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99–654 PDF 2004

NORTHERN ICE: STOPPING METHAMPHETAMINE

PRECURSOR CHEMICAL SMUGGLING ACROSS

THE U.S.–CANADA BORDER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 20, 2004

Serial No. 108–284

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Counsel

NICOLAS COLEMAN, Professional Staff Member and Counsel

MALIA HOLST, Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 20, 2004 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Azzam, Abraham L., Michigan HIDTA Director; Michael A. Hodzen, Interim Special Agent in Charge, Detroit, MI, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security; John Arvanitis, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Detroit Division Office, Drug Enforcement Administration; and Kevin Weeks, Field Operations, Detroit Field

Office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland

Security .......................................................................................................... 10

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Arvanitis, John, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Detroit Division Office, Drug Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of ............... 47

Azzam, Abraham L., Michigan HIDTA Director, prepared statement of .... 13

Hodzen, Michael A., Interim Special Agent in Charge, Detroit, MI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 40

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 6

Weeks, Kevin, Field Operations, Detroit Field Office, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 53

(1)

NORTHERN ICE: STOPPING METHAMPHETAMINE PRECURSOR CHEMICAL SMUGGLING

ACROSS THE U.S.–CANADA BORDER

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Detroit, MI.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., at 477

Michigan Avenue, Detroit, MI, Hon. Mark Souder (chairman of the

subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representative Souder.

Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member and

counsel; and Malia Holst, clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order. Thank you all

for coming this morning for our hearing on Northern Ice: Stopping

Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical Smuggling Across the U.S.-

Canada Border.

Good morning and thank you all for coming. This hearing continues our subcommittee’s work on the problem of methamphetamine

abuse, a problem that is ravaging nearly every region of our Nation. It also continues our ongoing study of drug trafficking and

similar problems facing law enforcement agencies at our border

and ports of entry and if I can just make a couple of comments before going into the thrust of the meth statement.

In my district in Northern Indiana bordering Southern Michigan,

the meth situation has gotten so bad that many of our drug task

forces will often—I have a number of counties that the drug task

force consists of four people, and they’ll spend the entire morning

at one location until the State Police labs, like the mobile lab we

visited when we were here which was kind of an early one that we

saw when we were here in Detroit earlier, can get there and then

they spend the rest of the day at another one. They can’t even get

to the regular drug busts. They can’t help the DEA with larger

trafficking stuff because they’re so occupied and flooded with a

number of meth labs. In Indiana we’ve gone from 90 to 1,200 cleanups in 3 years. The fifth largest in the country.

In Congressman Boozman’s District in Northern Arkansas which

was just featured in People Magazine and we’re doing a hearing

there in the next 60 days and he has spoken at our Washington

hearing, they’re even more flooded.

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There was just an article in the Washington Post a week ago

that’s happening in North Carolina, in Tennessee, eastern Kentucky and Indiana. We’re having a big problem in northern Indiana, but also down in the Hoosier National Forest area where we

have these heavily rural national forest areas, but interestingly

even in Indiana, and we saw this first about 5 years ago in northern California, with these huge superlabs.

One of the things we’ve seen in Indiana and what we’re going to

be investigating more today and this is what kind of triggered the

immediacy of this hearing before we get into some of these others

and I’ll have some questions related to this, is that what’s in the

news almost every night. I did a press conference Friday morning

with the Indiana State Police to try to expand our cleanup process

in Indiana. They had between midnight and 7 a.m., five additional

labs, including an explosion. About 60 percent are running in

southern Indiana, about 40 percent in northern Indiana. But even

in Indiana with this exponential increase in the meth labs and the

first signs that it’s getting into edges—they had a story Sunday, an

explosion in a motel. They’ve had now 10 cases in Indiana of labs

with problems in—where people rent a room in a hotel, Holiday

Inn Express was one, a Baymont Inn was one and that type of

thing that seems to be a growing phenomenon at the edges of the

cities. In Evansville, Fort Wayne, Southbend, it hasn’t hit the biggest cities yet. It seems to be heavily a rural phenomenon.

But even in Indiana, what happened is we started with this, it’s

kind of a rural, to some degree motorcycle gang, a rural home cooking network much like we’ve seen in the last views and other parts.

But then the superlabs start to move in, the price drops, the purity

soars and 70 percent of our meth in Indiana now is from superlabs

and it’s coming mostly it appears from Yakima, Washington and/

or up from Texas.

But interestingly, a lot of it’s Mexican and California superlabs.

But in discussing where the superlabs were coming, they said the

precursor chemicals were coming across to Detroit, heading back

over to California and then the superlabs were coming back to Indiana. Which is really an interesting wrinkle in my State, to the best

they can track that, and we’re seeing this in other States.

As what we’re going to be focusing on in the next number of

months is a little bit zeroing in on this meth phenomenon which

has really caught the political attention because it’s a new drug.

Whenever there’s a new drug that hits, you’ve got to get control of

it at the early stages. Politically in Congress, there are more Members signing up for the Meth Caucus right now than there are the

overall drug caucus. It’s one that’s grabbed their attention because

of the news coverage in their areas and because it has an immediate danger to the cleanup. Let me tell you one other story that

we heard in our Indiana hearing.

In one small town this idiot who was home cooking went to this

big anhydrous ammonia facility in this small town that distributes

anhydrous ammonia to a whole wide area around it. He was trying

to get his stuff out of this big tank and he was 11⁄2 screws from

exploding this tank which would have instantaneously wiped out a

town of 700.

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So all of the sudden you’re battling not only a drug problem, but

an explosion problem in the nature of endangering everybody

around you at a hotel, in a community, and then not to mention

the environmental cleanup that is incredible. You can see this from

the coke labs down in South America, in the rivers when you fly

over in the Amazon Basin. And now to think that this is hitting

in our own rivers with the home cookers. But at the same time, it’s

not the home cookers we’re focused on here in this particular hearing because many of them just go down to the local grocery store

or pharmacy or hardware store and pick up the stuff. It’s the big

superlabs because we have one dilemma we’re trying to face in this

smaller home cooking market that’s on TV a lot, but our real big

problem is people get introduced to this stuff, get the kick off of it,

and these superlabs then come in and blow the market apart.

They’re the big box stores that come in and take out your local

neighborhood pharmacy once it gets going. And you guys here in

this area are one of the battleground areas in working with the Canadians in how to get control of this stuff because we’ve toughened

our U.S. laws. So now we have to get a hold of this so we don’t

have an explosion that 5 years later we look and say, hey, this was

like crack, why didn’t we catch it at the first end.

Meth is among the most powerful and dangerous stimulants

available. The drug is highly addictive and has multiple side effects, including psychotic behavior, physical deterioration, and

brain damage. Death by overdose is a significant risk. Unfortunately, meth is also relatively easy to produce; so-called meth cooks

can create the drug from common household or agricultural chemicals and cold medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

Ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and similar chemicals are referred to

as meth precursors and these precursors are the main subject of

our hearing today.

The most significant source of meth in terms of amount produced

comes from the so-called superlabs in California, northern Mexico.

By the end of the 1990’s these superlabs produced over 70 percent

of the Nation’s supply of meth. The superlabs are operated by large

Mexican drug trafficking organizations that have used their established distribution and supply networks to transport meth throughout the country. These organizations have the additional advantage

over their smaller competitors of being able to import illegally, of

course, huge quantities of precursor chemicals from Canada.

The meth traffickers had to start smuggling precursor chemicals

from Canada because of the much tougher chemical diversion penalties enacted by Congress in the 1990’s, coupled with the effective

action by the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA and other

law enforcement agencies. Through a series of acts, including the

Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988, the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, the Methamphetamine

Penalty Enhancement Act of 1998, and the Methamphetamine

Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Congress made it far more difficult

to obtain large quantities of precursor chemicals within the United

States. Drug companies and pharmacies are now required to register large transactions involving cold pills and other precursor

chemical sources, and retail outlets are prohibited from selling anyone multiple packages of decongestants and similar medicines.

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Medicines containing pseudoephedrine are also required to be packaged in blister packs, which are more difficult for a meth cook to

open and dump into a vat than larger plastic bottles.

Unfortunately, Canada did not impose these controls on its side

of the border, which made it an attractive source of supply for meth

producers. According to a joint intelligence report by DEA and the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the RCMP, the amount of

pseudoephedrine imported into Canada rose by nearly 500 percent

in 1 year from 1999 to 2000 alone. DEA and the RCMP believe that

a portion of that increase was diverted to the illicit precursor chemical market in the United States. In the fall 2000, the Canadian

Government finally implemented new regulations of precursor

chemicals, imposing a reporting requirement and an end user declaration on large transactions. Questions remain, however, about

whether these new regulations are sufficient to curtail the largescale diversion and smuggling of precursor chemicals from Canada.

These chemicals are being smuggled, usually by truck, across

such major border crossings as the Ambassador Bridge here in Detroit, and the Blue Water Bridge up in Port Huron. DEA and other

law enforcement agencies have identified several organizations

doing this smuggling, many of Middle Eastern origin. Identifying

and stopping smugglers using these bridges presents a serious

challenge for law enforcement; Detroit is the busiest truck crossing

in the United States, while Port Huron is the fourth busiest crossing and both crossings are at or near the top in volume of passenger traffic as well. It is unclear whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, which conducts the inspections of all trucks

and persons entering the United States has sufficient resources

and facilities to check enough vehicles at the Ambassador and Blue

Water Bridges for drugs and other contraband. The task is further

complicated by the recent implementation of two fastpass systems

that expedite border crossings for certain travelers, the NEXUS

system for passengers, and the Free and Secure Trade, FAST system for commercial trucks. These systems have certainly helped

speed trade and travel across the border, but because they result

in fewer inspections for participants, they may also create a gaping

hole in our security network.

This hearing will give us an opportunity to discuss the current

status of precursor smuggling here in Michigan, and to explore

some possible solutions. We are pleased to be joined by representatives of four law enforcement agencies responsible for stopping precursor chemical and other drug trafficking across the Northern border. We first welcome Mr. Abraham L. Azzam, Director of the

Southeast Michigan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA.

