NBSIR 76-1014

Space Heater Involvements in

Fabric Fires

Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Center for Fire Research

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

March 1 976

Final Report

Sponsored by:

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Westwood Towers Building

5101 Westbard Avenue

Bethesda, Maryland 20207

NBSIR 76-1014

SPACE HEATER INVOLVEMENTS IN

FABRIC FIRES

Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Center for Fire Research

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D. C. 20234

March 1976

Final Report

Sponsored by:

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Westwood Towers Building

5101 Westbard Towers Building

Bethesda, Maryland 20207

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary

James A. Baker. Ill, Under Secretary

Dr. Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler, Acting Director

CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES iv

Abstract 1

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. Role of Ignition Sources 1

1.2. The Flammable Fabrics Accident Case and Testing System. 2

2. FINDINGS 2

2.1. Ranking of Ignition Sources 2

2.2. State Distribution of FFACTS Cases 3

2.3. Patient Disposition 3

2.4. Heater Types vs Intermediary Materials 3

2.5. Age of Victim vs Garment and Heater Type 4

2.6. Fabric Construction 4

2.7. Activity of the Victim. 5

2.8. Heater Types vs Direct Ignition 6

3. ANALYSIS OF DATA AND CONCLUSIONS 6

4. RECOMMENDATIONS 10

5. REFERENCES 12

iii
LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1. FFACTS Ranking of Direct Ignition Sources 13

Table 2. State Distribution of FFACTS Cases 14

Table 3. Patient Disposition 16

Table 4. Heater Types vs Intermediary Materials 16

Table 5. Age vs Garment/Heater (Direct Ignition) 17

Table 6. Direct Ignition Fabric Characteristics 18

Table 7. Age vs Activity vs Sex 19

Table 8. Heater Types vs Direct Ignition 20

iv
SPACE HEATER INVOLVEMENTS IN FABRIC FIRES

Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

Abstract

Space heaters are number six in the ranking of most frequently involved direct fabric ignition sources in the Flammable

Fabrics Accident Case and Testing System (FFACTS) . Eighty-two

of the 1573 direct fabric ignition incidents in FFACTS were

caused by space heaters. Gas heaters were responsible for 83

percent of all direct garment ignitions where heater type was

known. Nightgowns, dresses and robes account for 82 percent

of all the garment items directly ignited. Forty-seven percent of the direct garment ignition incidents would probably

not have occurred if the presently existing fabric flammability

standards had been in effect at the time.

Key words: Burns; fabric fires; FFACTS; garments; ignition

sources; space heaters.

1 . INTRODUCTION

1.1. Role of Ignition Sources

The ignition of fabric, which so frequently leads to fire injury,

would not occur if the fabric were noncombustible or if there were no

ignition sources. Therefore, one approach to reducing the possibility

of fabric ignition is to increase the consideration given to the fabric

ignition potential in the design of heat producing devices and equipment.

This report on space heaters is the third in a series of studies to

characterize the nature of the involvement of the ignition sources most

frequently identified with unwanted fabric fires — two previous studies

being on kitchen ranges [l] 1 and on matches and lighters [2]. This

report presents a summary of an analysis of information on the ignition

of fabric by space heaters, and was derived from the National Bureau of

Standards (NBS) Flammable Fabrics Accident Case and Testing System

(FFACTS) file now maintained by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

For the purpose of this report, space heater is defined as home heating

equipment for use within the principal space to be heated excluding floor

furnaces

.

Numbers in brackets refer to the literature references listed at the

end of this paper.

1
1.2. The Flammable Fabrics Accident Case and Testing System

Section 14a of the Flammable Fabrics Act, as revised and amended

December 14, 1967, stated that the Secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce should conduct a

continuing study and investigation of deaths, injuries, and economic

losses resulting from the accidental burning of fabric products. From

the time of passage of that act until the formation of the Consumer

Product Safety Commission, which took over the entire responsibility, NBS

on behalf of the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) on behalf of the Department of Health, Education

and Welfare (HEW) were working together to that end. FDA investigators,

using questionnaires developed cooperatively by FDA and NBS, investigated

accidental fabric fires and collected remnants of the burned fabrics.

