J.S36031/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.S., A MINOR, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

 : 

: 

 : 

APPEAL OF: D.F.M. A/K/A D.S., MOTHER, : 

 : No. 3609 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court No(s).: 51-FN-381481-2009 

 CP-51-AP-0000651-2013 

 CP-51-DP-0001847-2011 

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.S., A MINOR, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

 : 

: 

 : 

APPEAL OF: D.F.M. A/K/A D.S., MOTHER, : 

 : No. 3611 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court No(s).: 51-FN-381481-2009 

 CP-51-AP-0000626-2013 

 CP-51-DP-0001205-2011 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2014 

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
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D.F.M. a/k/a D.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on November 14, 2013, 

terminating her parental rights to her twin sons, A.J.S.1

 and D.M.S.2

(collectively “Children”), born May 5, 2008, and changing Children’s goal to 

adoption.3 The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

 On [May 5, 2008], [t]he Department of Human Services 

[(“DHS”)] learned that [Mother] prematurely gave birth to 

twin boys, [Children], at Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia. [Children] were exposed to illegal drugs 

during the pregnancy and were hospitalized after birth for 

three weeks for observation. 

 The [DHS] reports show a lengthy history with the 

family due to allegations of ongoing substance abuse by 

[Mother. DHS] obtained information of numerous eviction 

notices and shut off notices for utility services at the family 

home. 

* * * 

 On June 11, 2011, [DHS] learned the child, D.S., 

suffered abrasions to his face and bruises on his body 

which appeared to be at different stages of healing. Upon 

a visit to Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, it was 

determined that D.S.’s condition was post-concussion 

 

1

 A.J.S. and A.S. are the same child. 

2

 D.M.S. and D.S. are the same child. 

3

 These appeals were consolidated sua sponte by order of this Court on 

January 28, 2014. 
J. S36031/14 

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associated with self-injuring symptoms and symptoms of 

being developmentally delayed, with delayed gross motor 

skills and speech delays. The primary care physician 

reported D.S.’s parents failed to comply with the 

recommendation of Early Intervention services. 

 On June 12, 2011, [DHS] did a home assessment of 

[G.S. (“Father”)]4

 and [Mother] and found the home did 

not have proper utilities. [DHS] obtained an Order of 

Protective Custody [(“OPC”)].

 

 A shelter care hearing was held on June 16, 2011, 

[following which the Master] lifted the OPC and ordered [ ] 

D.S. to be temporarily committed to [DHS]. [ ] D.S. was 

placed in the care of a family member. It was reported 

[Mother] had a history of drug abuse and [Father] used 

drugs in front of [Children]. 

 An adjudicatory hearing was held on [June 21, 2011]. 

D.S. was [deemed] dependent and committed [ ] to 

[DHS]. The [c]ourt referred [Mother] to the [c]linical 

[e]valuation [u]nit for a forthwith drug screen, dual

diagnosis, assessment and monitoring. Both parents were

ordered to the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) 

program for reunification services. 

 On September 3, 2011, [DHS] received a General 

Protective Services [“GPS”] report which alleged [Mother] 

was under the influence of drugs and was causing 

confusion in the home where [Children] were located. A 

substantiated report alleged that [Mother] and [Father] 

were using heroin in front of [Children]. A family member 

visited the home and removed [Children] from the home. 

The family member refused to return [Children]. 

 On September 8, 2011, [DHS] learned [Mother] was 

incarcerated in prison in Delaware [C]ounty for [a] 

probation violation for testing positive for drugs. It was 

also alleged [Father] was incarcerated [ ]. 

 

4

 Father is not a party to this appeal. 
J. S36031/14 

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 On September 21, 2011, [DHS] obtained an [OPC] for 

A.S.

 An initial permanency review hearing was held for [ ] 

D.S. on September 21, 2011 [ ]. The [c]ourt ordered D.S. 

to remain committed to [DHS]. The [c]ourt received a 

report of noncompliance from [CEU] regarding [Mother’s] 

court ordered drug screens. 

 A shelter care hearing was held for [ ] A.S. on 

September 22, 2011. [A.S.] was adjudicated dependent

and committed to DHS on October 3, 2011.] The [c]ourt

lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to 

[DHS] to stand. [Neither Mother] nor [Father] attended 

the hearing. 

