JSOU Report 08-4 India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment Prakash Singh
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On the cover. Yimchungru Naga tribe members in traditional dress at the 

Hornbill Festival in Kisama, Nagaland, in May 2005. Photo Zumapress, used 

by permission of Newscom. 

JSOU Report 08-4

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2008

India’s Northeast:

The Frontier in Ferment

Prakash Singh
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

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The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant 

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james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

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This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-19-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

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February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

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Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

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February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

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vii

Contents

Foreword .............................................................................. ix 

About the Author .................................................................. xi 

1. Prologue: The Backdrop ..................................................... 1

2. Assam: A Flickering Insurgency .......................................... 9

3. Nagaland: Groping for Peace ........................................... 17

4. Manipur: Rebellion Sans Ideology .................................... 33

5. Tripura and the Other “Sisters”: On the Road to Peace ...... 43

6. External Factors: Stoking the Flames ................................. 53

7. Epilogue: Looking Ahead ................................................. 63

Endnotes .............................................................................. 67

Appendix A. Statement of Violent Incidents in the 

Northeast (2005–2007) ........................................................ 71

Appendix B. List of Major Militant/Insurgent Outfits Active 

in the Northeast ................................................................... 73

ix

Foreword

Prakash Singh’s monograph on the threat that insurgencies in northeast India present to the national government provides an excellent 

insight into a significant security challenge to the Indian state. The 

troubles in the eight northeastern states highlighted in Mr. Singh’s work 

are frequently overlooked in the West when people assess India’s security 

concerns, which often focus on other more widely known security challenges, both internal and external. These are usually discussed by focusing 

on Pakistan and China as external threats and terrorists or insurgents as 

internal challengers to the state. This work clearly elevates the fractious 

northeastern region as a region of concern and challenge for the central 

government. 

Upon the modern Indian state’s independence from the British Empire in 

1947, the members of the tribes and ethnic groups in the northeast clamored 

for various degrees of autonomy. The underlying factors behind these issues 

and desires are the differences between the region’s citizens and the majority 

of Indian populace. The northeast’s citizens differ in ethnicity, religion, and 

culture from “mainstream” India and for some of them, independence just 

transferred “colonial” rule from the British to the Indians. 

From the central government’s perspective, it is paramount to maintain 

control of this geo-strategic region that borders upon the People’s Republic 

of China and, until 1971, its archrival Pakistan. However, India’s perspective on needing to maintain control of all its territory cannot separate the 

northeast’s call for independence or autonomy from other areas, most 

notably the Jammu and Kashmir region. If India were to relent and grant 

independence to any of the northeastern states, it could open the floodgates 

for a deluge of forces that challenge the central government. Would the 

Muslims in Kashmir avoid reaching a settlement with the Indian government? Would other minorities push for independence or greater autonomy 

from the central government? The answer may be yes.

The government of India was fashioned and envisions itself as a secular, parliamentary, democratic state. Failure to accommodate an ethnic or 

religious minority group threatens the very nature of the Indian state. As 

conflict continues widely in the South and Central Asian region, how India 

accommodates minorities and can reach accommodation with insurgents is 
x

a critical element for long-term regional stability and is of critical concern 

to the United States and the international community. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
xi

About the Author

Mr. Prakash Singh is a distinguished police 

officer of India. He served—and occupied the highest positions—in the most 

turbulent areas of the country: Nagaland, Assam, 

Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Kashmir. Mr. Singh 

dealt with the insurgents in Nagaland, tackled the 

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) rebels 

in Assam, fought against Sikh terrorism in Punjab 

and Uttar Pradesh, and contributed to combating 

militancy in Kashmir. The Government of India, 

in recognition of his contribution to national security, awarded him the 

Padma Shri in 1991. 

Mr. Singh joined the Indian Police Service in 1959 and held the following key positions:

a. Director general, Border Security Force (1993-1994) during which 

time BSF played a stellar role in combating terrorism in Jammu and 

Kashmir

b. Director general of police, Uttar Pradesh (1991-1993), which was 

marked by a relentless campaign against the mafia, and terrorism 

in the Terai area was crushed 

c. Director general of police, Assam (1991), which was a special assignment to ensure that elections were held peacefully in the state in the 

context of ULFA rebels’ threat to disrupt the democratic exercise; 

elaborate arrangements were made and polling was conducted 

without a shot being fired

d. Additional director general/inspector general, Border Security Force, 

Punjab (1987-1991) where he served when terrorism was at its peak; 

he effectively secured the borders by raising fencing/lighting and 

organized operations that broke the backbone of the secessionist 

movement.

Apart from the prestigious Padma Shri award, Mr. Singh has received the 

President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Services and the State Award by 

the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 
xii

Mr. Singh lectures frequently in India and abroad on various topics—

for example, insurgency, terrorism, Maoist movement, communal problem, 

police reform, and the role of paramilitary forces in venues such as Police 

Training Colleges, National Police Academy, Internal Security Academy, 

Academy of Administration, Defense Services Staff College, National Defense 

College, and the Center for Policy Research. 

Mr. Singh’s educational experience includes an M.A. in History from 

the University of Allahabad (1957). He also served as assistant professor, 

Department of History at the University of Allahabad (1958-59). His publications include the following books:

a. Nagaland (National Book Trust, India, Fourth Edition)

b. Naxalite Movement in India (Rupa & Co), its French translation 

published by Les Nuits Rouges, Paris) 

c. Disaster Response in India (Center of Excellence and U.S. Foreign 

Military Studies Office), written in collaboration with two American 

authors

d. Kohima to Kashmir, On the Terrorist Trail (Rupa & Co.), a best-seller 

in India.

Mr. Singh has also written about 150 articles on political and security 

matters that were published on the editorial and op-ed pages of Indian 

Express, Financial Express, Times of India, Pioneer, Economic Times, 

Hindustan Times, and in journals published in India and abroad. 

Mr. Singh is also the architect of Police Reform in the country, and he 

is a JSOU associate fellow. He remains very active in community support 

activities serving nonprofit humanitarian organizations, research foundations, and public interest matters. 
1

Singh: India’s Northeast

1. Prologue: The Backdrop

I

ts northeastern states are to India what the Balkans are to Europe. There

 are currents and cross-currents, tribes fighting against each other, ethnic 

 groups making a wide range of demands from autonomy to secession, 

states confronting each other, and political formations challenging the writ 

of the Government of India. The region is indeed in a state of ferment. 

The political flux is to be attributed essentially to the policy pursued by 

the British who kept these areas distinctly separated from the rest of the 

country. With the dawn of independence in 1947, the various ethnic groups 

found themselves exposed to the pulls and pressures of mainstream politics. 

They were not able to comprehend or cope with the fast moving changes. 

They were apprehensive; they feared losing their identity, that they may be 

overwhelmed by the plains people, and that politically they may cease to be 

relevant. These misgivings and fears found expression in diverse ways with 

some ethnic groups taking recourse to arms, rebelling against the authority of the government and even taking the help of neighboring countries in 

their struggle against the central authority. 

The northeastern region of India comprises the states of Arunachal 

Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. 

The states are popularly known as the Seven Sisters. In due course, another 

state, Sikkim, was added to the family. 

India’s northeastern states Left: map courtesy 

Ministry of Development of Northeastern Region and 

Northeast Council. 

Below: inset shows 

map region. 
2

JSOU Report 08-4

A peculiar feature of the region is that it is surrounded by China in 

the north, Myanmar in the east, Bangladesh in the southwest and Bhutan 

in the northwest. The borders with these countries stretch over a distance 

of 4500 kilometers (kms). On the other hand, the area is linked with the 

rest of India by a narrow 22-km-long corridor passing through Siliguri 

in the eastern state of West Bengal. It is a legacy of the partition, when 

the boundaries between India 

and Pakistan were drawn in a 

great hurry without any regard 

for the geographical features. 

The damage could have been 

undone to some extent at least 

when Bangladesh was liberated in 1971, but the Indian leaders did not have 

the foresight to do that.

The northeastern region accounts for 8.06 percent of the total land surface of India and, as per the 2001 census, it has a population of 3.88 crores 

(1 crore being 10 million), which is 3.78 percent of the total population of 

the country. The area and population of the constituent states are shown 

in Table 1. 

Table 1. Constituent Demography

States Area

(sq. km)

Population

(persons)

Density

(per sq. km)

Arunachal Pradesh 83,743 1,097,968 13

Assam 78,438 26,655,528 340

Meghalaya 22,429 2,318,822 103

Manipur 22,327 2,293,896 103

Mizoram 21,081 888,573 42

Nagaland 16,579 1,990,036 120

Sikkim 7,096 540,851 76

Tripura 10,486 3,199,203 305

Northeast 262,179 38,984,857 149

All India 3,287,263 1,028,737,436 313

Source: Office of the Registrar General of India

...the area is linked with the rest of 

the country by a narrow 22-km-long 

corridor passing through Siliguri in the 

eastern state of West Bengal.
3

Singh: India’s Northeast

Early History

About 200 categories of different tribes inhabit the northeastern region. 

They mostly belong to the Indo-Mongoloid family. According to Dr. Suniti 

Kumar Chatterjee, these Indo-Mongoloids are none else than the Kiratas

frequently mentioned in the old Sanskrit literature. The earliest reference is 

to be traced in the Yajurveda, where we find the following lines: 

Guhabhyah Kiratam; sanubhyo Jambhakam

Parvatebhyah Kimpurusam

—The Kirata is for the caves, the Jambhaka (long-toothed man) for 

the slopes, and the Kimpurusa (a wild man) for the mountains 

The Atharvaveda also mentions a Kirata girl digging medicinal herbs 

from the mountains:

Kairatika kumarika saka khanati bhesajam;

Hiranyayibhir abhribhir girinam upa sanusu

—The young maid of Kirata race, a little damsel, digs for the herbs; 

digs with shovels wrought of gold on the high ridges of the hills 

In the Mahabharata, the Kiratas are the hill men living in the eastern 

Himalayas. After Duryodhana ascended the throne, having sent the Pandavas into exile, he sent his generals in different directions to subjugate 

the kings of the outlying provinces. One of these generals was Karna, the 

great warrior. He is mentioned in the epic as having invaded Batsabhumi

or grazing country and defeated Keroli, Mrittikavati, Mohana and Pattana, 

Tripura and Kosala, and made them all pay tribute. In the great battle of 

Kurukshetra, almost all the kings were aligned either on the side of Kauravas or on the side of Pandavas. One of these who fought under the leadership 

of Bhishma, the commander-in-chief of the Kaurava army, was Vrihatbala 

who had in his division the kings of Melaka, Tripura, and Chichila.1

Dr. Chatterjee summarized his observations on the Kiratas as follows:

The ways of the Kirata were simple. They lived mostly on fruits and 

tubers, dressed themselves in skins, wore their hair in a pointed 

top-knot, and were a pleasant-looking people, but terrible with their 

weapons, and cruel in war...
4

JSOU Report 08-4

It would appear that during the centuries immediately before 

Christ, and in the early Christian centuries, the Kiratas were known 

to the Hindu world as a group of peoples whose original home was 

in the Himalayan slopes and in the mountains of the East, in Assam 

particularly, who were yellow in color and presented a distinct type 

of culture. They had spread all over the plains of Bengal up to the sea 

and appear to have penetrated as far as West Bengal. They were rich 

with all the natural wealth of minerals and forest produce with which 

the mountains and hills and jungles where they lived abounded, but 

they were adept in the art of weaving cloth (as their descendants 

still are), the cotton and woolen fabrics they made being very much 

in demand...2

The Buranjis or the chronicles of the Ahom kings who ruled over 

Assam for nearly 600 years from the early 13th century throw more light 

on the northeastern tribes’ historical evolution. Frequent clashes occurred 

between the Ahoms and the tribes, but on the whole the Ahoms were able 

to keep them under their control. During the reign of King Gadadhar Singh 

(1681–1696), the Nagas, presumably Lothas, committed depredations in the 

Doyang Valley. An expedition was sent under Tamcheng Chinghai Phukan 

to chastise the culprits. The Phukan searched the villages and when he did 

not find the culprits, set fire to their houses. The local Nagas then approached 

the Phukan and said: 

We are your slaves, do not know what is right and what is wrong. We 

are abors (i.e., ignorant). We have given the king cause of offense. 

Now we shall offer two girls to the king with two female slaves, and 

other articles. We hope the Phukan will save us.3

The Phukan accepted their surrender. The Nagas generally paid tribute to the 

Ahom kings in the form of mithuns4 and other commodities. The Ahoms, 

in return, granted to the Nagas revenue-free lands and fishing waters on 

the understanding that they would desist from making any predatory raids 

into the plains. 

The Naga tribes were looked upon as subjects, as stated by Verrier Elwin, 

by the successive Ahom kings who collected taxes from them in the form of 

slaves, elephant tusks, spears, and hand-woven cloth and cotton. Summing 

up Ahom-Naga relations, Misra says that “while the Nagas submitted to the 
5

Singh: India’s Northeast

strength of the Ahom rulers, the latter respected the Nagas’ love of freedom 

and desisted from interfering in their internal matters.”5

The process of what has been called Sanskritisation and Aryanisation 

of Assam was a steady one. It gathered momentum during the time of Srimanta Sankardeva (1449–1568), the reformer-saint, whose liberal brand of 

Vaishnavism brought thousands of tribal people of the Brahmaputra Valley 

into the fold of Hinduism6 and reached a peak during the 17th and 18th 

centuries. The Ahom kingdom started showing signs of disintegration in 

the early 19th century. The Moamaria rebellion had sapped its strength. 

The British, who annexed Assam in 1826, initially followed a policy of nonintervention in the affairs of the tribals. However, the same was abandoned 

in the course of time in favor of one of steady penetration into the hills. As 

the chief commissioner wrote in his letter of 8 August 1901: 

Where there is an ethnological boundary it will be said that a further extension is necessary in order to secure a good natural and 

geographical boundary. When the boundary is a natural one, an 

ethnological frontier is declared to be the best. When the boundary 

is a stream, it is proposed to push it on to the top of the mountain 

ridge beyond. When the watershed has been reached, it will be found 

that political considerations require an extension to the bed of the 

next river below and so on ad infinitum.

7

Pax Britannica thus gradually established its sway over the entire northeastern region. The areas now known as the states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh were originally part of Assam. The 

Government of India Act of 1935 introduced the concept of excluded and 

partially excluded areas: 

a. An excluded area was beyond the pale of Provincial and Federal 

Legislatures, and its administration was vested exclusively in the 

governor. 

b. A partially excluded area was administered by ministers subject to 

the overriding authority of the governor. 

The Naga Hills district, Lushai Hills district, and the North Cachar Hills 

subdivision were classified as excluded areas, while the Garo Hills, Mikir 

Hills, and Khasi and Jaintia Hills were categorized as partially excluded 

areas. 
6

JSOU Report 08-4

Christianity made its presence felt in the northeast under the protective umbrella of the British rule. It was so arranged that different areas in 

Assam were parceled out among different missions. Thus, Naga Hills fell to 

the share of the American Baptist Foreign Mission. The missionaries made 

their impact by spreading education, providing medical relief, and engaging 

in evangelical work. The Christian population in the northeast (excluding 

Assam and Sikkim) was hardly 2.22 percent in 1901. It jumped to 22.35 percent in 1951 and was at 38.96 percent in 1991. In two states, the missionaries 

achieved phenomenal progress. In Nagaland, the Christian population in 

1991 stood at 88 percent, while in Mizoram it was 86 percent. 

Post Independence

After independence in 1947, various hill tribes demanded regional autonomy 

and a better constitutional status for themselves. The Government of India, 

sensitive to the aspirations of the tribals, appointed a subcommittee of the 

Constituent Assembly called The North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and 

Excluded Areas Committee under the chairmanship of Gopinath Bardoloi, 

chief minister of Assam. The committee recommended the abolition of 

excluded and partially excluded areas and suggested the setting up of district 

councils in the tribal areas to ensure their participation in the management 

of matters relating to the tribals. The recommendation was accepted and 

incorporated in the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The Bardoloi 

Committee also recommended regional councils for tribes other than the 

main tribe. The idea was to have an autonomous administration comprising 

district and regional councils in the hill areas of Assam so that the tribals 

could be assured that their traditional way of life would be preserved and 

their customs and traditions safeguarded. The district and the regional 

councils were constituted in 1952 and 1953, respectively. 

The district councils were given exhaustive legislative, executive, and 

judicial functions. Thus, they were given powers to make laws regarding use 

of land other than reserved forests for purposes of agriculture, grazing, and 

other residential and nonresidential purposes, management of unreserved 

forests, use of water channels and canals for agriculture purposes, regulation 

of shifting cultivation, establishment of village councils and town committees, administration of public health and sanitation, succession of chiefs or 

headmen, inheritance of property, marriage, divorce, and social customs. 
7

Singh: India’s Northeast

They were also given executive powers to construct or manage primary 

schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, roads, and 

waterways and the power to adjudicate or try cases relating to customary 

laws if both the parties were tribals. The governor was made head of the 

district council. The district councils and the regional councils provided a 

fair degree of autonomy to the tribal people living in Assam, Meghalaya, 

Manipur, and Mizoram. 