The incidents investigated were not selected on a statistical basis and

therefore do not constitute a statistically representative sample of all

the fabric fires in the United States. In particular, regional geographical biases could easily distort the apparent importance of space heaters

as an ignition source.

The FDA reports with fabric remnants when available were sent to NBS,

where they were processed for inclusion in the computerized FFACTS file.

The processing included physical and chemical identification of the fiber

in the fabric remnants, and physical characterization of the construction

and burn characteristics of the fabric remnants. The incident reports

and the laboratory results were then analyzed and 130 different elements

of this information and data were coded for entry into the computer file.

2 . FINDINGS

The findings in this report are based upon the 3132 incident reports

incorporated into FFACTS between July 1970 and February 1974.

2.1. Ranking of Ignition Sources

Space heaters rank sixth in the tabulation of direct sources of

fabric ignition in descending order of frequency of their involvement as

shown in table 1. There were actually 82 fabric ignitions from space

heaters in the total of 1573 fabric ignitions where the source was known

and directly applied to the fabric without the involvement of any intermediary material or flammable liquid. They thus account for 5 percent

of all direct fabric ignitions.

It should be pointed out that FFACTS contained 127 fabric ignition

incidents wherein space heaters were involved, but in 28 of these, there

was definite involvement of an intermediary material and in 17 others

there was possible involvement of an intermediary material. The remaining 82 incidents were categorized as direct fabric ignitions. Seventyseven of these direct fabric ignitions were garment ignitions and were

categorized as direct garment ignitions.

2
2.2. State Distribution of FFACTS Cases

Table 2 shows the state distribution of all the cases in FFACTS and

, of the different types of space heaters. One must remember that the

incidents were not investigated on a statistical sample basis; and therefore a comparison of frequency of incidents between states is not valid*

The comparison between the number of space heater incidents in a state

to the total number of incidents within a state does however indicate the

relative seriousness of the space heater hazard problem in that state.

In the states of West Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Tennessee, space

heaters accounted for at least 30 percent of the fabric ignitions.

2.3. Patient Disposition

Table 3 shows the disposition of the persons involved in space

heater ignition incidents. One can readily deduce that these incidents

are quite serious. Thirteen percent of the people involved in 127 incidents are known to have died and 69 percent were hospitalized. Those

hospitalized, whether they recovered or not, spent an estimated 46 days

on the average in the hospital. It is interesting to note that the

average for all the incidents in FFACTS is 5 percent dying and 33 percent

requiring hospitalization for an estimated 37 days on the average per

hospitalization.

It must be pointed out that the patient disposition was estimated

within several days after the incident and only in a few but indeterminate

number of cases was there a follow-up to verify either the outcome or the

hospital days estimate.

2.4. Heater Types vs Intermediary Materials

Table 4 shows the relationship between the various intermediary

materials that were involved in the incidents. Gasoline, at the top of

the list, was present about twice as frequently as oil, the next most

frequently involved intermediary material. In six of the eleven incidents

involving gasoline, it was being used as a cleaning fluid in the room

where the heater was located. The presence of oil as an intermediary

material occurred five times. Three of these incidents were precipitated

by a malfunction of the fuel supply system of an oil-fueled heater.

Also shown here are the cases wherein an explosion was reported. In

the case of gas heaters, the fuel itself was the largest contributor to

explosion, and in the case of oil heaters the fuel was the only contributor.

It is important to note that there was no intermediary material in

82 incidents or 75 percent of the cases where the involvement or noninvolvement of an intermediary material was reported.

3
"v.

2.5. Age of Victim vs Garment and Heater Type

Injury from garment ignition has been more prevalent among very

young and very old people. Apparel flammability standard development

until now has been concentrated on garments for the young. It is therefore of interest to consider the impact of the recently enacted mandatory

apparel flammability standards on the accidents involving space heaters.