 A permanency review hearing was held on December 

13, 2011 for [ ] A.S. The [c]ourt ordered [Children] to 

remain as placed and committed to [DHS]. [Mother and 

Father] remain incarcerated. 

 On April 23, 2012, [Father] pled guilty to criminal

charges of theft and was sentenced to a maximum of 23 

months [sic] incarceration. [Father] had a lengthy history 

of incarcerations from 2006 to present. 

A Family Service Plan [(“FSP”)] meeting was held by 

[DHS]. The [FSP] objectives for the parents were (1) to 

continue to occupy suitable housing for family with suitable 

space, heat and all other operable utilities, (2) to achieve 

and maintain recovery from drug and/or alcohol problems 

(3) to sign authorization forms to allow the release of 

copies of the evaluation and progress reports (4) to 

comply with all treatment recommendation [sic] including 

therapy and/or medications as prescribed. The objectives

specifically identified for [M]other were (1) continue to 

attend drug/alcohol program and comply with 

requirements, (2) participate in mental health evaluation 

and treatment and (3) to maintain employment. 

 The matter was then listed on a regular basis . . . and 

evaluated for the purpose of determining or reviewing the 

permanency plan of the child [sic] with the goal of 

reunification of the family. 
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 In subsequent hearings, the DRO’s [sic] reflect the 

[c]ourt’s review and disposition of evidence presented 

addressing the lack of compliance with suitable housing, 

and drug and alcohol treatments. 

Trial Ct. Op., 2/6/14, at 2-3 (unpaginated). We add that since 2011, 

Children have lived with their paternal grandmother. (“paternal 

grandmother”).

On October 29, 2013, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Children. The petitions alleged grounds for termination 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Following a 

hearing on the petitions on November 14, 2013, the trial court granted 

DHS’s petitions, changed Children’s goals to adoption, and terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed on December 13, 2013.

5

 

 Mother raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Did [DHS] sustain [its] burden that [Mother’s] rights 

should be terminated? 

2. Did the trial court err in determining that it was in the 

best interest of [Children] to terminate [Mother’s] parental 

rights by finding there was no bond between [Children] 

and [Mother]. 

Mother’s Brief at 5.

 Our standard and scope of review is well-established:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the 

evidence presented as well as the trial court’s factual 

 

5

 Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
J. S36031/14 

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findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of 

review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court’s order 

only if we conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent 

evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s decision 

is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). “[O]ur 

standard of review requires [u]s to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). 

 Furthermore: 

Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 . . . . Our case law has made 

clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a 

bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights 

does the court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and 

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing any such bond. Id. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511 (some citations omitted). 

 We have previously stated: 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come 

to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth
J. S36031/14 

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of the precise facts in issue.” It is well established 

that a court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider 

all explanations offered by the parent to determine

if the evidence in light of the totality of the 

circumstances clearly warrants termination. 

 

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

 A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

 Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, 

the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts 

to promote reunification of parent and child. However, the 

Commonwealth does not have an obligation to make such 

efforts indefinitely. The Commonwealth has an interest 

not only in family reunification but also in each child’s right 

to a stable, safe, and healthy environment, and the two 

interests must both be considered. 

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations 

omitted). 

“Where an incarcerated parent faces termination of parental rights, it 

is critical that the fact of incarceration and the practical limits it imposes on 

the parent/child relationship not obscure the focus of the statutory inquiry.” 

In re P.S.S.C. & P.D.S.C., 32 A.3d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Furthermore, this Court has held: 
J. S36031/14 

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“[U]nder 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2511(a)(1), incarceration alone 

cannot support termination due to a parent’s failure to 

perform parental duties. Moreover, a parent’s absence 

and failure to support a child due to incarceration is not 

conclusive on the issue of whether the parent has 

abandoned the child. Nonetheless, a parent’s 

responsibilities are not tolled during incarceration, and 

therefore the court must inquire whether the parent 

utilized those resources available while he or she was in 

prison to continue a close relationship with the child. 

Id. at 1286 (citations omitted). 

The trial court found that DHS presented sufficient grounds to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights under the following provisions of Section 

2511: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.ふThe rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

 (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period 

of at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

 (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent. 

* * * 

 (5) The child has been removed from the care of 

the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 
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conditions which led to the removal or placement of the

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a

reasonable period of time and termination of the 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child. 

 * * * 

 (8) The child has been removed from the care of 

the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions which

led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

 * * * 

(b) Other considerations.ふThe court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). 