HIDTA, a program overseen by the White House Office of National

Drug Control Policy, seeks to coordinate all the anti-narcotics efforts of the Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. We

also welcome Mr. Michael Hodzen, Interim Special Agent in Charge

of the Detroit Office of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, which is part of the new Department of Homeland Security. Mr. John Arvanitis, is that right?

Mr. ARVANITIS. Arvanitis, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Arvanitis, Acting Special Agent in Charge of DEA’s

Detroit Field Division; and Mr. Kevin Weeks, Director of Field OpVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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erations for the Detroit Field Office of CBP, which is also part of

the Department of Homeland Security. We thank everyone for taking time to be here today, and look forward to your testimony.

I also want to thank particularly Mr. Azzam and Mr. Weeks who

we met with before. This is the report that I referred to, the Federal Law Enforcement at the Border and Ports of Entry report.

When we were here for several days and we didn’t hold a hearing

at that time, we used a large number of information and background in addition to what we learned about the HIDTA when we

were doing the reauthorization of the ONDCP. This focus on the

border lays out the system, border system, some of the challenges

and the need that in order to keep trade moving, we need to invest

adequate resources. But in moving trade, we can’t forget that illegal narcotics, illegal immigration, terrorism, all those things are

very important at the border too, not to mention even from a trade

standpoint with all the illegal smuggling and copyright violations,

that we also have to make sure we can control trade at the border.

We can’t just in moving trucks across the border forget what we’re

protecting in our national interest in multiple ways.

One last thing as you are all are pretty familiar, I want to make

sure the record reflects that part of the challenge here involves

Canada. Because much of what we do in narcotics focuses on the

southwest border, but Canada is heavy in meth precursors, ecstasy

and certain drugs that are produced heavily in northwest Europe.

All of a sudden Buffalo and Detroit become major centers and to

some degree upstate New York moving down to Boston and New

York City, become a different mix in our narcotics question.

We have been over to visit in the Netherlands and also at Antwerp and Belgium. And we see some of the huge production of

these meth precursors and ecstasy move onto the Belgium side in

addition to the Dutch side, and try to get them to control it and

then it flows through Canada. Canada isn’t a producer of most, as

I understand it. If there’s any information other than that, make

sure I understand that today too. It isn’t the major producer of

much of these precursors, it’s the transfer point coming across from

Europe as I understand it. I want to make sure we get that clear

on the record today too.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Now, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions

for the hearing record and that all answers to written questions

provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without

objection, it’s so ordered.

Second, I ask unanimous consent that all Members present be

permitted to participate in the hearing. Without objection, it’s so

ordered. That’s to cover us in case any Member not on the committee comes in.

I ask unanimous consent that the full statement of each witness

be put in the record as well as any supporting materials that you

want to submit.

Our panel of witnesses is composed of four representatives of the

Federal Government, Mr. Abraham Azzam of the Southeast Michigan HIDTA, Mr. Michael Hodzen of U.S. ICE, Mr. John Arvanitis

of DEA, Mr. Kevin Weeks of the U.S. Customs Border Patrol. It is

our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify under oath because we’re an oversight committee, so I’ll ask if you’ll each stand

and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative. So we’ll now start with the testimony

and we’ll start with you, Mr. Azzam. Thank you very much.

STATEMENTS OF ABRAHAM L. AZZAM, MICHIGAN HIDTA DIRECTOR; MICHAEL A. HODZEN, INTERIM SPECIAL AGENT IN

CHARGE, DETROIT, MI, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;

JOHN ARVANITIS, ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,

DETROIT DIVISION OFFICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; AND KEVIN WEEKS, FIELD OPERATIONS, DETROIT

FIELD OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. AZZAM. Thank you, sir. I might, before I begin, mention that

in the year 2000 we were given five additional counties that we are

now called Michigan HIDTA and these additional counties include

Alleghan and Van Buren in western Michigan, Kent County where

Grand Rapids is, Kalamazoo County, Genesee County, where Flint,

MI is, as well as the four original counties of Wayne, Oakland,

Macomb and Washtenaw. The main reason these western counties

were added was because of the methamphetamine lab problem

which was an emerging problem in our State back in 1998, 1999

and 2000. Thank you, sir.

Congressman, thank you for this opportunity to testify. Our

HIDTA was authorized by the U.S. Congress and began in July

1997. The Michigan HIDTA Executive Board is the Governing

Body. This is important to note. And this Executive Board has designed a strategy and crafted initiatives to implement the strategy.

All Michigan HIDTA operations are approved by this Executive

Board and we function within the Policy Guidelines provided by

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, as well as the agencies

involved.

The voting members of this Executive Board consist of eight Federal Agencies. They are the U.S. Attorney, the FBI, DEA, ImmigraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion Customs Enforcement, IRS, Transportation Security Administration, ATF and the U.S. Marshal. Interestingly on the State side,

we have eight voting members. State and local agencies represented are—the Michigan State Police, the Detroit Police Department, which is the largest in our State. We have a representative

of the Michigan Association of Prosecutors, local prosecutors. We

have two eastern Michigan Sheriffs who vote because of the large

population in southeast Michigan. One western Michigan Sheriff to

represent their interest, an eastern and a western Michigan Chief

of Police. These chiefs represent the many, many Chiefs of Police

that we have in the area covered. These are voting members. Now

we do have Ex Officio members and they are the Michigan National Guard, the State of Michigan Office of Drug Control Policy,

that is the Governor’s drug czar for our State. We have the Michigan Attorney General and we also have a representative of a community group whose acronym is MOSES, which stands for Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength. And I’ve provided

the subcommittee with a written description of our HIDTA structure and activity.

Sir, the most unique aspect of the Michigan HIDTA, as well as

the 32 other HIDTAs throughout the United States is the Investigative Support and Deconfliction Center. We call it the ISC. The

Michigan HIDTA ISC is a collective of DEA, FBI, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, CBP, Customs Border Protection, the U.S.

Coast Guard, the IRS, the Michigan State Police, the Detroit Police, the Wayne County Sheriff and the Michigan National Guard.

We also have Canada Customs. Two analysts are present 2 days

each week in our Investigative Support Center. All these agencies

provide significant intelligence resources. For example, DEA has a

full group, FBI has a full group, ICE and CBP have a full group

and there are significant other agencies that I mentioned that who

have personnel there. We also receive frequent visits from the Canada Immigration and the Ontario Provincial Police. From time to

time the RCMP is also present.

These resources gather, process and disseminate information and

intelligence between Federal, State and local agencies, as well as

the Canada Authorities. Now we do that within the existing treaties and protocol. Specifically HIDTA hosts the IBET, International

Border Enforcement Teams and ICAP meetings. These analysts are

sent to focus on information for the seizure of drugs in general and

precursor contraband and they are also available for post seizure

followup. Pseudoephedrine has been a primary target of the ICE

and CBP and Canadian analysts for several years. I believe that

the international effort of the last 2 years has had a dramatic impact upon the smuggling of Pseudoephedrine in our area. It hasn’t

stopped, but it ceased to be so blatant and open. That may be bad.

They’ve gone under.

The Michigan HIDTA has 19 Initiative Task Forces. Several deal

with mid- and high-level investigations involving pseudoephedrine,

methamphetamine, party and rave drugs between the United

States and Canada. DEA’s Group 2 deals with followup investigations of precursors as well as rave drugs and BC Bud marijuana

investigations. Pseudoephedrine continues to be a primary target.

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On a local level, the Michigan State Police with HIDTA assistance, has a Uniform Division, Motor Carrier operations and has

conducted training for interdiction of drug contraband on our highways, including pseudoephedrine and other precursors. The Criminal Investigation Division of the Michigan State Police has two

HIDTA supported Task Forces dealing with methamphetamine and

its precursors. These are the small labs that you referred to earlier,

sir, which incidentally are just north of your Indiana counties. The

Michigan State Police and DEA, with HIDTA support, has trained

140 local officers to be Clandestine Laboratory Certified and 60

Certified Site Safety Officers to deal with the small methamphetamine labs which are so devastating, and also with the precursors

associated with them.

Michigan HIDTA support comes in many forms, such as funding

for overtime for the officers, equipment, training, investigative

travel and expenses. The Investigative Support Center with its

uniquely collocated intelligence assets has proven to be a valuable

coordinating aid to the numerous agencies involved in this effort.

I understand you will receive testimony from DEA, ICE and CBP

regarding their excellent efforts against the illegal smuggling of

pseudoephedrine and other drugs. One example is Operation

Northern Star. It’s a classic example of intelligence assets working

in harmony with enforcement assets to successfully conclude an important pseudoephedrine investigation. I’m proud to say that the

Michigan HIDTA program was instrumental.

That’s my testimony, sir, and I wish to thank this subcommittee

for this opportunity and I’m prepared to answer your questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you and as I said we’ll put the full statement

and supporting materials in the full record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Azzam follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Hodzen.

Mr. HODZEN. Good morning, Chairman Souder. I’m honored to

appear before you to discuss the investigative efforts and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration

and Customs Enforcement. Established in March 2003, ICE is the

Federal Government’s newest and the second largest investigative

agency. Through its legacy components, ICE brings to bear significant expertise, broad statutory authorities, and innovative investigative techniques. One key mission of ICE is to disrupt and dismantle organizations involved in the smuggling of narcotics into

the United States. Along with our counterparts from Customs and

Border Protection and in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement

Administration, we have developed a focused and integrated strategy to combat the importation of precursor chemicals used to manufacture narcotics in the United States, specifically ephedrine and

pseudoephedrine.

The production and distribution of methamphetamine in the

United States is not a new problem. For decades, outlaw motorcycle gangs controlled this criminal industry. However, the potential for high profit quickly drew others into the industry, including

narco-traffickers from Mexico. As U.S. law enforcement focused its

investigative efforts on domestic production and diversion, the U.S.

