IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 20S-MI-62

Indiana Land Trust Company, f/k/a Lake County 

Trust Company TR #4340,

Appellant-Movant,

–v–

XL Investment Properties, LLC, and LaPorte County 

Auditor,

Appellees-Respondents.

Argued: June 11, 2020 | Decided: October 27, 2020

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court

No. 46D02-1509-MI-1642

The Honorable Richard R. Stalbrink, Jr., Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 18A-MI-2150

Opinion by Justice David

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
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David, Justice.

Before the State sells a delinquent property, the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the owner of the property be 

given adequate notice reasonably calculated to inform him or her of the 

impending tax sale. While actual notice is not required, the government 

must attempt notice in a way desirous of actually informing the property 

owner that a tax sale is looming. If the government becomes aware that its 

notice attempt was unsuccessful—such as through the return of certified 

mail—it must take additional reasonable steps to notify the owner of the 

property if practical to do so.

In this case, property taxes went unpaid on a vacant property from 2009 

to 2015 resulting in over $230,000 in outstanding tax liability. The county 

auditor—through a third-party service—sent simultaneous notice of an 

impending tax sale via certified letter and first-class mail to the tax sale 

notice address listed on the deed for the property. The owner of the 

property, however, had moved from its original address several times and 

never updated its tax address for the property with the county auditor. 

The certified letter came back as undeliverable, but the first-class mail was 

never returned. After a skip-trace search was performed for a better 

address and notice was published in the local newspaper, the property

eventually sold and a tax deed was issued to the purchaser. The original 

owner was ultimately notified of the sale when the purchaser filed a quiet 

title action and searched for a registered agent. The original owner then

moved to set aside the tax deed due to insufficient notice.

The central question before our Court today is whether the LaPorte 

County Auditor gave adequate notice reasonably calculated to inform 

Indiana Land Trust Company of the impending tax sale of the property.

As a corollary question, we also confront whether the Auditor was 

required under the circumstances of this case to search its own records for 

a better tax sale notice address when the notice sent via certified mail was 

returned as undeliverable. We find the Auditor provided adequate notice

and was not required to search its internal records. We therefore affirm 

the trial court’s denial of Indiana Land Trust’s motion to set aside the tax 

deed. 
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Facts and Procedural History

Peter Dellaportas is a real estate developer and the president of 

Midwest Investment, Inc. At some point in the early 1990’s, Dellaportas 

purchased 140 acres of property on the former site of a municipal airport 

in Michigan City in LaPorte County, Indiana. Dellaportas began dividing 

the property and developing the parcels for various commercial tenants. 

Relevant to the current dispute, Lot 2 was a nearly 30-acre undeveloped

plat contained within the greater development.1

In 1993, Dellaportas transferred the property to Indiana Land Trust 

#4340 (hereinafter “Trust 4340” or “the Trust”). On the deed 

memorializing the transaction, a written notation directed that tax bills be 

sent to:

Midwest Investment, Inc.

415 North LaSalle Dr., Suite 700

Chicago, Illinois 60610

Attn: Mark Youngman, President.

App. Vol. 2 p. 8. Though Dellaportas testified that this address was 

accurate in 1993, Midwest Investment, Inc. moved from the tax notice 

address in the mid-1990s and several times after that. As of 2016, Midwest 

Investment moved to its presumably-still-current address at Clark Street 

in Chicago, Illinois. 

Property taxes were paid on Lot 2 from 1993 through 2008, but no 

payments were made from 2009 through 2015. As of July 31, 2015, the 

property had accrued an outstanding tax liability of $230,017.26. An 

adjacent property—also placed in Trust 4340—underwent a tax sale and 

1 Although the tax notice address is the center of the present dispute, at all relevant times, the 

property address for Lot 2 was “Unit 2, Lot 2 in Michigan City Town Centre Subdivision, as 

per plat thereof recorded May 30, 2003 as Instrument No. 2003-14174, In Plat Book 24, page 54, 

In the Office of the Recorder of La Porte County, Indiana” and was more commonly referred 

to as, “Vacant Land, Cleveland Avenue, Michigan City, IN 46360. Parcel ID No.: 46-05-09-300-

039.000-009.” Ex. Vol. I p. 59. See also App. Vol. 2 p. 54; Tr. p. 95.
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was ultimately redeemed by the Trust after it received notice of the sale 

from the purchaser’s attorney.2 Although Midwest Investment updated its

tax notice address for Trust 4340 with the LaPorte County Auditor with 

respect to the adjacent property, the records for Lot 2 were apparently 

never updated within the Auditor’s system. 

