18

- 3814 Singh v. Barr BIA Schoppert , IJ A 200 905 510 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**


## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER**  **FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS**  **COURT ’**  **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX**  **OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “**  **SUMMARY ORDER ”**  **). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY**  **NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**
**At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the**  **Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of**  3 **New York, on the 2**  **n d**  **d a**  **y of N**  **o v**  **e m**  **b e**  **r ,**  **two thousand twenty**  **.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DENNIS JACOBS ,**  7 **DENNY CHIN ,**  8 **JOSEPH F. BIANCO ,**  9 **Circuit Judges.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **KULVIR SINGH,** 13 **Petitioner ,**  14 15
**v. 18** 
**- 3814**  16 **NAC** 17 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES**  18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL ,**  19 **Respondent .**  20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER :**  Mona Liza F. Lao, Esq. , New York , 23 NY

. 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Jeffrey Bossert Clark , Acting 26 Assistant Attorney General ; Erica 27 B. Miles , Senior Litigation 282 Counsel ; Imran R. Zaidi , Trial 1 Attorney, Office of Immigration 2 Litigation, United States 3 Department of Justice, Washington, 4 D C. 5
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitio n for review 8

is DENIED. 9

Petitioner Kulv ir Singh , a native and citizen of India , 10

seeks review of a November 30, 2018 decision of the BIA 11
affirming a n October 3, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge 12
(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of 13
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 14

(“CAT”). In re Kulvir Singh , No. A 200 905 510 (B.I.A. Nov. 15

30, 2018 ), aff’g No. A 200 905 510 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 16

Oct. 3, 2017 ). We assume the parties’ f amiliarity with the 17
underlying facts and procedural history. 18
Rather than file a brief, the Government has moved for 19
summary denial. We deny the motion because s ummary denial 20

is reserved for frivolous cases

. S ee United States v. Davis , 21

598 F.3d 10, 13

- 14 (2d Cir. 2010) . However, we construe that 22
motion as the Government’s brief and deny the petition on the 23
merits because, a s discussed below, t he adverse credibility 243 determination is supported by substantial evidence. 1

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions 2
“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 3

Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The 4
applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 5

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions , 891 F.3d 6

67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility 7
determination for substantial evidence). 8
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 9
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 10
determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s 11

. . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal 12
consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of 13

such statements with other evidence of record .

. . , without 14
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or fal sehood 15
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other 16

relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer 17
. . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the 18
totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable 19

fact

- find er could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” 20
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); 214 accord Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 76. 1
The agency properly considered that Singh omitted from 2
his asylum application that he lived in Jordan for two years. 3

In his application, Singh reported that he lived in India 4
continuously from 1983 (when he was born) to 2013 (when he 5
left for the United States), despite a question instructing 6
him to provide all addresses for the past five years. I n his 7
accompanying written statement and in a supplemental 8
statement submitted prior to his hearing, he d id not mention 9
living in Jordan. On cross

- examination, however, he stated 10

that he fled to Jordan from India for two years starting in 11

2009 because of unspecified “ threats ” (presumably from the 12
Congress Party). See Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) 13

at 146

- 47. When asked why he failed to mention his time in 14
Jordan in his asylum application, he said that question was 15

not asked, see CAR at 147, but this explanation did not 16
resolve the discrepancy because the applicatio n requires a 17

list of prior residences , s ee M ajidi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 18
77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer 19
a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 20

secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact

- 215 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony. ” (internal 1
quotation marks omitted)). 2

While the agency may err if it relies too heavily on 3

minor omissions ( at least where the omitted information would 4
have supplemented, rather than contradicted, earlier 5

statements ) , the agency did not err here becau se the omission 6
related to Singh’s central claim that he was afraid of the 7

Congress Party. See Ming Zhang v. Holder , 585 F.3d 715, 726 8
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency may “draw an adverse 9
inference about petitioner’s credibility based, inter alia , 10
on h[is] failure to mention” important details or events in 11
prior statements). And it w as reasonable to expect Singh to 12
include the fact that he fled the country because of threats, 13
as that fact goes both to his subjective fear and the severity 14

of the th reats. See Hong Fei Gao , 891 F.3d at 78 (holding 15
that “the probative value of a witness’s prior silence on 16
particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the 17
witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose”). 18
Relatedly, Singh’s testimony was inconsistent with his 19

credible fea r interview as to why he moved to Jordan. Singh 20
never mentioned living in Jordan when providing direct 216 testimony, and on cross

- examination, he told the Department 1
of Homeland Security that he went to Jordan to escape 2
unspecified “ threats. ” See CAR at 146

– 47. But at a credible 3
fear interview a few weeks after he entered the United States, 4

he stated that he went to Jordan to work. Singh had no 5
compelling explanation for this inconsistency and simply 6
repeated both facts, that he received threats and went t o 7

Jordan to work. S ee Majidi , 430 F.3d at 80. He never 8
specified who threatened him, how often he was threatened, 9

and w hat the threats were. 10
Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency 11
reasonably relied on his failure to rehabilitate his 12
testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. S ee Biao 13
Yang v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An 14
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 15
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 16
general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 17
that has already been called into question.”). The agency 18
did not err in declining to afford significant weight t o 19
letters from Singh’s family members, fellow Mann Party 20
members, neighbor, and doctor because the family members were 217 interested parties and none of the authors was available for 1

cross

- examination. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 324, 332, 2

334 (2d Cir. 2013 ) (holding that weight of evidence is with in 3

the agency ’s discretion and deferring to agency’s decision to 4
afford little weight to spouse’s letter) ; s ee also In re H

5

L

- H

- & Z

- Y

- Z

- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B

. I

. A

. 2010) (finding 6

that unsworn letters from a lien’s friends and family were 7
insufficient support for alien’s claims because they were 8
from interested witnesses not subject to cross

- examination), 9
overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder , 677 10

F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012)

. 11
Accordingly, given Singh’s omission of the two years he 12
spent in Jordan from his asylum application and the 13
inconsistency between statement s at his credible fear 14

interview ( that he went to Jordan to work ) and his testimony 15

( that he went there to escape thr eats ) , as well as the lack 16
of specific information about the alleged threats or reliable 17
corroboration of his claims, we defer to the agency’s adverse 18
credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167; 19

see also Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 446 F.3d 20
289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that even a single 218 inconsistency is sufficient to support an adverse credibility 1
determination if it is material and relates to “an example of 2
the very persecution from which” the applicant seeks relief). 3
The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of 4
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all 5

three forms of relief were based on the same discredited 6
factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156

– 7
57 (2d Cir. 2 006). 8
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 9

DENIED

. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 10

stays VACATED. 11

FOR THE COURT: 12 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe , 13 Clerk of Court 14