Government strengthened anti-diversion regulations. As a result,

the criminal organization sought alternative means to obtain the

precursors necessary for the production of methamphetamine. Due

to the geographic proximity and the volume of trade with the

United States, Canada inadvertently became a primary source of

supply for these chemicals. Responding to the increase in demand,

legitimate Canadian industries made available large amounts of

pseudoephedrine in tablet form. Sold in the domestic Canadian

market, these tablets were purchased in bulk by criminal organizations and subsequently smuggled into the United States.

Joint investigative efforts by ICE and DEA produced valuable intelligence on the structure and methods of operation of these criminal organizations. In particular, an analysis of seizures and arrests

made in 2001 and 2002 identified a relationship between the movement of pseudoephedrine from Canada and smuggling organizations that were moving the product west.

Between 2001 and 2002, U.S. law enforcement seized more than

127 million tablets of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, including

one seizure of more than 42 million tablets in Detroit, MI and another of more than 21 million tablets in Port Huron, MI.

The continuous pursuit of these organizations, including largescale undercover operations, border interdiction activities, controlled deliveries, and the analysis of smuggling trends, has significantly disrupted the flow of pseudoephedrine from Canada.

A key component to these investigations was the cooperation provided by the Canadian law enforcement authorities, especially the

assistance provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the

Canada Border Service Agency. These agencies have continuously

supported U.S. efforts through the exchange of intelligence and

support of undercover international smuggling operations. For example, these agencies assisted ICE and DEA in Detroit, MI with

39

an undercover investigation involving a criminal conspiracy to import 200 cases of pseudoephedrine.

In 2003, in support of law enforcement efforts, the Canadian government implemented tighter regulations, requiring licensing and

permits for producers, importers, exporters, and wholesalers of

ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Aggressive bilateral investigation

and enforcement action, combined with the implementation of

these regulations has led to significant results.

For example, pseudoephedrine and ephedrine seizures from Canada spiked to approximately 127 million tablets between 2001 and

2002. However, after the Canadian Precursor Control Regulations

were implemented, the number of tablets seized decreased to approximately 11 million tablets in 2003. Simultaneously, the price of

pseudoephedrine on the street rose. The decline in seizures and the

corresponding rise in street prices suggest the relationship in

which the United States and Canadian efforts are making a difference.

The combined efforts of ICE, Federal Prosecutors, DEA, CBP and

our Canadian counterparts appears to have made a marked effect

on the availability of supply of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,

making it more difficult for methamphetamine producers to acquire

these chemicals. With the continuous cooperation of the Canadian

Government, the strengthening of regulations that govern these

chemicals, and working closely with our law enforcement counterparts in this shared mission, ICE looks forward to an even greater

success in fighting the growing threat of methamphetamine.

ICE continues to evolve to match its investigative priorities with

critical concerns of this Nation. With continuous cooperation with

our counterparts at Customs and Border Protection and proactive

undercover investigations and intelligence sharing with DEA, we

will continue to target the vulnerabilities that facilitate illegal activity. In conclusion, I would like to thank Chairman Souder and

the members of the subcommittee for the privilege to testify before

you today and highlight the investigative efforts and successes of

ICE, a premier law enforcement agency. It would be my pleasure

to answer questions you may have.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hodzen follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Arvanitis.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Thank you, sir.

Good morning, Chairman Souder and distinguished members of

the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to

discuss the challenge of stopping methamphetamine precursor

chemicals being smuggled across the United States and Canadian

border and the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration to

combat it. My name is John Arvanitis and I’m the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the Detroit Field Division. On behalf of Administrator Karen P. Tandy and Special Agent in Charge, John P.

Gilbride, I am particularly pleased to appear before you today on

this topic to discuss recent law enforcement successes that we believe demonstrate how law enforcement efforts can significantly impact supply and the trafficking of a drug.

International efforts were undertaken during the mid 1990’s to

control the flow of bulk ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. DEA Operations Mountain Express I and II targeted the domestic diversion

of pseudoephedrine primarily by individuals and companies registered by DEA to handle controlled substances and chemicals. Operations Mountain Express I and II subsequently resulted in the

arrest of 189 individuals and the seizure of more than 121⁄2 tons

of pseudoephedrine, 83 pounds of finished methamphetamine and

$11.1 million in U.S. currency. With the success of these investigations and enhanced regulatory oversight by DEA, methamphetamine producers found it increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient

quantities of pseudoephedrine within our borders. As a result, they

turned to Canada where pseudoephedrine tablets were available in

large quantities.

In response to the change in pseudoephedrine trafficking trends,

DEA subsequently initiated Operation Mountain Express III. This

operation concluded with the arrest of over 100 defendants in January 2002 and caused other Canadian pharmaceutical companies to

fill the void created by continuing to sell huge quantities of

pseudoephedrine. DEA subsequently initiated Operation Northern

Star, as mentioned earlier, specifically to combat precursor chemicals moving across the United States and Canadian border.

On April 15, 2003, the DEA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Revenue

Service, along with Royal Canadian Mounted Police, arrested more

than 65 individuals in 10 cities throughout the United States and

Canada. Approximately 108 million tablets of pseudoephedrine

were seized during this investigation. This quantity of

pseudoephedrine could have yielded approximately 9,000 pounds of

methamphetamine, with an estimated street value between $36

million and $144 million, depending on purity levels.

Operation Northern Star demonstrated that concentrating resources and investigative efforts in a specific geographic area of the

global chemical trade can make a tangible and demonstrable difference. This is best illustrated by the precipitous drop in the

amount of Canadian pseudoephedrine seizures after April 2003.

Seizures of pseudoephedrine dropped from a high of more than 75

million tablets in 2001 to approximately 26 million tablets in 2003,

a majority of which were confiscated before April of last year.

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United States and Canadian law enforcement measures, along

with the newly enacted precursor chemical laws in Canada have

clearly decreased pseudoephedrine availability dramatically. In addition, Canadian imports of pseudoephedrine have decreased from

511,395 kilograms in 2000 to 84,634 kilograms in 2003. As a result,

it appears that methamphetamine production is moving back to

Mexico.

Although the DEA’s concentrated operations have been regionally successful, chemical supply shortfalls have quickly been filled

by other sources from transnational organizations using other

countries as transit points for importing chemicals into our country. Foreign countries that establish and implement even basic regulatory controls for precursor chemicals provide the DEA with substantial assistance in stopping the importation of such chemicals.

The Canadian Health Ministry recently implemented a chemical

control system requiring the registration, licensing and permits for

import and export by Canadian companies, and is indicative of how

regulatory requirements can be effective. While not as rigorous as

provisions in the United States, these regulations have had a positive effect on the problems encountered by our country and have

made it more difficult for traffickers to obtain chemicals from Canada. Along with the improved accuracy of export figures supplied

by Canada to the DEA, authorities now can monitor the legal trade

of precursor chemicals between our two nations and help in our

combined efforts to prevent chemical diversion.

I would be happy also to answer any questions the subcommittee

may have of me.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Arvanitis follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Weeks.

Mr. WEEKS. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Souder. I

personally would like to thank you for allowing me this opportunity

to testify regarding the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s role

in interdicting narcotics at the United States and Canadian border.

The priority mission for CBP is homeland security. Although

nothing can diminish the importance of detecting and preventing

terrorists and implements of terrorism from entering the United

States, CBP also preserves its collective history of protecting the

homeland by seizing illegal drugs and other contraband at the U.S.

border, apprehending people who attempt to enter the United

States illegally and by protecting our agricultural interest and the

public health from harmful pests and diseases.

In order to uphold these responsibilities, CBP deploys a layered

defense that essentially employs enforcement strategies, technologies, inspection processes and facilitation programs simultaneously.

For CBP, success begins with our people and our effort to achieve

one fact at the border. CBP places great importance on cultivating

a highly skilled work force.

The National Targeting Center is the hub for CBP targeting efforts, setting the standards and defining processes. The NTC staff

includes personnel with customs, agriculture, immigration and Border Patrol law experience, as well as liaison personnel from other

agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration, the

U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of Energy and the Food and Drug Administration.

This collocation of enforcement and regulatory subject matter experts allows the NTC to support field programs and operations.

CBP continues to develop new modules and rule sets to further enhance targeting capabilities of the Automated Targeting System

[ATS]. Although nationally directed, support from field locations is

critical to the evolution of ATS. Their expertise in risks associated

with smuggling activity and knowledge specific to the Northern

Border trade patterns have been integrated into ATS targeting rule

sets specific to truck and rail cargo on the Northern Border. This

integration significantly enhances the ability of ATS to be used to

detect unusual shipments that might conceal narcotics or pose

threats to homeland security.

Our CBP and Border Patrol officers are also utilizing non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection technologies. In combination

with our layered enforcement strategy, these tools provide CBP

with significant capacity to detect and deter nuclear or radiological

materials, narcotics and other contraband.

There are currently three large-scale imaging systems and 44 radiation portal monitors deployed throughout the Detroit Field Office area of responsibility.

Close and constant coordination with our Canadian counterparts

is the last layer of our defense that I would like to discuss. CBP

continues to work closely with Canadian law enforcement personnel, including the Canada Border Service Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to address the mutual threat of narcotics

smuggling on our shared border.

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Our Border Patrol agents work side-by-side with Canadian law

enforcement officers on Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and

Integrated Marine Enforcement Teams. IBET teams are binational

law enforcement entities comprised of Federal, State and local law

enforcement agencies and the RCMP. The teams were established

to facilitate U.S./Canada law enforcement agency involvement in

the disruption and dismantling of criminal organizations involved

in the smuggling of people and contraband along the U.S./Canadian

border.

Now I would like to turn to some successes in narcotics interdiction that have resulted from our layered approach.

On March 25, 2004, CBP Officers, with the assistance of Canada

Border Service Agency Information, initiated an inspection that led

to the discovery and seizure of 166 kilos of marijuana and 10,224

tablets of ecstasy entering the United States via a commercial

truck trailer. A large-scale imaging system confirmed suspicions

about anomalous packages commingled with a commercial shipment. This success is particularly important because it represents

the convergence of several components of our layered defense;

international coordination and information sharing, technology and

skilled officer personnel.