Meanwhile, LaPorte County had entered into an agreement with SRI, 

Incorporated (“SRI”) to complete a variety of services, including 

preparing lists of properties eligible for tax sales, preparing notices, 

publications, and postings for those lots eligible for tax sale, and 

conducting tax sales. As part of the arrangement, SRI agreed to mail tax 

sale notices via certified mail and first-class mail to the property owners. If 

those notices were returned or not successfully delivered, SRI was 

required to perform a “skip trace” search to locate a different address for 

the owner; the LaPorte County Auditor’s office also agreed to search its 

own records for a better address. 

On July 31, 2015, SRI generated a report that indicated Lot 2 was 

delinquent on its property taxes. The same day, SRI sent two identical

notices of tax sale—one via certified mail and one via first-class mail—to 

Trust 4340 at the LaSalle Drive address. While the first-class mailing was

not returned to SRI or the Auditor, the certified mail was returned with a 

postal service NIXIE label reading “NOT DELIVERABLE AS 

ADDRESSED UNABLE TO FORWARD” and a handwritten notation 

“REFUSED” on the outside of the envelope. Ex. Vol. I p. 218. Notice was 

also published in a LaPorte County newspaper on three separate 

occasions.

SRI testified that after the certified mail was returned as undeliverable, 

it performed an unsuccessful skip trace search to see if it could find the 

owner of the property. Apart from SRI’s efforts, the LaPorte County 

Auditor’s office did not search its internal records for any additional 

addresses for Lot 2’s owner because it believed it had no obligation to do 

2 We note that Mr. Dellaportas still received this notice even though it was sent to the LaSalle 

Drive address—albeit at a different suite number.
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so after the first-class mail was not returned. Based on these actions, 

neither SRI nor the Auditor identified a different tax notice address for the 

parcel.

Lot 2 proceeded to a tax sale in October 2015 but did not sell. A 

certificate was issued to the county commissioners and Lot 2 was 

eventually sold via a “Commissioners Sale” to XL Investment Properties, 

LLC (“XL Investment”). Notice of the Commissioners Sale was published 

in a local newspaper on December 14, 21, and 28, 2015, and the sale 

occurred on February 19, 2016.

Once XL Investment received a tax sale certificate for Lot 2, a title 

search was conducted. On March 28, 2016, a Notice of Redemption from 

the tax sale was sent by XL Investment via certified mail to Trust 4340 at 

the LaSalle Drive address but was returned labeled “ATTEMPTED – NOT 

KNOWN UNABLE TO FORWARD.” Ex. Vol. I p. 52. A notice of 

redemption for the property was also published on March 30, 2016. A 

notice of filing of the petition for tax deed was sent on July 21, 2016—also 

to the LaSalle Drive address—but was returned with a NIXIE label that 

read “REFUSED UNABLE TO FORWARD” and the notation “REFUSED” 

written on the envelope. Ex. Vol. II p. 94.

XL Investment received an order issuing the tax deed for Lot 2 on 

August 30, 2016. XL Investment then filed a quiet title action and, after 

searching for the registered agent of Indiana Land Trust Company in the 

Secretary of State’s files, successfully notified Indiana Land Trust of the 

sale.3

On March 9, 2017, Trust 4340 filed a motion to set aside the tax deed 

issued to XL Investment. Among other things, the trial court determined 

3 It appears from the record that when Indiana Land Trust attempted to notify Midwest 

Investment of the quiet title action, it sent the mail to a Clark Street address with an old suite 

number. That envelope was returned with the scratched out notation “NO LONGER HERE.” 

Ex. Vol. I p. 62. Mr. Dellaportas testified that as of December 2016, Trust 4340 did not have an 

accurate address for Midwest Investments, Inc.
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SRI and the Auditor substantially complied with the tax sale notice 

statute, XL Investments met all statutory requirements to be entitled to the 

tax deed of the property, the Auditor’s mailings satisfied constitutional 

due process, and Trust 4340’s motion was untimely. Accordingly, the trial 

court denied Trust 4340’s motion on August 9, 2018, and Trust 4340 

appealed.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed on two separate 

grounds. Indiana Land Trust Co. v. XL Investment Properties, LLC, 130 

N.E.3d 630, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). First, the Court of Appeals held the 

trial court erred by finding Trust 4340’s motion to set aside the tax deed 

was untimely filed. Id. at 636. Second, the court found “the Auditor was 

required to search its records for a better address for Trust 4340 after the 

certified mail notice was returned as not deliverable.” Id. at 638. Therefore, 

the court found the Auditor failed to satisfy due process and the trial court 

erred by denying Trust 4340’s motion. Id. at 637, 638. On rehearing, the 

Court of Appeals, among other things, declined to vacate its opinion to 

allow the Attorney General to intervene. Indiana Land Trust, Co. v. XL 

Investment Properties, LLC, 134 N.E.3d 439, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), on 

reh’g. 