The first Prime Minister of the country, Jawahar Lal Nehru, had a vision 

of the northeast; and he wanted the tribals to develop according to their own 

genius. He enunciated the following five fundamental principles: 

a. People should develop along the lines of their own genius, and we 

should avoid imposing anything on them. We should try to encourage in every way their own traditional arts and culture.

b. Tribal rights on land and forests should be respected.

c. We should try to train and build up a team of their own people to 

do the work of administration and development. Some technical 

personnel from outside will, no doubt, be needed especially in the 

beginning. However, we should avoid introducing too many outsiders into tribal territory.

d. We should not over-administer these areas or overwhelm them in 

a multiplicity of schemes. Instead we should work through and not 

in rivalry with their social and cultural institutions.

e. We should judge results not by statistics or the amount of money 

spent but by the quality of human character that is evolved.

The district council was an administrative innovation to meet the political aspirations of the tribals by giving them a decisive role in their development through the instrumentality of district planning. The experiment, 

however, was not very successful, apart from the fact that there was resistance from bureaucracy to the sharing of power with the district councils. 

The apprehension and grievances—some real, some perceived—of the 

tribals found expression in separatist and secessionist movements in several 

parts of the northeast. Broadly speaking, these could be attributed to the 

following reasons:

a. A feeling of alleged neglect by the central government

b. False propaganda by leaders of the area
8

JSOU Report 08-4

c. Changes in the demographic pattern caused by the influx of people 

from across the borders

d. Availability of sanctuaries in Myanmar and East Pakistan (later 

Bangladesh)

e. Assistance to rebel groups by countries inimical to India

f. Inept handling of the problems by the central government.

The Nagas were carried away by the propaganda that Nagas had always 

been independent, that they were conquered only by the British, and that 

therefore after the withdrawal of the colonial rulers, they had ipso facto 

become independent again. About 10 years later, in 1966, the Mizos also 

rebelled. Successful counterinsurgency operations, followed by political 

dialogue leading to the formation of the separate state of Mizoram in 1987, 

restored peace in that area. Insurgency erupted in Manipur in the late 1960s 

and in Tripura in the late 1970s. Manipur nursed a feeling of step-motherly 

treatment by the Central Government, while in Tripura the tribals rebelled 

because they found themselves being overwhelmed by the Bengali migrants 

from what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Assam started having 

disturbances in the early 1980s with the United Liberation Front of Assam 

demanding that the state be liberated from the Indian “colonial regime.” 

While stirrings of trouble occurred in Meghalaya also, these have been 

largely contained. Arunachal Pradesh has generally been quiet, though its 

Tirap and Changlang districts bordering Nagaland have been infiltrated 

by rebel Naga groups. 

This monograph seeks to give a panoramic view of the ongoing insurgencies in India’s northeastern states—the secessionist movement in Assam, 

the Naga imbroglio, the Manipur conundrum, and the tribal disaffection 

in Tripura. 
9

Singh: India’s Northeast

2. Assam: A Flickering Insurgency

I

ndian epics are replete with references to Assam, which is described as 

Pragjyotisa in the Mahabharata and as Kamrupa in the Puranas. The 

boundaries of Pragjyotisa, during the Mahabharata period, extended 

southwards as far as the Bay of Bengal. The Kalika Purana states that Kamakhya temple was at the center of Kamrupa, while the Vishnu Purana mentions that the country extended around the temple in all directions for 100 

yojanas (about 450 miles). The Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang’s accounts confirm that the country now known as Assam “attained considerable power 

and a fair degree of civilization.”8

The 13th century saw a band of hardy hill men—an offshoot of the Tai or 

Shan race of Upper Burma—entering the eastern parts of the Brahmaputra 

Valley. They were integrated into the mosaic of Indian people and came to be 

known as Ahoms. During the reign of Suhunmung (1497–1539), one of the 

greatest Ahom rulers, the kingdom extended in all directions: the Chutiyas 

were subjugated, the Kacharis were defeated and their capital Dimapur was 

occupied, the Nagas raids were put down, and repeated Muhammadan invasions were repulsed. Firearms were introduced. The Saka era of Hindus was 

adopted, and Sankardev’s brand of Vaishnavism spread over large areas of 

Assam.9 The Ahoms ruled over Assam for about 600 years. They had a good 

administrative setup and they improved the economy of the region. Trade 

and commerce flourished during their period. The Burmese conquered 

Assam in 1821–1822, which brought them into conflict with the ill-defined 

British frontier in the northeast. The Anglo-Burmese War occurred, which 

ended in victory for the British. The Treaty of Yandaboo was signed on 24 

February 1826, whereby the Burmese agreed to abstain from interference of 

any kind in Assam, Cachar, and Jaintia and recognized Manipur as an independent state. Political control over the region passed on to the British. 

Break-up of Assam

The composite state of Assam was a conglomerate of ethnic, cultural, and 

linguistic groups. Its complex demographic pattern generated, at different periods of time, separatist trends leading to the Naga tribals getting 

Nagaland in 1963; the Khasis, Garos, and Jaintias getting Meghalaya in 

1970; and the Mizos getting Mizoram in 1972. Arunachal Pradesh, which 
10

JSOU Report 08-4

was earlier known as North-East Frontier Agency, was carved out as a 

union territory in 1972 and given full statehood in 1987. Unfortunately, 

however, even after these concessions to regional aspirations, Assam continued to suffer from tensions and 

rumblings—for example, the 

issue of large-scale infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals, 

linguistic tensions between the Assamese and the Bengalis, demand for a 

separate political status by the plains tribals, and boundary disputes with 

the neighboring states. 

The large-scale influx of foreigners into Assam led to an agitation by 

the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram 

Parishad (AAGSP). The Assamese were apprehensive that they would be 

overwhelmed by the sea of humanity that was flooding their territory from 

across the international borders. In a memorandum presented to the Prime 

Minister on 2 February 1980, the AASU expressed its misgiving that the 

continuing influx of foreign nationals would have a very adverse effect on 

the political, social, cultural, and economic life of Assam. Prolonged agitation occurred for 6 years (1979–1985); it was marked by widespread violence 

and communal upheaval. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s initiative led to the 

signing of the Assam Accord on 15 August 1985 whereby it was agreed:

a. For purposes of detection of foreigners, 1 January 1966 shall be the 

base date and year. 

b. Those who came to Assam on or after that date and up to 24 March 

1971 shall be detected and their names deleted from the electoral 

rolls.

c. Those who came on or after 25 March 1971 shall be detected and 

expelled in accordance with the law. 

The Government of India renewed its commitment to the speedy and 

all-round economic development of Assam and undertook to secure the 

international border against future infiltrations by the erection of physical 

barriers. 

The AASU and the AAGSP thereafter called off the agitation. Elections were held in Assam, and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) led by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta came to power in December 1985. It was the most 

youthful party that had ever been voted to office in any State. No wonder it 

...even after these concessions to 

regional aspirations, Assam continued 

to suffer from tensions and rumblings...
11

Singh: India’s Northeast

aroused great expectations. But, unfortunately, the party soon lost much of 

its popularity. The lifestyle of its leaders, factionalism in its ranks, and the 

widespread corruption of its ministers eroded its credibility. 

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Challenge

The ULFA had meanwhile been formed on 7 April 1979 with the avowed 

aim of liberating Assam “from the Indian colonial regime” through “armed 

struggle” and to bring about a “radical transformation of the Assamese 

society through scientific socialism.” 

The objectives of ULFA were defined as follows:

a. Achieve the sovereignty of Assam through armed revolution.

b. Safeguard the interests of Assam and its contiguous areas—that 

is, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal, and 

Tripura.

c. Have full control over the resources of Assam—like oil, natural gas, 

and the forest wealth.

d. Gain public support against Indian and non-Indian exploitation.

e. Take a stand against any suppression and repression of the Assamese masses.10

The ULFA developed a well-structured organization to carry out its 

activities on different fronts. At the apex, a Standing Committee comprising the Chairman (Arabinda Rajkhowa), Vice Chairman (Pradip Gogoi), 

General Secretary (Hirak Jyoti Mahanta), and Commander in Chief (Paresh 

Barua). The Standing Committee itself was part of a larger body known 

as the Central Committee, which was selected for a period of 3 years. The 

organization was divided into a civil wing and a military wing. The civil 

wing was headed by Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa and the military wing 

by Paresh Barua. 

In the 1980s, ULFA was involved in different kinds of illegal, violent 

activities leading to a deep sense of insecurity among the people, particularly among those from outside Assam and those opposed to its ideology. 

Its activities followed this pattern:

a. Extortion from the affluent sections of society, particularly the 

industrialists, and those in the tea industry
12

JSOU Report 08-4

b. Murder of political opponents, police officials, and others opposed 

to its program

c. Snatching/collection of arms from the license holders

d. Harassment of people, especially of non-Assamese origin, residing 

in Assam

e. Dacoities, robberies, and looting of banks

f. Forcible occupation of lands and buildings. 

The ULFA ran virtually a parallel administration in certain areas by 

collecting taxes from the people, holding “courts” to settle disputes of civil 

or criminal nature, imposing sentences, and taking up populist causes like 

organizing shramdan (voluntary labor) to repair village roads and giving 

financial help to social and cultural institutions. Its leaders established contacts with their counterparts in the National Socialist Council of Nagaland 

(NSCN) at the latter’s headquarters in the Somra tract of Upper Burma for 

mutual help and assistance. The ULFA thereafter started sending cadres 

for training in weapons and tactics with the Naga insurgents. They sent 

about 300 personnel to Burma (now Myanmar) between 1982 and 1986 for 

training. 

The ULFA maintained close relations with the AASU and even managed to infiltrate its ranks. Important ULFA members were office bearers 

of AASU Central Committee, and the ULFA activists dominated some 

of the district committees of AASU. The interrelationship between these 

organizations was appropriately described as “AASU by morning, AGP by 

noon, and ULFA by night.” 

The ULFA gradually grew into a full fledged, well equipped and highly 

motivated terrorist organization with a solid mass base and close links with 

the other secessionist outfits of the northeast. Its violent activities reached a 

peak in 1990. The ULFA cadres launched a massive fund collection drive and 

extorted huge sums of money from members of the business community, 

industrial houses, tea gardens, government officials, and other civilians. The 

total collection was estimated to be over Rs. 100 crores (1 billion). The ULFA 

extremists also snatched away more than 1,900 guns of different descriptions from the license holders. A large number of persons, about 150, were 

kidnapped and most of them were let go only after they had parted with 

handsome amounts of money. The most sensational kidnapping was that 

of the general manager of Guwahati Oil Refinery, his son, and the driver 
13

Singh: India’s Northeast

who were later released in exchange for the release of three hard-core ULFA 

activists lodged in jail.

Those gunned down by ULFA included a superintendent of police, D.S. 

Negi, his personal security officer (PSO), and the driver. Some of the victims 

were buried in mass graves. The killings by the ULFA created panic among 

the people and a general sense of insecurity. Some members of the business 

community moved out of Assam during that period.

The law-and-order situation in the entire Brahmaputra Valley had taken 

a nose dive. The Government of India, therefore, imposed President’s Rule in 

the state on the night of 27/28 November 1990. The Assam Disturbed Areas 

Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act were invoked, and the Army 

and the paramilitary forces started operations against the ULFA. 

The Crackdown

The Army’s crackdown on ULFA was code named Operation Bajrang. It 

was quite successful. The ULFA cadres were flushed out from their known 

camps. Their organizational network was broken, and their training 

camps—including the ULFA headquarters at Lakhipathar in Tinsukhia 

district—were smashed. A large number of activists were arrested and a sizeable quantity of arms and ammunition were seized. Those arrested included 

the regional commander of Northern Region, commander of Dhemaji district, chairman of Dibrugarh and Lakhimpur districts, a couple of district 

secretaries, and about 169 hard-core party members. About 1,170 weapons 

of different descriptions were seized. A number of cars and two wheelers, which the ULFA had snatched from their owners, were also recovered. 

Cash worth more than Rs. 6.40 crores, looted and extorted from different 

sources, was retrieved. The top leaders of the ULFA and the bulk of the hard 

core, however, managed to escape, possibly because they were tipped off by 

sources within the administration. 

The ULFA suffered a setback, but it started reorganizing itself by the end 

of the year. Its commander-in-chief issued orders to the cadres to strike at 

those figuring in the party’s hit list. Members of the Congress (I),11 police 

and army informers, businessmen not supporting the party, executives of 

the tea industry, and other political adversaries were particularly targeted. 

The ULFA also gave a call for boycott of the Republic Day on 26 January 

1991 and issued an ultimatum to members of all national political parties 
14

JSOU Report 08-4

to resign from their respective organizations by 30 March 1991 or else face 

the consequences. Several Congress (I) members tendered their resignation 

or dissociated themselves from party activities. 

With elections to be held in the state in 1991, the government called off 

Operation Bajrang on 20 April 1991; that would facilitate the restoration of 

the democratic process. The Congress (I) was voted to power. The popular 

government headed by Chief Minister Hiteshwar Saikia was installed in 

the state on 30 June. 

On 1 July 1991 the ULFA, in a meticulously planned operation, kidnapped 14 officials from Guwahati. The state government succumbed to 

their pressure and announced 

general amnesty for all the ULFA 

detainees held under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act 

(TADA). Violence reached a peak 

in 1998 with 273 incidents involving 139 killings. The outfit was 

particularly active in Dibrugarh, 

Kamrup, Tinsukia, Barpeta, Nalbari, Sibsagar, North Lakhimpur, 

and Naogaon districts. In August 

2000, however, 287 militants—

including 242 belonging to the 

ULFA—surrendered. Those surrendered included Lohit Deuri, 

a senior leader of ULFA, who 

claimed that the outfit had been 

reduced to a mere lackey of the Pakistan Intelligence Agency. Deuri disclosed that China was also supplying arms to ULFA.

The northeastern rebels—including the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)—suffered a serious setback in December 2003 when the Royal 

Bhutan Army, in a well-organized campaign, destroyed their camps on its 

territory. “There is a limit to our patience” as Yeshey Dorjee, director of 

the Bhutan Foreign Ministry, said. “We cannot allow armed militants to 

August 1998, firemen try to extinguish 

a blaze at the Indian Oil Corporation 

fuel depot in Nagaom, Assam, after an 

attack by ULFA militants. AFP photo, 

used by permission of Newscom. 
15

Singh: India’s Northeast

open a parade on our soil flouting 

the law-and-order machinery.”12

It was reported that about 120 

insurgents were killed and over 

500 injured. Some important 

leaders were arrested. 

Interestingly, the ULFA and 

the NDFB asked the Chinese government for shelter and medical 

facilities for the extremists fleeing 

Bhutan. The Chinese government, 

of course, ignored their plea. 

The United States, in its Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, 

placed ULFA on the list of Other 

Selected Terrorist Organizations 

(OSTO). The report described ULFA as “northeast India’s most prominent 

insurgent group,” which conducted hit-and-run operations on security 

forces in Assam, selective assassinations, and explosions in public places. 

The ULFA, however, gradually recovered the lost ground. Its 28th Battalion is the premier strike force that has been launching attacks in the 

Upper Assam districts. The outfit has also entered into strategic alliances 

with peripheral extremist groups like the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills 

Liberation Front (KLNLF) and the All Adivasi National Liberation Army 

(AANLA). During August 2007, the KLNLF carried out a violent campaign 

against the Hindi- speaking trading community of the Karbi Anglong district. The campaign was inspired and supported by the ULFA, which also 

participated in the mayhem at certain places. The AANLA, emboldened 

by its alliance with the ULFA that gave it sophisticated weapons, carried 

out an explosion in the New Delhi Rajdhani Express in Golaghat district 

of Assam on 13 December 2007, killing 5 people. During 2007, there were 

a total of 500 incidents of violence in the state resulting in 439 insurgencyrelated fatalities. Assam, in fact, turned out to be “the most violent theatre 

of conflict in India’s northeast in 2007.”13

December 2003, Bhutanese guards 

secure a gate following a crackdown 

on illegal separatist camps in the small 

Himalayan kingdom. Some 120 Indian 

rebels were killed and many Bhutanese soldiers injured in the operation. 

AFP photo/Biju, used by permission of 

Newscom. 
16

JSOU Report 08-4

Prospects of Peace 

The government has been able to negotiate a Suspension of Operations 

Agreement with the splinter groups active in Assam: 

a. United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) active in Karbi Anglong district

b. Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) active in North Cachar Hills district

c. National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) active in parts of 

Lower Assam. 

