UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4666

EARL WINSLOW,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.

James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-94-35)

Submitted: June 21, 2002

Decided: July 11, 2002

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Richard Andrew Davis, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. John

L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Ray B. Fitzgerald, Jr., Assistant

United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Earl Winslow appeals the sentence of thirty-six months imprisonment that the district court imposed on him after it revoked his supervised release. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the

sentence and remand for resentencing. 

Winslow pled guilty to federal drug charges in 1996 and was sentenced to a term of eighty months imprisonment and sixty months

supervised release. Winslow began serving his term of supervised

release in March 2000, in New York City. After Winslow repeatedly

violated supervised release by using drugs and failing to appear for

drug testing, the district court revoked his supervised release in

August 2001. The guideline range recommended under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, p.s. (2000), was 8-14 months imprisonment. The statutory maximum sentence was thirty-six months

imprisonment. 

The court found that Winslow needed an intensive drug treatment

program, and that the twelve-month, 500-hour treatment program he

had completed while incarcerated was not the most intensive program

the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had to offer. The court stated its belief

that the BOP offered a longer program lasting 24-30 months that

would benefit Winslow. The court imposed a sentence of thirty-six

months imprisonment so that Winslow could participate in that treatment program. On appeal, Winslow contends that the program envisioned by the district court is not available and that the district court

consequently abused its discretion in imposing the three-year sentence. 

This court reviews a sentence imposed after a revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d

638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). The sentencing range calculated under

§ 7B1.4 is purely advisory, so the district court did not abuse its discretion simply by imposing a sentence above the range. Davis, 53

F.3d at 642. The district court did not err in considering Winslow’s

need for rehabilitation because the statute governing revocation of

supervised release, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002)

2 UNITED STATES v. WINSLOW
expressly permits consideration of this factor. See, e.g., United States

v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000). The sentence did not

exceed the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (providing for three-year maximum for Class B felony). 

Winslow claims on appeal that the district court’s decision to sentence him to the statutory maximum of thirty-six months was an

abuse of discretion because it was based on misinformation. Relying

on 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) (1994), and 28 C.F.R. § 550.56 (2000), Winslow maintains that the BOP does not have a drug treatment program

lasting 24-36 months, that he has already completed the longest treatment program, which is the 500-hour program lasting 6-12 months,

and that he is ineligible to repeat the program. 

Our examination of the materials submitted on appeal reveals only

that Winslow may be correct. It is not entirely clear to this court what

treatment programs are available to an inmate returned to custody

after revocation of supervised release, but it is evident that the district

court lacked sufficient reliable information about treatment options to

justify imposing a thirty-six month sentence so that Winslow could

participate in a particular program that may not exist. The district

court specifically stated that it was imposing a thirty-six month sentence so that Winslow could participate in a 24-30-month drug treatment program which may well be unavailable. The district court did

not provide any other reason for imposing a sentence of that length,

and it is not clear from the record that the court would have imposed

the same sentence had it been aware that the intensive program it had

in mind is not currently available. 

Given the circumstances, we vacate the sentence and remand for

further proceedings. On remand, the parties should consult the BOP

and present to the district court reliable information as to what treatment programs are available to a defendant returned to custody after

revocation of supervised release. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

UNITED STATES v. WINSLOW 3