XL Investment and the LaPorte County Auditor sought transfer, which 

we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate 

Rule 58. The State of Indiana has filed an amicus brief to defend the 

constitutionality of the State’s tax sale notice statute. The Association of 

Indiana Counties, Indiana Auditors’ Association, Indiana County 

Treasurers’ Association, and SRI have also filed a joint brief of amici 

curiae in support of the Auditor’s petition to transfer. 

Standard of Review

Where, as here, a trial court enters special findings and conclusions 

according to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Marion Cnty. Auditor v. Sawmill Creek, LLC, 964 N.E.2d 213, 216 

(Ind. 2012). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings and if so, we next determine whether the findings support the 
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judgment. Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness 

credibility; we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings as long as 

they are supported by evidence and any legitimate inferences therefrom. 

Id. at 216-17. We will only set aside the findings or judgment of the trial 

court if they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 216.

Discussion and Decision

The basic issue presented in this case is not whether Indiana’s tax sale 

notice statute is constitutional. As we discuss below, it is not our duty to 

prescribe the form of service the government should follow when certified 

mail is returned as undeliverable. Rather, we must ensure the basic 

requirements of due process are met in a particular case. Whether a 

county auditor could or should search its own records for a better tax sale 

notice address depends on the information revealed to him or her when 

mail is returned. Necessarily, it follows that these determinations depend 

on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Here, the parties have understandably challenged the constitutional 

fortitude of Indiana’s tax sale notice statute. XL Investment and the 

Auditor argue that the current notice statute complies with constitutional 

due process requirements and, because the Auditor followed the statute, 

Trust 4340 was placed on proper notice of the tax sale and cannot now set 

aside the tax deed. Trust 4340, meanwhile, argues that it received 

insufficient notice and the General Assembly may not legislate away a due 

process requirement that an auditor must search its internal records when 

mail is returned.

It is wholly unclear whether the Court of Appeals opinion below 

actually declared the tax sale notice statute unconstitutional or if the 

Auditor’s actions in this case simply failed to meet constitutional muster.

See Indiana Land Trust, Co., 130 N.E.3d at 637, trans. granted, opinion vacated

(noting “regardless of the language of Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-4, the 

Auditor is charged with knowledge of the contents of its records and is 

constitutionally obligated to search those records” but observing “[t]he 

General Assembly does not have the authority to codify away 
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constitutional protections” which included an auditor’s search of its own 

records); Indiana Land Trust, Co. v. XL Investment Properties, LLC, 134 

N.E.3d 439, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), on reh’g, vacated (finding the auditor’s 

office, as an agency of the state, could adequately represent the State’s 

position in defending the constitutionality of the statute). Observing the 

“longstanding principle of constitutional avoidance” that weighs against 

deciding constitutional questions not absolutely necessary to a merits 

disposition, we find a narrower path to resolution of this case.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 818 (Ind. 2012) (citing Snyder 

v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 768 (Ind. 2011)). 

Rather than weigh in on the constitutionality of the underlying statute, 

we will instead focus on whether the Auditor’s actions complied with 

minimal due process standards. Below, we explore what the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, the structure of Indiana’s 

tax sale notice statute, and the extent to which the Auditor met minimal 

notice requirements. Finding that the Auditor complied with due process

standards, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Trust 4340’s motion to set 

aside the tax deed for Lot 2.4

I. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment sets minimum notice standards for 

tax sales of delinquent properties.

It is an “elementary and fundamental requirement” of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that before it institutes an action to 

sell a delinquent property, “a State must provide ‘notice reasonably 

calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.’” Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795, 103 S.Ct. 

4 The Court of Appeals below found Trust 4340’s motion to set aside the tax deed was timely

filed. Indiana Land Trust Co., 130 N.E.3d at 636. Assuming arguendo that this conclusion is 

correct, we need not reach this issue because of our determination that the Auditor complied 

with due process requirements.
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2706, 2709, 77 L.Ed. 180 (1983) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Put 

differently, a party that has a legally protected property interest in a 

particular parcel is “entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him 

of a pending tax sale.” Id. at 798. 