Since existing standards specify garment usage types by size range, it

is appropriate to look at the frequency of incidents with respect to

garment type and age of the victim. As a matter of information, sizes

0 to 6X normally fit persons 0 to 5 years old, and sizes 7 to 14 normally

fit persons 6 to 12 years old. Since the involvement of intermediary

materials would obscure the relationship between the heater and the garment type, these incidents were removed from consideration. The 77

remaining incidents are included in table 5 which shows the relationship

between age, garment and heater type for direct garment ignitions. Nine

of these incidents involved persons probably wearing sleepwear sizes 0

to 6X, and twenty-seven involved persons probably wearing sleepwear sizes

7 to 14. The total number of incidents involving persons in both of

these garment size groups is thirty-six and thus accounts for fortyseven percent of the direct ignition incidents. The reason for qualifying the sizes worn as probable is that the size was derived from data on

the age of victims who may not have been wearing the normally selected

garment size for the age. Sleepwear includes nightgowns, pajamas and

robes.

In every age group, incidents involving females outnumber those

involving males. / ; \

Gas heaters were involved- in eighty-three percent of the 70 direct

garment '.ignition incidents where the type of heater was known.

2.6. Fabric Characterization

Nightgowns, dresses, and robes' account for 49, 15 and 13 percent

respectively for a total of 77 percent of the 82 fabric items ignited

directly by space heaters. Table 6 shows the fiber content and burn

time of the nightgown, robe and dress, samples received. The fiber

composition was determined by a combination of microscopic and chemical

solubility techniques. The burn time- was determined by the CS 191-53

method except that if ignition did. not occur during the one second exposure specified for the test, the ignition was forced in order to obtain a

burn time. The CS 191-53 test is not very useful since it passes almost

every fabric except brushed cellulosics, but it was the test being used

by the Federal Trade Commission to exclude fabrics of excessive flammability from the market place at the time FFACTS was initiated. The

weight was determined by the weighing of 5.1 cm (2 in) squares. Many of

the burn time and weight determinations were run with fewer than the

specified number of samples because of insufficient fabric in the remnants. Eighty-one percent of the nightgown samples were identified as

cotton flannel with a weight average of 132.2 g/m2 (3.9 oz/sq yd).

' 4

'

'
Fifty-six percent of the dress fabrics were identified as plain woven

100 percent cotton weighing an average of 122.0 g/m2 (3.6 oz/sq yd).

Thirty-three percent of the dress fabrics were identified as plain woven

cotton and synthetic fiber blends weighing an average of 108.5 g/m2 (3.2

oz/sq yd) . It is important to note that none of the samples failed the

CS 191-53 test which requires that the specimen ignite during a one-second

exposure and burn 5 inches within 3-1/2 seconds in order to be considered failing. In fact, most of the samples did not even ignite in one

second. The seven samples that did ignite in one second included plain

woven cotton with a weight averaging 101.7 g/m2 (3 oz/sq yd), cotton

flannel with weight averaging 308.5 g/m2 (9.1 oz/sq yd). The average

burn time for the forced ignition tests on the nightgowns was 15-1/2 seconds for the 12.7-cm (5- in) gage length. This is roughly 5 times longer

than the failing time. A nightgown made from a cotton blend weighing

64.4 g/m2 (1.9 oz/sq yd) yielded the fastest burn time which was 9.5

seconds. This is almost 3 times the maximum time in which failure is

considered to occur.

The kinds of fabrics in the data base are a function of both the

fabrics in the fire incidents and the market-place mix at the time of

the investigations.

2.7. Activity of the Victim

The activity of the victim categories established for FFACTS were

intended for a wide range of ignition sources and did not include some

aspects of the circumstances of peculiar importance to space heater incidents. After reviewing all of the space heater case histories in the

file, it was decided that the human activity being engaged in at the time

of the ignition incidents would fit into the eight categories that follow:

(1) Warming — the person intentionally approaches the heater to warm himself presumably with some caution so as not to receive a burn or ignite

clothing; (2) Occupied near — the person may or may not consciously

select a position in proximity to the heater, and is primarily attentive

to some other activity which includes either standing or moving near the

heater; (3) Flammable liquids — the person is engaged in an activity

which includes the use of a flammable liquid such as gasoline, oil, adhesives, or hair spray and where the presence of the flammable liquid is

presumed to significantly effect the outcome; (4) Falls on — the person

makes intimate contact with the heater; (5) Light/adjust — the person

is performing a normal operator function required by the equipment;

(6) Play with — the person is playing with the heater and while attentive

to what he is doing is not aware of or prepared for the consequences of

his actions; (7) Other — includes explosions, malfunctions, and situations where the human activity is not significant or relevant to the outcome; (8) Unknown - the activity is not known.

The activity of the victim as related to age and sex is given in

table 7 which shows that the activity most frequently being engaged in at

ignition is "warming," which accounts for 35 percent of the incidents in

which the activity was known. Eighty-six percent of these incidents

5
involved females and 40 percent of these were in the 6-to 12-year age

bracket. The next most frequent activity was "occupied near" which

accounts for 28 percent of the incidents in which the activity was known.

Eighty-five percent of these incidents involved females, and 46 percent of

these were in the 6-to 12-year age bracket.

The incidents, where flammable liquids had a significant effect on

the outcome, account for 13 percent of the known activities. Apparently,

many people fail to realize that flammable liquids produce flammable

vapors that may drift considerable distances to reach a source of ignition.

2.8. Heater Types vs Direct Ignition

Table 8 shows the incident counts for direct ignitions by the different type heaters and also classifies the incidents as to whether the

heaters were or were not reported to be unguarded. One can see that gas

heaters were involved in 76 percent of all the direct ignition incidents

and that this is a little over six times the frequency with electric

heaters, the next highest category. Thirty-nine percent of the gas

heaters and 20 percent of the electric heaters were reportedly unguarded.

3. ANALYSIS OF DATA AND CONCLUSIONS

Space heaters are not major contributors to fire injury in terms

of frequency of involvement even though they rank sixth in the FFACTS

file. In terms of severity of personal injury, however, they appear to

achieve some significance. A comparison of these accident data with

those from matches and kitchen ranges reveals that deaths occur in incidents involving these leading ignition sources as follows: 16 percent

of all kitchen range incidents, 13 percent of all match incidents, 13

percent of all space heater incidents. There are twice as many deaths

from space heater incidents and additionally twice as many persons hospitalized as is the average for all FFACTS ignition sources.

Nightgowns, dresses and robes accounted for 82 percent of all the

garments directly ignited. Discounting the sleepwear incidents in the

category covered by existing flammability standards (sizes 0 thru 14)

leaves a total of 41 garment incidents. Thirty-two, or 78 percent of

these, are almost equally divided among nightgowns, dresses, and robes.

Therefore, while the recently enacted flammability standards covering

garments in sizes 0 to 14 will considerably reduce the number of incidents involving space heaters, there will continue to be problems associated with the remainder of these long loose garments.

The activities engaged in at ignition were predominantly "warming"

and "occupied near," which account for 36 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of the known activities. If we discount the sleepwear incidents

in the age groups covered by existing flammability standards, these same

activities will continue to be the main contributors to space heater

fire incidents. Judging from the body area burned, 29 of 43 ignitions

6

"
in the "warming" incidents were low on the back of the garment. This

suggests that persons usually back-up to a heater to gain warmth.

Re-enactments of this activity demonstrated the possible occurrences.

