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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re GRAY, Minors. November 14, 2017

No. 338069

Washtenaw Circuit Court

Family Division

LC Nos. 15-000019-NA; 

15-000020-NA; 

15-000021-NA

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to the 

minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). 

Because there are no errors warranting relief, we affirm.1

I. BASIC FACTS

The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the minor children in February 2015 after they

became the subject of a human trafficking investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI). The petition alleged that respondent failed to protect the minor children by allowing them 

to be physically and sexually abused and by failing to prevent the abusers from having continued 

contact with them. The petition further alleged that respondent’s intellectual disability prevented 

him from providing a safe environment for the minor children.

Respondent’s treatment plan required him to attend trauma therapy, find suitable housing, 

and participate in services designed to instill parenting and independent living skills. 

Respondent completed two parenting courses through the MSU Extension program and actively 

participated in Home Again, a hands-on parenting program. Respondent also attended individual 

therapy through Catholic Social Services. However, beginning in February 2016, respondent

began missing a majority of his scheduled parenting time, the minor children’s medical 

 1 The children’s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her daughters. Her 

parental rights to her son, as of May 2017, remained intact, and DHHS was working toward 

appointing a legal guardian for her son and placing him with his mother.
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appointments, and their school functions. Respondent refused the caseworker’s referrals for 

disability programs, a literacy course with Wayne County, trauma therapy with the University of 

Michigan, and housing assistance. Respondent also stopped attending his individual therapy 

with Catholic Social Services.

Following a May 2016 neuropsychological evaluation, the evaluator concluded that, 

despite respondent’s efforts, his intellectual disability caused him to have difficulties in holding 

employment, managing affairs, understanding relationships, and parenting. The evaluator further 

opined that this intellectual disability affected respondent’s ability to provide a safe and stable 

environment for the minor children.

By March 2017, respondent had not visited the minor children in nearly six months, with 

the exception of one visit in November 2016. Respondent also had not contacted DHHS since 

October 2016, and he refused to participate in any services. Following an April 2017

termination hearing, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the minor children.

II. REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights because 

DHHS did not modify its service plan to accommodate his intellectual disability, as required by 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq.

2

 This Court reviews a 

preserved issue regarding reasonable efforts for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-

543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is 

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Terry, 240 Mich

App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).

B. ANALYSIS

“Under Michigan's Probate Code, [DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable

efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, ___ 

Mich ___; 893 NW2d 637 (2017) (emphasis added). “The adequacy of [DHHS]’s efforts to 

provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights.” 

In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.). A trial “court is 

not required to terminate parental rights if the State has not provided to the family of the 

child . . . such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s 

home.” Id. at 105 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “While [DHHS] has a responsibility 

to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a 

commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are 

 2 Respondent does not argue that the trial court clearly erred by finding clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), nor does he argue that the 

trial court erred by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of his parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, we will not address those issues further.
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offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Moreover, DHHS is only 

required to offer reasonable services, which means that it has no duty to provide every 

conceivable service. See Hicks/Brown, ___ Mich at ___; 893 NW2d at 639.

DHHS’s obligation to provide services is subject to the requirements of the ADA, In re 

Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000), which provides that “no qualified 

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 

or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected 

to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 USC 12132. Accordingly, DHHS is required to make 

reasonable modifications to its service plan to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. In 

re Hicks/Brown, ___ Mich at ___; 893 NW2d at 640. Where DHHS fails to modify its service 

plan to accommodate a disability under the ADA, DHHS has failed to make reasonable efforts 

toward reunification. Id.

In the present case, DHHS was fully aware of respondent’s intellectual disability. 

Respondent’s first psychological evaluation was conducted in January 2015, before the current 

proceedings began, and it indicated that respondent was cognitively impaired. The petition 

included the results of this psychological evaluation and further alleged that respondent’s limited 

intellectual functioning created an unsafe environment for the minor children. Moreover, 

throughout the proceedings, the trial court, DHHS, the minor children’s lawyer-guardian ad 

litem, and respondent repeatedly referenced respondent’s intellectual disability.

Because DHHS was aware of respondent’s disability, it was required to make reasonable 

modifications to its service plan to accommodate this disability. In re Hicks/Brown, ___ Mich at 

___; 893 NW2d at 640. In May 2015, due to concern from respondent’s lawyer, a caseworker,

Brittney Reynolds, narrowed the scope of respondent’s treatment plan to only focus on parenting 

education, independent living, mental health issues, and housing. The record reflects that 

Reynolds amended respondent’s treatment plan to accommodate respondent’s intellectual 

disability and ensuring his best chance of a successful reunification with the children. 

Additionally, Reynolds and other caseworkers provided respondent with more extensive and 

extended services to accommodate his intellectual disability. Reynolds referred respondent to 

Home Again, a hands-on parenting program, wherein respondent was assigned a therapist to 

provide him with immediate feedback concerning his parenting skills. Reynolds later arranged 

for an extension of Home Again’s programming for respondent.

Furthermore, although respondent was initially rejected from some services, Reynolds 

arranged for respondent to receive individualized therapy through Catholic Social Services. 

Reynolds also arranged for family therapy with CSTS, although this therapy ultimately did not 

take place due to a minor child’s unwillingness to participate. In 2016, another caseworker,

Elaine Jones, arranged referrals for respondent to trauma therapy with the University of 

Michigan, to Comprehensive Services for Developmentally Disabled, and to a GED program 

with specialization for the cognitively impaired.

On appeal, respondent complains that the neuropsychological evaluation was not 

completed until May 2016. The record, however, shows that the delay was the result of 

bureaucratic confusion and that DHHS caseworkers continuously worked toward respondent 

receiving the evaluation. While the delay in receiving this evaluation was not ideal, the 
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neuropsychological evaluation was largely consistent with respondent’s January 2015 

psychological assessment. In other words, DHHS was aware long before respondent’s 

neuropsychological evaluation that he had an intellectual disability and was already providing 

accommodated services in response to his disability. It is unclear what exact benefit respondent 

believes he was denied by the delay of the neuropsychological evaluation.

Finally, respondent argues that DHHS did not accommodate him properly because it 

communicated with him largely via text message despite his literacy problems. As an initial 

matter, respondent never raised the issue of text message communication as an issue throughout 

the proceedings. Furthermore, the record reflects that respondent used text messaging and 

preferred it because it maintained a record of communication. In addition, DHHS records also 

reflect that its caseworkers also communicated with respondent via phone calls. Therefore, there 

is no reversible error arising from the use of text messaging as one method of communication in 

this case.

In sum, considering the extensive and targeted services provided by DHHS throughout 

the proceedings, the trial court did not err by finding that the DHHS made reasonable 

accommodations to its service plan to address respondent’s disability and rendered reasonable 

efforts towards reunification. See In re Hicks/Brown, ___ Mich at ___; 893 NW2d at 640.

The trial court did not err by terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor 

children.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra