to kill himself in the belief that he will become a martyr and gain 

entry into paradise is acting rationally. He is choosing the best possible outcome, 

given his beliefs and values, from amongst a range of possibilities. Although the 

suicide bomber’s logic may appear flawed or uninformed from a Western perspective that places a premium on individual life, the individual is striving to obtain 

a desired outcome and, as a result, acting rationally.

20. U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: 27 

September 2001), 6-3. The Marine Corps defines operational design as the “commander’s tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into 

the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and his staff.” The 

most current version of JP 5-0: Joint Operational Planning defines the same term 

as “the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign 

or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.” 

21. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Washington, 

DC: GPO, 17 September 2006), IV-13. The most current joint publication states 

that LOOs are used to “link multiple actions on nodes and/or decisive points with 

military objectives using the logic of purpose-cause and effect. Logical LOOs 

also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary 

instruments of national power.” LOOs are “used when positional reference to an 

enemy has little relevance.” 

22. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning

(Washington, DC: GPO, 26 December 2006), IV-35. 

23. Lindsay, 11. 

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Lindsay’s relationship vis-à-vis the Partisans, although best characterized as 

working “with” them, did not involve building the Partisans’ capacity or will 

through training. From the Partisan perspective, working “with” the OSS/SOE 

was beneficial only in as much as it built their military capacity. 
36

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

26. Lindsay, 200-202. For the specific results of Lindsay’s mission to cut the rail lines 

through Stajerska, see pages 84-87.

27. Ibid., 26, 265-267.

28. Ibid., 291. 

29. Whether or not the Western Allies had a realistic choice to not provide material 

support to the communist Partisan in Yugoslavia can be argued. Additionally, 

one could also effectively argue that the Western Allies, the British in particular, 

were aware of the communists’ postwar designs. However, the fact remains that by 

providing Tito with the capacity to take meaningful action against the Germans 

in the Balkans, he was also given the capacity to consolidate communist control 

in Yugoslavia and grab territory in the immediate aftermath of the war. The U.S. 

and U.K. worked “with” the Partisans to solve the immediate problem of defeating 

the Germans but thereby exacerbated a problem for themselves in the postwar 

world. 

30. Kenneth R. Bowra, “An Historical Study: The U.S. Army Vietnam Individual 

Training Group (UITG) Program, 1971-1973,” Individual Study Project (Carlisle, 

PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991), 1. Interestingly, the UITG Program provides 

an example of multiple, developed actors working “with” undeveloped actors 

because the program was staffed not only by Americans but also Australians and 

New Zealanders.

31. Ibid., 3. The Khmer government came to power by overthrowing the former 

regime under Prince Sihanouk who had broken diplomatic relations with the 

United States in 1963. 

32. Ibid., 7. U.S. Special Forces were not permitted to train Cambodian forces in 

Cambodia due to the Cooper-Church Amendment (1970). It “prohibited the use of 

funds for the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, 

or to provide United States advisors.”

33. Ibid., 15, 19. The UITG was redesignated as the FANK Field Training Command 

after the 1972 Easter Offensive. 

34. Ibid., 26. Bowra cites Lieutenant General Phan Trong Chinh, chief of the ARVN 

Central Training Command, who attested to the effectiveness of the training 

program and its effect on the ARVN in the wake of the 1972 Easter Offensive. “If 

it had not been for the FANK Training Command, there would not be an I Corps 

today.” 

35. Ibid., 10, 26. One of the rapport building measures undertaken by the UITG was 

their decision to wear the colors of the Khmer Republic on their beret flashes. 

36. Thomas Fargo, Remarks at Military Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, 

British Columbia, 3 May 2004; available from www.pacom.mil/speeches/

sst2004/040503milops.shtml (accessed 13 February 2007). 

37. Sumathy Permal, “Piracy and Sovereignty in the Strait of Malacca,” Centre for 

Maritime Security and Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 11 May 2005; 

www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/ pdf/sumathy/som-piracy.pdf (accessed 

14 February 2007), 3.
37

Homiak: Expanding the American Way of War

38. House Armed Services Committee, Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo 

Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 31 March 2004, www.pacom.mil/

speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml (accessed 13 February 

2007), 7. 

39. House Armed Services Committee, Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo Thomas 

Fargo, Question & Answer Session, 31 March 2004; available from www.pacom.

mil/speeches/sst2004/040331hasc-qa.shtml (accessed 13 February 2007), 2.

40. John Burton and Shawn Donnan, “U.S. Plan to Guard Strait of Malacca Not 

Welcome,” Financial Times, 6 April 2004; available from http://search.ft.com/

ftArticle?queryText=US+Plan+to+Guard+Strait+of+Malacca&aje=true&id= 

040406001090> (accessed 14 February 2007). 

41. Permal, 3.

42. Patrick Goodenough, “Renewal of U.S.-Malaysia Pact a Sign of Improving Ties,” 

CNSNews.com, 9 May 2005; available from www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus

%5Carchive%5C200505%5CFOR20050509c.html (accessed 14 February 2007). 

Goodenough’s article describes a marked improvement in U.S.-Malaysian relations, despite Malaysia’s initial negative response to Admiral Fargo’s remarks and 

specifically mentions the U.S. desire to work “with” the regional partners within 

the context of RMSI. Furthermore, the article reports as follows:

 “Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have established joint patrols in the Strait”

 U.S. offered Indonesia “expertise in the policing of ships.” 

43. Brian Harp, “Excluding Unconventional Warfare Solutions: Conventional 

Thinking in the Military’s Educational System,” Unpublished Monograph, Naval 

Postgraduate School, 1. Harp contends that the U.S. military, as a whole, does not 

understand UW operations and, by default, the indirect approaches such operations employ. 

44. Boyatt, “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?” 37; Mark Boyatt, 

“Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations,” Special Warfare

(October 1994): 11. Colonel Boyatt identifies the “core purpose of Special Forces 

[as]...accomplishing Special Forces missions through, with, or by indigenous 

populations.”

45. It is the author’s contention that “understanding” another culture is a misnomer. 

Unless one comes from that culture, the best that can be hoped for is an appreciation for how the culture makes decisions and views the world. 

46. In this case, the economic term “brand name” is synonymous with Joseph Nye’s 

concept of “soft power.” 

47. The issue of how other actors or agents employ their newly acquired capacity is a 

perennial problem. It relates directly to UW and the problem of disarming proxy 

forces in the aftermath of hostilities. At a minimum, a two-part solution exists 

for this problem at the operational level:

 First, planners must identify the minimum capacity required to solve a given 

problem, enabling the development of tailored capabilities vice creating superfluous capacity. 
38

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

 Second, planners must appreciate the goals and motivating factors of partner 

actors. Such an appreciation guards against second- or third-order effects begetting unintended consequences. 

48. Kagan, 1; Gilles Andréani, “The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation,” Survival 41 

no. 4 (Winter 1999-2000): 43.

49. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-

GVN Performance in Vietnam, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, RAND Corporation, 

August 1972, 145. 
39

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century

Kelly H. Smith

The tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or 

conventional versus unconventional, is of little value in developing 

guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. 

Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. 

operations that involve non-U.S. forces. This framework also provides an analysis of the surrogate warfare environment to determine 

the appropriate role of both conventional and Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) in conducting surrogate warfare operations.

Surrogate Warfare

What do the Northern Alliance, the Pashtun tribal militias, the 

Kurdish Peshmerga fighter, and army and ministry of interior 

police units from the Republic of Georgia, Afghan National 

Army, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces have in common? They are not all 

unconventional warfare forces or the targets of foreign internal defense—the 

two operational frameworks available. They are also not all irregular forces. 

However, they are all foreign and involved in combating terrorism and counterinsurgency operations with the United States in pursuit of U.S. objectives. 

They are all fulfilling roles that the United States either does not have the 

capability or the will to do with U.S. forces. They are all surrogate forces. 

Surrogate: An Updated Concept for a Contemporary World. The concept of using surrogates is not new to U.S. warfare. However, the guidance 

for how the U.S. incorporates surrogate forces into its military guidance is 

incomplete. Updating the concept of surrogate warfare and integrating it 

Major Kelly Smith is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. This excerpt was from 

a paper he wrote while attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) 

where he obtained his Masters of Military Arts and Science. He is currently assigned to Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina
40

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

in a useful manner into U.S. strategy, policy, and doctrine will increase the 

effective options available to future military and national security planners. 

This enhanced concept of surrogate warfare will close the doctrinal gap that 

exists under the constructs of regular versus irregular and conventional 

versus unconventional warfare. 

A surrogate, in its simplest sense, takes the place of something or 

someone.1 The surrogate is also a proxy for a particular function or set of 

functions. The word surrogate is not meant to be pejorative, but rather an 

expression that conveys substitution of one for another. Generally it implies 

that the surrogate is acting on behalf of the interests of another and is in 

some way distinct from the source of its authority to act. It is possible, in 

fact probable, that the surrogate will have interests of its own as well. 

The United States use of surrogates has ranged from the employment of 

a few individuals with special skills to entire armies and from the founding of the nation to the most recent conflicts. The fight for independence 

from Great Britain was the baptism of the U.S. Army. This initial conflict 

included a heavy reliance on surrogates. The U.S. depended heavily on the 

French, both its forces in Canada and its navy, as it organized itself to repel 

the British Army.2 In the century after independence, the fledgling army 

supported the U.S. expansion to the west by fighting wars against Mexico 

and the native Americans. The use of surrogates was limited during these 

frontier clashes, but many instances occurred in which the U.S. Army relied 

upon guides and translators from sympathetic or coerced Indians. 

In the brutal fighting against Filipino guerrillas during the Philippine 

War of 1899–1902, U.S. forces were continuously handicapped by their inability to penetrate ethnic tribal areas. One example of successful employment 

of surrogates was the creation of the Macabebe Scouts, an indigenous force 

that was opposed to the pro-independence guerrillas. The Macabebe Scouts 

took the place of U.S. Army forces that could not gain access to enemy 

strongholds.3

During the turmoil in Nicaragua from 1926 to 1933, Nicaraguan guardsmen served as surrogate partners with U.S. Marines against the liberal rebel 

group, led by Augusto Sandino, in Nicaragua in 1927.4 The relationship 

between the Marines and the indigenous forces made certain that Sandino 

was seen as fighting his own countrymen instead of resisting an American 

occupation. 
41

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

The allied forces in World War II sought out surrogate forces that could 

provide strategic challenges for the axis powers or conduct economy-offorce operations for the allies. The peak of U.S. surrogate warfare was 

during World War II. The Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the forerunner 

of modern Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, was responsible for U.S. surrogate operations. OSS teams trained, advised, and assisted 

French resistance elements and also aided partisan forces in Yugoslavia in 

an organized effort against German forces. OSS Detachment 101 developed 

and employed surrogates against the Japanese in Burma by building a guerrilla army of native tribesmen.5

Despite the historical significance of surrogate warfare, the 

current U.S. policy guidance on 

surrogates is decidedly lacking. The 

Department of Defense dictionary 

does not define the term surrogate 

or surrogate warfare. The term, surrogate, finds its way into current doctrine as an element within the definition of unconventional warfare. In this 

context, unconventional warfare is the use of either indigenous or surrogate 

forces. The Army’s manual on Special Forces Operations simply defines a 

surrogate as, “someone who takes the place of or acts for another.” 6

The best way to redefine surrogate, in terms of establishing a framework 

of warfare, is to take a more comprehensive approach that incorporates 

contemporary operational realities. A surrogate is an entity outside of the 

Department of Defense (i.e., indigenous to the location of the conflict, from 

a third country, partner nation, alliance, or from another U.S. organization) that performs specific functions that assist in the accomplishment 

of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S.

military either does not have or does not desire to employ. This new definition accounts for the wide range of forces and relationships that the United 

States may leverage in pursuit of national policy objectives. It also recognizes 

that in many cases entities outside of the U.S. military may exist that have 

superior capability in certain functions or are preferred because of political factors. 

The use of a substitute force is the defining characteristic of surrogate 

warfare. There are a wide variety of reasons that the United States may 

Despite the historical significance 

of surrogate warfare, the current 

U.S. policy guidance on surrogates 

is decidedly lacking.
42

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

establish a partnership with a surrogate. Likewise, many types of surrogates 

exist. Also, surrogate warfare can be conducted against the entire spectrum 

of adversaries. 

The use of surrogates may benefit the United States in a number of ways. 

Political legitimacy is one of the most fundamental reasons for seeking to 

include non-U.S. forces in operations. The involvement of external forces, 

which take the place of additional U.S. forces, establishes a broader base of 

political support for military intervention. The desire for legitimacy can 

range from the strengthening of existing alliances, as in the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo, to the building of specific coalitions, as in Operation Desert Storm and the war on terrorism. 

Another fundamental value of including surrogates is that it reduces 

the demand on U.S. forces. This aspect is especially true when including 

regular military forces from industrialized partners. The inclusion of NATO

airplanes in the bombing campaign in Kosovo reduced the number of U.S.

aircraft that needed to be used. Similarly, the contributions of coalition 

forces in Iraq lowered the requirement for U.S. forces, a critical benefit that 

allowed the United States to sustain the current level of operations. 

An often overlooked reason to use surrogate forces is that they may 

provide capabilities that the United States lacks. The superiority of U.S.

military forces is widely acknowledged and seems to contradict the notion 

that someone else has a capability that the United States does not. The most 

significant contribution of a surrogate may be their ethnicity, language, or 

culture. Conflict in the 21st Century is increasingly likely to involve ethnic 

or cultural disputes in regions of the world vastly different than the western 

culture of the United States. The ability to use surrogates to connect with the 

populations and gain their support, as well as provide a better understanding of the culture, is an important reason to consider surrogate warfare as 

a military option.7

A surrogate is not inherently inferior to the sponsor. Surrogates can 

range from the most advanced military forces in the world to third-world 

tribal militias. It is also possible for the United States to be used as a surrogate force by others. The heavy reliance by many nations on U.S. intelligence and communications support, especially space-based systems, is an 

example. The frequent employment of U.S. strategic lift to move peacekeeping forces in support of the United Nations or the African Union is another. 

The concept of surrogate warfare is not contingent upon the quantitative or 
43

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

qualitative value of the foreign force but rather on the relationship between 

the sponsor and the surrogate. 

The concepts of irregular or unconventional warfare are overly focused 

on the tactics employed by the forces involved. Surrogate warfare is defined 

as being independent from the tactical approaches used by the surrogate 

force. Many of what are commonly considered irregular tactics—guerrilla 

warfare, support to insurgencies, sabotage and subversion, and intelligence 

activities—can be conducted under the umbrella of surrogate warfare. 

However, surrogate warfare can also include high technology precision 

strikes and combined arms maneuver warfare. 

Surrogate warfare also avoids the trap of defining warfare based on the 

tactics of the enemy. The current interpretation of irregular warfare is based 

in large part on the adversary tactics. Specifically, if the enemy is using 

irregular tactics, then from a U.S. perspective it is irregular warfare.8 Given 

this framework, the launching of cruise missiles against Al Qaeda camps 

in Afghanistan, in response to the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa, is 

irregular warfare. One can adopt this definitional framework but it is of little 

use for formulating U.S. policy or doctrine on the employment of non-U.S.

forces. Additionally, an adaptive enemy is likely to change its tactics during a 

conflict, thus exacerbating the difficulties in understanding the operational 

environment. Surrogate warfare focuses on the elements of conflict that 

the U.S. can control, the inclusion of surrogate forces or not, and provides 

a solid foundation for the development of guidance for surrogate warfare 

against all types of adversary. 

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of a new understanding of surrogate warfare is the impact of the concept of U.S. sponsor force involvement. 

The existing guidance generally portrays a continuum in which the more 

irregular a conflict the greater the reliance on SOF. U.S. SOF have critical 

roles to play when the United States conducts operations through, with, 

or by foreign forces. However, the U.S. can maximize the effectiveness of 

its surrogate warfare operations by including the extensive capabilities of 

conventional forces in an appropriate balance of forces. 

Figure 1 illustrates that the concept of surrogate warfare provides a comprehensive framework that includes all the potential non-U.S. forces that 

may be employed in operations that support U.S. national interest. The level 

of involvement of U.S. conventional and SOF is no longer just a function of 

the type of operation. The graph across the top of Figure 1 illustrates that 
44

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

there are requirements for special operations and conventional forces in 

all types of military operations. The level of effort required of each force 

needs to be determined not just on the type of operation but also by the 

characteristics of the surrogate environment. 

Right Force, Right Place, Right Time. The concept of surrogate warfare expands the potential U.S. forces that will be associated with surrogate 

operations, beyond just SOF. This framework will provide a broader range 

of options to strategic planners. As a result, a model is required to evaluate 

options and make recommendations so that the right (i.e., most appropriate) 

U.S. force is employed based on the characteristics of the potential surrogate 

operations. Recognizing that the distinction between SOF and conventional 

forces has been an historic difference, criteria should be designed to inform 

the selection of the U.S. force to use. The factors most appropriate to making 

this decision are the nature of the potential surrogate, the types of operations the surrogate is expected to conduct, the austerity of the physical environment, the threat level of the operational environment, and the political 

sensitivities associated with the proposed operations. 

Figure 1. Surrogate Warfare

* Translates a type of operation to a type of force.

† Surrogate warfare provides a framework for all the options for employing indigenous forces of all types (regular and irregular). 

‡ The level of involvement between conventional and Special Operations Forces varies based on each particular operational situation.

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

U.S. Force 

Involvement 

‡

Type of

Operation

Coalition 

Warfare

Regular 

Military

ParaMilitaryParaMilitaryParaMilitaryParaMilitary *Insurgent 

Elements

Regular 

Military

Regular 

Military

Regular 

Military *

Guerrilla

Military

Counter 

Insurgency 

Warfare

Foreign 

Internal 

Defense

Unconventional 

Warfare

Type of

Non-U.S. 

Forces

Involved

Surrogate Warfare †
45

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

Potential surrogates range from modern, allied armies to revolutionary, third-world individuals. Where on this continuum a surrogate, in a 

proposed operation, falls is critical for determining the ways the United 

States will use to integrate the surrogate effort. In particular, the nature of 

the surrogate will be one of the factors for selecting the appropriate U.S.

force to conduct the surrogate operation. There are two key variables in 

describing a potential surrogate—the level of military organization and 

the level of control. 

The requirements to conduct operations with a surrogate organized into 

a recognized military structure (e.g., companies, battalions, and support 

units) are clearly different than organizing and employing the elements of a 

resistance movement (i.e., guerillas, underground, and auxiliary). In general 

the greater the level of military organization of the surrogate, the greater the 

range of U.S. forces capable of executing the surrogate operation. However, 

if the surrogate does not resemble a conventional military force, it is likely 

that SOF will be the preferred force to leverage the surrogate capability. 

In a similar vein, selecting the type of U.S. force to conduct surrogate 

warfare is informed by the level of control exercised over the surrogate. 

Control can be in the form of direct legal or political means or as a result 

of the degree of shared interests between the surrogate and the sponsor. 

Regardless of its source, a higher degree of control is desired in order for 

conventional forces, especially at the small unit level, to be able to operate 

by, with, and through a surrogate partner. 

Another factor is the types of operations that the surrogate force either 

needs to be trained in or is expected to be able to execute with its existing 

level of training and readiness. U.S. forces are proficient in a wide range of 

skills. However, conventional and SOF each have their areas of expertise. 

Planners must be cognizant of the expected operational tasks to be executed 

by the surrogate force and any associated training requirements. U.S. surrogate warfare capacity is limited if the entire range of Department of Defense 

assets are not considered for employment. SOF are the preeminent trainers of foreign fighters. However, many military functions exist that could 

be more effectively trained and advised by non-SOF units. Brigade-level 

combined-arms operations, theater logistics, and peace support operations 

are but a few examples of surrogate operations that conventional units might 

conduct. 
46

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

The physical environment is another factor for evaluating the assignment of forces to a surrogate warfare operation. Even as the U.S. military 

transforms into an expeditionary force, most units require the establishment 

of significant logistical infrastructure to sustain them. Tactical formations 

are designed to integrate into an echeloned system capable of providing 

everything from basic life support and maintenance to medical care. These 

logistical challenges can be reduced if sufficient infrastructure exists in the 

host nation, especially in noncombat surrogate operations. Austere environments without a robust local infrastructure require self-supportable units 

to conduct training or operations. The Special Forces A-team represents the 

SOF answer to operations in austere environments. The decision of whether 

to deploy an A-team or a company of instructors from a military training 

school depends in large measure on the level of support available either from 

the host nation or other U.S. military units in the area of operations. 

The operational environment includes more than just physical elements. 

The threat situation has a direct and significant impact on surrogate operations. Force protection is a continuous concern for U.S. military forces 

working overseas. However, the requirements for protecting the force are 

not as significant for a unit conducting foreign internal defense (FID) in a 

permissive environment as for one organizing and employing a resistance 

force in a denied area or for the integration of a coalition battalion in major 

combat operations. The threats for these operations can differ in magnitude 

and kind. 

The U.S. sponsor must be capable of addressing these threats. In some 

cases host-nation security forces can provide adequate security. In other 

cases the sponsor finds force protection with the surrogate itself or by operating in a clandestine manner. Another option is for the United States to 

deploy with enough combat power to deter hostile forces and if deterrence 

fails to defeat the threat. There is no singular answer as to which U.S. forces 

are best suited to a particular threat situation. However, SOF generally do 

not have the firepower to defeat large-scale threats—without relying on the 

surrogate force—but instead use stealth and cultural awareness to reduce 

vulnerabilities. Conversely, if large conventional formations have already 

been introduced to an area of operations, they can assist in protecting sponsor units. 

Surrogate operations are susceptible to political influences. U.S., adversary, and international political interests, as well as the surrogate interests, 
47

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

are all competing in the strategic environment. The sensitivity of this political environment is an important factor for considering the Department of 

Defense surrogate sponsor. 

The wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq finds a potentially diminished political will, domestically and internationally for the commitment 

of significant U.S. military forces, for unilateral or surrogate operations. 

Additionally, a high operations tempo has limited the U.S. force pool available for extended operations. In such circumstances the lower signature of 

small SOF elements, which have established a long precedence of foreign 

deployments, may be a much more politically feasible option. The United 

States may prefer the use of larger, more visible options in cases where the 

demonstration of U.S. resolve or deterrence is the desired effect. 

Conventional forces and SOF each have capabilities and limitations that 

make them better suited for certain surrogate warfare operations. Figure 2 

depicts the relationship of these capabilities and limitations with respect to 

five significant elements of the surrogate warfare environment. The chart 

depicts the most suitable force to serve as a surrogate sponsor given the 

characteristics of a particular element. 

Figure 2. U.S. Force Employment Criteria

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

Special Operations Forces

Conventional Forces

Resistance Forces, Weak 

Gov’t Control,

Fragmented

Standing Force,

Strong Gov’t Control,

Institutionalized

Basic Military Training,

Maneuver Warfare, 

Stability Operations

Good HN Infrastructure,

U.S. Sustainment Assets

Permissive, 

HN Force Protection Avail.,

U.S. combat forces Avail.

Supportive of operation,

No limit on footprint,

Overt presence

Strikes and Raids, 

Intelligence Activities, 

Special Operations, 

Deep Operations

Austere Setting, 

No other U.S. forces, 

Limited infrastructure

Denied or Hostile, 

No add’l U.S. forces

Low-visibility, 

HN or U.S. cannot 

support a large footprint, 

Limit to U.S. commitment

Organization of 

the Surrogate 

Force

Surrogate Force 

Training and 

Operations 

Requirements

Political 

Sensitivity of 

the Operating 

Environment

= Appropriate Force Decision

Physical 

Environment

Threat

Environment

Must 

Consider 

All of the 

Operational 

Criteria
48

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

SOF provide the tailored capability for U.S. surrogate warfare when the 

surrogate force is a fledgling resistance organization or in a FID environment 

in which the organization and governmental control of the military is weak. 

It also takes SOF capabilities to train surrogates to do special operations 

or to operate for extended periods of time in denied territory. SOF have 

been manned, trained, and equipped in ways that allow them to sustain 

themselves and their operations without the assistance of host-nation or 

U.S. logistics. This capability makes them suitable to lead surrogate warfare operations in austere environments. The low visibility and clandestine 

capability of SOF also provides them with unique force protection options 

in high threat areas when U.S. combat power is limited or nonexistent. 

Finally, the same low visibility capability supports the employment of SOF

if political sensitivities preclude the deployment of larger, more overt U.S.

formations.

Conventional forces can lend their significant capabilities to surrogate 

warfare as well. The large numbers of conventional forces, relative to SOF, 

implies that there is a deep pool of potential surrogate trainers. Conventional 

forces are very capable of working with a surrogate force that is organized 

in a recognizable military fashion and is responsive to the control of the 

government. In many cases the surrogate training requirements can be met 

with conventional force trainers. Basic military training, small-unit tactics, 

stability operations, and staff functions are all well within the realm of 

conventional force expertise, and the United States should seek to leverage 

that expertise whenever possible. A limitation of conventional forces is their 

sustainment requirements. However, if the proposed surrogate warfare environment mitigates this limitation either through host-nation infrastructure 

and support or the existing or desired presence of U.S. logistical support, 

then conventional forces may serve as a surrogate sponsor. 

In many areas of the world the threat to U.S. forces of any size is fairly 

low. In such cases conventional forces can operate freely in relatively small 

numbers to accomplish FID or other surrogate operations. Higher threat 

areas require either a commitment of host-nation security forces or perhaps U.S. combat forces to protect the conventional force sponsor. The idea 

that nothing sends a political message like the deployment of a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit speaks to the last element of the surrogate warfare environment. The U.S. interest may be best served by demonstrating resolve to 

an ally by using visible conventional forces to increase the interoperability 
49

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

and enhance the surrogate’s capability. Conventional forces are more effective in these demonstration or deterrent political situations. 

Seldom will all of the elements of a potential surrogate operation imply 

either a pure special operations or conventional force solution. The challenge 

for planners is to recognize that all of the elements must be considered and 

prioritized to determine the best mix of U.S. forces to conduct the surrogate 

warfare operation. 

Conclusion

The U.S. military’s latest attempt to categorize conflict has emphasized the 

distinction between regular and irregular warfare. The United States distinguishes these two types of warfare based upon the participation of irregular 

forces or the utilization of irregular tactics by either belligerent. This framework permits the description of U.S. unilateral conventional operations as 

irregular on the basis of an irregularity of some enemy tactical choices. Such 

a model describes the inclusion of a third-party nation’s military forces in a 

coalition as regular warfare if the threat is operating as a conventional military force. The inadequacies of this approach are exacerbated because the 

preponderance of irregular warfare concept development and operations are 

relegated to SOF. U.S. SOF possess significant capabilities in waging irregular 

warfare, but U.S. conventional forces do also. The future will demand, perhaps unprecedented, U.S. reliance on the participation of indigenous forces 

in their military operations.9 The presence or absence of non-U.S. forces is 

a critical distinguishing characteristic that is not recognized in the regular 

versus irregular warfare model. This shortfall should be rectified in order 

for the United States to maximize the benefits of including foreign forces 

into military planning.