Many persons showed a definite tendency to project their posterior towards

the heat source. This action not only positions the hem of long loose

garments closer to the heat source because the garments hang from the

hipline, but it also has a tendency to elevate and flare the hem toward

the source. In fact, the action usually begins with the person leaning

forward from the waist thereby raising the hem first and is followed by

projecting the posterior which thrusts the hem toward the heater. It

would therefore appear that the ignition incidents involving long loose

garments and classified as "warming" probably involve a downward, but

mostly horizontal, thrust of the hemline toward the heater. Additionally,

there will be at increasing velocity of thrust, an increasing tendency for

contact with a horizontal element of a guard to result in whipping of the

free end of the fabric toward the heat source. The deflection of this

free end needs to be only slightly more than the thickness of the guarding

elements to gain penetration. Once penetration has occurred, small movements of the fabric are likely to increase the penetration.

In the incidents classified as "occupied near," there are subclasslfications that might have provided very meaningful information had they

been defined before FFACTS was begun. These are standing still, turning

around, walking past and a combination of the three. Examples of the

latter are changing clothes, brushing teeth, mopping the floor, playing,

washing hair, and working. In the data base, all of these activities are

somewhat indistinguishable in the incident report narratives even though

some of the incident investigators did use terms such as "standing" and

"walking by."

Turning around produces centrifugal forces which tend to cause the

entire hemline of a long loose garment to flare out. The amount of

flaring depends on several factors including the weight of the fabric,

the length of the hem, and the velocity of the spin. The stiffness of

the fabric will also affect the amount of the flaring, but primarily, this

is because of its significance in determining whether the spin velocity

of the garment follows that of the wearer. Without stiffness, the garment

will usually tend to just wrap around the wearer rather than be accelerated to the same spin velocity.

Walking produces air forces which will cause flaring out in the back

of a continuous hemline garment. The degree of flaring will depend primarily on the weight of the fabric and the walking velocity. A garment

that is open in the front (a noncont;inuous hemline garment) will usually

entrap air and balloon at the sides as well as the back. The extent of

the ballooning will depend upon the fabric weight, porosity and stiffness,

the length of the hem, and the walking velocity.

Therefore, as previously mentioned, walking and turning will tend

to flare out long loose garments. The flaring caused by these air pressure and centrifugal forces will actually result in the hem being thrust

at a heater within range. In addition, concurrent horizontal movement of

7
the hem, parallel to the front of the heater resulting from walking or

turning will result in a swiping action. A guard incorporating mostly

horizontal elements could actually direct such a swiping garment toward

the heating elements. This phenomenon could be aggravated by ballooning

of the fabric within the guard, caused by the aforementioned air pressure,

convection air currents around the heater, and air pressure waves from

body movement

.

There is adequate evidence to show that guarding has been and may

still be deficient in providing protection from fabric ignition. Thirtyfive percent of the direct ignition incidents were reported to have

involved heaters that were unguarded presumably either because the design

failed to include one or because it had been detached or defeated in some

way. In 65 percent of the incident reports, the guard was noted as present or there was no mention of the guard, and it is considered reasonable

to assume that in most of these incidents the guard was present and in

fair condition. In two cases, the heater was described as being comletely enclosed which probably implies that the investigator considered

the guarding to be very good. Unfortunately, the incident reports usually

lacked important detail related to the make, model and character or condition of the heater that may have contributed to the incident. One must

remember that the main interest and emphasis of the flammable fabrics

program was on determining how the fabric characteristics of items were

related to burn injury. Attempts to get design information on heaters

involved in ignition incidents failed primarily because of the lack of

identifying information on the heaters. It must be added, however, that

the manufacturers have no incentive to provide design information on

heaters that 'predate the Consumer Product Safety Act. In fact, they can

by such assistance put themselves in jeopardy that would result from

disclosure of a safety design defect. Without design information on the

heaters involved in ignition incidents to relate to the circumstances of

t the incidents previously described as indis tinctively grouped, one cannot

make an accurate evaluation of the problem or specific recommendations

for a solution. It is, however, apparent that some guards are inadequate.

The following guard deficiencies are suspect:

1) They get too hot or permit fabric penetration to areas

sufficiently hot to ignite fabric.