The prospects of peace with the major insurgent outfit ULFA, however, 

appear rather dim. A People’s Consultative Group (PCG) formed in September 2005 and comprising leaders from the civil society held three rounds of 

talks with the Government of India with a view to facilitating negotiations 

between the rebel leaders and the government. The Government of India 

went out of its way to announce a unilateral cease-fire on 13 August 2006 

to facilitate the rebels coming over ground and holding fruitful consultations. However, when it was found that they were using the period to step 

up their violent activities and commit extortions, the cease-fire, which had 

lasted only 6 weeks, was called off. 

The ULFA has from time to time made difficult conditions for coming to 

the negotiating table. At one stage, they wanted the talks to be held outside 

the country, a United Nations observer to be associated in the deliberations, 

and five of their jailed Central Committee leaders to be released. The government did not agree to the first two conditions, but was inclined to release the 

leaders being held in detention. The ULFA then came up with an impossible 

demand—that the government should agree to discuss the issue of “restoration of Assam’s sovereignty.” On 31 December 2007, the ULFA clarified 

that the release of their leaders would not be sufficient to start the process of 

negotiations. No wonder the government rejected the suggestion. Evidence 

indicates that the ULFA leaders are being held captive and wire-pulled by 

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) based in Bangladesh. The ISI’s 

game plan is to destabilize India’s northeast; therefore it makes ULFA put 

forward demands that no government worth its salt could concede. 
17

Singh: India’s Northeast

3. Nagaland: Groping for Peace

The Nagas, who were classified under the generic term of Kiratas, are 

mentioned in the ancient literature. There is, however, no satisfactory account of their history during the intervening centuries. The 

chronicles of the Ahom Kings of Assam, the Buranjis, throw light on their 

relations with the Ahoms. Frequent clashes occurred between the Ahoms 

and the Nagas, but the Ahoms were able to keep the bordering tribes under 

control and even establish their authority, howsoever undefined, over the 

Nagas. Sukapha (1228–1268 AD) committed such frightful atrocities on the 

Nagas that “the other Nagas of the neighborhood hastened to make their 

submission.”14

The British relations with the Nagas fall into three periods:

a. 1832 to 1850, when the British undertook “military promenades” 

into the Naga Hills

b. 1851 to 1865, when the British followed a policy of nonintervention 

with regard to the Naga tribes

c. 1866 to 1922 during which period the British extended and established their control and authority over the entire Naga Hills. 

As recorded by Sir Robert Reid (governor of Assam, 1937–1941), “the process 

of penetration went on, inexorably if irregularly.”15

Inter-village wars, culminating in chopping off the heads of enemies, 

were part of everyday life in the Naga Hills. Head-hunting was not only the 

cause and effect of fights but also the inspiration for the Naga works of art. 

Much of the traditional Naga carvings and patterns on textiles had headhunting as their motif. The last recorded incidents of head-hunting were 

1969 in the Tuensang area.

Genesis of Insurgency

“The Naga disturbances are unique in having an almost entirely political 

foundation.”16 There was no economic exploitation of the Naga tribes, no 

interference with their religious practices, no attempt to change their social 

structure or cultural traditions. 

Angami Zapu Phizo and his followers systematically propagated that 

Nagaland was never a part of India, that it was an independent territory 
18

JSOU Report 08-4

between India and Burma, and therefore after the withdrawal of the British, the Nagas had become independent again. The propaganda, based on a 

facile and distorted interpretation of history, wrought havoc. 

As early as 1918, an organization known as the Naga Club was formed 

in Kohima with British patronage. It comprised mainly government officials, 

village headmen, and elders. In 1929, when the Simon Commission visited 

Kohima, members of the Naga Club submitted a memorandum, praying 

that the Naga Hills be kept beyond the ambit of proposed reforms and 

placed directly under the British government. The Naga elders expressed 

their apprehension about the “introduction of foreign laws and customs to 

supersede our own customary laws,” and desired to be left alone “to determine for ourselves as in ancient times.”17

In 1946, a body known as the 

Naga National Council (NNC) 

was formed “for the solidarity of 

Naga tribes.” In a memorandum, 

the NNC suggested that “the Naga 

Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous 

Assam, in a free India, with local 

autonomy and due safeguards 

for the interests of the Nagas.” Its 

tone, however, soon underwent a 

change. In a memorandum submitted on 20 February 1947, the 

NNC expressed its misgivings that “a Constitution drawn up by the people 

who have no knowledge of the Naga Hills and the Naga people will be quite 

unsuitable and unacceptable to the Naga people.” 

Phizo, who belonged to the Gwizantsu clan of the Angami tribe and 

had at one stage served in the Indian National Army of Subhash Chandra 

Bose, nursed political ambitions. Feeling that the situation was propitious, 

he decided to capture the NNC and use it as an instrument to further his 

political agenda. In 1948, however, he resigned from the NNC because he 

could not reconcile his radical outlook to its then moderate policies. 

In 1951, Phizo organized what he called a “plebiscite” on the issue of 

independence. He claimed to have visited all the villages, obtained the 

signatures or thumb impressions of the people, and administered them 

Yimchungru Naga tribe members in 

traditional dress at the Hornbill Festival 

in Kisama, Nagaland, in May 2005. 

Photo Zumapress, used by permission 

of Newscom. 
19

Singh: India’s Northeast

oaths in the traditional Naga fashion to fight for Naga independence. Phizo 

claimed that 99 percent of the people had voted for an independent Naga 

state. A falsehood repeated ad infinitum acquires the ring of truth. Phizo’s 

plebiscite also acquired the dignity of a popular verdict because the tall 

claims made by him were allowed to go unchallenged. In actual fact, the 

so-called plebiscite covered only Kohima and Mokokchung districts. The 

Tuensang area, which was not a part of the Naga Hills district then, was 

left completely untouched. Besides, even in the Kohima and Mokokchung 

areas, only the men were asked to exercise their franchise; women were 

not considered politically intelligent enough to give their choice on such a 

sensitive matter. 

The claim that Phizo himself visited all the villages was factually incorrect. He went only to some important villages, while the other villages were 

covered by his aides. The issues were also never properly explained to the 

people. Phizo would generally ask the villagers if they wanted their lands 

to remain with them or were willing to surrender them to India. It was a 

dangerously misleading over-simplification. No wonder the villagers voted 

for independence, which alone seemed to guarantee land to them. Phizo 

played on the psychology of the Naga people—their attachment to land. 

The claim that 99 percent of the people had voted for independence was 

absurd on the face of it. A plebiscite is a highly organized affair. To say that 

Phizo and his followers were able to conduct such an exercise in 1959 when 

communications in the area were so very difficult is to make an exaggerated 

claim; it does not stand the test of scrutiny. 

On 11 March 1952 a three-member Naga delegation met Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi. The interview was stormy. The Prime Minister is 

believed to have said that even if the heavens fell or India went to pieces, the 

Nagas would not be given independence! Phizo then decided to organize 

armed rebellion in the Naga Hills. He formed what was called the “Hongkin 

Government” in 1954, subsequently renamed as “Naga Central Government.” An armed wing called “Naga Home Guards” was also formed, and 

over time it evolved into the Naga Army. The youth were mobilized under 

the banner of the “Naga Youth Movement” and “Naga Women’s Society.” 

A campaign of violence was unleashed. The Naga Home Guards collected 

the dumps of arms and ammunition left behind during World War II, 

supplemented these with whatever arms could be locally manufactured, 

and reinforced their arsenal by over-running the isolated police posts and 
20

JSOU Report 08-4

looting whatever weapons and ammunition they could lay their hands on. 

Numerous incidents of loot, arson, intimidation, murder, and attacks on 

police posts occurred. The situation deteriorated beyond the control of 

the Assam Police and the Assam Rifles. In April 1956, the Government, 

therefore, entrusted the responsibility of law and order in the Naga Hills 

to the Army. This action was the first time that the Indian security forces 

were called upon to undertake counterinsurgency operations against a wellorganized outfit operating within the country in a terrain ideally suited for 

guerilla warfare. Mistakes were no doubt committed and excesses occurred. 

Gradually, however, the counterinsurgency doctrine was refined.18

Meanwhile the moderate Nagas realized the futility of Phizo’s demand 

for independence. They organized the first Naga People’s Convention at 

Kohima from 22 to 26 August 1957 and appealed to the insurgent Nagas 

“to give up the cult of violence.” The Convention demanded that the Naga 

Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division of NEFA be 

constituted into a single administrative unit and assured that they were 

in favor of a “satisfactory political settlement within the Indian Union.” 

The Government accepted the Convention’s demand for carving out a new 

administrative unit, and the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area was ushered in on 

1 December 1957.19

The second Naga People’s Convention was held at Ungma in Mokokchung district from 21 to 23 May 1958. This event was followed by yet 

another, the third Naga People’s Convention at Mokokchung from 22 to 26 

October 1959. The NPC demanded the formation of a new state to be known 

as Nagaland within the Indian Union comprising the territories heretofore 

known as Naga Hills-Tuensang Area with executive powers vested in a governor who would have special responsibility with regard to law and order. 

It sought the cooperation of every tribe to bring normalcy and appealed to 

the underground to stop all violent activities. 

Government Meets Naga Aspirations

The Government of India accepted their demand for the formation of a separate state of Nagaland within the Indian Union. Speaking in the Parliament 

on 1 August 1960, Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru said: 

I take this opportunity to express our satisfaction at the agreement 

reached with the Naga leaders. We have always regarded the Nagas 
21

Singh: India’s Northeast

as full Indian citizens: I have said to the Naga people several times 

in the past that there could be no question of independence for the 

Nagas. India achieved her independence 13 years ago, and the Nagas 

are as independent as other Indian citizens. We have not the slightest 

desire to interfere in the tribal customs and usage of the Nagas or in 

their distinctive way of life. The Nagas have been anxious to have a 

separate state within the Indian Union. The agreement now reached 

with them should enable them to find the fullest opportunity of selfexpression, and we sincerely hope that the new agreement will result 

in the rapid restoration of normal conditions in the area.”

In 1962, the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act was passed. It 

laid down, among other things, that

No Act of Parliament in respect of 

a. Religious or social practices of the Nagas

b. Naga customary law and procedure

c. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law

d. Ownership and transfer of land and its resources

shall apply to the state of Nagaland unless the legislative Assembly 

of Nagaland by a resolution so decides. 

This provision was incorporated in Article 371A of the Constitution.

It may be emphasized that no other state of the Indian Union enjoys 

such special safeguards for the protection of the religious practices, customary laws, and economic interests of its people. Referring to these provisions, 

a well-known expert on Naga tribes, J. H. Hutton, said: 

It seems to me that by the formation of the State of Nagaland, protected as it is by clauses in the Constitution of India, the Nagas have 

in fact got more than might have been expected or even desired—

complete internal home rule financed by the Indian government; 

indeed, they have won their war, but to take advantage of their victory 

the underground must be persuaded to surrender their arms, and 

order in the hills must be restored.20

On 1 December 1963, the separate State of Nagaland was inaugurated by 

President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. Speaking on the occasion, he said that the 
22

JSOU Report 08-4

Indian society has always been multilingual, multiracial, and multireligious 

and expressed the hope that normal conditions will rapidly return to the 

State and that all sections of Naga people shall come forward to participate 

in the development of Nagaland. 

The extremist Nagas, however, remained adamant. They did not resile 

from their demand for independence and continued violent activities of 

kidnapping, extortion, looting, murder, sniping, and ambushes in Nagaland 

and the adjoining areas of Assam and Manipur. 

Pakistan Fuels Insurgency

Pakistan’s abetment of insurgency in Nagaland added fuel to fire. Phizo had 

crossed over to Pakistan on 6 December 1956 with a view to seeking arms 

aid from that country and from there moved on to the United Kingdom to 

raise the Naga issue in various international forums. The first big gang to 

Pakistan was led by Kaito Sema, commander in chief of the Naga Home 

Guards, in 1962. Kaito raced across the plains of North Cachar with about 

200 men, eluding the unsuspecting police and the security forces. While the 

gang was being trained in Pakistan,21 Phizo visited that country to satisfy 

himself that they were being trained on the proper lines. 

Another formidable gang of about 500 Naga Army personnel went to 

Pakistan in October 1963 under the leadership of Dusoi Chakhesang. The 

gang took the longer but safer route through the Burmese Chin Hills. Yet 

another gang, about 300 strong, went to Pakistan under the leadership of 

Yeveto Sema. The biggest and the most successful expedition to Pakistan 

was led by Zuheto Sema in October 1964. It was about 1,000 strong and 

received training on the most modern lines in Pakistan. The gang returned 

to the Somra tract in Burma opposite the Pochury area of Nagaland in 

March 1965.

Subsequent efforts to send gangs to Pakistan were not so successful. 

Mowu Angami, chief of the Naga Army, attempted to take a 1,000 strong 

gang to Pakistan in November 1965. The gang crossed over to Burma, but 

the Burmese intercepted and forced them to re-enter India. In December 

1965, the underground attempted to send a gang to Pakistan through the 

Churachandpur area of Manipur, but the expedition failed. In June 1966, 

Nedelie Angami was able to take a gang of 200 Nagas to Pakistan, although 

with great difficulty. 
23

Singh: India’s Northeast

Between 1962 and 1968, at least ten gangs of Naga Army personnel 

crossed over to what was then East Pakistan. They were supplied with a 

wide range of weapons and ammunition including light machine guns, sten 

guns, rifles, mortars, medium machine-guns, rocket launchers, and various 

types of ammunition. About 2,500 Naga Army personnel were equipped 

and trained by the Pakistani authorities during the period. 

The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 changed the entire complexion, 

albeit for a few years only. It ended the period of Pakistan’s direct and proximate involvement in the northeast. The Pakistani forces surrendered before 

the Indian Army at Dacca on 16 December 1971. Naga Army “Commander 

in Chief” Thinuselie Angami and “Brigadier” Nedelie Angami were also 

taken into custody by the Indian Army. These arrests were a great setback 

to the Naga rebels.

China Fishes in Troubled Waters

Meanwhile, China also started fishing in the troubled waters of the northeast. Pakistan’s help had been substantial, but the rebels found it necessary 

to turn in another direction due to a combination of factors. They wanted 

the support of a big power, which would increase their bargaining capacity 

vis-a-vis the Government of India. Besides, the journey to Pakistan was 

becoming difficult because the known routes were effectively sealed by the 

security forces. Phizo was a trifle disenchanted with the West also. In a 

statement, he admitted that the Nagas were “despairing about the lack of 

moral support from the West in their struggle for freedom.” 

The first gang to China, about 300 strong, was led by Thinuselie and 

Muivah. It crossed the Tuensang border in November 1966 and returned 

in January 1968, laden with arms, ammunition, and other equipment. They 

were camping at a secret hideout in a deep jungle near the village of Jotsoma 

in the Angami area. The camp was raided by the security forces in the early 

hours of 7 June 1968. A fierce encounter ensued at the end of which the 

security forces captured 25 rebels together with a large quantity of arms 

and ammunition. The equipment seized included 60-mm mortars, 7.62-

mm self-loading rifles with folding bayonets, stenguns, and .303 rifles. A 

number of documents, papers, and diaries that gave conclusive evidence of 

the underground’s collusion with China were also seized. The Government 

of India lodged a strong protest and expressed its regret that the People’s 
24

JSOU Report 08-4

Republic of China was “master-minding this covert scheme in order to stir 

lawlessness against the legally constituted authority in India.” The Peking 

Radio indirectly admitted China’s involvement when it said (in a broadcast), 

“neither armed suppression nor political deception can curb the development of the armed struggle of the Nagas, Mizos, and Kukis.” 

A number of gangs, big and small, continued to trickle out of Nagaland 

on their way to China in the following years. They were trained at Teng 

Chung and Fukung in the Yunnan province. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Dr. 

Wei Tao-ming, told the United Nations Assembly on 22 October 1968 that 

China was training thousands of underground Nagas in Yunnan and sending them back to India to fight against the Government of India. According 

to official estimates, a total of 1,650 Naga rebels went to China during 1967 

and 1968. 

The Government meanwhile sustained its pressure on the rebel gangs 

coming back from China. The security forces located a formidable gang 

under the leadership of Mowu Angami in the Sema area. It was surrounded, 

and their supplies of food, water, and other essential commodities were cut 

off. The rebels were asked to surrender or face action. The show of force 

had the desired effect and on 28 March 1969, one hundred and sixty eight 

China-trained Nagas surrendered before the security forces. A huge consignment of Chinese arms and ammunition was also seized. Another gang 

led by Issac Swu was also hounded, and 90 of its members were captured. 

The Government claimed in the Parliament on 1 April 1969 that they had 

been able “to break the backbone” of the misguided Naga hostiles who had 

sought help and inspiration from foreign powers.