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).
J. S36031/14 

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In her first issue, Mother argues DHS failed to present sufficient 

evidence in support of termination pursuant to any of the subsections of 

Section 2511(a). Mother’s Brief at 13. Specifically, she claims that she 

never evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental rights to 

Children. Id. at 12. She states that she completed most of her FSP goals, 

and was actively completing the remaining goals, was compliant with her 

probation, including random drug screens, was enrolled in a drug program, 

and had re-engaged in mental health treatment. Id. She concedes, 

however, that she had only been re-engaged in mental health treatment for 

a few months, but claims that she needed to find suitable housing after 

being released from prison before she could seek mental health treatment. 

Id. at 13. 

Because we may affirm the trial court’s decision as to any subsection 

of Section 2511(a), we focus our analysis on whether the trial court properly 

terminated Mother’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). Our Court has 

explained: 

termination under subsection (a)(8) does not require 

evaluating [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the 

conditions that initially caused placement, nor does it 

require an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of 

[DHS] services. Though the state is required to make 

reasonable efforts to promote family stability and 

preserve family unity we cannot require [DHS] to extend 

services beyond what our legislature has deemed a 

reasonable time after state intervention or require 

Herculean efforts by [DHS] or other agencies after the goal 

has changed to adoption. Nor, in the interests of the 

children, should we. The state’s interest in preserving 
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family unity must be weighed along with the state’s 

interest in protecting children, and a child’s right to a 

healthy and stable environment. A child’s life simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

In support of the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights, DHS 

presented the testimony of Barbara Forest, DHS social worker. Ms. Forest 

testified that D.S. and A.S. were adjudicated dependent in June and 

September 2011, respectively.6

 N.T., 11/14/13, at 11. Although Mother has 

completed some of her FSP objectives, she did not have appropriate 

housing, had not provided verification of employment, and was not engaged 

in mental health treatment. Id. at 18, 21. Mother had also failed to 

participate in random drug screens, and, when she did appear for drug 

testing, she has had positive results. Id at 12-14. Ms. Forest testified that, 

at the time of the hearing, she was still not comfortable recommending that 

Mother have unsupervised visitation with Children. Id. at 20. Ms. Forest 

recommends that Children be adopted by their [paternal grandmother] with 

whom they have lived since 2011. Id. at 21. Paternal grandmother is 

bonded with Children, meets their basic needs, and provides them with 

stability. Id. at 21-22. Ms. Forest reiterated her recommendation that the 

 

6

 In fact, A.S. was adjudicated dependent on October 3, 2011. 
J. S36031/14 

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goal be changed to adoption because, even though Mother has completed 

some of her FSP objectives, “there has been a long time of non-compliance” 

and Children need permanency. Id. at 23. 

 In the instant case, the trial court made the following findings: 

Mother’s repeated incarceration prevented her from 

completing her objectives for reunification with [Children]. 

Furthermore, testimony revealed [M]other’s whereabouts 

were frequently unknown for long periods of time. 

* * * 

 . . . D.S. and A.S. have been in foster care for 

respectively for [sic] twenty-nine and twenty-six months. 

The testimony established [Children] are in a stable 

environment and adoption was in the best interest [sic] of 

[Children]. 

* * * 

 The testimony established [M]other neglected to meet 

the protective parental care needs for [Children]. 

Furthermore, testimony evidenced and confirmed that 

[M]other has an extensive criminal history. Moreover, 

testimony revealed [M]other’s repeated incarceration 

caused instability in the care of [Children]. 

 Furthermore, testimony established [M]other admitted 

a history of drug usage and mental health issues. Lastly, 

[M]other repeatedly failed to participate in court ordered 

random drug screens. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 (citations to the record omitted). 

The trial court’s conclusion that Mother has not, within the requisite 

statutory period, resolved the issues that led to Children’s placement is 

adequately supported by the record. The testimony and record evidence 

establishes that Children have been in placement in excess of two years, and 
J. S36031/14 

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Mother has not advanced beyond having supervised visitation with Children. 

We acknowledge Ms. Forest’s testimony that Mother has completed some of 

her FSP objectives. However, it is undisputed that Mother has not met all of 

the goals established by DHS, including consistently participating in mental 

health, drug and alcohol treatment, and obtaining employment. On appeal, 

Mother seeks to have this Court re-weigh the evidence. Our standard of 

review, however, does not permit us to invade the credibility determinations 

of the trial court and re-weigh the evidence, absent an abuse of discretion. 