2) They are, or become detached for one of the following reasons:

a) They are too fragile and become nonfunctional;

b) They cause excessive inconvenience in normal use;

c) They present another hazard that the user recognizes

and chooses to avoid.

None of the fabrics tested were determined to be highly flammable

by the test method of CS 191-53, and most did not ignite during the onesecond exposure to the gas pilot flame. Direct comparison of these

8
fabric characteristics with results by other laboratories could not be

made, but Heskestad [3] and Fourt [4] have reported ignition times of

less than one second for these same fabric types in the GovernmentIndustry Research Council on Fabric Flammability (GIRCFF) samples group,

except for the synthetic blend, but with slightly lower fabric weights.

Tests run at the National Bureau of Standards by J. J. Loftus whose

method was later described by Gobeil [5] confirmed these results. These

fabrics were scrutinized for characteristics related to use as ignition

test materials. The FFACTS analysis showed only 2 of 21 cotton flannel

samples igniting in one second, but three other investigators found

ignition times of less than one second for a similiar GIRCFF fabric.

The explanation may be that FFACTS samples are from remnants of apparel

that had been used for some period of time and that use had changed the

flammability characteristics. After use, flannel has been observed to

suffer loss of nap, which is the more easily ignited part of the fabric

and, occasionally, has been observed to spread flame across the surface

without burning the base material. Another interesting observation is

that Loftus got a 1.4-second ignition time for flannel conditioned at 50

percent relative humidity and a 0.5-second time for the same fabric dried

at 105 °C (221 °F) and cooled in a desiccator. This implies high sensitivity to conditioning. This sensitivity was not revealed by any other

of the GIRCFF fabrics. It means that as a test fabric cotton flannel

probably would require carefully controlled conditioning and use.

Cotton terry cloth from the GIRCFF fabrics has yielded ignition

times almost as low as the flannel, but it has displayed another characteristic worthy of note. Heskestad found that it would ignite in 0.9

seconds when exposed horizontally to a premixed methane flame, but when

exposed at an inclination of 41°, it took about 3 seconds. It would seem

that such sensitivity to angle of exposure should be explained before it

is considered as an ignition test fabric.

The ignition of the cotton, polyester, nylon blend in one second is

not surprising considering its weight of 64.4 g/m2 (1.9 oz/sq yd), but it

is rarely used. The 100 percent plain woven cotton fabric remnants

performed as would be expected. Loftus found a similar cotton fabric to

be only slightly sensitive to conditioning since it ignited in about one

second when conditioned at 50 percent relative humidity and had about a

0.1-second lower ignition time when conditioned at 105 °C (221 °F) and

cooled in a desiccator. Heskestad found its ignition time to be insensitive to orientation between 0 and 41 degrees from the horizontal over

a premixed methane flame. Its reaction to a methane diffusion flame is

in the median range of the aforementioned fabrics. It therefore appears

to have the more predictable ignition behavior of the fabric remnant

types here discussed for use as a direct flame contact ignition test

fabric

.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that a test fabric intended for

other than direct flame contact requires consideration of characteristics

other than ignition time. For the situation where a test sample is held

in contact with a guard and excluding the possibility that the guard gets

hot enough to be a severe skin contact burn hazard, the radiative or

9
convective mode of heat transfer probably dominates. If the radiative

mode dominates, the absorptance of the fabric will be a very important

characteristic. The effect of both of these modes is increased as the

ability of the fabric to conduct heat away from the exposed surface is

decreased. The importance of this has been demonstrated for example in

carpet burn tests where the presence of a backing pad has caused failure

that did not occur when the pad was absent. The effect of the pad is to

reduce the heat loss thru the back of the carpet thereby increasing the

heat retained to sustain combustion. Heat retention will contribute to

ignition in the same manner. The thermal conductivity of the fabric is

therefore another important characteristic to consider.

4 . RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Comparisons should be made by CPSC of designs of heaters involved

in incidents in order to identify similarities that could point to

safety design defects.