From April 2001 to May 2003, the Detroit Field Office affected

seizures of pseudoephedrine totaling over 150 million tablets or the

equivalent; however, I will only discuss two of those seizures this

morning. Fifty-seven percent of those pseudo seizures have been

discovered in commercial vehicles.

The largest seizure of pseudoephedrine in Michigan occurred on

April 11, 2001. A tractor-trailer arrived at the Detroit Fort Street

Cargo facility, where the subject stated he was empty. The truck

was taken to secondary for further examination. Inspectors confirmed that the trailer contained 22 pallets which amounted to 42

million tablets of pseudoephedrine. The subject was arrested for

Federal prosecution.

The most recent seizure of pseudoephedrine was in May 2003

where inspectors in Port Huron seized an estimated 795 tablets of

a powdered substance that tested positive for pseudoephedrine. The

subjects and the contraband were turned over to ICE agents for

Federal prosecution.

These samples of CBP’s interdiction activities along the northern

border illustrate that CBP continues its narcotics interdiction mission while moving rapidly to improve the personnel, technologies

and partnerships that allow us to meet the challenges to the homeland security.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify regarding our ongoing efforts to interdict narcotics and their precursors on the U.S.-

Canadian Border. I am happy to answer any questions that you

may have, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weeks follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you all for your testimony. I’m trying to figure out where to start here. Let me ask a couple of basic questions

before I actually move into some of what we planned because I’m

trying to sort out the broader picture because the presentation that

you’re seeming to make today doesn’t quite square with what we

were hearing coming in and I want to make sure I’ve got the mix

right and don’t misunderstand.

First, everywhere on our north and south border all of our agencies deserve tremendous credit for their aggressiveness in trying to

get at the different problems and we need success stories when

we’re going after it and we can show that we’ve demonstrated success. I don’t want to downplay any type of success that has been

made or movement toward success, but we’ve got to figure out some

basic variables and I’m trying to figure out how a couple of these

things fit.

My understanding from Mr. Azzam’s testimony, actually from all

of you, is that you are basically feeling successful with the possible

exception of Mr. Weeks and I wasn’t absolutely clear. First off,

there’s been some success, if anybody disagrees with any statement

say so and I can clarify.

There’s been some success due to the new laws in Canada on

meth precursors.

Mr. WEEKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the collective efforts

that have been made among these agencies, along with the Canadian law that was enacted has had an impact, at least from an

interdiction standpoint. From my perspective, we have not been

seeing the kinds of shipments of pseudoephedrine that we saw back

in early 2003, 2002, 2001.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have been performing many

more inspections of truck vehicles. Also since your last visit, we

have actually introduced many more technologies that allows us to

screen more trucks. Our stats seem to suggest that we are discovering more BC bud that’s coming through the border than any of

the other drugs and precursors that we saw earlier, but I think

that there have been a positive effect concerning the law, as well

as the efforts that have been employed, both at the border and with

the investigations.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Arvanitis, if I can ask you a followup and I

want to followup on the BC bud question too. You’ve raised a number of other things, so let me first go through some of them.

You said that Canadian imports of pseudoephedrine have decreased from 511,000 to 84,000 kilograms from 2000 to 2003 and

specifically you said U.S. law enforcement measures along with

newly enacted precursor chemical laws in Canada have clearly decreased pseudoephedrine availability.

Are you saying you agree that most of this isn’t manufactured in

Canada, but that Canada is predominantly getting it in from the

Netherlands and Belgium, is that what your understanding is as

well?

Mr. ARVANITIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. And I haven’t heard at any hearing before, have

you heard whether there’s been any decline in the production in

Belgium and the Netherlands.

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Mr. ARVANITIS. No, no, no, sir. I did not mention Belgium and

the Netherlands.

Mr. SOUDER. But the testimony suggested that most of the meth

precursors that were coming into the United States were coming in

from Mexico. Are we suggesting that Belgium and Netherlands are

now shipping around and down under, or that all that’s being sold

in Europe, but we haven’t seen a decline coming out of Antwerp

and Rotterdam. I’m trying to figure out where it’s going if it’s not

coming to Canada.

Mr. ARVANITIS. We know, sir, that in calendar year 2003, 85

shipments totaling approximately 420 million tablets of

pseudoephedrine were shipped from the Far East to fictitious companies in Mexico. We also know that a trend is beginning to become prevalent to DEA that there are other countries from that

hemisphere that are also shipping directly back to Mexico bulk

quantities of pseudoephedrine indicative of the Mexicans in and of

themselves creating superlabs that produce methamphetamine and

then import it into the United States along the southwest border.

Recent increases in border seizures of large methamphetamine is

indicative of that trend.

Mr. SOUDER. And because I am such a strong ally of each of your

agencies, it’s hard for me to ask some of the tough questions, but

this is an oversight committee and I need to ask some of the tough

questions. It has been very disturbing as we’re in Iraq and Afghanistan to find out just how difficult it is in your life to sort through

sourcing and identification. One thing I’m still kind of reeling from

which is a very critical variable that we’re working through right

now is that in our most sophisticated labs, for example, in New

York City where we test the drugs to determine origin, then in reality we can’t tell for sure. As I understand it, this is in layman’s

terms, what’s Colombian, what’s Afghan heroin because the poppy

doesn’t show. What it is is the process. The Colombians use certain

kinds of processes and the Afghans use certain kinds of processes.

But if Colombian processes are exported into another country,

the mark on the heroin coming in, it might be Colombian, but it

might be Afghan heroin. And what I’m trying to sort out here underneath this, first off in the pseudoephedrine that comes in, is can

we tell when you get the pseudoephedrine, are there marks, are

they labeled by a company, are we confident of what is Asian, what

is Mexican, what is coming through Rotterdam, how definitive is

it? You’re just doing the best you can tracing back the trail.

Mr. ARVANITIS. To answer your question, sir, I can’t answer that

specific question, but that I do know that in large shipments that

are in bottled pseudoephedrine, there is a batch number and a case

number that may potentially be able to lead investigative efforts to

tracking the origin of that pseudoephedrine. But I can make sure

that you get the answer for your committee.

Mr. SOUDER. Because ecstasy pills are often marked.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Right.

Mr. SOUDER. And so are other types of pills. I think that because

some of my questions are going to wind up national, I’m going to

leave the record open for 2 weeks to get any supplementary testimony that seems to elaborate from a Federal perspective on some

of the questions I ask here. I’ve got to get what you said today in

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context because what I’m really trying to establish here is even just

south of here the meth problem is increasing.

If we seize the precursors, we need to figure out where precisely

the precursors are coming in and what’s happening to what’s coming out of those huge factories in Belgium and the Netherlands and

where they’re being absorbed, or are they going across the other direction. We’ll sort through and get some kind of international

tracking there. My next question is it’s based on two assumptions.

If I understand Mr. Weeks point and your testimony is that Mr.

Azzam said you’ve broken through these two big cases which alone

constituted almost 40 percent of the meth precursors that you had

confiscated in Detroit in the last round, in what, was it 2002 and

2003, broken the back of some of the major organizations, or at

least got them. That is because of increased surges in technology

at the Ambassador Bridge and Windsor Tunnel, also Port Huron?

Mr. WEEKS. And Port Huron.

Mr. SOUDER. That you believe you’re actually searching more

than you were before, so it’s not that you decline in searches but

that you broke the back of the organizations. You’re searching more

and you’re not finding things as much and that’s led you to conclude that at those three crossings, at least, that there’s been a decline, or has that led you to conclude that there’s been a decline

in Canada as a whole.

Mr. AZZAM. Congressman, from my perspective I think what

we’re experiencing is the classic displacement phenomenon of any

drug when efforts are placed and pressure is put upon the traffic,

no matter what traffic it is, it displaces and goes somewhere else.

The activity of CBP and the investigative agencies, so interdiction

plus investigation, has made an impact. What I think is happening

is that they have gone to other methods.

For example, it’s quite easy to ship from Europe or the Far East

to South America or the Caribbean or Mexico, very simple. Very

simple. And if that’s the easiest course, that’s what the displacement factor does. They’ll do it that way. I think there still is activity on pseudoephedrine, I think from some indicators that it’s existing stocks that were in Canada. The pressure that the Canadians

have put on has caused also some concern among the traffickers.

Now also keep in mind that the Middle Eastern community was

the one who started the pseudoephedrine traffic and this area has

the largest Middle Eastern community in the area. If you draw a

50-mile radius from Detroit, which would include Canada, you’d

have the largest population. They also have contacts in other parts

of the world. Canada is active, Mexico has a large Middle Eastern

population, the Caribbean has a large Middle Eastern population.

Europe has a large Middle Eastern population. These people have

their connections, their family ties as well as criminal ties.

I think it’s just a displacement factor myself.

Mr. SOUDER. By displacement you mean they’re now moving

other narcotics, or they’re out of the narcotics business and moving

other illegal goods.

Mr. AZZAM. No. I think what they’ve done is gone to other trafficking routes.

Mr. SOUDER. Other routes.

Mr. AZZAM. Yes, sir.

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Mr. SOUDER. So it’s a route displacement to run a drug.

Mr. AZZAM. It’s not easy to come across Detroit and at Port

Huron any more. It’s not easy at all. I think there was some little

activity further up north and now I believe it’s moving to western

Canada toward Vancouver and we’ve heard reports of stocks in different parts of central Canada and western Canada.

So the border’s a little easier there than it is here.

Mr. SOUDER. Now let me move just to kind of do one more check.

Do you see, other than the small home cookers which are a whole

different market because we can’t really reach those with what

we’re doing at the border because they’re not buying meth precursors in huge quantity. We might deal with the pharmacies that

they get the stuff from and that kind of thing, but other than home

cooking, has there been any kind of dramatic rises in the Michigan

HIDTA in meth use? I mean, it’s still not the drug of choice. The

question is are you seeing a spike or does it seem to be turning

down now?

Mr. AZZAM. Well, it depends on what part of the State you’re in.

I believe DEA has a better answer than I would have, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. OK.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Mr. Chairman, I’ll address that issue. Recently

we’ve seen an increase in methamphetamine investigations, one

which I will speak to was a recent seizure of approximately one

pound of methamphetamine that was to be distributed in the metro

Detroit area. Two individuals were arrested. Based on intelligence,

we believe that the phenomenon is coming east toward the metro

Detroit area and it’s only a matter of time before methamphetamine use is seen here in the community.