The U.S. military has endured the significant demands of the first 5 years 

of the war on terrorism. These operational requirements have strained the 

U.S. capacity to respond to strategic requirements beyond the near-term 

objectives of the war on terrorism. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

U.S. freedom of action has been constrained in the domestic and international political environment. Simultaneously, many countries in the world 

are either unwilling (lack the desire) or unable (lack the capability) to control 

their territory, thus providing the potential for terrorist sanctuary or the 

escalation of regional conflict. The enemies of the United States are fully 
50

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

capable of recognizing and exploiting this strategic situation. The effective 

employment of surrogate forces can contribute significantly to the U.S. ability 

to counter these threats and accomplish its strategic objectives.

The ability to integrate foreign partners, of all types, into U.S. operations 

is not just a requirement for the future but is a present day reality. Relying 

on their professionalism and adaptability, U.S. forces are “figuring it out on 

the ground” when it comes to leveraging the strengths of surrogate forces 

and mitigating their weaknesses. The effectiveness of U.S. units would be 

greatly enhanced, and their efforts would produce greater strategic benefit, 

if the Department of Defense developed comprehensive guidance on surrogate warfare. The objectives of U.S. strategy and policy and a doctrinal 

methodology for conducting surrogate operations are not currently synchronized. The existing guidance is a convoluted set of terms and operations 

that alternate between a focus on the organization of the indigenous forces 

and their tactics.

A review of contemporary U.S. military operations illustrates the lack 

of a comprehensive approach to incorporating surrogates into the effort. 

The majority of the guidance for dealing with surrogate forces is found 

in the doctrine for unconventional warfare and FID. If the surrogate is a 

modern military power, joint doctrine addresses their integration into a 

coalition organization. FID, unconventional warfare, and coalition warfare 

are restricted to relatively narrow sets of circumstances, and they are viewed 

as distinct operations without a conceptual linkage between them. The reliance on SOF for the conduct of FID and unconventional warfare, combined 

with majority of the guidance on coalition warfare focused at the Joint Task 

Force level, reinforces the segregation of these operations. The totality of 

these circumstances results in an unfortunate limiting of U.S. options for 

using foreign forces.

The concept of surrogate warfare overcomes the incompleteness of irregular warfare, establishes a conceptual linkage between existing doctrinal 

operations, and provides a comprehensive range of options for strategic 

planners. It also facilitates the expansion of the discussion and the preparation of forces to employ surrogates beyond just SOF. The codification of 

surrogate warfare can be informed by the historical uses of foreign forces 

by the U.S. military and is consistent with that history as well as the predictions for future operations.
51

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

Surrogate warfare is the conduct of operations by, with, or through an 

entity outside of the U.S. military, performing specific functions that take the 

place of capabilities the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire 

to employ. The key to surrogate warfare is that it is defined by the inclusion 

of a force on behalf of the United States and not on the tactics or type of 

organization of one of the belligerents. Surrogate warfare is conceptually 

broad enough to provide guidance for the integration of any foreign entity, 

without being vulnerable to the wavering of enemy tactics.

A holistic approach to surrogate 

warfare will allow the United States 

to better reap the benefits of operating with proxies by ensuring the most 

effective allocation of U.S. force to 

maximize the advantages the surrogate offers. One of the most significant 

benefits is the increased likelihood of gaining political legitimacy for the 

operation itself. Another advantage is the practical savings in terms of U.S.

lives, treasure, and operations tempo when partners are enlisted to share 

the burdens of warfare. The widely acknowledged importance of civilian 

populations in future conflicts alludes to another advantage of incorporating 

foreign forces into U.S. campaigns. Surrogate forces that are indigenous to 

the country or regions of conflict possess inherent cultural and language 

capabilities that the United States cannot replicate. This advantage leads to 

both increased operational effectiveness and increased potential for civilian support. 

In order to gain these benefits, the paradigm of relegating surrogate 

operations to SOF must be reconsidered. A holistic approach to surrogate 

warfare seeks to leverage the advantages of conventional and SOF by applying them to the most appropriate surrogate operations. Instead of categorizing the operational environment as regular or irregular and employing 

conventional or SOF respectively, a surrogate warfare operation has several 

elements each of which contribute to determining the appropriate U.S. force 

to use for integrating the surrogate. These elements account for the level of 

organization and control of the proposed surrogate, the envisioned training 

and operational requirements of the surrogate, the infrastructure available 

to support the U.S. sponsor, the threat against U.S. forces, and the political 

sensitivity of the operation. The establishment of surrogate warfare guidance 

for the entire U.S. military permits the employment of both conventional 

A holistic approach to surrogate 

warfare will...maximize the 

advantages the surrogate offers. 
52

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

and SOF consistent with the demands of the environment while maintaining unity of effort. 

Surrogate warfare is part of the history of the United States and will 

certainly be part of its future. The development of comprehensive guidance 

on the use of surrogates will allow the United States to realize the significant 

benefits of conducting operations by, with, and through our partners around 

the world. Embracing surrogate warfare does not prevent or degrade the 

United States from acting unilaterally. Rather, it may increase the ability to 

act unilaterally when required by preserving political capital and national 

resources. Surrogate warfare expands the options available for the United 

States in pursuit of its national interests.

Recommendations

The United States is not going to realize the benefits of surrogate warfare 

spontaneously. A deliberate, comprehensive implementation of surrogate 

warfare guidance is a necessary condition for changing the way that the U.S.

military conducts operations by, with, and through surrogate forces. There 

are concurrent aspects of incorporating surrogate warfare into future U.S.

military operations. The first is to recognize the uniqueness of a surrogate 

and establish joint definitions for these substitute forces and for surrogate 

warfare. The next is to establish a doctrinal foundation for surrogate warfare 

operations. This new joint doctrine needs to provide both a single reference 

to address the key elements of how to conduct surrogate warfare with the 

joint force and the integration of relevant surrogate warfare impacts on 

other joint operations. Third, the Department of Defense needs to establish 

policies that describe the use of surrogates. This need includes, but is not 

limited to, the sharing of information and technology, aspects of interagency 

coordination that are unique to working with foreign forces, assignment of 

proponents, and budgeting and programming guidance. Finally, security 

strategies at the national and defense levels need to refine the objectives 

and desired effects of employing surrogate forces in support of national 

objectives.

Planning for the future requires an understanding of potential adversaries 

and the tactics that they may use against the United States. However, guidance should be directed towards those elements of warfare that are within 

U.S. control. The Department of Defense must make the philosophical shift 
53

Smith: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century 

from irregular warfare, as a framework for informing U.S. operations, to surrogate warfare, thereby directing those things that it can control while continuing to recognize the range of threats presented by future adversaries.

The best place to begin developing a U.S. surrogate warfare understanding is as one of Joint Staff’s Joint Operating Concepts. This level of integration will prevent surrogate warfare from being marginalized into a service 

or force specific concept. Also, the relationship between the Joint Operating 

Concepts and transformation planning will provide the degree of emphasis 

and visibility necessary for rapid implementation of surrogate warfare. The 

experimental and future focus of this family of concepts is appropriate for 

the development of new approaches to warfare. 

Experimentation is another area that the U.S. military can investigate 

the challenges and opportunities of surrogate warfare. The Department of 

Defense experimentation, modeling, and exercise communities can provide valuable insight into the use of surrogates. An increased focus on the 

impact of surrogates on U.S. operations, force structures, and technological 

advancement, and vice versa, will assist the development of effective policy, 

strategy, and doctrine. Additionally, if leaders and units are forced to explore 

the role of surrogates in exercise scenarios, they will become more comfortable with the potential of surrogate warfare and more likely consider 

surrogate operations in real-world planning situations. 

The dissemination of the surrogate warfare concept is critical in order to 

achieve the desired benefits. Carefully and thoughtfully crafted guidance is 

of no value if the interested parties are not aware of it. There are two critical 

audiences for the spread of U.S. surrogate warfare guidance:

a. The first and most obvious is the U.S. military force as a whole, which 

includes strategic planners that need to know the U.S. approach to 

surrogate warfare and incorporate it as one of the strategic options. 

Theater and operational level commanders need to continuously shape 

their environments to preserve and, as necessary, develop potential 

surrogate warfare options. Tactical units and force providers need to 

know the potential capabilities they will need in order to operate by, 

with, and through surrogate forces. 

b. Another vital audience is the international community of potential 

surrogates. The United States wants to preserve the widest possible 

range of future surrogates. This preservation can only be accomplished 
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

if foreign entities understand that being a surrogate is not a pejorative 

or inferior status. The United States must preserve, in the development 

of surrogate warfare guidance, the valuable contribution of surrogates 

and the shared interests and mutual benefits of conducting operations 

with the United States. Surrogates are not blind to the geo-political 

environment and can determine how their participation supports U.S.

interests. Therefore, the United States must likewise remain sensitive 

to the interests of the surrogate and recognize the limitations that 

accompany the employment of the surrogate when these interests are 

not identical. The surest way to corrupt the value of surrogate warfare 

is for the United States to be perceived as abusing their surrogates.

Conflict in the 21st Century is likely to be fought for a more diverse set 

of reasons and in more diverse settings than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. These two factors provide tremendous opportunity 

for the United States and imply unprecedented risks. The development of 

comprehensive, integrated surrogate warfare strategies and capabilities, and 

prudent dissemination of these to U.S. forces and their partners, can maximize the opportunities and mitigate the risks. The United States can win in 

the 21st Century by operating by, with, and through surrogate forces.

Endnotes

1. Frank R. Abate, editor, Oxford Pocket Dictionary and Thesaurus (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1997), 807.

2. Center of Military History, American Military History, (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Army, 1989), 56-60.

3. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 118.

4. Ibid., 234-244.

5. Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations 

Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 8-10.

6. FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations (Department of the Army, 2001), 2-5.

7. Brian L. Thompson, “Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force” (research 

paper at Naval War College, 2002), 3; see www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/

Essays2002/Essay_02.pdf.

8. FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 57.

9. United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment: The 

World Through 2020 and Beyond (August 2005), 4-10; see www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/joe_050805.doc. 
55

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army SF

Isaac J. Peltier

Operations in Afghanistan and northern Iraq demonstrated the 

Army SF ability to successfully leverage a surrogate force to achieve 

U.S. objectives. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga 

functioned as surrogate armies in place of conventional forces, 

and they were controlled by U.S. Army SF. This monograph seeks 

to answer, What is required of U.S. Army SF to conduct surrogate 

warfare in the future? Analysis suggests that cultural awareness 

and regional expertise are critical and the ability to function as an 

operational-level joint headquarters capable of planning and supporting an unconventional warfare campaign.

Introduction

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom saw 

the U.S. Army employ Special Forces (SF) on a scale not seen since 

the Vietnam War.1 Since 11 September 2001, these Green Berets 

have experienced a renaissance with unconventional warfare (UW), the role 

for which SF was originally founded in June 1952.2 In his 12 March 2002 

testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Charles 

R. Holland, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, stated 

that the “long-standing SOF mission” of surrogate warfare was receiving 

deserved new attention.3 In fact, according to General Holland, U.S. strategic 

objectives in Afghanistan would not have been achieved if not for surrogate 

warfare.4 This raises the primary research question, What does SF need to 

do to prepare for future surrogate warfare? This monograph will argue that 

Major Isaac Peltier is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. This paper was written while attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas) School of Advanced Military Studies where he obtained 

his Masters of Military Art and Science. He is currently assigned to the United 

States Special Operations Command Center for Special Operations, MacDill 

Air Force Base, Florida. 
56

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

surrogate warfare is indeed a form of UW and that U.S. Army SF are clearly 

the force of choice because of their cultural and regional expertise. 

The attacks of September 11th demanded a swift response. President Bush 

made it clear in his address to the nation that the U.S. would hunt down 

those responsible and hold them accountable.5 Intelligence suggested that 

Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were operating out of Afghanistan, which 

meant the military task fell to Central Command (CENTCOM) because it 

was in their geographic area of responsibility. In deciding how to respond 

militarily, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and CENTCOM commander 

General Tommy Franks were keenly aware of the failure of the Soviet Union 

in Afghanistan in the 1980s, thus did not want to repeat that failure. They 

agreed that the force would have to be small, flexible and possess the capabilities to operate with precision and lethality.6 CENTCOM directed their 

Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) to begin planning. 

SOCCENT in turn notified the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) to begin 

preparations for conducting UW in Afghanistan. 

Operation Enduring Freedom saw SF take an unprecedented role as the 

main effort in the campaign to overthrow the Taliban and root out Al Qaeda. 

The unconventional war fought in Afghanistan involved working through, 

with, and by the Northern Alliance to achieve strategic, operational, and 

tactical objectives. The Northern Alliance, under the advisement and direction of SF, served as a surrogate army in place of the large conventional U.S.

force that Rumsfeld and Franks wanted to avoid using. The success of SF in 

Afghanistan would foreshadow what was to come a year later in Iraq. 

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, SF was employed on an even larger scale. 

When the 4th Infantry Division was not allowed to enter northern Iraq 

through Turkey, the 10th SFG was used to open up a second front with 

surrogate forces. Kurdish militia, which numbered approximately 70,000, 

was used by SF to disrupt 13 Iraqi divisions, preventing them from interfering with the Combined Forces Land Component Command’s march on 

Baghdad. 

In both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S.

Army SF demonstrated they could leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S.

objectives. The use of surrogates in Afghanistan allowed the Bush administration to achieve the quick response desired after the attacks of September 

11th. The use of surrogates also reduced U.S. presence, gave the local population a stake in the coalition’s objectives, and bolstered the perception of 
57

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

legitimacy for a U.S.-led coalition. In northern Iraq, the use of surrogates 

served to fill the large void created by Turkey’s refusal to allow U.S. forces 

to enter Iraq through their country and proved to be a suitable substitute 

for the large U.S. conventional force that was originally planned for the 

northern front. 