2. A program should be initiated to develop improved methods for evaluating the effectiveness of the fabric ignition protection afforded

by space heaters. The methods should include determination of

functional durability, penetrability, surface temperatures and heat

flux levels. Functional durability means that the parts of the

heater incorporated in the protection should be durable enough to

perform their intended function as long as the appliance is capable

of producing heat. This would be determined by appropriate strength

and life cycle tests. If operation or maintenance of. the appliance

requires disabling of the protection, the associated mechanisms and

the procedures recommended by the manufacturer should be evaluated

for safety impact in light of this requirement. For example, if

a guard must be removed to re- ignite a heater, the operator should

be able to do so within a stated and reasonable period of time without causing burns to himself" or household furnishings. Furthermore,

the mechanisms for disabling the guard should be childproof, but not

so difficult that an adult of normal dexterity would neglect to

restore the protection. An alternate solution to these rather complex evaluations would be to require that the guard be permanently

attached.

Ease of penetration of the fabric ignition protection should be

determined by a method that takes into account the problem of flapping and flaring of long loose garments. A fabric exposure test

should detail techniques for testing the ease of penetration of

the protection. It is obvious that for this test sample weight and

stiffness can be as important as ease of ignition. The realization

that fabric characteristics are frequently changed by the manufacturers, suggests the need for experimentation with the use of a well

standardized non-fabric material such as filter paper or glasine

weighing paper.

10
An alternate technique would be to use a heat flux sensing probe.

For example, a probe could be designed with geometry that would

define guard penetration limits for simulating exposure to common

household flammables with emphasis on garment-related phenomena

such as thrusting of pleats and folds, swiping edges and ballooning

within the guard which are believed to be attendent with the ignition of long loose garments. A reference material attached to the

tip of such a probe could be used to indicate whether it penetrates

to a zone where heat flux is sufficient to ignite the materials in

question. The heat flux indication could be accomplished with a

thermocouple, but a small piece of the aforementioned non-fabric

material might be more indicative.

Surface temperature and heat flux measurements or a draped fabric

type of test are needed to evaluate the long time exposure circumstance, such as when a garment touches but does not penetrate the

guard, and when there is focusing of radiant energy.

3. Future collection of data related to space heater accidents should

be more detailed with regard to the following information: The

description of the activity should distinguish between walking up

to or by, backing up to, and turning around near. The heater should

be characterized as wall, floor, ceiling, by energy source, whether

or not certified by a testing laboratory, and by a detailed description of the appropriate protection devices. The part of the fabric

item ignited by the heater should be noted. In the case of wearing

apparel this would be the front or back, and the edge or distance

from the hem. The point of ignition on the item should be related

to the height of significant parts of the heater.

11
5 . REFERENCES

[1] Vickers, A. K. , Kitchen Ranges in Fabric Fires, Nat. Bur. Stand.

(U.S.), Technical Note 817 (April 1974).

[2] Slater, J. A., Buchbinder, B. and Tovey, H. , Matches and Lighters

in Flammable Fabric Incidents: The Magnitude of the Problem,

Nat. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), Technical Note 750 (Dec. 1972).

[3] Heskestad, G., Ease of Ignition of Fabrics to Flaming Heat Source,

Final Report, Factory Mutual Research, FMRC Serial No. 19967 (Jan.

1973).

[4] Fourt, L., Study of Ignition and Exposure, Final Report, Gillette

Research Institute, Harris Research Laboratory Department (Dec. 1971).

[5] Gobeil, N. , ASTM Task Group is Working on a New Flammability Tester,

Textile Chemist and Colorist, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Feb. 1973).