The arms traffic with China nevertheless continued. In April 1971, a 

gang of about 100 underground Nagas slipped into the adjoining Chin Hills 

of Burma in two batches en route to the Yunnan province of China. Yet 

another gang of 200 Naga Army personnel crossed over to Burma in July 

1971. Towards the end of 1974, a gang of about 60 rebel Nagas, including a 

few girls, crossed over to Burma in the month of November. Thuingaleng 

(Th.) Muivah was described as leader of a “goodwill mission” to China. 

Another group of about 140, including 15 girls, led by “Colonel” Vedai 

Chakhesang started trekking to China in December, but was badly mauled 

by the security forces. About 110 of them were captured and at least 6 killed. 

In early 1975, another group of about 75 underground Nagas led by “General” Viyalie Metha went to China. The documents captured from the rebels 
25

Singh: India’s Northeast

during this period clearly show the rebels’ determination to seek the help, 

financial and military, of foreign countries like China. In one of the letters, 

the President of the “Naga Federal Government” even suggested a “Friendship Treaty” to the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China.

The Chinese involvement in the northeast, however, gradually tapered 

off. This gradual decrease was partly because the Chinese were disappointed 

with the reverses suffered by Naga underground in the face of operations 

undertaken by the Indian security forces. They also realized that the rebel 

Nagas, who were devout Christians, would never accept Marxist-Leninist 

principles, and therefore they could not look forward to a Maoist ally in 

India’s northeast. Besides, in the post-Mao era, the Chinese were not keen 

to “export” revolution; they were more interested in economic reforms. 

And so they gradually washed their hands off the secessionist movements 

in the northeast. 

Latest reports, however, indicate that the Chinese are conniving at, if 

not directly encouraging, the supply of weapons to the insurgent groups 

in the northeast. Yunnan in China is said to have “emerged as a center for 

procurement of arms by the militant groups” in recent years. This subject 

was reportedly discussed at a meeting of police chiefs from all over the 

country in October 2007.22 It is suspected that cheap China-made weapons 

are smuggled from Yunnan by gun runners either through Myanmar or 

by sea in the trawlers across the Bay of Bengal, their ultimate destination 

being India’s northeast. 

Peace Initiatives

A section of church leaders, who saw the futility of armed confrontation, 

initiated moves that led to the formation of a Peace Mission comprising 

Jaya Prakash Narayan, a Gandhian leader; B. P. Chaliha, Chief Minister 

of Assam; and Rev. Michael Scott, a missionary. The Peace Mission held 

discussions with the underground leaders, which eventually led to the suspension of operations starting at midnight of 5 September 1964. This period 

was followed by six rounds of talks (1964–1967) between the rebel Naga 

leaders and the Prime Minister of India. The rebels were led by Kughato 

Sukhai, Ato-Kilonser (Prime Minister) of the “Naga Federal Government.” 

However, there could be no agreement because the rebel Nagas continued 

to harp on “sovereignty” and insist that there could be no solution within 

the framework of the Indian Union. 
26

JSOU Report 08-4

The Peace Mission proposal, submitted on 20 December 1964, struck 

a brilliant compromise between the opposing stands of the two parties. It 

stated that the rebel “Naga Federal Government” could “on their own volition, decide to be a participant in the Union of India and mutually settle 

the terms and conditions for that purpose,” and on the other hand, “the 

government could consider to what extent the pattern and structure of the 

relationship between Nagaland and the Government of India should be 

adapted and recast, so as to satisfy the political aspirations of all sections 

of Naga opinion.” The proposal, to this day, remains the best formula to 

resolve the impasse. The Government of India, in its reply, said that while 

they did not agree with “the line of reasoning and a series of postulates” on 

which the proposal was based, they welcomed the overall conclusion that a 

peaceful solution of the problem in Nagaland could only be found within 

the Indian Union. The rebel Nagas gave an evasive reply, saying that as the 

Nagas had every right to decide their future, a plebiscite should be held 

under the supervision of a neutral agency. 

A split in the underground movement meanwhile seriously weakened 

it. The Semas were not happy with the Angami hegemony over the “Naga 

Federal Government.” Kaito Sema, the firebrand Sema leader, ransacked the 

Naga Army Headquarters at Gaziphema and carried away the bulk of arms, 

ammunition, wireless equipment, and all the money kept there. The Sema 

tribesmen set up their own government and weaned away sizeable chunks 

of armed personnel from the underground Naga army. The Angamis were 

not prepared to tolerate this internal convulsion; they assassinated Kaito in 

the heart of Kohima bazaar on 3 August 1968. The crime boomeranged and 

led to a polarization of all the anti-Phizo groups under the leadership of the 

Semas. At a meeting held near Khuivi on 1 and 2 November 1968, which 

was attended by representatives of the Sema, Rengma, Pochury, Kuki, Shepoumaramth, and even Angami tribes, the formation of the “Revolutionary 

Government of Nagaland” was announced. The Semas had their pound of 

flesh when, in a masterly stratagem, they abducted Mhiasiu and Ramyo, the 

President and the Home Minister, respectively, of the Federal Government 

and kept them in captivity for over 8 months in one of their camps. 

The peace talks had already failed, and the underground were observed 

as not complying with the conditions of the Suspension of Operations 

Agreement. They even made an abortive attempt on the life of Hokishe 

Sema, Chief Minister of the State. The Government, therefore, called off the 
27

Singh: India’s Northeast

suspension of operations and issued an order on 1 September 1972 banning 

the underground organizations. The Naga National Council, the Naga Federal Government, and the Naga Army were declared unlawful associations 

under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 

Shillong Agreement

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Nagaland in December 1973. Her 

visit was followed by fresh initiatives to restore peace in Nagaland. The 

church leaders formed a peace council, which was able to prevail upon the 

representatives of the rebels to abandon their secessionist demand. The 

deliberations ultimately led to the signing of the Shillong Agreement on 

11 November 1975. Its salient features were as follows:

a. The representatives of the underground organizations conveyed 

their decision, of their own volition, to accept, without condition, 

the Constitution of India.

b. The arms, now underground, would be brought out and deposited at 

the appointed places. Details for giving effect to this agreement will 

be worked out between them and representatives of the Government, 

the Security Forces, and members of the Liaison Committee.

c. The representatives of the underground organizations would have 

reasonable time to formulate other issues for discussions toward a 

final settlement.

The Government released the rebels held in detention and gave them rehabilitation grants. The underground, on their part, deposited over 100 weapons 

and about 4,000 rounds of ammunition, although this was only a fraction 

of their total holding of arms and ammunition. 

Phizo, who was in London, did not approve of the agreement and gave 

a call to his followers to revive the insurgency. In a joint statement, Issac 

Swu and Th. Muivah (who were on what was euphemistically described as 

a “goodwill mission” to China) denounced those who had signed the agreement as “arch traitors” and said that “the people of Nagaland flatly refuse to 

be a party to any accord that entails loss of their sovereign existence.”

In retrospect, one could say that the Government of India was quite 

accommodating in meeting the demands of the Naga people and satisfying 

their political aspirations. The Naga People’s Convention had demanded 
28

JSOU Report 08-4

that the Naga Hills district of Assam and the Tuensang Frontier Division 

of NEFA be constituted into a single unit: the demand was conceded, and 

the Naga Hills–Tuensang Area was formed in 1957. The Naga People’s 

Convention again demanded that a separate State of Nagaland be created: 

the demand was conceded, and Nagaland was carved out in 1963. Then 

in 1975, the Shillong Agreement was signed whereby the representatives 

of the underground organizations agreed to surrender their weapons and 

accepted unconditionally the Constitution of India. They went back on this 

agreement also. The process of having a political settlement could not be 

stretched ad infinitum. 

Rise of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)

The extremist Nagas stuck to their political agenda. They formed, in 1980, 

the NSCN and followed it up with the formation of the Government of People’s Republic of Nagaland. The NSCN, however, suffered a split following a 

bloody clash between the rival factions of Khaplang and Muivah on 30 April 

1988. Khaplang’s men attacked the General Headquarters of Muivah’s group 

and killed about 140 men; about 230 others including women and children 

managed to escape, but most of them perished in the jungle. This intertribal 

clash was the worst one in the history of the Naga tribes. Henceforth, the 

Khaplang group was supported by Konayks of both India and Burma, Aos 

of Mokokchung area, Phoms and Yimchungers of Tuensang area, Pochuris 

of Phek district, and sections of Semas and Lothas. Muivah, a Tangkhul 

Naga from Manipur, and Issac, a Sema from Nagaland, were supported by 

the remaining Naga tribes of Nagaland and the Nagas from the bordering 

areas of Manipur. The Issac-Muivah (IM) faction has gradually emerged as 

the dominant rebel group of Nagaland. 

The NSCN (IM) has developed linkages with a section of the ULFA, 

the Bodo Security Force, the Hmar People’s Convention of Mizoram, and 

the All Tripura Tribal Front. Its leaders made repeated trips to Bangladesh, 

Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, and the European countries, shopping for 

arms and seeking international support. Issac and Muivah visited Pakistan 

in October 1990. They also attended a meeting of the United Nations Subcommission on Human Rights at Geneva in August 1992 and managed to 

get membership of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 

(UNPO) in January 1993. Pakistan agreed to extend all possible help to the 
29

Singh: India’s Northeast

insurgents,23 and Bangladesh, which owed its liberation to India, is tragically providing sanctuary and other facilities to the insurgent groups of the 

northeast the same way as Pakistan did in the 1950s and 1960s. A contingent of 200 Naga rebels under the leadership of Markson Tangkhul went to 

Bangladesh in 1991 and returned with sophisticated weapons. 

The NSCN was banned in November 1990, but inadequate follow-up 

action made no difference to its violent activities. The rebels took advantage of the thinning out of forces from the eastern frontier to deal with the 

insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The state administration was ineffective 

in handling the situation. It has been rightly said that the “handsome subventions and rehabilitation benefits have made rebellion lucrative, encouraged widespread corruption, and created a ‘creamy layer’ that flourishes in 

disturbed conditions.”24

Actually, the Naga rebels have devised a very elaborate system of tax 

collections. Funds are collected through the village headmen openly. Money 

is extorted from government servants also, and departmental heads have 

made payments directly to the insurgents. According to an estimate, they 

collect, through various means, a sum of not less than Rs. 50 crores every 

year.25

An Unstable Peace

Meanwhile the Government of India sent feelers to the NSCN (IM) about 

coming to the negotiating table. Issac and Muivah laid down three conditions: the negotiations should focus on security, the talks should be held 

outside the country, and the talks should include a third party mediator. The 

Government of India conceded the first two demands but did not agree to 

the presence of a mediator. Subsequent discussion led to a cease-fire agreement effective 1 August 1997. The agreement stipulated that the NSCN (IM) 

would not indulge in any kidnappings or extortions, would maintain camps 

at designated places, and would not move about with arms. The Government, on its part, agreed not to undertake any military operations against 

the insurgent group. A cease-fire monitoring group was set up, and the 

ground rules were formulated. The insurgents, however, did not observe the 

ground rules and there have been numerous complaints of their indulging 

in extortions and killings.
30

JSOU Report 08-4

There were rounds and rounds—not less than 50—of negotiations 

within India and abroad, but no agreement could be reached on the substantive issues mainly because of Nagas’ insistence on their sovereignty. In 

an interview, the text of which was released in April 2005, Muivah said:

Sovereignty of the Naga people belongs to the Naga people and to 

the Naga people alone. There cannot be otherwise. So long as that is 

there, adjustments can be made.26

The NSCN (IM)’s insistence on Greater Nagaland has queered the 

pitch further. They want the Naga-inhabited areas of Assam, Manipur, and 

Arunachal Pradesh to be merged into Nagaland. The neighboring states 

vehemently oppose this idea. The Prime Minister, during a visit to Guwahati 

in April 2006, categorically stated that the territorial integrity of the northeastern states could not be compromised. 

Ironically, resentment is building among the Naga tribes of Nagaland 

over the Tangkhul dominance of the NSCN (IM). Being a Tangkhul, Muivah 

General Secretary of the NSCN Thuingaleng Muivah (R) and NSCN 

Chairman Isak Chisi Swu (L) pay tribute to Mahatama Gandhi at his 

mausoleum in New Delhi, 9 January 2003. The two exiled separatist leaders were due to hold peace talks in the Indian capital. AFP 

photo/Prakash Singh, used by permission of Newscom. 
31

Singh: India’s Northeast

has appointed persons of his tribe to key positions in the rebel hierarchy. 

This practice has led to unpleasant confrontations. On 22 April 2007, following the abduction and torture of three Sumi tribesmen by the NSCN 

(IM) cadres, a mob of about 5,000 people attacked the Wungram colony 

where NSCN (IM) leaders stayed, destroying 47 houses and several vehicles. 

About 300 Tangkhul tribesmen had to be evacuated and shifted elsewhere. 

The incident may have been only a straw in the wind, but the possibility of 

fragmentation in the militants’ ranks on 

account of intertribal rivalries could not 

be ruled out.

On 1 August 2007, the cease-fire 

agreement between the Government of 

India and the NSCN (IM) was extended 

for an indefinite period. The ceasefire with the Khaplang group was also 

extended for 1 year on 26 April 2007. 

Internecine clashes between the National 

Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM) and 

the Khaplang faction is the most troubling aspect of the present scenario in 

Nagaland. During the year 2007, militants comprised 81 percent of the total 

108 militancy-related casualties.27

What is actually happening is a turf 

war for dominance. A church leader, 

Rev. Zhabu Terhuja, blamed the two 

NSCN factions for bringing “chaos and destruction” to Nagaland. Attempts 

to bring about rapprochement have occurred between the two groups. A 

truce agreement was signed by Kilonser (Cabinet Minister) C Singson of the 

NSCN (K) and Kilo Kilonser (Home Minister) Azheto Chophy of the NSCN 

(IM) at Hovishe in Dimapur district on 23 November 2007. However, the 

higher echelon of the NSCN (IM) did not approve the unity move. Subsequently on 7 December 2007, the three major factions—the NSCN (IM), 

the NSCN (K), and the NNC—in a rare show of unanimity, agreed to end 

interfactional bloodshed, pledging immediate cease-fire between themselves 

for the next 6 months. 

A Sema Naga Girl. Photo courtesy of Directorate of Information and Publicity, Government 

of Nagaland. 
32

JSOU Report 08-4

The Naga insurgency has now lasted nearly 50 years. It was looked upon 

as the mother of insurgencies in the northeast. Undoubtedly, the Naga 

example inspired the other tribes to make similar demands for autonomy/

independence. The Naga rebels also played some kind of a directing and 

coordinating role vis-a-vis the other separatist and secessionist movements. 

However, with the passage of time, the NSCN (IM) has been reduced to the 

position of just another insurgent outfit in India’s northeast. Its demand for 

a Greater Nagaland has antagonized the rebel formations of the neighboring 

states. Besides, the prolonged period of peace since 1997 has softened them, 

and it is most unlikely that the Naga rebels would be willing to go back to 

the jungle and fight another war with the Indian security forces. They know 

that they cannot break away from India. While their leaders keep harping 

on “sovereignty,” the rank and file understand it as just a bargaining counter 

with a view to getting additional political concessions. 
33

Singh: India’s Northeast

4. Manipur: Rebellion Sans Ideology

The early history of Manipur is recorded in the State Royal Chronicle 

called the Cheitharol Kumpaba, which mentions a total of 74 kings 

ruling the State. Nongda Lairen Pakhangba (133 AD to 154 AD) was 

the first king and Kulachandra (1890–1891 AD) the last.

Manipur lost its independence to the British in 1891. Thereafter, it was 

a princely native state as part of British India. The British paramountcy 

continued until 1947 when India became independent. 

Early History

The chronicle throws light on the early history of Manipur, especially its 

inimical relations with Myanmar. From the 17th to the 19th centuries, there 

was “a terrible relationship of plunder and devastation operating from both 

sides, to the damage of both peoples.” 28 The kings of the two countries 

would attack each other periodically. The first recorded invasion goes back 

to 1562 AD, when Bayinnaung, a powerful ruler of the Toungoo dynasty, 

defeated Manipur and made it a vassal state. Manipur, however, asserted its 

independence and in the 17th century when Toungoo dynasty and empire 

were beginning to decline, made forays into Myanmar. 

During the reign of Raja Gharib Niwaz, who ascended the throne of 

Manipur in 1714 AD, Manipur undertook offensive campaigns against 

Myanmar. Gharib Niwaz defeated the Myanmar forces in 1725 at the 

mouth of the Maglung River. In 1735 again Gharib Niwaz’s forces crossed 

the Ningthi River and destroyed the town of Myedu on the banks of the Mu 

River. Gharib Niwaz was one of the ablest kings who ruled over Manipur. 