See In re S.P., 47 A.3d at 826. 

 As we find there is competent evidence in the record to support the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations, we find no abuse of the 

court’s discretion in concluding that DHS sustained its burden with regard to 

Section 2511(a)(8). See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 507; In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 802 A.2d at 1276. 

Mother’s second issue on appeal challenges the trial court’s 

determination that termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b) is in Children’s best interests. Mother notes that the trial court 

made a specific finding as to the nature of the relationship between her and 

Children when it stated, “I have no doubt that Mother loves her children. I 

have no doubt that the children love Mom.” Mother’s Brief at 16 (citing N.T. 

at 62). But, she claims that the court “never made a decision as to how the 
J. S36031/14 

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boys would be affected by the termination of [Mother’s] parental rights.” 

Mother’s Brief at 16.

 With regard to Section 2511(b), this court has stated: 

Once the statutory requirement for involuntary 

termination of parental rights has been established under 

subsection (a), the court must consider whether the child’s 

needs and welfare will be met by termination pursuant to 

subsection (b). In this context, the court must take into

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship. 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). This 

Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section 

2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

In analyzing the parent-child bond, the court is not required to order that an 

expert perform a formal bonding evaluation. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 

529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is 

a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of 

parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ 

parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of 

child). 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (some citations omitted). 
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With respect to Children’s best interests, DHS presented the testimony 

of Adrianna Garcia, a social worker at Children’s Choice and Children’s 

caseworker. Ms. Garcia testified that Children are bonded with Paternal 

Grandmother. N.T. at 29-30. She testified that she has observed Mother’s 

visits with Children and that Mother struggles to discipline them in an 

appropriate way. Id. at 31. She also suspected Mother was under the 

influence of drugs or alcohol at one visit. Id. at 32. Ms. Garcia believes 

that, “[W]hile [Children] do know who their Mother is and do have a 

connection with her, they have a strong bond with [Paternal Grandmother], 

who has been providing for them. If she was no longer in their lives, they 

would struggle more to proceed.” Id. at 32-33. Ms. Garcia does not believe 

it would cause Children irreparable harm to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. Id. at 33-34. 

The trial court’s opinion belies Mother’s contention that it failed to 

address the effect that termination would have on Children. The trial court 

concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights “was in the best 

interests of [Children]” and changing Children’s goal to adoption would 

“provide[ ] longterm stability and permanency for [Children].” Trial Ct. Op. 

at 6. Specifically, the court found: 

Testimony established [M]other’s untreated mental health 

issues and drug abuse presented safety concerns for 

[Children]. The testimony of the social worker revealed 

concerns regarding [Mother’s] behavior during visits with 

[Children]. 
J. S36031/14 

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. . . In the instant matter, the testimony established that 

the child [sic] would not suffer any irreparable emotional 

harm if [M]other’s parental rights were terminated. 

[Children] have bonded with their foster parent, [Paternal 

Grandmother]. Testimony described the relationship 

between [Children] and their foster parent as very close 

and strong. Furthermore, testimony established their 

foster parent provides longterm stability and permanency 

for [Children]. 

 Lastly in the instant matter, the social worker for [DHS] 

testified credibly. Her testimony regarding [M]other’s 

history of drug abuse and failure to seek mental health 

treatment was consistent. 

* * * 

. . . [T]he court finds that its ruling will not cause 

[Children] to suffer irreparable harm and it is in the best 

interest of the child [sic] as a result of testimony regarding 

the child’s [sic] safety, protection, mental, physical and 

moral welfare, to terminate the parental rights. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the lack of a 

beneficial bond between Mother and Children and that Children’s needs and 

welfare will be best served by terminating her parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). Although the court found that Mother and Children love 

each other, and that Mother attempted to maintain a relationship with 

Children by attending some visitation with them, “the mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude termination of parental rights.” See In re 

N.A.M., 33 A.2d at 103. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that the termination of Mother’s parental rights 
J. S36031/14 

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would be in the best interests of Children. See id.; In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 

1121; In re Adoption of M.E.P., 802 A.2d at 1276. 

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders 

granting the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights and changing 

Children’s goals to adoption.

 Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/8/2014