Importance and Relevance. Since its inception in 1952, the SF niche 

has been UW with examples being Operation Enduring Freedom and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, the UW campaigns SF conducted 

in Afghanistan and northern Iraq were unique. They were not guerilla warfare characterized by small units using hit-and-run tactics but rather positional warfare in which cities were taken, ground was held, and the enemy 

capitulated or defeated. The Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga 

functioned as surrogate armies in place of U.S. conventional forces, and they 

were controlled by U.S. Army SF. The success SF achieved in Afghanistan and 

northern Iraq has established a trademark for UW in the 21st century. 

Methodology. In answering the primary research question, this monograph 

will examine history, theory, and doctrine. Analysis of the Office of Strategic 

Services Detachment 101’s use of Kachin tribesmen in Burma during World 

War II will demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of using surrogate forces. The theories of T. E. Lawrence will provide the importance 

of understanding culture and the value of the indirect approach to waging 

war. Analysis of current UW doctrine will offer insight to how surrogate 

warfare might fit into the overall UW framework. 

January 2005: 450th 

Civil Affairs Battalion 

soldiers, deployed in 

support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom, 

meet with village

leaders in Zangabad, 

Afghanistan to 

assess the needs 

of the village. U.S. 

Army photo by 

Spc. Jerry T. Combes, 

55th Signal Company. 
58

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

This monograph will also examine two historical vignettes from the UW

in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom:

a. Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan and the UW operations they conducted with Northern Alliance Forces

b. Task Force Viking in northern Iraq and the UW operations they 

conducted with Kurdish Peshmerga forces. 

Table 1 shows the two criteria and their focus used to analyze and evaluate 

the vignettes.

Table 1. Historical Vignettes

Criteria Focus

Training Cultural awareness and regional expertise required to conduct surrogate warfare. This paper will reveal the challenges SF faced in working with surrogates 

(and the steps taken to overcome these challenges) and demonstrate that 

Green Berets are indeed the force of choice for conducting surrogate warfare 

because they possess regional specialization and language capabilities.

Organization Ability of a SF Group to serve as an operational level headquarters capable of 

conducting an UW campaign. Described in this paper are the challenges both 

the 5th and 10th SFGs faced and the steps they took to overcome personnel, 

logistics, and planning issues.

Understanding Surrogate Warfare

History. Perhaps the organization that has contributed most to modern 

UW was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the operational predecessor of SF.

7

 The OSS is most famous for the Jedburgh teams that infiltrated 

into occupied France to organize the French resistance in preparation for 

D-Day. However, in the jungles of Burma the OSS also conducted UW, and 

it was there that they experimented with the art of working with indigenous 

surrogate forces. 

Detachment 101 was formed on 14 April 1942 to conduct UW against the 

Japanese in China and Burma.8 Their tasks included espionage, sabotage, 

guerilla warfare, propaganda, and escape and evasion. American OSS operatives knew they could not pass themselves off as natives in Burma. This 

limitation severely restricted their ability to conduct operations deep behind 

enemy lines, as the Jedburghs had done in Europe. Additionally, no more 

than 120 Americans were in the field in Burma at a time. Consequently, 

Burmese nationals were recruited to perform these tasks, thereby becoming 

surrogates for the Americans.
59

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

When Detachment 101 was formed, the Army had no doctrine or guidance on recruiting, training, and employing native forces. The leaders in 

Detachment 101 learned as they went along. Members of the detachment 

also received training from the natives. The Kachin tribesmen were fierce 

fighters who lived in the hills, and they trained their American advisors how 

to survive and fight in the jungles. As Detachment 101 evolved and the surrogate army grew, they began to rely more and more on airborne operations. 

They began infiltration via parachute, rather than overland travel, and they 

learned how to conduct resupply operations by air in the jungle. They also 

began developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting rescue 

operations for downed aircrew. By the beginning of 1944, Detachment 101 

had grown to 3,000 men and by 1945 they would be over 10,000 strong. 

Detachment 101 and their Kachin tribesmen had many important roles 

in the war. They provided valuable intelligence to conventional American 

and allied forces, and they served as a vital economy-of-force effort in the 

theater. Detachment 101 was responsible for killing 5,428 Japanese soldiers, 

wounding an estimated 10,000 and capturing 78 prisoners. Detachment 101 

losses were only 27 American and 338 natives killed. 9 The American use of 

surrogates in Burma was a huge success and proved equally successful in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Theory. With respect to surrogate warfare, perhaps no military theorist 

proves more insightful than T. E. Lawrence. In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 

Lawrence recounts his time spent as a British liaison officer from 1917–1918 

in support of the Arab Revolt led by the Emir Feisal. Prior to becoming a 

liaison officer, Lawrence had been an intelligence officer in Cairo where he 

became an expert in the Arab nationalist movement. His knowledge of the 

Arabs and his empathy for the Arab struggle against Turkish imperial rule 

allowed him to gain the trust and confidence of Emir Feisal. Subsequently, 

he was able to influence the Arabs to conduct operations for helping British 

forces under the command of General Allenby to defeat the Turks. 

Lawrence formed his theory of UW to address the unique circumstances 

of tribal Bedouins fighting against a modern army. Lawrence began by identifying the Arab aim of war as being geographical in nature. For Arabs, 

success was measured by how much land they controlled, not the number 

of enemy they killed. To achieve this aim, Lawrence realized that the Arabs 

would have to leverage their strengths against their enemy’s weaknesses. 
60

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Lawrence identified the Turkish Army’s weakness as a shortage of supplies. 

The Arabs, on the other hand, possessed mobility with their camels and 

could strike with impunity from the desert against Turkish lines of communication. Based on this awareness, Lawrence came to the conclusion that 

it was foolish for the Arabs to attack the Turkish Army, which outnumbered 

and outgunned them, but rather they should attack the railroads and bridges 

that the Turks depended upon so heavily for resupply.

It is essential to understand the importance of culture to understand 

Lawrence’s theory of UW. Lawrence was keenly aware of the importance of 

family in Arab culture, their allegiance to clan and tribe, and the role blood 

feud played in settling disputes. Unlike the Turks, the Arabs valued their 

people very much; a single death had significant impact on the whole. Thus, 

Lawrence developed a theory for fighting a war of detachment where the 

Arabs would avoid direct engagement with the Turkish Army and would 

concentrate instead on attacking their lines of communication. By doing 

this, Lawrence reasoned that he could exploit Turkish weakness while at 

the same time avoiding Arab casualties.

Lawrence capitalized on the strengths and weaknesses of the Arabs 

because he was intimately familiar with Arab culture. Similarly, U.S. Army 

SF attain similar success because they possess regional focus and language 

capabilities. Lawrence possessed immense knowledge of military history, 

theory, and doctrine. This knowledge helped him to develop his UW theories 

and to effectively leverage his Bedouin surrogates. U.S. Army SF have been 

described as “PhDs with guns.” Green Berets understand the importance of 

continually studying their region, language, and the culture of the people 

with whom they work. It is through a process of life-long learning that SF is 

able to achieve cross-cultural expertise, which allows them to achieve U.S.

objectives through unconventional means. 

Doctrine. To gain a better understanding of how surrogate warfare fits into 

the doctrinal framework of UW, it is useful to examine the seven phases of 

UW as put forth in current doctrine (Figure 1).10 Doctrine states that U.S.-

sponsored UW efforts generally pass through the following seven distinct 

phases: 

a. Preparation

b. Initial contact

c. Infiltration
61

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

d. Organization

e. Buildup

f. Employment

g. Transition. 

Figure 1. Seven Phases of UW Employment (FM 3-05.201)
62

JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Normally it takes months to plan and execute a UW campaign. However, 

the phases do not necessarily have to be conducted sequentially; some may 

be conducted concurrently or not at all, and not all phases are given the same 

level of effort. All UW campaigns are unique, as the Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom historical vignettes will show. 

Task Force Dagger, Afghanistan 

Once the decision was made to go to war with Afghanistan, Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks were not 

going to occupy Afghanistan with a large army.11 The Soviets had occupied Afghanistan from 1979–1989, and their 625,000-man army became 

embroiled in a difficult and costly counterinsurgency.

While the Department of Defense was deciding how it was going to come 

up with a military response to 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

had a plan to conduct a covert operation to overthrow the Taliban. Prior 

to 9/11 the CIA had been conducting operations in Afghanistan and had 

established contacts with various Afghan factions. The CIA’s plan was to 

insert paramilitary teams into Afghanistan, link up with anti-Taliban factions, and secure their allegiance with millions of dollars and the promise 

of technology and firepower forthcoming.12

CENTCOM did not have an on-the-shelf plan for Afghanistan.13 Initial 

planning efforts indicated that a conventional military response would take 

months to implement. Rumsfeld was not satisfied and demanded an unconventional approach to solving the problem, and he wanted a plan fast.14

CENTCOM gave the mission to their SOCCENT, who in turn directed the 

5th SFG to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).15 The 

5th SFG’s mission was to conduct UW for overthrowing the Taliban and 

destroying Al Qaeda forces.16 The UW campaign waged in Afghanistan 

would involve many elements of Army Special Operations Forces. This section of the monograph will focus on the Green Berets of the 5th SFG and 

the unconventional war they waged using surrogate forces. 

Standing Up a JSOTF. Within two days of 9/11, the 5th SFG was directed 

to form JSOTF-North.17 The 5th SFG immediately began preparations for 

deployment and on 10 October 2001, less than a month after 9/11, the 5th SFG

main body arrived at Karshi Kanabad, an old Soviet airbase in Uzbekistan. 
63

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

The 5th SFG was preceded by elements of the U.S. Air Force’s 16th Special 

Operations Wing. This Wing had already established a JSOTF headquarters 

to plan and command and control combat search and rescue operations in 

support of the air campaign. Upon arrival, Colonel Mulholland, the 5th 

SFG commander, assumed command of the JSOTF, and the 16th Special 

Operations Wing commander became the deputy JSOTF commander. The 

JSOTF was renamed “Task Force Dagger,” which henceforth will be used 

to refer to JSOTF-North. 

SFGs normally command and control their forces through a network of 

operational bases.18 When a SFG establishes a SF Operational Base, they are 

purely organic. An SFG may also serve as an Army Special Operations Task 

Force, where they direct and support only the Army Special Operations 

Forces assigned to a JSOTF. When properly augmented, a SFG may also 

serve as the nucleus for a JSOTF.

19 To help 5th SFG stand up as a JSOTF, the 

Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command provided personnel 

to augment the Group staff, including the key positions of J2 (Intelligence), 

J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics), J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy), and assistant 

J6 (Command, Control, and Communications).20

Task Force Dagger was composed of many units. The following Army 

Special Operations Forces made up the task force: the 5th SFG, elements of 

the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, the 112th Signal Battalion, 

the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 4th Psychological 

Operations Group, and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.21 The task force 

was also composed of the following Air Force Special Operations Command 

units: the 16th Special Operations Wing, the 9th Special Operations 

Squadron, and 23rd Special Tactics Squadron teams. Finally, the 1st 

Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, provided base security 

at Karshi Kanabad. Despite the growing pains of standing up a JSOTF, Task 

Force Dagger successfully infiltrated two SF operational detachments into 

northern Afghanistan within two weeks of arriving at Karshi Kanabad.

Initial Planning. SOCCENT, with staff augmentation from the U.S. Army 

Special Forces Command, took the lead on planning the UW campaign for 

Afghanistan. Using the seven classic phases of UW (Figure 1) as a foundation, 

planners envisioned that SF would link-up with Northern Alliance forces, 

organize and train them through the winter, and begin combat operations 

in the spring. Planners thought it would take months for the UW campaign 
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

to mature. Moreover, the UW campaign was viewed as a supporting effort 

to the decisive combat operations that would occur later with the introduction of conventional coalition ground forces. No one envisioned that the 

air campaign, in conjunction with a UW campaign, would achieve decisive 

victory over the Taliban. The “light speed” UW that occurred required Task 

Force Dagger to remain flexible and adaptive.22

The Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was an anti-Taliban opposition group consisting of a loose conglomeration of several different ethnic 

tribes that included the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. The southern 

Pashtun tribes, which represent the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, 

were not a part of the Northern Alliance, but they also were opposed to the 

Taliban regime. The two indigenous leaders the 5th SFG had identified as 

potential partners in their UW campaign were Mohammed Fahim Khan 

and General Rashid Dostum. Khan had succeeded Ahmad Shah Massoud as 

the senior military leader of the Northern Alliance. Massoud, known as the 

“Lion of Panjshir,” had led the mujahideen fight against the Soviet Union. 

He was assassinated just two days prior to 9/11. General Dostum, an ethnic 

Uzbek, had served in the Soviet army and fought against the mujahideen 

until he switched sides and joined Massoud to fight against the communist 

puppet regime in Afghanistan. Dostum had formed his own militia, which 

was approximately 10,000 to 15,000 strong. 

Many Northern Alliance members got their start as mujahideen fighting against the Soviets. During the Soviet’s ten-year occupation, the mujahideen ran an effective insurgency, but the Soviets adapted to the situation 

by effectively using air power to fight the insurgents. In the mid-1980s, 

however, the mujahideen regained the advantage when the CIA provided 

them with Stinger antiaircraft missiles, effectively neutralizing Soviet air 

power.23 The lesson learned from the Soviet’s experience in Afghanistan was 

that large conventional forces are ineffective in restrictive terrain against a 

determined enemy. 

Infiltration and Link Up. On 20 October 2001, after several aborted attempts 

to infiltrate Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODA) into Afghanistan, the 

first two teams were successfully inserted into Afghanistan. The 12-man 

teams were sent to make contact with Fahim Khan and General Dostum. 

