## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 1539- 07

R O BE R T H U FFM A N , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N A PPE LL A N T ’ S A N D STA TE ’ S PE TITI O N S FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE FOURTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

BEX AR CO UNTY K ELL ER , P .J ., de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he c our t i n w hi c h P RI CE , K EASLE R , H ER VEY , H OL C OM B , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . M E YE RS , J. , f i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on. W OMACK , J ., fi le d a c o n c u r r in g o p in io n . J OHNS ON , J. , f i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on. C OCHR AN , J. , f

i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h P RI CE , J OHNS ON , and H OL C OM B , J J ., j oi ne d.

We must determine whethe r cha rg ing the jury

in the d i s

j unctive with re spect to var ious statutory methods of committing the of fense of “f

ailure to stop and rende r aid” resulted in a violation of the c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nt t hat th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t be un anim ou s. We c on c lud e that th e se various statutory

methods for c ommitt ing the offe nse do not consti tute separ ate of fense s, but are

me re ly a lte rn a te me ans of

c omm itt ingthe same off ens e. Con se qu e ntl y , th e tr ia l ju dg e c or re c tlyHUF F MAN – 2

See T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE §§550.021, 550.023. 1 Th e jur y c ha rg e a lso a lle g e d th e inf

or ma tio n to be g ive n in

the dis jun c tiv e , a s: 2 Robert Huff

man’s name and addre ss, the reg istration numbe r of the vehicle Robe rt Hu ff man w a s d

ri vin g , o r t

he name of

Rob e rt Hu ff man’ s moto r veh icle li a

bil ity insurer to Raf

ael Ga rcia ; or to provide Rafae l G arc ia re asonable assistance , including char g ed the jury

with the differ ent statutory methods in the disjunctive. I. BACKG ROUND Appellant wa s i nvolved in a motor vehic le ac cident that re sulted in the death of Ra fae l Gar cia. The acc ident was a “hit and run” –appellan t wa s not present whe n office rs ar rived at the

scene . Subsequently , appellant wa s char g ed with the off ense of “fa ilure to stop and re nder a id.” 1 At t ri al , i nac co rd an ce wi t h t h e ap p l i cab l e s t at u t es , t h e ab s t ra ct p o rt i o no f t h e j u ry ch ar ge

su mma ri zed the re qu ir e me nts imp os e d upo n a moto ri st wh o is invo lve d in an ac c ide nt r e su lti ngin injury or death: Our law pr ov ide s tha t the op e rator of a ve hic le inv olv e d in

an a c c ide nt r e su lti ngin injury to or death of a pe rson shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the acc ident or as c lose to the scene as possible; immediately return to the sc ene of

the acc ident if the vehic le is not stopped at the sce ne of the acc ident; a nd rema in at the scene of the a ccide nt until t he oper ator g ives t h e o p er ator’s name and a ddress, the re g is tr a ti o n n u mb e r o f th e v e h ic le th e o p e r a to r w a s dr iv in g , an d th e n ame of the operator’s motor vehicle liabilit y i n s u re r to any person injure d or the ope rator or occupa nt of or person attending a vehicle i nvolved in the collision; and provide any person i n j u re d i nt h e a cc i d en tre as o n ab l e a s s i s t an ce , i n cl u d ing tr ansporting the per son to a p h y s i c i ano r

h o s p i t a l f

o r m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n ti f

i ti s a p p ar e n tt h a tt r e a t m e n tis n e c e s s ar y. Th e a pp lic a tio n p ara g ra

phc ha rg e d thre e me tho ds of

vio la tin g the statut e in t

he dis jun c tiv e : No w, i f y o u find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that . . . [ Robert Huffma n, operating a

motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in death and] . . . knowing said ac cident had oc cu rr ed fa i l ed to immediately stop, return to the sc e ne of the a c c ide nt, or

re ma in at the s c e ne of the a c c ide nt [t o g ive c e rt a in information] . . . then y ou will find the defe ndant g uilty of fa ilure to stop and re nder a id a s c ha rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. 2HUF F MAN – 3

transporting or making arr ang ements for transporting Rafae l Gar cia to a phy sician or h o s p i t a l f o r m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t , w h e ni tw a s a p p ar e n tth a tt r e a t m e n tw a s n e c e s s ar y, the n y ou wi ll f ind the de fe nd ant guil ty

of fa ilure to s top and

re nd e r a id a s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. Be cause appellant did not complain about this portion of t he jury char g e to the cour t of appe als, we have no oc c a sio n to a dd

re ss i t. Hu ffm an v . S

tat e , 234 S.W .3d 185, 189-94 (Te x . App.–San Antonio 2007). Se e als o 3 Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Appellant did not object to the ap p l i cation par ag raph’ s disjunctive wording . The jury found appellant guilty

and sente nced him to imprisonment for twenty y ear s and a f

ine of $10,000. On appe al, appe llant claimed that the disjunctive wor ding violate d h i s co n s t i tutional right to a un anim ou s v e rd ic t. T he c ourt of a pp e a ls a g re e d, bu t he ld t

hat appe ll ant was no t e g re g iou sly harme d. Both the State a

nd appellant have petitioned for discretionar y revie w. The State c omplains 3 about the cour

t of ap p ea l s ’s holding that ther e wa s a jury unanimity

violation, while appellant

c omp la ins a

bo ut t he c ourt of a pp e a ls’ s h arm

ana ly sis

. II. AN AL YSI S Our j ur y un anim ity op ini on s and se ve ra l of our d ou ble je op ard

y op ini on s a dd

re ss t he same basic que stion: I n a given situation, do diffe rent leg al theorie s of cr iminal liabili ty comprise diff

ere nt of fe ns es, or do the y

c omp ri se a lte rn a te me tho ds of c omm itt ingthe same of

fe ns e ? Th e se c los e ly intertwined stra

nds of our jurisprude nce ha ve addr essed the bas i c question i n four c ontext s: (1) ho mic ide of

fe ns e s, (2 ) i nju

ry to a c hil d off

e ns e s, (3 ) c re dit

c a rd a bu se of fe ns e s, and

(4 ) s e x off

e ns e s. Wit h respe ct to homicide offe nses, we have held that differ ent leg al theories involving the same victim are simply

alternate methods of committing the sa me offe nse. In Kitc he ns v . S tat e , we approve d a jury char g e that disjunctively alleg ed two differ ent capital murder theories with respec tHUF F MAN – 4

823 S.W .2d 256, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 4 Id. 5 991 S.W .2d 804, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 6 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 7 Erv in , 991 S.W .2d at 814. 8 Id. Other c onsiderations not rele vant her e we re a lso recited. See id. 9 189 S.W .3d 305, 306, 312- 14 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 10 to the same victim: murder in the c ourse of ag g ravated sexual assault and murder in the course of robber y . We char acte rized these as “ alt er n at e theories of committing the same offe nse.” I n Ex 4 5 pa rteErv in , we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited convic tions for both manslaug hter and intox ication manslaug hter whe n only one person was killed. We f ound that the Blockburge r 6 7 “same elements” test was “not the s ole t est for determining whether offe nses are the same under the multipl e punishments aspec t of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Other c onsiderations included:

8 “whe ther the of

fense provisions are c onta in e d w it h in th e same statutory

section, whe ther the of

fense s

are phrase d in the alternative . . . [and] whether the offe nses have a common focus ( i.e. whethe r the ‘g ra vame n’ of

the o ff e ns e is the same ) a

nd wh e the r t

hat c omm on

fo c us te nd s to ind ic a te a sin g le instance of

conduct.” 9 I n the injury

to a child context, whether separate leg al theorie s comprise sepa rate offe nses d e p e n d s u p o nw h e t h e r

t h e t h e o r i e s d i f

f e r w i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e r e s u l to f t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s c o n d u c t

. In J e ffe rso n v . S

tat e , we held that a jury

was not re quired to unanimously find which of thr ee a lleg ed acts or omissi o n s resulted in the c hild victim’s death. We found that “the e ssential element or 10 fo c us ” of the in jury to a c hil d s ta tut e wa s “ the re su lt o f t he de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t” –in jur y toHUF F MAN – 5

Id. at 312. 11 227 S.W .3d 744, 748-49 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). 12 Id. 13 218 S.W .3d 706, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 14 Id. at 718-19. 15 Id. at 7 1 8 (qu o t i n g Jefferson , 189 S.W .3d at 315-16 (Coc hran J., concurr ing) ). 16 ch i l d

– “a n d n o tt h e p o s s i b l e c o mb i n at i o n s o f c o n d u ct t h at ca u s e t h e re s u l t

. ” Fo l l o wi n g Jefferson 11 in Vi lla nu e v a v . S

tat e , we held that the Double J eopar dy Clause prohibited the State fr om obtaining tw o in ju r y to a c h il d c o n v ic ti o n s f

o r a d e a th th a t r e s u lt e d f

r o m bo th ana c t a

n d ano mi s s io n . We

12 reje cted the State’ s claim t h at injury to a child was a

“conduc t-oriented” offe nse and c oncluded, based on Jefferson , that it was in fac t a re sult-oriented off ense. 13 By contra st, Stu hle r v . S

tat e in vo lv ed leg a l th e or ie s o f i nju ry to a c hil d th a t di ff

e re d w ith

re sp e c t to the ty

pe of inj ur y inf lic te d. Em

ph a sizi ng that inj ur

y to a c hil d w a s a

“ re su lt o f c on du c t” 14 offe nse, we held in that c ase that the differ ent ty pes of injuries (beingresults) we re “ elementa l” and thus jury unanimity

was re quired a s to the ty

pe of injury

. I n doing so, w e also applied an “ eig hth-

15 g rade g rammar ” appr oach sug g ested by J udg e C ochra

n as “a g ener al rule of

thumb” for de termining le g isl a tiv e int e nt: I n sum, we must return to eig hth-g rade g rammar to determine w hat eleme nts the jury m u s t u n an imously

find bey ond a re asonable doubt. At a minimum, t hese a re: the subject (the de fenda

nt); the main verb; a

nd the direc t obje ct if the main ve rb re quires a dire ct obj ect (i.e., the offense is a re sult-oriented c rime) . . . . Ge nera lly , adver bial phrase s, introduced by

the pre position “by ,” des cr i b e the manne r and me ans of committing t he offense. They are not the gravamen of the offense, nor elements on wh ic h th e jur

y mus t be un anim ou s. 16 Unlike homicide and injury to a child offe nses, cre dit c ard abuse is a nature of conduc t crime, wh i ch ca nb e c o m m i t t edi na n u mb er o f w ay s , i n cl u d i n g: (1 ) s t ea l i n g a cr ed i t ca rd , (2 ) r ec ei v i n g aHUF F MAN – 6

Se e Ngo v . S

tat e , 175 S.W .3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 17 Id. 18 Id. at 745 n.24. 19 991 S.W .2d 830, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 20 Id. at 833. 21 cre dit card ow ned by

another , knowing that it had been stolen, and acting w ith intent to us e it, and (3) pres en ting a

cre dit card w ith intent to obt ain a be nefit fr audulently , knowing that the use wa s without the eff

ective consent of the c ardholde r. When confronte d in Ngo v . S tat e wi t h a j u ry

ch ar ge 17 that disjunctively char g ed these three differ ent ty pes of conduct as a single offe nse, we held that the State h a d c h ar g e d “ thr e e d if f e r e n t c r im in a l a c ts , ” an d th e d e f e n d an t’ s c o n s ti tuti o n a l r ig h t to a unanimous verdict require d that the jurors “unanimously ag ree [] upon the commission of any one of the se c ri min a l a c ts. ” We n ote d in that c a se that a “ ha nd y , tho ug h no t de fi nit ive , r ule of thumb 18 is to look at the statutory

verb de fining the cr iminal act. That verb

. . . is ge nera lly the cr iminal act upon which all jurors must unanimously ag ree .” 19 Sex offe nses ar e also nature of conduct c rimes, and we have unif ormly require d that differ ent ty pes of c onduct spec ified in the var ious statutes be treated as sepa rate offe nses. I n Vi c k v . S tat e , a do ub le je op ard

y c a se , w e ob se rv e d th a t a g g ra vate d se xua l a ssa

ult is a “ c on du c t- or ie nte d o ff

e ns e in which the leg islature cr iminaliz ed very specific conduct of sever al diffe rent ty pes.” We concluded 20 that “ se pa rate ly de sc ri be d c on du c t c on sti tut e s a se pa rate statut or

y of fe ns e ” and

c ou ld b e se pa

rate ly prosec uted. 21 I n Fran c is v . S

tat e , we he ld that two differ ent ty pes of c onduct desc ribed by the offe nse of indece ncy with a child occ urringat two diffe rent times wer e separ ate of fense s, so that the disjunctiveHUF F MAN – 7

36 S.W .3d 121, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 22 235 S.W .3d 711, 716-19 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). 23 Id. at 717. 24 Id. 25 su bmi ssi on of the tw o ty

pe s o f co nd

uc t in the jur

y c ha rg e vio la te d the ri g ht t o ju ry un anim ity

. Th is

22 holding lef

t open, howeve r, whe ther the two diff ere nt ty p es of conduc t were inhere ntly differ ent offe nses or simply

wer e diffe rent off

enses on the f

acts of the case . W e re solved that issue in Pi zzo v . S tat e , another

jury unanimity

case , which held that the dif fe re nt t y pe s o f c on du c t pr os c ri be d by the ind e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d s ta tut e we re dif

fe re nt o ff e ns e s, even if they occur red dur ing the same tra

nsaction. I n Pi

zzo , we e x haustively

analy zed the 23 g rammatica l structure of

the statute but found mos t persua sive the “focus” of the offe nse: “Unlike murder, injury

to a child, and c riminal mischief whe re the re sult is t he foc us, the conduc t is the focus of the de fi nit ion

of se xua l c on ta c t.” W e fur the r o bs e rv e d th a t tr e a tin g e a c h ty pe of c on du c t a s a 24 separ ate of

fense comported w ith our decision in Vick

. 25 The common threa d in all of t hese cases seems to be “focus.” We use g rammar and we look to other fa ctors bea

ring on whether

differ ent leg al t h eo ri es constit ute the “sa me” of fense or “diffe rent” offe nses, but those tools seem useful mainly as an a id to determining focus. The focus or “g rava men” o f t h e off

ense se ems to be one of the best indicators of

the allowable unit of pr os e c uti on

pr e sc ri be d b y

the le g isl a tur e . I f t

he fo c us of

the of fe ns e is the re su lt–

that is , th e of

fe ns e is a “ re su lt o f c on du c t” c ri me –th e n d if fe re nt t y pe s o f r e su lts are c on sid e re d to be se pa rate of fe ns e s, but differ ent ty

pes of c onduct ar e not. On the other hand, i f t h e fo cu s of the off ense is the conduct–that is, the off

ense is a “ nature of conduc t ” crime–then differ ent ty pes of c onduct ar eHUF F MAN – 8

Se e Mc Qu e e n v . S

tat e , 7 81 S.W. 2d

60 0, 60 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ); T EX . P EN . C ODE 26 §6.03(b)- (d). c on sid e re d to be se pa

rate of fe ns e s. Som e of

fe ns e s, su c h as ca

pit a l mur de r, may

c on ta in b oth

re su lt of c on du c t and

natur e of c on du c t e le me nts , a

nd the qu e sti on

be c ome s w hic h as pect of the statut e predominate s, or possibly whether both a spects are equally important for deter m i n i n g t he

se pa rate ne ss o f o ff

e ns e s. There is a third k i n d o f fo cu s t hat we ha ve not y et discussed, a

nd which has not be en addre ssed in this area

of the law : “circ u m s t an ce s surrounding the conduc t.” I f “c ircumstance s 26

surr ound ingthe c on du c t” is the fo c us of the of fe ns e , th e n und e r a

fo c us -b a se d appr oa c h to deter mining sepa

rate ness of offenses, diff

ere nt ty pes of c onduct could esta blish alternate me thods of committing the same offe nse rather than diff ere nt offense s, so l o n g as t he cir cumstance s surrounding the conduc t are the same. We turn now to the statute bef ore us. The statute that makes the failure to stop and rende r

a id a c ri min a l of

fe ns e pr ov ide s in

re le va nt p art : (a ) Th e op e rator of a ve hic le inv olv e d in an a c c ide nt re su lti ng in inj ur y to or death of a pe rs on sh a ll: (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the sce ne of the acc ident or as c lose to the scene as possible; (2) immediately

return to the sc ene of t h e ac cident if the ve hicle is not stopped at the sce ne of the acc ident; and (3) r emain at the sc ene of the ac cident until the operator complies with the require ments of Section 550.023. (b) An ope rator of

a vehic le re quired t o stop the vehicle by Subsection (a) shall do s o w i t h o u to b s t r

u c t i n g t r a f

f i c m o r e t h ani s n e c e s s ar

y. (c ) Ape rs on c omm its an of fe ns e if the pe rs on do e s no t sto p or do e s no t c omp ly wi thHUF F MAN – 9

T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE §550.021. Another statute, §550.023, a lso contributes to the 27 definition of the off

ense, but its require ments are not releva nt here

. Cat es v . S tat e , 102 S.W .3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 28 Go ss v . S

tat e , 582 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)(§6.02 re quires that the 29 acc used in a fa ilure to stop and re nder a id case had “know ledg e of the circ umstances surr ounding his conduct . . . i.e., ha d knowledg e that an a ccide nt had occ urre d”). See McQ ueen , 781 S.W .2d at 603. 30 Id. (q u o t i n g T EX . P EN . C ODE §31.07(a) ). 31 Id. 32 the re quirements of this sec tion. 27 The que stion, then, is what is the focus of this offe nse? We have said that the g rava men of the offe nse is “leaving the scene of an acc ident.” But more particula rly , our ca selaw le ads to the 28

c on c lus ion that an “ a c c ide nt” is the fo c us of the statut e . We h a ve he ld t hat a c ulp a ble me nta l st a te

mus t a tta c h to thi s c ir c ums tanc e , i. e ., wh e the r an a c c ide nt oc c ur re d. Whe n a

c ulp a ble me nta l st a te 29 is require d to attach to a pa rticular c ircumstance , it is because that circumstanc e is the g rava men of the offe nse. 30 I n Mc Queen v. Stat e , f or e xamp le , th e of

fe ns e of un a uth or ize d u se of

a mot or ve hic le pr ov ide d th a t a pe rs on “ c omm its an off e ns e if he int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

op e ra te s ano the r’ s b oat, airplane , or motor-prope lled vehicle w ithout the consent of the owne r.” We said: 31 Sin c e op e ratin g a no the r’ s mo tor -p ro pe lle d v e hic le is n ot c ri min a l by its very nat ure this offe nse is not a “natur e of conduct” ty pe offe nse. Nor is it a “ result” ty pe off ense since the statute does not prohibit any specific re s u l t o f such operation. What makes the c onduct unlawful is that it is done under cer tain circ umstances, i.e., w ithout the owner’s pe rmission. There fore , the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is a

“cir cumstance s” ty

pe off ense, a nd the c ulp a ble me nta l st a te of

“ kn ow ing ly ” mus t a

pp ly to t ho se surr ound ingc ir c ums tanc e s. 32 L ike wi se , a

pp e lla nt’ s f a ilure to s top , r e tur

n, or re ma in b e c ome s c ri min a l on ly be cause of

his kn o w l e d g e o f

c i r c u m s t an c e s s u r

r o u n d i n g t h e c o n d

u c t : an a c c i d e n t an d a v i c t i m s u f f e r i n g ani n

j u r y.HUF F MAN – 10

Sp ad lin g v . S tat e , 773 S.W .2d 553, 556-57 (Te x . Crim. App. 1989). 33 I n addition, we have held that a se parate prosec ution for fa ilure to stop an d re n der a id can

oc c ur fo r e a c h in div idu a l in

jur e d in the a c c ide nt w ho m the de fe nd ant fa ils to a id. B e c a us e se pa rate 33 victims result in separate offe nses for double jeopar dy purposes, they also result in se parate offe nses fo r j ur y un a nim ity

pu rp os e s. Fr om this di scussion, we deter mine that “fa ilure to stop and rende r aid” is a “ circ umstances

suro un din g the c on du c t” of fe ns e , w iththe c ir c ums tanc e s b e ingan a c c ide nt a nd vic tim s. At

le a st presumptively , then, the pre scribed unit of pr osecution is “ea ch victim, eac h acc ident.” Other a spects of the lang uag e and structure of t he st atute st reng then this conclusion. Unlike the touching of var ious body parts found in s ex offe nses, which a re inde pendent a cts, the “stop,” “re turn,” a

nd “re main” re quirements ar e not independe nt of ea ch other . Rather, they are serial require ments t h at al l re l ate, step- by -step, to what a n actor must do with respect to the sce ne of a n

acc ident. The “ stop” requir ement ca n be met in one o f t wo way s: stopping at the sc ene of the

a c c ide nt or sto pp ing a s clo se a s p os sib le to t he sc e ne of

the a c c ide nt. Th e “ re tur

n” re qu ir e me nt i s conting ent upon the drive r satisfying the “stop” requireme nt via the sec ond method. That is, if the actor does not stop at the s cene , but stops as close as possible to the scene , then he must retur n to the

scene . The “ rema in” re quirement is conting ent upon the driver satisfying the stop require ment by the fi rs t meth od or satis fy

ing the sto p re qu ir e me nt by the se c on d me tho d p lus the re tur n r e qu ir e me nt. That is, if the driver stops at the scene , then he must rema in at the sce ne, or if he stops as close as possible to the scene and re turns to the scene , then he must rema in at the sce ne. An a lle g a tio n th a t th e thr e e dif fe re nt t y pe s o f r e qu ir e me nts have be e n v iol a te d is e ff e c tiv e ly an alleg ation in the alternative. The “return” provision contemplates a stop that is not at the sce neHUF F MAN – 11

but as close a s possible to the scene , not a total f ailure to stop. And one c annot fa il to “remain” at the sce ne if one never

stops at the scene to beg in with. Even if one could say that a drive r could fa il to “stop,” “re turn,” a nd “re main,” such a

failure would not rea sonably

consti t u t e t h ree discre te instance s of conduc t. Aside from the pr oblem that these a re a ll omis sions, one still could not cate g orize the omissions as sepa rate in any

meaning ful

re sp e c t. Ape rs on

wh o f a ils to sto p at al l mig ht be sa id t o v iol a te a ll thr e e re qu ir e me nts , b ut t hat is

rea lly just a single f

ailure. O ne could f

ail to stop, one could stop close to the sce ne but not return,

or on e c ou ld sto p a t the sc e ne or re tur n to t he sc e ne bu t no t r e ma in. I n a ny on e of tho se c a se s, on ly one fa ilure ca

n be mea ningf ully ascr ibed to the driver

. The leg islature could have wr itten the statute so that the State could obtain three convictions when ther e is only

one ac cident and one victim. But based on our anal y sis, as well as a natural

rea ding of the statute, we hold that “fa iling to stop,” “f ailing to r eturn,” and “f

ailing to r emain” a

re simply alternate methods of committing the same off ense. Conseque ntly , this case is controlled by Kitchens , Erv in , Jefferson , and Villanueva , a nd the jur y c ha rg e did no t vi olate a

pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o a unanimous ver dict. The State’s c ontention in this re gard is sustained, a ppellant’s petition for discretionar

y revie w is dismis sed, and the judgme nt of the cour t of appe als is affir

med.

Deliver ed: Octobe r 1, 2008 Pub lis h