He was influenced by the Vaishnav missionary, Shantidas Adhikary, and 

declared Vaishnavism to be the state religion. Vaishnavism thereafter spread 

all over Manipur, particularly in the Imphal Valley. The indigenous faith, 

named after deity Sanamahi, however, did not disappear. It survived, and 

there is an attempt to revive it now. 

In the subsequent years, it was the turn of Myanmar rulers to commit 

depredations in Manipur. In 1758, Alaungpaya defeated the Manipuris in 

the battle of Pulel (now Palel) and massacred thousands of people during 

his 2-week stay in Imphal. “The invasion of Manipur by Alompra (Alaungpaya) must have been most disastrous to the inhabitants of that country as 
34

JSOU Report 08-4

they then, for the first time, sought external aid and appeared a few years 

afterwards as supplicants for British protection.”29

British help was sought by the Manipur princes either to remain in 

power or by way of assistance in their fight against Myanmar. The British 

naturally took advantage of the situation. In 1762, they signed a treaty of 

alliance with Manipur whereby the latter agreed to give rent-free land at 

a suitable place in Manipur for a fort and also facility for the promotion 

of trade with China. In return, the British agreed to provide a contingent 

of troops to Manipur. It was Trojan-horse tactics. The British took advantage of the fratricidal conflicts among the Manipuri princes and started 

interfering in its internal affairs. At one stage, when the Manipuris under 

Tikendrajit Singh offered resistance and even executed some British officers, 

open confrontation occurred. The British thereafter launched a full scale 

invasion of Manipur in 1891. The Manipur Maharaja, however, was “not 

prepared to yield to the mightiest and the invincible until his forces had 

been defeated.”30 The Manipuris put up a brave resistance, but they were no 

match to the British forces. On 27 April 1891, the Union Jack was hoisted 

in Imphal, and Manipur became a part of British India. 

Political Awakening

The first political stirrings in Manipur were noticed in 1934 with the formation of “Nikhil Hindu Manipuri Mahasabha.” Its sessions were held in 

Silchar, Mandalay, and Imphal. At the fourth session held at Chingamathak 

on 29–30 December 1938 in Imphal, the organization was renamed Nikhil 

Manipur Mahasabha. The Mahasabha passed a resolution demanding “full 

administrative power” for Manipur and a “combined administrative unit of 

Hills and Plains.” World War II saw Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army 

penetrating Manipur. Mahatma Gandhi’s noncooperation movement also 

had its reverberations in the State. Thousands of Manipuris were arrested 

and put behind bars for participating in the freedom movement. Hijam 

Irabot Singh, a brother-in-law of the Maharaja, was deeply influenced by 

the political developments of the time and was determined to “liberate” 

Manipur from the shackles of foreign domination. He appealed to the people 

not to use foreign goods and set a bonfire of such items in front of the court 

in Imphal. He toured extensively—visiting Dacca, Burma, and Assam—and 

mobilized the people against the British. 
35

Singh: India’s Northeast

On the eve of India’s independence, the Maharaja of Manipur signed 

the Instrument of Accession on 11 August 1947, entrusting defense, communications, and foreign affairs to the Government of India. A Standstill 

Agreement was also signed in respect of other matters. At the initiative of 

the Manipur State Darbar, the Constitution of Manipur was drafted and 

Assembly elections were held in 1948. Significantly, this was the first election 

held in any part of the country on the basis of adult franchise. 

The Manipur Congress adopted a resolution on 29 April 1949 stating 

that “the Congress views with deep concern the present international situation specially the communist uprising in the neighboring state of Burma 

(Myanmar) and feels that the consolidation of the Government of India 

through integration and merging of native states, especially Manipur State 

which is an eastern gateway to India and which is now administered by a 

pro-communist and inefficient government, is urgently required.” 31 On 

21 September 1949, Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh signed the agreement 

on merger of Manipur with India at Shillong, and the State was formally 

merged with the Indian Union on 15 October 1949. Irabot, who had developed leftist leanings, fled to Myanmar following the crackdown on Communist members. He tried to form a united front with the Communist 

parties of Myanmar but could not make any headway. He breathed his last 

on 26 September 1951. 

It has been rightly said that “the revolutionary seed had not fallen on 

barren ground” and that “it hibernated in a seedbed of growing discontents that gradually germinated an injured Meitei sub-nationalism.”32 It was 

alleged that except for the Manipur State Congress Party, the other political 

groups were not in favor of merger; besides, the issue of merger was neither 

discussed nor approved by the elected government of the day. The Government of India was accused of having arm-twisted the Maharaja to sign the 

merger agreement. A number of other factors contributed to deepening the 

sense of hurt. Manipur was classified as a Part C state and it became a full 

fledged state in 1972 only after prolonged agitation. The Nagas, who had 

rebelled against the government, were on the other hand given statehood as 

early as 1963. The Manipuris had also to agitate for the recognition of their 

language; the same was included in the Eighth Schedule only in 1992. 

Presently, the people of Manipur are greatly concerned over the NSCN 

(IM)’s demand for Greater Nagaland including inter alia the hill areas of 

Manipur. In 2001, the Government of India, under pressure from the Naga 
36

JSOU Report 08-4

rebels, announced the extension of cease-fire to the Naga-inhabited areas 

of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. The Meiteis became apprehensive. They thought the extension was a prelude to the dismemberment 

of their state and thus mounted a fierce agitation. The Meiteis even burnt 

down the State Assembly. The police opened fire on the protestors, killing 

18. The government realized its folly and announced that the truce would 

be limited to the boundaries of Nagaland only; however, the damage had 

been done.

Insurgent Groups

The injured Meitei subnationalism expressed itself in the form of insurgent 

movements in the region. An intellectual Pan Mongolian movement eventually led to the founding of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in 

1964 under the leadership of Arambam Somorendra. It claimed the “right 

to national self-determination” and decided to fight for an “independent 

Manipur.” In 1969, a group of about 200 Meiteis crossed the international 

border and managed to reach Sylhet in what was then East Pakistan with 

a view to seeking assistance from that country. The Pakistani leaders were 

lukewarm in their response because they were afraid of antagonizing India. 

The Meitei youths were lodged in a jail for about a month. The expedition 

was a failure, but the disgruntled youth did not give up. One of them was 

Nameirakpam Bisheshwar, who later played an important role in forging the 

international links of the Meitei insurgents. Meanwhile, the youth formed a 

Consolidation Committee of Manipur (CONSCOM) and eventually set up 

a Revolutionary Government of Manipur with headquarters in Sylhet. The 

Flames engulf the 

Manipur state assembly 

18 June 2001. Thousands 

of protesters rioted in the 

streets of Imphal, burning 

down the state assembly, 

political party offices, 

and official residences. 

AFP photo, used by permission of Newscom. 
37

Singh: India’s Northeast

liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 proved a setback to the insurgents, many 

of whom were apprehended by the Indian security forces. 

The internecine squabbles within the UNLF led to Bisheshwar parting company and setting up his own separate organization. In the early 

1970s about 20 Meitei insurgents made an abortive attempt to go to China. 

Another attempt was made in 1975, when they were able to reach Lhasa. The 

Chinese put them through an ideological training course, which the Meitei 

did not particularly relish. The group later returned to Imphal and embarked 

on a mass contact program. In 1978 they formed the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) with Bisheshwar as its first chairman. The PLA’s objective is 

to organize an armed struggle for the liberation of Manipur, and they want 

to establish a society based on socialistic principles. Towards the end of the 

1970s and in the early 1980s, the armed cadres of the PLA were involved in 

several lootings, killings, and encounters with the security forces. 

Other insurgent groups were also formed around this period. In fact, 

there has been a proliferation of militant groups in Manipur. The important 

outfits other than UNLF and PLA that are presently active include 

a. People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

b. Kangleipak33 Communist Party (KCP)

c. Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL)

d. Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF)

e. Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF).

The activities of these insurgent groups have undergone four distinct 

phases, as shown in Table 2:34

Table 2. Phases of the Insurgent Groups

Phase Description

1 Marked by the formation of the UNLF, the Meitei State Committee, and the Revolutionary Government of Manipur, all of which petered out by the end of 1970

2

Witnessed the birth of the PLA in 1978, Chinese assistance to the rebel groups, and 

a high trajectory of violence in the Imphal Valley followed by an anticlimax in the 

reverses suffered by the PLA

3 Marked by realignment of these groups and redefinition of their political objectives 

followed by revival of insurgency in the Imphal Valley between 1988 and 1998

4 Began with the formation of the MPLF, which brought together several Meitei groups 

on one platform in 2003
38

JSOU Report 08-4

UNLF has a strength of about 2,500 men and is currently led by Rajkumar Meghen. The outfit is active in all the districts of the Imphal Valley and 

also in Assam’s Cachar district. It has camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar 

and has nexus with the NSCN (K) and the ULFA. 

PLA has a strength of about 1,500. It is organized in four divisions for 

carrying out operations—Sadar Hill West area of the Imphal Valley, Sadar 

Hill Eastern area of the Valley, the hill areas of Manipur, and the Imphal 

area. The PLA has been issuing populist diktats from time to time—for 

example, imposing restrictions on the sale of alcohol and drugs and ban on 

the consumption of betel leaf. The outfit is clandestinely patronized by the 

politicians of the State. It has camps in Bangaldesh and Myanmar. 

PREPAK is one of the oldest militant groups of Manipur. It demands the 

establishment of an independent Manipur state sans the migrants. The outfit 

has strategic linkages with UNLF and PLA. In October 2007 the outfit set 

2015 as the deadline for achieving its objective; if it failed, it would abandon 

the path of armed revolution. 

KCP is concerned primarily with the preservation of Meitei culture. It 

wants the Manipuri script, Meetei Mayek, to be introduced in the educational institutions. In September 2005 the outfit banned the shooting and 

exhibition of digital movies and music albums. It has a strength of about 

100 only and is active mostly in the Valley areas of Manipur. 

KYKL was formed in 1994 with the objective of setting up a utopian 

Manipuri society, which would be free of all the vices. The outfit issued a 

fatwa against corruption in public offices, reform of the educational system, 

stoppage of the drug trade from Myanmar and prescribed a dress code for 

the women. In August 2003 the organization clamped a ban on restaurants 

and cafes having dimly-lit cubicles on the grounds that these encouraged 

premarital sex among young lovers. In 2006 the KYKL, along with UNLF 

and PREPAK, issued a joint statement banning the sale and consumption 

of heroin and opium.35 The KYKL maintains close links with other militant 

outfits operating in the Valley and has a nexus with the NSCN (IM). 

MPLF is an umbrella organization of the UNLF, PREPAK, and PLA. 

The RPF is the political wing of the PLA.

In the mid-1990s, the leaders of the underground outfits felt the need 

to join hands. The NSCN (Khaplang), UNLF, and ULFA formed the IndoBurma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) on 22 May 1990 with a view to building up “a united struggle for the independence of Indo-Myanmar.” The 
39

Singh: India’s Northeast

IBRF issued a joint declaration, regretting that the struggles for national 

independence of the various ethnic groups of the region had made little 

headway. The declaration was signed by NSCN Chairman S.S. Khaplang, 

ULFA Chairman Arabindo Rajkhowa, and UNLF General Secretary Sana 

Yaima. The IBRF, however, proved to be a nonstarter. 

The combined strength of all the insurgent groups is estimated to be 

around 10,000. A stepping up of militant activities in the recent past is 

shown in the figures within Table 3.

Table 3. Manipur, Militancy-Related Fatalities

Year Civilians Security Forces Militants Total

2001 70 25 161 256

2002 60 54 125 239

2003 50 27 128 205

2004 88 36 134 258

2005 158 50 202 410

2006 96 28 187 311

2007 130 39 218 387

Total: 652 259 1,155 2,066

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

Government Response

The Government, in view of the activities of the insurgents, declared the 

Imphal Valley a “disturbed area” in 1980 and passed the Armed Forces 

(Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, giving the security forces personnel special powers to operate and immunity from prosecution. The PLA, 

PREPAK, and KCP were declared unlawful institutions. In 1981, the Army 

was able to apprehend Bisheshwar and liquidate seven of his top aides. The 

new PLA leader, Kunjabihari, and eight others were also killed in another 

encounter a few months later. The Tibet-trained cadres were almost completely wiped out. Bisheshwar was disillusioned. He tried to enter mainstream politics and contested the elections, but his colleagues did not forgive 

him for this turnaround and annihilated him. 

Counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the Army and the paramilitary forces produce results, but in the absence of civil administration 

taking appropriate follow-up action or consolidating its hold over the region, 
40

JSOU Report 08-4

the insurgent groups are able to reestablish their authority in the area. Major 

incidents happen now and then. On 31 December 2005, Manipur Inspector 

General of Police (Intelligence), T. Thangthuam, was killed in an ambush 

by PLA militants in Bishnupur district. On 23 November 2007, there was 

an attempt on the life of Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh himself when 

the security forces recovered an explosive device at the Langthabal Hao–

Lamkhai junction along National Highway 39 in Imphal West district, minutes before the chief minister’s convoy was due to pass through the route. 

Three days later, on 26 November 2007, Manipur State Legislative Assembly 

Deputy Speaker Th. Shyamkumar Singh’s convoy was ambushed by militants under Lamlai Police Station in Imphal East district. 

Present Scenario

Credible reports give a nexus between the political leadership and insurgents. The Army alleged in December 2005 that Chief Minister Ibobi Singh 

had contributed Rs. 15 million to two insurgent groups operating in the 

State.36 Earlier, in the late 1980s, the Governor of the State had accused the 

then Chief Minister, Rishang Keishing, of contributing Rs. 3 million to the 

coffers of the then undivided NSCN. On 11 August 2007 police raided the 

official residences of three Manipur MLAs and apprehended 12 militants. 

Eight of them, who belonged to the outlawed KYKL, were arrested from the 

house of the ruling Congress Party MLA, Brajabidhu Singh. One M16 rifle, 

one 9-mm pistol, live ammunition, and extortion notes were also seized. 

Four other rebels were arrested from the residences of Bijoy Koijam and K. 

Meghachandra, also Congress MLAs. The politician-militant nexus frustrates to a great extent the efforts of the security forces to neutralize the 

insurgents. 

Manipur has “one of most comprehensive networks of terrorist extortion in the country.”37 Huge sums of money are collected from practically 

all sections of society including the government servants. The insurgents 

describe these as voluntary contributions, but the fact is that the demand for 

contributions is always backed by the threat of action. On 2 March 2005 the 

militants shot and injured Th. Kulachandra—principal of the Manipur Institute of Technology, Takyelpat, at Mongsangei in the Imphal West district—

for refusing to meet an extortion demand of Rs. 500,000. On 25 October 

and again on 26 November 2005, employees of the Manipur government 
41

Singh: India’s Northeast

who were stationed in Thoubal district conducted a silent rally at the district 

headquarters to protest against the extortion demands of the militant outfits 

and the abduction of some of their colleagues for nonpayment of “dues.” 

In fact, with the passage of time, self aggrandizement through collection 

of money has become an end in itself. The ideological content is gradually 

fading. 

Some Kuki militant outfits have entered into cease-fire agreements with 

the Army. However, none of the major insurgent groups have expressed any 

desire to engage in dialogue with the Government of India. On the contrary, 

the UNLF reiterated its demand for a plebiscite under the auspices of the 

United Nations on 24 November 2007 on the occasion of its Raising Day.

The civil society in Manipur has been agitating for the repeal of Armed 

Forces (Special Powers) Act, which vests the security forces with special 

powers in view of the prevailing insurgency. The Government appointed a 

committee headed by Justice Jeevan Reddy to review the law. The committee 

found that the law had become “a symbol of oppression, an object of hate, 

and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness,” and recommended its repeal. The Prime Minister promised that he would either have 

the law repealed or give it a human face.

Manipur is the worst affected state of the northeast from the point 

of view of insurgency, but the militant groups in the state have gradually 

lost their political moorings. Whatever political objectives they had set for 

themselves have either been forgotten or just dumped because those are not 

considered achievable. “The survival of the groups at current or marginally augmented strengths, the defense of their ‘spheres of influence’ and 

‘dominance’ against sporadic Security Force onslaughts and internecine 

strife, and the ‘management’ of the networks of extortion, have become 

ends in themselves.”38

43

Singh: India’s Northeast

5. Tripura and the Other “Sisters”: On 

 the Road to Peace

Tripura finds mention in the earliest Indian epic of Mahabharata. 

Sahadeva, the youngest of the Pandavas, was sent to conquer the 

“immeasurably effulgent Tripura.”39 Later when the Pandavas went 

into exile, Duryodhana sent Karna, the Indian Achilles, to subjugate the 

eastern kingdoms that included Tripura. In the epic battle of Kurukshretra, 

where all the kings from different parts of India fought on either side, the 

King of Tripura extended his loyalty to the Kauravas. Tripura Raj thus has 

an ancient history.