After successfully linking up with their respective warlords, they quickly 
65

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

established rapport. Within 24 hours, at the request of their warlords, both 

ODAs—with their attached Air Force Special Tactics Squadron teams—

found themselves directing air strikes on Taliban frontline positions. These 

air strikes impressed the Northern Alliance and further strengthened rapport with the teams.24

Initial assessment of the factions revealed they were ready and willing to 

begin combat operations. However, the UW campaign plan that SOCCENT

envisioned did not involve immediate combat operations. The ODAs discovered that the classic approach to conducting UW would not work in 

Afghanistan. Like Lawrence with his Bedouin tribesmen in Arabia, SF in 

Afghanistan had to adapt their strategy to the people with whom they were 

working. The ODAs were not intimidated by this change in plans. They knew 

the necessary air assets were in place and were able to begin conducting 

combat operations immediately. Had the air assets not been in place, they 

would not have been able to achieve overmatching firepower and would not 

have been able to proceed as they did. 

The Northern Alliance commanders took great care to protect their 

new American friends. For example, General Dostum had his personal 

bodyguards surround the SF team and initially did not let them get any 

closer than 8 kilometers to the fight.25 Dostum was well aware of American 

intolerance for casualties, and he was not going to risk America pulling out 

of Afghanistan because U.S. SF soldiers were killed.26

During their first two weeks on the ground the ODAs learned how to 

effectively support their assigned surrogate forces. They discovered that by 

splitting the 12-man SF detachment, often into three-man elements, they 

could cover a broader front and better track the positions of the Northern 

Alliance Forces. This tactic proved valuable in preventing fratricide. It also 

facilitated synchronization of operations because the Northern Alliance 

lacked the means to effectively communicate among units. Because each 

element of the SF team had communications equipment, they were able to 

compensate for the Afghans’ shortfall. The SF teams were also able to bring 

in critical supplies such as horse feed, blankets, and cold-weather equipment. 

Eventually, with the assistance of the CIA, the teams received the weapons 

and ammunition the surrogate forces needed to wage a sustained campaign 

against the Taliban.
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

Mazar-e Sharif. The second largest city in Afghanistan, Mazar-e Sharif, 

was of significant cultural, religious, and economic value to the Northern 

Alliance. The U.S. was also interested in Mazar-e Sharif, because of the 

airfields located there. If captured, the airfields would provide a critical 

airhead to bring in additional U.S. troops and supplies.27 In 1998 the Taliban 

pushed the Northern Alliance out of Mazar-e Sharif and forced them into 

the mountains. Now the Northern Alliance had American SF and U.S. air 

power to assist them. In preparation for major offensive operations, Task 

Force Dagger infiltrated elements of ODC 53—the equivalent of a battalion 

command post—on 2 November 2001 to provide high level liaison with 

General Dostum and the other faction leaders.28 On 4 November 2001 Task 

Force Dagger infiltrated another ODA to assist General Mohammed Atta 

and his faction. 

The plan to liberate Mazar-e Sharif consisted of concurrent attacks by 

different factions through the two river valleys to the south of the city. 

The factions would link up and combine their forces where the two rivers 

joined and then together would make a final push to Mazar-e Sharif. On 5 

November 2001 they began the offensive. To facilitate command and control 

and fire support, the ODAs split their teams to provide coverage across the 

Northern Alliance front. As the Northern Alliance advanced, SF and the 

Special Tactics Squadron continued to call in air strikes against the Taliban 

defenders in the river valley. Because the Taliban chose to maintain the 

integrity of their formations, they were easier targets for coalition air strikes. 

Had they dispersed and reverted to guerilla warfare tactics, they may have 

sustained less damage and prolonged the war.

While the SF teams were directing precision air strikes to reduce Taliban 

defensive positions, the Northern Alliance commanders were negotiating 

with Taliban commanders. This practice is common in Afghanistan; it is 

customary to switch sides and change allegiances. While some Taliban 

commanders took up the offer, others were determined to resist at all costs. 

Many of these die-hard fighters were foreigners and had ties to Al Qaeda. 

These non-Afghan forces tended to be better trained and equipped, and 

they fought the hardest against the Northern Alliance. 

After several days of fighting, the Northern Alliance had pushed the 

Taliban out of the river valleys. The Taliban were now consolidating and 

reorganizing in defensive positions in the Tangi Gap, the only defensible 

terrain between the Northern Alliance and Mazar-e Sharif. As SF continued 
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to direct air strikes against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance forces massed 

and then launched an overwhelming assault on the gap, completely routing 

the enemy. The offensive maneuver consisted of Northern Alliance forces 

charging in on horseback while others moved in on foot or by truck, all the 

while being supported by precision-guided bombs dropped from coalition 

aircraft under the control of SF. As the Taliban retreated, coalition air power 

continued to interdict the fleeing forces. The way to Mazar-e Sharif was now 

open and the SF and the Northern Alliance flowed into the city where they 

were met by celebrating crowds. 

The liberation of Mazar-e Sharif, on 10 November 2001, represented the 

first major victory for the Northern Alliance and their SF advisors and was 

significant as follows:

a. Boosted the confidence of the Northern Alliance forces

b. Started the collapse of the Taliban not only in the north but also 

throughout the country.29

c. Indicated the speed with which the UW campaign could be fought as 

evidenced by the fact that it was only three weeks from the time the 

first ODAs infiltrated until Mazar-e Sharif was liberated.

d. Demonstrated that SF could bring together multiple factions under 

one formation and coordinate a major offensive with surrogate Afghan 

forces.30

Analysis. The first criterion used to analyze this vignette is training, focusing on several aspects of cultural awareness and regional expertise, which 

is essential to conducting surrogate warfare. One of the most important 

aspects of cultural awareness and regional expertise is language skills. All 

SF soldiers maintain proficiency in a foreign language. To facilitate language 

proficiency SFGs have language labs, which provide SF soldiers the necessary 

materials and instruction they need to maintain proficiency. Additionally, 

all SF soldiers are required to take the Defense Language Proficiency Test 

annually. However, because of the high operational tempo, most SF soldiers 

have little time to dedicate to their language training, although deployment 

offers ample on-the-job training.

In an interview with Frontline, Colonel Mulholland stated he was concerned about his Group’s “lack of precise cultural and tribal knowledge of 

Afghanistan.” 31 5th SFG’s language and cultural focus is on Arabic and the 

Middle East. The predominant languages in Afghanistan are Pashtun and 
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Dari. Moreover, Afghanistan was a new area for the 5th SFG; consequently, 

they had little institutional knowledge of the country.32 SF operational 

detachments were forced to improvise. For example, the detachment commander for the team assigned to General Dostum knew enough Russian 

that he could communicate on a very rudimentary basis until an Afghan 

translator was found who could speak better English than the commander’s 

Russian.33 The biggest limiting factor for language and cultural training is 

time. Because of the quick deployment to Afghanistan, time was scarce for 

gaining proficiency in the languages of the region. Despite having limited 

language and cultural experience with Afghanistan, SF teams were still very 

successful. The reason was because they were able to adapt cultural skills 

and experience developed during other training missions to the Middle East 

to the situation in Afghanistan. 

Task Force Dagger was also sensitive to the implications of cultural 

awareness. For example, the task force recognized that rivalries existed 

between the various factions. Consequently, as more anti-Taliban groups 

were identified, the task force took care to ensure equitable distribution 

of ODAs among the various factions, thus preventing any perception of 

favoritism.34 This action is significant because it demonstrates an operational level of cultural awareness on the part of Task Force Dagger. The 

second criterion concerns the organization of a SFG and their ability to be 

an operational-level headquarters that plans, supports, and supervises the 

execution of a UW campaign. The problem was that 5th SFG was directed 

to establish a JSOTF, an operational-level joint headquarters, not a tacticallevel Army SF Command or Army Special Operations Task Force. They 

lacked the personnel, communications equipment, and training to run a 

joint headquarters. In addition to serving as a joint headquarters, the JSOTF

was also responsible for the isolation, infiltration, resupply, command, control and communications for their SF operational detachments, a mission 

that would normally have gone to a separate Army Special Operations Task 

Force or SF Operational Base.35

The lack of training and personnel would manifest itself in a number 

of ways during the early days of the JSOTF. For example, within a JSOTF

many important tasks exist that must be performed in order to effectively 

support a UW campaign and the operational detachments. Fire support and 

air operations are among these. Just as T. E. Lawrence was able to effectively 

combine British motorized forces with Arab horsemen, the SF ODAs brought 
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U.S. air power to bear on the Taliban. The SF ODAs depended upon air 

power to destroy Taliban forces and establish credibility with the Northern 

Alliance. Also, like Detachment 101 in Burma, SF depended upon air operations to infiltrate and exfiltrate the operational area as well as to logistically 

support themselves and the Northern Alliance. Therefore, personnel at the 

operational level needed to be able to effectively plan fire support and air 

operations. Recognizing the importance of these two missions and the lack 

of expertise to perform them, Colonel Mulholland drew upon various units 

assigned to the JSOTF to form an ad hoc Joint Fires Element and eventually 

was able to get the Joint Special Operations Aviation Component to co-locate 

with the JSOTF for planning all fixed- and rotary-wing operations.36

Although the 5th SFG experienced initial growing pains, they proved to 

be an adaptive learning organization. According to Peter M. Senge, author 

of The Fifth Discipline, “the organization that will truly excel...will be organizations that tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at levels in an 

organization.” 37 Because of the maturity, professionalism, and commitment 

of the soldiers in a SFG, they were able to adapt to a complex situation and 

achieve outstanding success.

Task Force Viking, Northern Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom saw many brave and bold actions enroute to toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, but perhaps none was more daring than 

that of Task Force Viking in northern Iraq. Here in the northern fifth of 

the country, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and 

70,000 Kurdish Peshmerga took on 13 Iraqi divisions. Task Force Viking’s 

mission was to conduct UW, and their key task was to disrupt Iraqi forces 

positioned along a 350-kilometer de facto boundary called the Green Line, 

preventing them from going south where they could interfere with the 

conventional coalition assault on Baghdad. The motto of the task force, 

“Concede Nothing,” captures the spirit in which they took on their mission. Not satisfied with just disrupting the Iraqi forces they faced, the task 

force took the fight to the enemy. When the dust settled, Task Force Viking 

had captured two of the largest cities in Iraq, secured key Iraqi oilfields and 

caused conventional Iraqi forces to either surrender or abandon their posts 

and melt away into the local population. 
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A Friendship is Formed. The idea of conducting UW with the Kurds was 

not a new one. During the Persian Gulf War, Brigadier General Richard 

Potter, commander of Special Operations Command Europe, deployed “pilot 

teams” to Turkey to assess the feasibility of organizing Kurds into resistance 

groups.38 General Carl Stiner, the commander of U.S. Special Operations 

Command at the time, proposed a UW plan to Generals Schwarzkopf 

and Powell that entailed attacking Sadam’s rear with Kurdish and Shiite 

rebels organized by Green Berets.39 According to Stiner, a UW campaign 

in Saddam’s rear area would cause him to divert forces, thus preventing 

him from invading Saudi Arabia and possibly causing him to pull out of 

Kuwait.40 Unfortunately, Special Operations Forces in the early 1990s were 

not viewed with the same enthusiasm they are today. As a result, Stiner’s 

ideas were met with resistance. Meanwhile, BG Potter laid the groundwork with the Turks and CENTCOM for possibly organizing the Kurds and 

positioned half of the 10th SFG in Turkey under the pretense of conducting 

combat search and rescue operations.41 The Turks were very concerned about 

the prospect of the U.S. conducting UW in their backyard. Specifically, they 

were against arming and training the Kurds, which they feared would lead 

to the unification and establishment of an independent Kurdish state. This 

same issue would resurface in Operation Iraqi Freedom when Turkish Prime 

Minister Erdogan said that Kurdish control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be 

grounds for a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq.42

The positive relationship between the Kurds and the 10th SFG was 

cemented a decade before Operation Iraqi Freedom, when in early April 

1991 the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG deployed to southeast Turkey and northern 

Iraq to provide humanitarian assistance to over a half a million Kurds. The 

humanitarian crisis was brought on when Saddam Hussein attacked the 

Kurds for rising up against his regime following operation Desert Storm. 

The Kurds, who were no match for the Iraqi Army, fled to the mountains 

along the southeast border of Turkey where they suffered from freezing 

temperatures and starvation. Over the next few weeks both the 2nd and 3rd 

Battalions of the 10th SFG also deployed to provide relief to the Kurds. This 

operation would mark the first time the Group would deploy as a whole. 

General Galvin, the commander of European Command, would remark, 

“The 10th SFG saved a half million Kurds from extinction.” 43 The compassion 10th SFG showed the Kurds would not be forgotten, and in March 2003 

the Kurds provided a warm reception when the 10th SFG returned. 
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The Kurds. The situation in northern Iraq had improved considerably since 

the Gulf War. Under the protection of Operation Northern Watch, the successor to Operation Provide Comfort II, the Kurds prospered. In 1998 the 

two main political parties, the KDP led by Massoud Barzani and the PUK led 

by Jalal Talabani, put aside their differences and agreed to share power. The 

KDP and PUK both possessed militias called the Peshmerga, which literally 

translated means “those who face death.” Although the Peshmerga primarily 

had small arms, what they lacked in firepower they made up for in fierceness. By the time Task Force Viking arrived in March 2003, approximately 

70,000 Peshmerga were available to form a surrogate army for executing the 

UW campaign in the north.44

Task Force Viking. Task Force Viking was first formed on 26 July 2002 

at Fort Carson, Colorado, home of the 10th SFG (Airborne). The 10th SFG, 

commanded by Colonel Charles Cleveland, formed the nucleus of this 

CJSOTF-North.45 The task force was composed of many units. At its core 

was the Group Headquarters, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 10th SFG, 

and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG. The task force also consisted of the 

following joint and coalition special operations units: 404th Civil Affairs 

Battalion, D Company/96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Task Force 7 Special 

Boat Squadron from the United Kingdom, and the 352nd Special Operations 

Group (U.S. Air Force). The following conventional army and joint forces 

also contributed to Task Force Viking: 2nd Battalion/14th Infantry from the 

10th Mountain Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and elements of the 

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. At its peak, Task Force Viking consisted 

of approximately 5,200 personnel.46

Preparation for War. Task Force Viking planned to establish a base of 

operations in Turkey while the 4th Infantry Division was planning to offload 

from the Mediterranean, transit overland through Turkey, and enter Iraq 

from the north. While basing rights in Turkey did not seem promising, 

General Franks kept negotiations open with Turkey pending a vote in their 

Parliament.47 When no Turkish support became official, plans had to be 

changed. Because the 4th Infantry Division would not be entering Iraq from 

the north with their 60,000 troops, CENTCOM needed to do something 

to keep the 13 Iraqi divisions in place and prevent them from reinforcing Baghdad. Task Force Viking was ordered to open up a second front in 

northern Iraq.48
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The Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) that Task Force Viking established in northern Iraq encompassed over 173,000 square kilometers and 

was bordered by Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and to the south by 

the Green Line that separated Iraq proper from the Kurdish autonomous 

zone. The JSOA was further divided into two Special Operations Areas that 

represented the approximate territorial boundaries for the KDP and PUK. 

