Filed 10/22/13 Pryor v. Matta CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DANNY WAYNE PRYOR,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BERTO MATTA,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B244149

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MC 021132)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Carlos P. Baker, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Danny Wayne Pryor, in pro per.

Berto Matta, in pro per.

__________________________________
2

Danny Wayne Pryor appeals from a judgment, following a bench trial, in 

favor of respondent Berto Matta.1 We conclude appellant has not met his burden of 

showing that the trial court erred. Accordingly, we affirm.

As an initial matter, we note that appellant’s opening brief violates rule 

8.204 of the California Rules of Court, as it fails to concisely and clearly explain 

the factual and procedural background of the case. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 

122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 [self-represented party must follow rules of 

appellate procedure].) In addition, the record on appeal is inadequate. For 

example, appellant included the cover page of the operative complaint, but not the 

actual pleading. Thus, our consideration of the appeal is greatly hampered by the 

inadequacy of the briefing and record. 

Based upon the record and the appellate briefs, we deduce the following 

facts. In 2003, appellant purchased and developed 18 lots of land in the City of 

Lancaster. In 2006, appellant’s lender foreclosed on the real property. In 2009, 

appellant filed for bankruptcy. He also filed mechanic’s liens on the property. On 

July 8, 2009, respondent purchased the property, and later had the mechanic’s liens 

released. 

On December 17, 2009, appellant filed a complaint against numerous parties 

alleging 11 causes of action, including “breach of covenant,” fraud, wrongful 

foreclosure, and quiet title. Appellant apparently alleged a civil conspiracy among 

the defendants, including his lender and respondent, to defraud him of the real 

 

1

Pryor appealed from a minute order, and not from any final judgment 

identified in the record. Because the order disposed of all of appellant’s claims and 

respondent does not challenge the appealability of the minute order, we will deem 

the order a final judgment. (See Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 

753, 761, fn. 7.) 
3

property, causing him an economic loss of $5 million. Respondent eventually filed 

an answer, generally denying the allegations. Discovery was then propounded, 

although only respondent’s responses to discovery requests are included in the 

record. After subsequent proceedings, only respondent remained as a defendant. 

A three-day bench trial on appellant’s claims commenced March 14, 2012 

before the Honorable Carlos P. Baker, Jr. Both appellant and respondent presented 

evidence. The trial court’s oral findings of fact and statement of decision, if any, 

are not in the record. On August 15, 2012, the trial court issued a minute order, 

entering judgment in favor of respondent and against appellant. On September 10, 

2012, appellant filed his notice of appeal, attaching the minute order and a notice 

of his 2009 bankruptcy filing.2 

On appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct, and 

appellant has the burden of demonstrating reversible error by an adequate record. 

(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; accord Denham v. Superior Court

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 

150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) Moreover, any issue not adequately raised or supported 

is deemed forfeited. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6; 

accord Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors (1971) 

16 Cal.App.3d 581, 608; see also Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 

95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“The appellate court is not required to search the record 

on its own seeking error.”].)

 

2

To the extent that appellant is challenging any order or judgment arising 

from the bankruptcy, we have no jurisdiction to review any such order or 

judgment. (See, e.g., Choy v. Redland Ins. Co. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 789, 797 

[determination of parties’ rights and duties in bankruptcy process exclusively 

under federal jurisdiction].)
4

Appellant does not explain how the trial court erred in entering judgment for 

respondent. He does not assign error to any of the court’s evidentiary rulings at 

trial. Nor does he contend that the judgment was not supported by substantial 

evidence. Rather, appellant challenges a judgment releasing the mechanic’s liens 

(entered August 20, 2010), a judgment dismissing other defendants (entered 

November 29, 2011), and an order vacating default as to respondent (entered 

September 25, 2012).3 None of these prior rulings involves the trial court’s 

judgment following the bench trial. Accordingly, appellant has not affirmatively 

demonstrated that the trial court erred when it entered judgment for respondent.4

 

3 We note that appellant’s challenges to the prior judgments (entered in 2010 

and 2011) are untimely, as appellant did not file his notice of appeal until 

September 10, 2012. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104 [appeal must be taken 

within 60 days of service of notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after 

entry of judgment].) Moreover, the judgments and order vacating default were not 

included or identified in appellant’s notice of appeal, which attached only the 

posttrial minute order and appellant’s 2009 bankruptcy petition. This court has no 

jurisdiction to consider a judgment or order not identified in the notice of appeal. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100; see Hardin v. Elvitsky (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 

357, 363 [“Since the notice of appeal limits the power of the reviewing court, an 

order from which an appeal has not been taken will not be reviewed.”].) Thus, we 

cannot consider appellant’s challenges to these prior judgments and order.

4

Contrary to appellant’s contention, the record fails to show entry of a default 

judgment. To the extent appellant argues that a default judgment should have been 

entered, we find that appellant has not met his burden of showing the trial court 

erred. The relevant pleadings and hearing transcripts are not included in the 

appellate record. Nor does appellant explain how the superior court erred in 

declining to enter a default judgment. In short, appellant has not met his burden of 

showing reversible error by an adequate record. Accordingly, appellant has 

forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s decision to proceed with a bench trial. 

(Reyes v. Kosha, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 466, fn. 6.)
5

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MANELLA, J. 

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

SUZUKAWA, J.