The recent history of Tripura is chronicled in Rajamala, which was 

written by the Brahmin officials of Raja Dharma Manikya (1430 to 1462), 

a great patron of arts and literature. He was succeeded by Dhanya Manikya (1463 to 1515), the greatest of the kings of Tripura, who extended his 

kingdom to the borders of Burma, annexed Chittagong, and defeated the 

Pathan Army of Hussain Shah near Comilla. Dhanya Manikya was a devout 

Hindu ruler. Many temples were built by him, the most famous being the 

Tripureshwari temple of Udaipur. The Tripura kingdom reached its zenith 

during the rule of Vijay Manikya (1528–1570). He finds a very honorable 

mention in Aai-ne-Akbari, which was recorded during the time of Mughal 

Emperor Akbar. Tripura is described as an “extensive country” with an army 

that had an infantry of 200,000 men and a thousand elephants. 

The disintegration of the Tripura kingdom started in the early 17th century. During the time of Mughal Emperor Jahangir, King Yasodhar Manikya 

was taken prisoner for failing to present elephants, for which Tripura was 

famous, to the Emperor. However, as recorded by the British, Tripura was 

never subjugated by the Mughals. The British relations with Tripura were 

somewhat anomalous in the sense that the British did not annex the hill territory, although they interfered in its affairs now and then. No treaty existed 

between the British Government and the Raja of Tripura. Regarding the 

tradition and usage that continued until the last ruler, Maharaja Bir Bikram 

Manikya (1923–47), Aitchinson has recorded the following observations: 

The State pays no tribute but is nominally subject to the nazarana

rules. Both as regards its own constitution and its relation with the 
44

JSOU Report 08-4

paramount power, Tripura holds a position quite unique, as the 

Ruler holds Zamindaries under the British Government side by side 

with a sovereign state of comparatively large area with full powers 

of legislation... There is no written treaty with the paramount power, 

the relations being governed by recognized usages and customs... 

The State is now in direct political relation with the Government of 

India, and His Excellency the Governor of Bengal is in position of 

agent to the Governor General.40

On the eve of independence, Maharaja Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya 

contemplated joining the Indian Union in 1947, but he died and was succeeded by a minor. A Council of Regency was formed with Queen Kanchan Prava Devi as the regent ruler of the state. The Maharani signed the 

Instrument of Accession on 13 August 1947 with the Indian Union. Subsequently, on the advice of the Government of India, the Regency Council 

was dissolved and a Dewan was appointed on 21 March 1948 to carry on 

the day-to-day administration. On 9 September 1949, the Maharani signed 

the Agreement for the Merger of Tripura with the Indian Union. A chief 

commissioner was appointed to run the administration of the State. In 

1950, Tripura was classified as a Part C State of the Indian Union. Eventually Tripura became a Union Territory and on 21 January 1972 was given 

the status of a full fledged state. 

Demographic Changes

Refugees continually flowed into Tripura following the partition of the 

country from what was earlier East Pakistan. The tribal population registered a steady decline, as shown in Table 4. 

Table 4. Demographic Changes

Year Population Tribal Population % of Tribals

1941 513,010 256,991 53.16

1951 639,028 237,953 37.23

1961 1,142,005 360,070 31.50

1971 1,556,342 450,544 28.95

1981 2,053,058 583,920 28.44

1991 2,754,205 853,345 30.95
45

Singh: India’s Northeast

The Bangladeshis occupied large chunks of land. The Tripura psyche 

was hurt “by loss of dominance to plains people from ‘outside,’ the transfer of power from tribal to nontribal, consequent land alienation, and the 

ethno-linguistic erosion of Kokborok and a Mongoloid ethos by things 

Bengali and Aryan.” 41 Great resentment occurred among the tribals, and 

their anger expressed itself in acts of rebellion. According to Rabindra Debbarma, General Secretary of the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), most 

militants were from “impoverished tribal families who have lost their land 

to Bengali migrants, giving rise to a sense of deprivation and injustice that 

fuels the present insurgency in Tripura.”42

Tribal Unrest

The government acquired lands of thousands of farmers to rehabilitate the 

refugees. Political organizations like the Mukti Parishad and the Communist Party opposed this move, but their protests were disregarded. It 

has been said that “such a large-scale rehabilitation of refugees in the rural 

areas of Tripura broke to pieces last remnants of isolation enjoyed by the 

Jhumias.”43 The tribals formed an organization called Sengkrak (Clenched 

Fist), which expressed its unequivocal opposition to the settlement of refugees in Tripura and carried out violent activities to terrorize the refugees so 

that they leave the state. The outfit developed links with the Mizo National 

Front and was active until the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Another 

organization, Tribal Union, with similar objectives was also formed.

In the early 1960s, the leftist tribals formed the Gana Mukti Parishad 

under the leadership of the Communist Party (Marxist) while the rightist 

tribals formed the Upajati Yuba Samiti under the inspiration of the Congress 

Party. Tribals of all hues were opposed to the influx of Bengalis. The Bengalis, by virtue of their better educational qualifications, gradually started 

capturing key positions in the administration. This tendency widened the 

chasm between the communities. Meanwhile, a chauvinistic organization, 

Amra Bangalee (We are Bengalis), was also formed at the behest of the followers of Ananda Marg. The end result was a communal polarization in the 

state. As observed by Suchintya Bhattacharya, “the large-scale exploitation 

of the tribals carried out by the non-tribal peoples in all aspects of their 

life and activities is the primary cause of the discontent with and anger 
46

JSOU Report 08-4

towards both the government and the non-tribal, particularly the Bengali 

community, who constitute the majority in the State administration.”44

The tribals were getting desperate. A convention held under the aegis 

of the TUJS in March 1978 adopted a unanimous resolution to drive all 

foreigners out of the state. The TUJS in fact adopted an 11-point charter 

of demands, seeking inter alia extension of the fifth schedule to Tripura, 

introduction of Kokborok language as the medium of instruction for tribal 

students, and restoration of the alienated tribal land. An armed wing, Tribal 

National Volunteers (TNV), was constituted by Bijoy Hrangkhal, a tribal 

leader of the Halam community, in 1979 with the objective of establishing 

an independent tribal state of Tripura. Hrangkhal sent a small batch of TNV 

volunteers to Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh for training in weapons 

under the guidance of Mizo National Front insurgents. The beginning of 

the 1980s saw organized attacks by TNV volunteers on the non-tribals. In 

a major incident, the TNV massacred more than 200 non-tribals including 

women and children in the Mandai village of West Tripura on 6 June 1980. 

The Chief Minister of Tripura conceded that the primary objective of the 

mass killings was to terrorize the Bengalis to leave Tripura. On 13 June 1980, 

Hrangkhal was arrested. 

The government was able to persuade Hrangkhal to return to the mainstream. The extremists were angry at his turnaround and on 14 August 1982, 

a militant group called Army of Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization 

(ATPLO) kidnapped Hrangkhal and his wife. Hrangkhal, however, was 

rescued by his erstwhile lieutenants. In a letter that he wrote to the then 

Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on 17 March 1983, Hrangkhawl said:

Armed insurgency was necessary to reach your heart... Either you 

deport all foreign nationals who infiltrated into Tripura after 15 

October 1947 or settle them anywhere in India other than Tripura. 

Restore tribal majority interest. It may not matter to you much, but 

delaying implementation of our demands means the TNV will fight 

for total self-determination. We demand a free Tripura.45

The TNV volunteers, however, realized that independence was an 

impossible proposition and it would be better to seek a peaceful settlement 

within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Consequently, Hrangkhal 

and five other leaders representing the TNV signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding with the Government of India in 1988. The TNV agreed that 
47

Singh: India’s Northeast

its cadres would surrender and not extend support to any other extremist 

group in any manner. The Government agreed to take stringent measures 

to prevent infiltration from across the border, promised to reserve 20 seats 

out of 60 in the state assembly for the tribals, frame an employment scheme 

for the tribal youths, and resettle the families that depended on shifting 

cultivation.46 The TNV activists who surrendered were absorbed in government jobs or inducted in the Assam Rifles.

Tribal disaffection, however, continued to simmer. The extremist fringe 

of the TNV formed in 1989, what came to be called the National Liberation 

Front of Tripura (NLFT). The establishment of an independent Tripura 

through armed struggle and promotion of indigenous languages and culture 

are the main objectives of the NLFT. The outfit, comprising about 90 percent 

Baptist Christians, has pronounced fundamentalist leanings. The NLFT 

cadres have been frequently attacking Hindu priests and Hindu temples. 

In late 2000, the party leadership issued a statement directing the tribals to 

boycott the Hindu festivals of Saraswati puja and Durga puja.47 The NLFT 

targets primarily three groups: 

a. Bengali Hindus who are said to have grabbed the land of tribals

b. Hindu religious institutions and symbols

c. Communist Part of India (Marxist)—CPM cadres.48

The outfit, however, has lost much of its strength and following in recent 

years. It presently has a cadre strength of about 250 men and weapons holdings of about 150 including about 80 AK rifles. 

Another outfit, All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF), was formed by the 

tribal activists of the Left in 1990. It demands expulsion of all “foreigners” 

who entered Tripura after 1949, removal of their names from the electoral 

rolls, and restoration of alienated land to the tribals. The organization has a 

nexus with Assam’s ULFA. The ATTF has a strength of about 200 men who 

are in possession of about 300 weapons including about 200 AK rifles. 

The numerical strength of the insurgents may be small, but what gives 

them teeth is the sanctuaries and the logistic support that they get in Bangladesh, their links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and 

nexus with the other insurgent outfits of the northeast like the ULFA and 

the NSCN (IM).

It is alleged that the NLFT was formed at the instance of the Congress 

party to challenge CPM’s base among the tribals. On the other hand, the 
48

JSOU Report 08-4

Congress accuses the Left Front 

of backing the ATTF. Both outfits 

were on a rampage from 1999 to 

2003, when incidents of killings, 

abductions, and attacks on police 

posts and Bengali settlements 

occurred. The State Chief Minister, replying to a question in the 

State Assembly on 15 June 2004, 

admitted that 952 people had been 

killed and over 1,200 abducted by 

terrorists during the last 5 years.49

The tide, however, turned in 2004. 

Well-planned counterinsurgency 

operations by the security forces 

produced results. The trajectory 

of violence came down sharply. 

Civilian casualties fell from 207 in 

2003 to 67 in 2004, 28 in 2005, 14 

in 2006, and again 14 in 2007. 

It has been said that the “time 

is ripe to work out and implement 

a strategy of ethnic reconciliation 

in Tripura.”50 Land alienation has 

been at the root of tribal insurgency and therefore the government must 

find ways and means to return land to the tribal people. 

The improved security scenario in Tripura is reflected in countries like 

China, Japan, Germany, and Thailand showing interest in investing or in 

providing financial assistance to Tripura. The Chief Minister of Tripura, 

Manik Sarkar, recently claimed that China had agreed to provide technology 

to set up bamboo-based industries and livelihood opportunities to farmers and tribal people and that the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) was going to provide Rs. 3.66 billion as a soft loan to the State. 

Besides, Germany was giving Rs. 1.12 billion for ecological conservation 

projects and the development of livelihood resources for tribals and other 

forest dwellers. A Thai delegation, besides, had expressed interest in investing in tourism, infrastructure, food processing, and agro-based industries.51

August 2001, a tribal woman sells 

bamboo shoots, a local delicacy 

available year-round, in Mandai market 

28 kms from Agartala, the capital of 

Tripura. Tripura’s rich forests abound 

with many varieties of bamboo used 

by the tribal community for many purposes including food. Photo AFP, used 

by permission of Newscom. 
49

Singh: India’s Northeast

These are hopeful portents and show government’s success in containing 

the tribal insurgency in the State.

The Other Sisters

A brief reference to the other sisters—Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, and 

Mizoram—completes the picture of the northeast.

Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal 

Pradesh, the largest of the northeastern states, was earlier known 

as the Northeast Frontier Agency. 

It was carved out of Assam in 1972. 

The State faced no problems of 

militancy for about 20 years. The 

NSCN (Khaplang faction) was the 

first to make an inroad into the 

virgin territory in the early 1990s 

following the split in the NSCN. 

Later, some disgruntled politicians 

of the state invited the NSCN (IM). 

The Tirap and Changlang districts have ever since been a hunting ground for both the factions. The IM faction, however, is numerically 

stronger and better equipped. They carried out Operation Salvation with 

the ostensible object of spreading consciousness about health and hygiene, 

but their real objective was to dislodge the Khaplang group and spread 

Christianity. The NSCN (IM) has managed to entrench itself in the two 

districts bordering Nagaland.

Meghalaya. Meghalaya, “the abode of the clouds,” was carved out of Assam 

on 21 January 1972. Its major tribes are Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo. Violent 

incidents were first noticed in the Garo Hills. “Injustice and corruption were 

at the root of the conflict.”52

The Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA), which was a vigilante 

group to start with, was “lured to the gun” by the NSCN (IM).53 The ALMA 

surrendered in 1994, but its extremist fringe combined with the radical elements of the Khasi Students Union to form Hynniewtrep-Achik Liberation 

Tribal people from Arunachal Pradesh 

perform a traditional dance during a 

festival in Maio, some 700 kms from 

the state capital Itanagar, in January 

2007. AFP photo/Parthajit, used by permission of Newscom. 
50

JSOU Report 08-4

Council (HALC). The outfit was active for a couple of years, but it later split 

into its Khasi and Garo versions. The Khasi outfit came to be known as 

Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), while the Garo outfit 

called itself the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC).

The ANVC was engaged in a hit-and-run campaign against the security forces, demanding the creation of a separate “Achik Land” comprising 

the two Garo Hills districts of Meghalaya and a large chunk of Kamrup 

and Goalpara districts in adjoining Assam. The outfit had a nexus with 

the ULFA. On 23 January 2004, the ANVC signed a cease-fire agreement 

with the Government of India. The ANVC General Secretary expressed his 

group’s “full faith in the country’s Constitution.” 

The HNLC, which has been banned, is now the only significant insurgent group in the state representing the Khasi tribe. During 2007 several 

leaders of the group surrendered. These included Julius Dorphang, chairman 

of the outfit, and four of his colleagues. The so-called “commander in chief” 

Bobby Marwein and the “general secretary” Cheristerfield Thangkhiew, 

however, are still in Bangladesh. Militancy in the state is nevertheless on 

the decline. 

Mizoram. The Mizos became apprehensive about their identity when the 

Government of Assam introduced legislation in 1960, making Assamese the 

official language of the state. However, what really antagonized the Mizos 

was the alleged indifference to their plight during famine in the district. 

The general impression was that the state government had failed to take 

the warning of famine seriously and initiated relief measures only after the 

damage had been done. An organization called Mizo National Famine Front, 

formed by Mizo ex-servicemen to cope with the disaster, later converted 

itself into Mizo National Front. It assumed the character of a political party 

and contested the elections in 1963, winning two of the three Mizo seats. 

The extremist Mizos, however, had other ideas. They established contacts 

with East Pakistan and at midnight of 28 February, launched Operation 

Jericho, capturing 11 towns in a lightning strike. The available government 

forces barely managed to hold on to the capital city of Aizawl. The Indian 

Army had to be inducted to recapture the towns. The guerillas thereafter 

retreated to the hills and their leaders fled to East Pakistan.
51

Singh: India’s Northeast

Intense fighting occurred between the security forces and the insurgents 

of the Mizo National Front. The insurgency, which lasted two decades, went 

through three distinct phases: 

a. A rising crescendo of violence from 1966 to 1971

b. Decline in the wake of the liberation of Bangladesh during the 

period 1972 to 1976

c. Sporadic violence and periodic negotiations from 1977 onwards, 

leading to the final settlement in 1986.54

The Memorandum of Settlement between the Government of 

India and the Mizo National Front 

involved a power-sharing arrangement between the Congress, which 

was then ruling Mizoram, and the 

Mizo National Front and ensured 

the grant of full statehood to Mizoram. The Mizo National Front 

agreed to abjure violence and 

desist from supporting any armed 

group against the Government of 

India. The Government agreed to 

rehabilitate the Mizo cadres and conceded the Mizos’ right to adopt “any 

one or more languages in use in the state” as its official language. A special 

provision was also added in the Constitution of India as Article 371G which 

stated that 

No Act of Parliament in respect of 

a. Religious or social practices of the Mizos

b. Mizo customary law and procedure

c. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions 

according to Mizos customary law

d. Ownership and transfer of land 

shall apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly 

of the State of Mizoram by a resolution so decides.