Opposing the task force along the Green Line were three Iraqi corps, consisting of 13 Iraqi divisions—2 of these being Republican Guard divisions, 

2 mechanized, 1 armor, and 8 infantry divisions.49 Also located in the north 

along the Iranian border was a 700-man terrorist organization called Ansar 

Al Islam, which was believed to have ties to Al Qaeda. 

The campaign plan Task Force Viking developed involved assigning a 

SF battalion to each of the major Kurdish factions, with a third SF battalion 

available to conduct other special operations. The PUK and the KDP would 

serve as a surrogate army in place of the conventional U.S. forces originally 

planned for in the north. The campaign plan consisted of three lines of 

operations:

a. Air interdiction in which targeting priorities were directed against 

the two Republican Guard divisions and one armored division, collectively comprising the Iraqi operational center of gravity

b. Ground operations in which key cities were defended, close air support and terminal guidance operations conducted, and dislocated 

civilians managed

c. Information operations, which sought to support the deception plan, 

facilitate capitulation and cease fires, prevent movement of Iraqi forces 

south, and limit oil infrastructure damage. 

The end state was that Iraqi operational mobility was disrupted and operational success was exploited. 

Infiltrating Northern Iraq. Turkey continued to confound the situation 

by refusing to allow the U.S. overflight rights. The initial infiltration into 

northern Iraq, dubbed “Ugly Baby,” took a circuitous route from Constanta, 

Romania; over the Mediterranean Sea; down to Jordan; then across the 

western desert of Iraq just below the Syrian border into Bashur airfield. U.S.

Air Force Special Tactics Squadron teams had already established airheads 

at Bashur airfield and As-Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq. On 22 March, the 

Special Operations Combat Talon MC-130s flew under Iraqi air defenses. 
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Still, they came under heavy fire, and several aircraft were damaged. One 

aircraft carrying an entire SF company was severely damaged and was forced 

to conduct an emergency landing in Turkey.50 Turkey granted overflight 

rights the next day. 

Task Force Viking continued to infiltrate their forces via their MC-130s. 

Because of the distance from Romania, restrictions imposed by the Turks, 

and the remaining air defense threat, only one infiltration per night was 

feasible. This limitation required task force planners to modify the plan, 

balancing the infiltration of ODAs with supplies. Because of the limited lift 

capacity of the MC-130 and the lack of C-17 support, the buildup of combat 

power occurred slower than desired. Despite these challenges, the MC-130s 

of the task force performed admirably, successfully infiltrating all of Task 

Force Viking in a matter of weeks. 

Operation Viking Hammer. The first order of business for Task Force 

Viking was to defeat Ansar Al Islam, camped in northeastern Iraq near 

the Iranian border. The Kurds had been battling Ansar Al Islam for several 

years prior to the arrival of the U.S. in March 2003. Ansar Al Islam’s terror 

campaign against the Kurds escalated in December 2002 when two PUK

outposts were overrun, the bodies of the soldiers mutilated, and videotapes 

of the heinous act distributed in Sulaymaniyah.51 A belief was that Ansar’s 

terror camps were providing sanctuary to members of Al Qaeda, and the 

Kurds were adamant that Ansar be destroyed. Using the PUK Peshmerga 

as a surrogate force, the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG under the command of 

LTC Kenneth Tovo planned Operation Viking Hammer to destroy Ansar 

Al Islam. 

Operation Viking Hammer commenced on 28 March and ended on 30 

March 2003. The operation was an impressive display of U.S. firepower, which 

included strikes by Tomahawk missiles, B-52s, F-14s, and F-18s. Perhaps the 

most impressive display came from the AC-130 gunships that were in direct 

support of the task force. Despite receiving antiaircraft fire, they loitered 

on target all night until they expended all their ammunition. The assault 

force consisted of approximately 7,000 Peshmerga and was conducted along 

several prongs with two SF soldiers per approximately 360 Peshmerga.52

Like Task Force Dagger with the Northern Alliance, Task Force Viking also 

successfully combined U.S. air power with surrogate forces to accomplish 

both U.S. and surrogate objectives. 
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Operation Viking Hammer was a huge success and accomplished several important tasks. It demonstrated U.S. commitment to the Kurds, just 

as T. E. Lawrence and the British Expeditionary Force had done with the 

Arabs in 1918 and Task Force Dagger had done with the Northern Alliance 

in 2001. The Peshmerga also proved themselves to their SF advisors by continually advancing under heavy fire.53 Routing Ansar Al Islam eliminated 

a significant rear area threat, which allowed Kurdish and U.S. forces to 

focus combat power against regular Iraqi forces positioned along the Green 

Line.54 In the operation, Task Force Viking and their Kurdish surrogates 

seized over 300 square kilometers of terrain and killed over 300 Ansar Al 

Islam fighters. Only three Kurds were killed and 23 were wounded, with 

no American casualties.55

Attacking the Green Line. With the Kurds fully aboard, Task Force Viking 

turned south and commenced operations against Iraqi forces positioned 

along the Green Line. Operation Mountain Thunder was planned to be a 

series of aggressive attacks utilizing all of the task force’s U.S. and surrogate 

assets. In the southern portion of the JSOA, the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG with 

their PUK forces attacked to seize Chamchamal, pushing Iraqi forces to the 

outskirts of Kirkuk. In the center, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG, along 

with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG and their Kurdish Peshmerga, 

attacked an armor brigade and defeated several counterattacks. In the north 

the 2nd Battalion with KDP Peshmerga attacked towards Mosul. All along 

the Green Line, Iraqi units remained dug in and presented themselves as 

lucrative targets to coalition airpower.

In response to Turkish demands that Kirkuk and Mosul not fall into 

Kurdish hands, the task force ordered their ODAs to only advance beyond 

the Green Line with a maximum of 150 Peshmerga fighters.56 Because the 

ODAs depended upon their Kurdish surrogates as their only maneuver force, 

they had to use their interpersonal and cross-cultural communications 

skills to bridge the gap between policy objectives and military reality. As 

Lawrence discovered with the Arabs, the key to conducting warfare with 

surrogates rests in the ability to strike a balance between the goals of the 

surrogates with those of the sponsor. 

Once Iraqi Forces had retreated past Kirkuk, the relationship between 

the task force and the Kurds would once again be tested with the securing of 

the oil fields and the occupation of the city. Because of the political danger 
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of Turkish intervention, the oil fields were initially secured with elements of 

the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG and 2-14 Infantry. The U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade 

soon conducted a relief in place and assumed responsibility for securing the 

oil fields. After Kirkuk fell, SF ODAs began moving their Peshmerga forces 

back behind the Green Line and transitioned control of the city to the 173rd 

Airborne Brigade.

Meanwhile the battle for Mosul raged on. SF with their Kurdish 

Peshmerga were taking and giving ground with Iraqi forces in a series of 

battles.57 Whereas Kirkuk had a predominantly Kurdish population, Mosul 

was mostly Arab and strongly supported the Iraqi army. Resistance in the 

city was much more significant, and the arrival of Kurdish Peshmerga only 

served to aggravate the situation. However, a Kurdish population was also 

in the city, and the Kurd’s interest in reuniting with them was strong. The 

2nd Battalion, 10th SFG, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert 

Waltemeyer, was in an awkward situation. While he needed the Kurds to 

fight the Iraqi forces, he did not want them advancing into Mosul, triggering 

a Turkish response. The 2nd Battalion would struggle to keep the Kurds out 

of the city. But a city of two million people is impossible for an SF battalion 

to secure alone. In order to balance the competing national goals, Task Force 

Viking developed a plan to introduce the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

for securing the city and satisfying U.S., Kurdish, and Turkish interests. 

The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit would continue their efforts to secure 

Mosul until the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) arrived and assumed 

control of the city. Meanwhile the ODAs would continue to move their 

Peshmerga forces back behind the Green Line. 

Analysis. Applying the criterion of training, focusing specifically on cultural awareness and regional expertise, insight can be gained into how Task 

Force Viking successfully conducted surrogate warfare in northern Iraq. 

For Task Force Viking, the ability to rapidly gain the trust and confidence 

of the Kurdish Peshmerga proved vital to their success. Operation Provide 

Comfort had paved the way for a positive relationship with the Kurds. For 

example, the commanders of both 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 10th SFG, participated in Provide Comfort as detachment commanders.58 This involvement went a long way in giving them credibility with senior KDP and PUK

leadership. The experience was not limited to the battalion commanders, as 

many of the senior noncommissioned officers and warrant officers on the 
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ODAs had participated in Provide Comfort as junior noncommissioned 

officers. They also capitalized on this experience to establish rapport with 

the Peshmerga. The practice reinforces the value of employing SF in areas 

where they have previously operated. Institutional knowledge of the area 

of operations and interpersonal relationships formed during prior deployments allowed SF to quickly integrate and commence operations. This result 

also suggests that regional expertise and cultural awareness is not created 

overnight, but rather takes years to build. 

Like the 5th SFG in Afghanistan, 10th SFG faced challenges with language. Part of the reason is because 10th SFG’s geographic area of responsibility is Europe, not the Middle East, and Arabic and Kurdish are not 

languages for which they typically focus. Recognizing this shortcoming 

and learning from the challenges the 5th SFG faced in Afghanistan, 10th 

SFG incorporated language training as part of their pre-mission training for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Because the 10th SFG had more time to prepare 

for operations in Iraq than 5th Group did for Afghanistan, their soldiers 

received accelerated language training in Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic from 

the Group Language Institute. Although they learned only enough language 

to survive and communicate on a very primitive basis, even rudimentary 

language skills went a long way towards building rapport and establishing 

credibility with their Kurdish hosts. 

In addition to receiving language training, 10th SFG soldiers also received 

cultural awareness training. Instructors from the Joint Special Operations 

University, located at Hurlburt in northwest Florida, traveled to Fort Carson 

to conduct a series of cultural awareness seminars over a three-day period.59

With respect to Muslim culture, 10th SFG soldiers already had a wealth of 

experience to draw upon from operations conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

This foundation is significant because it demonstrates that the cultural skills 

and experience developed over years of deployments are easily transferable 

to other regions and cultures. 

At the operational level, Task Force Viking planners were also cognizant of the importance of cultural awareness. They recognized the volatile 

dynamic that existed between the Turks, Kurds, and Iraqi Arabs. The task 

force maintained peace between the three ethnic groups by controlling the 

actions of the Kurds. They limited the number of Kurds that crossed the 

Green Line by directing each ODA to only take 150 Kurdish fighters with 

them. As soon as Kirkuk and Mosul were liberated, Task Force Viking 
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directed the ODAs to remove their Peshmerga from the two cities and back 

behind the Green Line. This direction was not always easy because tension 

existed between the different Kurdish factions. However, through interpersonal skills SF was able to maintain balance between the groups and leverage 

their surrogates to accomplish the mission. What follows are examples. 

During a meeting between the task force commander, his battalion 

commanders, and the KDP and PUK leadership, the PUK contingent began 

celebrating about the fall of Kirkuk. The KDP leader, Barzani, left the meeting in anger.60 The KDP were concerned about the PUK making a grab for 

Kirkuk, a city both factions wanted. In response, the task force commander 

gathered up the PUK and KDP leaders and retired them to a private room, 

away from their lieutenants, where he proceeded to lay out the campaign 

plan. He explained how they each were contributing to the campaign and 

that if either of them wished to have a role in a post-Saddam Iraq, they must 

be careful how they conduct themselves. By taking the time to explain the 

significance of the campaign in the north, the task force commander was 

able to defuse the situation while at the same time enrolling them into his 

vision for the conduct of the campaign. 

The second criterion concerns the organization of the SFG and their 

ability to serve as an operational-level headquarters that can plan, support, 

and execute a UW campaign. Like the 5th SFG, the 10th SFG was directed 

to form a JSOTF, an operational-level joint headquarters, not a tactical-level 

SF Operational Base or Army Special Operations Task Force. Although they 

initially lacked the personnel, communications equipment, and training to 

run a joint headquarters, the biggest difference between the experience of 

10th SFG and 5th SFG was time. 

Task Force Viking had significantly more time to prepare to become a 

JSOTF. In addition to having the 5th SFG lessons learned in Afghanistan, 

they had the opportunity to rehearse as a JSOTF. For example, in December 

2002, Task Force Viking participated in CENTCOM’s Internal Look exercise, which focused on joint and coalition operations in support of the 

Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign plan.61 This exercise was essentially 

a dress rehearsal for the war, and although many growing pains occurred 

and mistakes made, the experience proved invaluable in helping Task Force 

Viking function as a JSOTF. 

The recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq produced a wealth 

of institutional knowledge in the SFG with respect to running a JSOTF. 
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Additionally, much of the necessary equipment required to run a JSOTF has 

been acquired. However, a SFG still only forms the nucleus of a JSOTF and 

as such the SFG staff needs time to bring all of the other joint and combined 

participants together to train prior to deploying. 

Another operational-level issue Task Force Viking faced was logistics. 

Because of a lack of strategic airlift, Task Force Viking was forced to rely 

solely on their MC-130s for infiltrating personnel and supplies. As Task Force 

Viking built combat power in northern Iraq, they had to constantly balance 

what supplies were pushed forward. For example, initial heavy fighting along 

the Green Line required the task force to push forward more .50-caliber 

ammunition and Javelin antitank missiles at the expense of food, water, 

and other requirements. To help alleviate the logistical strain, the task force 

relied on the Kurds for much of their initial logistical requirements. The 

Kurds were very helpful in providing everything from lodging, sustenance, 

and vehicles. In this regard, the Kurds proved to be more than just good 

fighters, but gracious hosts who provided critical life support to the task 

force as they built up combat power during the early days of the war. 

Conclusion and Recommendations

U.S. Army SF have played a critical role in prosecuting the war on terrorism. Their ability to wage unconventional war remains their trademark. 

Operations in Afghanistan and northern Iraq demonstrated SF’s ability to 

successfully leverage a surrogate force to achieve U.S. objectives. These UW

campaigns were unique and suggest what future operations in the war on 

terrorism may resemble. 

Although the use of surrogates in Afghanistan and northern Iraq was 

unique in many ways, the concept of using surrogates is not new. This monograph examined history, theory, and doctrine in arriving at an understanding of surrogate warfare. During World War II, Detachment 101 organized 

and trained Kachin tribesmen to fight the Japanese in China and Burma. 

They functioned as a surrogate army, performing a valuable economy-offorce mission in support of the allies in the China-Burma-India theater of 

operations. 

T. E. Lawrence’s theory of UW further emphasizes the importance of 

understanding the culture of the indigenous force with which one works. 

His understanding of the importance of family in Arab culture, for example, 
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led him to develop a theory of fighting a war of detachment. His theory 

stressed maintaining offensive initiative and avoiding the defense. Both the 

Northern Alliance and Kurdish Peshmerga faced a numerically superior 

force, yet they took the fight to the enemy. With the help of SF and coalition air power they were able to maintain offensive initiative and ultimately 

defeated Taliban and conventional Iraqi forces. 

The UW campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique in many 

ways. For example, they did not sequentially follow the seven phases of 

UW described in current doctrine, but rather went straight into the combat 

employment phase. These UW campaigns were also unique because SF 

advised large formations of surrogates in the conduct of large-scale conventional type operations as opposed to the classic small-unit hit-and-run 

tactics characterized by guerrilla warfare. It is in this context that surrogate 

warfare emerges as a unique form of UW. 

This monograph presented two historical vignettes of UW operations conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq. It examined U.S. Army SF in 

Afghanistan and the role they played in leveraging the Northern Alliance 

as a surrogate army. The pace of operations with which Task Force Dagger 

waged their UW campaign was faster than anyone anticipated. Within 24 

hours of linking up with Northern Alliance factions, SF operational detachments were calling in air strikes against the Taliban. Within three weeks the 

first major combat operation began to liberate Mazar e-Sharif. 

Task Force Viking and the UW operations they conducted with the 

Kurds in northern Iraq were examined here. Together with 70,000 Kurdish 

Peshmerga, SF led the way in disrupting 13 Iraqi divisions along the Green 

Line. Although the 10th SFG focus is on the European Command area of 

responsibility, they successfully adapted to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Operation Provide Comfort proved invaluable in helping to make 

this transition. Many 10th SFG soldiers, to include two of the battalion commanders, were veterans of Operation Provide Comfort, giving them instant 

credibility with their Kurdish counterparts.

The primary research question was, What does SF need to do to prepare 

for surrogate warfare in the future? The criterion of training, specifically 

cultural awareness and regional expertise, was used to analyze SF’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysis revealed that while SF were successful in applying cross-cultural skills developed over years of deployments, 

they still had challenges. Although SF conducted “crash course” language 
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training in preparation for their UW operations, they still had to improvise 

to overcome language barriers by utilizing other nonnative language skills 

until translators could be found. Based on this result, the following conclusion is drawn: Although SF is capable of transferring cross-cultural and 

language skills, this means is not sufficient for future UW operations. Too 

often, SF relies on translators and rudimentary communications in third 

languages as a workaround. Investment 

needs to be made to increase SF’s language capability. Four to six months of 

initial language training is insufficient. 

Selected noncommissioned officers and 

officers should be sent for more comprehensive language training. Additionally, 

all SF soldiers should conduct immersion training to fully develop their 

language and cultural awareness skills. Finally, analysis of future threats 

should dictate what languages and cultures to invest in, rather than cycling 

SF soldiers through a group of core languages. 

The second criterion, organization, was used to assess the ability of a 

SFG to function as an operational-level joint headquarters. Analysis of the 

experience of the 5th and 10th SFGs revealed that while they successfully 

accomplished their missions and established Joint Special Operations Task 

Forces, significant growing pains occurred. The primary reasons were a lack 

of equipment, personnel, and training. Much of the required equipment 

has now been acquired, and institutional knowledge within the SFGs has 

increased with respect to operating a JSOTF. However, a requirement will 

always exist to bring the army, joint, and combined personnel together in 

a timely manner for training as JSOTF prior to deploying. 

The UW campaigns SF waged in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique and 

established a trademark for UW operations in the 21st century. Because of 

the cultural divide that currently exist between eastern and western cultures, the use of surrogates abroad may become increasingly more attractive. U.S. Army SF are clearly the force of choice to leverage surrogates to 

achieve U.S. objectives. In order to prepare for future surrogate warfare, SF 

must increase their cultural and regional expertise. SF must also be better 

able to function as an operational-level joint headquarters that can plan and 

support a UW campaign. 

Investment needs to be made 

to increase SF’s language 

capability. Four to six months 

of initial language training is 

insufficient. 
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Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

Endnotes

1. Jim Garamone, “Iraqi Freedom Largest Special Ops Effort Since Vietnam,” 

American Forces Press Service, available from www.defenselink.mil/news/articles 

(accessed 27 August 2004).

2. Mike Skinner, “The Renaissance of Unconventional Warfare as an SF Mission” 

Special Warfare (Winter 2002), 16. 

3. Charles R. Holland, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the State of Special Operations 

Forces (United States Senate, 2002), 12.

4. Ibid.

5. George Bush, Statement by the President in Address to the Nation, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 1 October 2004). 

6. Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 271. 

7. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (California: 

Presidio Press, 1986), 206.

8. James R. Ward, The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS (1942-1945), available 

from www.oss-101.com/history (accessed 2 October 2004).

9. Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose 

of Special Forces,” Special Warfare (Summer 1999), 5. 

10. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.201: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare

(Washington DC, 2007), 2-9.

11. Franks, 271.

12. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 75.

13. Tommy Franks, “Campaign Against Terror,” interview with Frontline, 2002. 

14. Woodward, 43. 

15. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp, 

Weapon of Choice: Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Afghanistan (Fort 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 370.

16. Ibid.

17. John Mulholland, “Campaign Against Terror,” interview with Frontline, 2002.

18. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, 4-4.

19. Ibid.

20. Briscoe, Kiper, Schroder, and Sepp, ARSOF in Afghanistan, 57.

21. Ibid., 45.

22. Kenneth Bergquist, Unconventional Warfare in Afghanistan, Joint Special 

Operations University briefing to Command and General Staff College, 24 April 

2003. 

23. Briscoe, Kiper, Schroder, and Sepp, ARSOF in Afghanistan, 13.

24. Kaleve I. Sepp, “Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595” Special Warfare (September 

2002), 12.

25. Briscoe, Kiper, Schroder, and Sepp, ARSOF in Afghanistan, 126.
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

26. Sepp, 12.

27. Captain Mark, “Campaign Against Terror,” interview with Frontline, 2002. 

28. 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG, “The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SFG Conducts UW 

in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare (June 2002), 36.

29. Ibid., 34.

30. Ibid., 36.

31. Mulholland, “Campaign Against Terror,” interview with Frontline, 2002. 

32. Ibid.

33. Briscoe, Kiper, Schroder, and Sepp, ARSOF in Afghanistan, 126. 

34. Ibid., 98.

35. Ibid., 57.

36. Ibid., 79.

37. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 4.

38. Douglas C. Waller, The Commandos: The Inside Story of America’s Secret Soldiers

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 233.

39. Ibid., 232.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 235.

42. Ken Dilanian, Kevin G. Hall, and Mark Mc Donald, “As Turkey casts wary eye 

on Kurdish held territory, U.S. forces move into position for a fight with Iraqis,” 

Philadelphia Inquirer, available from www.contracostatimes.com (accessed 19 

July 2004). 

43. History of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), available from www.soc.

mil (accessed 26 October 2004). 

44. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Now We Have America,” Newsweek (7 April 2003), 35.

45. 10th SFG, CJSOTF-N After Action Report (Fort Carson, Colorado, June 2003).

46. Charles Cleveland, Global Scouts (briefing presented at NDIA Symposium, 5 

February 2004). 

47. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 186. 

48. Ibid.

49. Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 299.

50. 10th SFG, CJSOTF-N After Action Report.

51. Paul McEnroe, “Arrival of U.S. troops suggests a move soon in northern Iraq” 

Star Tribune (24 March 2003). 

52. Dehghanpisheh, 35.

53. Ibid.

54. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004), 250.
83

Peltier: Surrogate Warfare, The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces

55. Robinson, 323.

56. 10th SFG, CJSOTF-N After Action Report.

57. Robinson, 328.

58. Ibid., 11.

59. 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG, After Action Report, (Fort Carson, Colorado, June 

2003).

60. Robinson, 332.

61. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 54.

85

White: Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

D. Jonathan White

Legitimacy is a concept frequently mentioned in literature of 

both international affairs and counterinsurgency. This monograph 

explores the nature of legitimacy, the implications of legitimacy on 

surrogacy, and how surrogate warfare can turn the issues associated with legitimacy to the benefit of the sponsoring party. It concludes with some cautionary thoughts on how surrogate warfare 

can threaten the legitimacy of the sponsor. 

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs 

do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you 

are to help them, not to win it for them.1

— T. E. Lawrence

The preceding essays have explored the definition, underlying concepts, and history of surrogate warfare. This essay will pull these 

strands together and address the purposes of engaging in surrogate 

warfare and make a few points on the implications of surrogacy.

Neither U.S. Joint nor Army doctrine defines the terms surrogate and 

surrogate warfare. The definition offered by Kelly Smith is as judicious as it is 

useful. Smith defines a surrogate as “an entity outside of the Department of 

Defense (i.e., indigenous to the location of the conflict, from a third country, 

partner nation, alliance, or from another U.S. organization) that performs 

specific functions that assist in the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S. military either does not 

have or does not desire to employ.” 2

D. Jonathan White is a retired U.S. Army officer, retiring in 2007 after 22 

years in the Army and 18 years of experience in Special Forces. He has 

served on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and on the faculty of the British Joint Services 

Command and Staff College in Shrivenham, England. He earned a Masters of 

Arts in Defense Studies from King’s College London and is currently pursuing 

a Ph.D. in History at the University of Alabama.
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

One of the keys to understanding the utility of surrogate warfare is the 

concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a term much bandied about in the 

literature of counterinsurgency and international affairs.3 Legitimacy is, 

however, one of those concepts that is widely acknowledged as important, 

yet rarely defined in sufficient detail. In a lecture at the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College in 1998, Dr. Larry Cable defined the term and 

analyzed its implications. Legitimacy, according to Cable, is “the generally 

conceded right to exercise authority.” 4 Cable then postulated two broad 

types of legitimacy, existential and functional. Existential legitimacy deals 

with how a regime came to wield power. Functional legitimacy deals with 

how the regime exercises its power, what it does for the people in whose 

eyes legitimacy is sought.

Frequently, in the eyes of the United States policy makers, existential 

legitimacy flows from holding free and fair elections. Not every culture 

shares the United States emphasis on elections, however. In some cases, a 

regime is legitimate despite not being elected through elections that adherents of western liberal ideology would consider free and fair. For example, the Emir of Kuwait is generally seen to be legitimate despite being 

a hereditary monarchy. Likewise, Fidel Castro’s regime is probably seen 

by most Cubans as legitimate despite never having submitted to elections 

meeting the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe.5

There are limits to the existential legitimacy of a regime. A regime that 

possesses existential legitimacy yet fails to meet the functional needs of 

its population can find its authority challenged. The people of a nationstate expect their government to provide certain functions that range from 

respecting basic human rights and providing physical security to making 

the trains run on time. It is the people of a country who get to decide what 

constitutes functional legitimacy, not the government. People have a right 

to expect their government to behave legitimately. Stated negatively, a government that does not attempt to earn functional legitimacy in the eyes 

of its people should expect problems. Thus, while existential legitimacy 

holds a reservoir of goodwill on the part of the people, pushed to extremes, 

functional legitimacy can trump existential legitimacy and threaten the 

regime’s survival. 

Given the history of the United States in some key regions of the 

world, the presence of United States forces in large numbers can have the 
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White: Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

unintended consequence of bringing into question the existential legitimacy of an allied regime. If a government is seen to be unable to sustain 

itself without aid from outside, 

the people of the country will 

question the existential legitimacy of the government. Look, 

for example, at the propaganda 

the National Liberation Front 

(NLF) used against the Republic 

of Vietnam. NLF propaganda used the presence of U.S. forces as an excuse 

to belittle the Saigon government as a puppet of the U.S.6 The Chinese 

Communist Party echoed the phrase.7 A more recent and relevant example is 

the policy of the Philippine Islands toward U.S. military presence. Due to the 

legacy of imperialism and the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the Philippine 

Insurrection of 1899–1902, a legacy that one historian labels “baggage,” the 

Philippine constitution places restrictions on foreign troops engaging in 

combat operations on Philippine soil.8

Likewise, the perceived heavy-handedness of the United States in Latin 

America in the past means that local civilians may view a large, overt U.S.

military presence in ways other than the U.S. policy makers intended.9

Locals in Latin American countries may see such a U.S. military presence 

as a reminder of former unpopular U.S. policies and perhaps as a continuation of such former policies. Most importantly, they may question the 

existential legitimacy of their own government. 