Both the Supreme Court of the United States and our own Court have 

weighed in on what these standards entail. We will review the relevant 

cases from each court below. 

A. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that

while actual notice is not required, notice must be given 

in a manner desirous of actually informing the owner.

The Supreme Court has addressed the contours of due process in 

several opinions over the years. For example, in Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 

a case with Hoosier origins, the Court considered a tax sale in which 

Elkhart County posted and published notice of a tax delinquency but 

failed to mail any notice to the mortgagee. The Court determined, inter 

alia, that publication and posting alone were unlikely to reach those with 

interest in the property. Id. at 799. The Court’s opinion concluded that 

personal service or mailed notice was required for a creditor with a legal 

interest in a property. Id. The Court wrote, “Notice by mail or other means 

as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional 

precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or 

property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in 

commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably 

ascertainable.” Id. at 800 (emphasis in original). In Mennonite Bd. of 

Missions, then, a single letter of notice would have discharged the county’s 

constitutional obligation to give notice to the party with a legal interest in 

the property. Id. 

More recently in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 

L.Ed.2d 415 (2006), the Supreme Court confronted an issue not unlike the 

one our Court faces today. There, a property owner became delinquent on 

property taxes after he got divorced and moved out of his marital home. 
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The government sent a certified letter to his property to notify the owner 

of an impending tax sale, but the letter was returned unclaimed. The 

government made no additional attempts to notify the owner other than 

publishing notice of the sale in a local newspaper. The property was 

eventually sold, and the owner was only notified when the purchaser 

delivered an unlawful detainer notice to the owner’s daughter at the 

property. Id. at 223-24, 126 S.Ct. at 1712-13. 

The owner filed suit alleging the government failed to give him 

sufficient notice of the tax sale in violation of the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue presented to the Supreme Court 

was framed as “whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner 

and returned undelivered, the government must take additional 

reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the owner’s property.” Id. 

at 223, 126 S.Ct. at 1712. Under the circumstances presented in Jones, the 

Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding 

“someone who actually wanted to alert [the property owner] that he was 

in danger of losing his house would do more when the attempted notice 

letter was returned unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could 

be done.” Id. at 238, 126 S.Ct. at 1721.

The Jones Court made several foundational observations to reach its 

result. First, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

requires the government to provide “notice and opportunity for hearing 

appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id. at 223, 126 S.Ct. at 1712 (quoting 

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313, 70 S.Ct. at 652). 

Second, “actual notice” is not required by due process. Id. at 225, 126 

S.Ct. at 1713. Rather, due process requires the government to provide 

“notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 

interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” Id., 126 S.Ct. at 1713-14 (quoting 

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 652). 

Third, to assess the adequacy of a particular form of notice, a Court 

must balance the interest of the State against the individual interest sought 

to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 229, 126 S.Ct. at 1715 

(quotations omitted). So “when notice is a person’s due ... [t]he means 
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employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee 

might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 

315, 70 S.Ct. at 652). 

Applying the facts of Jones to this framework, the Court wrote that 

someone desirous of actually informing a property owner that his house 

was subject to a tax sale would surely take “additional reasonable steps” 

to give notice if a mailing were returned. Id., 126 S.Ct. at 1716. Because the 

government in Jones did nothing when the certified letter was returned as 

unclaimed, the Supreme Court observed that the government “should 

have taken additional reasonable steps to notify [the landowner], if 

practicable to do so.” Id. at 234, 126 S.Ct. at 1718. The Jones Court stopped 

short, however, of prescribing any particular type or form of service. Id. 

(citing Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455, n.9, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 

249 (1982)). It followed, then, that “if there were no reasonable additional 

steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed 

notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.” Id. 

Perhaps stated differently, the Supreme Court concluded the 

“reasonable additional steps” that must be taken when a certified letter is 

returned “depends upon what the new information reveals.” Id. In the 

case of a certified letter returned as unclaimed, the Court posited that one 

viable option would have been for the government to send another letter 

via regular mail. Id., 126 S.Ct. at 1718-19. Another practical option would 

have been for the government to post notice on the door of the property. 

Id. at 235, 126 S.Ct. at 1719. In the Court’s view, either of these options 

would increase the likelihood the owner would be notified of the 

impending tax sale on his property. Id. 

Particularly relevant to today’s decision, the Supreme Court addressed 

the landowner’s argument that the government should have searched 

either the phone book or “other government records” to reveal his new 

address. Id. at 235-36, 126 S.Ct. at 1719. But the Supreme Court did “not 

believe the government was required to go this far.” Id. at 236, 126 S.Ct. at 

1719. “An open-ended search for a new address—especially when the 

State obligates the taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax 
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collector[ ]—imposes burdens on the State significantly greater than the 

several relatively easy options” discussed above. Id. 