November 2003, Mizo people sing at 

a church service in Aizwal in mainly 

Christian Mizoram state. Photo AFP, 

used by permission of Newscom. 
52

JSOU Report 08-4

The Mizo Accord of 1986 has been the best of all the political settlements in the northeast. It has stood the test of time, and today Mizoram 

is perhaps the most peaceful and stable state in the region. It has a literacy 

rate of 88.80 percent, which is second highest for the country. 
53

Singh: India’s Northeast

6. External Factors: Stoking the Flames

A peculiar feature of India’s northeast is that it is connected with the 

rest of the country only by a 22-km corridor, and its borders are 

almost entirely with the neighboring countries of China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan. Nepal, though not contiguous, is close to the 

western tip of Assam. Pakistan’s eastern wing was always willing to provide 

sanctuaries to the insurgents of the northeast and equip them with weapons 

to create problems for the Indian State. After the liberation of Bangladesh in 

1971, it was expected that this phase would end. Unfortunately, Bangladesh 

also started playing the same game after a few years. China also fished in 

the troubled waters until they found that the tribals would never accept 

Marxist-Leninist ideology; besides, after Mao, China concentrated on its 

own economic development rather than on exporting revolution. Some 

current reports state that the Yunnan-based mafia is passing on weapons 

obtained from China’s ordnance factories to the northeastern rebels. It is 

not clear yet whether it is happening with the knowledge or connivance of 

the Chinese government. Myanmar and Nepal have been friendly to India, 

but their internal problems prevent them from exercising full control over 

the disaffected elements within their own countries. The northeastern rebels 

strike a nexus with these elements and with their help, establish sanctuaries in those countries. Bhutan has always stood by India, and it effectively 

flushed out the insurgents from its territory. 

Role of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Directorate 

General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) 

Pakistan’s ISI has been playing a devastating role in India’s northeast. Its 

strategy has been as follows:

a. Provide arms, ammunition and explosives to the rebel groups 

b. Arrange sanctuaries for the insurgents 

c. Extend training facilities 

d. Provide financial support 

e. Ensure coordination among the rebel formations.
54

JSOU Report 08-4

The ISI played a sinister role in fuelling terrorism in Punjab in the 1980s. 

Subsequently, it aided and abetted insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir in 

the 1990s. It opened a third front against India in the northeast and has 

struck a close nexus with the ULFA of Assam and the National Socialist 

Council of Nagaland (Issac-Muivah group). The Pakistanis facilitated the 

visit of several ULFA leaders including Paresh Barua to Afghanistan and 

even arranged their meeting with the Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who promised to supply weapons to ULFA.55 The ISI has also been 

pumping in fake Indian currency notes into the country with a view toward 

destabilizing its economy.

The Chief Minister of Assam, making a statement in the Assembly on 6 

April 2000, said that the police had gathered evidence to prove that the ISI 

was fomenting violence and militancy in the State by either creating new 

outfits or actively supporting the local ones. The ISI, he added, was also 

promoting fundamentalism and insurgency among the Muslim youth.56

The intelligence agencies recorded the emergence of several Muslim organizations in Assam: 

a. Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA)

b. Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam ( MULTA)

c. Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (MLFA)

d. Muslim Security Force (MSF)

e. United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)

f. Muslim United Liberation Army (MULA)

g. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM)

h. Peoples United Liberation Force (PULF).

The professed aim of these organizations is to safeguard the interests 

of Muslims, but most of them have already started showing fundamentalist traits. The Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan has been providing financial help 

to the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) through the 

Jamat-e-Islami, Bangladesh. Evidence also exists that the Bangladesh JEI 

deputed some MULTA members to Afghanistan for training. On 6 August 

2007, Assam Forest and Environment Minister, Rockybul Hussain, replying on behalf of the Chief Minister, stated that jihadi groups including the 

HUM and the MULTA were active in the State. 

On 26 March 2008, the National Security Advisor, MK Narayanan, 

said that there is “no change in ISI’s attitude to mentor terror groups like 
55

Singh: India’s Northeast

Lashkar and Jaish” and “attacks on India from Pakistan’s soil are likely to 

continue.”57

Bangladesh’s military intelligence—the DGFI—has developed close 

links with the ULFA, the NDFB, the PLA, and the UNLF of Manipur. 

Meghalaya’s rebel groups such as the Achik National Volunteers Council and 

Tripura’s insurgent outfits ATTF and NLFT also have bases in Bangladesh. 

India’s Border Security Force has been giving a list of the insurgents’ camps 

in Bangladesh to the Bangladesh Rifles year after year—more than 100 such 

camps exist—but the Bangladesh authorities deny their existence. 

Weapons are smuggled through Bangladesh in huge quantities for delivery to the northeastern rebels. On 2 April 2004, the Bangladesh police and 

Coast Guard stumbled upon what was perhaps the largest ever consignment of sophisticated illegal arms and ammunition when they raided the 

Government-controlled Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Limited. Weapons and 

explosives were being unloaded from two fishing trawlers on the east bank 

of the Karnafully River; examples of the seizures follow:

a. 690 7.62-mm T-56-I submachine guns (SMGs)

b. 600 7.62-mm T-56-2 SMGs

c. 150 40-mm T-69 rocket launchers

d. 840 40-mm rockets

e. 400 9-mm semiautomatic rifles

f. 100 Tommy guns

g. 150 rocket launchers

h. 2,000 launching grenades

i. 25,020 hand grenades

j. 6,392 magazines for SMG bullets

k. 739,680 rounds of 7.62-mm caliber and 400,000 rounds for other 

weapons. 

Most of the arms and ammunition were of Korean, Italian, Chinese, and 

American make. The weapons were enough to arm an infantry brigade. 

According to Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2004), the shipment 

involved two insurgent groups of India’s northeast—ULFA and the IssacMuivah faction of the NSCN—and the purchases were financed by “a foreign 

intelligence service seeking to destabilize India’s northeast.” 

The apparent collusion between Pakistan’s ISI and Bangladesh’s DGFI 

is of particular concern. In fact, “the two organizations undertake anti-
56

JSOU Report 08-4

India operations in eastern India almost in tandem.” 58 A report published in 

Time magazine (21 October 2002) stated that agents of the DGFI maintain 

contacts with the ISI and have “a long history of supporting rebels fighting 

Indian rule across the border, including providing safe houses in Dhaka 

for the leaders of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).” Jaideep 

Saikia, who has written extensively on the northeast, has made the following 

observations on the matter:

Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and its surrogate, Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), are 

presently utilizing a plethora of militant organizations in the North 

East to bleed India with a ‘thousand cuts,’ seeking the severance 

of the region from the rest of India by tying down Indian security 

forces in the region and away from Kashmir, where the real battle 

is being waged.59

The DGFI has, in fact, extended its operations even to the Indian territory. DGFI-sponsored jihadi modules have been set up in Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura. According to a U.S. think-tank, Stratfor, 

Pakistan’s ISI, in cooperation with Bangladesh’s DGFI is investing considerable resources “in solidifying India’s militant corridor.” It goes on to say 

that “there are growing indications that these two agencies are working 

clandestinely in Bangladesh to bring all the northeast based insurgent outfits 

and jihadi elements under one umbrella.”60

Fundamentalism 

A mushroom growth of mosques and madrassas has occurred all along the 

borders with Bangladesh. These institutions have come up even at places 

where there is very small or negligible population of the minority community, and they have come up on both sides of the border as if they were 

being set up according to a plan. Table 5 shows the result of a government 

survey conducted in the year 2000. 
57

Singh: India’s Northeast

Table 5. Mosques and Madrassas in the 10-km Belt on 

Either Side of Indo-Bangladesh Border

Indian Side Bangladesh Side

State Mosques Madrassas Mosques Madrassas

West Bengal 458 208 523 302

Assam 236 157 204 38

Meghalaya 17 2 103 38

Tripura 194 72 130 71

 Total: 905 439 960 469

Religious instructions in the madrassas are given in Arabic rather than 

in Urdu, and that alienates the Muslim children from their Indian moorings. Of particular concern is that the boys are being indoctrinated with 

fundamentalist ideology in these institutions. The Border Management Task 

Force felt that “these institutions could be construed as Islamic infrastructure which have a potential for intelligence encirclement of India.” 

According to Maloy Krishna Dhar, an officer who served in the Intelligence Bureau, Muslim clerics and ulema belonging or affiliated to the following institutions visit the mosques and madrassas in Muslim-dominated 

areas of Assam, especially the Tanjim-ul-Madaris at Hojai and the Markazul 

Ma’arif Education and Research Center: 

a. King Faisal University, Dhaka

b. Jahangirnagar University, Savar

c. Darul Ishan University, Dhanmondi, Dhaka

d. Islamic Foundation, Dhaka.

They have also established contacts with several Muslim organizations in 

Manipur including the People’s United Liberation Front, Darul Uloom, 

Rabeta Madaris-e-Arabiya, and the Madarasa Alia. The DGFI also promotes 

formal and informal movements of the Tablighi Jamaat activists between 

Bangladesh and the northeastern states.61

Demographic Invasion

One of the biggest problems facing the country and having a direct bearing 

on national security, particularly of the northeastern region, is that of the 

illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India. 
58

JSOU Report 08-4

This process of migration had started well before the partition. A large 

number of cultivators, primarily Muslims, came to Assam in the 1930s 

and 1940s. They were encouraged by the Sadullah regime in Assam for the 

“Grow More Food Campaign,” though as Viceroy Lord Wavell said, Sadullah was more interested in “Grow more Muslims rather than grow more 

food.” The availability of large tracts of cultivable fertile area in Assam was 

an incentive to migration.

In the wake of the partition of the country, a large number of Hindus 

crossed over to the states of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. Eventually 

when the Pakistan Army started persecuting the Bengalis, a large number 

of Muslims also crossed the borders into India. With the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, it was expected that the new regime would ensure communal harmony and tackle the social and economic problems of its teeming 

millions in a manner that would eliminate, or at least reduce, the factors 

contributing to migration. However, that did not happen and both Hindus 

and Muslims continued to pour into India in large numbers. The assassination of Sheikh Mujib in August 1975, lifting of the ban on communal 

parties by General Zia-ur Rehman, and declaration of Islam as the State 

religion by General Ershad were accompanied by intensified attacks on the 

minorities—the Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and the tribals. Thousands 

of Hindu houses were destroyed, hundreds of Hindu women raped, and 

Hindu temples desecrated or destroyed. The Hindu population of Bangladesh, as a result, registered a sharp decline. It dropped from 28 percent of 

the total population at the time of independence to less than 10 percent in 

1991.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, which were the traditional 

abode of the Buddhist Chakma and other tribes, underwent a complete 

metamorphosis due to the forcible occupation of tribal lands and the settlement of thousands of Muslims thereon. The entire area was ethnically 

cleansed. The Chakmas fled to India where they were rehabilitated in Mizoram and in the Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. The parliamentary elections of October 2001 in Bangladesh were followed by yet another 

wave of persecution of the minorities because of their suspected support 

to the Awami League, which lost at the hustings. A British journalist, John 

Vidal, in an article published in The Guardian on 21 July 2001, commented 

that “dozens of people were killed, more than 1,000 women from minority 

groups were raped, and several thousand people lost their land in 3 months 
59

Singh: India’s Northeast

around the election.” The Refugees International called upon the Bangladesh government to protect the minorities and ensure that land of Hindus 

confiscated was returned to them “within a well-defined timetable.”62 The 

Amnesty International also criticized the government of Bangladesh for the 

large-scale attacks on the country’s minority communities.

The Government of Bangladesh, however, turned a blind eye to the 

atrocities on the minorities and allowed the culprits, mostly Bangladesh 

Nationalist Party (BNP) followers and the Jamaat cadres, to go scot-free. 

The Muslims have been moving into India primarily for economic 

reasons. They constitute nearly 70 percent of the infiltrants. The factors 

that have been contributing to the influx from the Bangladesh side are as 

follows: 

a. Steep rise in population with increasing pressure on land and the 

resultant unemployment

b. Recurring natural disasters (e.g., floods and cyclones), uprooting 

large segments of humanity

c. Better economic opportunities in India

d. Religious persecution of Hindus and discrimination of tribals

e. Islamic interests encouraging the overflow of population

f. Porous and easily negotiable international borders.

The Bangladesh government hardly makes any efforts to stop these 

exfiltrations. A section of intellectuals in Bangladesh has even been legitimizing the theory of lebensraum—living space for the people of Bangladesh. 

In the early 1990s, Sadeq Khan, a former diplomat, recorded the following 

views:

All projections, however, clearly indicate that by the next decade, 

that is to say by the first decade of the 21st century, Bangladesh will 

face a serious crisis of lebensraum...there is no reason why regional 

and international cooperation could not be worked out to plan and 

execute population movements and settlements to avoid critical 

demographic pressure in pockets of high concentration... The natural 

trend of population overflow from Bangladesh is towards the sparsely 

populated lands in the South East, in the Arakan side, and of the 

North East in the Seven Sisters side of the Indian subcontinent.63
60

JSOU Report 08-4

Several thinkers and economists of Bangladesh have been articulating 

the idea of free movement of people across the international borders. Professor Amena Mohsin of Dhaka University expressed the view that “migration 

is a normal and natural phenomenon and cannot be stopped; the need today 

is to evolve ways to legalize it.”64

The net result is that waves of Bangladeshis have been flooding eastern 

India. It is interesting that, according to Sharifa Begum of the Bangladesh 

Institute of Development Studies in Dhaka, nearly 3.5 million people “disappeared” from East Pakistan between 1951 and 1961, and that another 

1.5 million possibly entered India between 1961 and 1974. The records of 

the Election Commission of Bangladesh also make an interesting study. In 

1991 the electoral roll of Bangladesh had 62,181,745 voters, but during their 

revision undertaken in 1995, the Commission had to delete the names of 

6,165,567 voters from the electoral rolls, apparently because these people 

were no longer living within Bangladesh. Again, in June 1996, the Commission removed the names of nearly 120,000 Bangladeshi citizens from 

the country’s electoral rolls. These people were not disappearing in thin air; 

they were moving toward the contiguous states of India.65

The Task Force on Border Management estimated (in August 2000) the 

total number of Bangladeshis in India to be about 1.5 crore. The sparsely 

populated states of the northeast have been flooded with the arrival of Bangladeshis. Assam’s population increased from about 15 million to about 

23 million during the 20-year period from 1971 to 1991; while the nonMuslim portion grew at the rate of 45.39 percent, Muslims rose at the rate 

of 77.42 percent. The Supreme Court of India also took notice of the illegal 

migrations and while striking down The Illegal Migrants (Determination 

by Tribunals) Act in July 2005, recorded that “there can be no manner 

of doubt that the State of Assam is facing ‘external aggression and internal disturbance’ on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladesh 

nationals.” 
61

Singh: India’s Northeast

Table 6 shows the growth of the Muslim population in the other northeastern states from 1981 to 1991.66

Table 6. Growth of Muslim Population

Muslim Population

State 1981 1991 Growth (%)

Arunachal Pradesh 5,073 11,922 135.01

Manipur 99,327 133,535 34.44

Meghalaya 41,434 61,462 48.34

Mizoram 2,205 4,538 105.80

Nagaland 11,806 20,642 74.84

Tripura 138,529 196,495 41.84

The tribals are not happy with the presence of these Bangladeshis in 

their midst. In Tripura, they rose in rebellion because the demographic 

balance was upset in the state. The Group of Ministers, in their recommendations on the National Security System (February 2001), stated that 

“the massive illegal immigration poses a grave danger to our security, social 

harmony, and economic well being.” 

The government has decided to fence the border with Bangladesh to 

stem the tide of migrations. The total length of the border is 4096.7 kms. Out 

of this total, the plan is to fence 3286.87 kms; the remaining stretch is either 

riverine or has population within 150 yards of the border. So far, 2535.80 

kms have already been fenced.67 The project is encountering hurdles, but is 

nevertheless being pushed through. Border roads over a stretch of 3250.60 

kms have also been constructed for patrolling by the Border Security Force 

personnel. 

These external factors—subversive role of Pakistan and Bangladesh’s intelligence agencies, growth of fundamentalist institutions along the borders, and 

surreptitious and steady demographic movements from Bangladesh—are 

all adding to the complexity of India’s problems in the northeast. 

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Singh: India’s Northeast

7. Epilogue: Looking Ahead

The northeast has suffered insurgencies for nearly 50 years. The Naga 

Hills were the first to witness a rebellion. The prairie fire spread 

to the Mizo Hills and later to Manipur and Tripura. Assam also 

witnessed turbulence. Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya have been comparatively quiet. 

The Government of India cannot be said to have dealt with these 

problems with great competence or foresight. Its approach has generally 

been ad hoc. Experts have been very critical of 

the government for having been soft and even 

indulgent towards the insurgent outfits. The 

criticism is perhaps not misplaced. However, the 

fact remains that these insurgencies have been 

contained, and no possibility exists of any of the rebel formations achieving 

their objective of secession. 