I would also like to address your prior question to the extent

that, you know, DEA and ICE have an outstanding working relationship with our colleagues across the way in Canada, in Windsor.

I frequently interact with my RCMP counterparts there. There is

an informal sharing of intelligence as it relates to investigations

that potentially could come into the metro Detroit area for potential distribution to other, you know, core cities within the United

States to include pseudoephedrine, BC Bud, any of the contraband

that’s being, you know, imported into Canada eventually for distribution into the United States.

I’d also like to add that DEA recognizes the sovereignty of Canada. It’s not DEA’s policy to impose our will on any sovereign nation, however, that a strong chemical control program must also

have a strong regulatory and enforcement component. Those two

aspects working hand in hand together with one another will result

in a successful destruction and dismantling of, you know, significant organizations importing pseudoephedrine into Canada for

eventual importation into the United States and eventually getting

it to the Mexican superlabs on the west coast.

Mr. SOUDER. Now, I think I should say as well we’ve been very

pleased with the RCMP cooperation, but I don’t think we have to

say what our opinion necessarily is of inside Canada, which is a

sovereign nation, and it can make these decisions. RCMP has been

very critical themselves of their current government at this point

and their willingness to enforce and control a lot of these things.

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trated with some of their political leaders and they’ve even had

their law enforcement prosecutors across the country right now objecting to their national policy, so it’s not all sweetness and light

on the other side of the border. They’re having a big internal debate there, where we have a concern about our sovereignty and

protecting the United States is what we do at our border and how

we deal with that.

Now let me see if I can still distill fundamentally what you’re

saying. You believe that much like the phenomenon that I was describing in Indiana, that in this case you’re looking at—that the

meth phenomenon started in the home cooker labs to a large degree in western Michigan, started to move in typically to cities of

about 40,000, then into places like Kalamazoo, to some degree, and

then you start seeing it move toward the larger cities in the State.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. And that when it moves to the larger cities in the

State, it’s not so much a home cooker phenomenon, it is a large organization, trafficking organizations move in, realize they have a

new drug of choice so to speak?

Mr. ARVANITIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. And that in that drug of choice that’s coming in,

you don’t believe that the system that’s hitting Michigan is coming

with precursors that are crossing at Michigan at this point and

going the other direction. You believe it’s coming up predominantly

from west southwest, or do you see some of this coming Miami and

through the Caribbean and up?

Mr. ARVANITIS. No, sir. We only saw that in that one specific

case that I referenced to you and it was coming from the western

part of the State to the metro Detroit area.

Mr. SOUDER. Are you confident that when they see the pressure

at Detroit, they don’t move up to Sault Ste. Marie and come down

that way.

Mr. ARVANITIS. I cannot address that answer for you, sir, at this

time.

Mr. SOUDER. Has anybody ever spot-checked?

Mr. WEEKS. We have been employing, as I mentioned in my earlier remarks, more inspections up in Sault Ste. Marie because of

the remote location, you know, it would certainly be a question in

our minds as to whether or not that kind of route would be a preferred route. But we have worked closely with our Canadian counterparts up in the Sault with respect to sharing Intel and doing

special operations where we are examining commercial vehicles

more intensely. That’s certainly not the kind of volume as we experience in Port Huron and in Detroit, but based on what we have

examined and inspected in the Sault, we have not seen any evidence that is a route that they’re using.

Mr. SOUDER. And it’s not attractive for moving large quantities.

I mean we had the famous bomber who moved all the way across

and came down over at Port Angeles, but the Canadian side really

doesn’t lend itself to huge trucking shipments going all across on

the Canadian side of the border and trying to come down far west.

Did you have anything you wanted to add to that.

Mr. ARVANITIS. No, sir.

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Mr. SOUDER. That while we’re still in kind of the generic overview, you mentioned BC Bud. Is BC Bud coming across from Vancouver, or are you talking about Quebec Gold or just that type of

hydroponic marijuana.

Mr. WEEKS. I can’t address the actual origin but because of the

THC content. It’s been tested and, you know, it has the characteristics of BC Bud and we have seen a rise in the number of discoveries of seizures over the past 3 fiscal years and, in fact, we’re

going to, at least I’m projecting that we’ll have more seizures

poundage-wise this fiscal year than we’ve had in the past and

again that’s certainly a result of the number of stepped up inspections and screenings with the large x-ray imaging system that has

been able to at least display anomalies that would show up with

what would seem would be legitimate commercial shipments. And

because of those kinds of capabilities that we now have that we

didn’t have years ago, we’re making those kinds of discoveries in

large quantities. So we still run into some of the personal use in

the passenger vehicles and to some extent smaller quantities in

those kinds of vehicles, but there’s now commingling of large BC

Bud shipments in commercial loads. Those kinds of discoveries are

now being made and we see a growth in that area and so I make

that comparison in terms of a rise in the BC Bud seizures versus

the decline fairly rapidly in the pseudoephedrine area.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Also, Congressman, DEA, I’d like to add, has an

outstanding working relationship with all aspects of ICE here in

the Detroit area. Frequently the border seizures that do actually

take place, coordinated efforts between the agencies, as well as

other State and local entities within Michigan, as well as outside

of Michigan are utilized to conduct controlled deliveries and attempt also to disrupt and dismantle organizations from point of origin all the way to distribution, as well as subsequent seizure of

their illicit gains from their drug trafficking activities.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to go back to another question with Mr.

Azzam.

Mr. AZZAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. In the organizations that you were discussing, and

you said you believe they may have switched their modes of transportation—or where they come in with their loads. Have you seen

the Middle Eastern organizations interconnecting with the Hispanic organizations, Mexican or Colombian.

Mr. AZZAM. Well, that phenomenon I think was always prevalent

in the cocaine traffic and heroin traffic. The transition is not going

to be that difficult, but what we have seen is that in western

Michigan we have a large migrant worker population because of

the agricultural nature of that part of the State and hidden within

that group are known traffickers that already have established

routes.

For example, Mexican marijuana that comes to Michigan comes

that way and it’s very simple. Once the use is established for methamphetamine for them to bring up meth from the superlabs, that’s

a very simple thing. That’s not the Middle Eastern population. The

Middle Eastern population does have the connections in California,

as well as Mexico to somehow arrange for pseudoephedrine, no

matter if it is displaced out of Michigan.

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Mr. SOUDER. So, in other words, they may not be bringing it in

to this State at all, but they’re based here arranging a shipment

to come into one of the Caribbean nations from western Europe

theoretically.

Mr. AZZAM. Could be, very easy.

Mr. SOUDER. To move across?

Mr. AZZAM. They did it with heroin, they did it with cocaine and

they can do it with pseudoephedrine.

Mr. ARVANITIS. I think you saw that as an underlying theme in

Operations Mountain Express and in Northern Star that there was

a relationship between the Middle Eastern brokers, if you want to

call them that and the Mexican organizational operatives on the

west coast. You know, like any organization, if you have a root,

somebody will exploit it. If the Middle Eastern community here has

the capabilities of funneling illicit proceeds back to a point where

a trafficking group wants to get it, they will find a way to get along

with them and put their illicit means through there.

I don’t think you can ever say that law enforcement will successfully disrupt and dismantle the entire relationship between the

Middle Easterners and potential Mexican and Colombian traffickers operating in this country, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. How does meth differ as it moves through Michigan

than say cocaine and heroin.

Mr. ARVANITIS. As I have earlier stated, we have not seen a

major movement of meth into the metro Detroit area, except for the

mom and pop laboratories that we’ve encountered on the western

part of the State, so that phenomenon has not come to fruition yet

here in this State.

Mr. SOUDER. So it’s less than 8 percent of the drug use would

you say?

Mr. ARVANITIS. I couldn’t give you a figure, sir.

Mr. AZZAM. That’s pretty good.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me review any of these questions that you think

definitely need to get into the record, the ones I haven’t covered.

I want to make sure because I used to be a staffer. I want to

make sure that since I’ve been out doing everything from dinners

to everything else for the last couple of weeks, that I make sure

we get into the record some of the key questions here.

Mr. Weeks, in your testimony, 57 percent of the precursor seizures have been in commercial vehicles. Does that mean 43 percent

have been in passenger vehicles? What would be the other alternative to commercial vehicles?

Mr. WEEKS. Well, again, you know when we talk about vehicles,

we could actually group into that buses, personally owned vehicles.

That would be the other category that I did not capture in my earlier remarks.

Mr. SOUDER. In the passenger vehicles I presume that’s not the

split of volume, and you mentioned personal use just a little bit

ago. Do you think most of the non-commercial vehicles are heavily

personal, or many dealerships, or are they using multiple wheels.

Mr. WEEKS. Are we talking pseudoephedrine specifically? Because I believe my personal use——

Mr. SOUDER. I thought that the 57 percent was——

Mr. WEEKS. My personal use remarks——

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Mr. SOUDER. Precursor chemicals.

Mr. WEEKS [continuing]. Was related to the marijuana earlier.

Mr. SOUDER. I thought that the 57 percent was precursor.

Mr. WEEKS. The 57 percent is certainly related to pseudo. When

we were talking about BC Bud, that’s when I referenced the personal use.

Mr. SOUDER. Are 43 percent, you’re saying 43 percent of the precursor chemicals are coming in non- commercial vehicles?

Mr. WEEKS. Non-commercial vehicles, correct.

Mr. SOUDER. So what would be a typical individual bringing precursor chemicals? I mean, I don’t quite understand.

Mr. WEEKS. Well, they’re much smaller. I mean, we can be talking 300 or 400 tablets versus literally thousands.

Mr. SOUDER. So who would he be heading to distribute to.

Mr. WEEKS. Well, we wouldn’t necessarily follow the investigative stream lead. We would turn that over to ICE.

Mr. SOUDER. OK, well, let me ask Mr. Hodzen then.