B. Our Court’s decisions echo the findings of the Supreme 

Court and evaluate the adequacy of notice based on the 

facts and circumstances of each case.

Our own Court has had the opportunity to review Jones under factually 

similar circumstances in Sawmill Creek, 964 N.E.2d at 213. In that case, the 

property owner’s business name was incorrectly listed as “Saw Creek” 

instead of “Sawmill Creek” on several documents filed with the 

government. Id. at 214. When the property owner moved operations, 

addresses were updated for Sawmill Creek in the auditor’s system, but 

not for the “Saw Creek” entity used on the property documents. Id. at 215. 

The property became delinquent. Id. 

The county auditor sent a pre-sale notice via certified mail to the 

address on file for “Saw Creek,” but the notice was returned as ”NOT 

DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED, UNABLE TO FORWARD.” Id. The 

auditor published notice in the newspaper, on its website, and on a list 

posted outside of the county clerk’s office. Id. After the property was sold, 

the auditor employed a title company to conduct additional research on 

the property, but the title company could not locate a “Saw Creek” 

business entity. Id. Two post-sale notices—one via certified mail and one 

via first-class mail—were again sent to the address on file, but both 

mailings were returned as undeliverable. Id. Only when the new property 

owner’s “for sale” signs appeared on the property did the original owner 

become aware of the sale and sued to set aside the tax deed. Id. at 216.

Applying the analytical framework of Jones referenced above, our Court 

found the county auditor satisfied due process requirements because, 

under the circumstances of that case, “the [a]uditor’s actions were 

reasonably calculated to provide notice to [the landowner].” Id. at 221. 

Observing “every fact relevant to whether the [a]uditor acted or failed to 

act ‘as one desirous of actually informing’ [the owner] of the pending tax 

sale must be considered,” id. at 219, we found that after the certified letter 
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was returned as undeliverable, it would have been unreasonable for the 

auditor to re-send the same notice via first-class mail. Id. at 220. We also 

observed that posting notice on bare, unimproved land was not practical. 

Id. at 221. Ultimately, we were satisfied that the auditor took the required 

“additional reasonable steps” by engaging a title search company to 

search government records and the phonebook for additional addresses. 

Id. 

Our Court again examined Jones in the case M&M Inv. Group, LLC v. 

Ahlemeyer Farms, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 1108 (Ind. 2013). Though the facts and 

procedure of that case are not particularly relevant to today’s decision, our 

Court’s opinion carefully reviewed the structure and history of Indiana’s 

tax sale statutes and the decisional law interpreting them. Id. at 1112-17. 

Focusing on our prior decision in Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 

1992), our Court discussed whether auditors are required to search 

internal records for a better address when notice to the delinquent 

property owner is returned. We recounted that in Elizondo, “due process 

required the auditor to search his or her own records for alternate 

addresses for the owner of the property.” Id. at 1116 (citing Elizondo, 588 

N.E.2d at 505). See also Griffin v. Munco Assoc., 589 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 1992); 

Miller Reeder Co. v. Farmers State Bank of Wyatt, 588 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1992). 

After a review of Jones v. Flowers and then-existing statutes, however, we 

called Elizondo’s viability—at least with respect to property owners—into 

question. Id. at 1117.

We determined that “the portion of Elizondo dealing with a property 

owner has been abrogated [by Jones v. Flowers] to the extent it implies an 

auditor may receive a notice back ‘unclaimed’ and then effectively sit on 

his or her hands and do nothing more...” Id. While “Jones would compel 

the additional steps of at least mailing the notice by first class mail, 

posting it on the front door, and/or addressing it to ‘occupant’” if notice to 

a property owner was returned to a county auditor, our opinion deferred 

to the legislature’s additional guidance codified at the time the opinion 

was handed down. Id. 

In M&M Investment Group, we further observed that notice 

requirements are different depending on the class of interest at stake. 
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Whether notice was sent to a property owner or a mortgagee proved to be 

a consequential distinction. We observed that “[w]hile those cases relate 

to, inform, and persuade each other, it would be erroneous to presume 

that they control issues and parties beyond their own scope. Each class of 

interest merits its own analysis.” Id. at 1118. Unlike M&M Investment

Group and the remaining viable portion of Elizondo, the present “class of 

interest” is that of a property owner, not a mortgagee. As we discuss 

below, this distinction places Elizondo’s internal records search 

requirement outside the present facts.