The Muslim world also holds a view of U.S. policy that U.S. policy makers 

may not share, or intend. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, working for 

the Gallup organization, have conducted surveys of Muslim opinions from 

around the world and compiled the results. It is enough to say here that the 

way many Muslims view U.S. policies, and U.S. forces enacting those policies, differs in substantive ways from how U.S. policy makers view them.10

Despite assurances from President Bush that the war on terror is not a war 

against Islam, many Muslims believe that the U.S. is inherently anti-Islamic. 

The United States special relationship with Israel also complicates the United 

States relationship with Muslim-majority nations.11

In each of these cases, a large overt U.S. military presence may bring 

the existential legitimacy of host nation governments into question in the 

eyes of the people of those countries. Limiting the size and visibility of U.S.

If a government is seen to be unable 

to sustain itself without aid from 

outside, the people of the country 

will question the existential legitimacy

of the government. 
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military forces, and emphasizing surrogate forces, may achieve U.S. policy 

goals while at the same time mitigating or eliminating the adverse effects of 

direct U.S. military action. Given that, why would the U.S. pursue a policy 

of employing U.S. forces acting unilaterally, or primarily in such a country? 

Obviously, U.S. operational effectiveness is in many ways superior to those 

of surrogate forces. The level of training and responsiveness to U.S. military 

forces argue powerfully for their employment. U.S. military forces bring 

an incredibly high state of training to a problem. Also, the U.S. possesses 

distinct advantages over allied or surrogate forces in terms of Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), command and control (C2), and 

equipment, to name a few areas.

The dilemma for the United States is how best to balance the operational 

effectiveness of U.S. military forces against the negative implications of an 

overt U.S. military presence. One obvious answer is the use of surrogate 

forces. While surrogate forces may not bring equal levels of training and 

equipment to the problem, they possess marked advantages of their own. 

For one thing, surrogate forces will frequently possess superior knowledge 

of the local culture, history, and language, a shortfall the Army and Marine 

Corps have attempted to rectify through predeployment language and cultural training. For example, in Iraq, some few U.S. forces possess limited 

Arabic language ability. This is offset, to a certain degree, by the U.S. use 

of interpreters. Yet, even this solution brings a new set of problems. Using 

an Arabic interpreter from Basra with a unit operating in Mosul may well 

limit his effectiveness if his accent and word choice give away his place of 

origin. Likewise, the agendas of interpreters—especially interpreters who 

are locally hired—may limit their effectiveness.12 Surrogate Iraqi forces, 

however, will speak Arabic fluently. Indeed, their knowledge of local dialect 

is frequently superior to U.S. contract interpreters who may speak Arabic 

just as well, but will speak it with a different accent, drawing attention to 

the fact that they are foreigners.

Likewise, local surrogate forces will bring, almost as a matter of course, 

superior knowledge of local culture, history, and customs to their operations. The United States has attempted to improve the cultural knowledge 

of U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan by 

employing Human Terrain Teams (HTTs).13 HTTs consist of anthropologists, political scientists, or historians that possess or build knowledge of 
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White: Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

the culture in which the U.S. forces operate. This knowledge is certainly 

important in conducting effective counterinsurgency operations, yet the 

importation of foreign HTT members into a culture provides maneuver 

commanders with a form of artificial knowledge of the culture in which 

U.S. forces are operating. This knowledge is artificial because it is exogenous 

and must be built over time by the HTTs.

Surrogate forces may come with detailed cultural knowledge superior to 

the “artificial” knowledge that HTTs build over time. For example, members 

of Iraqi forces, being born and raised in Iraqi society, probably already know 

how the various tribes of Iraq have interacted in the past, the various tribal 

rivalries and loyalties. They do not have to learn it. They have lived it.

Having addressed the advantages of employing surrogate forces over U.S.

forces, how should surrogate forces by aided, advised, or controlled? Which 

type of U.S. forces should do the advising and controlling? Kelly Smith has 

explored that issue (in previous essay herein), and a brief summary of his 

considerations will suffice here. 

In those areas in which the U.S. logistics support is robust, employing 

U.S. conventional forces in conjunction with surrogate forces may be advisable. General Purpose (GP) forces are trained, organized, and equipped to 

operate for long periods of time, but require a substantial logistics footprint. 

The messing, medical coverage, and maintenance support of a GP force, 

for example, frequently increase the total size of the U.S. force, due to the 

historically low “tooth-to-tail” ratio of U.S. GP forces. For example, as of 

August of 2005, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) had approximately 1,600 military personnel to support a small “maneuver force” of a 

Civil Affairs Company, one infantry company, and a U.S. Army well-digging 

detachment. 14

In those areas where the force protection threat is higher, employing U.S.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) may be a better choice. One reason is that 

without the normal logistics train of GP forces, they can establish a smaller 

footprint, meaning less U.S. force to be protected. Secondly, SOF tend to 

have greater language capability and greater cultural expertise, which helps 

them identify force protection threats.

In those areas in which a low visibility profile is desirable for political 

reasons, U.S. SOF may be able to employ different uniform policies, or otherwise lower the profile of U.S. forces, and make advising or training surrogate 
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

forces more acceptable to host-nation governments. The decision whether 

the employ GP forces or SOF will depend, in each case, on the situation into 

which the force will operate. Context is everything.

The key factor in the decision to use surrogate force is the existence of 

a commonality of interests between the United States and the surrogate 

force or nation. History of surrogate warfare is replete with examples in 

which a surrogate force shared a common goal, or common enemy, with the 

sponsoring power. The French government in 1778–1783 shared a common 

enemy with the nascent American states: the British. The Arabs of Hejaz 

shared with the British the common goal of defeating the Turks in Arabia.15

The United States and the Philippines shared a common goal of defeating 

the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan Island.

Some cautionary notes are in order, however, in relation to the employment of surrogate forces. First, the shared interests are unlikely to be entirely 

coincident. While the Hejaz Arabs shared a common enemy with the British, 

their strategic objectives were not uniform. The British sought to establish 

British hegemony in the Middle East, while the Arabs sought an independent Arabia. Both the United States government and the Philippines sought 

the defeat of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. Achieving this 

goal, however, may see a separation between U.S. strategic objectives and 

those of the Philippines, and bring to the fore the traditional Philippine 

interest in having no foreign troops on Philippine soil. If the commonality 

of surrogate and sponsor is based on a common enemy, the defeat of that 

enemy is likely to see the evaporation of the unity between surrogate and 

sponsor.

Another factor that bears watching in the employment of surrogate forces 

is the respect for human rights and the impact of any violations by surrogate forces on the United States. As noted above, generally, U.S. forces 

bring with them a very high state of training and generally superior equipment, C2 systems, and logistics. Surrogate forces frequently bring with them 

superior language skills in the local language and greater cultural expertise 

and finesse. In the area of human rights and the strict subordination of 

military forces to civilian authority, however, the surrogate forces may not 

meet the standards of U.S. forces. Examples of this abound. In the 1980s, 

the record of Salvadoran force in respecting the human rights of civilians 

was sometimes quite bad.16 Likewise, the Northern Alliance’s record with 

the treatment of prisoners was a cause of concern early in the conflict in 
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White: Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

Afghanistan.17 Given the very public and regrettable failure on this issue at 

the Abu Ghraib detention facility in 2004, the record of the United States 

has not been perfect in this regard either. The United States had systems in 

place to deal with violations of human rights, and employed them to detect 

violations when they occurred and punish the perpetrators. The issue at 

hand, however, is what happens if surrogate forces are prone to conduct 

themselves in such a manner as to violate the human rights of the population within their area of operations?

First, it is possible to argue that respect of human rights by surrogate 

forces are improved by the presence of U.S. forces. U.S. forces are required 

by law to respect human rights and refuse funding to nations and units that 

are believed to violate human rights, “unless all necessary corrective steps 

have been taken” to correct such abuses.18 Thus, merely having U.S. forces 

around surrogate forces causes surrogates to respect human rights or face 

the withdrawal of U.S. support.

Second, if U.S. forces operating with surrogate forces cannot prevent 

human rights abuses, the legitimacy of the relationship is at risk for two 

reasons:

a. First, the reaction from the U.S. populace and U.S. political figures 

might demand the severing of the relationship. This might be considered the loss of an attenuated form of existential legitimacy. This 

loss of existential legitimacy is attenuated because it threatens the 

existential legitimacy of neither the U.S. government nor the surrogate, 

but does threaten the relationship between the two. 

b. Almost as important, human rights abuses by a surrogate force will 

likely undermine the functional legitimacy of the surrogate force 

among the affected population. Given the importance of legitimacy 

in irregular warfare, it is difficult to overestimate the importance 

of maintaining functional legitimacy in the eyes of the affected 

population.19

One final point on surrogate warfare is in order. What happens after the 

relationship is terminated is worth considering. Once the strategic objectives are achieved, it is natural for the relationship to be terminated. If the 

power of the surrogate force depended in large measure on the continued 

provision of materiel support, or other forms of combat support such as fire 

support, then the severing of the relationship from the supporting power 
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JSOU Report 09-3, Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches

would return the surrogate force to the status quo ante. If the power of the 

surrogate force is dependent on training provided by the sponsoring power, 

then the severing of the sponsor-surrogate relationship may not necessarily lead to a loss of power by the surrogate force. The strategic goals of the 

surrogate force may evolve in directions not in line with, and perhaps contradictory to, those of the sponsoring nation.20

Given the overall risks and benefits of surrogate warfare, the issue is well 

worth considering. Given the scope and duration of the long war, accessing 

surrogate forces is a key component of a strategy that will allow the United 

States and her allies to operate globally at many places simultaneously. There 

simply are not enough U.S. forces to go around, even if this were advisable. 

Further, the use of U.S. forces in many countries actually may undermine 

the existential legitimacy of the countries the U.S. is trying to help. Using 

surrogate forces allows the U.S. to maintain the existential legitimacy of 

our allies and will likely improve the functional legitimacy of the surrogate forces operating alongside U.S. forces and in support of U.S. strategic 

objectives. 

Endnotes

1. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-28.

2. Kelly H. Smith, “Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century” herein.

3. FM 3-24, 1-1 through 1-4; Gates, Brown, and Pace, Irregular Warfare Joint 

Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, 6.

4. Despite the controversy surrounding Dr. Cable’s career, his thoughts on counterinsurgency and the nature of legitimacy are both insightful and, from a military 

perspective, quite useful. Cable lecture, “Interventionary Operations,” CGSC 

C520 lecture, February, 1997.

5. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) publishes 

standards for the conduct of elections. Castro’s regime obviously does not allow 

its legitimacy to be tested through a free and fair election.

6. Robert Maranto and Paula S. Tuchman, “Knowing the Rational Peasant: The 

Creation of Rival Incentive Structures in Vietnam,” Journal of Peace Research, 

Vol. 29, No. 3 (August, 1992), 258.

7. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, No. 215-229, November 1969, 5.

8. Dr. Cherilyn A. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with 

the Philippines,” Special Warfare Magazine, September 2004, p. 11. See also, 

Philippines Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 25, which limits operations by 

foreign forces within the Philippines, except those covered by treaty.
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White: Legitimacy and Surrogate Warfare

9. Look at the base of the U.S. Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia for 

just one indication of the extent to which the U.S. military has operated in Latin 

America in the past, particularly the early 20th century.

10. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam: What A Billion 

Muslims Really Think (NY: Gallup Press, 2007).

11. Andrew Kohut of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Arab and Muslim Perceptions 

of the United States,” Testimony to U.S. House International Relations Committee, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 10 November 2005.

12. In the author’s personal experience in Haiti in 1994, knowing the local language 

proved to be extremely helpful. When a Haitian denounced his neighbor as a 

member of FRAP’H (the party of General Raoul Cedras), speaking to the alleged 

FRAP’H member established that he had won a court case against his neighbor 

the previous year, and the neighbor was hoping to use the cultural and linguistic ignorance of the Americans to inconvenience his neighbor by having him 

arrested. For problems of interpreters with agendas in current operations, see 

GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Military Operations: High-Level 

DOD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and 

Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, December 2006, 32.

13. Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and Don Smith, “Human Terrain System: 

A CORDS for the 21st Century,” Military Review, September-October 2006, 

8-15.

14. Maneuver in this case is relative to the JTF’s mission, which in 2005 was largely 

Civic Action, specifically MEDCAPs, DENCAPs, and VETCAPs as well as drilling 

and refurbishing wells. See www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-hoa.

htm; accessed 16 October 2008.

15. Although, as will appear hereafter, the commonality of interest between the Hejaz 

Arabs and the British was on perfect. Substantial differences existed between the 

long-term Arab strategic objectives and those of the British.

16. See William M. Leogrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central 

America 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC Press, 2000).

17. Amir Zia, “Straw warns over treatment of prisoners,” The (UK) Independent, 

Friday, 23 November 2001.

18. See the 2001 Defense Appropriations Act (Sec. 8092 of P.L. 106-259), the Foreign 

Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208), and the Leahy Law in the 2001 

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 563 of P.L. 106-429).

19. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy 

and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect 

and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and 

other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

20. As one battalion commander told one of his NCOs training with a foreign country’s forces, “Don’t train these guys too well. Next year, we might have to come 

back here and fight them.”