If somebody’s, you know, I’m used to thinking in terms of this is

a major shipment. I know in marijuana you get freelancers, you get

sometimes—in fact, the last time we were here, snared a new vehicle that was coming across because they had seen another similar

vehicle move through just with a similar type story, seized it, the

sides of the car were packed, so that was probably a multi-run

group coming through that were going to connect up on the other

side.

In precursor chemicals, how does this work? Are they doing a

similar type thing, or are we talking freelancers who may be dealing with 10 home cookers heading to the west side of Michigan,

could he be coming across to head down to Fort Wayne? We have

a big Canadian pharmacy business going.

Mr. HODZEN. The bulk shipments come in the commercial vehicles coming over from Canada due to Northern Star and the legislation happening at about the same time. The investigations prior

to the legislation and through the legislation with RCMP, DEA,

they had suspects linked to the pharmacies right there in Canada,

the executives of companies. After the arrests and the take downs

of that and the legislation, we seemed to—the commercial vehicle

smuggling of pseudo and ephedrine go down to the point where we

haven’t had a commercial load of pseudo or ephedrine come in in

2004 yet into the big ports.

We are seeing more mail. We’re seeing more mail come through

the mail service, DHL, etc. And in those instances, they could be

coming—we’re seeing, like I said, more mail.

Certain organizations might be taking smaller loads with multiple passenger vehicles and making larger loads once in the

United States because of the crackdown at the border from Customs and Border Protection has gotten so—they’ve gotten so good

at what they do. Their technology has gotten so good that their machinery and their expertise, they’re stopping the big loads of commercial shipments, so whether it’s through the mail in small

amounts, through passenger vehicles in small amounts, they could

be gathering it once they’re in the United States for subsequent

transportation to the west.

69

Mr. SOUDER. You said a couple things there that intrigued me.

Are you doing anything to what’s really exploded, I mean this is

a side subject, but it’s not a side subject and I’m wondering how

you relate to this because it so closely relates to pharmaceutical

sales.

In Fort Wayne we’re not far from the Canadian border, so they’re

running bus trips up to get every kind of pharmaceutical under the

sun at these dramatically cheaper prices. And I noticed last week

for the first time ads up for a Canadian pharmacy storefront in

Fort Wayne that will sell it directly and there are constant ads on

television saying order directly over the Internet.

Are we looking at this on precursors and how does this interrelate?

Mr. HODZEN. Absolutely. ICE had an operation where we were

targeting these companies that were selling over the Internet and

they were literally using the inbound transportation to get it to

Mexico. They’re coming inbound from Dallas. These shipments,

some of them were coming from Hong Kong, freight shipments to

Dallas coming inbound, going through to Texas to get into Mexico.

Our intelligence and our investigations started cracking down on

these organizations that were doing this primarily through the

Internet, so there are ongoing investigations related to that.

Mr. SOUDER. Do we track smaller scale type operations? Is there

a monitoring system at all on what’s sold through the pharmaceutical trade? You probably take a tip that somebody was doing

it and you’d monitor it, because it would be a great way to hide.

I mean, we just did a hearing a month and a half ago on

OxyContin in Florida and one of the disturbing things was that the

Florida newspaper seemed to have more information on, bluntly

put, seven doctors who were flagrantly abusing the OxyContin than

the law enforcement agency did. They’ve been scrambling to catch

up, and some of them were being monitored, but the fact was the

newspaper exposed them and then the government went after

them. Huge amounts of OxyContin was available through tracking

and are we watching this phenomenon because it would be a great

way to hide an operation because the number of dollars has to be

phenomenal right now that are moving in the pharmaceuticals.

Mr. ARVANITIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. I know the use of illegal drugs is a focus of the director right now.

Mr. ARVANITIS. DEA mandates that under its regulatory arm

that a DEA Form 486 is completed by any importer of any Schedule 3, 4, 5 and List 1 chemicals which would include precursor

chemicals. That DEA Form 486 must be completed 15 days in advance to the transportation of that shipment. Three copies of that

form are attached in there. One copy is provided to the importer,

one copy is provided to DEA Headquarters and one copy is provided to ICE. That form would serve as a mechanism to be able to

track suspicious rogue companies importing, you know, whether

large or small, frequent pseudoephedrine or chemicals into this

country for potential use in the production of methamphetamine or

any other contraband.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me go back to Mr. Weeks. In the NEXUS system, have you had a substantial increase in the number of pasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sengers enrolled at Detroit or Port Huron who were under NEXUS?

Do you have the actual figures.

Mr. WEEKS. I don’t have the actual figures, but we have had a

substantial growth since we launched that program. And as you

know, I want to address the concerns that you reference in your remarks. NEXUS, as you know is you know essentially a program designed for commuters that utilize the border crossings on a regular

basis, although we encourage anyone to apply. And of course these

are individuals are rated both by the Canadian Government and

the U.S. Government to ensure there isn’t any evidence of criminal

activity.

Having said that, you know, it isn’t just a free card across the

border without at times being subject—you’re always subject to an

inspection and, in fact, there is a random factor where there is an

automatic selection made for individuals that are enrolled in the

program to be sent to secondary for a further and more intensive

inspection. There’s always a CBP officer in the booth that depending upon body language or any other anomalies that they may, you

know, observe during that short interaction, they can override that

system and they can send those individuals or individual over to

secondary for an examination.

So I understand the concern, you know, concerning the program,

but we have found that we have rarely found a violation for those

that are in the program. Does it mean that an honest Joe couldn’t

be recruited? No, it means that they can be, but it also means that

we are randomly and selectively on occasion sending those individuals for a more intensive examination when they cross.

Mr. SOUDER. Has it been the expansion in the fast system as

well?

Mr. WEEKS. Oh, yes, it has been, although we have noticed here

it’s primarily those suppliers and those companies that are engaged

with the automotive industry which is the largest user of this

crossing and most of those companies that are in the Fast Free and

Secured Trade Program are automotive related, although we are

certainly trying to extend that to other users.

Mr. SOUDER. One of the Canadian centers who was a plant manager near Scarborough, Ontario told me my GM plant in Fort

Wayne that makes the Silverado and one other pickup, it’s the

largest pickup plant in the United States, 100 crossings at Detroit

in each pickup. Amazing. Partly for union reasons they do 60/40 in

their trucks which really moves the border.

We heard at a hearing we did in upstate New York and one in

Vermont from a panel member of Canadian trucking companies

and they said they would be amenable, and we heard this also at

Niagara Falls, Buffalo, to significantly increasing the penalties for

violations of a fast system or NEXUS system. In other words, if

you’re going to get extra privileges, that there’s also other extra

penalties for abusing those privileges.

Do you support something like that?

Mr. WEEKS. Well, you know, the penalty today, if we found a

driver, for example, if in fact after the investigation was concluded

that the driver was the rogue individual in the entire process, that

person would be excluded from the program. That has devastating

impact on that driver’s ability to continue to carry loads for that

71

company or for the trucking firm that’s involved. I don’t know necessarily, you know, that a monetary penalty is necessary. Exclusion

from the program is what we would do today.

Mr. SOUDER. We’re probably going to look at for the companies

themselves, not just the exclusion, but, in other words, because

particularly in tight bridge areas and tunnel areas like you have

here in Detroit or at Buffalo, Niagara Falls, it is a real privilege

to be able to do this.

Mr. WEEKS. Sure.

Mr. SOUDER. And the other thing as we got into this, have you

caught anybody on fastpass with materials at this point on the fast

system?

Mr. WEEKS. I mean, we have found a few, very few violations.

Mr. SOUDER. How do they play pass the buck? In other words,

wouldn’t it always be fingered to the driver or somebody put this

in my truck that I didn’t know, or often the person that has the

tractor is different than the company that owns the trailer, where

was the trailer loaded? How do we—because this seems to me the

vulnerability in the system.

Mr. WEEKS. One of the activities that CBP takes on is we send

a cadre of individuals that are familiar with the fast security protocols to the company under the threat that if, in fact, they don’t

have the proper controls in place, then they could be excluded from

the program. That gets their attention very quickly. And we’ve had

at least one or two occasions of companies that do business through

the Michigan crossing of that activity and that seems to work very

well.

I mean, certainly there is perhaps finger pointing, you know, in

any kind of scenario, but we make it clear through a post-seizure,

a post-discovery basis to ensure that the controls are either in

place or improved to ensure that they don’t find themselves in a

violative status, you know, in terms of subsequent shipments.

Mr. SOUDER. So even if it was a driver for a major shipper, even

if you decided it was the driver, the company would also have additional pressures?

Mr. WEEKS. Because we have to look at the entire supply chain,

you know. We can’t necessarily just attribute it to the driver.

Something happened and we have to review the entire supply

chain before we are satisfied that there—all those vulnerabilities

have been addressed.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you still use drug sniffing dogs.

Mr. WEEKS. Yes. We have actually increased the number of canine teams which would include the narcotics detector dogs.

Mr. SOUDER. Has the narcotics detector dog stayed roughly the

priority? I sit on the Homeland Security Committee too and I understand that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is the

highest priority, but in Congress we’re having a big battle. Just

like the administration is and 1 day whatever’s the current crisis

is the highest of the day, but then if you miss one of the big terrorists, then that was the thing. I mean, we’re all struggling with this

because in the Coast Guard, for example, if they miss fisheries, the

fishery industry collapses. If they’re pulling back in to protect the

Cook Nuclear Plant on western Michigan and two sailboat people

die and that’s on the news that week, then it will be what hapVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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pened to search and rescue. That we have more people dying because of narcotics than we do quite frankly from terrorism right

now and some of us are very concerned that your agents on the

border can only do so many things simultaneously when you have

long lines and everybody rustles to get through and hollering at

you because of trade.

There is probably not going to be a bomb dog and a drug dog at

the same vehicle and the question is, are you keeping the drug

dogs in the rotation or are we going to get squeezed out of this mix

as we’re looking for other things? I just want to know are you keeping the number of narcotics dogs roughly the same?