* * *

There are several key lessons we can learn from these decisions as we 

turn our focus to the present set of facts and circumstances. First, we know 

that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires the 

government to provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Jones, 547 U.S. 

at 226, 126 S.Ct. 1708 (quotation omitted). Second, while actual notice is 

not required, id. (citation omitted), the government must take additional 

reasonable steps if practical when notice via certified mail is returned. Id.

at 234, 126 S.Ct. at 1718. Third, to assess the constitutional adequacy of the 

means of notice employed, “the interest of the State” must be balanced 

against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Id. at 229, 126 S.Ct. at 1715 (quotation omitted). This 

balancing of interests depends on the class of interest at stake. M&M Inv.

Group, 994 N.E.2d at 1118.

It follows, then, that we must evaluate the adequacy of notice afforded 

to Trust 4340 before the county sought to extinguish its interest in the 

property. As the issue is framed for our review, we must examine every 

fact relevant to whether the Auditor acted or failed to act “as one desirous 

of actually informing” Trust 4340 of the impending tax sale. See Sawmill 

Creek, 964 N.E.2d at 219.

In light of the foregoing observations, we will next evaluate the tax sale 

notice statutes as they currently stand and apply the present facts to this 

context.
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II.The notice given by the Auditor met minimal 

due process requirements.

Trust 4340 has launched a two-pronged attack on the tax sale deed, 

arguing first that the Auditor was required—or at minimum should have—

searched its own records for a better tax sale notice address, and second, 

that the contents of the notice were insufficient for failing to include a 

common description of the property. Based on our understanding of the 

relevant statutes and decisional caselaw, we decline to adopt Trust 4340’s 

arguments and find the Auditor gave adequate notice.

We will address each of Trust 4340’s arguments in turn.

A. The manner in which notice was provided was 

constitutionally sufficient.

Because the underlying statutes provide context and structure for each 

party’s actions, we will start by reviewing the applicable laws for tax sales 

in Indiana. The General Assembly has codified the procedures and 

requirements to conduct a tax sale when an owner of real property 

becomes delinquent on property taxes. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24 et seq.

Under the present statutory scheme, there are certain notice requirements 

that must be met before the property is sold. I.C. § 6-1.1-24-4. If notice is 

given and no property owner objects or steps forward to contest the sale, 

the property is subject to sale at a public auction. I.C. §§ 6-1.1-24-4.7, -5. 

After the tax sale, there is a redemption period during which a person 

may redeem the property for a certain sum of money. See I.C. § 6-1.1-25 et 

seq. If the property is not redeemed, the purchasing party may file a 

petition for the tax deed to the real property. I.C. § 6-1.1-25-4.6.

More specifically, Indiana Code section 6-1.1-24-4(b) (2015) currently 

provides, in relevant part: 

Not less than twenty-one (21) days before the earliest date on 

which the application for judgment and order for sale of real 

property eligible for sale may be made, the county auditor shall 

send a notice of the sale by certified mail, return receipt 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 16 of 22

requested, and by first class mail to:

(1) the owner of record of real property with a single owner; or

(2) at least one (1) of the owners, as of the date of certification, 

of real property with multiple owners;

at the last address of the owner for the property as indicated in 

the transfer book records of the county auditor under IC 6-1.1-

5-4 on the date that the tax sale list is certified. If both notices 

are returned, the county auditor shall take an additional 

reasonable step to notify the property owner, if the county 

auditor determines that an additional reasonable step to notify 

the property owner is practical... The notice must set forth the 

key number, if any, of the real property and a street address, if 

any, or other common description of the property other than a 

legal description... The county auditor must present proof of 

this mailing to the court along with the application for 

judgment and order for sale. Failure by an owner to receive or 

accept the notice required by this section does not affect the 

validity of the judgment and order. The owner of real property 

shall notify the county auditor of the owner's correct address. 

The notice required under this section is considered sufficient if 

the notice is mailed to the address or addresses required by this 

section.

We can glean from this statute that (1) two notices must be sent, one by 

certified mail and one by first-class mail; (2) these notices must be sent to 

the last address on record at the date the tax sale list is certified; and (3) 

only if both notices are returned must the auditor take an additional 

reasonable step if practical. These are the circumstances that happened in 

this case.

