1

The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-3297

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

Michael Lee Knight, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: April 15, 2010

Filed: July 29, 2010

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Michael Lee Knight pled guilty to failure to pay child support under 18 U.S.C.

§ 228(a)(3). The district court1

 sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment, and

ordered restitution of $78,565.85. He appeals the reasonableness of his sentence.

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

Knight failed to make $35,833.13 in child support payments, and pled guilty to

failure to pay child support, without the benefit of a plea agreement. After a two-level
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reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Knight's total offense level 12 and criminal

history category VI yielded a Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months

imprisonment. However, the statutory maximum of 24 months became the guideline

sentence under Guideline § 5G1.1(a). 

This court reviews a district court's sentencing for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 704 (8th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Gall,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). "[A] district court's imposition of a sentence within the

advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable." United States v. Wallenfang,

568 F.3d 649, 662 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Knight first argues that his 20-month sentence is unreasonable because the

district court did not address his poverty, history of sexual and physical abuse,

struggles with drug addiction and bipolar disorder, incarceration while he was to pay

child support, and efforts to care for his current wife, mother, children and

stepchildren. He cites United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2007), for

the proposition that a district court fails to adequately explain its sentence when

arguments in the sentencing memorandum go “unmentioned and unaddressed, save

the general statement by the district court that it had received, read, and understood

the sentencing memorandum.” However, in this case the district court specifically

addressed Knight’s lack of income, his “drug abuse issue,” his prior problems with the

law, and that he was “doing stuff to help out at home.” “[T]he [district] court need not

specifically respond to every argument made by the defendant, or mechanically recite

each § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Struzik, 572 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 2009)

(internal citation omitted). “Rather, the district court must simply ‘set forth enough

to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a

reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Id., quoting

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, although the district court did

not respond to each of Knight’s arguments, it considered them and had a reasoned

basis for imposing a 20-month sentence.
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Knight contends that the district court gave significant weight to the fact that

Knight and his family receive Social Security disability income, an allegedly

irrelevant factor. According to the sentencing transcript, the court noted the disability

income only when considering how Knight survived without a steady job for four

years. Nothing suggests that the district court gave this factor any weight in its

sentencing decision, and it did not abuse its discretion by mentioning the factor.

Knight asserts that his sentence reduces respect for the law because he could

have pled to a misdemeanor if he paid 10% of the loss amount. However, the district

court correctly noted that such a plea bargain is routinely offered because the ultimate

end is the welfare of the child. The possibility of such a deal is irrelevant to the

district court’s sentencing discretion. At sentencing, Knight had already pled guilty

to the felony change. The district court heard all the arguments, properly considered

the § 3553(a) factors, and in fact varied downward four months from the guideline

sentence. See United States v. Moore, 581 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 2009) ("where a

district court has sentenced a defendant below the advisory guidelines range, it is

nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still

further" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing Knight to 20 months’ imprisonment.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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