USCOMM-NBS-DC

12
Table I. FFACTS Ranking of Direct

Ignition Sources (3132 Case Data Base)

Rank Direct Ignition Source Count

1 Matches "}ft J Jo

Z uigar e l ces J1Z 1 1 9

J Gas Ranges Z J J

4 Electric Ranges TOO XZZ

5 Open Fires 90

0 Space Heaters 82

7 Unspecified Smoking Materials 65

o8 Lanterns/ Candles 61

9 Lighters C "7 57

10 Jilectrxc blankets 3Z

XX uuner Appliances ZD

XZ Electric Wiring 9 £

X J lilgnt DUlDo; lidlups ZU90

Unknown xy

1

J

utner X /

1 ft Id Fireworks xo

1 / Cutting/Welding Torch lb

1 Q Xo Cigar /Pipe XX

±y Furnace "7/ 20 Unspecified Range 6

; 2i Extension Cords 6

| 22 Other Heater 4

23 Matches or Lighter 4

j 24 Hot Water Heater 2

25 Other Range 2

26 Other Work Tools 1

] 27 Combustion Engines 1

Total 1573

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Table 3. Patient Disposition

(3132 Case Data Base)

Disposition Count

No Injury 8

No Treatment 0

First Aid 2

Treated and Released 10

Hospitalized 88

Died in Hospital 11

Dead on Arrival 5

Other 0

Unknown 3

Total 127

Table 4. Heater Types vs Intermediary Materials

(3132 Case Data Base)

Intermediary

Material

Heater Type Total

Materials

Gas Electric Oil Wood Coal Unknown

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* 7[2] 1 [1] 11

Oil [4] [1] 5

Gas [3] 1 4

Adhesive [1] 1 2

Hairspray 1 1

Wood Stick 1 1 2

Anti Freeze [1] 1

Ceiling Material 1 1

Plastic Comb 1 1

None 62 10 3 1 6 82

Unknown 7 4 6 17

Total 84 18 7 3 1 14 127

Numbers in brackets [] refer to explosions

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19
Table 8. Heater Types vs Direct Ignition

(3132 Case Data Base)

Type Unguarded Guarding Unknown Total Percent

Gas 24 38 62 76

Electric 2 8 10 12

Oil 3 3 4

Coal 0 0 0 0

Wood 1 1 1

Unknown 6 6 7

Total 29(35%) 53(65%) 82 100

20
NBS-1MA (REV. 7-73)

U.S. DEPT . OF COMM.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET

1. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO.

NBSIR 76-1014

2. Gov't Accession

No.

3. Recipient's Accession No.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

SPACE HEATER INVOLVEMENTS IN FABRIC FIRES

5. Publication Date

March 1976

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S)

Warren D. Hayes, Jr.

8. Performing Organ. Report No.

} PFRFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

10. Project /Task/Work Unit No.

4913380

11. Contract/Grant No.

1 2. Sponsoring Organization Name and Complete Address (Street, City, State, ZIP)

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Westwood Towers Building

5101 Westbard Avenue

Bethesda, Maryland 20207

13. Type of Report & Period

Covered

Final Report

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.)

Space heaters are number six in the ranking of most frequently involved

direct fabric ignition sources in the Flammable Fabrics Accident Case and

Testing System (FFACTS). Eighty-two of the 1573 direct fabric ignition

incidents in FFACTS were caused by space heaters. Gas heaters were responsible for 83 percent of all direct garment ignitions where heater type was

known. Nightgowns, dresses and robes account for 82 percent of all the

garment items directly ignited. Forty-seven percent of the direct garment

ignition incidents would probably not have occurred if the presently existing

fabric flammability standards had been in effect at the time.

17. KEY WORDS (six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the first key word unless a proper name; separated by semicolons)

Burns; fabric fires; FFACTS; garments; ignition sources;

space heaters.

18. AVAILABILITY Unlimited

I

' For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

1

1 Order From Sup. of Doc, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402, SD Cat. No. C13

QOrder From National Technical Information Service (NTIS)

Springfield, Virginia 22151

19. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS REPORT)

UNCL ASSIFIED

20. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS PAGE)

UNCLASSIFIED

21. NO. OF PAGES

24

22. Price

U5COMM.DC 29042-P74