Prior to 2015, however, this same section required: “If both notices are 

returned due to incorrect or insufficient addresses, the county auditor 

shall research the county auditor records to determine a more complete or 

accurate address.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4 (2014) (repealed by P.L. 251-
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 17 of 22

2015); see also City of Elkhart v. SFS, LLC, 968 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (finding due process “requires the county auditor to search the 

records that it maintains”); Hullett v. LaFevre, 926 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010) (same); Edwards v. Neace, 898 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (same); Reeder Assocs. II v. Chicago Belle, Ltd., 778 N.E.2d 828, 834 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same). On this point, Trust 4340 argues the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Jones did nothing to abrogate Indiana caselaw 

requiring an auditor to search its records for a better address. In support, 

Trust 4340 points to decisions that predate the current statutory scheme

and would have us enshrine this “internal records search” requirement 

into the threshold of constitutional due process. See, e.g., Elizondo, 588

N.E.2d at 504; M&M Inv. Group, 994 N.E.2d at 1122; City of Elkhart, 968 

N.E.2d at 817. 

We decline to hold as much today. It is true that prior opinions of our

Court of Appeals, including decisions handed down after Jones, have held 

“the auditor is deemed to be aware of the contents of the records 

maintained in its office, and due process requires the county auditor to 

search the records that it maintains.” City of Elkhart, 968 N.E.2d at 817

(citation omitted). This observation tracks back to our decision in Elizondo

where, as discussed above, we found it was “reasonable to require the 

auditor to search the records of his own office for other possible addresses 

upon the receipt of an undelivered notice.” 588 N.E.2d at 505. 

Recall, however, that the viable portion of Elizondo dealt with notice to 

mortgagees and we have subsequently declined to extend this analysis to 

different classes of interest. See M&M Inv. Group, 994 N.E.2d at 1118. In 

M&M Investment Group, we observed “analysis of the sufficiency of notice 

in a property deprivation matter under the Due Process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment turns on the ‘practicalities and peculiarities of the 

case,’ and ‘will vary with circumstances and conditions.’” Id. (quoting 

Elizondo, 588 N.E.2d at 503). These cases have historically been assessed 

independently based on the class of interest at stake, see id., and we see no 

reason to depart from that approach today.

That is not to say a county auditor is never required to search his or her

internal records. Rather, an auditor’s responsibility lies in what is learned
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 18 of 22

after notice is given in a particular case. Jones, 547 U.S. at 234, 126 S.Ct. at 

1718. In addition to striking this internal-search requirement, the 2015 

amendments to the tax sale notice statute also added the requirement that 

the auditor “take an additional reasonable step to notify the property 

owner, if the county auditor determines that an additional reasonable step 

to notify the property owner is practical.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4 (2015); 

P.L. 251-2015.

As was the case in Jones, this “additional reasonable step” is based on 

what new information is revealed to the government. 547 U.S. at 234, 126 

S.Ct. at 1718. A court will not “prescribe the form of service that the 

government should adopt,” but rather assess whether there were 

additional reasonable steps that could be taken if practicable. Id. (cleaned 

up, citation omitted).

Here, the Auditor, through SRI, sent contemporaneous notice via 

certified and first-class mail. While the certified mail was returned to SRI, 

there is no evidence the first-class mail was ever returned to its sender. 

This meant either the mail was received by its intended recipient or 

simply lost to time. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Jones observed 

that sending notice via regular mail likely increases the chances of actual 

notice. Id. at 236, 126 S.Ct. at 1719. Given actual notice is not required, we 

do not think the Auditor should be left to speculate whether the first-class

mail was truly delivered, especially when it was not returned to its 

sender. 

Regardless, Trust 4340 argues the distinction between “Unclaimed” 

mail and mail returned as “Not Deliverable as Addressed—Unable to 

Forward” made notice by first-class mail unreasonable. See Sawmill Creek, 

964 N.E.2d at 219 n.6. The first-class mail in this case, however, was sent 

contemporaneously with the certified letter. This is unlike the facts in 

Sawmill Creek where we made particular note that following up with firstclass mail after a certified letter was returned as undeliverable would be 

unreasonable based on the auditor’s new knowledge that the certified 

letter was not deliverable at the listed address. See id. at 219-20. One could 

reasonably assume the unreturned first-class mail in this case indicated to 

the Auditor that the mail was received by the intended recipient. We do 
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not think that under these circumstances, the Auditor was required to 

speculate any further.