Mr. WEEKS. Yes. Our growth have been in the area of the bomb

detector and chem-bio teams. However, we have the same number

of canine teams that we’ve always had. Those dogs are actively

working at the land border as well as at the Detroit Airport and,

you know, one of the I think observations that I would make is because of our successor in narcotics interdiction, that tends to be an

elixir for our officers and so, you know, it actually balances the

scorecard in terms of our mission. It is expansive. It’s a fairly, you

know, expansive mission, but, you know, we’re not going to compromise any of our mission with regard to border enforcement,

whether it’s in the area of homeland security, looking for terrorists

or weapons or narcotics and I might add pests that may endanger

our agriculture. One of the benefits of this merger is to have a

much larger staff that’s more sensitive to every one of these areas

versus the sort of stove piping that we had in the past.

Mr. SOUDER. Yeah. I want you really focused on the narcotics

and the terrorism, but you let one bad soybean in here.

Mr. WEEKS. It could have a devastating impact on our economy.

Mr. SOUDER. I mean that’s the challenge we face because all politics are local as well as international.

Mr. WEEKS. Sure.

Mr. SOUDER. With that, I’m going to leave that subject. Anything

else you want me to make sure I got on the record? We may send

you some written questions in addition.

When you were talking about the violations, what kind of violations have you actually found of the NEXUS and the Fast Pass?

Mr. WEEKS. I believe they were in the narcotics area and I believe it was marijuana that we found.

Mr. SOUDER. Large loads?

Mr. WEEKS. No, they weren’t large loads.

Mr. SOUDER. Anything else any of you want to add?

Mr. AZZAM. There is one thing, Congressman. The HIDTA Program not being aligned with the law enforcement agency does provide I think an important function. For example, even though we

only have nine counties in Michigan, our investigative support center is a combination of all the agencies here and others working together on a daily basis to support the line people so that if Chief

of Police in Ontonagon, MI needed a service, he could call the Center and they would take care of it for him.

The combination of agents that are working there, CBP, ICE,

DEA, FBI, it’s incredible. You can’t tell the difference who’s who

when they’re working at that Center. That is the one point.

73

The second point is on behalf of my colleagues to my left, you’ve

mentioned earlier that the emphasis is on the southwest border

and that’s very true. During my long career being a native Detroiter and having worked around the world with DEA and other

law enforcement agencies I’ve been associated with, they do an

amazing amount of professional work with a fraction, a mere minuscule fraction of the resources devoted to the southern border.

These agencies are constantly understaffed, yet their production

has not failed at all. And I’m talking about all the ones next to me

and others that are not represented here and it’s been a frustrating

factor for me for 47 years in law enforcement and I know it is for

those young men next to me who are involved with this activity

every day.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, let me tell you the dilemma that I have as

somebody who’s a strong supporter of these categories. We’ve tried

to steadily increase the dollars, but here’s the challenge that I have

and this is just the way life works on this squeaky wheel. We don’t

have enough funds to cover everywhere. What I see is that everybody is working hard. Some people, like in any organization are a

little more effective than other people, even if they have the same

resources. I’m not going to argue there aren’t effectiveness and

challenges. But I know others have really been trying to move more

to the north border and as you heard in my opening statement,

we’ve had dramatic movement of resources to the north border,

partly because just like wherever you have large communities of

any group, and in this case Arab Americans, this is a huge center.

It means there are more places for bad guys to hide among them,

just like you mentioned in migrant workers, it’s a place for bad

Hispanics to hide among. And even in my district coming down to

Angola which butts up to a little high school there in a rural area,

has 23 languages, including a teacher who speaks Farsi because

there are so many people of Middle Eastern decent there.

Now the challenge we have is that theoretically it would be

somewhat easier for terrorists to move in the north though. Whether that holds long-term, Bahamas are certainly vulnerable right

now coming up the east side. So we’ve moved more to the northern

border and the question is has there been a drug nexus as well.

Well, BC Bud is part of it, the high THC marijuana, ecstasy and

meth precursors. But to some degree, like anything, when you’re

successful what you’re in effect telling us today is that we’ve made

it difficult in the north border, it’s pouring in the south border.

We’ve been down there on the south border and I’ll tell you, they

have tons of agents, they’re stacked up compared to here. But compared to the number of people pouring at the border, the Canadians themselves, for all my criticism of the Canadian Government,

they have much better order in their country, so that we don’t necessarily have to worry on a given case. And we’re making progress

in Mexico under President Fox. I don’t want to downgrade the

progress and I don’t want to make any statement too inflammatory.

At the same time you, generally speaking, don’t have to worry

about which side the RCMP is on when you work on a case jointly

with them and that it has been a problem for the southwest border.

When we had our hearings down at Oregon Pithe and over by

Douglas, I mean, you can just see. I mean, it isn’t one, it’s hunVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dreds of people massed to make a run. All along the border you can

see the milk containers. If they’re black colored, it’s drugs. If it’s

clear, it’s water and literally they’ve had to close down hiking trails

in these national parks because they’re pouring through. It’s not

even safe because there are shootouts over turf and that kind of

stuff and when we’re dealing with limited funds here, if the meth

problem is also moving back that direction, we’ve got to figure out

how to be efficient in the prioritization.

Mr. AZZAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. So I understand your concern as somebody who’s in

the north not the south. Interesting we were having this argument

in the Homeland Security subcommittee because Dave Camp’s from

Michigan and I’m there, and my closest friend there is John Chavy

from Arizona and he’s hollering at the northern guys that have

been transferring resources off the south border, that the south

border’s becoming a bigger problem, even with meth and if that’s

the case, then some resources are going to have to be reshifted not

to the north border but to where the problem’s increasing.

To some degree this is a classic example in any type of thing. Do

a good job, you lose your funds for a while, until it gets to be a big

problem again and we move it back because the last time I

checked, nobody wants a tax increase.

And if I may make a brief political statement, by the time John

Kerry gets his head pounded in, any tax increase he ever proposed

it will back people up for a while again. That it’s just a tough business and I’m one who’s advocating more for the north. I live in the

north. I understand those challenges. I was impressed for the first

time here that you’re being very aggressive at it and also the

RCMP is. I’m worried at that soft drug trend in Canada may expand our problems. That in my opinion, Peter Jennings commentary, this kiss-up promotion of ecstasy on national television,

who knows how this is going to ripple through our system because

Canada already doesn’t control that process very well.

Scott Burns testified at another one of our hearings that he

didn’t believe Canada was enforcing it and the Office of the National Drug Policy Control has been up there very concerned about

their lack of enforcement of the precursor laws, as well as their

marijuana and ecstasy laws. And if Canada slides toward, as they

seem to be, not the law enforcement side, but the political side,

sliding toward the Mexico situation where Mexico is at least trying

to stand up and battle a little bit. So we could see that pressure

on the north and those of us in the north are raising that concern

partly to make sure we don’t abandon our resources if Canada, in

effect, goes soft on narcotics here, that we don’t suddenly have it

hit our borders all across the place.

Mr. AZZAM. Well, Congressman, there’s no doubt that John Walters, the Director of ONDCP and my ultimate boss is very critical

of the Canadian policies. From a local level what we’ve noticed and

what I’ve heard as reported on the media is that some of that laxity over there has become self-destructive. Apparently there’s a

greater percentage of drug use among the young people on the

Windsor side than on the Detroit side. I think they will come to the

right conclusion eventually. If one goes to the Netherlands and

walks the streets of Amsterdam, they understand what it’s like to

75

have liberal laws. I won’t expand on that. Anyone who has been

there knows what I’m talking about.

The other point that I wanted to make, I understand that Home- land Security had designated $380 million for intelligence fusion

and I would suggest that if they were to take a look at the 33

HIDTA Investigative Support Centers and see how they’re structured, that the mechanism and the platform is there. All they need

to do is expand upon it and probably save a good deal of money.

All the agencies are there. The resources are there. They’re working very hard. They’re working for their ends.

HIDTA is, for example here we have 60 people there. Only four

of them are HIDTA employees. The rest belong to the agencies involved. There’s some areas there that I never could understand

why they haven’t exploited. We’re there, we’ve been there, we’ve

worked out the kinks. You know, it runs pretty well. The agencies

get along famously. As I say, you couldn’t tell the difference between an FBI analyst, and a DEA analyst, or an ICE analyst, or

a CBP analyst.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me raise this to you as you look at this. It’s a

little off the meth subject, but it’s also kind of regionally looking

at Detroit. I’m one of the persons who’s skeptical of this and I’m

skeptical for a different reason I’ve expressed my concerns to Mr.

Bonner at ICE, and I’ve expressed my concerns multiple times to

Mr. Mackin, who’s the Drug Intelligence Coordinator there and Asa

Hutchinson in the whole system in the Homeland Security subdivisions, but particularly how ICE investigations are handled. And

you heard me talking about how the border side is handled, which

is more Mr. Bonner. I support the concept of how we’re trying to

move. All of us, even though I find it infuriating to watch any of

the September 11 hearings, we already knew what our problems

are in domestic and international merging. It’s a question of how

we do it. We know we’re not really fully merged yet in our agencies

domestically. But here’s the challenge that some of us have.

I’m concerned that a terrorist incident that kills 50 people will

result, or even 200 people will result in a panic when 20,000 people

a year are dying from narcotics. It will result in a panic and diversion of resources, partly politically driven, that will pull them off

of the drug case. So that all of a sudden every dog hitting at the

border is a bomb or a chemical bio dog, that the officers themselves

know that if they fail, their careers are over.

If anything remotely is true to terror—I thought your elixir comment was really interesting. Because if you look 365 days for a terrorist, 24 hours a day for a terrorist and never find a terrorist, you

become lulled. And unless you have something in there, which I

thought the elixir was a great explanation of that, not to mention

that the drug money, as we’ve just seen now with ETA is tied in

directly with the terrorists and many cases that’s child prostitution, selling human beings. I mean, how are they going to fund

their operations?

But as we look at this homeland security question, I’m worried

that, for example, we could nail people at the border and then all

of a sudden the ICE Division, the Investigation Division of the

Homeland Security gets all diverted over to chasing this and won’t

follow through. We’ve been trying to keep the pressure on, get asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:44 Mar 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\99654.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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surances, but I’m telling you from the political side. You get it up

to where there’s 1,500 dead in one incident and you’re going to see

a movement in pressure on your agency that you won’t believe from

Congress and from everybody else that says find these guys, particularly if it comes between now and the election.

And the pressure, which is said as a Republican, the pressure is

overwhelming and I’m worried that the fusion centers could get diverted into this too. On the other hand, they’ve done what you talk

about in New York.

Mr. AZZAM. Yes, they have.

Mr. SOUDER. In New York. It’s an excellent center and New

York’s a primary target and to the degree that what I think will

happen is that narcotics nexus and the drug nexus are the same.

It’s there. But some of us are very concerned and say that if the

FBI focuses more directly on the terrorist threat and the DEA on

the narcotics threat, then Homeland Security has to have some of

both. We have to have some continuity in this and not play what

I term little kids playing soccer where everybody’s running to the

ball of the moment and it doesn’t look like a soccer game, it looks

like a little herd going through. And we’re doing that right now

and we’ve got to be careful. We don’t even do that in certain drugs

from time to time.

Mr. Azzam and then Mr. Hodzen.

Mr. AZZAM. Before you get that, the Investigative Support Center

next door to you right now is doing both. The FBI components are

working principally on terrorism. The rest of them are working on

drugs. And I told the Attorney General of the United States this

and I’ll say it again. There’s about 3 percent difference between a

terrorist and a drug trafficker, 3 percent. And if you’re doing a good

job in one area, you’re doing a good job in the other. If you have

good anti-narcotic procedures in place, good anti- narcotic intelligence, you will get involved with terrorism. And if you’re doing a

good terrorism job, there’s very little difference between the two, in

my opinion.

Go ahead.

Mr. HODZEN. Since 2001, the big pseudo cases that we’ve had

commercially in the Detroit area, Port Huron area, of the 16, 13

of them were accompanied with controlled deliveries or undercover

operations related to coming into the border. This is since 2001.

When I first got here a couple of years ago, we only had like 35

agents. We’ve gone up quite a bit. And in that, our drug group has

actually enhanced. Our drug group, along with the DEA, they’re

out all the time. We have different groups. We have a joint Terrorism Task Force Group that works hand in hand with the terrorism

issue. When a drug call comes, the drug group comes and they go

out with the DEA and State and locals, if necessary. There’s not

really a mixture and running back and forth. We have different

groups that focus. If you had a singular office with a few agents,

you’d have that. We’ve built up. We’re working great. I know we’ve

heard this, but it’s an unbelievable relationship we have in the Detroit area with law enforcement, DEA, CBP, HIDTA, everybody

gets along great and you need that.

But as far as the drug pursuit faltering, I say it’s quite the contrary. Like I said, every time we have the opportunity, the drug

77

groups goes to go on with a controlled delivery, undercover meetings, it doesn’t stop at the border. And when a terrorism related

call comes in, we have joint Terrorism Task Force agents that will

go out with the FBI, do interviews and investigate that and on

many days we have many different things going on. But the drug

group is focused and it has enhanced and it will continue to enhance.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Weeks.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate the concern of some

of the political realities that you’ve mentioned, but, you know,

speaking from a field perspective as a field manager in overseeing

interdiction efforts at the border, quite frankly I don’t believe that

we would have been able to make as much of an impact in the

interdiction mode if we didn’t have the growth that we experienced

along the northern border, both at the ports of entry and between

the ports of entry.

As you know, the Border Patrol has increased in numbers and

are working more closely with the folks at the port of entry where

we have, you know, an active and a very assertive group here in

Michigan. But with the technology, with the new resources that

have been given to us, perhaps as a result of September 11 has had

a byproduct and that is our capabilities are much more tighter with

regard to interdicting illegal drugs, narcotics, precursors, illegal

aliens. I mean, we just see an uptick in activity based on the

growth that we have.

So I understand the issue of focus, but, you know, we have underscored and resonated the message to the officers that, you know,

it’s a priority mission, yes, with regard to terrorism, but at the

same time we have this broader traditional missions that have

been brought to bear in terms of many other concerns that you’ve

expressed this morning and that certainly we have a concern of,

you know, going forward. But I believe we’re in a better position

today to make an impact at the border from an interdiction standpoint.

And I might add and join the colleagues that I know that we

don’t have an investigative component in CBP, but we still work

very closely with ICE and with DEA and other investigative agencies that will come to the border and take those interdictions that

we make and turn them into investigations and controlled deliveries. Of course, we then bring that information back to the officers

because they like to hear the conclusion of some of the work that

they do at the border too and it has been a very successful model.

Mr. SOUDER. Anything else?

Mr. ARVANITIS. I would like to add one other thing, Congressman. In this community DEA plays a unique role. It has an outstanding relationship with my partners at the table, but also with

the FBI. We participate in having a seat at the table and the JTTF

strategy. We also are strong proponents of the fact that intelligence

drives enforcement, OK, and the key to that statement is that

amongst all these people who sit in this community, that we communicate with one another, share the intelligence so that we may

be able to make a successful impact within the community, as well

as in Canada and any other countries that these cases are taking

us to.

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As I said earlier, our relationship with RCMP is outstanding. My

relationship with my colleagues there is outstanding. If there’s a

case, an issue, it’s usually remedied by a phone call or by lunch on

the Canadian or the U.S. side.

You know, in all the offices that I’ve worked at and I have not

worked in as many offices as Mr. Azzam, former DEA agent has

worked, I’ve never seen a relationship amongst Federal and State

law enforcement entities in a community such as that here in Detroit. And that’s all I’d like to add.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, I thank you all for your testimony today. It’s

been very enlightening as we try to zero in on meth which is a diverse topic. I forgot to ask you something. If you can’t answer this

question, that’s fine.

Have you seen meth to the degree you have it here coming

through, and you mentioned western Michigan, anything from Yakima and tri-cities, Washington, Georgia, either of those two places?

Mr. AZZAM. Not that I know of.

Mr. ARVANITIS. No, sir.

Mr. AZZAM. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOUDER. I’m more skeptical about how we’re going to make

sure that in the short-term, because I believe narcotics here can become so interrelated financially with the terrorism that we’re going

to see it, but I think there’s a number of phenomenons that we

have to be very vigilant. I understand that we gain and the official

position is that we don’t need to spend more money, we need to

spend it more efficiently because we’re going to get this combined

effort that makes it more efficient.

Some of us are a little concerned that what’s happening is not

structural, but personnel driven. In other words, you have two

former DEA directors in key positions in the Department of Homeland Security which will not necessarily be true in the future. That

we had to force, bluntly put, the Administration Office of Narcotics

Control, which Roger Mackin has in his subpart and that’s because

the current Speaker headed this narcotics committee and is committed to narcotics. It wasn’t because I introduced the bill because

I’m a real powerful guy, but somewhat of a mosquito compared to

the President of the United States.

That it took the Speaker to basically demand that in the bill to

make sure that narcotics were even in the Homeland Security Bill.

That Secretary Ridge was initially resistant. But there’s an amazing thing that happens and that is the word elixir wouldn’t fit here,

but there’s an amazing thing when you’re trying to accumulate

funds is that if the money moves to certain issues, then everybody

wants to move to that issue. And you’ve seen this in narcotics between 1989 and 1990, you couldn’t put enough money into narcotics

and then when it goes and everybody wants to get into the narcotics business and then when the money starts to dry up, everybody

wants to go where the next thing is and terrorism was the thing

for a while.

Then all of a sudden they realized, well, what about terrorist attacks, how do we maintain our system, so all of a sudden there’s

mission creep and you get the narcotics thing back into it. The Attorney General realizes that, wow, I just lost a couple of my big divisions. Maybe narcotics is a bigger part of the Attorney General.

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So you get the Attorney General at the table a little more interested in narcotics than he was in the very beginning because he

lost a big chunk of the terrorism part. And what’s going to be the

relationship long-term in the cabinet of the power of the Department of Homeland Security which is a far bigger agency now and

the Attorney General, and that I believe that there is a strong consensus but not as formed on narcotics.

There is 100 percent consensus that when we’re hit by a terrorist

attack, that we need to do something. What we do in the times in

between is that we gradually lull asleep and then we get hit. But

I’m firmly convinced we’re going to get hit again. My personal opinion is we’ve got them sidetracked over in Iraq and Afghanistan and

we’re buying time and meanwhile you’re getting more lane systems

set up, we’re getting better examination systems, more trained

agents, more people up and we’re going to be better able.

For example, we’re now actually going to follow college students

who come in and check them to see if they went to college. I mean,

we had the son of the Chinese CIA director and we lost him. And

he never showed up to school. We don’t know whether he’s still

here or not because we had so many that INS couldn’t possibly;

they get these forms in from the universities, they have them

stacked up, there was no way we had the personnel to sort them

through and then at the same time the university stopped sending

them in because they knew INS didn’t do it and it’s like, man,

what’s the point of the system.

So we’re getting up to speed, but we have zero tolerance after

September 11. You will not know what hit your agencies. I’m just

trying to tell you. That’s why I’m trying to put up some firewalls.

We miss another terrorist attack, you will not know what hit your

agencies.

My prediction is if it’s a big one, half of DEA will be diverted.

National Parks Service will be diverted because everything political

will run to that because there’s nothing more scary than a one-time

random hit that could be anybody. Rather than the steady kind of

thing that you guys do with everyday and if we don’t have some

firewalls to protect our system from running to the urgency here,

that’s why I’m interested in hearing it, it’s great to hear that in

fact it’s working because in New York City it seems to be working,

here it seems to be working, but you haven’t had the test yet. What

happens if we get hit.

Because partly, and this is the dilemma, maybe by all the coordination we can avoid getting the hit and that’s our thing. So I just

want to protect the narcotics portion of it. But I and some of the

others have actually been some of the problem in how much we

allow the mergers because I’m trying to make sure that there’s actually money designated for narcotics and that Homeland Security

doesn’t take all the narcotics money and Frank Wolf in the appropriations process, has been pretty good with this too.

Anything else?

Mr. ARVANITIS. No, sir. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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