B. G. Verghese has beautifully summed up the government’s handling 

of the northeast in the following words:

Although many Indians are prone to criticize what they read as 

failures of the Indian state, a look around the world must compel 

admiration for India’s comparative success in nation building. Astute 

political management and constitutional accommodation have harmonized many diversities, despite visible turbulence and confrontation. It would be mistaken to interpret the sharpening of ethnic 

and other identity differences as spelling disintegration. This is a 

manifestation of growing political and social consciousness among 

a heterogeneous but hitherto ‘dormant’ mass and the competing 

pulls and pressures this generates. This process has yet to exhaust 

itself, and nowhere as much as in the Northeast.68

The government never had a well formulated policy for the northeast. 

Its paramount consideration was to maintain the unity and integrity of the 

country and within that framework, meet the legitimate aspirations of the 

diverse ethnic groups to the extent possible. However, if we take an overall 

...the fact remains that 

these insurgencies have 

been contained...
64

JSOU Report 08-4

view of the last five decades, the following would appear to have been the 

salient features of the government’s policy:

a. Assure the tribals that their rights on land would be protected and 

their social customs and cultural traditions would not be interfered 

with

b. Take counterinsurgency measures, wherever appropriate 

c. Implement schemes for the economic development of areas even if 

these are witnessing insurgency

d. Engage the separatist/secessionist groups in political dialogue 

e. Enter into suspension of operations agreements with the insurgent 

groups 

f. Meet their legitimate aspirations by granting them autonomy or 

even statehood

g. Have understanding with neighboring countries (Bhutan, Myanmar) 

so that the insurgents do not get any shelter there.

The policy, even if its contours appeared inchoate or ephemeral, would 

appear to have paid off in the long run. All said and done, India has been 

more successful than Russia or China in dealing with its ethnic minorities. 

Russia has been going hammer and tongs against the Chechen separatists 

ever since 1992 without much success. China continues to have a serious 

problem with the discontented Uighurs; a fairly big demonstration occurred 

against the Chinese authorities in Khotan in the Xinjiang province on 23 

March 2008. Fresh rumblings of unrest are also seen with demonstrations 

by Tibetan monks and students in Tibet, Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai. It 

is true that incidents continue to happen in India’s northeast, but these are 

easily absorbed in the numerous currents and cross-currents, which are integral to the body politic of a nation containing more than a billion people. 

The Naga insurgency is gradually tapering off. It may have been the 

mother of all insurgencies in the northeast, but today it is no more than 

one of the insurgencies. The insurgent outfits of both Assam and Manipur 

have been antagonized by the NSCN (IM)’s demand for Greater Nagaland 

including the contiguous Naga-inhabited areas of the two states. ULFA 

has said that the NSCN’s claim over Assam districts as part of Nagalim has 

“neither credibility nor any historical basis.” Besides, an insurgency fatigue 

seems to have set in. The present generation of Nagas have become used to a 

comfortable life, and it is most unlikely that they would be willing to go back 
65

Singh: India’s Northeast

to the jungle. The NSCN (IM) faction would be happy if some face-saving 

formula could be found, which they could flaunt as their achievement. The 

ULFA has become a proxy of the ISI and although it is still able to perpetrate 

violent incidents now and then, it has lost much of the ground support. In 

Manipur, insurgency has become an instrument of extortion, and the outfits 

are bereft of any ideology. Tripura has been able to turn the corner, and the 

rebel formations there are virtually gasping for breath. 

Meanwhile, the Government of India has embarked on a program for 

an “integrated and holistic development of the region.” It is true that the 

northeast has intrinsic bottlenecks: the area is geographically remote, the 

terrain is difficult, infrastructure is poor, capital formation is weak, and the 

spread of technology is slow. However, the area has its positives: huge deposits of minerals, abundant natural resources, potential for agro-forestry and 

horticultural sectors including bamboo plantations, vast water resources, 

proximity to Southeast Asia’s fast growing economies, a highly literate 

population, rich heritage of handicrafts, and a strong community spirit. 

The effort is to develop these potentials. A Vision Northeastern Region 

(NER) 2020 for the northeast has been drawn up. The plan aims to develop 

all sectors of the region’s economy by exploiting its resource potential. It 

A Chinese army officer (L) exchanges greetings with his 

Indian counterpart at Nathu La pass on the border between 

Sikkim and Tibet in July 2006. Formal trading was due to 

begin at the 4,545-meter pass along the historic Silk Route. 

Photo Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP/Getty, used by permission of Newscom. 
66

JSOU Report 08-4

lays emphasis on the constituent states working as a single entity for the 

accelerated socio-economic development of the region instead of competing 

among themselves. Huge investments are slated to develop energy, aviation, 

agriculture, infrastructure, and commercial sectors.

The government also initiated a Look East policy in the early 1990s to 

change the economic profile of the region and break its isolation. What was 

thus far considered to be a disadvantage—the fact that the frontiers of the 

region are contiguous mostly to the neighboring countries and it is linked 

only with a corridor to the rest of India—is now being sought to be turned 

into an advantage. As stated by the Prime Minister, the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) markets “provide big opportunities for 

the northeastern region” and that “affinity in the cultural background will 

make our products acceptable and saleable once the land connectivity is 

improved.” 69 Significantly, the Ministry of External Affairs is also being 

involved in the development of the northeast as a strategic extension of 

India’s foreign policy objectives.70 Transit and trade agreements with China, 

Myanmar, and Bangladesh would henceforth be in sync with the development of the northeast. The proposed Trilateral Highway from Moreh in 

Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand through Bagan in Myanmar, which is 

expected to be completed by 2011, is going to play a crucial role in India’s 

trade with the far-east and southeast regions. The objective is to have a new 

paradigm of development in which the foreign policy initiatives blend with 

the projects for economic development.

What was so far a dormant economic powerhouse shackled by militant 

movements appears to be on the threshold of emerging as a bridge with the 

economies of Southeast Asia. The seven states are in the process of combining to form a rainbow on the northeastern horizon.
67

Singh: India’s Northeast

Endnotes

1. E. F. Sandys, History of Tripura (Tripura State Tribal Cultural Research Institute 

and Museum, 1915), p. 3.

2. Dr. S. K. Chatterjee, “Kirata-Jana-Kriti, the Indo Mongoloids: Their Contribution 

to the History and Culture of India,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 

Vol. XVI, No. 2, Cal, 1950, pp. 21-22.

3. Ahom Buranji, p. 268, cited by Lakshmi Devi in Ahom-Tribal Relations: A Political 

Study (Guwahati: Lawyer’s Book Stall, 1968), p. 68.

4. A species of Indian bison, domesticated variety of Bos frontalis.

5. Udayon Misra, The Periphery Strikes Back (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced 

Study, Rashtrapati Nivas, 2000), p. 19.

6. Ibid., p 5.

7. Sir Robert Reid, History of Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941, 

(Shillong: Spectrum Publications, 1942), pp. 100-101.

8. Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam (Guwahati: Lawyer’s Book Stall, 1905), p. 

21.

9. Ibid., p. 97.

10. A leaflet The Voice of Asom [Assam] released by the ULFA stated as follows:

ULFA is a revolutionary mass organization, with the goal of ‘A sovereign 

Asom’ with ‘A society free from all kinds of exploitation and inequality.’ ULFA believes in the path of armed struggle because against the 

ruthless character of the Indian state peaceful demonstrations are totally 

ineffective. ULFA firmly believes in the equality of all religions, and is 

committed to religious neutrality as an organization. The international 

policy of ULFA is guided by the principle of mutual cooperation and noninterference. ULFA’s national policy is guided by the principle of equal 

status and rights for all ethnic groups of Asom irrespective of numerical 

strength. Every ethnic group of Asom shall enjoy autonomy in political 

and economic cum cultural spheres.

11. Congress (I) is Congress (Indira)—that is, the Congress faction led by Mrs. Indira 

Gandhi. 

12. The Hindu, 19 December 2003, available at www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/

fr/2003/12/19/index.htm. 

13. South Asia Intelligence Review (SAI), Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Vol. 6, No. 

27, 14 January 2008; available from www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/.

14. Sir Edward Gait, A History of Assam, pp. 77-78.

15. L. W. Shakespear, History of Upper Assam, Upper Burmah and North-Eastern Frontier (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1914), p. 225.

16. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland (Shillong: Spectrum Publications, 1961), p.70.

17. Prakash Singh, Nagaland (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1995), p. 79.
68

JSOU Report 08-4

18. Kenneth Kerhuo, field director of the Angami Baptist Mission, in a statement 

published in Naga Khabar, Vol. 1, No. 6 said: “Thanks to the Army, confidence has 

returned to the villages, and the peaceful Nagas are able to look after their affairs 

unafraid... I have heard nothing but the highest praise of Army officers and men in 

general from several Nagas of different tribes.” In another statement published in 

Nagar Khabar, Vol. 1, No.7, a group of Nagas including Jasokie, Kenneth, Khieya, 

Lucy Dino and others said: “No Armed Force in the world could have behaved 

better than the Indian Armed Forces have done in Naga Hills.”

19. Referring to the Prime Minister’s acceptance of NPC’s demands, the New York 

Times of 28 September 1957 observed: “This is a realistic phase of approach. It is 

not possible to conceive of a really viable independent Naga State. The tribesmen 

are vigorous and liberty loving, but they are not in a position to assume full responsibilities of self-government except upon a limited local scale. Economically, their 

position, completely landlocked, would be impossible to improve. Politically, while 

they may rightly desire to have a sense of freedom, they have not the equipment 

with which to conduct the affairs of an independent State. The Indian approach to 

the question at this point seems a wise one.”

20. Assam Tribune, 18 August 1966.

21. References to Pakistan here mean what was then East Pakistan, which is now 

Bangladesh. 

22. R. K. Singh, “China abetting insurgents in Northeast,” The Pioneer, 15 October 

2007.

23. A report, The New Islamist International, prepared by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. House of Representatives stated that 

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) expanded its activities to northeastern 

India in the 1990s and fuelled ethnic separatism. 

24. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, “North-East in Turmoil,” The Indian Express, 17 July 

1993.

25. Asian Age, 19 March 2006.

26. The Pioneer, 29 April 2005. 

27. The State Home Minister Thenucho disclosed in the Legislative Assembly on 25 

March 2007 that 270 lives (NSCN-IM –101, NSCN-K – 110, Naga National Council 

–25 and the remaining civilians) had been lost in a total of 378 factional clashes in 

Nagaland, and 159 persons had been injured between March 2003 and 19 March 

2007.

28. W. S. Desai, A Pageant of Burmese History (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1961), p. 

109.

29. E. W. Dun, Gazetteer of Manipur, (Delhi: Manas Publications, August 1996), p. 

39.

30. Phanjoubam Tarapot, Insurgency Movement in North-Eastern India (New Delhi: 

Vikas Publishing House, 1996), cited on p. 24.

31. Lt Col H. Bhuban Singh, The Merger of Manipur, (Imphal, 1988), p. 97.
69

Singh: India’s Northeast

32. B. G. Verghese, India’s Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996), p. 116.

33. Kangleipak is the ancient name of Manipur. Revivalist units use this expression.

34. Subir Bhaumik, Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change, 

East-West Center Washington Working Papers, No. 10, July 2007, p. 17.

35. The Pioneer, 8 September 2006.

36. Outlook, 12 December 2005.

37. South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments and Briefings, Vol. 6, No. 21, 

3 December 2007.

38. Ibid.

39. E. F. Sandys, History of Tripura, pp. 2-3. 

40. Tripura District Gazeteers (1975), p. 111. Sandys’ History of Tripura has a similar 

entry on p. 37:

The British Government has no treaty with Tipperah. The Raja of Tipperah stands in a peculiar position in as much as in addition to the hill 

territory known as ‘Independent Tipperah’; he is the holder of a considerable Zemindary in the district of Tipperah in the plains; he receives his 

investiture from the British Government and is required to pay the usual 

nazarana ... Independent Tipperah is not held by gift from the British 

Government, or its predecessors, under any title derived from it or them, 

never having been subjected by the Mogal. 

41. B. G. Verghese, India’s Northeast Resurgent, p. 166.

42. The Pioneer, 2 September 2001.

43. J. B. Ganguly, “The economic content of the state formation process in Medieval 

Tripura,” p. 151.

44. Suchintya Bhattacharya, The Halams of Tripura (Kolkata: Kreativmind, 2003), 

p.368.

45. Phanjoubam Tarapot, Insurgency Movement in North Eastern India, p. 175.

46. Shifting cultivation is a form of cultivation practiced in northeastern India. It is 

also called “jhumming.” In practice, the field cultivated in one season is left out in 

the following season, and another plot is cultivated in the next season. This practice 

enables soil in the first field to recuperate its fertility. 

47. Separatist Group bans Hindu Festivities, BBC News South Asia, 2 October 2000.

48. Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnic Conflict and Militancy in Tripura,” Frontier in Flames: 

North East India in Turmoil edited by Jaideep Saikia, (Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2007), 

p. 108.

49. South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Vol. 2, No. 49, 

21 June 2004.

50. Subir Bhaumik, op.cit, p. 113.

51. The Pioneer, 24 January 2008.

52. Patricia Mary Mukhim, “Turbulence in the Abode of Clouds,” Frontier in Flames

edited by Jaideep Saikia, p. 7. 
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JSOU Report 08-4

53. Ibid., p .7.

54. Subir Bhamik, “Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change,” 

East-West Center Washington Working Papers, No. 10, July 2007, p. 14.

55. Wasbir Hussain, “Cross-border Links and Strategic Alliances,” Faultlines, Vol. 17, 

p. 108.

56. ISI Activities in Assam, statement laid on the table of the house of Assam Legislative Assembly under item No. 12, 6 April 2000.

57. The Times of India, 27 March 2008.

58. M. K. Dhar, “Fulcrum of the Eastern Dark: Motivational Mechanics of the ISI and 

DGFI,” Frontier in Flames edited by Jaideep Saikia, p. 81.

59. Jaideep Saikia, Frontier in Flames: North East India in Turmoil (Delhi: Penguin/

Viking, 2007), pp. xviii-xix. 

60. The Times of India, 25 April 2007.

61. M. K. Dhar, op.cit. p. 78.

62. Deccan Chronicle, 10 December 2003.

63. The Holiday (Dhaka), 18 October 1991.

64. Wasbir Hussain, “Demographic Invasion. Anxiety and Anger in India’s Northeast,” 

Faultlines, Vol. 7 (November 2000), p. 128.

65. Hiranya Kumar Bhattacharyya, The Silent Invasion (Guwahati: Spectrum Publications, 2001), p. 84. 

66. Prakash Singh, “Demographic Movements: The Threat to India’s Economy and 

Security,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 

pp. 94-115.

67. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report, 2007-2008, p. 

145. The state-wise break up of border length and fencing completed along the 

Indo-Bangladesh border as of 31 December 2007 follows. 

States Border Length Fencing Completed

West Bengal 2,216.7 1,181.05

Assam 263.0 200.71

Meghalaya 443.0 378.25

Tripura 856.0 668.04

Mizoram 318.0 107.75

Total: 4,096.7 2,535.80

68. B. G. Verghese, India’s Northeast Resurgent, p. xviii.

69. Outlook, 6 March 2006.

70. The Times of India, 25 September 2007.
71

Singh: India’s Northeast

Appendix A. Statement of Violent Incidents 

in the Northeast (2005–2007)

Incidents

Extremists 

Arrested/Killed/

Surrendered

Security Forces 

Personnel Killed Civilians Killed

States 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007

Assam 398 413 474 544 752 759 7 32 27 173 164 287

Meghalaya 37 38 28 108 112 85 0 0 1 1 6 9

Tripura 115 87 94 212 196 303 11 14 6 28 14 14

Arunachal 

Pradesh 32 16 35 58 23 53 1 0 5 3 0 12

Nagaland 192 309 272 141 203 211 1 2 1 28 29 44

Mizoram 4 5 2 210 848 21 0 0 0 2 0 2

Manipur 554 498 584 1,186 1,097 1,443 50 28 39 158 96 130

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 

2007–2008

73

Singh: India’s Northeast

Appendix B. List of Major Militant/Insurgent 

Outfits Active in the Northeast

Assam

➢ United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

➢ National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Manipur

➢ People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

➢ United National Liberation Front (UNLF)

➢ People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

➢ Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)

➢ Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup (KYKL)

➢ Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF)

➢ Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF)

Meghalaya

➢ Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)

➢ Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)

Tripura

➢ All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)

➢ National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

Nagaland

➢ National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muviah)-NSCN(IM)

➢ National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) NSCN(K).

Notes

1. All the militant outfits except the two factions of National Socialist Council of 

Nagaland have been declared unlawful associations under the Unlawful Activities 

(Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967). These outfits in respect of Assam, Manipur, 

and Tripura have also been listed as terrorist organizations in the schedule of the 

said Act.

2. In addition, other militant groups—for example, Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) and 

United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS); DHD (Jole faction), Karbi Longri 

NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA); and Naga National Council (NNC)—are also operating in 

the northeast. 

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 2007–08.