Perhaps the circumstances would be different if both the certified letter 

and first-class mail were returned to SRI and the Auditor. This 

knowledge—that the tax notice address was more than likely incorrect—

would certainly require additional reasonable steps to notify Trust 4340 if 

practical to do so. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 234, 126 S.Ct. at 1718. And perhaps 

under those facts, an auditor would satisfy due process by searching its 

internal records. But those circumstances are simply not present here. In 

addition to the first-class mail, the Auditor—through SRI—performed a 

skip trace search for a better address and published notice in the 

newspaper. These combined actions, at least under the circumstances 

present in this case, satisfy the minimal due process requirements

discussed in Jones and subsequent caselaw in Indiana.

While the Auditor certainly could have done more, the Constitution 

does not require more than the actions taken in this case. The power to 

require more than the threshold requirements of due process rests 

squarely with the General Assembly and we decline to enter that arena 

today. See id. at 238, 126 S.Ct. at 1721. 

B. The contents of the notice substantially complied with 

relevant statutory requirements.

On appeal, Trust 4340 also challenges the adequacy of the notice itself. 

Indiana Code section § 6-1.1-24-4(b) provides, in relevant part, “The notice 

must set forth the key number, if any, of the real property and a street 

address, if any, or other common description of the property other than a 

legal description.” In addition to the requirement that “[t]he owner of real 

property shall notify the county auditor of the owner’s correct address,”

this provision provides, “The notice required under this section is 

considered sufficient if the notice is mailed to the address or addresses 

required by this section.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4(b).

“The issuance of a tax deed by the trial court creates a presumption that 

a tax sale and all of the statutory steps leading to the issuance of the tax 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 20 of 22

deed were proper.” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 134 N.E.3d 423, 431 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted). “[T]his presumption may be 

rebutted by affirmative evidence showing the contrary.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). As challenged here, a tax deed may be set aside if a party 

demonstrates that “the notices required by ... IC 6-1.1-24-4 ... were not in 

substantial compliance with the manner prescribed in those sections.” Ind. 

Code § 6-1.1-25-16(7); see generally Porter v. Bankers Trust Co. of California, 

N.A., 773 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing substantial 

compliance with tax sale notice statutes); Reeder Assocs. II, 778 N.E.2d at

832-35 (same). Whether notice “substantially complied” with statutory 

requirements, though a “fact-sensitive determination,” is a question of 

law. Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989).

The notice sent in this case contained a property identification number 

and a “so-called” brief legal description but did not contain a location and 

street address or a common description of the property. The trial court 

concluded that “although the Tax Sale notice did not include the property 

address or other description of the property, the Auditor and SRI still 

substantially complied with Indiana Code §6-1.1-24-4 [sic] by providing 

the pin number and legal description and could not provide any address 

or other description because the property was vacant.” App. Vol. 2 at 26.

The evidence indicates the parcel was an undeveloped, 29 acre tract of 

land. The Auditor testified that vacant parcels are not assigned property 

addresses until improvements are made upon the land. While nothing 

identified as a common description or street address was listed on the 

notice, it read, “13-05-09-300-039 MICH CITY TOWN CENTRE SD UNIT 2 

LT 2 29.827 AC.” Ex. Vol. I p. 220. This description—which included the 

name of the development, the unit and lot number, and the exact 

acreage—substantially complies with the purpose of a “common 

description” by allowing a lay person to identify the property.

As such, this description would have alerted the owner that his 

property was in danger of being sold at a tax sale. This supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that the notice substantially complied with the statute’s 

requirements.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 21 of 22

In light of these circumstances, the trial court’s holding is supported by 

the evidence.

Conclusion

We find that under the facts of this case, the LaPorte County Auditor 

provided notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise 

Trust 4340 of the pendency of the action and afforded them an 

opportunity to present their objections.

We affirm the trial court’s denial of Indiana Land Trust Company’s 

motion to set aside the tax deed.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Greg A. Bouwer

Jeff Carroll

Koransky Bouwer & Poracky, P.C.

Dyer, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLE E XL INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC

Matthew J. Hagenow

Anthony G. Novak

Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones, LLP

LaPorte, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LAPORTE COUNTY AUDITOR

J. Alex Bruggenschmidt

Thomas C. Buchanan

Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C.

Zionsville, Indiana
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-MI-62 | October 27, 2020 Page 22 of 22

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE STATE OF INDIANA

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Thomas M. Fisher

Solicitor General of Indiana

Julia C. Payne

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Kian Hudson

Deputy Solicitor General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE THE ASSOCIATION OF 

INDIANA COUNTIES, INDIANA AUDITORS ’ ASSOCIATION , 

INDIANA COUNTY TREASURERS’ ASSOCIATION, AND SRI, 

INCORPORATED

Matthew T. Albaugh

Emily A. Kile-Maxwell

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana