a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005 MILITARY BASES

Analysis of DOD’s 

2005 Selection 

Process and 

Recommendations for 

Base Closures and 

Realignments

GAO-05-785
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-785.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-785, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2005

MILITARY BASES

Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection 

Process and Recommendations for Base 

Closures and Realignments 

DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) reducing 

excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering transformation, 

and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a record number of 

closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC rounds combined, 

many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively few on closing 

active bases. Projected savings are almost equally large, but most savings are 

derived from 10 percent of the recommendations. While GAO believes 

savings would be acheived, overall up-front investment costs of an estimated 

$24 billion are required, and there are clear limitations associated with 

DOD’s projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much 

of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with 

eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than 

reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be 

reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit 

dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from 

efficiency measures and other actions, but underlying assumptions have not 

been validated and could be difficult to track over time. Some proposals 

represent efforts to foster jointness and transformation, such as initial joint 

training for the Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with 

many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military 

services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for 

proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on 

various transformation options. 

 

DOD’s process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, 

and well documented. DOD’s process placed strong emphasis on data, 

tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military services and 

seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common businessoriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the unique aspects 

of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in adhering to the use of 

military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this 

round, such as surge and homeland defense needs. Data accuracy was 

enhanced by the required use of certified data and by efforts of the DOD 

Inspector General and service audit agencies in checking the data. 

Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together 

an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country 

into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on 

evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of 

individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may 

warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad range 

of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in developing 

certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, or potential 

impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified certain candidate 

recommendations, including some that were changed by senior DOD 

leadership late in the process that may warrant attention. 

On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of 

Defense submitted proposed base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) 

actions to an independent 

commission for its review. The 

Commission must submit its 

recommendations to the President 

by September 8, 2005, for his 

acceptance or rejection in their 

entirety. Congress has final action 

to accept or reject these 

recommendations in their entirety 

later this year. The law requires 

that GAO issue a report on the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

recommendations and selection 

process by July 1, 2005. GAO’s 

objectives were to 

(1) determine the extent to which 

DOD’s proposals achieved its 

stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze 

whether the process for developing 

recommendations was logical and 

reasoned, and (3) identify issues 

with the recommendations that 

may warrant further attention. 

Time constraints limited GAO’s 

ability to examine implementation 

details of most of the individual 

recommended actions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making a recommendation 

to DOD aimed at tracking and 

periodically updating savings, and 

is highlighting issues for the BRAC 

Commission’s consideration. 

In providing oral comments on a 

draft of this report, DOD concurred 

with the recommendation to 

establish a system to track and 

periodically update BRAC savings 

estimates. 
Page i GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

DOD’s Recommendations Would Have Varying Degrees of Success 

in Achieving Goals for the 2005 BRAC Round 17

DOD Developed a Generally Logical and Reasoned Process for 

Making BRAC Decisions 30

Several Aspects of DOD’s BRAC Recommendations and Rejected 

Proposals May Warrant Further Attention 40

Conclusions 56

Recommendation for Executive Action 57

Agency Comments 57

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 61

Appendix II: Glossary of BRAC-Related Terms 66

Appendix III: The Department of the Army Selection Process and 

Recommendations 69

Appendix IV: The Department of the Navy Selection Process and 

Recommendations 92

Appendix V: The Department of the Air Force Selection Process and 

Recommendations 111

Appendix VI: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations 131

Appendix VII: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and Recommendations 145

Appendix VIII: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations 166

Appendix IX: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process 

and Recommendations 185

Appendix X: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations 193

Appendix XI: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations 207

Appendix XII: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations 219
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XIII: Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model 237

Appendix XIV: Economic Impact Assessments 244

Appendix XV: Draft DOD Transformational Options Recommended for 

Approval 254

Appendix XVI: Key GAO and Other Defense Audit Agency Products Related 

to DOD’s 2005 Base Realignments and Closures 262

Appendix XVII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 265

Tables Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds 18

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 

Recommendations 20

Table 3: Major Recommendations Supporting Joint Activity 28

Table 4: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD 

Component 41

Table 5: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD’s 

Recommended Major Base Closures 46

Table 6: Military Installations That Would Receive a Net Gain of 

Over 2,000 Personnel due to BRAC Actions 50

Table 7: Candidate Recommendations That Were Deleted or 

Significantly Revised by the Infrastructure Executive 

Council 53

Table 8: Excess Capacity Identified by the Army for Selected 

Mission Areas 73

Table 9: Army Military Value Criteria Weights 75

Table 10: Financial Aspects of the Army’s Recommendations 79

Table 11: Excess Capacity Identified by the Navy, by Function 95

Table 12: Navy Military Value Criteria Weights 97

Table 13: Financial Aspects of the Navy’s Recommendations 102

Table 14: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing and Realigning 

Naval Air Station Brunswick and Marine Corps Logistics 

Base Barstow 108

Table 15: Excess Capacity Identified by the Air Force, by 

Function 114

Table 16: Air Force Military Value Criteria Weights 115

Table 17: Financial Aspects of the Air Force’s 

Recommendations 120

Table 18: Impact of Air Force BRAC Recommendations on 

Installations with Flying Missions, by Component 125

Table 19: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing or Realigning Grand 

Forks Air Force Base 129
Contents

Page iii GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 20: Excess Capacity Identified by the Education and Training 

Joint Cross-Service Group 134

Table 21: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Military 

Value Criteria Weights 136

Table 22: Financial Aspects of the Education and Training Joint 

Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 140

Table 23: Excess Capacity Identified by the Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 147

Table 24: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 

Group Military Value Criteria Weights 149

Table 25: Financial Aspects of the Headquarters and Support 

Activities Joint Cross-Service Group’s 

Recommendations 154

Table 26: Impact of One-time Antiterrorism and Force Protection 

Savings on Recommendations Involving Leased Space 159

Table 27: Excess Capacity Identified by the Industrial Joint 

Cross-Service Group 168

Table 28: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value 

Criteria Weights 170

Table 29: Financial Aspects of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 

Group’s Recommendations 175

Table 30: Excess Capacity Identified by the Intelligence Joint 

Cross-Service Group 187

Table 31: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value 

Criteria Weights 188

Table 32: Financial Aspects of the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service 

Group’s Recommendations 191

Table 33: Excess Capacity Identified by the Medical Joint 

Cross-Service Group 195

Table 34: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 

Weights 198

Table 35: Financial Aspects of the Medical Joint Cross-Service 

Group’s Recommendations 201

Table 36: Excess Capacity Identified by the Supply and Storage Joint 

Cross-Service Group 209

Table 37: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Military 

Value Criteria Weights 210

Table 38: Financial Aspects of the Supply and Storage Joint 

Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 214

Table 39: Excess Capacity Identified by the Technical Joint 

Cross-Service Group 221
Contents

Page iv GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 40: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 

Weights 222

Table 41: Financial Aspects of the Technical Joint Cross-Service 

Group’s Recommendations 226

Table 42: Comparison of Alternatives to Personnel Reductions for 

the Recommendation to Create a Naval Integrated 

Weapons and Armaments Research, Development and 

Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation Center 231

Table 43: Estimated Costs and Savings for the Rejected Closure of 

Los Angeles Air Force Base 235

Table 44: Major Improvements to COBRA for the BRAC 2005 

Round 239

Table 45: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Negative Impact on 

Employment 252

Table 46: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Positive Economic 

Impact on Employment 252

Figures Figure 1: DOD’s BRAC Leadership Structure 9

Figure 2: DOD’s Selection Criteria for BRAC 2005 Round 11

Figure 3: DOD’s BRAC 2005 Process 12

Figure 4: Major Base Closures with Plant Replacement Values 

Exceeding $100 Million 15

Figure 5: Major Base Realignments with a Net Loss of 400 or More 

Military and Civilian Personnel 16

Figure 6: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings 22

Figure 7: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC 

Recommendations 31

Figure 8: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value for a Technical Facility 35

Figure 9: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of an Army Installation 76

Figure 10: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Naval Aviation Operations 98

Figure 11: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Fighter Aircraft 116

Figure 12: Realignment of Fighter Aircraft at Lambert-St. Louis Air 

Guard Station and Otis Air National Guard Base 127

Figure 13: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Flight Training 137

Figure 14: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Major Administrative and 

Headquarters Activities 150
Contents

Page v GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 15: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Depot Maintenance 

Activities 171

Figure 16: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of an Intelligence Facility 189

Figure 17: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Health Care Services 199

Figure 18: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of Supply and Storage 

Activities 211

Figure 19: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to 

Assess Military Value of a Technical Facility 224

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.

Abbreviations

BRAC base realignment and closure 

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DOD Department of Defense

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

IEC Infrastructure Executive Council

ISG Infrastructure Steering Group

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Page 1 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 1, 2005 Letr

Congressional Committees

It has been 10 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) last conducted 

a base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.1

 As a result of prior BRAC 

rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, DOD reports that it has reduced its 

domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent in terms of plant replacement 

value,2

 transferred hundreds of thousand of acres of unneeded property to 

other federal and nonfederal entities, and saved billions of dollars on an 

annual recurring basis for application to higher priority defense needs. 

Despite these infrastructure reductions, DOD recognized the need for 

additional closures and realignments following the 1995 closure round and 

made repeated efforts to gain congressional authorization for an additional 

closure round. 

We too have frequently reported in recent years on the long-term 

challenges DOD faces in managing its portfolio of facilities, halting 

degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up 

funds to better maintain enduring facilities and meet other needs. Because 

of these long-standing issues, DOD’s management of its support 

infrastructure has been included in our list of high-risk areas since 1997. 

Congress authorized an additional BRAC round for 2005 with the passage 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (the Act).3

The 2002 Act essentially extended the authority of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,4

 which had authorized the 1991, 1993, 

and 1995 rounds, with some modifications for the 2005 base closure round. 

The BRAC legislation provides for an independent Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of Defense’s 

realignment and closure recommendations, which were publicly 

announced on May 13, 2005, and present its findings and conclusions on the 

Secretary’s recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the 

1

 Definitions of closures and realignments and other BRAC-related terms are included in 

app. II.

2

 DOD defines plant replacement value as the cost to replace an existing facility with a 

facility of the same size at the same location, using today’s building standards.

3

 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001).

4

 P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX (Nov. 5, 1990); 10 U.S.C. 2687, note.
Page 2 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

President, by September 8, 2005. The President, in turn, must either 

approve or disapprove the Commission’s recommendations in their entirety 

by September 23, 2005. If approved, the recommendations are forwarded to 

Congress, which has 45 days or until the adjournment of Congress to 

disapprove the recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, they 

become binding.5

 If the President disapproves the recommendations, the 

Commission must consider the President’s objections and send a revised 

report back to the President no later than October 20, 2005. The President 

then has until November 7, 2005, to forward his approval of the revised 

Commission recommendations to Congress for its review. 

Considering changes in the national security environment and emerging 

threats, along with ongoing changes in the United States defense strategy 

to address these threats and protect our homeland, DOD has come to 

realize the need to reshape its base structure to more effectively support its 

military forces. In establishing goals for the 2005 BRAC round, the 

Secretary of Defense, in a November 15, 2002, memorandum initiating the 

round, expressed his interest in (1) reducing excess infrastructure, which 

diverts scarce resources from overall defense capability, and producing 

savings; (2) transforming DOD by aligning the infrastructure with the 

defense strategy; and (3) fostering jointness by examining and 

implementing opportunities for greater jointness across DOD. 

In the submission of his recommendations to the BRAC Commission on 

May 13, 2005, the Secretary reported that his recommendations, if 

approved, would accomplish these goals. DOD reported that its 222 

recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 closure and 

realignment actions—including 33 major base closures and 30 major 

realignments, plus numerous other closures and realignments would 

generate annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal 

year 2012.

Legislation authorizing the 2005 round maintained the requirement, 

applicable to three previous rounds, that we provide a detailed analysis of 

the Secretary’s recommendations and the selection process. Our objectives 

were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD achieved its stated goals for 

BRAC 2005, (2) analyze whether DOD’s selection process in developing 

5

 Once the recommendations become binding, DOD must initiate closure or realignment 

actions no later than 2 years and complete these actions within 6 years from the date the 

President transmits his report to Congress. P.L. 101-510, section 2904. 
Page 3 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

recommended actions was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues 

regarding the recommendations that may warrant attention by the BRAC 

Commission. 

To analyze the selection process and the recommendations, we monitored 

various aspects of the process as it evolved over time leading up to and 

following the public release of the Secretary’s recommendations. We 

sought to assure ourselves that DOD followed a logical, reasoned, and welldocumented decision-making process leading to the proposed 

recommendations. Prior to the release of the recommendations, we abided 

by an agreement with DOD not to disclose details of the process due to the 

sensitivity of the information while the process evolved. With the approval 

of the large number of recommendations occurring in the final weeks of the 

process, the broad scope and complexity of the recommendations, and the 

limited time available for us to report our results, we generally focused 

greater attention following the announcement of the proposed closures and 

realignments on those issues affecting more than one recommendation 

than on issues pertaining to the implementation of individual 

recommendations. However, as time permitted, we visited selected 

installations to better gauge the operational and economic impact of the 

proposed recommendations. We generally experienced good access to 

relevant documentation and to key senior officials and staff involved in the 

BRAC process.

We performed our work primarily at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the military services’ base closure offices, and the offices of the 

seven joint cross-service groups that were established by the Secretary to 

propose cross-service recommendations.6

 While we did not attend 

deliberative meetings, we had access to minutes of meetings and relevant 

documentation, as well as opportunities to meet periodically with senior 

leadership to provide observations or concerns we had as the process was 

unfolding. We relied on DOD’s Office of the Inspector General, Army Audit 

Agency, Naval Audit Service, and Air Force Audit Agency to validate the 

accuracy of the data used by the military services and joint cross-service 

groups in their decision-making process. We met with staff members of 

these audit agencies periodically to discuss the results of their work as well 

as to observe their data validation efforts at selected locations. Based on 

these discussions and observations and a review of their reports, we 

6

 The seven joint cross-service groups were Education and Training; Headquarters and 

Support Activities; Industrial; Intelligence; Medical; Supply and Storage; and Technical.
Page 4 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We conducted our work from October 2003, as DOD’s process was 

beginning, through June 2005, shortly after the Secretary of Defense 

announced his proposed closures and realignments, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details on the 

scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

Results in Brief DOD’s recommendations, if approved, would have varying degrees of 

success in achieving goals that were set forth by the Secretary of Defense, 

despite producing closure and realignment actions numbering more than 

those of all four previous rounds combined. The department’s 

recommendations were dominated by relatively minor closures and 

realignments, and many were related to the reserve components.7

 DOD 

data indicate that implementing the proposed recommendations would 

reduce the defense infrastructure by about 5 percent based on the facilities’ 

plant replacement value. We believe the recommendations overall, if 

approved, would produce savings. However, overall up-front investment 

costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and there are limitations 

associated with DOD’s projection of nearly $50 billion in net present value 

savings over a 20-year period.8

 Most projected savings are derived from 10 

percent of the 222 recommendations. Also, much of the projected net 

annual recurring savings (47 percent) are associated with eliminating jobs 

currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing endstrength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned 

to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings 

available for other uses. Without recognition that these are not dollar 

savings that can be readily applied elsewhere, this could create a false 

sense of savings available for other purposes. Furthermore, about $500 

million of the net annual recurring savings is based on business process 

reengineering efforts, but some of the assumptions supporting the 

expected efficiency gains have not been validated; while savings are likely 

to be realized, the precise magnitude of savings is uncertain. For example, 

one of DOD’s recommendations—to create fleet readiness centers in the 

7

 The reserve components consist of the Army National Guard of the United States, the 

Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the 

United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

8

In the context of BRAC, net present value is taking into account the time value of money in 

calculating the value of future cost and savings.
Page 5 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Navy by integrating different levels of maintenance to reduce repair time—

is estimated to yield $215 million in annual recurring savings as a result of 

overhead efficiencies, but such assumptions have not been validated and 

actual savings will be shaped by how the recommendations are 

implemented. We have previously reported on limitations in DOD’s efforts 

to track and update savings from prior BRAC rounds. Our concerns over 

this issue are heightened in this BRAC round, with the emphasis on 

business process reengineering efforts, because of past tendencies to 

reduce related operating budgets in advance of actual savings being known 

and fully realized. While DOD characterized many of its recommendations 

as transformational—whereby infrastructure would be aligned with the 

defense strategy—we found that the concept of transformation is not well 

defined, and many of the recommendations referencing it as support for 

the proposed BRAC actions are more appropriately categorized as efforts 

to improve business processes. Some proposed actions increase emphasis 

on jointness, such as establishing a single site for initial training for the 

Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. However, the extent of joint and 

transformational progress varied, as shown by other DOD-proposed 

actions reflecting preferences to consolidate functions within rather than 

across services, and by a lack of agreement on transformational options 

despite frequent references to them in support of proposed actions. We are 

making a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to establish 

mechanisms for tracking and periodically updating savings estimates as the 

BRAC recommendations are implemented. 

DOD’s decision-making process for developing its recommendations was 

generally logical, well documented, and reasoned. DOD established a 

structured and largely sequential process for obtaining and analyzing data 

that provided an informed basis for identifying and evaluating BRAC 

options. At the same time, initial difficulties in obtaining complete and 

accurate data in a timely manner often added to overlap and varying 

degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in 

the process. That notwithstanding, DOD’s process relied on certified data,9

as required by the BRAC legislation, and the use of various analytical 

models to evaluate the data. Further, as the military services and joint 

cross-service groups assessed the importance of installations, facilities, 

and functions, they were consistent in following the key considerations set 

9

 During the BRAC process, data were certified by senior officials at DOD installations. Each 

official certified that the information was accurate and complete to the best of his or her 

knowledge and belief.
Page 6 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

forth in the BRAC law—such as military value—although they varied 

somewhat in their analytical approaches based on unique aspects of the 

functions being evaluated. As Congress mandated, DOD updated and 

considered its 20-year force structure plan in completing its BRAC 

analysis.10 Further, DOD focused on the military value selection criteria as 

the predominant decision-making factor, including legislatively mandated 

emphasis for this BRAC round on such elements as homeland defense and 

surge capability. Military judgment also played a role throughout the 

process. While the effort to ensure the accuracy of the voluminous 

amounts of data used in the process proved challenging for the services 

and joint cross-service groups, the DOD Inspector General and the military 

service audit agencies played key roles in pointing out data limitations, 

fostering corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the 

process through their validation efforts, and generally found the data 

sufficiently reliable to support BRAC decision making.

We identified various issues regarding DOD’s BRAC recommendations, as 

well as candidate recommendations11 that were not included on DOD’s final 

list that may warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. These 

issues include instances of lengthy payback periods, which is the time 

required to recoup up-front investment costs for closing or realigning a 

facility or function; inconsistencies in formulating cost and savings 

estimates; uncertainties in estimating total costs to the government for 

implementing recommended actions; and potential impacts on 

communities surrounding bases that are either losing or gaining large 

numbers of personnel. With respect to the latter issue, this BRAC round 

differs from prior rounds in that many communities will be facing 

increased growth with the return of thousands of forces from overseas 

locations and the consequent challenges of addressing increased needs in 

areas such as schools and housing. In a few instances, we identified 

implementation or operational issues related to some recommendations. 

We are also highlighting specific closure or realignment actions that were 

projected as having the potential to generate significant savings that the 

services or joint cross-service groups approved for further consideration, 

10 P.L. 101-510, section 2912(a)(1)(A) required DOD to develop a 20-year force structure plan 

as the basis for its BRAC analysis.

11 Candidate recommendations refer to proposed recommendations that were approved by 

either the military services or joint cross-service groups and forwarded for review to DOD’s 

Infrastructure Steering Group and Infrastructure Executive Council. 
Page 7 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

but which were either deleted or substantially revised by senior DOD 

leadership during the latter phases of the selection process.

In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with 

the recommendation regarding the need for a system to track and 

periodically update BRAC savings estimates.

Background As described at the beginning of this report, DOD recognized the need for 

additional base closures and realignments following the 1995 closure round 

and made repeated efforts to gain congressional authorization for an 

additional closure round. Congress authorized an additional round for 2005 

with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2002.12 The 2002 Act essentially extended the authority of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,13 which had authorized the 1991, 

1993, and 1995 rounds, with some modifications for the 2005 base closure 

round. 

In a memorandum dated November 15, 2002, the Secretary of Defense 

issued initial guidance outlining goals and a leadership framework for the 

2005 BRAC round. In doing so, he noted that “At a minimum, BRAC 2005 

must eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, sustainment and 

recapitalization of which diverts scarce resources from defense capability.” 

However, specific reduction goals were not established.14 At the same time, 

the Secretary’s guidance for the 2005 round depicted the round as focusing 

on more than the reduction of excess capacity. He said that “BRAC 2005 

can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the 

Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy.” He 

further noted that “A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to 

realigning our base structure to meet our post-Cold War force structure, is 

to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity.” Toward 

that end, the Secretary indicated that organizationally the 2005 BRAC 

12 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001).

13 P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX (Nov. 5, 1990); 10 U.S.C. 2687 note.

14 This contrasts with secretarial guidance issued in January 1994, initiating the 1995 BRAC 

round, which established the goal of reducing domestic base structure by a minimum of 15 

percent of DOD-wide plant replacement value. The Secretary of Defense indicated in a 

March 2004 report to Congress that DOD likely had about 24 percent excess facility capacity 

going into the 2005 BRAC round. 
Page 8 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

analysis would be two pronged. Joint cross-service teams would analyze 

common business-oriented functions, and the military departments would 

analyze service-unique functions. 

The Secretary of Defense established two senior groups to oversee and 

guide the BRAC 2005 process from a departmental perspective. The first 

was the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), which was designated the 

policy-making and oversight body for the entire process, and the second, a 

subordinate group, was the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), created to 

oversee the joint cross-service analyses and integrate that process with the 

military departments’ own service-unique analyses. Each of the military 

departments also established BRAC organizations, which had oversight 

from senior leaders. Likewise, each of the joint cross-service teams, under 

the purview of the ISG, was led by senior military or civilian officials, with 

representation from each of the services and relevant defense agencies. 

DOD’s BRAC leadership structure is shown in figure 1.
Page 9 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 1: DOD’s BRAC Leadership Structure

DOD developed a draft set of 77 transformational options that once 

approved, were expected to constitute a minimum analytical framework 

upon which the military departments and joint cross-service groups would 

conduct their respective BRAC analyses. Because of a lack of agreement 

among the services and OSD, the draft options were never formally 

approved, but they remained available for consideration by analytical 

teams and were referenced by some groups in support of various BRAC

Secretary of Defense

Infrastructure

Executive Council 

Chair: Deputy Secretary

of Defense 

Infrastructure 

Steering Group 

Chair: Under Secretary

of Defense 

(Acquisition,Technology, 

and Logistics) 

Army Navy Air Force

Education and Training

Industrial

Intelligence

Medical

Supply and Storage

Technical

Headquarters and 

Support Activites

Senior

Review Group

The Army

 Basing Study 

Group

Infrastructure

Evaluation

Group

Infrastructure

Analysis Team

Base Closure

Executive Group 

Base Closure

Working Group

Joint Cross-Service Groups

Source: DOD.

Membership: (10)

• Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Service Vice Chiefs

• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

 (Installations and Environment) 

• Military Department Assistant Secretaries 

 (Installations and Environment)

Membership: (10)

• Military Department Secretaries and 

 their Service Chiefs

• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

 Technology, and Logistics)
Page 10 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

actions being considered.15 (See app. XV for a list of the draft 

transformational options.) To some extent, the analyses and 

recommendations of each of the services and joint cross-service groups 

were also influenced by various guiding principles or policy imperatives 

developed by the respective service or joint cross-service groups, such as 

the need to preserve a particular capability in a particular location.

The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, enacted as part of the 

fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, required DOD to give priority to 

selection criteria dealing with military value and added elements of 

specificity to criteria previously used by DOD in prior BRAC rounds. 

Subsequently, The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 200516 codified the entire selection criteria and added the 

word “surge” to one previously used criterion related to potential future 

contingencies and mobilization efforts. In large measure, the final criteria 

closely followed the criteria DOD employed in prior rounds, with greater 

specificity added in some areas, as required by Congress. Figure 2 shows 

DOD’s selection criteria for 2005, with changes from BRAC 1995 denoted in 

bold.17

15 DOD broadly defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of 

military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, 

people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against 

asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and 

stability in the world.” Examples of draft transformational options included (1) consolidate 

management at installations with shared boundaries and (2) establish regional cross-service 

and cross-functional ranges that will support service, collective, interoperability, and joint 

training, as well as test and evaluation of weapon systems.

16 P.L. 108-375, section 2832 (Oct. 28, 2004).

17 In this report, we refer to the selection criteria by the numbering method used by DOD 

instead of the specific statutory provisions detailing these criteria as contained in P.L. 101-

510, section 2913.
Page 11 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 2: DOD’s Selection Criteria for BRAC 2005 Round

Source: DOD and P.L. 101-510, section 2913.

Note: Bolding denotes changes from the 1995 BRAC round.

To ensure that the selection criteria were consistently applied, OSD 

established a common analytical framework to be used by each military 

service and joint cross-service group. Each service and group adapted this 

framework, in varying degrees, to its individual activities and functions in 

evaluating facilities and functions and identifying closure and realignment 

options. Despite the diversity of bases and cross-service functions 

analyzed, each of the groups was expected to first analyze capacity and 

military value of its respective facilities or functions, and then to identify 

and evaluate various closure and realignment scenarios and provide 

specific recommendations. Scenarios were derived from data analysis and 

transformational options, as well as from goals and objectives each group 

established for itself as it began its work. Figure 3 depicts the expected 

progression of that process. 

• Military value criteria.

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness 

of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint 

warfighting, training, and readiness.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including 

training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a 

diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed 

Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving 

locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force 

requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations 

and training.

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

• Other criteria.

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, 

beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to 

exceed the costs.

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military 

installations.

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving 

communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential 

environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance 

activities.
Page 12 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 3: DOD’s BRAC 2005 Process

An initial part of the process involved an overall capacity analysis of 

specific locations or functions and subfunctions at specific locations. The 

analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to assess such factors 

as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, excess 

capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge requirements. 

The military value analysis consisted of assessments of operational and 

physical characteristics of each installation, or specific functions on an 

installation related to a specific joint cross-service group’s area of 

responsibility. These would include an installation’s or function’s current 

and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to accommodate 

future needs, and cost of operations. This analysis also relied on data calls 

to obtain certified data on the various attributes and metrics used to assess 

each of the four military value criteria and permit meaningful comparisons 

between like installations/facilities with reference to the collective military 

value selection criteria. DOD officials used these data to develop 

comparative military value scores for each installation/facility or for 

categories of facilities serving like functions.

The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying 

various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. These 

scenarios were to be derived from consideration of the department’s 20-

year force structure plan, capacity analysis, military value analysis, and 

transformational options; applicable guiding principles, objectives, or 

policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint crossservice groups; and military judgment. Each component had available for 

its use an optimization or linear programming model that could combine 

the results of capacity and military value analyses and other information to 

derive scenarios and sets of alternatives. The model could be used to 

address varying policy imperatives or objectives, such as minimizing the 

number of sites, minimizing the amount of excess capacity, or maximizing 

the average military value. A BRAC review group could also direct 

Finalize

recommendations

Proposed 

base 

realignments

and closures

Capacity

analysis

Military 

value

analysis

Scenario 

development

and analysis

Source: DOD.
Page 13 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

variations that would, for example, eliminate as much excess capacity as 

possible while maintaining an average military value at least as high as the 

original set of sites. 

OSD policy guidance has historically specified that priority consideration 

be given to military value in making closure and realignment decisions, but 

that priority was specifically mandated by the legislation authorizing the 

2005 BRAC round. At the same time, historic practice and the 2005 

authorizing legislation both required consideration of additional issues 

included in selection criteria 5 through 8, detailed below:

• Criterion 5—costs and savings: This criterion consists of measures of 

costs and savings and the payback periods18 associated with them. Each 

component assessed costs using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions 

(COBRA) model that was used in each of the BRAC rounds since 1988. 

Appendix XIII summarizes improvements that have been made to the 

model over time and more recently for the 2005 round.

• Criterion 6—economic impact: This criterion measures the direct and 

indirect impacts of a BRAC action on employment in the communities 

affected by a closure or realignment. Appendix XIV provides a more 

complete description of how economic impact was assessed and the 

changes made to improve the assessment for this round.

• Criterion 7—community infrastructure: Selection criterion 7 

examines “the ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and 

potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and 

personnel.” The services and joint cross-service groups considered 

information on demographics, childcare, cost of living, employment, 

education, housing, medical care, safety and crime, transportation, and 

public utilities of the communities impacted by a BRAC action.

• Criterion 8—environmental impact: Selection criterion 8 assesses “the 

environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential 

environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental 

compliance activities” of closure and realignment recommendations. In 

18 Payback period is defined as the number of years, beginning with the date of completion 

of a closure or realignment, required for cumulative estimated savings to exceed cumulative 

estimated costs incurred in net present value terms as a result of implementing a BRAC 

action.
Page 14 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

considering this criterion, the services and joint cross-service groups 

focused mainly on potential environmental impacts while 

acknowledging, when appropriate, known environmental restoration 

costs associated with an installation recommended for closure or 

realignment. Waste management and environmental compliance costs 

were factored into criterion 5. However, under OSD policy guidance, 

environmental restoration costs were not considered in the cost and 

savings analyses for evaluating individual scenarios under criterion 5. 

DOD is obligated to restore contaminated sites on military bases 

regardless of whether they are closed, and such costs could be affected 

by reuse plans that cannot be known at this time but would be budgeted 

for at a later time when those plans and costs are better identified. 

Each of the military departments produced reports with closure and 

realignment recommendations, as did each of the joint cross-service 

groups, the results of which are summarized in appendixes III through XII. 

Figures 4 and 5 show, respectively, the 33 major closures and 30 major 

realignments that have been recommended by DOD where plant 

replacement values exceed $100 million for major base closures and net 

losses of 400 or more military and civilian personnel for major base 

realignments.
Page 15 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 4: Major Base Closures with Plant Replacement Values Exceeding $100 Million 

Naval Station 

Ingleside, TX

Red River 

Army Depot, TX

Fort McPherson, GA

Lone Star Army 

Ammunition Plant, TX

Naval Support Activity Corona, CA

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS

Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS

Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR

Naval Shipyard 

Portsmouth, ME

W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station, MI

Hawthorne Army Depot, NV

Naval Weapons Station

Seal Beach 

Concord Detachment, CA

Onizuka Air Force Station, CA

Riverbank Army 

Ammunition Plant, CA

Deseret Chemical Depot, UT

Kulis Air Guard Station, AK

Kansas Army 

Ammunition Plant, KS

Brooks City-Base, TX

Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA

Fort Monmouth, NJ

Otis Air National 

Guard Base, MA

Fort Monroe, VA

General Mitchell 

Air Reserve Station, WI

Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD

Newport Chemical Depot, IN

Submarine Base

New London, CT

Pittsburgh 

International 

Airport Air 

Reserve Station, PA

Selfridge 

Army Activity, MI

Niagara Falls 

International 

Airport Air Reserve 

Station, NY 

Naval Air Station Willow Grove, PA

Fort Gillem, GA

Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA

Source: GAO map based on DOD data.

Cannon Air Force Base, NM
Page 16 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 5: Major Base Realignments with a Net Loss of 400 or More Military and Civilian Personnel 

While the 2005 BRAC round, like earlier BRAC rounds, was chartered to 

focus on United States domestic bases,19 DOD separately had under way a 

review of overseas basing requirements that had implications for the 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX

Naval Support Activity Crane, IN

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL

Naval Air Station 

Pensacola, FL

Naval Medical Center 

Portsmouth, VA

Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

Defense Finance 

and Accounting 

Service, 

Arlington, VA

Rock Island Arsenal, IL

Eielson Air Force Base, AK

Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK

Multiple leased 

locations, 

Washington, DC 

metropolitan area

McChord Air Force Base, WA

Portland International Airport 

Air Guard Station, OR

Marine Corps Logistics Base 

Barstow, CA

Naval Base Ventura City, CA

Naval Base Coronado, CA

Naval Medical Center 

San Diego, CA

Lackland Air Force Base, TX

Sheppard Air Force Base, TX Army Reserve 

Personnel Center, 

St. Louis, MO

Naval Station 

Great Lakes, IL

Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service, 

Cleveland, OH

Fort Knox, KY

Naval District, 

Washington, DC

Walter Reed Army 

Medical Center, 

Washington, DC

Marine Corps Air Station 

Cherry Point, NC

Fort Eustis, VA

Source: GAO map based on DOD data.

Pope Air Force Base, NC

Naval Air Station 

Brunswick, ME

19 Besides the 50 states, this also includes the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico; Guam; the Virgin Islands; American Samoa; and any other commonwealth, 

territory, or possession of the United States. P.L. 101-510, section 2910(7).
Page 17 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

domestic BRAC process. In a September 2004 report to Congress, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided an update on DOD’s “global 

defense posture review.” It noted that once completed, the changes 

stemming from the review would result in the most profound reordering of 

United States military forces overseas as the current posture has been 

largely unchanged since the Korean War. The report noted that over the 

next 10 years, it is planned that up to 70,000 military personnel would 

return to the United States, along with approximately 100,000 family 

members and civilian employees. It further noted that a net reduction of 

approximately 35 percent of overseas sites—bases, installations, and 

facilities—is planned. DOD had indicated that the domestic BRAC process 

would be used in making decisions on where to relocate forces returning to 

the United States from overseas bases. 

Separately, Congress in 2003 mandated the creation of a special 

commission to evaluate, among other things, the current and proposed 

overseas basing structure of the United States military forces.20 The 

Commission’s observations are included in its May 2005 report.21 Among 

other things, the Commission cited the need for appropriate planning to 

ensure the availability of community infrastructure to support returning 

troops and to mitigate the impact on communities.

DOD’s 

Recommendations 

Would Have Varying 

Degrees of Success in 

Achieving Goals for the 

2005 BRAC Round

The recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Defense would have 

varying degrees of success in achieving DOD’s BRAC 2005 goals of 

reducing infrastructure and achieving savings, furthering transformation 

objectives, and fostering joint activity among the military services. While 

DOD proposed a record number of closure and realignment actions, 

exceeding those in all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focus 

on the reserve component bases and relatively few on closing active bases. 

Projected savings are almost equally as large, as all prior BRAC rounds 

combined, but about 80 percent of the projected 20-year net present value 

savings (savings minus up-front investment costs) are derived from only 10 

percent of the recommendations. While we believe the recommendations 

20 The Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, 

also known as the Overseas Basing Commission. See P.L. 108-132, section 128 (Nov. 22, 

2003).

21 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States 

(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005).
Page 18 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

overall would achieve savings, up-front investment costs of about 

$24 billion are required to implement all recommendations to achieve 

DOD’s overall expected savings of nearly $50 billion over 20 years. Much of 

these saving are related to eliminations of jobs currently held by military 

personnel but are not likely to result in end-strength reductions, limiting 

savings available for other purposes. Some proposed actions represent 

some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, but progress 

in these efforts varied without clear agreement on transformational options 

to be considered, and many recommendations tended to foster jointness by 

consolidating functions within rather than across military services. 

BRAC 2005 Round Differs 

from Past Rounds

The BRAC 2005 round is different from previous base closure rounds in 

terms of number of actions, projected implementation costs, and estimated 

annual recurring savings. While the number of major closures and 

realignments is just a little greater than individual previous rounds, the 

number of minor closure and realignments, as shown in table 1, is 

significantly greater than those in all previous rounds combined. 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds

Source: DOD.

The large increase in minor closures and realignments is attributable partly 

to actions involving the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Air National 

Guard, and vacating leased space. 

Dollars in billions

Major bases 

Round Closures Realignments

Minor closures

and realignments Total actions Costs

Net annual

recurring savings

1988 16 4 23 43 $2.7 $0.9

1991 26 17 32 75 5.2 2.0

1993 28 12 123 163 7.6 2.6

1995 27 22 57 106 6.5 1.7

Total (for previous 

BRAC rounds)

97 55 235 387 $22.0 $7.2

Total (for 2005 

BRAC round)

33 30 774 837 $24.4 $5.5
Page 19 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The costs to implement the proposed actions are $24.4 billion compared to 

a $22 billion total from the four previous rounds through 2001, the end of 

the 6-year implementation period for the 1995 BRAC round.22 The increase 

in costs is due partly to significant military construction and moving costs 

associated with Army recommendations to realign its force structure, and 

to recommendations to move activities from leased space onto military 

installations. For example, the Army projects that it will need about 

$2.3 billion in military construction funds to build facilities for the troops 

returning from overseas. Likewise, DOD projects that it will need an 

additional $1.3 billion to build facilities for recommendations that include 

activities being moved from leased space. Time will be required for these 

costs to be offset by savings from BRAC actions and this in turn affects the 

point at which net annual recurring savings can begin to accrue.

Finally, the projected net annual recurring savings are $5.5 billion 

compared to net annual recurring savings of $2.6 billion and $1.7 billion for 

the 1993 and 1995 rounds respectively. The increased savings are partly 

attributable to significant reductions in the number of military positions 

and business process reengineering efforts.

Infrastructure Would Likely 

Be Reduced with Some 

Limitations Noted

DOD projects that the proposed recommendations would reduce excess 

infrastructure capacity, indicating that the plant replacement value of 

domestic installations would be reduced by about $27 billion, or 5 percent. 

However, the projected reductions in plant replacement value did not 

account for the $2.2 billion in domestic military construction projects 

associated with relocating forces from overseas. On the other hand, 

reductions in leased space are not considered in the plant replacement 

value analysis, since leased space is not government owned. DOD 

estimates that its recommendations will reduce about 12 million square 

feet of leased space. 

22 We most recently reported that these costs were $23.3 billion through fiscal year 2003 and 

they excluded an estimated $3.6 billion in costs that are needed to complete environmental 

cleanup at BRAC bases in future years. Also, they did not include about $1.9 billion in costs 

incurred by other DOD and federal agencies to provide assistance to communities and 

individuals impacted by BRAC as a result of prior BRAC rounds.
Page 20 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

DOD Projects 

Recommendations Would 

Produce Savings, but there 

are Limitations Associated 

with the Savings Estimates

DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly 

$50 billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring 

savings of about $5.5 billion. There are limitations associated with the 

savings claimed from military personnel reductions and we believe there is 

uncertainty regarding the magnitude of savings likely to be realized in other 

areas given unvalidated assumptions regarding expected efficiency gains 

from business process reengineering efforts and projected savings from 

sustainment, recapitalization, and base operating support.23

Table 2 summarizes the projected one-time cost, the cost or savings 

anticipated during the 6-year implementation period for the closure or 

realignment, the estimated net annual recurring savings, and the projected 

20-year net present value costs or savings of DOD’s recommendations. 24

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 Recommendations

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

23 Sustainment refers to recurring maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep 

facilities in good working order. Recapitalization refers to major renovation or 

reconstruction activities (including facility replacement) needed to keep facilities modern 

and efficient in an environment of changing standards and missions. Base operating support 

refers to a collection of day-to-day programs, activities, and services, such as food services, 

grounds maintenance, and custodial services, needed to keep the bases and installations in 

running order. 

24 These projections exclude environmental restoration costs, which historically have not 

been included in BRAC costs and savings analyses because restoration is a liability that 

exists regardless of whether a base is closed, but are included in implementation budgets 

once BRAC recommendations have become binding.

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

DOD component

One-time

(cost)

Net

implementation

(cost) or savings

Net annual

recurring

(cost) or

savingsa

20-year net

present value

(cost) or

savingsb

Army ($9,963.4) ($8,519.1) $497.6 ($3,038.6)

Navy (2,099.8) 440.7 753.5 7,713.7

Air Force (1,883.1) 2,635.5 1,248.5 14,560.3

Joint cross-service 

groups (10,466.1) 1,372.8 2,985.1 29,569.1

Total ($24,412.4) ($4,070.1) $5,484.7 $48,804.5
Page 21 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

a

Projected annual recurring savings after the 6-year implementation period.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

Table 2 also shows the Navy, Air Force, and joint cross-service groups all 

projecting net savings within the 6-year implementation period, as well as 

significant 20-year net savings. In contrast, because of the nature of the 

Army’s proposed actions and costs, such as providing infrastructure for 

troops returning from overseas and the consolidation and recapitalization 

of reserve facilities, the Army does not achieve net savings either during 

the implementation period or within 20 years, based on recommendations 

included in its BRAC report.

Notwithstanding these projected savings, we identified limitations or 

uncertainties about the magnitude of savings likely to be realized. As figure 

6 shows, 47 percent of the net annual recurring savings can be attributed to 

projected military personnel reductions. About 40 percent ($2.1 billion) of 

the projected net annual recurring savings can be attributed to savings 

from operation and maintenance activities, which include terminating or 

reducing property sustainment and recapitalization, base operating 

support, and civilian payroll. Furthermore, about $500 million of the 

“other” savings is based on business process reengineering efforts, but 

some of the assumptions supporting the expected efficiency gains have not 

been validated. 
Page 22 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 6: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings 

Note: Analysis does not include data from one classified recommendation.

Military Personnel Savings Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) are 

associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel; 

but rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions 

are expected to be reassigned to other areas, limiting dollar savings 

available for other uses. For example, although the Air Force projects net 

annual recurring savings of about $732 million from eliminating about 

10,200 military positions, Air Force officials stated the active duty positions 

will be reinvested to relieve stress on high demand career fields and the 

reserve positions to new missions yet to be identified. Likewise, the Army 

is projecting savings from eliminating about 5,800 military positions, but it 

has no plans to reduce its end-strength. Finally, the Navy is projecting it will 

eliminate about 4,000 active duty military positions, which a Navy official 

noted will help it achieve the end-strength reductions already planned. As 

47%

Civilian personnel 

$1,271

24%

Military personnel

$2,530

13%

Sustainment and recapitalization

$457

Base operations support

$400

9%

7%

Source: GAO.

All other savings

$699

Dollars in millions
Page 23 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

we noted during our review of DOD’s process during the 1995 BRAC round, 

since these personnel will be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of 

the force structure, they do not represent dollar savings that can be readily 

reallocated outside the personnel accounts.25 Without recognition that 

these are not dollar savings that can be readily applied elsewhere, this 

could create a false sense of savings available for use in other areas 

traditionally cited as a beneficiary of BRAC savings, such as making more 

funds available for modernization and better maintenance of remaining 

facilities.

Sustainment, Recapitalization, 

and Base Operating Support 

Savings

DOD is also projecting savings from the sustainment and recapitalization of 

facilities that are scheduled to be demolished, as well as from facilities that 

might remain in DOD’s real property inventory when activities are 

realigned from one base to another. For example, the Industrial Joint 

Cross-Service Group is claiming about $20 million in annual recurring 

savings from the recapitalization of facilities at installations responsible for 

destroying chemical weapons at three locations recommended for 

closure.26 However, the Army had already expected to demolish these 

chemical destruction facilities upon completing the destruction of the 

chemical weapons at each site and the Army has not identified future 

missions for these installations. As a result, we do not believe it is 

appropriate for the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group to claim any 

recapitalization savings related to these installations.

Likewise, DOD is projecting savings from the recapitalization and 

sustainment of facilities in cases where functions or activities would be 

realigned from one base to another. However, it is not clear to what extent 

the proposed realignments would result in an entire building or portion of a 

building being vacated, or if entire buildings are vacated, whether they 

would be declared excess and removed from the military services’ real 

property inventory. Our analysis shows that the supply and storage group’s 

recommendations project about $100 million in sustainment and 

recapitalization savings from realigning defense distribution depots. The 

group estimates its recommendations will vacate about 27 million square 

feet of storage space. Supply and storage officials told us their goal is to 

25 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for 

Closure and Realignment, GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995).

26 The sites are the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; 

and Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah.
Page 24 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

vacate as much space as possible by re-warehousing inventory and by 

reducing personnel spaces, but they do not have a specific plan for what 

will happen to the space once it is vacated. In addition, until these 

recommendations are ultimately approved and implemented, DOD will not 

be in a good position to know exactly how much space is available or how 

this space will be disposed of or utilized. As a result, it is unclear as to how 

much of the estimated $100 million in annual recurring savings will actually 

occur.

Collectively, the issues we identified suggest the potential for reduced 

savings that are likely to be realized in the short term during the 

implementation period, which could further reduce net annual recurring 

savings realized in the long term. The short-term impact is that these 

reduced savings could adversely affect DOD’s plans for using these BRAC 

savings to help offset the up-front investment costs required to implement 

the recommendations and could further limit the amount of savings 

available for transformation and modernization purposes.

Savings Based on Business 

Process Reengineering

DOD projected net annual recurring savings in the “other” category as 

shown in figure 6 include about $500 million that is based on business 

process reengineering efforts. Our analysis indicates that four 

recommendations—one from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group and 

three from the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group—involve 

primarily business process reengineering efforts. However, the expected 

efficiency gains from these recommendations are based on assumptions 

that are subject to some uncertainty and have not been validated. For 

example, our analysis indicates that $215 million, or 63 percent, of the 

estimated annual recurring savings from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 

Group recommendation to create fleet readiness centers within the Navy is 

based on business reengineering efforts that would result in overhead 

efficiencies. Although the data suggest there is the potential for savings, we 

believe the magnitude of the savings is somewhat uncertain because the 

estimates are based on assumptions that have undergone only limited 

testing. Realizing the full extent of the savings would depend on actual 

implementation of the recommended actions and modifications to the 

Navy’s supply system. The industrial group and the Navy assumed that 

combining depot and intermediate maintenance levels would reduce the 

time needed for an item to be repaired at the intermediate level, which in 

turn would reduce the number of items needing to be kept in inventory, as 

well as the number of items being sent to a depot for repair. These 

assumptions, which were the major determinant of the realignment 

savings, were reportedly based on historical data and pilot projects and 
Page 25 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

have not been independently reviewed or verified by the Naval Audit 

Service, the DOD Inspector General, or us. 

Furthermore, our analysis indicates that $291 million, or about 72 percent, 

of the net annual recurring savings expected from the Supply and Storage 

Joint Cross-Service Group’s three recommendations are also based on 

business process reengineering. In the COBRA model, the savings are 

categorized as procurement savings and are based on the expanded use of 

performance-based logistics27 and reductions to duplicate inventory.

Supply and storage group staff said that these savings accrue from reduced 

contract prices because the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will have 

increased buying power since it is responsible for purchasing many more 

items that before were purchased by each of the services. In addition, 

savings accrue from increased use of performance-based agreements,28 a 

key component of performance-based logistics. The group estimates DLA 

can save 2.8 cents on each contract dollar placed on performance-based 

agreements. In addition, savings result from reductions in the amount of 

stock that must be held in inventory. Supply and storage staff said that 

these savings are attributable to reductions in the cost of money, cost of 

stock losses due to obsolescence, and cost of storage. Together the group 

estimates these factors save about 17 percent of the estimated value of the 

acquisition cost of the stock that is no longer required to be held in 

inventory. These savings estimates, for the most part, are based on 

historical documentation provided by DLA, which time did not allow us to 

validate. The extent to which these same savings will be achieved in the 

future is uncertain. As noted above, how these actions are implemented 

could also affect savings. We are concerned that this is another area that 

could lead to a false sense of savings and lead to premature reductions in 

affected budgets in advance of actual savings being fully realized, as has 

sometimes occurred in past efforts to achieve savings through business 

process reengineering efforts. We are also concerned that it could 

exacerbate a problem we have previously identified regarding past BRAC 

rounds involving the lack of adequate systems in place to track and update 

savings resulting from BRAC actions—the focus of our recommendation 

27 Performance-based logistics is defined as the purchase of weapon system sustainment as 

part of an integrated weapon system package based on output measures, such as weapon 

system availability, rather than input measures, such as parts and technical services.

28 Performance-based agreements are defined as the negotiated agreements between the 

major stakeholders that formally document the performance and support expectations and 

resources to achieve the desired outcome.
Page 26 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

for the Secretary of Defense. These concerns are reinforced by limitations 

in DOD’s financial management systems that historically have made it 

difficult to fully identify the costs of operations and provide a complete 

baseline from which to assess savings.

Transformation Cited as 

Justification for Many 

Recommendations Despite 

Lack of Clear Agreement on 

Transformational Options 

While furthering transformation was one of the BRAC goals, there was no 

agreement between DOD and its components on what should be 

considered a transformational effort. As part of the BRAC process, the 

department developed over 200 transformational options for stationing and 

supporting forces as well as for increasing operational efficiency and 

effectiveness. The OSD BRAC office narrowed this list to 77 options, but 

agreement was not reached within the department on these options, so 

none of them were formally approved. Nonetheless, each service and joint 

cross-service group was permitted to use the transformational options as 

appropriate to support its candidate recommendations. Appendix XV has a 

list of these 77 draft options.

Collectively, these draft options did not provide a clear definition of 

transformation across the department. The options ranged from those that 

seemed to be service specific to those that suggested new ways of doing 

business. For example, some transformational options included reducing 

the number of Army Reserve regional headquarters; optimizing Air Force 

squadrons; and co-locating various functions such as recruiting, military 

and civilian personnel training, and research, development and acquisition 

and test and evaluation, across the military departments. In contrast, some 

options suggested consideration of new ways of doing business, such as 

privatizing some functions and establishing a DOD agency to oversee 

depot-level reparables. 

While the transformational options were never formally approved, our 

analysis indicates that many of DOD’s recommendations reference one or 

more of the 77 transformational options. For example, 15 of the 

headquarters and support activities group recommendations reference the 

option to minimize leased space and move organizations in leased space to 

DOD-owned space. Likewise, 37 of the Army reserve component 

recommendations reference the option to co-locate guard and reserve units 

at active bases or consolidate guard and reserve units that are located in 

proximity to one another at one location. 

Conversely, a number of the scenarios that were initially considered but 

not adopted reference transformational options that could have changed 
Page 27 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

existing business practices. For example, the education and training group 

developed a number of scenarios—privatizing graduate education 

programs and consolidating undergraduate fixed and rotary wing pilot 

training—based on the draft transformational options, but none were 

ultimately approved by the department. 

Some Progress Made in 

Fostering Joint Basing 

DOD’s recommendations make some progress toward the goal of fostering 

joint activity among the military services, based on a broad definition of 

joint activity. We found that for DOD’s recommendations, joint activity 

included consolidating some training functions within the same service, colocating like organizations and functions on the same installation, and 

moving some organizations or functions closer to installations in order to 

further opportunities for joint training. Although the recommendations 

achieve some progress in fostering jointness, we found other instances 

where DOD ultimately adopted a service-centric solution even though the 

joint cross-service groups proposed a joint scenario. Table 3 shows the 

major recommendations that foster joint activity. 
Page 28 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 3: Major Recommendations Supporting Joint Activity

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

While the proposal to create joint bases by consolidating common 

installation management functions is projected to create greater 

efficiencies, our prior work suggests that implementation of these actions 

may prove challenging. The joint-basing recommendation involves one 

service being responsible for various installation management support 

Type of joint activity Recommended action

Consolidation The education and training group is proposing to consolidate 

• initial Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force at Eglin Air Force 

Base;

• undergraduate navigator training for the Navy and Air Force at Naval Air Station Pensacola; and

• transportation management, religious studies, and culinary training among the military services.

The medical group is proposing to establish

• the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, by consolidating the Walter Reed 

Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center, and

• the San Antonio Regional Military Medical Center by relocating inpatient care from Wilford Hall Medical 

Center to the Brooke Army Medical Center.

The headquarters and support activities group is proposing to consolidate the installation management 

functions across various bases.

Co-location The Army is proposing to move the Third Army Headquarters (Army component command to Central 

Command) to Shaw Air Force Base to be co-located with the Air Force component of Central Command.

The Navy is proposing to move aircraft from Willow Grove Air Reserve Station to McGuire Air Force Base, 

and from Naval Air Station Atlanta to Robins Air Force Base.

The technical group is proposing to co-locate 

• the services’ and defense agencies’ extramural funding program managers at the National Naval Medical 

Center, Bethesda, Maryland and 

• gun and ammunition research and development and acquisition to Picatinny Arsenal.

The headquarters and support activities group is proposing to co-locate DOD investigative agencies at 

Quantico Marine Corps Base.

Proximity The Air Force is proposing to move A-10 aircraft to Moody Air Force Base to enhance training Army units at 

Fort Benning and Fort Stewart.

The Army is proposing to move a special operations unit from Fort Bragg to Eglin Air Force Base in 

proximity to the Air Force’s Special Operations Command headquarters at Hurlburt Field.
Page 29 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

functions29 at bases that share a common boundary or are in proximity to 

one another. For example, the Army would be the executive agent for Fort 

Lewis, Washington, and McChord Air Force Base, Washington, combined as 

Joint Base Lewis-McChord. However, as evident from our recent visit to 

both installations and discussions with base officials, concerns over 

obstacles such as seeking efficiencies at the expense of the mission, could 

jeopardize a smooth and successful implementation of the 

recommendation.

In some cases, the joint cross-service groups proposed scenarios that 

would have merged various support functions among the services, but a 

service solution was adopted by DOD. For example, the Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group proposed to (1) consolidate 

civilian personnel offices under a new defense agency as DOD implements 

the national security personnel system, and (2) co-locate all military 

personnel centers in San Antonio, Texas, in anticipation of a standard 

military personnel system being implemented across the department. 

However, in both cases, DOD decided to consolidate military and civilian 

personnel centers within each service. Likewise, the Education and 

Training Joint Cross-Service Group proposed scenarios to consolidate 

undergraduate fixed wing training activities between the Air Force and the 

Navy and rotary wing training activities between the Navy and the Army to 

eliminate excess capacity. However, the proposals were not adopted 

because the Navy and the Air Force expressed concerns that this 

recommendation would result in significant permanent change of station 

costs for the services, specifically the cost of students traveling to 

designated training locations. 

29 These functions could include such areas as real property management and maintenance, 

utilities, housing, emergency services, environmental services, base security, reserve 

component support, resource management, procurement, personal property management, 

transportation, equipment maintenance, retail supply, base communications, audio/visual 

services, personnel and professional support, personnel services, food services, laundry 

services, education services, personal and family services, recreation, military exchange 

operations, airfield operations, garrison operations, internal review, inspector general, and 

strategic planning. 
Page 30 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

DOD Developed a 

Generally Logical and 

Reasoned Process for 

Making BRAC 

Decisions

Based on our analytical work, we believe DOD established and generally 

followed a logical and reasoned process for formulating its list of BRAC 

recommendations. The process was organized in a largely sequential 

manner with a strong emphasis on ensuring that accurate data were 

obtained and used. OSD established an oversight structure that allowed the 

seven individual joint cross-service groups to play a larger, more visible 

role in the 2005 BRAC process compared to BRAC 1995. Despite some 

overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, these groups 

and the military services generally followed the sequential BRAC process 

designed to evaluate and subsequently identify recommendations within 

their respective areas, with only the Army using a separate but parallel 

process to evaluate its reserve components. DOD also incorporated into its 

analytical process several key considerations required by the BRAC 

legislation, including the use of certified data, basing its analysis on its 20-

year force structure plan and emphasizing its military value selection 

criteria, which included homeland defense and surge capabilities. In 

addition, DOD’s Inspector General and the military service audit agencies 

helped to ensure the data used during the BRAC process were accurate and 

reliable. 

BRAC Process Was Logical 

and Largely Sequentially 

Structured 

DOD provided overall policy guidance for the BRAC process, including a 

requirement that its components develop and implement internal control 

plans to ensure the accuracy and consistency of their data collection and 

analyses. These plans also helped to ensure the overall integrity of the 

process and the information upon which OSD considered each group’s 

recommendations. The BRAC recommendations, for the most part, 

resulted from a data-intensive process that was supplemented by the use of 

military judgment as needed. The process began with a set of sequential 

steps by assessing capacity and military value, developing and analyzing 

scenarios, then identifying candidate recommendations, which led to OSD’s 

final list of BRAC recommendations. Figure 7 illustrates the overall 

sequential analytical process DOD generally employed to reach BRAC 

recommendations. 
Page 31 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 7: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC Recommendations 

a

A scenario is a proposal that has been declared for formal analysis by a military department or joint 

cross-service group deliberative body and is officially accounted for and tracked by OSD.

It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the 

sequential process established by the department, initial difficulties 

associated with obtaining complete and accurate data in a timely manner 

added to overlap and varying degrees of concurrency between data 

collection efforts and other steps in the process. 

During the 2005 BRAC process, the seven individual joint cross-service 

groups played a larger, more visible role compared to their role during the 

1995 BRAC round. Our analysis indicates that many, although not all, 

actions proposed by these groups were accepted by OSD and the military 

services. Based on lessons learned, OSD empowered these groups in 2005 

BRAC results

Process inputs

Over 1,050 BRAC scenariosa mostly developed 

from January through March 2005 

Many ideas and proposals developed as starting points

for potential BRAC consideration and analysis

2005 BRAC legislation required recommendations be based on 

– certified data 

– 20-year force structure plan 

– military value selection criteria 

Capacity

analysis 

including surge 

Military value

analysis 

including

homeland

defense

Scenario

development

including DOD’s

transformational

and joint options

Scenario

analysis

including costs

and savings

Military

judgment 

Analytical framework

About 400 proposed recommendations 

as April 5, 2005 

 222 recommendations submitted

to BRAC Commission on

May 13, 2005 

Source: GAO.
Page 32 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

to suggest BRAC recommendations directly to a senior-level group that 

oversaw the BRAC 2005 analysis. Moreover, we noted a closer coordination 

between these groups, the military services, and OSD than existed during 

the 1995 round. OSD’s efforts to integrate the process among these seven 

joint cross-service groups with the military services’ own efforts led to 

increased discussions, greater visibility, and more influence for the crossservice recommendations than in prior BRAC rounds. 

To assist in the process for analyzing and developing recommendations, the 

military services and joint cross-service groups used various analytical 

tools. These tools helped to ensure a more consistent approach to BRAC 

analysis and decision making. For example, all of the groups used the DODapproved COBRA model to calculate costs, savings, and return on 

investment for BRAC scenarios and, ultimately for the final 222 BRAC 

recommendations. As noted in appendix XIII, the COBRA model was 

designed to provide consistency across the military services and the joint 

cross-service groups in estimating BRAC costs and savings. DOD has used 

the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has 

improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our 

past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally 

reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among 

various BRAC options. 

Furthermore, the military services and joint cross-service groups generally 

used a consistent process to assess and formulate BRAC 

recommendations, with one minor exception involving the Army reserve 

components. The Army created a separate yet parallel approach in 

reviewing its reserve components for several reasons, although it generally 

followed the BRAC process. With respect to its reserve components, the 

Army did not perform a military value rank-ordering of these various 

installations across the country, but instead assessed the relative military 

value that could be obtained by consolidating various facilities into a joint 

facility in specific geographical locales to support, among other things, 

reserve component training, recruiting, and retention efforts. This 

approach provided an opportunity for the Army reserve components to 

actively participate in the BRAC process along with the voluntary 

participation of the states. The Army reported that consulting with the 

states was crucial to ensure the support of the state governors and staff 

Adjutants General for issues related to recommendations that affected the 

National Guard. The Army’s recommendations affected almost 10 percent 

of the Army’s 4,000 reserve components’ facilities. More specifically, the 

Army recommended 176 Army Reserve closures with the understanding 
Page 33 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

that the state governors will close 211 Army National Guard facilities with 

the intent of relocating their units into 125 new Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. The Army reports that 38 states and Puerto Rico voluntarily 

participated in the BRAC process.

The Air Force and the Navy also reviewed their reserve components’ 

installations but did so within the common analytical structure established 

by OSD, yet with some differences in approach in involving affected 

stakeholders in the process. For example, the Air Force did not involve 

state officials or its State Adjutants General as it analyzed and developed its 

BRAC recommendations. However, senior Air National Guard and Reserve 

leadership were in attendance as voting members of the Air Force’s Base 

Closure Executive Group, a senior deliberative body for the BRAC process. 

The Navy also reviewed its reserve components, including the Marine 

Corps Reserves, within the BRAC process, and worked closely with 

representatives from the Navy and Marine Corps reserve components to 

consolidate units within active duty installations or armed forces reserve 

centers without affecting recruiting demographics. 

BRAC Process Incorporated 

Key Legislative 

Requirements

DOD also incorporated into its analytical process the legal considerations 

for formulating its realignment and closure recommendations. As required 

by BRAC legislation, DOD based its recommendations on (1) the use of 

certified data, (2) its 20-year force structure plan, and (3) military value 

criteria as the primary consideration in assessing and formulating its 

recommendations. 

Use of Certified Data DOD collected capacity and military value data that were certified as to 

their accuracy by hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions across 

the country.30 These certified data were obtained from corporate databases 

and from hundreds of defense installations. DOD continued to collect 

certified data, as needed, to support follow-up questions, cost calculations, 

and to develop recommendations. In total, DOD projects that it collected 

over 25 million pieces of data as part of the BRAC process.31 Given the 

extensive volume of requested data from the 10 separate groups (3 military 

30 Each official who submitted data for BRAC analysis certified that the information was 

accurate and complete to the best of his or her knowledge and belief.

31 Noted by the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before the BRAC Commission on 

May 16, 2005.
Page 34 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

departments and 7 joint cross-service groups), we noted that the data 

collection process was quite lengthy and required significant efforts to help 

ensure data accuracy, particularly from joint cross-service groups that were 

attempting to obtain common data across multiple military components, 

which, because of the diverse nature of the functions and activities, do not 

always use the same data metrics. In some cases, coordinating data 

requests, clarifying questions and answers, controlling database entries, 

and other issues led to delays in the data-driven analysis DOD originally 

envisioned. As such, some groups had to develop strategy-based proposals. 

As time progressed, however, these groups reported that they obtained the 

needed data, for the most part, to inform and support their scenarios. The 

DOD Inspector General and the service’s audit agencies played an 

important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses were 

accurate and certified by cognizant senior officials.

Consideration of DOD’s 20-year 

Force Structure Plan 

As congressionally mandated, each of the military services and the seven 

joint cross-service groups considered DOD’s 20-year force structure plan in 

its analyses. DOD based its force structure plan for BRAC purposes on an 

assessment of probable threats to national security during a 20-year period 

beginning with fiscal year 2005. DOD provided this plan to Congress in 

March 2004, and as authorized by the statute, it subsequently updated it 1 

year later in March 2005. Based on our analysis, updates to the force 

structure affected some ongoing BRAC analyses. For example, the 

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group reassessed its data pertaining to 

overhauling and repairing ships based on the updated force structure 

outlook and decided that one of its two smaller shipyards—Naval Shipyard 

Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard Portsmouth—could close. Ultimately, the 

Navy decided to close the Portsmouth shipyard in Maine. In addition, the 

Navy told us it recalculated its capacity based on updates to the force 

structure plan and determined that there was no significant change to its 

orginial analysis. The other groups, such as those examining headquarters 

and support activities, education and training, or technical functions, 

considered updates to the defense 20-year force structure and determined 

the changes would have no impact on their ongoing analyses or the 

development of recommendations. 

Primary Consideration of 

Military Value Criteria, Which 

Included Homeland Defense and 

Surge 

DOD gave primary consideration to its military value selection criteria in its 

process. Specifically, military value refers to the first four selection criteria 

in figure 2 and includes an installation’s current and future mission 

capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of 

operations. The manner in which each military service or joint crossservice group approached its analysis of military value varied according to 
Page 35 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

the unique aspects of the individual service or cross-service function. 

These groups typically assessed military value by identifying multiple 

attributes or characteristics related to each military value criterion, then 

identifying qualitative metrics and measures and associated questions to 

collect data to support the overall military value analysis. For example, 

figure 8 illustrates how the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group linked 

several of its military value attributes, metrics, and data questions to the 

mandated military value criteria. 

Figure 8: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value for a Technical Facility

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria. 

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The technical group used a total of five 

military value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attribute. The technical group used a total of 30 military 

value metrics.

d

The technical group used a total of 44 data call questions.

Quantitative scoring plans were developed by each military service or joint 

cross-service group assigning relative weights to each of the military value 

criteria for use in evaluating and ranking facilities or functions in their 

respective areas. Appendixes III through XII highlight the use and linkages 

of military value criteria by each service and joint cross-service group. 

As noted earlier, based on congressional direction, there was enhanced 

emphasis on two aspects of military value—an installation’s ability to serve 

People

Military value criteriaa Military value 

metricsc

Military value 

attributesb

Highest education level for 

professional/technical workforce. 

Number and funding for other services’ 

programs executed at the facility. 

Education

Sample data call 

questionsd

Synergy Jointness

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and airspace. 

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization,

 surge, and future total

 force requirements.

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

Source: GAO analysis of Technical Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Page 36 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

as a staging area for homeland defense missions and its ability to meet 

unanticipated surge.32

• Homeland defense: Each of the three military services considered 

homeland defense roles in its BRAC analysis and coordinated with the 

U.S. Northern Command—a unified command responsible for homeland 

defense and civil support. In October 2004, the U.S. Northern Command 

contacted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting to play a 

role in ensuring that homeland defense received appropriate attention in 

the analytical process. Our analysis shows that all three military 

departments factored in homeland defense needs, with the Air Force 

recommendations having the most impact. According to Air Force 

officials, the U.S. Northern Command identified specific homeland 

defense missions assigned to the Air Force, which they incorporated 

into its decision-making process. Navy officials likewise discussed the 

impact of potential BRAC scenarios on its maritime homeland defense 

mission with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the 

U.S. Coast Guard. In this regard, the Navy decided to retain Naval Air 

Station Point Mugu, California, was influenced, in part, because the U.S. 

Coast Guard wanted to consolidate its West Coast aviation assets at this 

installation for homeland defense purposes. According to Army 

officials, most of the their role in supporting homeland defense is 

carried out by the Army National Guard. The U.S. Northern Command 

reviewed the recommendations and found no unacceptable risk to the 

homeland defense mission and support to civil authorities.

• Surge: DOD left it to each military service and joint cross-service group 

to determine how surge would be considered in the their analysis. 

Generally, all the groups considered surge by retaining a certain 

percentage of infrastructure, making more frequent use of existing 

infrastructure, or retaining difficult-to-reconstitute assets. For example, 

the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group set aside 10 percent of its 

facility infrastructure for surge, while the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 

Group factored in additional work shifts in its analysis. The military 

services retained difficult-to-reconstitute assets as the primary driver to 

satisfying the statutory requirement to consider surge capability. Both 

the Army and Navy gave strong consideration to infrastructure that 

would be difficult to reconstitute, such as large tracts of land for 

32 Homeland defense and surge considerations are in the military value selection criteria 2 

and 3, respectively, as reflected in P.L. 101-510, section 2913(b)(2)&(3).
Page 37 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

maneuver training purposes or berthing space for docking ships. For 

example, the Navy has a finite number of ships and aircraft and would 

likely have to increase operating tempo to meet surge needs. The Air 

Force addressed surge by retaining sufficient capacity to absorb 

temporary increases in operations, such as responding to emergencies 

or natural catastrophic events like hurricane damage, and the capacity 

to permanently relocate all of its aircraft stationed overseas in the 

United States if needed.

Congress also mandated four other criteria to be considered in the 

analytical process: cost and savings of the BRAC recommendations, 

economic impact on affected communities, impact on communities’ 

infrastructure, and environmental impact. The extent these other mandated 

considerations influenced recommendations varied. For example, high cost 

was the primary reason the Army decided not to develop a 

recommendation to restation troops returning from overseas to 

installations with large tracts of undeveloped land that could potentially 

accommodate these moves, such as Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, or 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. Despite these installations having the 

capacity to provide large training ranges, they do not have existing 

infrastructure to immediately house 3,000 to 5,000 troops required for the 

Army’s new modular combat brigades.33 Initially, the Army assessed the 

possibility of building new infrastructure at these locations, but Army 

BRAC officials told us it would be too costly given that the Army’s COBRA 

analysis showed that at Yuma, for example, it would cost about $2 billion to 

build the required infrastructure. As a result, the Army decided to place 

units returning from overseas at installations currently used to base other 

operational units, notwithstanding limitations in existing training 

capacities.

Although there was heavy reliance on data for completing analyses, 

military judgment was also a factor throughout the entire process, starting 

with an analytical framework to base analysis of the 20-year force structure 

plan and ending with the finalized list of 222 recommendations submitted 

to the BRAC Commission. Military judgment also played a role in decisions 

on how military value selection criteria would be captured as attributes, 

33 Modularity refers to the Army Modular Force Initiative whereby the Army is transforming 

its force structure by increasing from 67 brigade combat teams to 77 modular brigade 

combat teams (43 active Army and 34 Army National Guard) with the potential for 48 active 

Army modular brigade combat teams.
Page 38 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

with associated values or weights. Military judgment was also applied in 

deciding which proposed scenarios or actions should move forward for 

additional analysis. Generally, military judgment was exercised at this stage 

to delete or modify a potential recommendation for reasons such as 

strategic importance, as shown in the following examples:

• Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, which has a lower military value 

than other shipyards, was eliminated from closure consideration 

because the shipyard was considered to have more strategic 

significance in the Pacific Ocean area compared to other alternatives.

• Tripler Army Medical Center, Hawaii, which has a lower military value 

than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 

because it is the only defense medical center of significant size in the 

Pacific Ocean area.

• Naval Station Everett, Washington, which has a lower military value 

than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 

because of strategic reasons regarding the number and the locations of 

the Navy’s aircraft carriers on the West Coast and in the Pacific.

• Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, which has a lower military 

value than some other bases, was eliminated from closure consideration 

because of the belief that a strategic presence was needed in the north 

central United States. Even though Grand Forks Air Force Base was 

retained for strategic reasons, Minot Air Force Base is also located in 

North Dakota and is not affected by any BRAC recommendations.

DOD Audit Agencies Helped 

to Improve the Accuracy of 

Data Used during the BRAC 

Process 

The oversight roles of the DOD Inspector General and the military services’ 

audit agency staff, given their access to relevant information and officials 

as the process evolved, helped to improve the accuracy of the data used in 

the BRAC process. The DOD Inspector General and most of the individual 

service audit agencies’ reports generally concluded that the extensive 

amount of data used as the basis for BRAC decisions was sufficiently valid 

and accurate for the purposes intended. In addition, with limited 

exceptions, these reports did not identify any material issues that would 

impede a BRAC recommendation. 

The DOD Inspector General and the services’ audit agencies played an 

important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses were 

accurate and certified by cognizant senior officials. Their frontline roles 
Page 39 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

and the thousands of staff days devoted to reviewing the massive data 

collection efforts associated with the BRAC process added an important 

aspect to the quality and integrity of the data used by military services and 

joint cross-service groups. Through extensive audits of the capacity, 

military value, and scenario data collected from field activities, these audit 

agencies notified various BRAC teams of data discrepancies for corrective 

action. The audit activities included validation of data, compliance with 

data certification requirements employed throughout the chain of 

command, and examination of the accuracy of the analytical data. While 

the auditors initially encountered problems with regard to data accuracy 

and the lack of supporting documentation for certain questions and data 

elements, most of these concerns were resolved. In addition, the auditors 

worked to ensure certified information was used for BRAC analysis. These 

audit agencies also reviewed other facets of the process, including the 

various internal control plans, the COBRA model, and other modeling and 

analytical tools that were used in the development of recommendations. 

Appendix XVI lists these organizations’ audit reports related to BRAC 2005 

to the extent they were available at the time this report was completed. 

Overall, these organizational audit agencies reported the following:

• The Naval Audit Service reported that it visited 214 sites, covering 45 

data calls, and audited over 8,300 questions. It concluded that the data 

appeared reasonably accurate and complete and the Navy complied 

with statutory guidance and DOD policies and procedures. 

• The Air Force Audit Agency officials told us they visited 104 

installations, reviewed over 11,110 data call responses at 126 Air Force 

locations, 8 major commands, the Air National Guard, and Headquarters 

Air Force, and concluded that data used for Air Force BRAC analysis 

were generally reliable. 

• The Army Audit Agency reported that it visited 32 installations and 3 

leased facilities and reviewed for accuracy over 2,342 responses. It 

concluded that the data was reasonably accurate and that the Army 

BRAC office had a sound process in place to collect certified data. 

• DOD Inspector General officials told us they visited about 1,550 sites 

covering 29 defense agencies and organizations and reviewed over 

15,770 responses. We were told that these responses were generally 

supported, complete, and reasonable. The DOD Inspector General also 

evaluated the validity, integrity, and documentation of data used by the 
Page 40 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

seven joint cross-service groups and found they generally used certified 

data for the BRAC analysis.

We closely coordinated with the DOD Inspector General and the three 

service audit agencies to maximize our individual and collective efforts and 

avoid duplication. As part of this coordination, we observed their audit 

efforts at selected military installations to verify the scope and quality of 

coverage they provided throughout the process and to give us insights into 

potential issues having broader applicability across the entire process. We 

also observed the work of these audit agencies to better familiarize 

ourselves with the types of issues being identified and resolved, with a view 

toward determining their materiality to the overall process. 

Several Aspects of 

DOD’s BRAC 

Recommendations and 

Rejected Proposals 

May Warrant Further 

Attention 

We identified issues regarding DOD’s recommendations, and other actions 

considered during the selection process that may warrant further attention 

by the BRAC Commission. Many of the issues relate to how costs and 

savings were estimated while others relate to potential impacts on 

communities surrounding bases that stand to gain or lose missions and 

personnel as a result of BRAC actions. Further, we are highlighting 

candidate recommendations that were presented during the selection 

process by either the military services or the joint cross-service groups to 

senior DOD leadership within the IEC that were projected as having the 

potential to generate significant savings, and which were substantially 

revised or deleted from further consideration during the last few weeks or 

days of the selection process. Additional discussion of issues targeted more 

specifically to the work and recommendations of the military services and 

joint cross-service groups is included in appendixes III through XII.

Issues with DOD’s BRAC 

Recommendations

We identified a number of issues, most of which apply to a broad range of 

DOD’s recommendations, that may warrant further attention by the BRAC 

Commission. In addition to the issue previously discussed regarding 

military personnel eliminations being claimed as savings to the department, 

other issues include (1) instances of lengthy payback periods (time 

required to recoup up-front investment costs), (2) inconsistencies in how 

DOD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving military construction 

projects, (3) uncertainties in estimating the total costs to the government to 

implement DOD’s recommended actions, and (4) potential impacts on 

communities surrounding bases that are expected to gain large numbers of 

personnel if DOD’s recommendations are implemented. 
Page 41 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Some Lengthy Payback Periods Many of the 222 recommendations DOD made in the 2005 round are 

associated with lengthy payback periods, which, in some cases, call into 

question whether the department would be gaining sufficient monetary 

value for the up-front investment cost required to implement its 

recommendations and the time required to recover this investment. Our 

analysis indicates that 143, or 64 percent, of DOD’s recommendations are 

associated with payback periods that are 6 years or less while 79, or 36 

percent, of the recommendations are associated with lengthier paybacks 

that exceed the 6-year mark or never produce savings. DOD officials 

acknowledge that the additional objectives of fostering jointness and 

transformation have had some effect on generating recommendations with 

longer payback periods. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the number 

of recommendations with lengthy payback periods varied across the 

military services and the joint cross-service groups, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD Component 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

a

While the DOD BRAC report lists 21 Navy recommendations, several of these have multiple actions, 

thus bringing the total to 53 recommendations.

Payback period

DOD component

Number of

recommendations

Immediate

to 6 years

7 to 9

years

10 years

and greater Never

Army 56 26 3 22 5

Navy 53a 45 2 6 0

Air Force 42 29 6 7 0

Education and 

training 9 5 0 3 1

Headquarters 

and support 

activities 21 14 2 5 0

Industrial 17 13 3 1 0

Intelligence 2 0 2 0 0

Medical 6 3 1 2 0

Supply and 

storage 3 3 0 0 0

Technical 13 5 5 3 0

Total 222 143 24 49 6

Percentage 100 64 11 22 3
Page 42 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

As shown in table 4, the Army has five recommendations and the education 

and training group has one recommendation that never payback, as 

described below:

• Army realignment of a special forces unit from Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

• Army realignment of a heavy brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort 

Carson, Colorado;

• Army realignment of a heavy brigade to Fort Bliss, Texas, and infantry 

and aviation units to Fort Riley, Kansas;

• Army reserve component consolidations in Minnesota;

• Army reserve component consolidations in North Dakota; and 

• Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s establishment of 

Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

According to Army officials, their five recommendations have no payback 

because, in part, they must build additional facilities to accommodate the 

return of about 47,000 forces currently stationed overseas to the United 

States as part of DOD’s Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy 

initiative (see app. III for further discussion of the restationing initiative). 

According to the education and training group, its one recommendation 

with no payback period is due to the high military construction costs 

associated with the new mission to consolidate initial training for the Joint 

Strike Fighter aircraft for the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Air Force. 

Similarly, the Army has nearly 50 percent of the total number of DOD 

recommendations with payback periods of 10 years or longer. Our analysis 

of Army data shows that these lengthy paybacks are attributable to many of 

the recommendations regarding the reserve components. These 

recommendations typically have a combination of relatively high military 

construction costs and relatively low annual recurring savings, which tend 

to lengthen the payback period. 

We also identified some portions of DOD’s individual recommendations 

that are associated with lengthy payback periods for certain BRAC actions 

but are imbedded within larger bundled recommendations. The following 

are a few examples:
Page 43 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• A proposal initially developed by the Headquarters and Support 

Activities Joint Cross-Service Group to move the Army Materiel 

Command from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 

had more than a 100-year payback period with a net cost over a 20-year 

period. However, the proposal did not include some expected savings 

that, if included, would have reduced the payback period to 32 years. 

Concurrently, the group developed a separate proposal to relocate 

various Army offices from leased and government-owned office space 

onto Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which would have resulted in a 3-year 

payback period. The headquarters group decided to combine these two 

stand-alone proposals into one recommendation, resulting in an 

expected 20-year net present value savings of about $123 million with a 

10-year payback. 

• Many of the individual Air Force proposals involving the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve had payback periods ranging from 10 to 

more than 100 years. These individual proposals were subsequently 

revised by combining them with other related proposals to produce 

recommendations that had significant savings, minimized the longer 

payback periods, and linked operational realignment actions. We found 

that this change occurred in the realignment of Lambert-St. Louis 

International Airport Air Guard Station, Missouri, which originally had a 

63-year payback period and resulted in a 20-year net present value cost 

of about $22 million. However, this realignment is now a part of the 

closure of Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, and the 

realignment of Atlantic City Air Guard Station, New Jersey. The 

combined recommendation results in a 20-year net present value 

savings of $336 million and a 3-year payback period.

Inconsistencies in DOD’s 

Estimated Costs for Military 

Construction Projects 

While the military services used the COBRA model to estimate the costs for 

military construction projects needed to implement BRAC 

recommendations, we found some inconsistencies in how they estimated 

some costs associated with these projects. While the impact of these 

inconsistencies on savings is likely not as great as others noted in this 

report, it nevertheless contributes to the overall imprecision of the cost 

estimates of DOD’s recommended actions. 

One area of inconsistent accounting involves the relative amounts of 

estimated support costs—such as the cost of connecting a new facility to 

existing water, sewage, and electrical systems—associated with military 

construction projects across the services. In its estimates, the Army 

considered these additional support costs as one-time costs whereas the 
Page 44 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Navy and the Air Force included them in the cost of the military 

construction projects for each project. By including these support costs in 

the cost of each project, the Navy and Air Force generally generated higher 

relative recurring costs than the Army for the recapitalization of facilities 

over time. Specifically, the Army increased its military construction cost 

estimates by 18.5 percent to account for the connection of the projected 

new facilities’ utilities. The Air Force, on the other hand, increased its 

construction costs for support services from 8 to 40 percent, depending on 

the type of facility, while the Navy included support costs at only two 

locations. According to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy 

for BRAC, the Navy assigned teams to review all proposed military 

construction projects by location to determine any support costs necessary 

for connection of utilities. Our analysis shows that had the Army used the 

same methodology as the Navy and the Air Force, the Army would incur 

about $66 million in additional recapitalization costs for all of its proposed 

military construction projects. 

The services were also inconsistent in considering the costs associated 

with meeting DOD’s antiterrorism force protection standards in their 

estimated costs for military construction projects.34 The Air Force 

increased the expected costs of its military construction projects by 2.3 

percent, or about $18 million, to meet DOD’s standards. Air Force officials 

noted that these funds would provide enhancements such as security 

barriers and blast proof windows. The Army and the Navy, on the other 

hand, did not include additional costs to meet the department’s standards 

in their proposed military construction projects. If the Army and the Navy 

estimated costs similarly to the Air Force, the cost of their proposed 

military construction projects would have increased by about $146 million 

and $25 million, respectively. 

Uncertainties in Accounting for 

All Expected Costs or Savings to 

the Federal Government

DOD’s cost and savings estimates for implementing its recommendations 

do not fully reflect all expected costs or savings that may accrue to the 

federal government. The BRAC legislation requires that DOD take into 

account the effect of proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any 

other activity of the department or any other federal agency that may be 

34 DOD’s antiterrorism standards, effective no later than October 2009, apply to both new 

and existing DOD-inhabited buildings and require, for example, minimum building standoff 

distances; structures that will avoid progressive building collapse; reinforced exterior walls; 

glazed windows, skylights, and doors; and properly secured entrances. Unified Facilities 

Criteria, 4-010-01 (Oct. 8, 2003).
Page 45 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

required to assume responsibility for activities at military installations.35

While the services and joint cross-service groups were aware of the 

potential for these costs, estimated costs were not included in the cost and 

savings analysis because it was unclear what actions an agency might take 

in response to the BRAC action. One such agency was the U.S. Coast 

Guard, which currently maintains some of its ships or various units at 

several installations that are slated to close. Navy BRAC officials briefed 

the U.S. Coast Guard about its recommendations prior to the list being 

published, but the Air Force did not meet with the Coast Guard. The U.S. 

Coast Guard was still in the process of evaluating various responses to take 

as a result of the proposed BRAC actions and did not complete its analysis 

in time for it to be included in this report.

Further, as noted earlier, estimated costs for the environmental restoration 

of bases undergoing closure or realignment are not included in DOD’s cost 

and savings analyses. Such costs would be difficult to fully project at this 

point without planned reuse of the unneeded property being known. 

Consistent with the prior BRAC rounds, DOD excluded estimates for base 

environment restoration actions from its costs and savings analysis and in 

determining payback periods, on the premise that restoration is a liability 

that the department must address regardless of whether a base is kept open 

or closed and therefore should not be included in the COBRA analysis.

Nevertheless, DOD did give consideration to such costs in addressing 

selection criterion 8, and included available information on estimated 

restoration costs as part of the data supporting its BRAC 

recommendations. DOD estimates that the restoration costs to implement 

its major closures would be about $949 million, as shown in table 5. (See 

fig. 4 in the Background section for a map of DOD’s major base closures.) 

35 P.L. 101-510, section 2913(e).
Page 46 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 5: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD’s Recommended 

Major Base Closures 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Estimated costs include some costs not specifically reported in DOD’s May 2005 report to the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. While the Army and Navy generally reported 

these costs, the Air Force did not but its costs were noted in supporting documentation. 

Based on the data provided, the Army would incur the largest share of 

estimated restoration costs due to the closure of several ammunition plants 

and chemical depots. The largest expected costs for any one location 

across DOD, about $383 million, would be for restoration at Hawthorne 

Army Depot, Nevada. While the DOD report does not specifically identify 

the potential for some additional restoration costs at its installations, 

available supporting documentation does identify some additional costs. 

For example, the Army estimated the range restoration at Hawthorne Army 

Depot could cost from about $27 million to $147 million, which is not 

included in the estimates in table 5. Further, the Army recognizes that 

additional restoration costs could be incurred at six additional locations 

that have ranges and chemical munitions, but these costs have not yet been 

determined. 

Our prior work has shown that environmental costs can be significant, as 

evidenced by the nearly $12 billion in total cost DOD expected to incur 

when all restoration actions associated with the prior BRAC rounds are 

completed. Service officials told us that the projected cost estimates for 

environmental restoration are lower, in general, because the environmental 

condition of today’s bases is much better than the condition of bases closed 

during the prior BRAC rounds, primarily because of DOD’s ongoing active 

base environmental restoration program. Nonetheless, our prior work has 

indicated that as closures are implemented, more intensive environmental 

investigations occur and additional hazardous conditions may be 

uncovered that could result in additional, unanticipated restoration and 

higher costs. Finally, the services’ preliminary estimates are based on 

restoration standards that are applicable for the current use of the base 

Dollars in millions

Military service

Number of major

closures

Estimated environmental

restoration costsa

Army 14 $723.3

Navy 9 154.5

Air Force 10 71.3

Total 33 $949.1
Page 47 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

property. Because reuse plans developed by communities receiving former 

base property sometimes reflect different uses for the property this could 

lead to more stringent and thus more expensive restoration in many cases. 

Based on experiences from prior BRAC rounds, we believe other costs are 

also likely to be incurred, although not required to be included in DOD’s 

cost and savings analysis but which could add to the total costs to the 

government of implementing the BRAC round. These costs include 

transition assistance, planning grants, and other assistance made available 

to affected communities by DOD and other agencies. DOD officials told us 

that such estimates were not included in the prior rounds’ analyses and that 

it was too difficult to project these costs, given the unknown factors 

associated with the number of communities affected and the costs that 

would be required to assist them. Additionally, as we reported in January 

2005,36 in the prior four BRAC rounds, DOD’s Office of Economic 

Adjustment, the Department of Labor, the Economic Development 

Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the Federal 

Aviation Administration provided nearly $2 billion in assistance through 

fiscal year 2004 to communities and individuals, and according to DOD 

officials, these agencies are slated to perform similar roles for the 2005 

round. However, while the magnitude of this assistance is unknown at this 

time, it is important to note that assistance will likely be needed in this 

round, as contrasted with prior rounds, for not only those communities that 

surround bases losing missions and personnel but also for communities 

that face considerable challenges dealing with large influxes of personnel 

and military missions. For example, DOD stated in its 2005 BRAC report 

that over 100 actions significantly affect local communities, triggering 

federal assistance from DOD and other federal agencies. Also, as discussed 

more fully later, the number of bases in the 2005 BRAC round that will gain 

several thousand personnel from the recommended actions could increase 

pressure for federal assistance to mitigate the impact on community 

infrastructure, such as schools and roads, with the potential for more costs 

than in the prior rounds. 

Finally, the BRAC costs and savings estimates do not include any 

anticipated revenue from such actions as the sale of unneeded former base 

property or the transfer of property to communities through economic

36 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, 

GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005).
Page 48 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

development conveyances.37 The potential for significant revenue may exist 

at certain locations. For example, the Navy sold some unneeded property 

from prior round actions in California at the former El Toro Marine Corps 

Air Station for about $650 million and the former Tustin Marine Corps Air 

Station for $208.5 million. The extent to which sales will play a role in the 

disposal of unneeded property arising from the 2005 BRAC round remains 

to be seen.

Impact of BRAC Recommended 

Actions on Communities

The recommended actions for the 2005 BRAC round will have varying 

degrees of impact on communities surrounding bases undergoing a closure 

or realignment. While some will face economic recovery challenges as a 

result of a closure and associated losses of base personnel, others, which 

expect large influxes of personnel due to increased base activity, face a 

different set of challenges involving community infrastructure necessary to 

accommodate growth. 

In examining the economic impact of the 222 BRAC recommendations as 

measured by the percentage of employment, DOD data indicate that most 

economic areas across the country are expected to be affected very little 

but a few could face substantial impact. Almost 83 percent of the 244 

economic areas affected by BRAC recommendations fall between a 

1 percent loss in employment and a 1 percent gain in employment.38 Slightly 

more than 9 percent of the economic areas had a negative economic impact 

of greater than 1 percent, but for some of these areas, the projected impact 

is fairly significant, ranging up to a potential direct and indirect loss of up 

to nearly 21 percent. Almost 8 percent of the economic areas had a positive 

economic impact greater than 1 percent. Appendix XIV provides additional 

detail on our economic analyses.

Of those communities facing potential negative economic impact, six 

communities face the potential for a fairly significant impact. They include 

communities surrounding Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; 

37 Economic development conveyances are used to transfer unneeded property to 

communities for uses that promote economic recovery and job creation. The National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107, Title XXX, section 3006 

(Dec. 28, 2001)) included a provision stipulating that DOD seek to obtain fair market value 

for BRAC-related transfers of property in the 2005 round. The effect this provision will have 

on the generation of revenue for DOD is unknown at this time.

38 Some of the recommendations had multiple actions that affected more than one economic 

area.
Page 49 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada; Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; 

Submarine Base New London, Connecticut; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; 

and Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, where the negative impact on 

employment as a percent of area employment ranges from 8.5 percent to 

20.5 percent. Our prior work has shown that a variety of factors will affect 

how quickly communities are able to rebound from the negative economic 

consequences of closures and realignments. They include such factors as 

the trends associated with the national, regional, and local economies; 

natural and labor resources; effective planning for reuse of base property; 

and federal, state, and local government assistance to facilitate transition 

planning and execution. In a series of reports that have assessed the 

progress in implementing closures and realignments in prior BRAC rounds, 

we reported that most communities surrounding closed bases have been 

faring well in relation to key national economic indicators—unemployment 

rate and the average annual real per capita income growth rates.39 In our 

January 2005 report for example, we further reported that while some 

communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than others, 

most have recovered or are continuing to recover from the impact of 

BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative 

impact from the economic downturn nationwide in recent years. 

The 2005 round, however, also has the potential to significantly affect a 

number of communities surrounding installations, which are expected to 

experience considerable growth in the numbers of military, civilian, and 

civilian support personnel. These personnel increases are likely to place 

additional demands on community services, such as providing adequate 

housing and schools, for which the communities may not have adequate 

resources to address in the short term. The total gains can be much more 

than just those personnel with the consideration of accompanying families. 

Table 6 shows that 20 installations are expected to realize gains of over 

2,000 military, civilian, and mission support contractor personnel for an 

aggregate increase of more than 106,000 personnel. 

39 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, 

GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005); GAO, Military Base Closures: Progress in 

Completing Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, GAO-02-433 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002); and GAO, Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and 

Closure Rounds, GAO/NSAID-99-36 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 1998).
Page 50 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 6: Military Installations That Would Receive a Net Gain of Over 2,000 Personnel due to BRAC Actions 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

As shown in table 6, most of the gaining installations are Army installations 

with the gains attributable to a number of actions, including the return of 

large numbers of personnel from overseas locations under DOD’s 

integrated global presence and basing strategy and the consolidation of 

various activities, such as combat-support related activities at Fort Lee, 

Virgina. Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has the largest expected growth, due in large 

measure to some consolidation of various activities from lease space in the 

Washington, D.C. area. 

The challenges facing communities surrounding gaining bases can be many, 

including increased housing demand, increased demands for roads and 

utilities, and adequate schools. These challenges can be formidable as 

Installation 

Net gain of

military personnel

to an installation

Net gain of civilians

and mission support

contractors to an installation

Total net gain of

personnel to an

installation

Fort Belvoir, VA 4,521 15,837 20,358

Fort Bliss, TX 11,354 147 11,501

Fort Benning, GA 9,221 618 9,839

Fort Sam Houston, TX 7,648 1,716 9,364

Fort Lee, VA 6,139 1,205 7,344

Fort Meade, MD 682 4,679 5,361

Fort Carson, CO 4,178 199 4,377

Fort Bragg, NC 4,078 247 4,325

Little Rock Air Force Base, AR 3,579 319 3,898

Fort Sill, OK 3,444 158 3,602

Defense Finance and Accounting Service, IN 114 3,381 3,495

Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA 3,245 122 3,367

Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA 446 2,567 3,013

Fort Riley, KS 2,415 440 2,855

Naval Station Norfolk, VA 3,447 (640) 2,807

Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA 154 2,315 2,469

Eglin Air Force Base, FL 2,140 78 2,218

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD (3,411) 5,587 2,176

Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA 177 1,859 2,036

Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL 1,902 123 2,025

Total 65,473 40,957 106,430
Page 51 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

communities may be faced with inadequate resources to address concerns 

in these areas as follows: 

• Housing: If history is any indication, while some of the personnel 

transferring into a base may live on-base, the majority may not, as the 

military services are turning more to housing privatization. Installation 

officials at Fort Riley, Kansas, told us about concerns about the nearby 

availability of housing (within a 20-mile radius) to support the expected 

influx of military and civilian personnel and their families transferring to 

the base. For those installations where adequate housing is not available 

in the surrounding communities existing housing privatization projects 

would need to be revised and expedited to provide for additional units. 

Fort Bliss, Texas, officials told us that they expect the need to accelerate 

their existing housing privatization efforts, but would require additional 

funds to do so. Currently, housing privatization has taken place or is in 

the process of taking place at several of these installations and similar 

efforts may be needed there as well.

• Schools: Effects on bases with the greatest gain in personnel resulting 

from BRAC vary between whether dependents attend schools operated 

on base by DOD (Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and Marine Corps Base 

Quantico as shown in table 6) or schools operated by local educational 

agencies. We recently reported on challenges likely to be faced by both 

DOD operated schools and those operated by local educational agencies 

in the post BRAC environment at these and other locations.40 Recently, 

in visiting selected bases affected by the BRAC recommendations, 

installation officials told us that while local educational authorities 

should be able to absorb additional students into their school systems, 

they are more concerned about the potential shortage of teachers. 

Another concern is that make-shift trailers or temporary modular 

facilities might be used. For example, while Kings Bay, Georgia, officials 

told us that the local school system should be able to accomodate the 

increase of students, it may need to resort to the use of portable 

classrooms. All installations that are expected to gain more than 2,000 

personnel have local community-administrated school systems with the 

exceptions of Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and Marine Corps Base 

Quantico which have DOD-administrated school systems. If additional 

40 GAO, DOD Schools: Limitations in DOD-Sponsored Study on Transfer Alternatives 

Underscore Need for Additional Assessment, GAO-05-469 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005).
Page 52 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

capacity is required at these three locations, additional military 

constructions funds would likely be needed. 

• Other infrastructure: Installation officials we spoke to also expressed 

some concern for the increased demand for various community 

services, such as health care, transportation, and utilities to 

accommodate personnel increases. Fort Carson, Colorado, officials told 

us that with its expected personnel increases, the local community will 

need more TRICARE providers to meet the expected demand. In other 

cases, such as at Fort Belvoir, Virgina, discussion has ensued regarding 

the need for increased mass transit capability, which may involve 

requests for millions of dollars in federal grant assistance. 

As previously noted, it is likely that these concerns may increase federal 

governmental expenditures that are not included in the BRAC cost and 

savings analyses. 

Candidate 

Recommendations That 

Were Deleted or Revised 

during the Final Weeks of 

the Selection Process 

We also identified several candidate recommendations that were presented 

by the military services or joint cross-service groups to the IEC—DOD’s 

senior BRAC leadership group—that were substantially revised or deleted 

from further consideration during the last few weeks of the BRAC section 

process. In aggregate, based on projected savings, these actions reduced 

the overall potential for estimated net annual recurring savings by nearly 

$500 million and estimated 20-year net present value savings by over $4.8 

billion, as shown in table 7.
Page 53 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 7: Candidate Recommendations That Were Deleted or Significantly Revised by the Infrastructure Executive Council 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Each of the cases highlighted in the table is described in additional detail 

below. 

• The educational and training group proposed to privatize graduate 

education, which enabled the Navy to recommend the closure of the 

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The proposed closure 

supported DOD’s draft transformational option to privatize graduatelevel education. Navy officials, however, stated that they believed 

professional military education was more important than ever given the 

world climate. During the IEC deliberations, Navy officials expressed 

concern about the loss of such a unique graduate military education 

facility and the effect on international students who participate in the 

school’s programs. Further, in the IEC meeting the Navy stated its belief 

that all education recommendations should be withdrawn because 

education is a core competency of the department and relying on the 

Dollars in millions

Initial proposal IEC decision Change

Candidate recommendations

Net annual

recurring

savings

20-year

savings

Net annual

recurring

savings

20-year

savings

Net annual

recurring

savings

20-year

savings

Proposals deleted by the IEC

Close Naval Postgraduate School, CA $90 $1,120 $0 $0 ($90) ($1,120)

Close Uniformed Services of the University of 

the Health Sciences, MD 58 575 0 0 (58) (575)

Close Natick Soldier Systems Center, MA 20 114 0 0 (20) (114)

Close Adelphi Laboratory Center, MD 166 949 144 1,026 (22) 77

Close Carlisle Barracks, PA 50 555 0 0 (50) (555)

Close Air Force Institute of Technology, OH 8 14 0 0 (8) (14)

Proposals changed from closure to 

realignment by the IEC

Close Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, 

CA 142 1,600 18 231 (124) (1,369)

Close Naval Air Station, Brunswick, ME 93 841 35 239 (58) (602)

Close Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 226 2,656 173 1,982 (53) (674)

Close Rome Laboratory, NY 46 230 41 357 (5) 127

Total $899 $8,654 $411 $3,835 ($488) ($4,819)
Page 54 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

private sector to fulfill that requirement is too risky. The IEC agreed and 

disapproved the recommendation. 

• The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group recommended that the 

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences associated with 

the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, be closed, 

citing that educating physicians at the site was more costly than 

alternative scholarship programs (about triple the cost) and that the 

department could rely on civilian universities to educate military 

physicians.41 We also reported previously that the university is a more 

costly way to educate military physicians.42 The IEC, subsequently 

disapproved the recommendation, citing that education is a core 

competency for the department, and therefore it was considered too 

risky to rely on the private sector to provide this function. Also, a DOD 

official indicated that, with the recommended action to realign Walter 

Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda, Maryland, it would be highly 

desirable to have a military medical college associated with this medical 

facility in order for it to be a world-class medical center. 

• The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group, through the Army, proposed 

that the Natick Soldier Systems Center, Massachusetts, be closed and 

technical functions relocated to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, to 

create an integrated command, control, communications, and 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance center. In its 

presentation to the IEC, the Army noted that the cost for this 

recommendation was high, but it would generate greater efficiencies 

and faster transition from research and development through the 

acquisition and fielding phases of the technology. Although the ISG 

initially raised no concerns and approved the recommendation, the IEC 

disapproved it in the last week of the BRAC selection process, citing the 

high cost of the recommendation. 

41 The medical group developed this candidate recommendation with the knowledge of a 

specific provision of federal law (10 U.S.C. 2112a) that could preclude closure of the 

university.

42 See GAO, Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 

2001, GAO/OCG-00-8 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000); GAO, Budget Issues: Budgetary 

Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2000, GAO/OCG-99-26 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 16, 1999); and GAO, Military Physicians: DOD’s Medical School and Scholarship 

Program, GAO/HEHS-95-244 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1995).
Page 55 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• The closure of the Adelphi Laboratory Center, Maryland, was originally 

part of the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and, 

along with Natick Soldier Systems Center, was part of the Army’s plan 

for an integrated command, control, communications, and computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance center. An Army official 

told us that, as with the closure of Natick, no concerns were originally 

raised and the recommendation was approved by the ISG, but the IEC 

later removed it from the recommendation that includes the closure of 

Fort Monmouth because of high cost. 

• The proposed closure of Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania—home of the 

Army War College—was initiated by the Education and Training Joint 

Cross-Service Group and was aimed at creating synergy between the 

college and Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. The IEC approved the proposed recommendation 

when it was initially briefed, but later rejected it, based on the Army’s 

argument that among other things, the Army War College’s proximity to 

Washington, D.C., provides access to key national and international 

policymakers and senior military and civilian leaders within DOD. 

• The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group recommended 

the closure of the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson 

Air Force Base, Ohio. The group recommended that graduate-level 

education be provided by the private sector and that all other functions 

of the institute be relocated to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 

However, the IEC disapproved the recommendation based on the risk 

involved in relying on the private sector for education requirements, 

given that education is a core competency of the department. 

• The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group recommended transferring the 

workload of the Marine Corps’ depot maintenance facility in Barstow, 

California, which enabled the Department of the Navy to recommend 

closure of the Marine Corps Logistics Base. The Marine Corps raised 

concerns over the impact that the closure would have on Marine Corps 

deployments from the West Coast. The IEC decided to downsize the 

base and retain the depot, citing the Marine Corps’ concerns. 

• While the Navy recommended closure of the Naval Air Station 

Brunswick, Maine, the IEC revised this to a realignment. Navy officials 

stated that the senior Navy leadership had been reluctant to give up the 

Navy’s remaining air station in the Northeast region, but found the 

potential savings significant enough to recommend closure. Navy 
Page 56 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

officials stated that the IEC relied on military judgment to retain access 

to an airfield in the Northeast. Nonetheless, all aircraft and associated 

personnel, equipment, and support as well as the aviation intermediate 

maintenance capability will be relocated to another Navy base. The 

Navy is maintaining its cold weather-oriented Survival, Evasion, 

Resistance and Escape School, a Navy Reserve Center, and other small 

units at the air station. 

• While the Air Force had proposed to close Grand Forks Air Force Base, 

North Dakota,43 the IEC revised this to a realignment a week before OSD 

released its recommendations. The Air Force reported in its submission 

to the BRAC Commission that over 80 percent of the base’s personnel 

are expected to be eliminated or realigned under the revised proposal. 

The revision to keep the base open was made based on military 

judgment to keep a strategic presence in the north central United States, 

with a possible unmanned aerial vehicle mission for the base. Even 

though Grand Forks Air Force Base was retained for strategic reasons, 

Minot Air Force Base is also located in North Dakota and is not affected 

by any BRAC rcommendation.

• The closure of Rome Laboratory, New York, was originally part of a 

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group recommendation to consolidate 

the Defense Research Laboratories. No concerns were originally raised 

about the closure, and it was approved by the IEC. However, the IEC 

subsequently decided to realign rather than close the laboratory to 

address strategic presence and cost concerns. The realignment of Rome 

has a higher 20-year net present value savings than the closure proposal 

because the closure would have required more military construction 

and transfers of military and civilian personnel and equipment.

Conclusions While we believe DOD’s overall recommendations, if approved and 

implemented would produce savings, there are clear limitations associated 

with the projected savings, such as the lack of military end-strength 

reductions and uncertainties associated with other savings estimates. 

DOD’s recommendations would provide net reductions in space and plant 

replacement value, which would reduce infrastructure costs once up-front 

investment costs have been recovered but the extent some projected space 

43 The Grand Forks Air Force Base recommendation also includes the realignment of 

McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.
Page 57 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

reductions will be realized is unclear. Other DOD savings estimates are 

based on what might be broadly termed business process reengineering 

efforts and other actions, where savings appear likely, but the magnitude of 

savings has not been validated and much will depend on how the 

recommended actions are implemented. Nevertheless, the savings could 

prove difficult to track over time. As a result, DOD’s projections may create 

a false sense of the magnitude of the savings, with fewer resources 

available for force modernization and other needs than might be 

anticipated, and there may be the potential for premature budget 

reductions. Given problems in tracking savings from previous BRAC 

rounds, and the large volume of BRAC actions this round that are more 

oriented to realignments and business process reengineering than closures, 

we believe it is of paramount importance that DOD put in place a process 

to track and periodically update its savings estimates. 

Despite a fundamentally sound overall process, we identified numerous 

issues regarding DOD’s list of recommendations that may warrant further 

attention by the BRAC Commission, as noted in this report and appendixes 

III through XII. These include those recommendations having lengthy 

payback periods, some with limited savings relative to investment costs, 

and potential implementation difficulties. Given the large number of such 

items for the Commission’s consideration, we are not addressing them as 

individual recommendations but simply referring our report in its entirety 

for the Commission’s consideration.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate steps to 

establish mechanisms for tracking and periodically updating savings 

estimates in implementing individual recommendations, with emphasis 

both on savings related to the more traditional relignment and closure 

actions as well as those related more to business process reengineering.

Agency Comments Cognizant officials of the military services and joint cross-service groups 

reviewed drafts of the report providing us with informal comments, 

permitting us to make technical changes, as appropriate, to enhance the 

accuracy and completeness of the report. Subsequently, we similarly 

provided complete drafts of the report to cognizant OSD officials, obtaining 

and incorporating their comments as appropriate. In providing oral 

comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Installations and Environment concurred with our recommendation.
Page 58 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress; the 

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget; and the Chairman, Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix XVII.

Barry W. Holman, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 59 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison

Chairman

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction

and Veterans Affairs

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 60 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The Honorable James Walsh

Chairman

The Honorable Chet Edwards

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans 

Affairs, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 
Page 61 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

Prior to the release of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations on May 13, 2005, we 

monitored the BRAC process in a real-time environment beginning in 

October 2003. We sought to assure ourselves that DOD followed an 

objective and consistently applied process in which we could observe 

logical decision making leading to defensible and well-documented 

proposed closure and realignment recommendations. During this period, 

we abided by an agreement with DOD to not disclose details of the process 

due to the sensitivity of the information. Following the release of the 

recommendations, we continued our analyses of the process and 

recommendations. With the unprecedented large number of 

recommendations and the finalization of many of these occurring in the 

final weeks of the process, along with the limited time available for us to 

report our results following DOD’s May 13, 2005, release of the 

recommendations, we were not able to review all recommendations in 

detail. We focused more of our attention on cross-cutting issues than on 

implementation issues of individual recommendations, but did review 

individual recommendations as time permitted. Further, because of time 

constraints, we had only limited opportunities to gain further insight into 

some of the recommendations from officials at bases affected by the 

recommendations. 

We performed our work primarily at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the military services’ base closure offices, and the offices of seven 

joint cross-service groups1

 that were established by OSD to develop crossservice recommendations. While we did not attend deliberative meetings, 

we had access to minutes of meetings and relevant documentation and met 

periodically with key staff and senior leadership to gain an understanding 

of each phase of the process and to provide them with the opportunity to 

address our concerns as the process was unfolding. We also visited 

selected bases following the public disclosure of the Secretary’s 

recommendations to gain further insights into potential issues regarding 

specific recommendations. Those bases included the Anniston Army 

Depot, Alabama; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Riley, Kansas; Lackland Air 

Force Base, Texas; McChord Air Force Base, Washington; Marine Corps Air 

Station Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine; 

Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia; Naval Submarine Base New 

1

 The joint cross-service groups were Education and Training, Headquarters and Support 

Activities, Industrial, Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 62 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

London, Connecticut; and Red River Army Depot, Texas. We also met with 

officials of the U.S. Coast Guard to discuss the impact of BRAC actions on 

their operations since they are tenants on several bases recommended for 

closure or realignment. We relied on DOD’s Office of the Inspector General, 

Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and Air Force Audit Agency to 

validate the data used by the military services and joint cross-service 

groups in their decision-making processes. We met with staff of these audit 

agencies periodically to discuss the results of their work as well as to 

observe their data validation efforts at selected locations across the 

country. The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies issued 

reports that generally concluded that the extensive amount of data used as 

the basis for BRAC decisions was sufficiently valid and accurate for the 

purposes intended. In addition, with limited exceptions, these reports did 

not identify any material issues that would impede a BRAC 

recommendation.2

 Where questions existed, we made further assessments 

and were able to satisfy ourselves that issues raised would have limited, if 

any, impact on the department’s recommendations. Based on the audit 

agencies’ extensive validation efforts and our observation of their work, we 

believe the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To determine the extent to which DOD achieved its BRAC goals, we 

interviewed key officials and collected and analyzed relevant 

documentation generated by OSD, the military departments, and the joint 

cross-service groups. We reviewed the Secretary of Defense’s November 

2002 memorandum that initiated the 2005 BRAC process and highlighted 

DOD’s goals and obtained DOD officials’ views on the degree to which the 

goals were accomplished. With respect to DOD’s goal of reducing excess 

capacity, we initially reviewed the capacity analysis reports of the services 

and joint cross-service groups to gain insight into the relative amounts of 

excess capacity within the department. We subsequently reviewed major 

recommendations to determine the extent to which these recommended 

actions would reduce infrastructure and excess capacity. In this regard, we 

also assessed the changes in the overall defense infrastructure’s plant 

replacement value—a measure used by the department to determine the 

cost to replace an existing facility with a facility of the same size at the 

same location, using today’s standards—by reviewing supporting 

documentation for the recommendations. We also analyzed the aggregated 

estimated costs and savings associated with reducing DOD’s unnecessary 

2

 See app. XVI for a list of relevant DOD Inspector General and military service audit reports 

that were available at the time we completed our review.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 63 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

infrastructure, as depicted in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions 

(COBRA) analyses for the 222 recommendations proposed by the 

department, and compared these estimates with similar data from the prior 

BRAC rounds to determine similarities and differences in sources of costs 

and savings and thereby identify potential areas for further review. With 

respect to DOD’s costs and savings estimates, we examined selected 

supporting documentation to determine the basis for the estimates and 

identified key elements, such as base operating support, personnel 

compensation, or recapitalization of facilities, those estimates comprised. 

We also performed a qualitative analysis of DOD’s performance in 

addressing its other BRAC goals—transforming the infrastructure and 

fostering jointness—by examining DOD’s proposed recommendations and 

seeking views from key officials on the relative success of achieving these 

initiatives. We also compared the justification narratives supporting 

individual recommendations for closures and realignments against draft 

transformation options developed by the department, although not 

formally adopted, that were nonetheless used by the individual military 

services and joint cross-service groups. Our efforts in addressing this and 

other objectives were facilitated by remote access to selected automated 

databases and tracking systems, which gave us near real-time access to 

relevant briefings and other documents, permitting us to broadly track the 

evolution of the BRAC process and identify issues for further 

consideration.

To address whether DOD’s selection process for developing 

recommendations was logical and reasoned, we focused on key aspects of 

the BRAC process, including capacity and military value analyses. In doing 

so, we sought to determine whether DOD’s selection process was objective 

and in compliance with key considerations of BRAC legislation. Our 

monitoring of the process from the start permitted us to assess the extent 

to which the process followed was logical, sequential, reasoned, and well 

documented. Our monitoring permitted us to determine to what extent a 

logical and sequential flow existed among all phases of DOD’s selection 

process from the point at which data were collected and analyzed through 

the compilation of the final recommendations. We reviewed the services’ 

determinations of which installations to consider in the BRAC process and 

analyzed the services’ and joint cross-service groups’ excess capacity 

analyses and military value evaluation plans and analyses to determine if 

they were developed in a reasoned fashion and supported by appropriate 

documentation. In reviewing military value analyses, we reviewed specific 

attributes established by the services and joint cross-service groups and 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 64 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

examined the linkage between the groups’ methodologies and the military 

value selection criteria (i.e., criteria 1 through 4) to determine if these 

mandated selection criteria were addressed. Regarding the development of 

recommendations, our focus was to determine whether the 

recommendations were developed in a logical and reasoned manner. We 

reviewed, among other things, the extent to which the services and joint 

cross-service groups (1) considered various alternative proposals for 

closure or realignment, (2) assessed proposed recommendations using 

military value as the predominant decision-making factor, and 

(3) considered the remaining four selection criteria as mandated by law. 

To address issues regarding DOD’s recommendations, we focused more of 

our attention on cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of 

individual recommendations, but did review individual recommendations 

as time permitted. We reviewed recommendation justification packages 

that included particulars on the benefits of implementing the 

recommendations from an operational perspective, the estimated costs and 

savings associated with implementing the recommendations, and their 

degree of conformity to the mandated selection criteria. We discussed 

perceived benefits with key officials and reviewed appropriate supporting 

documentation. We also examined financial aspects of the recommended 

actions, including expected up-front investment costs to implement the 

actions, length of payback periods, net present value savings or costs over 

a 20-year period, and annual recurring savings or costs. In examining the 

expected costs and savings as generated by DOD’s COBRA model, we 

further examined assumptions and specific calculations regarding specific 

recommendations to determine the relative reasonableness of the 

estimates, given the data available to the services and the joint crossservice groups using the COBRA model. Further, we examined and 

discussed with DOD officials the economic and community impact for 

selected closure and realignment actions, including both adverse impacts 

associated with closing bases as well as challenges facing bases and 

surrounding communities that stand to receive large influxes of military 

personnel, civilian personnel, or both. Additionally, we reviewed potential 

recommendations that were approved by either the services or joint crossservice groups but ultimately rejected by senior leadership, the 

Infrastructure Executive Council, during the last few weeks of the BRAC 

process. We examined the merits of these proposals as presented by the 

services or joint cross-service groups in terms of addressing DOD’s BRAC 

goals. We further reviewed the rationale offered by senior leadership in its 

decisions to reject or substantially revise the offered proposals. Because of 

time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 65 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

the unprecedented 837 closures and realignment actions across the country 

into 222 recommendations, we focused more on evaluating major issues 

affecting more than one recommendation than on implementation issues of 

individual recommendations. However, as time permitted, we did visit 

several selected installations, as noted above, to better gauge the 

operational and economic impact of the proposed recommendations. 

Installations visited were selected on a judgment basis because of our 

desire to have additional information on issues of concern, such as those 

related to costs and savings, potential operational implications, and 

potential economic impact. They included a number of bases with 

industrial-type activities because of concerns in prior rounds about how 

well the BRAC process and the COBRA model deal with such issues and 

other aspects of those facilities that permitted us to address other issues of 

concern. 

We conducted our work from October 2003, as DOD’s process was 

beginning, through June 2005, shortly after the Secretary of Defense 

announced his proposed base closures and realignments, in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 66 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix II

Glossary of BRAC-Related Terms ApendxiI

The following terms were used by DOD during the 2005 BRAC process. 

• Annual recurring savings: Savings that are expected to occur 

annually after the costs of implementing a BRAC action have been offset 

by savings.

• Candidate recommendation: A scenario that a joint cross-service 

group or military department has formally analyzed against all eight 

selection criteria and which it recommends to the Infrastructure 

Steering Group and Infrastructure Executive Council respectively for 

approval by the Secretary of Defense. A joint cross-service group 

candidate recommendation must be approved by the Infrastructure 

Steering Group, the Infrastructure Executive Council, and the Secretary 

of Defense before it becomes a DOD recommendation. A military 

department candidate recommendation must be approved by the 

Infrastructure Executive Council and the Secretary of Defense before it 

becomes a DOD recommendation.

• Certified data: P.L. 101-510, section 2903 (c)(5) requires specified DOD 

personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that 

information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 2005 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission concerning the realignment 

or closure of a military installation is accurate and complete.

• Closure: All missions of the installation have ceased or have been 

relocated. All personnel positions (military, civilian, and contractor) 

have either been eliminated or relocated, except for personnel required 

for caretaking, conducting any ongoing environmental restoration, and 

disposing of base property. 

• COBRA: An analytical tool used to calculate the costs, savings, and 

return on investment of proposed realignment and closure actions.

• Force structure plan: Numbers, size, and composition of the units that 

comprise U.S. defense forces, for example, divisions, air wings, aircraft, 

tanks, and so forth.

• Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC): One of two senior groups 

established by the Secretary of Defense to oversee and operate the 

BRAC 2005 process. The IEC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, composed of the Secretaries of the military departments and 

their chiefs of services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
Appendix II

Glossary of BRAC-Related Terms

Page 67 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 

was the policy-making and oversight body of the entire BRAC 2005 

process.

• Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG): The subordinate of two senior 

groups established by the Secretary of Defense to oversee the BRAC 

2005 process. The ISG, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), and composed of the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Vice Chiefs, Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), and the 

Military Department Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Installations and 

Environment), provided oversight to joint cross-service group analyses 

of common business and support functions and ensured the integration 

of that process with the military departments’ and defense agencies’ 

specific analyses of all other functions. 

• Losing installation: An installation from which missions, units, or 

activities would cease or be relocated pursuant to a closure or 

realignment recommendation. An installation can be a losing installation 

for one recommendation and a receiving installation for a different 

recommendation. 

• Military installation: A base, camp, post, station, yard, center, 

homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of 

the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. The term does 

not include any facility used primarily for civil works, river and harbor 

projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary 

jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

• Military value: Referring to one or more of the first four BRAC 

selection criteria, which are collectively referred to as the military value 

criteria and are expected to receive priority consideration in the 

analytical process that results in recommendations for the closure or 

realignment of military installations within the United States. 

• Net present value: In the context of BRAC, net present value is taking 

into account the time value of money in calculating the value of future 

cost and savings.

• Payback period: The time required for cumulative estimated savings to 

exceed the cumulative estimated costs incurred in net present value 

terms as a result of implementing BRAC actions.
Appendix II

Glossary of BRAC-Related Terms

Page 68 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• Realignment: Includes any action that both reduces and relocates 

functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a 

reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced 

personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances. 

• Receiving installation: An installation to which missions, units, or 

activities would be relocated pursuant to a closure or realignment 

recommendation. An installation can be a receiving installation for one 

recommendation and a losing installation for a different 

recommendation. 

• Scenario: A proposal that has been declared for formal analysis by a 

military department or joint cross-service group deliberative body. The 

content of a scenario is the same as the content of a proposal. The only 

difference is that it has been declared for analysis by a deliberative body. 

Once declared, a scenario was registered at the ISG by inputting it into 

the ISG BRAC Scenario Tracking Tool.

• Surge: A term incorporated in one of the military value selection 

criteria for the 2005 BRAC round: “the ability to accommodate 

contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements.” 

The term is not otherwise defined and application of the term can vary 

by specific operational or support categories.

• Transformation: According to the department’s April 2003 

Transformation Planning Guidance document, transformation is “a 

process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and 

cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, 

people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and 

protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic 

position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”
Page 69 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiI

The Army generally followed the common analytical framework 

established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for reviewing 

its active component installations and followed a separate parallel process 

for its reserve components installations. Compared to prior rounds, the 

Army’s process produced a record number of 56 recommendations, with 44 

of them directed to its reserve components and 12 directed to the active 

component, recognizing that many of the individual recommendations 

contain multiple closure and realignment actions. The 44 reserve 

components recommendations involved realignment or closure actions 

that could have been approved outside of the BRAC process, but the Army 

and DOD decided to include them as part of DOD’s efforts to aid 

transformation through the base realignment and closure process.1

 Unlike 

the other military services and joint cross-service groups, the Army’s 

recommendations, while producing estimated net annual recurring savings 

of nearly $500 million after 2011, are not expected to achieve overall net 

savings over the 20-year period typically used to measure net savings from 

BRAC actions. Over this 20-year period, the Army expects to incur a net 

present value cost over $3 billion, which is due primarily to the very large 

up-front costs in a few recommendations that are necessary to return 

forces to the United States under DOD’s Integrated Global Presence and 

Basing Strategy.2

 However, the financial outlook for the Army improves if 

joint cross-service recommendations involving Army bases are 

considered—these separately reported actions are expected to produce 

$10.7 billion in net present value savings over a 20-year period. Payback 

periods—the time required for savings to offset closure costs—for the 

active component recommendations are projected to average 2.5 years 

1

 BRAC legislation establishes specific thresholds that require decisions regarding the 

closure or realignment of U.S. domestic military installations to be made under the BRAC 

process. Accordingly, decisions to close domestic U.S. military installations with 

authorization for at least 300 civilian personnel or to realign domestic U.S. military 

installations authorized at least 300 civilian personnel that involve a reduction of more than 

1,000 or 50 percent in the number of civilian personnel authorized must undergo the BRAC 

process. See P.L. 101-510, section 2909. 

2

 The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) refers to DOD’s effort to 

evaluate the global posture of the armed forces, which in part recommended the return of 

U.S. forces from Europe and Korea. The Army’s BRAC 2005 report indicates that had it been 

able to include savings expected from closing overseas bases and restationing overseasbased personnel to the United States, its recommendations related to these actions would 

have achieved a net savings. However, DOD determined, and we agree, that the inclusion of 

such savings based on overseas base closures in BRAC is not appropriate, because the 

BRAC process was established to consider only the closure or realignment actions involving 

domestic U.S. military installations and not U.S. military installations located in foreign 

countries. 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 70 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

with a range of immediate to no payback, and average 12.3 years with a 

range of immediate to more than 100 years for the reserve components. We 

believe some of the Army’s recommendations may warrant additional 

attention from the BRAC Commission due to the likelihood of overstated 

savings projections associated with military personnel eliminations, 

uncertainties regarding overseas restationing of forces to the United States 

and other ongoing force structure changes, challenges facing communities 

surrounding bases that are gaining large numbers of personnel, the 

bundling of various recommendations, various unknowns associated with 

implementing the reserve components’ recommendations, and issues 

regarding the proposed closure of the Red River Army Depot in Texas. The 

Army Audit Agency, which performed audits of the data used in the 

process, concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for use in BRAC.

Organization and 

Focus

The Army established a Senior Review Group, headed by the Vice Chief of 

Staff of the Army and the Under Secretary of the Army and comprising 

senior Army military and civilian personnel, responsible for assessing 

potential recommendations for consideration by the Secretary of the Army, 

who in turn was to forward recommended actions to the Infrastructure 

Executive Council (IEC) for approval.3

 This group was supported by The 

Army Basing Study Group, headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Infrastructure Analysis, which was responsible for collecting and 

analyzing data and developing recommendations. In addition, subject 

matter experts and representatives from the Army’s major commands 

provided expertise and input throughout the BRAC process.

The Army’s broadly stated goals for BRAC 2005 were to enhance the 

capabilities of a transforming Army while aligning its infrastructure to meet 

its post-Cold War force structure and eliminating excess physical capacity 

to provide ready combat power to Combatant Commanders. Some key 

planning and strategy documents provided guidance in the pursuit of Army 

goals. The Army Stationing Strategy, for example, provided an overall 

vision, principles, and goals relative to future basing decisions while DOD’s 

Strategic Planning Guidance helped to define objectives regarding soldiers’ 

well-being. In further defining its goals, the Army identified the capabilities 

and missions that its installations require to support its forces in the future. 

With these needs in mind, the Army set out numerous objectives, such as:

3

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure Executive Council 

(IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process. 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 71 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• locate Army forces and materiel (at critical installations) to enhance 

deployment and redeployment; 

• relocate forces in accordance with the Integrated Global Presence and 

Basing Strategy;

• reshape installations to support home station mobilization and 

demobilization;

• reshape reserve components infrastructure to improve efficiency of 

mobilization and demobilization; and

• provide sufficient area and facilities (with varied terrain, climate, and 

airspace) to support institutional training, combat development, and 

doctrine development.

Framework for 

Analysis 

The Army’s BRAC analysis included a review of 87 active component 

installations and 10 leased facilities. A separate effort was undertaken to 

review over 4,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve facilities to 

explore infrastructure consolidation opportunities that would afford the 

reserve components better facilities and enhance, among other things, 

training and operations.4

 Army officials indicated that differences in the 

objectives and the nature of facilities associated with the active and reserve 

components infrastructure made it impractical to use identical review and 

decision-making processes. As with previous BRAC rounds, capacity and 

military value analyses provided the starting point for the Army’s decisionmaking process. A key focus in the Army’s efforts was to preserve large 

maneuver areas to ensure that future training requirements could be met 

and to relocate missions and personnel from small, single-function 

installations to larger, multi-function installations. The Army Audit Agency 

played an important role in helping to ensure data accuracy through 

extensive audits of data gathered at various locations.

4

 In a May 2003 report, we noted the challenges that the Army faces in the funding of its 

reserve component facilities due to budget coordination difficulties. See GAO, Defense 

Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management Processes Needed to 

Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and Reserve Facilities, GAO-03-516

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003). According to Army officials, BRAC provides them an 

opportunity to overcome these challenges.
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 72 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The Army’s BRAC process was made more challenging by two ongoing 

force structure and basing initiatives—the rebasing of thousands of Army 

forces and their families to the United States as a result of the Integrated 

Global Presence and Basing Strategy and the restructuring of the Army’s 

forces under its modularity5

 program—that were to be integrated into the 

BRAC process.

Capacity Analysis The Army initiated its capacity analysis by collecting capacity-related data 

for its active duty installations (e.g., buildings, land) based on 28 capacity 

metrics, such as buildable acres, maneuver areas, and instructional 

facilities. In calculating capacity excesses or shortages through a 

comparison of the physical capacity data with requirements, the Army 

considered a surge capability to ensure that sufficient capacity existed to 

meet unforeseen military contingencies, future threats, and future needs as 

outlined in DOD’s 20-year force structure plan. The Army’s surge analysis 

also reinforced the importance of preserving assets such as maneuver land 

that would be difficult to reconstitute if eliminated. Table 8 shows selected 

Army’s capacity results for 7 of 12 mission areas, as presented in the Army’s 

BRAC 2005 report.

5

 Modularity refers to the Army Modular Force Initiative whereby the Army is transforming 

its force structure by increasing from 67 brigade combat teams to 77 modular brigade 

combat teams (43 active Army and 34 Army National Guard) with the potential for 48 active 

Army modular brigade combat teams.
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 73 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 8: Excess Capacity Identified by the Army for Selected Mission Areas

Source: GAO analysis of the Department of the Army data.

As shown in table 8, some areas, such as armaments production and 

ammunition storage, had excess capacity ranging from about 5 percent to 

about 220 percent while other areas had shortages. Further, the Army 

reported that it had a service-wide excess of over 1.5 million square feet of 

general administrative space even though 35 installations reported 

shortages. While the Army’s BRAC report did not indicate the overall 

impact the Army’s proposed closure and realignment recommendations 

would have on reducing excess capacity, Army officials projected that its 

proposed actions would reduce excess general administrative space by 

over 1 million square feet while realigning Army units to better match the 

remaining capacity. 

Mission Capacity metrics

Percentage

of excess

capacity

(shortage)

Deployment Fixed wing runway, surfaced 28.6

Aircraft apron, surfaced (17.9)

Mobilization Vehicle maintenance shop (20.3)

Annual training/mobilization barracks (56.9)

Institutional training and 

education

General instructional facilities (8.4)

Applied instructional facilities (18.6)

Well-being Medical center/hospital 9.2

Dental facility (6.9)

Enlisted unaccompanied personnel housing (6.3)

Education center (4.5)

Nursery and child care facility (43.5)

Joint logistics Depot maintenance 24.7

Armaments production 219.9

Ammunition storage 65.9

Command, control, 

computers and 

communications/ 

headquarters

General administrative space 4.9

Small unit headquarters (41.9)

Large unit headquarters (11.5)

Research, development, 

test and evaluation

Specialized training facilities 61.9
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 74 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

While the overall capacity excesses and shortages, identified by 

installation, provided insights for potential closures or realignments, the 

Army subsequently conducted more detailed capacity analyses that 

identified the types of facilities and training lands that were required to 

support various units (e.g., light and heavy maneuver brigades, small and 

large training schools). In this manner, the Army had the ability to 

determine which installations could handle additional missions and units 

and what infrastructure improvements and additional military construction 

might be required to support those units.

The Army did not perform a similar capacity assessment of the reserve 

components’ facilities because of the nature of their facilities and differing 

objectives, but did collect and assess data related to, for example, the 

condition and location of facilities, as well as expected costs such as 

construction and force protection upgrades that may be necessary to 

provide for viable reserve consolidation opportunities. Prior to the 

collection of this data, the Army sought interest from the state Adjutant 

Generals of the National Guards for units in each state participating in such 

efforts on a voluntary basis.

Military Value Analysis The Army’s military value analysis focused on a set of 40 attributes, such as 

maneuver land, and housing availability for its soldiers and dependents, 

that are characteristics the Army considered desirable for its installations 

to meet Army needs. Attributes with less flexibility for change, such as the 

availability of maneuver land or direct fire ranges, were among those most 

highly valued in developing a scoring plan for evaluating the military value 

for each of the Army’s installations. According to Army officials, this 

reflected their view of the criticality of possessing adequate acreage to 

conduct unit training, particularly in view of the expectation for an 

increase in the number of brigades and return of various forces from 

overseas locations. The Army’s military value attributes also reflected 

consideration of its role in supporting the global war on terrorism, 

homeland defense, and transformation.6

 Through a process of weighting 

each of the Army’s attributes, the Army derived relative weights for the four 

6

 DOD defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military 

competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people 

and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against asymmetric 

vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in 

the world.”
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 75 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

legislatively-mandated military value selection criteria. As shown in 

table 9, three of the four criteria had relatively higher weights than the 

remaining criterion dealing with cost and manpower implications. 

Imbedded within these criteria was a key focus on the need for availability 

of existing land and facilities for expansion purposes to address the needs 

as cited in those specific criteria. In this regard, the Army placed high value 

on these criteria as a hedge against uncertain future requirements and to 

ensure that they did not dispose of assets such as large tracts of land, 

which would be difficult to reacquire. 

Table 9: Army Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and Department of the Army.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

In performing its military value assessment, the Army assessed each active 

duty installation and ranked each of them across the four military value 

selection criteria to more fully evaluate the potential for realignment and 

closure actions. This contrasted with the approach the Army used in the 

1995 BRAC round when it developed a military value ranking for individual 

installations under one of 13 mission categories, which made it more 

difficult to assess an installation for use in a different mission area. For this 

round, the Army assessed the military value of each of its installations 

based on a common framework that linked attributes, metrics, and data 

call questions to military value as shown in figure 9. 

Figures in percentages

Criteria

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, 

including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

29

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas 

and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland 

defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 

29

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving 

locations to support operations and training. 

32

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 10

Total 100
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 76 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 9: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of an Army Installation

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The Army used a total of 40 attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The Army used over 80 metrics.

d

The Army used over 80 data call questions.

During its assessment, the Army stressed multi-function capabilities for 

installations. To account for the unique capabilities that some Army singlefunction installations provided, the Army applied military judgment to 

modify the initial ranking of its installations to better identify installations 

that the Army believed were best suited to meet its current and future 

capabilities. For example, the Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii, 

which initially ranked low in military value, is DOD’s only medical center of 

significant size in the Pacific and therefore was retained for strategic 

reasons. Ultimately, the Army moved nine installations higher in the list 

based on their unique capabilities.7

 Subsequently, those installations with a 

Sample data call 

questionsd

Military value 

attributesb

Military value 

criteriaa

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

2) Availability and condition 

 of land, facilities, and 

 airspace.

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total 

 force requirements.

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

General 

instructional

facilities 

Workforce 

availability

Heavy maneuver 

area

Buildable

acres

Military value 

metricsc

Total acres of largest 

contiguous heavy 

maneuver area

Total acres usable for 

ground maneuver 

training

Total square feet of 

general instructional 

facilities

Number of adults 

residing within 50 

miles

Total buildable acres 

on the installation

What is the acreage of the 

installation’s largest contiguous 

heavy maneuver area?

What are the total acres usable 

for ground maneuver training at 

the installation? How many acres 

are usable for heavy forces?

What is the total square footage 

of general instructional facilities 

on the installation?

What are the numbers of adults 

age 25 and over who reside 

within 50 miles of the installation?

Provide total buildable acres for 

all land owned/controlled by the 

base.

7

 The nine installations were Holston, Radford, and Lake City Army Ammunition Plants; 

Watervliet Arsenal; Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point; Forts Myer and Detrick; and 

Tripler and Walter Reed Army Medical Centers.
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 77 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

lower military value ranking became more vulnerable to closure or 

realignment actions.

With respect to its reserve components, the Army did not perform a 

military value rank-ordering of these various installations across the 

country, but instead assessed the relative military value that could be 

obtained by consolidating various facilities into a joint facility in specific 

geographical locales to support, among other things, the reserve 

components’ training, recruiting, and retention efforts. 

Army Audit Agency’s Role in 

the Process 

Throughout the BRAC process, the Army Audit Agency advised the Army 

on the development and implementation of its internal control procedures; 

performed audits of the Army’s conduct of the process, including the 

validation of data and various models used to assist in decision making. 

During the capacity and military value data calls, the Army Audit Agency 

performed on-site audits of data collection efforts at various installations 

on a sample basis to validate the data being gathered. Instances of 

inaccurate data or inadequate source documentation identified during 

these audits were generally corrected by the Army. As a result, the auditors 

generally found the data to be sufficiently reliable for use in the BRAC 

process. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Army used the results of its capacity and military value analyses, along 

with the 20-year force structure plan, as the foundation for the 

development of hundreds of potential closure and realignment scenarios. 

Scenarios under consideration were refined using various models—

primarily an optimization model and the Cost of Base Realignment Actions 

(COBRA) model—along with military judgment. The optimization model, 

using capacity data, military value scores, and other data, provided the 

Army with various competing, plausible alternatives associated with the 

restationing of various missions and forces within the infrastructure. The 

model provided for alternative scenarios and their impact on overall 

military value as functions were moved to higher ranked installations. The 

COBRA model, which was used by all military services and joint crossservice groups to address the fifth selection criterion regarding costs and 

savings, provided the Army with the relative cost and savings estimates of 

these various alternatives. 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 78 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The Army further assessed the various scenarios in terms of the remaining 

selection criteria 6 through 8, regarding the economic impact on 

communities affected by BRAC, the ability of the infrastructure within 

communities to support military missions, and the environmental impact of 

the BRAC actions, respectively. The Army used input from various DODgenerated models in assessing its scenarios against these criteria, which, 

while important and mandated by the BRAC legislation, played less of a 

role than that of military value. However, the Army considered these 

criteria in order to ensure that there were no insurmountable challenges 

that would derail the implementation of any particular scenario. In 

addition, they were used to differentiate between competing scenarios. For 

example, the Army determined its final stationing of modular brigades 

based in part on its assessment of the environmental impact these brigades 

would have on the receiving installations.

The Army also integrated into the overall process those scenarios that had 

been generated for the reserve components in the parallel process referred 

to previously. Those scenarios were developed through a series of meetings 

with state officials across the country. As with the active component, the 

reserve component scenarios were assessed using the COBRA model and 

other models. 

The Army also worked closely with the joint cross-service groups as they 

developed recommendations that affected Army installations. In some 

cases, the Army developed scenarios that were provided to the joint crossservice groups for further consideration. For example, the Army developed 

initial scenarios proposing to close three chemical demilitarization 

facilities, which were subsequently provided to the Industrial Joint CrossService Group, which ultimately developed and processed 

recommendations for these closures. Alternatively, some scenarios which 

ultimately became Army recommendations were developed in conjunction 

with the joint cross-service groups. For example, the Industrial Joint CrossService Group’s scenario regarding the realignment of the depot 

maintenance workload out of the Red River Army Depot in Texas, was 

instrumental in leading to an ultimate Army recommendation to close the 

depot. Similarly, the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group 

developed a scenario to realign the Army’s Armor Center and School from 

Fort Knox, Kentucky to Fort Benning, Georgia, an action that was later 

folded into the Army’s broader realignment of Fort Knox. As the Army and 

cross-service group recommendations were being finalized, the Army held 

a series of meetings with the joint cross-service groups to ensure that all 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 79 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

recommended actions involving Army installations were properly 

integrated and corresponding impacts were considered in their entirety.

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The Army produced 56 recommendations8 that were approved by DOD—6 

closures of active component installations, 6 realignments of active 

component installations, and 44 recommendations consisting of multiple 

reserve components closure and realignment actions grouped by state or 

region. These recommendations, along with other Army-related 

recommendations produced by the joint cross-service groups, align, for the 

most part, with the Army’s objectives of reducing the number of primarily 

single-function, smaller installations and transforming the infrastructure to 

better meet current and expected future Army needs. Table 10 provides the 

financial implications of the Army’s recommendations. 

Table 10: Financial Aspects of the Army’s Recommendations

8

 These recommendations represent only those produced by the Army as detailed in DOD’s 

2005 BRAC report. In addition, the various joint cross-service groups produced various 

recommendations that affected Army installations. Those recommended actions are 

detailed in the appropriate appendices in this report. 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Installations DOD report page

One-time

(costs)

Net

implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year net

present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Reserve Componentsc Army-25 to 120 ($2,856.8) ($1,557.4) $322.8 12.3 average $1,598.6

Close Fort Monmouth, NJ Army-11 (822.3) (395.6) 143.7 6 1,025.8

Realign Maneuver Trainingd

 Army-20 (773.1) (244.1) 123.3 5 948.1

Close Fort McPherson, GA Army-8 (197.8) 111.4 82.1 2 895.2

Close Fort Monroe, VA Army-19 (72.4) 146.9 56.9 1 686.6

Close Red River Army Depot, TX Army-16 (456.2) (216.6) 76.5 4 539.0

Close Fort Gillem, GA Army-6 (56.8) 85.5 35.3 1 421.5

Close U.S. Army Garrison (Selfridge) 

MI

Army-106 (9.5) 91.4 18.1 immediate 260.9

Realign Single Drill Sergeant Schoole Army-105 (1.8) 7.6 2.5 immediate 31.3

Realign Fort Wainwright, AK Army-5 (0.1) 0.2 0.1 2 0.7

Realign Fort Bragg, NC Army-10 (334.8) (446.1)f (23.8) never (639.2)
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 80 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

c

The Army produced 44 recommendations realigning its reserve components, which are combined into 

one entry in the table.

d

This recommendation primarily stations a modular brigade and some overseas forces at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky while realigning the Armor Center and School to Fort Benning, Georgia.

e

This recommendation realigns the drill sergeant schools from Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri to Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

f

The Army BRAC 2005 report mistakenly reported this figure as a savings rather than a cost. The Army 

subsequently issued a correction.

g

This recommendations primarily restations some overseas forces at Fort Bliss, Texas and Fort Riley, 

Kansas.

As shown in table 10, the Army’s recommendations are expected to 

produce nearly $500 million in estimated net annual recurring savings 

beginning in 2012, but have a large 20-year net present value cost of about 

$3 billion, rather than savings which are typically expected in that 

timeframe; this is due primarily to very large up-front costs, nearly 

$10 billion in expected one-time costs, that are required to implement the 

recommendations. A few of the recommendations, particularly the one 

involving the redeployment of Army forces to the United States under 

DOD’s Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, are responsible for 

the high costs and negative returns.

The recommended closures of 6 active duty installations, which are largely 

installations of lower military value within the Army, have the greatest 

potential for savings with a combined estimated net present value savings 

over the next 20 years of about $3.8 billion and payback periods of 6 years 

or less. Most of the expected savings from these recommendations are due 

to reductions in personnel costs and overhead (e.g., base operations 

support). Expected personnel savings from these 6 recommendations are 

driven by the elimination of nearly 3,500 personnel of which nearly 25 

percent, or over 800, are military. 

Realign Fort Hood, TX Army-15 (435.8) (579.5) (45.3) never (980.4)

Realign Operational Army (IGPBS)g Army-22 (3,946.0) (5,229.0) (294.7) never (7,826.7)

Total ($9,963.4) ($8,519.1) $497.6 ($3,038.6)

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Installations DOD report page

One-time

(costs)

Net

implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year net

present

value (costs)

or savingsb
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 81 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

While 3 of the remaining 6 active duty base realignment recommendations 

as shown in table 10 also produce savings, 3 recommendations account for 

more than $9.4 billion in 20-year net present value costs and will never 

payback. The largest of these three latter recommendations involves the 

rebasing of Army forces to the United States from overseas locations. The 

Army projected that this realignment alone has a one-time cost of about $4 

billion and annual recurring costs of almost $300 million and will never 

produce savings. Army officials note that a contributory factor to these 

high costs is the fact that the Army could not claim the estimated savings 

that would accrue from the expected closure of the overseas installations 

and the departure of Army forces from those locations. The Army estimates 

that had these estimated savings been accounted for in BRAC, the 

recommended actions would have produced substantial net savings rather 

than the costs as indicated. We did not validate the Army’s savings 

estimates for the overseas closures, and it is not clear to us that sufficient 

information is available at this time to fully assess the total changes in 

overseas basing costs since much of the detail regarding these plans has 

not been finalized. Further, we agree with DOD that it would not be 

appropriate for the Army to include these particular savings in BRAC as 

BRAC provisions in existing legislation do not contemplate consideration 

of savings from the closure or realignments that take place outside of the 

United States.9

With regard to the reserve components, the Army adopted 44 

recommendations, which taken as a whole, would provide a net present 

value savings of over $1.5 billion over the next 20 years but have an average 

payback period of over 12 years. Five of the recommendations involve the 

realignment of the Army Reserve’s command and control structure within 

five regional areas. The remaining recommendations realign reserve 

components facilities in 38 states and Puerto Rico by constructing 125 new 

armed forces reserve centers while closing 176 Army Reserve centers and 

with the understanding that various states would close 211 National Guard 

armories and centers.10 These closures represent about 10 percent of the 

over 4,000 existing Army reserve components’ facilities across the country. 

9

 For purposes of BRAC 2005 actions, the United States is defined under P.L. 101-510, section 

2910(7) as the 50 states, District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of 

the United States.

10 In addition, some of these armed forces reserve centers are expected to include some 

reserve activities from the other services.
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 82 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

While most of the Army’s projected savings associated with the reserve 

components’ recommendations result from reductions in personnel costs 

by eliminating over 4,000 personnel, about 80 percent of these eliminations 

are military personnel. 

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each 

recommendation, particularly recommendations that included multiple 

closure and realignment actions across multiple locations. However, we 

offer a number of broad-based observations about the proposed 

recommendations. Some recommendations may warrant additional 

attention from the BRAC Commission based primarily on issues associated 

with the projected savings from military personnel reductions, 

uncertainties regarding the rebasing of overseas forces and modularity, 

potential impact of expected increase in the use of training ranges, the 

impact on gaining communities, uncertainties regarding the reserve 

component recommendations, the bundling of various recommendations, 

and concerns over the transfer of workload from Red River Army Depot, 

Texas.

Military Personnel 

Reductions

Our analysis showed that about $450 million of the Army’s projected annual 

recurring savings from its recommended closure and realignment actions 

are based on claimed savings from eliminating military personnel. Army 

officials acknowledged that a large portion of their annual recurring 

savings were derived from military personnel eliminations but noted that 

the Army’s financial outlook improved if joint cross-service group 

recommendations involving Army bases are considered. Nevertheless, the 

Army does not plan to reduce its active or reserve component end-strength 

in implementing these recommendations. According to Army officials, 

these personnel are being redistributed within the Army. While we believe 

that the potential exists for these personnel to provide a benefit to the 

Army in their new positions, it represents a savings to the Army in the 

sense of potentially avoiding costs that otherwise might be incurred in 

increasing authorized end strength levels. They do not represent dollar 

savings that might be shifted to other appropriations to meet other priority 

needs such as equipment modernization or improving remaining facilities, 

areas typically cited as likely beneficiaries of BRAC savings. Further, 

because DOD envisions BRAC savings in general to be used to partially 

fund up-front investment costs associated with implementing BRAC 

actions, the Army may be forced to find other sources of funding as military 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 83 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

personnel savings will not likely be available for this purpose. The 

Commission may wish to consider this issue in evaluating the BRAC 

recommendations. 

Uncertainties regarding the 

Rebasing of Army Overseas 

Forces to the United States 

and Force Structure 

Changes due to Modularity

Uncertainties over plans to realign thousands of soldiers and their families 

to the United States as a result of the Integrated Global Presence and 

Basing Strategy as well as the Army’s modularity efforts to create new 

modular brigades have the potential to change the expected costs and 

savings associated with the Army’s BRAC recommendations. The Army’s 

BRAC recommendations incorporate about 15,000 of the 47,000 Army 

personnel currently expected to return as a result of the global basing 

study.11 The Army also incorporated the stationing of five of ten brigades 

being created under the Army’s modular restructuring effort.12 Estimated 

BRAC costs and savings are typically calculated based on assumptions for 

specific units or missions that are expected to realign to specific 

installations in specific years. Changes to these assumptions can alter the 

costs and savings associated with the actions being undertaken. Existing 

Army plans for the return of overseas forces and modularity were the basis 

for the assumptions used to calculate estimated costs and savings and to 

determine potential impacts to the environment and communities 

surrounding the affected installations. However, our analysis identified 

several areas of uncertainty that could affect the assumptions contained in 

those recommendations:

• Army officials told us that DOD has been and is continuing to modify its 

overseas restationing plans, even as the Army BRAC recommendations 

were being finalized. Because of BRAC reporting requirements, the 

11 According to Army officials, the return of 15,000 soldiers was directly incorporated into 

the Army’s BRAC recommendations, including the 1st Armored Division headquarters and 

three heavy maneuver brigades from Germany to Fort Bliss, the 1st Infantry Division 

headquarters, division support command, and aviation brigade to Fort Riley, and military 

police, engineer, and logistical units to Fort Knox, Kentucky. The Army also validated 

existing plans to restation about 10,000 soldiers to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Fort Lewis, 

Colorado; and Fort Carson, Colorado. The remaining 22,000 soldiers will return to the 

United States individually to be restationed as part of the Army’s force restructuring effort 

(called modularity). 

12 The Army’s current modular force restructuring plan calls for the creation of ten modular 

brigades within the United States by year 2006, with the possibility of an additional five 

modular brigades beyond then. As part of its BRAC analysis, the Army validated existing 

stationing decisions for five of the ten new modular brigades and incorporated the 

stationing of the remaining five modular brigades into four of its BRAC recommendations.
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 84 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Army had to finalize its recommendations before the overseas rebasing 

plans were finalized. Army officials indicated that the major overseas 

restationing actions included in the BRAC recommendations are 

expected to occur as currently envisioned. However, as plans continue 

to evolve, the specific details regarding the rebasing could be adjusted, 

with corresponding adjustments in costs and savings being required.

• In a May 2005 report produced by the Commission on Review of the 

Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States,13 the 

Commission recommended slowing down the Army’s entire overseas 

restationing process. If DOD heeds this recommendation, the timing of 

some planned restationing actions could be affected with the potential 

risk of not completing BRAC closure or realignment actions within the 

6-year implementation period with a 2011 completion date as 

established by the BRAC legislation. Further, over half of the Army’s 

forces returning from overseas are expected to be folded into the new 

modular brigades being formed in the United States. Uncertainties over 

the timing of their return could also impact the costs and savings 

associated with those brigades.

• In a March 2005 congressional testimony, we reported that the design 

configuration of the Army’s modular brigades had not been finalized at 

that time.14 In this regard, the Army is considering adding an additional 

combat battalion to each of its modular brigades and has not finalized 

the design of higher echelon and support units. Any such changes to the 

design that was used in deriving the cost and savings estimates and 

potential impacts to the environment and communities of the 

recommended actions are likely to impact the estimates and may alter 

the potential impacts as well.

The Commission may wish to ensure that it has the Army’s latest plans 

regarding the overseas rebasing and modularity efforts in reviewing the 

Army’s recommendations. 

13 This commission, also known as the Overseas Basing Commission, was established by 

Congress in 2003. See P.L. 108-132, section 128 (Nov. 22, 2003). It was created to evaluate, 

among other things, the current and proposed overseas basing structure of the U.S. military 

forces. The Commission’s observations are included in the Report of the Commission on 

Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 

May 9, 2005).

14 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and 

Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 85 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Potential Impact on Training 

Ranges 

The Army’s BRAC recommendations provide for the stationing of returning 

overseas forces and new modular brigades on existing Army installations. 

Our review of Army documentation shows these installations are already 

facing environmental and encroachment issues that constrain their ability 

to meet unit training requirements. These issues raise concerns that 

currently constrained installations may face additional challenges and 

unexpected costs in meeting the training requirements of the additional 

forces the Army plans to station at these installations. As we reported in 

June 2005, several of the Army’s training ranges already face challenges 

resulting from inadequate maintenance and modernization and may also 

require substantial investment for modernization to support the training 

requirements of the new brigades.15 Army officials stated they reviewed 

their BRAC recommendations to ensure that there were no insurmountable 

environmental or encroachment obstacles. They also noted that their 

recommendations included costs for training range upgrades. However, we 

have not validated whether these costs will adequately address training 

range limitations. Further, we have concerns as to whether the Army will 

need to acquire additional training range land at existing bases that are 

already experiencing range limitations—a potential cost not identified in 

the current BRAC recommendations.

Concerns over the ability of existing training ranges to meet training 

requirements are exacerbated by uncertainties over the final number and 

composition of the modular brigades as well as the potential for additional 

forces returning from overseas. Because of existing constraints on training 

ranges, the Army developed scenarios to examine the possibility of 

stationing operational Army units on other installations, including 

installations belonging to other military services and Army installations 

with considerable acreage such as the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. 

The Army deemed none of these scenarios feasible for various reasons, 

such as the configuration of other service installations and their associated 

training ranges did not meet Army training requirements. For other 

scenarios, such as use of the Yuma Proving Ground, the lack of adequate 

infrastructure and the associated high military construction costs that 

would be required essentially made them infeasible. However, Army 

officials told us that should the Army decide to create an additional five 

modular brigades or bring additional forces back from overseas, it may 

15 GAO, Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve 

Conditions of Military Training Ranges, GAO-05-534 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 86 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

become necessary to station these units at installations such as the Yuma 

Proving Ground, which has large tracts of land, because existing Army 

installations might not be able to support these additional units. The 

Commission may wish to review the Army’s plan for addressing training 

range issues and the potential need to acquire additional land to mitigate 

likely challenges the Army faces in the probable increased use of its 

training ranges.

Impact on Gaining 

Communities 

Several of the Army’s recommendations involve relocating significant 

numbers of forces and their families to various installations, which raises 

concerns about the ability of local communities to adapt to these changes 

and absorb these personnel increases. For example, Fort Bliss, Texas is 

expected to receive a net gain of over 11,000 military and civilian 

personnel. The full impact of such increases on surrounding communities, 

particularly on schools, housing, and other community infrastructure, is 

unclear at this time. According to Army officials, its analysis for the 

selection criterion regarding community impact (criterion seven) provided 

an overall assessment of the ability of local communities impacted by a 

potential BRAC action to handle additional personnel and their families, 

including the identification of potential obstacles that could prevent a 

recommendation from being implemented. For example, in assessing the 

impact of the return of forces from overseas, the Army’s review of 

community infrastructure for Fort Bliss and Fort Riley indicated the 

importance of working with these communities to assess and implement 

housing and schooling requirements. However, the Army concluded that 

these issues did not represent impediments to implementing 

recommendations involving these bases.

Addressing the challenges that these communities face may require 

significant investments, particularly with regard to available housing and 

schools, which would increase pressures for federal assistance from 

various agencies to help mitigate these needs. While such costs might be 

borne outside the defense budget to some extent, they would nevertheless 

represent additional costs to the federal government. These potential costs, 

although not required to be captured in DOD’s cost and savings analyses for 

the various recommended actions, could be substantial, given the number 

of Army installations with expected personnel gains. Army officials stated 

that they expect to resolve these issues during implementation and that by 

staggering the movement of units being moved to these installations, they 

believe they will be able to reduce adverse impacts and enable 

communities to better prepare for their arrival. Nevertheless, some 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 87 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

communities may lack the infrastructure to easily absorb these forces. This 

could impact the timing of the movement of forces to these communities, 

which in turn could alter current BRAC cost and savings estimates from a 

governmentwide perspective. The Commission may want to review the 

Army’s plans for addressing these issues.

Uncertainties regarding 

State Involvement in the 

Reserve Components’ 

Recommendations

We identified a number of uncertainties associated with the Army’s reserve 

components’ recommendations. Most of these recommendations, as 

detailed in the Army’s 2005 BRAC report, are contingent upon certain 

actions that have either yet to take place or be decided. For example, the 

Army expects to build 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers, which are 

currently expected to be able to accommodate National Guard units as well 

as Army Reserve units and some reserve units from the other military 

services. However, the decision to relocate these National Guard units lies 

with state authorities. While the states with Guard units that are affected by 

BRAC recommendations have agreed, on a voluntary basis, to be included 

in the process, they can opt out at any time, thereby creating uncertainties 

over future state actions and their impact on the precision of current cost 

and savings estimates for these recommendations. Should state authorities 

decline to relocate some or all of these units, the costs and savings 

associated with these armed forces reserve centers could change. Some of 

the reserve components’ recommendations have other contingencies as 

well. For example, the recommendation for the Texas reserve components 

calls, in part, for an Armed Forces Reserve Center to be located in 

Amarillo, Texas, if the Army is able to acquire land suitable for the 

construction of facilities there. Many others are like this as well. Should the 

land not be available, these recommendations will need to be adjusted as 

well as the related costs and savings estimates. While the Army’s reserve 

components’ recommendations as a whole are projected to generate more 

than $1.5 billion in net savings over a 20-year period if implemented, the 

uncertainties regarding some of the actions these recommendations are 

relying on could result in increases or decreases to this estimate. The 

Commission may wish to seek clarifications as to the status of these statebased actions and the potential consequences if some of those actions are 

not executed as currently planned.

Bundling of Various 

Recommendations Lessens 

Visibility of Costs

Most of the Army’s recommendations involve the bundling of multiple 

closure and realignment actions under one recommendation, which 

reduces the visibility of the estimated costs and savings as well as the 

payback periods of the individual actions that are embedded within the 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 88 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

recommendation. While the the Army only produced six recommendations 

for the realignment of its active component installations, most of these 

recommendations have several components to them. For example, one 

Army recommendation involves the realignment of the Armor Center and 

School from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning, Georgia; the activation 

of a new modular brigade at Fort Knox; the relocation of various combat 

service support and other units from Europe and Korea to the United 

States; and the relocation of a reserve training center from Fort McCoy, 

Wisconsin, to Fort Knox. Similarly, the Army packaged all of its proposed 

reserve components’ realignments and closures within a state into a single 

recommendation for that state. As a result, there may be components 

within a recommendation that have relatively high costs or long pay-back 

periods (or never produce savings) even though the recommendation taken 

as a whole appears to have relatively higher savings or a shorter payback 

period. The Commission may therefore wish to request and examine 

information on the costs and savings associated with these individual 

actions. The following examples highlight these potential issues:

• The Army’s maneuver training recommendation would realign Fort 

Knox by incorporating several elements of scenarios the Army and the 

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group developed over time. 

The DOD-approved recommendation includes the stationing of a new 

modular brigade at Fort Knox. However, the Army’s original scenario for 

realigning Fort Knox, which did not include stationing the modular 

brigade or realigning the Armor Center and School, would have 

generated a 20-year net savings of almost $225 million. The Education 

and Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s related scenario involving the 

relocation of the Armor Center and School from Fort Knox to Fort 

Benning would have generated a 20-year net savings of over $1.3 billion. 

The Army’s approved recommendation combined most of the elements 

of these two scenarios but generated 20-year savings of about 

$950 million, or about $500 million less than one might have expected. 

The difference may be largely attributed to the inclusion of the new 

modular brigade in the Army’s final recommendation.

• The Army’s reserve components’ transformation recommendation in 

Arizona is expected to have a payback period of 5 years and generate a 

net savings of almost $52 million over a 20-year period. However, one 

action contained within this recommendation involves the creation of 

an Armed Forces Reserve Center at the Buckeye Training Site, Arizona. 

A previous scenario, which focused solely on this action, indicated that 

the Army would incur a net cost of almost $9 million over the 20-year 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 89 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

period and that it would take more than 100 years to produce savings. 

By bundling this action with others, the net costs of this action are 

obscured by the net savings of the recommendation’s other actions.

Red River Army Depot, 

Texas

We are raising several issues with the recommended closure of the Red 

River depot and the transfer of its functions to other locations that may 

warrant further review by the Commission. The issues relate to the transfer 

of the Red River combat vehicle workload to the Anniston Army Depot, 

Alabama; the transfer of certain munitions to the McAlester Army 

Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma; and the replication of Red River’s capability 

to remove and replace rubber pads for vehicle track and road wheels.

Potential Transformation 

Opportunity for Depot 

Maintenance

As discussed in appendix VIII, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, 

when developing its maintenance proposals, completed its depot 

workloading analysis on the basis of one and a half shifts per workday (60 

hour workweek) rather than the one shift per day (40 hour workweek) 

under the current system, thus increasing available capacity and allowing it 

to consider depot closures. Industrial group officials told us that use of 

more than one shift, which is a common private industrial better business 

practice, would enhance transformational opportunities in that it would 

provide for more efficient use of facilities and equipment. Industrial group 

officials stated that the expanded shift concept, although transformational, 

was only a “sizing or planning tool” to examine ways to increase depot 

capacity and that it would be left up to each depot to decide whether or not 

to employ the expanded shift concept. In other words, it was a way to see if 

a depot could accommodate the incoming transfer of additional workload. 

We were also told that no policy changes were envisioned to actually 

implement the expanded shift concept. Available information indicates that 

the closure recommendation may not be implemented based on the 

concept of a one and a half shift operation at the Anniston Army Depot, 

which is to receive the combat vehicle workload from Red River. In our 

visit to Anniston Army Depot, officials told us that, with additional 

construction to increase capacity as provided for in the supporting 

documentation for the recommendation, they would be able to 

accommodate this additional workload without much difficulty and 

without working under the expanded shift concept. Industrial group 

officials acknowledged that, while some one and a half shift operations 

may be implemented at other activities, only a one shift operation was 

envisioned at Anniston, given the uncertainty associated with future 

requirements and the need to minimize risk by providing for additional 

capacity if a contingency arises. As such, it appears that there is essentially 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 90 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

no substantive transformational changes occurring with the closure of the 

Red River Army Depot. 

Uncertainties on Munitions 

Storage

The BRAC recommendation to close the Red River Depot also dictates the 

transfer of its munitions storage mission to another Army depot--McAlester 

Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma. However, officials at Red River told us 

they were concerned about whether storage capacity at McAlester was 

sufficient to handle all of Red River’s munitions. Specifically, Red River 

officials told us during a recent visit that available excess storage capacity 

at McAlester has decreased since BRAC data were gathered, thus raising 

concerns whether all of Red River’s munitions can be stored there. Further, 

Red River officials asserted that McAlester did not have sufficient storage 

capacity for special types of munitions without constructing new storage 

facilities. According to Red River officials, certain munitions (category I 

and II) require different storage capacity and that McAlester currently does 

not have enough storage capacity for Red River’s entire category I 

munitions. However our analysis of the closure recommendation 

supporting documentation does not include any provision for military 

construction funds. Industrial group officials told us, however, that it 

expects that the McAlester plant will demilitarize much of its ammunition 

and thus free up space for the munitions stored at Red River. However, 

given that some diversion of demilitarization funds for other purposes has 

occurred in recent years, it raises questions as to the extent of the 

demilitarization that will occur. Nonetheless, in their opinion, this potential 

issue is not of concern to them. Time did not permit us to fully resolve the 

conflicting information regarding the extent to which the munitions may be 

transferred and McAlester’s ability to sufficiently accommodate the storage 

of any transferred munitions. 

Transfer of Rubber Production 

Capabilities 

Red River officials also raised concerns about the complexities associated 

with replicating its rubber production capability, which consists of 

removing and replacing rubber pads for vehicle track and road wheels, at 

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and that it is currently the only source for 

road wheels for the Abrams M1 tank. Specifically, Red River officials told 

us this capability is not an easy process to reproduce, including obtaining 

the required certification associated with the rubber production capability 

and that the processes must be qualified through rigorous testing. The 

complexities with replicating the rubber production capability was also 

echoed by officials at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama—the installation 

which is expected to absorb most of Red River’s combat vehicle workload. 

Officials at Anniston told us they expect a long certification process in 

order to perform the required rubber repair process and that this 
Appendix III

The Department of the Army Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 91 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

represents the most serious challenge in the workload transfer of Red 

River’s work. As to the Abrams Ml tanks road wheels, Red River officials 

told us that if the capability to produce road wheels is interrupted, the 

ability to sustain the warfighter is diminished and overall readiness could 

be degraded. To mitigate this risk, officials at Red River told us that it is 

imperative that the Army construct a new rubber production facility at 

Anniston, establish its processes and qualify its product before ceasing 

rubber production at Red River. Industrial group officials told us that, 

should a problem arise in this area, that commercial sources are available 

to purchase rather than repair these parts. We did not independently verify 

their assertion. 

The Commission may want to review the extent to which these concerns 

associated with Red River are valid and whether they were adequately 

considered by DOD.
Page 92 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiIV

The Navy followed the common analytical framework established by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for reviewing its functions and 

facilities. The Navy’s process produced 21 base closure and realignment 

recommendations, which cover 63 active and reserve installations. The 

Navy projects that its recommendations would realize about $7.7 billion in 

net present value savings over a 20-year period. Payback periods—the time 

required for savings to offset closure costs—range from immediate to 15 

years and average 3.5 years. At the same time, there are limitations 

associated with the projected savings related to the lack of planned 

reductions in military personnel end-strength associated with the savings. 

Some of the Navy’s recommendations may warrant additional attention 

from the BRAC Commission based on projected force structure changes, 

decisions to realign versus close some bases, and extended payback 

periods. The Naval Audit Service, which performed audits of the data, 

concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for use during the BRAC 

process. 

Organization and 

Focus 

The Navy established an organization to conduct the closure and 

realignment analysis similar to the one it used in the 1995 round. The 

Secretary of the Navy established a group of senior military officers and 

civilian executives, the Infrastructure Evaluation Group (IEG), chaired by 

the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) to 

conduct the process, and a related team, the Infrastructure Analysis Team, 

to support the IEG. The Secretary subsequently established a second 

senior-level group, the Department of the Navy Analysis Group, chaired by 

the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for BRAC, that was 

subordinate to the IEG, and he directed it to conduct the Navy’s analysis for 

Navy-unique functions.1

 Another associated group, the Functional Advisory 

Board, consisted of the Navy and Marine Corps principal members of the 

seven joint cross-service groups and was responsible for ensuring that the 

Navy leadership was informed of matters relevant to those groups and for 

articulating the Navy’s position on common business-oriented support 

functions for Navy leaders. 

The Navy established numerous goals for BRAC, organized around such 

considerations as (1) facilitating recruitment and training, (2) providing 

quality of life, (3) matching force structure to national defense strategy, 

1

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure Executive Council 

(IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process. 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 93 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

(4) adequately equipping the force, (5) ensuring access to an optimally 

integrated logistical and industrial infrastructure, and (6) maintaining 

secure and optimally located installations for mission accomplishment 

(including homeland defense). With these and other considerations in 

mind, the Navy established numerous objectives corresponding to DOD’s 

BRAC principles, examples include: 

• Optimize access to critical maritime training facilities.

• Accommodate the 20-year force structure plan.

• Facilitate active/reserve integration and synchronization.

• Leverage opportunities for joint basing and training.

• Enable further installation management regional alignment.

• Optimize regional management structure for recruiting districts and 

reserve readiness command.

• Minimize use of long-term leased administrative space.

• Provide flexible research, development, test, and evaluation 

infrastructure to adapt to Navy transformational mission changes and 

joint operations.

• Consolidate aircraft basing to minimize sites while maintaining ability to 

meet operational requirements.

• Rely on private-sector support services where cost-effective and 

feasible.

• Retain sufficient organic capability to effectively support maritimeunique operation concepts.

• Align Navy infrastructure to efficiently and effectively support Fleet 

Response Plan and Sea-basing concepts.

• Realign assets to maximize use of capacity in fleet concentration areas 

while maintaining fleet dispersal and viable antiterrorism/force 

protection capability.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 94 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Framework for 

Analysis

In executing its BRAC process, the Navy sought to eliminate excess 

capacity and reconfigure its current infrastructure so that operational 

capacity maximized warfighting capability and efficiency. The IEG 

approved four major areas for analyses: operations, education and training, 

headquarters and support activities, and other activities. These major areas 

were then further divided into functions to ensure that installations 

performing comparable functions were compared with one another and to 

allow identification of total capacity and military value for an entire 

category of installations.

The Navy’s BRAC process included a review of 889 reporting activities—

765 Navy and 124 Marine Corps—of which 673 were active component and 

216 reserve component activities (reserve centers, reserve forces 

headquarters, reserve recruiting areas, and reserve personnel centers). As 

with previous BRAC rounds, capacity and military value analysis provided 

the starting point for the Navy’s BRAC process. The Naval Audit Service 

served an important role in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these 

analyses through extensive audits of data gathered at various locations. 

Capacity Analysis For its capacity analysis, the Navy universe was defined at the activity or 

function level, and a capacity data call was distributed to the 889 reporting 

activities. Capacity analysis for each activity consisted of comparing the 

current Department of the Navy base structure to the future force structure 

requirements to determine whether excess base structure capacity existed 

within the Department of the Navy. Current force requirements were based 

on the existing force structure, and future force requirements were derived 

from the 20-year force structure plan. 

All Navy and Marine Corps bases were placed into one of four categories 

for capacity analysis: operations, headquarters and support activities, 

education and training, and other activities. Each category used a different 

metric to analyze capacity. Almost all of the Navy’s bases were contained in 

the operations function category. In evaluating air operations activities the 

Navy used hangar modules,2

 while in evaluating surface/subsurface 

2

 The hangar module is defined as the hangar space, line space, administrative space, and 

maintenance shop space required to house on aircraft squadron. There are two types of 

hangar modules used: Type I, which supports carrier-based fixed wing aircraft and 

helicopters, and Type II, which supports larger aircraft.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 95 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

operations activities it used a cruiser-equivalent concept,3 the same 

measures that were used in BRAC 1995.4

 In evaluating ground operations 

activities, the Navy used a battalion-equivalent concept that considered the 

amount of administrative space, covered storage space, and maintenance 

space required to support a generic Marine Corps battalion. In evaluating 

munitions storage and distribution, the Navy used throughput (loading and 

unloading) and short-term storage functions to conduct its analysis. The 

Navy identified excess capacity in all four categories, as shown in table 11.

Table 11: Excess Capacity Identified by the Navy, by Function

Source: Department of the Navy. 

In completing its capacity analysis, the Navy assumed that it would be 

necessary to home base all aircraft and ships at the same time. The Navy 

did not include additional infrastructure requirements to accommodate 

surge capability. According to Navy BRAC officials, the force structure—

number of ships and aircraft—is finite in number, and additional ships or 

aircraft could not be quickly produced in the event of a contingency. The 

officials stated that their analysis also ensured that sufficient flexibility was 

3

 That concept is a single metric that considered berthing capacity for all Navy surface ships 

normalized to the Cruiser class of ship. They must have cold-iron, homeport capability and 

must meet shore power quality and quantity requirements, water and sewage requirements, 

and channel depth and height restrictions. For example, an aircraft carrier equals four 

cruiser equivalents.

4

 The capacity analysis for surface/subsurface activities considered all naval activities that 

reported cruiser-equivalent berthing capability except for the Naval District of Washington, 

Naval Support Activity New Orleans, and the Nuclear Power Training Unit, Charleston. 

These activities were excluded because they have limited capability and viability to 

homeport naval vessels.

Function

Percentage of

 excess capacity

Aviation 19

Surface/subsurface 25

Ground

• Administrative

• Storage

• Maintenance

0

12

11

Munitions storage and distribution (naval weapons 

stations) 24
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 96 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

retained to handle surge represented by operational tempo changes or 

unanticipated operational requirements. For example, for 

surface/subsurface operations, the Navy concluded that there was 

sufficient berthing space available in nonoperational bases (shipyards and 

weapon stations) to meet surge or other unanticipated operational 

requirements. 

Navy officials projected that their closure recommendations, if approved, 

would reduce excess capacity in aviation operations from 19 percent to 16 

percent, in surface/subsurface operations from 25 percent to 17 percent, 

and in munitions storage and distribution5

 operations from 24 percent to 16 

percent, but they would not reduce excess ground operations capacity. The 

Navy did not recommend closing any ground operations facilities, citing 

cost considerations and noting that planned force structure changes would 

further increase its requirements. 

Military Value Analysis In completing its military value analysis, the Navy targeted military value 

questions to specific activities in order to rank installations in the four 

operational subgroups from highest to lowest in military value. Each of the 

four operational subgroups had overarching concepts by which military 

value scoring plans were then developed to measure and rank each 

installation. Military values were assigned to 35 Navy and Marine Corps 

installations under air operations, 29 surface/subsurface installations, and 

11 ground operations installations. Table 12 shows how the Navy weighted 

military value criteria in its analyses of operational functions.

5

 The analysis showed no excess capacity for munitions throughput and showed excess 

capacity for storage. 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 97 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 12: Navy Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and Department of the Navy.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative values to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

Key factors considered in evaluating the military value of aviation 

operations activities included size and versatility of the facilities, proximity 

to training opportunities, and the strategic location of airfields. In 

considering surface/subsurface activities, key factors were the size and 

versatility of ship berthing, maintenance and support capabilities, and 

proximity to naval shipyards. Additional value was given for strategic 

nuclear submarine homeport capability and Nimitz-class nuclear powered 

berthing capability. Also considered was the proximity to training facilities, 

ranges, and operations areas as well as strategic location. Likewise, in 

considering ground operations activities, key factors were facilities and 

services, operational staff buildings, ordnance storage depots, and organic 

maintenance shops. Additional value was given for capability to receive 

and stage onward movement and integration of forces. Also considered 

was proximity to ranges, maneuver areas and training areas as well as 

proximity to aerial and seaports of debarkation. Key factors in the 

munitions storage and distribution operations activities were storage 

capability, throughput capability, strategic factors, environment and 

encroachment, and personnel support. Figure 10 illustrates how the Navy 

linked its analysis to the military value criteria for the naval aviation 

function. 

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of the Department of 

Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness.

50

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas 

and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland 

defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 

20

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at both existing and potential 

receiving locations to support operations and training.

15

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 15

Total 100
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 98 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 10: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Naval Aviation Operations

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The Navy used a total of five military 

value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The Navy used a total of 31 military value 

metrics.

d

The Navy used a total of 73 data call questions. 

The same process was used to analyze military value with the other 

operational and functional areas.

Naval Audit Service’s Role 

in the Process 

The Naval Audit Service played an important role in ensuring that the data 

used in the Navy’s analyses were certified. Through extensive audits of the 

capacity, military value, and scenario data collected from field activities, 

Military value criteriaa

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and airspace.

Military value

attributesb

Military value

metricsc

Sample data call

questionsd

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total 

 force requirements. 

Operational

Infrastructure

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

Operational 

training

Quality of life Non-military

education

Accident

potential zones

Operational

location

Proximity to 

training airspace

Runways and 

arresting gear

Runway length, cross wind, number of 

runways with arresting gear and number of 

parallel runways. 

Distance from and size of various types of 

airspace and its training purpose. 

Field elevation, distance to supported units, 

relative value of sea and air ports of 

embarkation, strategic location. 

Incompatible land use for Accident Potential 

Zones. 

Dependent primary and secondary 

educational opportunities. Availability of 

dependent and member post-secondary 

education 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

Environment 

and 

encroachment

Airfield 

characteristics
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 99 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

the audit service notified the Navy of any data discrepancies for the 

purpose of follow-on corrective action.6

 While the process of validating 

data was quite lengthy and challenging, the Naval Audit Service deemed the 

Navy data was sufficiently reliable for use in the BRAC process. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternative Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Navy used results from the capacity and military value analyses as the 

inputs to its optimization model to help identify initial scenarios for 

realignment and closure.7

 In some circumstances, such as closure of naval 

reserve centers, military judgment and transformation provided the basis 

for scenarios and later decisions. For example, Navy officials said it was 

necessary to retain naval reserve centers for naval air reservists near major 

airline hubs and activities in order to retain the demographic profile 

necessary to recruit and retain personnel for these units. The Navy 

identified 187 scenarios for consideration; 82 involved Navy and Marine 

Corps reserve centers. The scenarios were then further assessed through 

more detailed scenario analyses, cost and savings considerations, risk 

assessments, and the Navy’s IEG deliberations, which resulted in 53 

candidate recommendations being forwarded to DOD’s IEC. After some 

consolidation and bundling, DOD approved 21 Department of the Navy 

recommendations and forwarded them to the BRAC Commission. 

The Navy eliminated scenarios for strategic reasons, to maintain 

operational flexibility, and for cost considerations. For example, various 

scenarios proposing to close Submarine Base San Diego, California, were 

dropped because a closure would have eliminated the sole capability for 

berthing attack submarines on the West Coast. Likewise, scenarios 

proposing to close Naval Station Everett, Washington, were dropped 

because of the strategic importance of this seaport. Various proposals to 

close active naval air stations were dropped because of operational 

6

 The Naval Audit Service visited 214 sites, covering 45 data calls, and audited 8,338 

questions.

7

 A model developed by the Center for Naval Analysis, which was used in BRAC 1995 and 

updated for BRAC 2005. The model met operational requirements and policy considerations 

by incorporating “rules” or “constraints” for functions so that the model would not select an 

operationally infeasible solution. For example, if the East Coast naval bases had enough 

berthing capacity to handle all of the ships in the force structure plan, the model could place 

all the ships at those bases and suggest closure of all of the West Coast and Pacific bases, 

which would be unacceptable. Therefore, the surface/subsurface operations portion of the 

model included a constraint that at least 40 percent of the surface/subsurface ship be 

located on each coast. 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 100 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

concerns. For example, the Navy analyzed the potential to close Marine 

Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, and relocate its squadrons to 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. However, the Navy 

leadership concluded that Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort should be 

retained for future tactical aviation basing flexibility, especially in light of 

concerns about the continued viability of basing aviation units at Naval Air 

Station Oceana, Virginia. Due to increasing environmental and 

encroachment issues surrounding Naval Air Station Oceana, the Navy also 

analyzed various scenarios to close it. However, the analyses indicated a 

long payback period for achieving return on investment, high one-time 

costs, and operational issues at receiving sites. Therefore, the Navy 

determined that the closure of Naval Air Station Oceana was not feasible. 

Another complicating factor for basing of East Coast tactical aircraft is the 

Navy’s attempt to purchase approximately 33,000 acres in eastern North 

Carolina to build a new outlying landing field to provide simulated aircraft 

carrier landings for aircraft stationed at Naval Air Station Oceana and 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. The purchase is currently being 

challenged in federal court over environmental concerns. 

The Navy also did not pursue some scenarios because of cost 

considerations and extended payback periods. For example, Navy data 

showed a one-time cost of $838 million to close Construction Battalion 

Center Gulfport, Mississippi, and relocate it to Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina, and a one-time cost of $643 million to close Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot San Diego, California, and relocate all recruit training to Parris 

Island, South Carolina. The Navy leadership determined that these costs 

did not justify closing either the Construction Battalion Center Gulfport or 

the Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego.

The Navy also considered alternatives to homeport an additional carrier 

strike group forward in the Pacific theater through the BRAC process to 

accommodate Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy decisions. 

The Navy analyzed moving a carrier to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Guam, 

and found that other than cost, there was no clear BRAC preference for 

either the losing or the gaining base.8

 The Navy leadership postponed any 

decision until the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review is completed. 

8

 Costs associated with moving a carrier strike group to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, were 

projected to be from $2.6 to $3.1 billion. Cost for moving it to Guam were projected to be 

from $4 billion to $6.6 billion.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 101 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The Navy worked closely with the joint cross-service groups as they 

developed recommendations that affected Navy installations. In some 

cases, a joint cross-service group recommendation or series of 

recommendations relocated a majority of the functions, workload, 

equipment, or personnel from a Department of the Navy installation, 

thereby enabling closure of the entire installation. Where the DAG 

determined that the aggregate of joint cross-service group actions were of 

such magnitude that it affected the “critical mass” of the installation, e.g., 

impact on the major mission, a substantial number of personnel, and/or a 

substantial amount of acreage, a Navy closure scenario was developed. The 

closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine is an example of such a 

closure. The ISG and IEC approved an industrial joint cross-service group 

recommendation to relocate the ship overhaul and repair function at 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval 

Shipyard, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, and to relocate the Submarine 

Maintenance Engineering, Planning and Procurement Activity at 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. This 

recommendation eliminated Portsmouth Naval Shipyard’s primary mission 

and moved or eliminated approximately 90 percent of its workforce. After 

conducting criteria 5-8 analyses, the Navy recommended closing 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in its entirety.

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The Navy projects that its 21 recommendations will produce about 

$754 million in net annual recurring savings and, after savings have offset 

implementation costs, a 20-year net present value savings of $7.7 billion. 

Table 13 provides a summary of the financial aspects of the Navy’s 

recommendations.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 102 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 13: Financial Aspects of the Navy’s Recommendations

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present valueb

Close Submarine Base New London, 

CT

DON-10 ($679.6) ($345.4) $192.8 3 years $1,576.4

Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, 

Kittery, ME

DON-23 (448.4) 21.4 128.6 4 years 1,262.4

Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA DON-13 (43.0) 289.9 66.1 immediate 910.9

Close and realign Naval Station 

Ingleside, TX and Naval Air Station 

Corpus Christi, TX respectively

DON-26 (178.4) 100.0 75.6 2 years 822.2

Close and realign Naval Air Station 

Willow Grove, PA and Cambria 

Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA 

respectively

DON-21 (126.3) 134.7 60.6 2 years 710.5

Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS DON-20 (17.9) 220.0 47.4 immediate 665.7

Close Naval Support Activity New 

Orleans, LA

DON-15 (164.6) (86.1) 36.5 3 years 276.4

Realign Naval Air Station Brunswick, 

ME

DON-18 (147.2) (112.6) 34.9 4 years 238.8

Close Navy Reserve Centers DON-37 (3.2) 87.1 16.1 immediate 236.6

Realign Marine Corps Logistics Base 

Barstow, CA

DON-6 (26.0) 56.5 18.4 immediate 230.6

Close Navy Recruiting Districts

Indianapolis, IN; Omaha, NE; Buffalo, 

NY; Montgomery, AL; Kansas City, MO

DON-34 (2.4) 78.3 14.5 immediate 214.5

Close Naval Weapons Station, Seal 

Beach, Concord, CA

DON-9 (14.0) 43.2 16.4 1 year 199.7

Realign Navy Reserve Readiness 

Commands

DON-44 (2.6) 30.9 6.5 immediate 91.7

Close Naval Facilities Engineering Field 

Division/Activity

DON-28 (37.9) (9.1) 9.3 4 years 81.8

Close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Centers

DON-29 (62.4) 17.0 9.9 7 years

(average)

76.8

Close Marine Corps Support Activity 

Kansas City, MO 

DON-19 (23.3) (8.0) 5.8 3 years 49.8

Close Navy Regions DON-35 (3.2) 8.9 2.7 1 year 34.6

Close Navy Supply Corps School 

Athens, GA

DON-14 (23.8) (13.6) 3.5 7 years 21.8
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 103 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

The Navy’s recommendations include 16 closures and 5 realignment 

actions, affecting 63 installations. Much of the projected annual recurring 

savings are based on military and civilian personnel reductions. The Navy 

has two recommendations with payback periods greater than 10 years—the 

realignment of Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island, and the closure of the 

Naval Support Activity Corona, California. 

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each 

recommendation, particularly individual recommendations that include 

multiple closure and realignment actions at multiple locations outside of a 

single geographic area. Nonetheless, we offer a number of broad-based 

observations about the proposed recommendations. These 

recommendations may warrant additional attention from the BRAC 

Commission based on issues associated with projected savings from 

military personnel reductions, force structure changes, decisions to realign 

versus close some bases, extended payback periods, and potential impact 

on the U.S. Coast Guard.

There remains uncertainty as to what the Navy’s future force structure will 

actually look like, particularly with battle force ships. While the Navy’s 

force structure plan that accompanies its BRAC report gives a range of 341 

to 370 ships in the fleet in 2024, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan 

identifies a possible lower limit of 314 ships in 2024 (including all type 

surface ships and submarines). Additionally, the shipbuilding plan provides 

a fleet profile in the decade afterward (to the year 2035) with as few as 260 

Realign Officer Training Command, 

Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL

DON-12 (3.6) 1.4 0.9 4 years 10.0

Realign Naval Station Newport, RI DON-25 (11.8) (8.3) 1.0 13 years 2.1

Close Naval Support Activity Corona, 

CA

DON-7 (80.2) (65.5) 6.0 15 years 0.4

Total ($2,099.8) $440.7 $753.5 3.5 avg. $7,713.7

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present valueb
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 104 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

to 325 ships. This includes a decrease in aircraft carriers from the current 

12 to 10 in 2035, as projected in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. 

Military Personnel 

Reductions

Our analysis showed that about $386 million, or about 51 percent, of the 

projected $753.5 million in net annual recurring savings are based on 

savings from eliminating almost 4,000 active duty military personnel 

positions. A Navy official indicated that these reductions will help the Navy 

achieve the projected 21,000 active military personnel reductions already 

programmed between fiscal year 2006 and 2011. However, the Navy has 

already reduced the military personnel account to reflect the savings 

associated with the projected 21,000 end-strength reduction. While the 

projected almost 4,000 reductions associated with BRAC actions might 

help the Navy achieve their overall programmed end strength reductions, it 

will not generate any additional dollar savings that could be reallocated for 

other higher priority needs. 

Projected Changes in Navy 

Force Structure

While the recommendations to close Submarine Base New London, 

Connecticut, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine, project significant 

savings, both are based on projected decreases in the number of 

submarines in the future force structure. However, as mentioned earlier, 

there is uncertainty over the number of submarines and surface ships 

required for the future force. 

Submarine Base New London The proposed closure of Submarine Base New London is based on reducing 

existing excess capacity in the surface/subsurface category and planned 

reductions in the submarine force. Both the 25 percent excess capacity 

identified in the surface/subsurface infrastructure and the projected 21 

percent reduction in the submarine force led the Navy to analyze various 

proposals to close submarine bases. As previously noted, the Navy’s BRAC 

scenario analysis focused on East Coast submarine bases because attack 

submarines are single-sited on the West Coast. The Navy considered three 

alternatives: (1) moving all submarines at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, 

to New London, Connecticut; (2) moving all submarines at Submarine Base 

New London and the Submarine School New London to Naval Station 

Norfolk; and (3) moving submarines at Submarine Base New London to 

both Naval Station Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, and 

moving the submarine school to Kings Bay or Naval Station Newport, 

Rhode Island. The Navy analysis showed that only the option to relocate 

submarines from New London to Norfolk and Kings Bay achieved a 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 105 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

reduction in capacity and savings resulting from a base closure. Navy 

officials noted that Submarine Base New London had a lower military value 

than both Norfolk and Kings Bay. As we also discuss in appendix XIV, this 

recommendation has the largest economic impact on any community in 

terms of the number of job losses (8,457 direct jobs and 7,351 indirect 

jobs). These direct and indirect job losses would result in a negative change 

of 9.4 percent in unemployment for the economic area around Submarine 

Base New London.

The majority of the projected savings would result from the elimination of 

about 80 percent of the civilian personnel positions at New London. 

Officials at New London we met with concurred with the projected number 

of civilian positions that could be eliminated based on coordination with 

both receiving locations—Kings Bay, Georgia, and Norfolk, Virginia, and on 

the number of personnel that would be needed to support the missions 

being relocated. However, a separate issue of concern relates to the 

proposed move of the Navy’s submarine school from New London to Kings 

Bay. In our discussions with officials at New London, we found while the 

Navy’s BRAC cost and savings analysis includes one-time costs to move the 

specialized equipment associated with the submarine school, the Navy 

analysis does not appear to have included an assessment of the time it 

would take to pack, move, and unpack the equipment, and the potential 

impact on the training pipeline and the certification of crews for 

submarines. In subsequent discussions with Navy headquarters officials, 

we were told that the submarine school would be the last activity to move 

from New London to ensure that facilities at Kings Bay are ready to start 

training. Furthermore, they noted that the implementation plan will ensure 

that the Navy will be able to perform crew certification and maintain the 

training pipeline. The BRAC Commission may want to assure itself that the 

Navy has developed a transition plan to satisfy the training and certification 

requirements until the receiving sites are able to perform this training, 

without unduly interrupting the training pipeline.

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard The proposed closure of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard assumes that the 

remaining three shipyards9

 could perform all of the projected depot level 

maintenance workload based on planned reductions in the number of 

attack submarines and the Navy’s proposal to decommission an aircraft

9

 The other shipyards that perform depot level ship refueling, modernization overhaul, and 

repair work are Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and Puget Sound.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 106 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

carrier.10 The Navy, with agreement from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 

group, which initially had assessed depot functions, selected the 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for closure, despite Pearl Harbor Shipyard’s 

having a slightly lower military value score, because it determined that 

Portsmouth was the only closure that would both eliminate excess capacity 

and satisfy the Combatant Commander’s and Navy’s strategic objective to 

place ship maintenance capabilities close to the fleet. 

The Navy BRAC and Industrial Joint Cross-Service Groups analyzed 

scenarios closing each of the four shipyards, and determined that only the 

potential closure of Portsmouth or Pearl Harbor was feasible due to cost 

and capacity considerations. Initially, based on capacity data and the 20-

year force structure plan submitted in March 2004, the Industrial Joint 

Cross-Service Group determined that there was sufficient excess capacity 

in the aggregate across the four shipyards to close either Pearl Harbor or 

Portsmouth. However, the group determined that there was insufficient 

excess capacity in certain commodities11 in the remaining three shipyards 

to accept all the workload from the closing shipyard. As such, the group 

initially determined that no shipyard should be closed. However, based on 

changes in the DOD’s 20-year force structure plan it submitted to Congress 

in March 2005—reductions in the number of submarines and the 

decommissioning of an aircraft carrier—the industrial group’s analysis 

indicated that workload for all commodities at Portsmouth or Pearl Harbor 

could be accommodated by the remaining three shipyards. A Naval Sea 

Systems Command analysis of dry dock availability indicates that the three 

remaining Navy shipyards could handle the projected ship repair and 

overhauls in the future. However, the analysis indicates that within the next 

three years there would not be much, if any, room for unanticipated ship 

repairs. According to Navy officials, any unanticipated requirements would 

be addressed by a combination of delaying and re-prioritizing scheduled 

overhaul work, and authorizing additional overtime, which they noted is no 

different than how they manage these requirements in the current 

operating environment.

10 Legislation is currently pending in Congress that would not allow the Navy to 

decommission the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy. See H.R. 1815, 109th Congress, section 127 

(2005).

11 A commodity is a generic grouping of the types of depot and maintenance work associated 

with end items, weapons systems, or major processes, for example, cranes and rigging, 

electronics, forge, nuclear testing, or welding.
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 107 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

In selecting Portsmouth over Pearl Harbor for closure, the Navy noted that 

Pearl Harbor is in a fleet concentration area in the Pacific theater and is the 

homeport for many ships, while Portsmouth is not in a fleet concentration 

area or a homeport for any ships. In addition, closing Pearl Harbor would 

require the ships that are homeported there to transit back to the east 

coast, in some cases, for maintenance, which the Navy would essentially 

view as a deployment and, for quality of life reasons, would want to avoid if 

possible. Another strategic objective was to maintain dry docks for aircraft 

carriers on both coasts and in the central Pacific. Pearl Harbor has aircraft 

carrier dry-docking capability, but Portsmouth does not. 

In our meeting with employees at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in June 

2005, they raised questions about several issues regarding the cost and 

savings analysis developed to support the proposed action. First, they 

objected to the industrial group and the Navy disallowing about 

$281 million in costs ($205 million one-time and $76 million recurring) that 

they believed would be incurred if the shipyard were to close. About 

$52 million of the recurring costs are associated with sustainment of 

facilities and power plant from fiscal year 2008, when the base is projected 

to close, until 2011. While some of these costs are likely valid, overall they 

appear high in relation to the Navy’s projected savings of about $120 million 

over the same period from reduced base operating support and 

sustainment of facilities. The majority of the one-time costs are associated 

with closure of the buildings, historical preservation of buildings, and 

write-off of undepreciated assets of the working capital fund. While it is 

questionable whether all of these costs should be included, our analysis 

shows that if they are all included, the projected 20-year savings would 

decrease by $192 million, or 15 percent. 

Portsmouth employees were also concerned that the cost and savings 

analysis did not adequately capture the widely recognized efficiencies of 

their shipyard, which, if adopted, could translate into additional costs that 

the Navy would incur by shifting its workload to the remaining three Navy 

shipyards. The employees estimated that they perform submarine overhaul 

and depot maintenance work at about $54 million per year less than the 

average of the other three shipyards, an efficiency which was not included 

in the Navy’s analysis. Department of Navy officials recognized that the 

Portsmouth Naval shipyard is presently more efficient than the Puget 

Sound and Pearl Harbor shipyards, but noted that it is very difficult to 

quantify the impact of this efficiency. Navy officials noted that the scope of 

work performed is not always the same, depending on the condition of 

each submarine, and wages, especially in Pearl Harbor, are higher than in 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 108 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Portsmouth. Navy officials told us they were reviewing the efficiency 

analysis developed by the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; however, their 

analysis was not completed in time to be included in this report. The 

Commission may wish to consider the views of the shipyard employees and 

the results of the Navy’s review in their analysis of this recommendation. 

Decisions to Realign Rather 

Than Close Some Bases

The Navy initially recommended the closure of Naval Air Station 

Brunswick, Maine, and Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, California. 

However, based on direction from the IEC, these closure recommendations 

were changed to realignments. As a result, the 20-year savings decreased by 

almost $2 billion, as shown in table 14.

Table 14: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing and Realigning Naval Air Station Brunswick and Marine Corps Logistics Base 

Barstow

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.

According to Navy BRAC officials, the senior Navy leadership was 

reluctant to give up the Navy’s remaining air station in the Northeast but 

found the potential savings significant enough to recommend closure of 

Brunswick. However, the judgment of the IEC changed the closure to a 

realignment to retain access to the strategic airfield in the Northeast. As a 

result, the base will become a naval air facility with an operational runway, 

but all aircraft and associated personnel, equipment, and support will be 

relocated to Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida, and the Aviation 

Intermediate Maintenance will be consolidated with Fleet Readiness 

Center Southeast Jacksonville, Florida. The Navy is maintaining its cold 

weather–oriented Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape School, a 

Navy Reserve Center, and other small units at Brunswick. Navy officials 

Dollars in millions

Brunswick Barstow

Closure Realignment Difference Closure Realignment Difference

One-time (costs) ($192.9) ($147.2) ($45.7) ($316.6) ($26.0) ($290.6)

Net implementation 

(costs) or savings

$73.4 ($112.6) ($39.2) ($248.3) ($56.5) ($191.8)

Net annual

recurring savings

$92.7 $34.9 $57.8 $141.9 $18.4 $123.5

Payback period 1 year 4 years 1 year immediate

20-year net present value 

savings

$840.7 $238.8 $601.9 $1,600.0 $230.6 $1,369.4
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 109 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

also stated that Brunswick would provide a base from which to carry out 

potential homeland defense missions should those missions not be able to 

be carried out from other military or civilian airfields in the Northeast. 

The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group had proposed to close the depot 

maintenance functions at Barstow because of its low military value and to 

increase opportunities for joint maintenance at Army depots doing similar 

work. However, the Marine Corps objected to the closure because that 

would eliminate its only West Coast ground vehicle depot maintenance 

presence and would increase repair cycle times for the Marine’s West Coast 

equipment by increasing rail transit and customer turnaround time by 10 to 

30 days. In response to the Marine Corps’ concerns, the IEC directed the 

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group to develop several alternative 

recommendations that would have closed Barstow but still realigned its 

workload to other West Coast activities. The Industrial Joint Cross -Service 

Group estimated that all of these options would result in higher net annual 

recurring and 20-year net present savings than would the realignment 

option. The Commission may want to assess DOD’s rationale for changing 

the recommendation from a closure to realignment in light of the projected 

reductions in savings.

Extended Payback Periods The Navy has two recommendations for which the payback period is 

greater than 10 years, much longer than typically associated with 

recommendations in the 1995 BRAC round, and the one-time costs are 

significantly greater than the projected 20-year savings by which BRAC 

rounds are typically measured. The Navy’s proposal to realign Naval 

Station Newport by relocating the Navy Warfare Development Command to 

Naval Station Norfolk has a 13-year payback period and a projected onetime cost of about $12 million, primarily to rehabilitate existing structures 

and move 111 personnel. According to Navy officials, this recommendation 

places the Navy Warfare Development Command closer to Fleet Forces 

Command and the Second Fleet Battle Lab it supports. Likewise, the Navy 

recommendation to close Naval Support Activity Corona has a payback 

period of 15 years, one-time cost of about $80 million, and 20-year savings 

of about $400,000. Navy data shows that the one-time cost is primarily to 

rehabilitate existing facilities and relocate personnel from Corona to Naval 

Air Station Point Mugu, California. Navy officials stated the closure had 

merit because the Corona facility was a single-function facility whose 

mission could be performed at other multifunction bases. 
Appendix IV

The Department of the Navy Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 110 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Potential Impact on the U.S. 

Coast Guard

Several Navy recommendations to close bases could affect the U.S. Coast 

Guard. However, the Navy’s cost and savings analysis did not consider any 

costs that could be incurred by the Coast Guard if the bases are closed. 

Navy officials recognized that the Coast Guard would be affected by 

several of its recommendations and considered the impact in its 

deliberations. However, they determined that it was unreasonable to 

include any cost estimates for the Coast Guard because the Navy could not 

assume the final disposition of the facility and how much, if any, of the 

facility the Coast Guard would opt to retain. Coast Guard officials stated 

that the Navy briefed them on their potential recommendations several 

months prior to the public announcement of the recommendations. The 

Coast Guard is in the process of developing potential basing alternatives, to 

include cost impacts, for each affected location. However, the Coast Guard 

had not completed these estimates in time for us to include them in our 

report. 
Page 111 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiV

The Air Force followed the common analytical framework established by 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for reviewing its functions and 

facilities. The Air Force’s process produced 42 recommendations. Most of 

the recommendations are devoted to reserve component bases, including

several realignment actions reallocating aviation assets to multiple 

locations. In comparison with the other services, its recommendations 

contain the smallest number of closures (three) of active component bases. 

It had two major realignments, however, that left the bases in a reduced 

active duty status, and another where the base was transferred to the Army, 

with the Air Force retaining a limited presence as a tenant. The Air Force 

recommendations project the greatest savings of any of the services—

$14.6 billion in 20-year net present value savings. Payback periods—the 

time required for savings to offset closure and realignment costs—for 

active component bases range from immediate to 14 years, and average 

3 years, and for reserve component bases they range from immediate to 

18 years, and average 6 years. However, our analysis indicates that these 

projected savings in each of their categories could have some limitations, 

primarily due to the lack of personnel end-strength reductions associated 

with claimed savings. In addition, some Air Force recommendations may 

warrant additional attention by the BRAC Commission because of 

uncertainty regarding future mission requirements for adversely affected 

reserve component personnel, and because of lengthy payback periods 

associated with some recommendations having been merged with other 

recommendations that have shorter payback periods, thus making the 

former appear more acceptable. The Air Force Audit Agency, which 

performed audits of the data, concluded that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for use during the BRAC process. 

Organization and 

Focus

The Secretary of the Air Force established a group of senior Air Force 

military and civilian personnel to form an executive deliberative body 

responsible for conducting the Air Force base closure and realignment 

analyses. The Base Closure Executive Group was led by a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary and a General Officer from Plans and Programs, who served as 

co-chairs. This group’s working-level staff made up the Base Closure 

Working Group, which provided direct support for data collection, 

validation, and analysis in the development of base closure and 

realignment recommendations.1

1

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure Executive Council 

(IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 112 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The Air Force 2005 BRAC goals were to transform by maximizing 

warfighting capability of each squadron and realigning infrastructure with 

future defense strategy, maximizing operational capability by eliminating 

excess physical capacity, and to capitalize on opportunities for joint 

activity. To guide the BRAC process, the Air Force developed the following 

principles, to be applied to both active and reserve components:

• Maintain squadrons within operationally efficient proximity to DODcontrolled airspace, ranges, military operations areas, and low-level 

routes.

• Optimize the size of Air Force squadrons in terms of aircraft models, 

aircraft assigned, and crew ratios applied.

• Retain enough domestic capacity to base the Air Force entirely within 

the United States and its territories.

• Retain aerial refueling bases in optimal proximity to their missions.

• Better meet the needs of the Air Force by maintaining or placing Air 

Reserve Component (Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve 

Command) units in locations that best meet the demographic and 

mission requirements unique to the Air Reserve Component.

• Ensure joint basing realignment actions (in comparison with the status 

quo) either increased the military value of a function or decreased the 

cost for the same military value of that function.

• Ensure that long-range strike bases provide flexible strategic response 

and strategic force protection.

• Support the Air Expeditionary Forces framework by keeping two 

geographically separate munitions sites.

• Retain enough surge capacity to support deployments, evacuations, and 

base repairs.

• Consolidate or co-locate legacy fleets (such as A-10, B-1, B-52, F-15, and 

F-16 aircraft).

• Ensure global mobility by retaining two air mobility bases and one 

additional wide-body-capable base on each coast.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 113 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Several of the above principles were included in an Expeditionary Air 

Force Principles White Paper,

2

 which outlined principles to shape future 

force development and basing. This document, discussed the increased 

effectiveness and efficiency of consolidating smaller squadrons into larger 

units. The significant reduction in aircraft based on the future force 

structure plan of 2025 will reduce the Air Force infrastructure, including 

that of the Air Reserve and the Air National Guard to select the best 

combination of bases, while accomadating use of reserve components for 

emerging missions, such as homeland defense and unmanned aerial 

systems. 

Framework for 

Analysis 

The Air Force BRAC process included a review of 154 installations—70 

active and 84 reserve. As with previous BRAC rounds, capacity and military 

value analyses provided the starting point for analysis. However, in this 

BRAC round the Air Force concentrated its analysis on operational aircraft 

and space missions, since joint cross-service groups developed capacity 

and military value analyses and recommendations for various commonly 

held business-oriented categories, such as education and training, 

headquarters, and technical functions. The Air Force Audit Agency 

performed an important role in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these 

analyses through extensive audits of data gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis The Air Force collected information on key capacity areas, such as physical 

capacity (buildings and utilities), environmental issues (air emissions and 

water resources), encroachment (constraints and noise safety), airfields, 

airspace and ranges (operational capacity of runways, ramp space, and fuel 

storage), communications (telecommunications), and personnel. The 

capacity data call was designed to provide information to assess bases for 

current and future missions in the following mission areas: (1) airlift; 

(2) space operations; (3) bombers; (4) tankers; (5) command and control 

and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; (6) unmanned aerial 

vehicles; (7) fighter aircraft; and (8) Special Operation Forces and Combat, 

Search, and Rescue. The Air Force also considered surge requirements in 

its capacity analysis. According to Air Force officials, surge was defined as 

the ability to domestically “bed down” all aircraft, including those currently 

2

 Department of the United States Air Force, Expeditionary Air Force Principles White 

Paper (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004).
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 114 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

stationed overseas, as well as the ability to respond to natural disasters, 

emergencies, and runway repairs.3

Following the collection of the capacity data call, the Air Force requested 

that its eight major commands4 and the Air National Guard estimate each 

installation’s capacity to acquire additional squadrons, taking into 

consideration existing conditions, facilities, additional construction 

requirements, and operational and environmental infrastructure. 

The capacity analysis incorporated information from the 20-year force 

structure plan to serve as a baseline and to further define requirements in 

the future. Although this analysis indicated the ability of bases to bed down 

additional aircraft, according to Air Force officials, it did not provide a 

specific excess capacity percentage by installation or major command. 

Accordingly, an overall capacity analysis report was not made available to 

us, comparable to that provided by the other military departments. 

However Air Force officials said they considered capacity information in 

their assessment of installations. Air Force officials did provide limited 

capacity information in their final BRAC report. Table 15 provides excess 

capacity percentages that were calculated for two areas. 

Table 15: Excess Capacity Identified by the Air Force, by Function

Source: Department of the Air Force.

3

Air Force officials defined three types of surge, which increase operations in response to a 

situation or event. For example, local surge increases flying time; regional surge mobilizes 

and deploys military forces; and strategic surge includes large-scale return of forces from 

overseas or large scale mobility operations.

4

Air Force BRAC installations fell into eight major commands: (1) Air Mobility Command, 

(2) Air Combat Command, (3) Air Force Space Command, (4) Air Force Materiel Command, 

(5) Air Force Special Operations Command, (6) Air Education and Training Command, 

(7) Pacific Air Force, and (8) Air Force Reserve Command. The Air National Guard was 

included in the analysis, although it is not considered a major command.

Function

Percentage of

excess capacity

Flight line and ramp 25

Building and facilities 14
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 115 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

According to Air Force officials, their recommendations if implemented are 

projected to reduce excess capacity by 37 percent for flight line and ramp 

space and 75 percent in buildings and facilities.

Military Value Analysis In completing its military value data calls, the Air Force evaluated each of 

its bases in each of the eight mission categories, regardless of the base’s 

current use. Military value data analysis was directly linked to the four 

DOD military value selection criteria required by the BRAC process and 

legislation. As shown in table 16, the Air Force developed a weighting 

system for the military value criteria with the first two criteria having larger 

weights, or importance, than the remaining two criteria.

Table 16: Air Force Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and Department of the Air Force.

The Air Force used various military value attributes (characteristics, 

factors, etc), metrics (measures), and questions related to each of the four 

military value criteria. Key military value attributes included operating 

environment, geographic-location factors, key mission infrastructure, 

operating areas, mobility/surge, growth potential, and cost. Other 

installation-specific attributes included such factors as electromagnetic 

spectrum and bandwidth, munitions storage and handling, runway 

dimensions, ramp area, space launch, proximity to (and quality of) airspace 

and ranges, and geographical factors. 

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, 

including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

46

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace 

(including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air 

forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging 

areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at 

both existing and potential receiving locations.

41

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving 

locations to support operations and training.

10

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 3

Total 100
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 116 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 11 shows how the attributes, metrics, and military value data 

questions were linked to the military criteria for the fighter aircraft mission 

category.

Figure 11: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Fighter Aircraft

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The Air Force used a total of seven 

military value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The Air Force used a total of 23 military value 

metrics for the fighter mission compatibility index.

d

The Air Force used a total of 23 out of a total of 154 military value data call questions for the Fighter 

Mission Compatibility Index. The Air Force commonly referred to metrics as questions.

The Air Force followed a similar process for all eight mission categories. 

Likewise, each base was evaluated against metrics associated with each of 

the eight mission categories, which resulted in multiple military values for 

each base. Air Force officials stated that the resulting military value scores 

enabled them to determine which bases were best to retain and which were 

Geo1) Current and future mission 

 capabilities.

Military value 

criteriaa

Military value 

attributesb

Military value 

metricsc

Sample data call

questionsd

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, facilities, 

 and airspace.

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total force

 requirements.

Percentage of installation 

departures delayed by air traffic 

control. 

Proximity to airspace support 

mission.

Total square yards of every 

serviceable ramp at the 

installation. 

Identify special use airspace that 

is suitable for supersonic training.

Identify ability to support largescale mobility deployment.

Identify buildable acres for air 

operations or industrial 

operations growth.

Identify the 2004 locality pay rate 

for the general schedule pay 

schedule.

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

Air Traffic Control

Ramps

Capacity of

parking ramps 

Access to adequate

supersonic airspace 

General schedule 

locality pay rate

Buildable acres 

Airspace

Operating

environment 

Locational factors

Key mission

infrastructure 

Operating areas

Mobility/surge

Cost

Growth potential 
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 117 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

less desirable. This enabled them to produce mission compatibility indexes 

for their bases related to each of the four military value criteria.5

 However, 

the Air Force did not develop one composite score for each base across all 

eight mission areas, which might have allowed for a clearer distinction 

between lower and higher military value rankings. Instead of developing 

one composite score, the Air Force established an overall mission 

compatibility index score within each of the eight mission areas, which 

provided each installation with eight entirely different scores for the 

various mission areas. According to Air Force officials, this approach was 

used to apply military judgment to select the best combination of bases to 

retain.

Air Force Audit Agency’s 

Role in the Process 

During both the capacity and the military value data collection and analysis 

processes, the Air Force Audit Agency provided the Air Force with realtime evaluations of BRAC 2005 policies, procedural controls, systems, and 

data to ensure accurate data and analyses support for BRAC 

recommendations. One of its primary efforts involved three audits to verify 

the Air Force data call responses submitted during the BRAC process. 

Although the auditors found errors or inadequate source documentation, 

they reported that most discrepancies were subsequently corrected. In 

addition to these nationwide audits, the Air Force Audit Agency produced 

audit reports on other facets of the BRAC process, including the Air Force 

Internal Control Plan, COBRA data, and various modeling and analysis 

tools that were used in development of recommendations.6 The final Air 

Force Audit Agency reports on BRAC data concluded that overall the Air 

Force data were reliable for the purpose of developing recommendations. 

5

 The mission compatibility indexes list each of the 154 installations considered in the Air 

Force BRAC process, with its respective scores for the overall mission; current and future 

mission; condition of infrastructure; contingency, mobilization, and future forces; and cost 

of operations and manpower.

6

 The Air Force Audit Agency performed audits on the following areas for BRAC 2005: Air 

Force Internal Control Plan, Installations Inventory, Installation Capacity Analysis 

Questionnaire, Base Realignment and Closure Data Collection System, Air Force Data 

Collection, Joint Cross-Service Group Data Collection, Joint Action Scenario Team Data 

Collection, Installation Visualization Tool Data Reliability, NOISEMAP Reliability, Air Force 

Analysis, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Cueing and Analysis Tools, and BRAC Facility 

Analysis Capability.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 118 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Air Force identified over 100 scenarios, which were later reduced to 42 

recommendations.7

 The Air Force scenario teams8 identified potential 

scenario groups of like weapons systems, and then the Base Closure 

Executive Group selected scenarios for analysis. While the Air Force relied 

on certified data to identify proposed closure and realignment 

recommendations, other factors were instrumental in guiding decisions for 

closures and realignments, including changes in unit sizing, a decreased 

force structure, the active and reserve mix and future total force initiatives 

such as those discussed in the Expeditionary Air Force White Paper. 

Toward the end of the BRAC process, the Air Force eliminated and scaled 

back several recommendations because they did not actually result in net 

savings. In addition, the Air Force combined several interrelated 

recommendations (some that provide savings and some that do not) to

present a consolidated recommendation with savings and a shorter 

payback period than would otherwise appear had some recommendations. 

The military value data were analyzed by a computer-generated 

optimization model called the Air Force cueing tool. This model used the 

military value data and the 20-year force structure plan to create a starting 

point for Base Closure Executive Group deliberations by allocating aircraft 

to the fewest bases while conserving the greatest military value. This model 

also included Air Force imperatives. For example, to ensure unimpeded 

access to polar and equatorial earth orbits for U.S. satellites, the Air Force 

decided that Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and Patrick Air Force 

Base, Florida, must be retained. Likewise, the Air Force retained Andrews 

Air Force Base, Maryland, to provide support to the President of the United 

States. According to Air Force officials, the cueing tool results were the 

starting point for analysis in allocating its inventory of aircraft. The model

had various limitations, such as its inability to factor the active/reserve 

force mix for specific types of aircraft or the different types of aircraft at an 

installation. Furthermore, it assumes that all aircraft are bedded down at 

bases ranked highest in military value, which generally were active bases. 

To address these limitations, the Base Closure Executive Group relied on 

military judgment in some cases to overrule the results of the model to 

7

 According to the Air Force’s BRAC report, it recommends 72 BRAC closures and 

realignments. However, it presented only 42 recommendation narratives because various 

realignment actions were combined.

8

 The Air Force scenario teams in BRAC 2005 were the Combat Air Forces, Mobility Air 

Forces, Space, and Integration.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 119 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

preserve the existing active/reserve force mix, a ratio expectation to be 

maintained through 2011. 

In reviewing alternatives for BRAC recommendations, the Air Force went 

through various iterations of the BRAC recommendations (called second 

look, third look, and so forth) in order to provide force structure 

alignments that conformed to the Air Force principles and improved 

military capability and efficiency, consistent with sound military judgment. 

Air Force scenario teams analyzed the results of the analytical tools, 

including information to be considered with each recommendation—for 

example, force structure reductions from the future year force structure 

plan, new missions, military construction requirements, homeland defense 

missions, and other areas. Furthermore, the scenario teams were 

responsible for identifying any “showstoppers,” in terms of capacity or 

environmental characteristics that would make a recommendation difficult 

to implement. These consisted of running a potential recommendation 

through the COBRA model and developing the information for selection 

criteria 6 (economic impact), 7 (community infrastructure), and 8 

(environmental impact) to help identify or evaluate possible closure and 

realignment actions. 

The majority of the candidate recommendations had various components 

derived from using the optimization model; however, a few of the 

recommendations did not. For example, a few of the candidate 

recommendations involved realigning aircraft from an active base to an Air 

National Guard station with a lower military value score in order to achieve 

the appropriate mix between active and reserve forces and to increase the 

standard squadron size. Further, in some recommendations Air National 

Guard aircraft were realigned to other Air National Guard stations with a 

lower military value to align common versions of weapon system types, 

and for strategic interests.9

Four other recommendations were not derived from an optimization model 

because the model primarily focused on the bedding down of aircraft 

rather than specific functional areas, such as repair facilities. These 

recommendations involved logistics support centers, standard air 

9

 For example, Bangor Air Guard Station, Maine, is a receiver in the realignment of 

Birmingham Air Guard Station, Alabama, although it has a lower military value score for the 

tanker Mission Compatibility Index than Birmingham Air Guard Station. However, the 

Bangor Air Guard Station is used by the Air Force as a host base for the Northeast Tanker 

Task Force in order to support transatlantic air operations.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 120 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

munitions packages (munitions storage), and avionics intermediate repair 

and maintenance facilities. Air Force officials told us they had requested 

that the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group consider the above candidate 

recommendations in its process, but the group declined and deferred to the 

Air Force because it was considering scenarios at a joint operational level 

rather than at the installation level. As a result, Air Force officials told us 

that they applied either a Mission Compatibility Index approach to these 

scenarios in deliberative session to assess installations for future missions 

or they recommended certain functions to follow the placement of aircraft 

in other Air Force recommendations. 

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The Air Force recommended closing 10 installations (3 active, 3 Air 

Reserve, and 4 Air National Guard bases) and realigning 62 other 

installations.10 In total, the Air Force projected its BRAC recommendations 

to result in 20-year net present value savings of over $14 billion—the largest 

projected savings of any service or Joint Cross-Service Group—and net 

annual recurring savings of $1.2 billion. Table 17 shows the financial aspect 

of the Air Force recommendations. 

Table 17: Financial Aspects of the Air Force’s Recommendations 

10 According to the Air Force’s BRAC report, it recommends 72 BRAC closures and 

realignments. However, the Air Force presented only 42 recommendation narratives 

because various realignment actions were combined.

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Installation

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present value

savingsb

Realign Eielson Air Force Base, AK AF-6 ($141.4) $594.0 $229.4 immediate $2,780.6

 Close Cannon Air Force Base, NM AF-32 (90.1) 815.6 200.5 immediate 2,706.8

Realign Pope Air Force Base, NCc AF-35 (218.1) 652.5 197.0 immediate 2,515.4

Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND AF-37 (131.5) 322.5 173.3 1 year 1,982.0

Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD AF-43 (299.1) 316.4 161.3 1 year 1,853.3

Realign Mountain Home Air Force Base, 

ID

AF-18, 47 (74.2) 21.2 37.8 immediate 389.0

Close Otis Air National Guard Base, MA AF-25 (103.0) 12.2 33.6 3 years 336.1

Close Onizuka Air Force Station, CA AF-12 (123.7) (45.3) 25.9 5 years 211.0
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 121 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Close Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station, 

NY

AF-33 (65.2) 5.3 20.1 2 years 199.4

Realign Robins Air Force Base, GA AF-16 (6.7) 31.9 15.0 immediate 175.1

Close W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station, MI AF-27 (8.3) 46.7 12.7 immediate 166.8

Close Kulis Air Guard Station, AK AF-7 (81.4) (20.6 ) 17.3 4 years 146.7

Realign New Castle Air Guard Station, 

DE

AF-15 (15.5) 29.1 9.6 1 year 120.1

Realign Nashville Air Guard Station, TN AF-44 (25.4) (16.7) 13.7 2 years 120.0

Realign Portland Air Guard Station, OR AF-41 (85.5) (36.2) 14.0 7 years 100.2

Realign Martin State Air Guard Station, 

MD

AF-24 (9.4) 13.7 8.7 1 year 97.1

Close Mansfield –Lahm Air Guard 

Station, OH

AF-39 (33.4) 3.1 8.7 3 years 86.2

Realign Hill Air Force Base, UT AF-47 (28.2) 8.2 8.1 4 years 85.9

Realign Andrews Air Force Base, MD AF-23 (21.7) 12.2 7.5 2 years 83.1

Realign Naval Air Station New Orleans 

Air Reserve Station, LA

AF-22 (50.2) (32.5) 11.3 5 years 80.7

Establish Air Force logistics support 

centers

AF-53 (9.3) 19.2 6.1 1 year 77.0

Close General Mitchell Air Reserve 

Station, WI

AF-52 (38.4) (14.3 ) 6.5 5 years 50.2

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX AF-46 (8.1) 4.7 2.9 2 years 32.4

Realign Bradley Air Guard Station, CT AF-14 (3.2) 6.1 2.0 2 years 25.2

Realign Reno-Tahoe Air Guard Station, 

NV

AF-31 (22.9) (12.2) 3.6 9 years 22.7

Realign Great Falls Air Guard Station, 

MT

AF-30 (9.3) 0.7 1.8 4 years 18.1

Realign March Air Reserve Base, CA AF-11 (10.8) (1.9) 1.8 5 years 15.5

Realign Richmond Air Guard Station, VA AF-50 (24.2) (11.6) 2.5 10 years 13.2

Realign Hector Air Guard Station, ND AF-38 (1.8) 3.3 1.0 2 years 12.9

 Realign Fairchild Air Force Base, WA AF-51 (6.4) (1.6) 1.0 7 years 8.3

Establish centralized intermediate repair 

facility – F-15 Avionics (Langley Air 

Force Base, VA)

AF-49 (1.8) 1.5 0.7 3 years 8.3

 Realign Duluth Air Guard Station, MN AF-28 (2.1) 0.2 0.8 5 years 7.8

Establish F100 engine centralized 

intermediate repair facilities 

AF-55 (9.2) (3.8) 1.1 9 years 7.1

Realign Beale Air Force Base, CA AF-10 (45.4) (34.6) 3.9 14 years 6.4

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Installation

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present value

savingsb
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 122 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

c

The Pope Air Force Base recommendation includes the closure of Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station and 

the realignment of Yeager Air Guard Station and Little Rock Air Force Base.

Over 80 percent of the projected 20-year savings are based on the first 5 

recommendations shown in table 17, which involve closing two and 

realigning three active bases and have payback periods of 1 year or less. 

Conversely, the one-time costs of over $1.8 billion to implement all 

recommendations are primarily comprised of new military construction to 

implement the recommendations. Most of the Air Force’s 

recommendations involve realignment of Air Guard facilities with limited 

savings. For example, the Air Force is proposing to realign five Air National 

Guard stations, with payback periods greater than 10 years and $12 million 

in 20-year savings, with onetime costs of about $71 million. According to 

Air Force officials, these proposals were necessary because the Air Force 

recommendations are interwoven, depending on realignment actions from 

other recommendations. For example, 72 realignment and closure 

recommendations involving active and reserve installations were combined 

to create 42 candidate recommendations. At least one segment

Realign Capital Air Guard Station, IL AF-20 (19.9) (13.3) 2.0 13 years 6.3

Realign Ellington Air Guard Station, TX AF-45 (1.6) 0.1 0.4 5 years 3.6

Realign Key Field Air Guard Station, MS AF-28 (10.7) (6.9) 0.9 13 years 2.5

Realign Schenectady Air Guard Station, 

NY 

AF-34 (3.5) (3.3) 0.6 8 years 2.4

Realign Fort Smith Air Guard Station, AR AF-8 (17.6) (12.4) 1.4 16 years 2.0

Realign Boise Terminal Air Guard 

Station, ID

AF-17 (2.5) (1.6) 0.3 8 years 1.7

Realign Springfield-Beckley Air Guard 

Station, OH

AF-40 (11.4) (8.4) 0.9 17 years 0.7

Realign Birmingham Air Guard Station, 

AL

AF-5 (11.0) (7.7) 0.8 18 years 0.5

Total ($1,883.1) $2,635.5 $1,248.5 $14,560.3

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Installation

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present value

savingsb
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 123 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

of all but 3 of the 42 Air Force recommendations that were combined11

affects the Air Force Reserve Command or Air National Guard.

Based on our analysis we noted that the majority of the net annual 

recurring savings (60 percent) are cost avoidances from military personnel 

eliminations. However, eliminations are not expected to result in 

reductions to active duty, Air Reserve and Air National Guard end 

strengths, limiting savings available for other purposes. 

None of the recommendations included in the Air Force’s report involve 

consolidation or integration of activities or functions with those of another 

military service.12 However, the Air Force believes that its 

recommendations to realign Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and 

Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, and to move A-10 aircraft to Moody Air 

Force Base, Georgia, will provide an opportunity for joint close air support 

training with Army units stationed at Forts Benning and Stewart, Georgia. 

Furthermore, the Air Force’s recommendations support transformation 

efforts by optimizing (increasing) squadron size for most fighter and 

mobility aircraft.13 According to the Air Force BRAC report, the 

recommendations maximize warfighting capability by fundamentally 

reshaping the service, effectively consolidating older weapons systems into 

fewer but larger squadrons, thus reducing excess infrastructure and 

improving the operational effectiveness of major weapons systems. We 

have previously reported that the Air Force’s could not only reduce 

11 The three recommendations that do not affect the reserve component include the closure 

of Onizuka Air Force Station, California; the realignment of Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; 

and the Air Force logistics support centers recommendation. 

12 Joint cross-service groups and other service recommendations do, however, allow for 

increased jointness with the Air Force. For example, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, will host 

Joint Strike Fighter pilot training and will also host the Army’s Seventh Special Forces 

Group in conjunction with Education and Training Joint-Cross Service Group and Army 

recommendations, creating substantial joint training opportunities. Additionally, the Air 

Force enables Army closures and realignments by turning over property ownership of Pope 

Air Force Base to the Army, though an active/Air Reserve unit will permanently be based at 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to assist with the aerial port and tactical airlift capabilities 

needed by the Army’s Airborne Corps.

13 Based on senior military judgment reflected in the Expeditionary Air Force Principles 

White Paper, fighter squadrons will be optimally sized to 24 aircraft per squadron, and 18 is 

the acceptable size per squadron for stand-alone reserve installations. Sixteen is the 

optimum size for C-130s (airlift aircraft) and KC-135s (tanker refueling aircraft), and 12 is 

the acceptable size for stand-alone reserve installations.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 124 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

infrastructure by increasing the number of aircraft per fighter squadron but 

could also save millions of dollars annually.14

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each 

recommendation, particularly where recommendations involve multiple 

locations. Nonetheless, we offer a number of broad-based observations 

about the proposed recommendations and selected observations on some 

individual recommendations. Our analysis of the Air Force 

recommendations identified some issues that the BRAC Commission may 

wish to consider, such as the projected savings from military personnel 

reductions; impact on the Air National Guard, impact on other federal 

agencies; and other issues related to the realignments of Pope Air Force 

Base, North Carolina; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Grand Forks Air 

Force Base, North Dakota and the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base, 

South Dakota. 

Military Personnel Savings Our analysis showed that about $732 million, or about 60 percent, of the 

projected $1.2 billion net annual recurring savings are based on savings 

from eliminating military personnel positions. Initially, the Air Force 

counted only military personnel savings that resulted in a decrease in end 

strength. However, at the direction of OSD, the Air Force included savings 

for all military personnel positions that were made available through 

realignment or closure recommendations. The Air Force was unable to 

provide us documentation showing at the present time to what extent each 

of these positions will be required to support future missions. According to 

Air Force officials, they envision that most active slots will be needed for 

formal training, and all the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel 

will be assigned to stressed career fields and emerging missions. 

Furthermore, Air Force officials said that positions will also be reviewed 

during the Quadrennial Defense Review, which could decrease end 

strength. Either way, claiming such personnel as BRAC savings without 

reducing end strength does not provide dollar savings that can be reapplied 

outside personnel accounts and could result in the Air Force having to find 

other sources of funding for up-front investment costs needed to 

implement its BRAC recommendations.

14 GAO, Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs, 

GAO/NSIAD-96-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 125 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Impact on the Air National 

Guard and Reserve 

Components

At least one segment of all but 3 of the 42 Air Force recommendations that 

were combined15 affects the Air Force Reserve Command or Air National 

Guard. The Air Force BRAC report lists 7 closures and 35 Air Reserve and 

Air National Guard realignments.16 Overall, 68 Reserve Command (12) and 

Air National Guard (56) installations were affected by a closure or 

realignment, or they received aircraft or missions from these actions. 

According to Air Force officials, its BRAC recommendations have resulted 

in a reduction of 29 installations with flying missions. Of these reduced 

installations with flying missions, over 75 percent, or 22, are from the Air 

National Guard. If implemented the BRAC recommendations will affect 

over 30 percent of the 70 Air National Guard and 13 Air Reserve 

installations with air flying units, respectively. Table 18 shows the 

reduction of flying units in the BRAC process by active force, Air Force 

Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard. 

Table 18: Impact of Air Force BRAC Recommendations on Installations with Flying 

Missions, by Component 

Source: Department of the Air Force.

a

All percentage changes were calculated by using the change in number of installations with air flying 

units divided by the pre-BRAC total installation number of 142. 

Based on our analysis of COBRA data, we estimate that more than 1,419 

positions in the Air Reserve and 5,700 positions in the Air National Guard 

15 The three recommendations that do not affect the reserve component include the closure 

of Onizuka Air Force Station, California; the realignment of Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; 

and the Air Force logistics support centers recommendation.

16 The Department of the Air Force Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005, volume 5, 

part 1 of 2, page iii, lists 31 Air National Guard and 4 Air Reserve installations that were 

realigned. The Willow Grove Air Reserve Station realignment action is located in the 

Department of the Navy section of DOD’s BRAC report.

Installations with flying 

missions Change

Component Pre-BRAC Post-BRAC Number Percentagea

Active 59 56 3 2

Air Force Reserve 13 9 4 3

Air National Guard 70 48 22 15

Total 142 113 29 20
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 126 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

will be affected by the proposed recommendations, in terms of military 

personnel and civilians eliminated and realigned. In recommendations 

affecting active installations, over 26,000 positions are affected (eliminated 

and realigned); however, since the Air Force has combined active and 

reserve component actions in some recommendations those positions also 

include additional Air National Guard and Air Reserve personnel.17 Also the 

Air Force recognizes that in moving Air National Guard and Air Reserve 

units, part-time military (commonly referred to as drill) personnel will also 

be affected since they will not be moved.18 A significant portion of the 

personnel associated with these units must be replaced at the gaining 

installation and will require training. At Air National Guard installations 

with flying units, over 30 percent have been recommended for realignment 

or retirement; many of the personnel positions associated with the units do 

not have missions. Air Force officials said they plan to use these positions 

for emerging missions in such areas as homeland security, unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and intelligence, which they expect to further refine as part of the 

ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Initially, many of the Air Force proposals involving the Air National Guard 

and Air Force Reserve with payback periods ranging from 10 to more than 

100 years were stand-alone recommendations. Those recommendations 

linked by related operational realignment actions were grouped together to 

produce recommendations that had significant savings and minimized the 

longer payback periods. We found that this occurred in the realignment of 

Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, Missouri, which 

originally had a 63-year payback period and resulted in a 20-year net 

present value cost of $22 million. However, this realignment is now a part 

of the closure of Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, and the 

realignment of Atlantic City Air Guard Station, New Jersey because of 

related operational realignment actions. The current combined 

recommendation results in a 20-year net present value savings of $336 

million and a 3-year payback period. Figure 12 shows the various BRAC 

actions in this recommendation. For example, 18 F-15 fighter aircraft are 

17 For example, the Pope Air Force Base recommendation, which primarily affects active 

duty units, also includes the closure of Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station, realignment of Yeager 

Air Guard Station and Little Rock Air Force Base, thus affecting active, Air Reserve, and Air 

National Guard personnel.

18 The Air Force presented further information regarding the impact of BRAC 

recommendations on manpower including full time and drill personnel in the Air Force 

reserve component document titled, State-by-State Installation View, May 13, 2005.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 127 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

realigned from Otis Air National Guard Base and Lambert-St. Louis Air 

Guard Station to Atlantic City Air Guard Station. Furthermore, all three Air 

Guard Stations also realign other aircraft to three separate installations, 

Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; Burlington Air Guard Station, Vermont; and 

Jacksonville Air Guard Station, Florida. 

Figure 12: Realignment of Fighter Aircraft at Lambert-St. Louis Air Guard Station 

and Otis Air National Guard Base 

Finally, questions have been raised by various state officials whether the 

Secretary of Defense is authorized to close or realign Air National Guard 

bases without the consent of the state governor. DOD’s Office of General 

Counsel has not issued a legal opinion on this issue. According to an Air 

Force official, as of the date of this report, there have been no legal 

challenges brought against DOD regarding this issue. 

Impact on the Coast Guard The Air Force recommendation to close Otis Air National Guard Base could 

impact the U.S. Coast Guard.19 While the Air Force officials recognized the 

Otis 

Air National Guard Base

Jacksonville 

Air Guard Station

Atlantic City 

Air Guard Station

Lambert -

Lambert-St. Louis 

Air Guard Station

Burlington 

Air Guard Station

+ Denotes receiving fighter aircraft

- Denotes losing fighter aircraft

-6 F-15C

-12 F-15C

-15 F-15C

Nellis 

Air Force Base

+9 F-15C

+3 F-16

+3 F-15C

Source: Department of the Air Force.

-15 F-15C

+18 F-15C

-3 F-16

-12 F-16 Retired

19 The U.S. Coast Guard has eight helicopters at Otis Air National Guard Base, 

Massachusetts.
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 128 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Coast Guard could be affected if the base was closed, their cost and savings 

analysis did not consider any costs that could be incurred by the Coast 

Guard. Air Force officials stated they didn’t have access to credible cost 

data during the BRAC process since cost estimates would have been 

speculative; the Air Force could not assume the final disposition of the 

facility and how much, if any, of the facility the Coast Guard would opt to 

retain. The Coast Guard is in the process of developing potential basing 

alternatives, to include costs impacts, for each affected location. 

Subsequent to the recommendations being made public, the Coast Guard 

estimated that they would incur about $17 million in additional annual 

operating costs to remain at Otis Air National Guard Base. 

Realignment of Selected 

Active Bases

The realignment of Pope Air Force Base20 involves the transfer of 100 

percent of the acres and facilities to the Army to become part of Fort 

Bragg, with a C-130 active/reserve associate unit remaining to support the 

Army. Our analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between 

the savings claimed by the Air Force and the costs projected by the Army 

regarding base operations support, recapitalization, and sustainment for 

facilities on Pope Air Force Base. For example, the Air Force claimed total 

net annual recurring savings of about $36 million for not providing base 

operations support and recapitalization and sustainment of facilities on 

Pope Air Force Base. However, the Army estimated total annual recurring 

costs for these areas to be about $19.5 million. This estimated cost 

comprises over $13 million from the Army as well as over $5.5 million from 

the Air Force to remain as tenant at Fort Bragg. According to Army 

officials, their estimated costs included taking ownership for all facilities 

on Pope Air Force Base. 

The Air Force is also proposing to realign Eielson Air Force Base by 

moving all active duty units, leaving the Air National Guard units, and 

hiring contractors to provide base operating support and maintenance and 

repair of the facilities. The Air Force projects this action would produce a 

20-year net present value savings of $2.8 billion, the most of any Air Force 

recommendation. Air Force officials said the decision to realign Eielson 

was made because of the high cost of operating the base and its value as 

major training site. The officials noted that the realignment will enable the 

Air Force to expand an annual training exercise as well as provide 

20 The Pope Air Force Base recommendation includes the closure of Pittsburgh Air Reserve 

Station and the realignment of Yeager Air Guard Station and Little Rock Air Force Base. 
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 129 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

opportunities for increase use of the training area by other Air Force units. 

However, we have some question about the facilities that need to be 

retained to support the training mission and Air National Guard units. 

While the Air Force plans to give up the base family housing, it appears that 

all other base facilities would be retained. For example, Air Force COBRA 

data indicates that there will be no reduction in the square feet of facilities. 

The data also indicates that 64 percent of the facilities will be sustained at 

current funding. 

The Air Force proposed to close Grand Forks Air Force Base21 but this was 

changed to a realignment by the Infrastructure Executive Council a week 

before the recommendations were finalized within the department. As a 

result, the projected savings were significantly reduced, as shown in table 

19. 

Table 19: Comparison of Alternatives to Closing or Realigning Grand Forks Air 

Force Base

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

The decision to realign rather than close the base did not affect the need to 

move current aircraft and associated personnel to other bases to achieve 

the active and reserve mix. According to the Air Force BRAC report, this 

change to a realignment was based on military judgment to keep a strategic 

presence in the north central United States and on the fact that Grand 

Forks Air Force Base ranked high for acquiring a possible unmanned aerial 

21 The Grand Forks Air Force Base recommendation also includes the realignment of 

McConnell Air Force Base.

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Closure

recommendation

Realignment

recommendation Difference

One-time costs ($128.6) ($131.5) ($2.9)

6-year net savings $490.0 $322.5 $167.5

Net implementation (costs) or 

savings

$226.6 $173.3 $53.3

Payback period immediate 1 year 1 year

20-year net present value savings $2,656.3 $1,982.0 $674.3
Appendix V

The Department of the Air Force Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 130 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

vehicle mission.22 Even though Grand Forks Air Force Base was retained 

for strategic reasons, Minot Air Force Base is also located in North Dakota 

and is not affected by any BRAC recommendation. Furthermore, Minot Air 

Force Base scored only 3.4 points less than Grand Forks Air Force Base in 

the unmanned aerial vehicle mission area. 

Closure of Ellsworth Air 

Force Base

The Air Force is proposing to close Ellsworth Air Force Base, South 

Dakota, and move its 24 B-1 bomber aircraft to Dyess Air Force Base, Texas 

to achieve operational efficiencies at one location. Ellsworth Air Force 

Base ranked lower in the military value than Dyess Air Force Base. In the 

1995 BRAC round,23 the Air Force considered but chose not to close 

Ellsworth Air Force Base out of concern over placing all B-1 aircraft at a 

single location. In contrast, one of the Air Force principles which guided 

the BRAC 2005 process emphasized consolidating or co-locating legacy 

fleets such as the B-1 aircraft. Air Force officials stated that they no longer 

had concerns about consolidating the B-1 fleet in one location because it 

does not have the same operational mission requirements it had 10 years 

ago. 

22 The Infrastructure Executive Council examined the strategic presence of Grand Forks Air 

Force Base in the central United States after all the service and Joint Cross-Service Group 

candidate recommendations were evaluated as an aggregate.

23 GAO, Military Bases, Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for 

Closure and Realignment, GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995).
Page 131 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations ApendxiVI

The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group followed the 

common analytical framework established by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) for reviewing its functions and facilities. The group 

produced a relatively small number of recommendations (nine) compared 

with the amount of excess capacity it identified. The group reported that 

the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) or the Infrastructure Executive 

Council (IEC) had each disapproved two recommendations for various 

reasons, and four recommendations were rolled into military department 

recommendations and are discussed in appendixes related to these groups. 

The group’s recommendations are projected to produce $1.3 billion in net 

present value savings over a 20-year period. For these recommendations, 

the length of time required for the savings to offset closure costs varied 

widely, with two recommendations expected to take just 1 year, two other 

recommendations requiring 13 and 16 years, respectively, and one never 

having any payback. We identified issues regarding the projected savings 

and extended payback periods with some recommendations that may 

warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. The DOD Inspector 

General and service audit agencies, which performed audits of the data 

used in the process, concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for 

use during the BRAC process. 

Organization and 

Focus

The overarching goal of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group was to pursue those educational and training economies and 

efficiencies that enhance readiness and promote academic synergies for 

more joint or interservice education. The group was chaired by the 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 

with senior-level members from Air Force Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

Marine Corp Training and Education Command, Army and Naval 

Personnel, and the Joint Staff. This cross-service group was organized into 

four subgroups,1

 focusing on (1) flight training, (2) specialized skill 

training, (3) professional development education, and (4) ranges. 

The group identified five principles that were used to provide focus to its 

work:

• Advance jointness: Declare jointness paramount for specific functions. 

Establish Joint National Training Capability.

1

 At the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the ISG and the IEC provided overall 

coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 132 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• Achieve synergy: Jointly construct, co-locate or put in close proximity 

multiple functions that are mutually supportive. Increase crossfunctional use of training and testing ranges.

• Capitalize on technology: Leverage distance learning capability to 

significantly reduce residential requirements.

• Exploit best practices: Establish centers of excellence. Outsource to 

alternative providers.

• Minimize redundancy: Identify common functional areas and eliminate 

duplication, reduce or avoid costs, standardize instruction, and increase 

efficiency.

The organizational structure and the above guiding principles provided a 

framework to evaluate the potential of a broad series of transformational 

options to improve DOD education and training. 

Framework for 

Analysis

Capacity and military value analysis became the starting point for the 

group’s analyses. The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies 

performed an important role in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these 

analyses through selective audits of data gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis To form the basis for its analyses, the group developed metrics in each of 

the functional areas to measure capacity and subsequently collected 

certified data linked to these metrics from various defense activities whose 

missions resided within these categories. Each subgroup developed 

metrics to analyze capacity and to compare the various functions. The 

major standards used by each subgroup are described below: 

• For undergraduate fixed and rotary flight training, runway and airspace 

capacity were the primary metrics used to analyze capacity. Runway 

capacity for fixed wing aircraft was calculated using Federal Aviation 

Administration standards to define the number of runway operations 

that could be conducted during daylight hours for 244 training days, at 

12 hours per day. This approach accounted for weather conditions, the 

number and configuration of runways, the mix of aircraft, and the 

percentage of touchdown/takeoff operations. Other metrics included 
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 133 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

the amount of ramp (apron) space and ground-training facilities, such as 

classrooms and simulators. 

• For professional development education, capacity was based on 

classroom equivalent hours available on a 6-hour training day basis for 

244 days a year. Classroom equivalent hours represent the number of 1-

hour classes (15 students per class) that can be held in designated 

facilities, and they are based on available classroom space and 

instructor office space. 

• For specialized skill training, capacity was measured by the student 

population that can be sustained by the number of available dormitory 

rooms, dining facilities, and classrooms. This figure was based on an 8-

hour training day for 244 days per year. 

• For ranges, capacity was based on the volume and time for training and 

open air testing at ground, air, and sea levels. 

Each subgroup focused its capacity analysis on the existing capability to 

perform specific functions. Surge requirements, where applicable, were 

determined by military judgment. Excess capacity was defined as current 

capacity less current usage plus surge capacity. As seen in table 20, 

significant excess capacity was identified across all education and training 

functions except for the ranges subgroup.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 134 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 20: Excess Capacity Identified by the Education and Training Joint CrossService Group 

Source: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group.

The percentage of excess capacity includes consideration of surge 

requirements for all functions except professional development education.2

Subgroup/function Capacity metric

Percentage of

excess capacity

(shortage)

Flight training

Undergraduate fixed wing

Undergraduate rotary wing

Undergraduate navigator/naval 

flight officer

Runway 45

Airspace 51

Ramp space 23

Classrooms 62

Simulator 48

Runway 76

Ramp space 52

Classrooms 73

Simulator 71

Runway 57

Airspace 35

Ramp space 48

Classrooms 84

Simulator 55

Professional development 

education

Classroom equivalent hours 58

Specialized skill training Dormitory rooms 10

Dining facilities (45)

Classrooms 42

Ranges

Training

Test and evaluation

Ground acreage 0

Air nautical miles 0

Sea nautical miles 28

Open air testing 9

2

 Since there was no standard definition, three of the subgroups identified surge 

requirements on a judgmental basis as a percentage of capacity raging from 10 to 25 percent. 

The professional development education subgroup did not identify a surge requirement.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 135 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

According to service officials, in the event of a mobilization, postgraduate 

educational institutions and facilities would cease to operate and the 

students would revert back to their warfighting duties. The surge 

requirements for the remaining functions were based on military judgment. 

For example, the flight and specialized skill training subgroups used a 20 

percent surge factor based on a review of current planning documents and 

military judgment. Likewise, a 25 percent surge factor was used for training 

ranges and a 10 percent factor for test and evaluation ranges, based on 

military judgment. According to service officials, a higher surge factor was 

used for training ranges to meet anticipated training needs for 

contingencies and mobilization, while test and evaluation are more 

measured and predictable and less likely to generate large surge loads on 

test and evaluation missions.

The group did not analyze the extent to which its proposed 

recommendations would reduce excess capacity across all education and 

training functions. Nonetheless, the Air Force estimated that the 

recommendation to consolidate undergraduate pilot training would reduce 

excess capacity by 2 percent. At the same time, the excess capacity 

identified will remain in undergraduate rotary wing training because the 

Navy could not agree on a scenario to consolidate training. Since there 

were no recommendations involving training ranges, there was no 

reduction in excess capacity in the sea and open air testing areas. 

Military Value Analysis Each subgroup developed military value scoring plans to analyze and rank 

each training facility using DOD’s four military value selection criteria. The 

subgroups assigned weighted values to each of the four criteria based on 

relative importance in assessing the military value of a site under each 

subgroup and related functions. Table 21 shows the weights for each 

subgroup. 
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 136 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 21: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria Weights

Source: DOD and Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

Some key assumptions used by the subgroups in developing scoring plans 

for military value include the following:

• Installations with larger capacities are of comparatively greater military 

value for flight training and specialized skill training.

• Managed training areas (particularly airspace) would be extremely hard 

to reconstitute if lost due to the BRAC process.

• Existing service qualitative training requirements must be maintained.

• Retain unique, one-of-a-kind assets or capabilities.

Attributes varied by subgroup. For example, the flight training subgroup 

identified six attributes that included airfield capacity, weather, 

environmental constraints (air quality, noise abatement, and 

encroachment), quality of life, managed training areas, and ground training 

facilities. The professional development subgroup applied location (access 

to senior political and military decision makers), educational output, 

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria Flight training

Specialized

skill training

Professional

development

education Ranges

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of the Department of 

Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness.

40 44 40 25

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain 

areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in 

homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential 

receiving locations.

35 32 25 50

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, 

and future total force requirements at both existing and potential 

receiving locations to support operations and training.

5 9 10 15

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 20 15 25 10

Total 100 100 100 100
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 137 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

facilities, educational staff, and quality of life. The specialized skill training 

subgroup attributes included location, quality of life issues, training 

facilities/resources (number of classrooms and available housing), support 

for other missions, training mission/throughput, and environmental 

constraints/expansion potential. Finally, the attributes for the ranges 

subgroup included personnel (experience and education), workload, 

physical plant (available space and range features), synergy with other 

ranges, and encroachment. Figure 13 gives an example of how the flight 

training subgroup was linked to the military value criteria.

Figure 13: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Flight Training

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The flight training subgroup used a total 

of six military value attributes.

Military value criteriaa Military value 

attributesb 

Military value 

metricsc 

Sample data call

questionsd 

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities. 

2) Availability and condition of 

 land, facilities, and airspace. 

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total force 

 requirements. 

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications. 

Airfield 

capacity

Managed 

training areas 

Ground training 

facilities 

Main field

Hangar/ramp 

space 

Special use 

aircraft 

Military training 

routes 

Classrooms

Simulator bays

List the number and configuration of the 

useable runways on the airfield complex. 

List the percentage of time the airfield 

can conduct simultaneous operations on 

more than one runway. 

List the amount of special use airspace 

available to the aviation units on the base 

used for training. 

Provide the number of usable military 

training routes with an entry/exit point 

within 50 and 100 nautical miles of the 

base. 

List the amount and percentage of 

classroom space rated in adequate 

condition at the installation. 

List the percentage of simulator bays 

rated in adequate condition at the 

installation. 

List any special physiology training 

facilities located at the installation.

Source: GAO analysis of Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group data.

List the percentage of hangars rated as 

adequate on the airfield complex.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 138 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The flight training subgroup used a total of 22 

military value metrics.

d

The flight training subgroup used a total of 70 data call questions. 

The specialized skill training, professional development education, and 

ranges subgroups used similar approaches of attributes, metrics, and data 

call questions to link analysis back to the military value criteria.

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Roles in the Process 

The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies reviewed the data 

and processes used by each subgroup to develop their recommendations. 

The overall objective was to evaluate the validity, integrity, and 

documentation of the data used by the subgroups. The DOD Inspector 

General and service audit agencies used real-time audit coverage of data 

collection and analyses processes to ensure that the data used in the 

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group capacity analysis and 

military value analysis were reliable and certified. Through extensive 

audits of the data collected by each subgroup from field activities during 

the process, the Inspector General and service audit agencies notified the 

group about identified data discrepancies for the purpose of follow-on 

corrective action. While the process for validating data was quite lengthy 

and challenging, the Inspector General and the service audit agencies 

ultimately determined the education and training–related data to be 

sufficiently reliable for use in the BRAC process once the subgroups made 

corrections to all the discrepancies. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations 

Although corrections were later made, the group did not have accurate and 

complete capacity and military value data when it started developing 

potential closure and realignment scenarios, and therefore, it had to rely on 

incomplete data, military judgment, and transformation options3

 in 

developing initial scenarios for consideration. However, certified capacity 

and military value data and results of COBRA analyses were subsequently 

used to support the group’s final candidate recommendations. The group 

initially identified 64 scenarios and selected 17 candidate 

3

 Some of the transformation options included privatizing graduate-level education, 

establishing centers of excellence for joint or interservice education and training by 

combining or co-locating like schools, establishing joint officer and enlisted specialized skill 

training, and consolidating or co-locating at a single installation all services’ primary phase 

of pilot training that uses the same aircraft.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 139 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

recommendations that were forwarded to the ISG. Four of the 

recommendations were rejected by the ISG and IEC and 4 of the group’s 

recommendations were integrated into military service recommendations. 

Ultimately, 9 recommendations were approved by the IEC. 

Generally, scenarios were eliminated because they were alternatives to a 

recommendation that was selected or because the services objected to the 

scenario and the group leadership decided to delete it. For example, the 

professional development education subgroup developed three scenarios 

to streamline graduate education courses—two to consolidate these 

functions at existing military facilities and another to obtain graduate-level 

education at civilian colleges and universities. The group selected the 

privatization option because of the significant savings; however, it was 

rejected by the IEC, as discussed later. The professional development 

education subgroup also developed nine scenarios to realign the seniorlevel education courses provided by the service war colleges. The group 

elected to relocate the service war colleges under the National Defense 

University as the “best choice” option because it establishes a joint 

strategic center of excellence in the National Capitol Region. However, the 

IEC rejected this option, as discussed later. Finally, the flight subgroup 

developed eight alternatives to consolidate undergraduate pilot training. 

However, the Navy and the Air Force objected to these scenarios because 

they believed they would result in too much disruption to the pilot 

production pipeline.

The flight training subgroup was the only subgroup that used an 

optimization model in its scenario analysis. The subgroup used it to identify 

potential locations to consolidate undergraduate fixed wing pilot training 

functions among 11 installations. According to flight subgroup officials, the 

model was not used for rotary wing pilot training because there are only 

two locations where this training is conducted. Likewise, they noted that it 

was not used to select sites for the Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle training because there were limited sites selected for this 

training. Officials from the other three subgroups stated they did not use 

the model because of the limited number of facilities or functions 

reviewed. For example, the professional development education subgroup 

compared from two to six locations within each scenario, so the team 

manually developed scenarios by maximizing military value and 

capitalizing on excess capacity.
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 140 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The group estimated that its recommendations will produce $1.3 billion in 

20-year savings and $236 million in net annual recurring savings. Table 22 

provides a summary of the financial aspects of the group’s 

recommendations, all of which are realignment actions.

Table 22: Financial Aspects of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Payback period refers to the length of time required for the savings to offset closure costs.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savings

Net annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

perioda

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Realignment to establish Combat 

Service Support Center at Fort Lee

E&T-6 ($754.0) $352.4 $131.8 6 $934.2

Realignment to relocate Air Defense 

Artillery Center and School to Fort Sill

E&T-12 (247.0) (93.0) 42.6 6 319.1

Realignment to establish Joint Strike 

Fighter initial joint training site at Eglin 

Air Force Base

E&T-10 (199.1) (209.6) (3.3) never (226.3)

Realignment of various installations to 

consolidate undergraduate pilot and 

navigator training 

E&T-14 (71.7) (1.6) 18.3 4 174.2

Realignment to relocate Aviation 

Logistics School to Fort Rucker

E&T-5 (492.3) (348.1) 42.9 13 77.4

Realignment to establish Joint Center 

of Excellence for consolidated 

transportation management training at 

Fort Lee

E&T-7 (1.5) (5.8) 1.3 1 18.0

Realignment to establish Joint Center 

of Excellence for culinary training at 

Fort Lee

E&T-8 (5.4) (2.6) 1.4 2 15.7

Realignment to establish Joint Center 

of Excellence for religious training and 

education at Fort Jackson 

E&T-9 (1.0) 4.0 0.8 1 11.9

Realignment to relocate Army Prime 

Power School training to Fort Leonard 

Wood

E&T-13 (6.0) (3.9) 0.5 16 0.8

Total ($1,778) ($308.2) $236.3 $1,325
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 141 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Our analysis indicates that $1.3 billion, or over 95 percent, of the group’s 

projected 20-year savings results from two recommendations that involve 

only the Army—the combat service support center and the air defense 

artillery center. The greater part of the projected savings from these two 

recommendations is based on military personnel reductions. 

While five of the nine recommendations would foster jointness, they have 

limited projected savings. For example, the three recommendations that 

would establish joint centers of excellence for training (culinary, 

transportation management, and religious studies) are projected to 

produce only $45.6 million, or less than 1 percent, of the projected 20-year 

savings. Furthermore, the recommendation to consolidate the Joint Strike 

Fighter training has a payback period of never and a 20-year net present 

value cost of $226 million.

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each of the 

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service group’s recommendations, 

particularly where operations proposed for consolidation extend across 

multiple locations outside of a single geographic area. While available data 

supporting the recommendations suggest that their implementation should 

provide for more efficient operations within DOD, the BRAC Commission 

may wish to consider the basis for the group’s assumptions about military 

personnel reductions, because these have a significant impact on the 

recommendations’ annual recurring savings and the potential benefits in 

relation to the investment costs for recommendations with longer payback 

periods. 

Military Personnel 

Reductions

Significant portions of the savings in three recommendations—combat 

service support, air defense, and aviation logistics—are related to military 

personnel reductions. These recommendations represent $217 million, or 

92 percent of the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s 

projected net annual recurring savings. Our analysis indicates that about 

$174 million of the net annual recurring savings is based on eliminating 

over 2,000 military positions within the Army. However, the Army does not 

plan to reduce its end strength by 2,000 in implementing these actions. 

These projected revenues do not represent dollar savings that can be 

readily reallocated to other accounts and applied to other priorities such as 

modernization, an area typically cited as a potential beneficiary of BRAC 

savings. Our analysis shows that without the savings from the military 
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 142 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

personnel reductions, the payback for the combat service support 

recommendation increases to 35 years, and for both the air defense and 

aviation logistics recommendations there would be no payback.

Extended Payback Periods The group has proposed one recommendation that has no expected 

payback period and two others that have payback periods that exceed 10 

years, far longer than the average payback typically associated with 

recommendations in the 1995 BRAC round. The recommendation to 

establish an integrated training center for the Joint Strike Fighter at Eglin 

Air Force Base, Florida, has no expected payback period, one-time cost of 

$199 million ($168 million is for military construction), and annual 

recurring cost of $3.3 million. This recommendation calls for the 

realignment of nearly 800 military positions—675 maintenance and 115 

pilot—from five military installations to Eglin Air Force Base to train entrylevel aviators and maintenance technicians from the Navy, Marine Corps, 

and Air Force in how to operate and maintain the new Joint Strike Fighter 

aircraft when produced and deployed. According to the chairman of the 

flight training subgroup, the recommendation does not provide the 

opportunity to generate savings through the consolidation and alignment of 

similar personnel because it is a new mission. However, this 

recommendation would establish a baseline program in a 

consolidated/joint school with a curriculum that brings a joint perspective 

to the learning process. 

The two recommendations with payback periods greater than 10 years 

affect the Army. For example, the recommendation to relocate the Army 

Prime Power School from Fort Belvoir, Virginia to Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, has a 16-year payback period, onetime cost of $6 million, and a 

20-year net present value savings of less than $1 million. According to the 

DOD BRAC report, implementation of this recommendation consolidates 

engineer courses at Fort Leonard Wood, since the common-core phase of 

engineer courses are already taught at Fort Leonard Wood. Likewise, the 

recommendation to realign Fort Eustis, Virginia by relocating the Aviation 

Logistics School and consolidating it with the Aviation Center and School 

at Fort Rucker, Alabama has a 13-year payback period, one-time cost of 

$492.3 million, and a 20-year net present value savings of only $77.4 million. 

According to the DOD BRAC report, consolidating aviation logistics 

training with the Aviation Center and School fosters consistency, 

standardization, and training proficiency. 
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 143 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Proposals Eliminated from 

Consideration

The proposed recommendations do little to reduce the significant excess 

capacity (see table 20) that was identified in undergraduate pilot training 

for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The Education and Training Joint 

Cross-Service group identified several scenarios to consolidate 

undergraduate pilot training that could have enabled some base closures, 

but the group was unable to get the military services to agree to a joint 

solution. As a result, the Air Force made a proposal to realign its 

undergraduate pilot training and consolidate its navigator training with the 

Navy, which DOD adopted. However, the approved recommendation did 

not include rotary wing flight training. According to the chairman of the 

flight training subgroup, the capacity and military value analysis clearly 

showed that sufficient space is available at Fort Rucker for the Navy 

undergraduate rotary wing program to relocate from Naval Air Station 

Whiting Field, Florida, to Fort Rucker with limited renovation or military 

construction. However, the chairman noted that his group could not get the 

Navy to agree to the consolidation because of the Navy’s concerns over 

how such actions would affect other training schedules, so it was not 

pursued. 

The Education and Training Joint Cross-Service group also developed a 

proposal to privatize graduate education that was conducted at the Naval 

Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, and the Air Force Institute of 

Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The group estimated 

that the proposal would produce $14 million in 20-year savings, with 

payback in 13 years, and enable the closure of the Monterey location. 

However, the IEC removed this recommendation late in the process 

because they believed that relying on the private sector to fulfill this 

requirement is too risky. According to the Navy’s Special Assistant for 

BRAC, the Chief of Naval Operations did not want to lose the synergy and 

interaction between U.S. and foreign students who attended the 

postgraduate school, and there were questions over whether all graduatelevel courses would be available at civilian institutions. 

The group also developed a recommendation to consolidate all the military 

services’ senior war colleges at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., making 

them one college of the National Defense University. The group estimated 

that the proposal would produce $213 million in 20-year savings, with 

payback in 2 years. All of the military services voiced concerns about this 

recommendation. The Air Force believed that this recommendation would 

significantly degrade its Center of Excellence for Professional Military 

Education that includes extensive curriculum for air centric studies located 

at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Navy believed that the existing 
Appendix VI

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 144 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

system already has joint educational forums to address executive-level 

interchange, and it is unclear what would be gained by creating a single 

senior war college. Finally, the Army opposed the recommendation 

because it would move senior leaders and their families to the National 

Capital Region for 10 months. Based on the services’ concerns, the IEC 

rejected the proposal. However, the group, with the Army’s concurrence, 

developed a recommendation to move the Army War College, 

Pennsylvania, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and consolidate it with the 

Army Command and General Staff College at a single location. This 

proposal would have enabled the closure of Carlisle Barracks in 

Pennsylvania, with projected 20-year savings of $555 million and a 2-year 

payback period. However, the IEC rejected this proposal because it wanted 

to maintain the proximity to Washington, D.C. that provides access to key 

national and international policy makers as well as senior military and 

civilian leaders. 

Finally, the group developed eight scenarios to promote joint management 

of the military services’ training ranges. These options included utilizing a 

joint national urban operations training center and establishing three joint 

regional range coordination centers. The group ultimately proposed one 

recommendation to establish three regional joint range coordination 

centers, which it projected would have a 20-year cost of $138 million and 

no payback. The ISG rejected this recommendation because it deals with a 

program action as opposed to a BRAC-related issue. 
Page 145 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations ApendxiVI

The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 

followed the common analytical framework established by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) for reviewing its functions and facilities. The 

group produced 21 recommendations, each of which resulted in multiple 

closures or realignments of activities, mostly from leased space onto 

military bases intended to consolidate commands, reduce costs, and 

enhance force protection. Nine other recommendations were referred to 

other joint cross-service groups or military services for inclusion in their 

reports. The group’s 21 recommendations are projected to realize $9.5 

billion in net present value savings over 20 years. The payback period, or 

length of time required for the savings to offset closure costs for the 

recommendations discussed here, varied widely, from immediate to up to 

16 years. We have identified some issues that suggest uncertainty about the 

level of savings likely to be realized, which the BRAC Commission may 

want to consider in its analysis of the proposed recommendations. The 

DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies, which performed audits 

of the data, concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for use during 

the BRAC process, but did raise issues of concern impacting some 

recommendations.

Organization and 

Focus

The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 

comprised six senior-level principal members, representing each service, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 

group was chaired by the Army Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Programs, and principal members included the Commandant, Naval 

District Washington; the Marine Corps Assistant Deputy Commandant for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Air Force; the Office of the Secretary of Defense Deputy 

Director for Administration and Management; and the Chief of the Forces 

Division, Joint Staff.1

 The group analyzed common headquarters-, 

administration-, and business-related functions across DOD, covering the 

military services, and defense agencies and activities. The group’s 

objectives were to 

• improve jointness; 

• eliminate redundancy, duplication, and excess capacity; 

1

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure Executive Council 

(IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 146 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• enhance force protection; 

• utilize best business practices; 

• increase effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability; and

• reduce costs.

Framework for 

Analysis

The group organized itself into three subgroups: (1) major administrative 

and headquarters activities, (2) geographic clusters and functional, and 

(3) mobilization. The major administrative and headquarters activities 

subgroup focus included headquarters activities in leased and DOD-owned 

space within and outside a 100-mile radius of the Pentagon, combatant, 

service component, and supporting commands, and reserve and recruiting 

headquarters. The geographic clusters and functional subgroup examined 

installation management within geographic clusters,2

 Defense Finance and 

Accounting Services headquarters and field offices, correctional facilities, 

and civilian and military personnel centers. The mobilization subgroup 

looked at the potential for joint mobilization sites. Capacity analysis 

identified the current inventory of administrative space, while the military 

value analysis became the starting point for developing recommendations 

as they applied to the four military value selection criteria. The DOD 

Inspector General and service audit agencies performed an important role 

in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these analyses through extensive 

audits of data gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis To form the basis for its analyses, the group developed metrics in each of 

the functional areas to measure capacity and subsequently collected 

certified data from the military services and defense agencies and 

activities. In most cases, the group used a single metric, a standard factor 

of 200 gross square feet per person in analyzing existing administrative 

space requirements.3

 The group also used fiscal year 2003 inmate 

population and current and maximum operational capacities for 

2

 These are installations having shared boundaries or that are located in proximity to each 

other. 

3

 The group used 200 gross square feet as the standard factor as a compromise to account 

for the different standards used by each of the military services and defense agencies. 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 147 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

correctional facilities, and it used fiscal year 2004 personnel processing 

numbers and peak processing capacities at military installations serving as 

reserve component mobilization sites to estimate mobilization excess 

capacity figures. 

The capacity analysis identified excess capacity across all functions 

analyzed—even when surge requirements were considered. As shown in 

table 23, excess capacity ranged from 14 percent to 87 percent across 

various capacity metrics in functional categories after applying a surge 

factor to figures for major administrative and headquarters installations 

and facilities and correctional facilities. The table provides the amount of 

the aggregate excess capacity for each of the functional categories; 

however, the amount of excess capacity varies by individual installation 

and activity. 

Table 23: Excess Capacity Identified by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group

Source: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: Group officials noted the high percentage of excess capacity for mobilization is due to 

differences in the required maximum potential capacity and the different service standards for 

mobilizations.

In calculating excess capacity estimates for each of the eight categories, 

the group analyzed the data call responses pertaining to current capacity, 

maximum potential capacity, current usage, and space required for surge, 

Figures in gross square feet

Subgroup Category

Maximum

potential

capacity Current usage Surge

Excess

capacity

Percentage of

excess capacity

Major administrative 

and headquarters 

activities

Installations 112,006,087 87,566,988 362,760 24,076,339 22

Activities 26,576,615 20,269,800 6,350 6,300,465 24

Geographic clusters 

and functional

Installation 

management

9,381,190 8,009,278 0 1,371,912 15

Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service

3,245,808 2,530,240 0 715,568 22

Correctional facilities 2,975 2,141 410 424 14

Civilian personnel 

centers

1,278,040 969,000 0 309,040 24

Military personnel 

centers

2,293,495 1,748,400 0 545,095 24

Mobilization Mobilization/ 

demobilization

106,929 13,592 0 93,337 87
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 148 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

using a standard factor of 200 gross square feet per employee. Subtracting 

current usage and surge space requirements from maximum potential 

capacity resulted in the excess capacity estimates. The group used a variety 

of approaches to consider surge requirements. For example, the major 

administrative and headquarters activities subgroup determined surge 

requirements through specific data call questions and then used these 

requirements in the capacity analysis in terms of requirement and space 

evaluations. The correctional facilities function within the geographic 

clusters and functional subgroup considered surge as a function of demand 

against maximum potential capacity. At the same time, the geographic 

clusters and functional subgroup determined that military personnel 

centers had been operating in a surge mode for the past several years and 

did not require additional surge capacity to be retained. The group did not 

determine the aggregate impact its recommendations had on reducing 

excess capacity.

Military Value Analysis The group’s military value analysis was directly linked to the four military 

value selection criteria, as required by the BRAC legislation. The group 

assigned military values to 25 civilian personnel offices, 10 military 

personnel centers, 17 correctional facilities, 26 Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service sites, 65 installation management sites, 334 major 

administrative and headquarters installations and activities, and 66 

mobilization sites. Each functional group developed weighted values for 

each selected criteria by first asking each group member to assess weights 

across the military value selection criterion, ranking them from highest to 

lowest in importance to military value. Once the rankings were determined, 

the weights generated for each group member were compared and, if they 

were close, the weights were adopted. If not, the group discussed the 

differences and reached agreement. Table 24 shows the various weights 

assigned to each of the four military value selection criteria.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 149 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 24: Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group Military 

Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group.

a

The geographic clusters and functional subgroup military value scorings are a cumulative average of 

its five functional areas, including civilian personnel, military personnel, correctional facilities, Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service, and geographic clusters. The system of weights provided a basis for 

assigning relative value to data collected and tabulated across each military value dimension.

b

Individual entries do not sum to total because of rounding.

The group’s assessment of military value included development of 

attributes (characteristics, facts, etc.), metrics or measures, and data call 

questions for each of the three subgroups. Figure 14 demonstrates an 

example of how attributes, metrics, and data call questions were linked 

back to the BRAC military value selection criteria for the major 

administrative and headquarters activities subgroup. 

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

Major

administrative

and headquarters

activities

Geographic

clusters and

functionala Mobilization

1. The current and future mission 

capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total 

force of the Department of Defense, 

including impact on joint warfighting, 

training, and readiness.

40 37 11

2. The availability and condition of 

land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas 

suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout a 

diversity of climate and terrain areas 

and staging areas for the use of the 

Armed Forces in homeland defense 

missions) at both existing and 

potential receiving locations. 

44 20 7

3. The ability to accommodate 

contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at 

both existing and potential receiving 

locations to support operations and 

training.

11 20 77

4. The cost of operations and the 

manpower implications. 

5 24 5

Total 100 100b 100
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 150 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 14: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Major Administrative and 

Headquarters Activities

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The major administrative and 

headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 14 military value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The major administrative and headquarters 

activities subgroup used a total of 20 military value metrics.

d

The major administrative and headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 31 data call questions.

The geographic clusters and functional subgroup and the mobilization 

subgroup used similar approaches of attributes, metrics, and data call 

questions to link the analysis back to the military value selection criteria. 

For example, the geographic clusters and functional, and major administive 

and headquarters subgroups developed metrics and data call questions 

addressing force protection issues.

Leased and temporary space occupied.

Military value

criteriaa

Sample data call 

questionsd

Whether an activity has a written statutory 

requirement for a specific location—either 

within 100 miles of the Pentagon or remains 

at current location. 

Military value

metricsc

Military value

attributesb

For each building of administrative space, is 

building owned or leased?

For each building of administrative space, is it 

a temporary building?

Percentage of total administrative space in 

largest single location.

How many blocks of contiguous, vacant, 

administrative space in defined space ranges 

are located on your installation?

Key relationships 

in D.C. area 

Ownership/

type of space 

Vacant 

administrative 

space 

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities. Statutory

requirement 

2) Availability and

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and 

 airspace.

3) Ability to 

 accommodate 

 contingency, 

 mobilization, surge, 

 and future total force 

 requirements. 

4) Cost of operations 

 and manpower 

 implications. 

Leased, 

temporary 

and/or owned 

Single/ multiple 

locations 

Total usable 

square feet of 

leased space 

Blocks of 

contiguous 

administrative 

space 

Workforce

pay factors

For each installation, what is the 2004 locality

pay rate for the GS pay schedule? Locality pay

Source: GAO analysis of Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 151 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Using mostly certified data, the headquarters group examined the 

capabilities of each function from questions developed to rank activities 

from most valued to least valued. Exceptions occurred where military 

value responses were slow in arriving, contained obvious errors, or were 

incomplete, and in these cases judgment-based data were used. For 

example, in about 30 cases, activities in leased space did not respond to 

particular data call questions addressed to the leased space building 

manager nor did they identify what entity managed the building. After 

numerous follow-ups with the activities and meetings with representatives 

of the Washington Headquarters Service and Army Corps of Engineers—

property agents for DOD—the group decided to use judgment-based data 

derived from functional subject matter experts, in consultation with the 

military departments and defense agencies. In an October 2004 

memorandum to the Infrastructure Steering Group describing military 

value scoring plan changes, the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group concluded that based on an analysis of the effect of 

the missing, wrong, and incomplete data on proposals, there were some 

data issues that could affect the generation and comparison of proposals by 

the group members. However, improvements to the data occurred over 

time, and as of May 2005, when the military value analysis was completed, 

the group reported that a vast majority of its data were certified. We were 

told by a group operations research analyst that 99 percent of the analysis 

was determined by certified data and less than 1 percent by judgmentbased data. 

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Role in the Process 

The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies reviewed the data 

and processes used by each subgroup to develop their recommendations; 

the military service audit agencies reviewed data inputs from the services, 

and the Inspector General reviewed data inputs from defense agencies and 

activities. Their objectives were to validate the data and the adequacy of 

the supporting documentation. The process for detecting and correcting 

data errors was quite lengthy and challenging. Through their audits of the 

data collected from field activities during the process, audit agencies 

notified the group as data discrepancies were discovered so that follow-on 

corrective actions could be initiated. The military service audit agencies 

concluded that the information was sufficiently reliable for its intended 

purpose. Assessments by the DOD Inspector General’s office of the data it 

reviewed were more mixed. In its June 10, 2005 draft report on the 

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group’s data 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 152 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

integrity and internal control process for BRAC,4 the DOD Inspector 

General’s office concluded that after corrections were made, the group 

generally used certified data and created an adequate audit trail for its 

capacity, military value, and cost of base realignment actions. However, the 

Inspector General’s office raised issues involving estimated one-time 

savings associated with vacating leased space and consistency in rounding 

to estimate personnel savings. According to group officials, the Inspector 

General’s issues were discussed with group leadership, and they decided in 

deliberative session that the approaches taken by the group were the most 

fair and accurate approaches available and should be retained.

Our analysis indicates that the two issues identified by the Inspector 

General would reduce projected savings. Our analysis shows that if the 

one-time cost savings associated with antiterrorism and force protection 

are excluded, the 20-year net present value savings would be reduced by 

$268.4 million, the payback periods for 7 of the 15 affected 

recommendations would be extended by 1 year, and 3 years for one 

recommendation. Also, for the two recommendations5

 identified by the 

Inspector General as using abnormal rounding techniques6

 to estimate 

personnel reductions, the projected 20-year net present value savings in 

one case would be reduced from $13.5 million to a $749,000 cost, and for 

the other recommendation, the 20-year net present value savings drops 

from approximately $4.9 million to $ 2.6 million. 

4

 Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group Data Integrity and Internal Control 

Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, Report No. D2003-D000CG-0135.000 

(Arlington, Va.: forthcoming).

5

 The recommendations are to co-locate defense and military adjudication activities at Fort 

Meade, Maryland, and to consolidate Defense Commissary Agency offices at Fort Lee, 

Virginia.

6

 A DOD Inspector General representative told us that the group rounded all personnel 

reductions to the next highest number, rather than the normal practice of rounding up only 

when the calculated number was .5 or higher.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 153 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Proposals 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 

developed proposals without receiving all the data they had requested from 

numerous activities. As such, the group relied on transformational goals 

and military judgment to develop its initial proposals. The group also used 

certified data to support or reject its proposals, data which the DOD 

Inspector General audited for accuracy. The group used the optimization 

model on a limited basis for a few functional areas because potential for 

those functional realignment possibilities was generally slight. 

The following transformation options helped guide the group in developing 

initial proposals:

• Consolidate management at installations with shared boundaries and in 

geographic clusters.

• Consolidate or co-locate civilian and military personnel offices.

• Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service central and field 

offices.

• Establish and consolidate mobilization sites and establish joint 

deployment processing sites.

• Justify locations for headquarters, commands, and activities within 100 

miles of the Pentagon.

• Eliminate leased space.

• Consolidate multi-location headquarters at single locations, and 

eliminate stand-alone headquarters.

• Consolidate corrections facilities.

• Co-locate reserve and active component recruiting headquarters, and 

eliminate reserve force management organizations.

• Regionalize common headquarters, administrative, and business-related 

common support activities. 

The group initially developed 117 proposals, based on these 

transformational options and military judgment, to include alternative 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 154 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

proposals being requested by the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The 

group settled on 50 recommendations that were initially forwarded to the 

ISG. Seventeen of them were subsequently consolidated with other 

recommendations; 2 were rejected by the ISG and one by the Infrastructure 

Executive Council. Also, 9 recommendations were transferred to other 

cross-service groups or military departments for inclusion in their reports.7

That left 21 recommendations that the group addressed in its report and 

accordingly are addressed in this appendix. 

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group 

projects that its 21 recommendations will produce a 20-year net present 

value savings of $9.5 billion, net annual recurring savings of about $914 

million, and payback, or length of time required for the savings to offset 

closure costs for the recommendations, that varies widely from immediate 

to up to 16 years. Table 25 provides a summary of the financial aspects of 

the group’s recommendations.

Table 25: Financial Aspects of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations

7

 The group’s recommendations transferred to the military departments allowed the 

departments to recommend closure of Fort Monroe, Virginia, Fort McPherson, Georgia, 

Naval Supply Activity New Orleans, Louisiana, Marine Corps Support Center Kansas City, 

Missouri, and Brooks City-Base, Texas. 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions 

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) savingsa

Net annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year

net present

value savingsb

Joint basing H&SA-41 ($ 50.6) $601.3 $183.8 immediate $ 2,342.5

Consolidate/co-locate active and 

reserve personnel and recruiting 

centers for Army and Air Force H&SA-33 (119.3) 463.0 152.8 immediate 1,913.4

Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service H&SA-37 (282.1) 158.1 120.5 immediate 1,313.8

Consolidate transportation command 

components H&SA-31 (101.8) 339.3 99.3 immediate 1,278.2

Consolidate Defense Information 

Systems Agency H&SA-27 (220.0) (102.1) 59.4 2 years 491.2
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 155 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Co-locate Missile and Space Defense 

agencies H&SA-15 (178.2) 13.0 36.1 1 year 359.1

Co-locate miscellaneous Army leased 

locations H&SA-10 (44.1) 59.5 27.8 1 year 322.0

Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force 

leased locations and National Guard 

Headquarters leased locations H&SA-3 (90.5) (10.8) 30.8 1 year 308.3

Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, 

defense agency, and field activity 

leased locations H&SA-12 (539.0) (376.9) 63.3 9 years 257.6

Consolidate civilian personnel offices 

within military department and 

defense agencies H&SA-19 (97.5) (46.4) 24.4 4 years 196.7

Co-locate military department 

investigation agencies with DOD 

Counterintelligence and Security 

Agency H&SA-8 (174.0) (88.0) 26.3 7 years 172.7

Relocate miscellaneous Department 

of the Navy leased locations H&SA-49 (61.9) (12.8) 18.0 1 year 164.0

Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation 

Command Headquarters H&SA-18 (7.1) 44.0 8.7 immediate 125.7

Relocate Army headquarters and field 

operating activities H&SA-46 (199.9) (111.8) 23.9 10 years 122.9

Consolidate media organizations into 

new agency for media and 

publications H&SA-30 (42.0) (2.9) 9.5 4 years 89.0

Create joint mobilization sites H&SA-35 (0.1) 30.9 0.8 immediate 37.9

Co-locate Navy Education and 

Training Command and Navy 

Education and Training Professional 

Development and Technology Center H&SA-17 (33.3) (23.6) 3.7 10 years 14.4

Co-locate defense and military 

department adjudication activities H&SA-5 (67.1) (47.5) 5.7 13 years 11.3

Relocate Air Force Real Property 

Agency H&SA-44 (4.5) (0.9) 0.9 5 years 7.9

Consolidate Defense Commissary 

Agency Eastern and Midwestern 

Regions, and Hopewell, VA, offices H&SA-26 (47.2) (35.4) 3.9 14 years 4.9

Consolidate correctional facilities into 

joint regional correctional facilities H&SA-22 (178.8) (149.4) 14.6 16 years 2.3

Total ($2,539.0) $700.6 $914.2 $9,535.8

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions 

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) savingsa

Net annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

20-year

net present

value savingsb
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 156 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Note: After DOD released its BRAC recommendations on May 13, 2005, the Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group discovered errors in cost and savings data for 6 of its 21 

recommendations. At the time of this report, the impact resulting from these recommendations 

increased the 20-year net present value savings by $34.6 million. For 3 of the recommendations, 20-

year net present value savings increased, while the remaining 3 decreased. The issue was still in the 

process of being corrected at the time of this report.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

In total, the group estimates that its recommendations will require a total 

investment of $2.5 billion, primarily for new military construction and 

moving personnel from leased space onto military bases, and will 

ultimately result in net annual recurring savings of $914.2 million. Our 

analysis indicates that about 92 percent of the annual recurring savings 

results from reductions in military and civilian employment levels (about 

$270 million, and about $267 million respectively) and the elimination of 

future lease payments for administrative office space ($300 million). 

Eighteen of the group’s recommendations are expected to realize savings 

within 10 years of completing the BRAC realignment and closure actions, 

while 3 have a payback period greater than 10 years. 

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each 

recommendation, particularly where operations are proposed for 

consolidation across multiple locations outside a single geographic area. 

However, we offer a number of broad-based observations about the 

proposed recommendations. While available data supporting the 

recommendations suggest that their implementation should provide for 

more efficient operations within DOD, the BRAC Commission may wish to 

consider the basis of the group’s assumptions for personnel reductions 

because they have a significant impact on the recommendations’ savings; 

the assumptions regarding vacating leased facilities because including 

antiterrorism and force protection savings also has an impact on the 

recommendations’ savings; challenges to implementing joint basing; cases 

where realignment actions with long payback periods were combined with 

actions with shorter durations; stand-alone actions where the payback 

period exceeded 10 years; and proposals eliminated prior to release of the 

final recommendations. 

Personnel Reductions Approximately $537 million, or about 59 percent, of the group’s projected 

net annual recurring savings are based on reductions in the number of 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 157 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

military and civilian personnel eliminated as a result of the BRAC actions.8

The process used raises questions about the projected savings. The group 

initially used generic savings factors to estimate the number of personnel 

positions that could be eliminated when organizations were co-located or 

consolidated. These factors were developed on the basis of comments from 

subject matter experts and research of various databases available through 

the Pentagon library or the Internet. The group found that personnel 

reductions from 14 percent to 30 percent resulted from consolidation of 

organizations and 7 percent to 15 percent when they were co-located. The 

group adopted these personnel savings factors because the information it 

did collect on the number of personnel performing common support 

functions within the affected organizations could not be used and believed 

it did not have sufficient time to perform more precise manpower studies. 

The group used these savings factors consistently as starting points in 

negotiating the number of personnel reductions with the military 

departments and defense agencies and activities. In most cases the 

negotiated estimates were accepted, but in some cases the group imposed 

a personnel reduction percentage when negotiations failed. For example, in 

analyzing the costs and savings associated with relocating the Army 

Materiel Command from temporary lease space on Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to 

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, the group leadership decided to impose a 7 

percent personnel elimination based on expected economies of scale from 

co-locating the command with one of its major subordinate activities. Our 

analysis showed that the percentage factor used to estimate personnel 

reductions for all recommendations ranged from zero percent to about 42 

percent. 

A separate area of concern involves savings reported for military 

personnel. Our analysis indicates that the group’s recommendations 

propose to eliminate 2,479 military positions, which would result in about 

$270 million in net annual recurring savings. However, service officials 

indicate that they do not plan to reduce their end-strength based on these 

proposed eliminations but rather reallocate these positions elsewhere 

within the force structure. Since these military personnel will be assigned 

elsewhere rather than removed from the force structure, the projected 

savings do not represent dollars that can be readily allocated outside the 

personnel accounts to other purposes. 

8

 Approximately $270 million, of the projected net annual recurring savings are from the 

elimination of military personnel and approximately $267 million from the elimination of 

civilian employees.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 158 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Leased Space Fifteen of the group’s recommendations include a one-time savings of over 

$300 million from moving activities from leased space onto military 

installations. For example, these recommendations, if approved, would 

reduce total DOD leased space within the National Capital Region9

 from 8.3 

million square feet to about 1.7 million square feet, or by 80 percent. While 

our prior work generally supports the premise that leased property is more 

expensive than government owned property, the recommendations related 

to vacating leased space also raises questions about a limitation in 

projected savings and impact on local communities. 

The one-time cost savings represents costs expected to be avoided in the 

future by moving from leased facilities onto government owned and 

protected facilities rather than upgrading existing leased space to meet 

DOD’s antiterrorism and force protection standards.10 According to a DOD 

official, the department put together a task force after the June 1996 

Khobar Tower bombing incident in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, of mostly 

engineers to develop minimum force protection standards for all DODoccupied locations. The official also stated that application of the 

standards in BRAC was not the result of a threat or vulnerability 

assessment of the affected facilities. The Pentagon Force Protection 

Agency will shortly begin a 10-month antiterrorism and force protection 

vulnerability assessment of about 60 DOD-occupied leased buildings in the 

National Capital Region. This assessment will provide DOD with 

information to estimate the costs and feasibility of upgrading leased 

facilities to the antiterrorism and force protection standards. The force 

protection standards for leased buildings apply only where DOD personnel 

occupy at least 25 percent of the net interior usable area; only to the 

portion of the building occupied by DOD personnel; and to all new leases 

executed on or after October 1, 2005, and to leases renewed or extended on 

or after October 1, 2009. Initially, the group prepared military value data 

call questions that could determine whether a leased location met the force 

protection requirements. However, group officals stated that most of these 

questions were discarded because of inconsistencies in how the questions 

9

 The National Capital Region includes Washington, D.C.; the Maryland counties of 

Montgomery and Prince George’s; and the Virginia counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince 

William and the City of Alexandria, Virginia.

10 Unified Facilities Criteria: DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-

010-01, 8 Oct. 2003).
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 159 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

were answered except for the percentage of DOD personnel occupying 

buildings. 

The group applied the cost avoidance factor consistently to all leased 

locations but did not collect data that would indicate whether existing 

leases met the standards, which could possibly result in application of the 

factor at locations meeting the force protection requirements. For example, 

the group applied over $2 million in one-time force protection cost 

avoidance to relocate a Navy human resources service center from the 

Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, to the Naval Support Activity, 

Pennsylvania, even though the Stennis Space Center may be as secure as 

any military installation. If these one-time savings, as shown in the final 

recommendations forwarded to the BRAC Commission, are not considered 

in the cost and savings analysis, our analysis shows that the projected 20-

year net present value savings decrease by 3 percent 

($268.4 million), the payback period increases by 1 year for 7 of 15 

recommendations, and by 3 years for one recommendation as shown in 

table 26. After the final recommendations were released to the BRAC 

Commission, the group found errors in some recommendations, affecting 

one-time estimated savings and other costs and savings, which were still in 

the process of being corrected at the time of this report.

Table 26: Impact of One-time Antiterrorism and Force Protection Savings on Recommendations Involving Leased Space 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended action

DOD proposed

recommendation

GAO analysis without 

antiterrorism and force 

protection savings

20-year net

present value

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present value

savings

Payback

period

Consolidate transportation command components $ 1,278.2 immediate $ 1,273.4 immediate

Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and recruiting 

centers for Army and Air Force

 1,909.0a immediate 1,880.7 immediate

Consolidate Army Test and Evaluation Command Headquarters 125.7 immediate 122.8 immediate

Co-locate Missile and Space Defense agencies 359.1 1 year 282.6 4 years

Co-locate miscellaneous Army leased locations 322.0 1 year 300.3 2 years

Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force leased locations and National Guard 

Headquarters leased locations

308.2a 1 year 294.7 2 years

Relocate miscellaneous Department of the Navy leased locations 164.0 1 year 151.2 2 years
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 160 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

The 20-year net present value savings for these proposed recommendations differ from the amount in 

the final BRAC report because of errors found in the COBRA reports after release of the final BRAC 

report.

Furthermore, four of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint CrossService Group’s recommendations involve moving personnel from leased 

space to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, mostly at the engineering proving ground, 

increasing Fort Belvoir’s population by about 10,700.11 The 

recommendations include military construction projects to build facilities 

for these personnel on Fort Belvoir. In addition, the recommendations 

include a $55 million Army estimate to improve roads and other 

infrastructure in the area surrounding the fort. However, it is uncertain at 

this time whether this will be sufficient to fully support the impact on the 

surrounding community’s infrastructure, or the likelihood that federal 

assistance is likely to be sought by local governments to help communities 

Co-locate military department investigation agencies with DOD 

Counterintelligence and Security Agency

172.7 7 years 161.6 7 years

Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency 491.2 2 years 475.1 3 years

Consolidate civilian personnel offices within military department and 

defense agencies

196.7 4 years 189.6 4 years

Consolidate media organizations into new agency for media and 

publications

89.0 4 years 86.5 4 years

Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity leased 

locations

257.6 9 years 200.1 10 years

Relocate Army headquarters and field operating activities 122.9 10 years 115.4 10 years

Consolidate Defense Commissary Agency Eastern and Midwestern 

Regions, and Hopewell, VA, offices

4.9 14 years 2.3 15 years

Co-locate defense/military department adjudication activities 13.5a 13 years 10.0 14 years

Total $5,814.7 $5,546.3

Difference $268.4

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended action

DOD proposed

recommendation

GAO analysis without 

antiterrorism and force 

protection savings

20-year net

present value

savings

Payback

period

20-year net

present value

savings

Payback

period

11 The other joint cross-service groups are also proposing to move about 9,600 personnel to 

Fort Belvoir for a total of over 20,300 personnel.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 161 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

reduce the impact—costs that will have the effect of increasing one-time 

costs and offsetting short-term savings from the recommendations.

Implementation Challenges While the proposal to create joint bases by consolidating common 

installation management functions is projected to create greater 

efficiencies, our prior work suggests that implementation of these actions 

may prove challenging. The joint-basing recommendation involves one 

service being responsible for various installation management support 

functions12 at bases that share a common boundary or are in proximity to 

one another. For example, the Army would be the executive agent for Fort 

Lewis, Washington, and McChord Air Force Base, Washington, combined as 

Joint Base Lewis-McChord. However, as evident from our recent visit to 

both installations and discussions with base officials, concerns over 

obstacles such as seeking efficiencies at the expense of the mission, could 

jeopardize a smooth and successful implementation of the 

recommendation. Further, Air Force officials stated that most military 

personnel at McChord are mission critical and deployable, increasing the 

difficulty to identify possible Air Force military personnel reductions. The 

group projects 20-year net present value savings of about $2.3 billion, with 

net annual recurring savings of about $184 million. More than 90 percent of 

the recurring savings reported represent military (54 percent) and civilian 

(37 percent) personnel reductions. The group applied personnel reductions 

ranging from 1 to 10 percent for each of the 12 locations included in the 

joint basing recommendation. The actual percentage used for each location 

was negotiated between the group and the military departments based on 

the size of base populations and the kind of services provided. 

In our June 2005 report13 we noted that DOD and the military services’ 

ability to forecast base operations support requirements and funding needs 

has been hindered by the lack of a common terminology for defining base 

12 The functions include such activities as real property management and maintenance, 

utilities, housing, emergency services, environmental services, base security, reserve 

component support, resource management, procurement, personal property management, 

transportation, equipment maintenance, retail supply, base communications, audio/visual 

services, personnel and professional support, personnel services, food services, laundry 

services, education services, personal and family services, recreation, military exchange 

operations, airfield operations, garrison operations, internal review, inspector general, and 

strategic planning. 

13 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and Funding 

Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 162 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

support functions, as well as by the lack of a mature analytic process for 

developing base support requirements. We also reported challenges in 

maintaining adequate funding to meet base operating support requirements 

and facility upkeep. We concluded that until such problems are resolved, 

DOD will not have in place the management and oversight framework 

needed for identifying total base support requirements and ensuring 

adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint environment. In its 

comments to a draft of our June report, DOD indicated that it expects to 

release a new facilities operation model by December 1, 2005, and use it to 

develop the fiscal year 2008 program and budget. DOD stated that it is also 

conducting a cross-department initiative to develop definitions for the 

common delivery of installation services and expects to complete this 

effort by December 2005. However, regarding modeling efforts, a Senior 

Joint Basing Group14 official expressed doubt during our review whether 

there would be a single funding model because base operating support, as 

it currently exists, has too many diverse activities to model. He indicated 

that it is more likely that a suite of tools will evolve over time.

Bundling Lessens Visibility 

of Costs

The headquarters group consolidated some recommendations with more 

than 10-year payback periods, far longer than typical payback periods in 

the 1995 BRAC round, with other proposals having shorter returns on 

investment. In total, 8 of the 21 final recommendations were actually 

packages that consolidated two or more recommendations approved by the 

joint cross-service group as stand-alone candidate recommendations. We 

found that in 7 instances, the more than 10-year payback periods of initially 

stand-alone proposals tended to be masked after they were combined in 

such packages. For example, the group developed a proposal to move the 

Army Materiel Command from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Redstone Arsenal, 

Alabama, which showed a 20-year net present cost and a 100-year payback 

period by not having to spend about $71 million to construct a permanent 

facility for the headquarters at Fort Belvoir. Had the construction savings 

been included in the recommendation, the payback period would have 

been 32 years. Concurrently, the group developed a separate proposal to 

relocate various Army offices from leased and government-owned office 

space mostly onto Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which would result in a 20-

year net present value savings of about $277.4 million and a 3-year payback 

period. The group decided to combine these two stand-alone proposals so 

14 In late 2004, a Senior Joint Basing Group was created by DOD to address installation 

management issues at joint bases.
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 163 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

that all Army headquarters related activities were addressed in one 

recommendation with an estimated 20-year net present value savings of 

about $123 million with a 10-year payback. 

Extended Payback Periods The group proposed three recommendations that have an estimated 

payback period exceeding 10 years and one-time costs for implementation 

that greatly exceeds the expected 20-year net present value savings. The 

cost, savings, and expected benefits for these recommendations are 

described below: 

• The recommendation to co-locate military department and DOD 

security clearance adjudication and appeals activities to Fort Meade, 

Maryland, has an estimated payback of 13 years, one-time cost 

exceeding $67 million, and 20-year net present value savings of only 

$11.3 million. According to the DOD final BRAC report, implementation 

of this recommendation would co-locate adjudication activities, reduce 

lease costs, and enhance security.

• The recommendation to consolidate the Defense Commissary Agency 

Eastern and Midwestern regions and a leased site in Hopewell, Virginia, 

to Fort Lee, Virginia, has an estimated 14-year payback period, one-time 

cost exceeding $47 million, and 20-year net present value savings of only 

$4.9 million. According to the DOD BRAC report, implementation of this 

recommendation would consolidate headquarters operations at single 

locations, enhance security, and reduce lease costs.

• The recommendation to establish joint regional correctional facilities 

has an estimated 16-year payback period, one-time cost of almost 

$179 million, and 20-year net present value savings of only $2.3 million. 

For example, the recommendation would establish the Midwest Joint 

Regional Correctional Facility by relocating correctional functions 

currently located at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; Fort Knox, 

Kentucky; and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

According to the DOD BRAC report, implementation of this 

recommendation would improve jointness, centralize corrections 

training, and eliminate or significantly reduce old inefficient facilities.

Proposals Eliminated from 

Consideration

Three recommendations were initially approved by the group; two were 

later rejected by the ISG and another by the IEC. The ISG rejected the 

recommendation to relocate U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida, from 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 164 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

its leased space to a state-owned leased space also in Miami with no 

explanation. Group officials stated the ISG rejected the U.S. Southern 

Command recommendation because costs associated with the relocation 

were too high. The ISG also rejected the relocation of U.S. Army Pacific 

Headquarters from Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, because 

of Pacific Command Combatant Commander and the Army concerns 

regarding future requirements of U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters. The 

recommendation rejected by the IEC to co-locate military department and 

DOD medical activities to the National Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland 

was discarded because of cost and long payback issues.

In other cases, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 

Group members considered proposals that could have fostered jointly 

operated support activities, but they were later dropped on the basis of 

cost considerations and perceived operational risks. For example, the 

group considered co-locating all military personnel offices at one location. 

However, in analyzing this proposal, the group determined that 

implementing the joint proposal would be very costly, while also citing 

concerns about the uncertain availability of skilled employees at a single 

location to operate the joint facility. Therefore, the group concluded that it 

was better to co-locate or consolidate personnel centers within the 

individual military departments. Similarly, for civilian personnel centers the 

group developed a proposal to consolidate 25 offices that are currently 

operated by the military departments and defense agencies into 10 DOD 

“joint” offices. However, the proposal was dropped after concerns were 

raised by one military department that the risks associated with 

implementing joint personnel offices concurrently with processing 

paperwork supporting other BRAC-related personnel moves and 

implementing a new standardized personnel data system were too high. 

Consequently, the IEC directed the group to revise its proposal. The group 

revised its proposal to provide for consolidating the 25 current offices into 

12 offices—4 to be operated by the Army, 4 by the Navy, 1 by the Air Force, 

and 3 by a single agency providing support to the defense agencies. While 

DOD did not recommend the creation of joint military personnel offices or 

joint civilian personnel offices, it is important to note that each of the initial 

proposals included justifications citing ongoing efforts within the 

department to establish standardized personnel processes and systems. 
Appendix VII

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint 

Cross-Service Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 165 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The recommendation to co-locate components of the U.S. Transportation 

Command15 does not include the Navy Military Sealift Command, one of the 

service component organizations. The group developed a proposal to move 

the Army and Navy component of the Transportation Command to Scott 

Air Force Base, Illinois. While the Army agreed to the proposal, the Navy 

did not believe that the group should be proposing to move the Military 

Sealift Command because it was considered an operational headquarters 

and not an administrative function under the purview of the Headquarters 

and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group. The ISG agreed with the 

Navy and deleted the Military Sealift Command from the recommendation, 

which reduced projected 20-year net present value savings from $1.30 

billion to $1.28 billion. 

15 Scott Air Force Base is the current home of the U.S. Transportation Command 

headquarters and the Air Force Air Mobility Command, one of the combatant command’s 

subordinate component commands.
Page 166 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiVI

The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group followed the common analytical 

framework established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for 

completing its review. The group initially produced 34 candidate 

recommendations; 3 were disapproved by the Infrastructure Executive 

Council (IEC); and several were subsequently integrated into larger 

military service recommendations. As a result, the group had 17 remaining 

recommendations that are addressed in this appendix. These 17 

recommendations represent a mixture of closures and realignments with 

the realignments often encompassing the consolidation of various types of 

industrial workloads at fewer locations. Although some of the 

recommendations may be considered transformational, limited progress 

was made in recommending major actions to foster greater interservicing 

among the services. Industrial group officials said this was due to 

economic and military value considerations as well as the downsizing of 

maintenance facilities in prior BRAC rounds. Altogether, DOD projects 

these recommendations to produce about $7.6 billion in net present value 

savings over a 20-year period; nearly all are projected to have short 

payback periods (time required to recoup up-front investment costs) with 

expected savings offsetting expected implementation costs either 

immediately or within a few years. One recommendation has a payback 

period exceeding 10 years. However, uncertainty exists about the precision 

of the savings estimates because many estimates are based on efficiency 

gains that are yet to be validated and other factors. Further scrutiny by the 

BRAC Commission of this and other recommendations may be warranted 

to assess the impact of reductions against future force structure needs or 

capacity constraints. The DOD Inspector General and the military service 

audit agencies, which performed audits of the data, concluded that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for use during the BRAC process.

Organization and 

Focus 

The industrial group was composed of senior-level principal members from 

the installations directorates for each service, the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was supported by staff 

from these organizations. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) chaired the group, which in turn forwarded its 

proposed recommendations to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) for 

its review and approval.1

 The group organized its BRAC analyses around 

three subgroups: (1) maintenance, (2) ship overhaul and repair, and 

1

 At the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the ISG and the IEC provided overall 

coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process.
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 167 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

(3) munitions and armaments. All of the subgroups focused their work 

similarly on identifying opportunities for reducing excess capacity. 

Framework for 

Analysis 

The industrial group’s analytical process included a review of nine distinct 

industrial areas across each of the military services. They included: 

(1) ground vehicles, aircraft, and other depot maintenance; (2) ground 

vehicles, aircraft, and other intermediate maintenance; (3) ship depot 

maintenance; (4) ship intermediate maintenance; (5) munitions production; 

(6) munitions storage; (7) munitions demilitarization; (8) munitions 

maintenance; and (9) armaments production. As per the BRAC process 

outlined by OSD, capacity analysis and military value analysis provided the 

starting point for the cross-service group’s work. The DOD Inspector 

General and service audit agencies performed an important role in ensuring 

the accuracy of data used in these analyses through extensive audits of 

data gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis To form the basis for its analysis, the group developed metrics in each of 

the nine industrial areas to measure current capacity and subsequently 

collected certified data linked to these metrics from various defense 

activities across the country whose missions resided within these 

categories. While the most predominate metric was direct labor hours—

used by both the maintenance and ship overhaul and repair subgroups 

exclusively and by the munitions and armaments subgroup in some 

instances—the munitions and armaments subgroup also used other metrics 

for measuring capacity. For example, for measuring munitions production, 

the subgroup used pounds and units, and for measuring munitions storage, 

the subgroup used square feet and short tons. The disparate nature of the 

functions analyzed by the group did not lend itself to a “one size fits all” 

analytical approach and each of the three subgroups conducted its own 

capacity analysis. 

The munitions and armaments and ship overhaul and repair subgroups 

defined excess capacity as the difference between current capacity and 

current usage. For depot maintenance, the maintenance subgroup defined 

excess capacity as the difference between current capacity and the larger 

of current usage or core requirements. Core requirements are those 

workload needs that must be performed in organic rather than contractor 

facilities. For intermediate maintenance, the maintenance subgroup 

defined excess capacity as the difference between current capacity and 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 168 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

current usage. The cross-service group’s capacity analysis showed that 

excess capacity existed within many of functional areas it examined, 

especially in those of munitions and armaments functions. As shown in 

table 27, the estimates of excess capacity ranged from 7 percent to 91 

percent among individual functional categories.

Table 27: Excess Capacity Identified by the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Source: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: These excess capacity figures are based on one eight-hour shift and current capacity.

The three subgroups addressed surge requirements in their capacity 

analyses to varying degrees. For the maintenance subgroup, the excess 

percentages represent excess capacity above surge requirements, because 

the collected core requirements data included surge requirements and the 

excess capacity calculations were based on the larger of current usage or 

core requirements. For the munitions and armaments subgroup, the excess 

capacity percentages represent the capacity available to meet surge 

requirements. According to munitions and armaments subgroup officials, 

there are no over-arching, quantified, DOD-wide surge requirements for 

munitions and armaments. Instead, surge becomes a factor of how much 

excess capacity is available and can be addressed through multiple work 

shifts. Conversely, the percentages for ship repair and overhaul do not 

Subgroup Function

Capacity 

measure

Percentage of

excess capacity

Maintenance Ground vehicles, aircraft, and 

other depot maintenance

Direct labor 

hours 

7

Ground vehicles, aircraft, and 

other intermediate maintenance

Direct labor 

hours

16

Ship overhaul and 

repair

Ship depot maintenance Direct labor 

hours

20

Ship intermediate maintenance Direct labor 

hours

17

Munitions and 

armaments

Munitions production Pounds/units 36

Munitions storage Square feet/

short tons

40

Munitions demilitarization Short tons 91

Munitions maintenance Direct labor 

hours

35

Armaments production Direct labor 

hours

44
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 169 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

address surge requirements. According to ship overhaul and repair 

subgroup officials, because the Navy’s surge requirements are dictated by 

emergent deployments or ship repair requirements and because shipyards 

are normally workloaded to their workforce capacity, surge capability is 

limited to the use of overtime and delaying previously planned work. 

As table 27 shows, the data indicate that there was not much excess 

capacity in the ground vehicles, aircraft, and other depot maintenance area. 

Therefore, in that area the group focused much of its attention on 

minimizing sites by redistributing and consolidating workload. On the 

other hand, while many of the group’s ship overhaul and repair and 

munitions and armaments recommendations were directed toward 

reducing excess capacity, group officials did not calculate a percentage for 

the reduction in excess capacity made possible by implementing the 

recommendations. 

Military Value Analysis The military value of activities within the group played a predominant role 

in formulating recommendations. In completing its military value 

assessment, the industrial group assessed each activity across the four 

established military value criteria to more fully evaluate the potential for 

realignment and closure actions. As was the case with capacity analysis, 

the disparate nature of the industrial areas analyzed by the group precluded 

a uniform analytical approach among the three subgroups. As a result, the 

subgroups differed in the methodology they used to develop relative 

weights for the military value criteria for each of their functions. Table 28 

shows the various weights assigned to each of the four military value 

criteria by the subgroups for their functions. 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 170 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 28: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria Weights

Source: DOD and the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension. The munitions maintenance, storage and 

demilitarization functions were combined because the munitions and armaments subgroup applied the 

same weights for these functions. 

The group’s military value analysis also included the development of 

attributes, metrics, and data call questions for each of the nine functional 

areas represented in the categories in the chart above which were linked 

back to the four military criteria. Figure 15 provides examples of these 

attributes, metrics, and data questions and shows how each of these was 

linked back to the criteria. 

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

Maintenance

weight 

Ship overhaul and 

repair weight Munitions and armaments weight 

Depot Intermediate Depot Intermediate

Munitions

production

Munitions

maintenance,

storage, and

demilitarization

Armaments

manufacturing

and production

1. The current and future mission 

capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total 

force of the Department of 

Defense, including impact on joint 

warfighting, training, and 

readiness.

39 50 25 50 35 25 45

2. The availability and condition 

of land, facilities, and associated 

air space (including training 

areas suitable for maneuver by 

ground, naval, or air forces 

throughout a diversity of climate 

and terrain areas and staging 

areas for the use of the Armed 

Forces in homeland defense 

missions) at both existing and 

potential receiving locations.

30 30 25 15 15 20 15

3. The ability to accommodate 

contingency, mobilization, surge, 

and future total force 

requirements at both existing and 

potential receiving locations to 

support operations and training.

21 15 30 25 45 50 35

4. The cost of operations and the 

manpower implications.

10 5 20 10 5 5 5

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 171 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 15: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Depot Maintenance Activities 

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The industrial group used a total of 27 

military value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The industrial group used a total of 58 military 

value metrics.

d

The industrial group used a total of 89 data call questions.

Because of the disparate nature of the industrial areas analyzed by the 

industrial group, the subgroups also differed in the way they assigned 

military value scores to their respective activities. For instance, the 

maintenance subgroup determined military value by commodity2

 only and 

Maintenance

capability

Workforce and skills

Equipment

Last source/

directed workload 

Facilities

Maximum capacity

Available capacity

BRAC military value 

selection criteriaa

1) Current and 

 future mission 

 capabilities.

Military value 

attributesb

Military value 

metricsc

Sample data call 

questionsd

2) Availability 

 and condition 

 of land, facilities, 

 and airspace.

3) Ability to 

 accommodate 

 contingency, 

 mobilization, 

 surge, and 

 future total force 

 requirements.

4) Cost of 

 operations 

 and manpower 

 implications.

Surge/

reconstitution

Direct labor 

costs

For each commodity group list occupational 

series and number of personnel for each.

Replacement value for capital equipment and 

capital equipment investment.

For each commodity list the total number of 

direct labor hours produced that are identified 

as last source or directed workload.

Size, type, and 

condition of buildings

Direct labor costs 

per production hour

For each commodity group identify the 

maintenance space by building type and 

condition code.

Maximum capacity and total capacity from 

capacity data call.

Total capacity and required capacity from 

capacity data call.

For each commodity group list total direct 

labor costs.

Source: GAO analysis of Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group data.

2

 A commodity is a generic grouping of the types of depot and maintenance work associated 

with end items, weapons systems, or major processes, such as engines, combat vehicles, 

and calibration. 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 172 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

did not develop an overall military value score for activities in the depot 

and intermediate maintenance functions. Because military value scores 

were only determined for activities by commodity, activities were only 

ranked within their respective commodities. For example, Rock Island 

Arsenal, Illinois, received a military value score for its combat vehicle 

maintenance workload and was ranked accordingly against all the other 

depot level activities that perform combat vehicle maintenance. In 

addition, because most activities involve multiple commodities, such as 

major maintenance functions like aircraft engines, electronics, etc., many 

of the activities received multiple military value scores. In the case of Rock 

Island Arsenal, it not only received a military value score for its combat 

vehicle maintenance work but also for its tactical vehicle maintenance 

work and its other equipment maintenance work. These military value 

scores were then used in an optimization model to determine the best 

locations to consolidate various like commodities among the three 

services. In all cases, the subgroup examined redistributing the workload 

to activities with a higher military value score for that commodity. 

According to the maintenance subgroup, determining military value by 

commodity allowed for more opportunities to create interservicing3

 and 

consolidations of workload among the services. The maintenance 

subgroup’s process was focused on military value and available capacity 

without regard to service. The final recommendations were tempered by 

financial and operational considerations. However, as we discuss later, our 

analysis shows that while some interservicing may be achieved, most of the 

group’s recommendations remained relatively service-centric. The ship 

overhaul and repair and munitions and armaments subgroups, on the other 

hand, developed overall military value scores for activities within their 

respective functions and ranked their activities within those functions 

accordingly. For example, all shipyards were ranked together under the 

depot maintenance function, and all industrial activities that perform 

munitions production were ranked together under the munitions 

production function. 

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Role in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and the service audit agencies played 

important roles in ensuring that the data used in the industrial group’s data 

analyses were certified and properly supported. Through extensive audits 

of the data collected from field activities during the process, these audit 

3

 The term interservicing is used here to refer to the consolidation of common workloads of 

more than one service under a single military service.
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 173 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

agencies notified the group regarding any identified data discrepancies for 

the purpose of follow-on corrective action. While the process for detecting 

and correcting data errors was quite lengthy, the audit agencies ultimately 

deemed the industrial data to be sufficiently accurate for use in the BRAC 

process. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The industrial group did not have complete capacity or military value data 

when it initiated the development of potential closure and realignment 

scenarios. Therefore, it had to rely on incomplete data as well as military 

judgment to determine which industrial areas had excess capacity and 

which could receive new workloads. As time progressed, however, the 

group obtained the needed data to inform and support its scenarios. The 

DOD Inspector General validated the data.

The maintenance and munitions and armaments subgroups used an 

optimization model to help facilitate scenario development, while the ship 

overhaul and repair subgroup, which had similar data problems, also relied 

on incomplete data as well as military judgment to help formulate 

scenarios for consideration. This subgroup did not rely on the optimization 

model as extensively as the other subgroups due to the relatively small 

number of activities analyzed. Collectively, the subgroups initially 

developed 120 proposals and scenarios and with the maturation of the data, 

completion of Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analyses, and 

elimination of alternative scenarios, the industrial group settled on 34 

recommendations that were forwarded to the ISG with all but 3 being 

ultimately approved by the IEC.

Despite having incomplete data, the maintenance subgroup began its 

scenario development by generating several ideas as potential scenarios. In 

testing the feasibility of these ideas, the maintenance subgroup found it 

useful to use an optimization model, because the subgroup was dealing 

with a universe of 57 commodities across 28 depot level activities and 11 

commodities across over 200 intermediate level activities which made it 

extremely difficult to determine where workload could be consolidated or 

redistributed. For realignment considerations, officials told us the 

preferred method was to consolidate workload at the highest military value 

sites that remained open in the optimization results, but military judgment 

also played a role in finalizing the sites. In some instances, military 

judgment was used to override the results of the optimization model. For 

example, the subgroup chose not to realign the rotary aircraft workload 

from the Naval Air Depot at Cherry Point, North Carolina, to the Corpus 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 174 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Christi Army Depot, Texas, even though it was proposed for realignment 

under the optimization model because of concerns about establishing a 

single point of failure or vulnerability for DOD’s rotary aircraft workload. 

One issue that the maintenance subgroup dealt with during its scenario 

development was that the current DOD capacity baseline for its 

maintenance work was based on a single shift 40 hours per week workload. 

According to the subgroup, when using the optimization model, it found 

that existing capacity as measured on this basis would constrain its ability 

to identify options for achieving more economical operations. Further, 

recognizing that such a baseline was inconsistent with industry practice, 

the subgroup modified the capacity baseline to one and a half shifts with a 

60 hours weekly workload, thus increasing available capacity at its 

industrial activities and the potential for consolidating work at fewer 

locations. As we reported after the 1995 BRAC round, a capacity baseline of 

a single shift 40 hours per week workload is a conservative projection of 

capacity because the private sector frequently uses a capacity baseline of 

two or two and a half shifts.4

 In addition, based on more current 

information of private sector capacity utilization, we still believe that a 

single shift is a conservative projection of capacity, since many firms today 

work multiple shifts. 

Like the maintenance subgroup, the munitions and armaments subgroup 

also used the optimization model to test the feasibility of its ideas and to 

facilitate its scenario development and analysis. Its emphasis was on 

increasing multi-functional activities, (i.e., those activities that have the 

capability to do more than one munitions and armaments function). During 

scenario development, the subgroup’s preference was to eliminate excess 

capacity through closure versus realignment. 

The ship overhaul and repair subgroup, on the other hand, used mostly 

capacity and military value data in combination with military judgment in 

developing and analyzing its scenarios. Due to the small number of 

activities analyzed—22 depot and intermediate level ship overhaul and 

repair activities—the subgroup did not have to rely on the optimization 

model to determine where workload could be potentially consolidated or 

redistributed. While it did use the model primarily to check the feasibility 

and rationalization of scenarios, military judgment was required because 

4

 GAO, Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization without Further Downsizing Increases 

Costly Excess Capacity, GAO/NSIAD-96-201 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 18, 1996).
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 175 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

most of the subgroup’s scenarios were influenced by Navy force structure 

changes and planned changes in the homeports of ships. According to 

industrial group officials, expected out-year changes in Navy force 

structure—specifically expected reductions in the number of ships—

allowed them to recommend the closure of a shipyard. Expected changes 

in the homeports of ships also influenced the subgroup’s intermediate level 

scenarios because the Navy’s intermediate level maintenance is generally 

performed where ships are homeported.

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The industrial group’s 17 recommendations are estimated to produce an 

estimated $7.6 billion in 20-year net present value savings. Table 29 

provides a summary of the financial aspects of the group’s 

recommendations. 

Table 29: Financial Aspects of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended action

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Realign to establish Navy Fleet Readiness 

Centers 

Ind-19 ($298.1) $1,528.2 $341.2 immediate $4,724.2

Close Hawthorne Army Depot, NV Ind-12 (180.3) 59.2 73.4 immediate 777.7

Close Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR Ind-14 (15.5) 89.1 61.0 immediate 681.1

Close Newport Chemical Depot, IN Ind-8 (7.1) 95.6 35.7 immediate 436.2

Close Deseret Chemical Depot, UT Ind-17 (4.4) 65.1 30.3 immediate 356.4

Close Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX Ind-16 (29.0) (4.7) 17.3 immediate 164.2

Realign Ship Intermediate Maintenance 

Activity Norfolk, VA

Ind-18 (10.6) 26.8 8.2 1 104.3

Close Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, KS Ind-9 (25.2) 2.1 10.3 2 101.4

Realign Sierra Army Depot, CA Ind-6 (33.4) (7.2) 7.5 7 66.7

Close Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, CA Ind-5 (25.2) (10.4) 6.5 3 53.3

Close Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, MS Ind-11 (32.4) (10.8) 5.1 7 38.6

Realign Lackland Air Force Base, TX Ind-15 (10.2) 0.1 2.9 3 28.0

Realign Lima Army Tank Plant, OH Ind-10 (0.2) 5.9 1.7 immediate 22.3

Realign Naval Shipyard Detachments Ind-26 (12.5) 0.9 2.3 4 20.7
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 176 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

Most of the projected savings from the group’s recommendations are 

concentrated in relatively few recommendations and nearly all have an 

immediate or moderately short payback period where projected savings 

are anticipated to offset the implementation costs either immediately or 

within a few years. The recommendation regarding the establishment of 

Navy fleet readiness centers is by far the largest in terms of overall savings, 

accounting for about $341 million, or about 56 percent, of the total 

estimated net annual recurring savings. As discussed later, only one 

recommendation—the realignment of the Watervliet Arsenal, New York, 

has a lengthy payback period exceeding 10 years. 

Of the industrial joint cross-service group’s 17 recommendations, 8 are 

closures and 9 are realignments. However, contained within these 

recommendations are 40 smaller, individual realignment actions and 

several recommendations involve installations with less than 300 personnel 

that could be but were not required to be proposed under BRAC. The 

following summarizes some of our overall observations about the group’s 

recommendations.

• Interservicing: Despite setting up its military value scoring for 

maintenance by commodity to foster opportunities for interservicing, 

the industrial group actually developed few recommendations that 

proposed greater interservicing. Of the 9 realignment recommendations, 

we consider only three to involve interservicing—(1) realigning the Air 

Force’s depot maintenance workload at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, 

to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, (2) realigning the Navy’s depot 

Realign Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, 

CA

Ind-4 (4.1) 2.3 1.6 1 17.7

Realign Rock Island Arsenal, IL Ind-7 (27.0) (16.2) 3.1 9 13.8

Realign Watervliet Arsenal, NY Ind-13 (63.7) (46.8) 5.2 18 5.2

Total ($778.9) $1,779.2 $613.3 $7,611.8

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended action

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 177 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

maintenance at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, California to several 

other service depots, and (3) realigning Lima Army Tank Plant, Ohio, to 

support, in part, the future manufacturing of the Marine Corps 

expeditionary force vehicle. DOD has stated recently that there is some 

interservicing of ground maintenance work already being performed at 

the major depots. However, while there is significant interservicing of 

electronics work at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania and of rotary 

work at Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas, our analysis shows that 

interservicing at the major ground vehicle maintenance depots is very 

limited. For example, in fiscal year 2003, only 3 percent of Anniston 

Army Depot’s total workload was for the Marine Corps and only 3 

percent of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow’s and Marine Corps 

Logistics Base Albany’s workloads was for the Army. Moreover, out of 

17 major maintenance depots across the services, the group only 

proposed the closure of three—Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine, Red 

River Army Depot, Texas and Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, 

California—with Barstow ultimately becoming a realignment. No 

recommendations were developed regarding the Air Force’s three 

relatively large air logistics centers and only Navy-centric 

recommendations were developed regarding the Navy’s three naval air 

depots, despite that the industrial group had registered scenarios 

consolidating similar types of work from a naval air depot into air 

logistics centers. According to group officials, they decided not to 

propose these as recommendations because of the Navy’s desire to 

combine its aircraft depot and intermediate work into fleet readiness 

centers and because this recommendation offered greater financial 

benefits. As a result, this essentially removed the naval air depots from 

the BRAC analysis in considering opportunities for more interservicing. 

While not considered an industrial group recommendation or otherwise 

addressed in this appendix, the industrial group’s work also helped the 

Navy develop a recommendation realigning some of the workload at 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow to Army depots. This 

recommendation is discussed in appendix IV. 

• Closures: Regarding eight closures, four involve underutilized Army 

ammunition facilities, and three are chemical demilitarization facilities 

where the primary mission is slated to disappear in the coming years. 

• Savings: Essentially all of the projected savings from the group’s 

recommendations are based on reducing overhead and eliminating 

civilian and military personnel as installations are closed and functions 

are realigned between installations. For example, 63 percent of the 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 178 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

group’s total projected net annual recurring savings is from reductions 

in overhead and 37 percent is from personnel eliminations with civilians 

making up 21 percent of total net annual recurring savings and military 

personnel 16 percent. 

Taken individually, the recommendation that the industrial group expects 

will generate the greatest amount of savings is the establishment of the 

Navy’s fleet readiness centers, which is estimated to produce net annual 

recurring savings of $341 million or 56 percent of the group’s total net 

annual recurring savings and an estimated 20-year net present value 

savings of $4.7 billion or 62 percent of the group’s estimated total net 

present value savings. This realignment recommendation differs from the 

other realignments in that it proposes a significant business process 

reengineering effort to integrate the Navy’s non-deployable, intermediate 

and depot level aircraft maintenance rather than a consolidation or 

realignment of workload. While the changes proposed would appear to 

have the potential for significant savings, as explained below, some 

uncertainty exists about the full magnitude of the savings estimate for this 

recommendation because most of the group’s projected savings are based 

on efficiency gains that have yet to be validated. For example, based on our 

analysis, over 63 percent of the estimated net annual recurring savings for 

this recommendation are miscellaneous recurring savings projected to 

accrue from overhead efficiencies, such as reduced repair time and 

charges, while 12 percent of the annual recurring savings is produced from 

reductions in military personnel and 24 percent of the savings is derived 

from reductions in civilian personnel. These efficiencies are expected to be 

gained from integrating intermediate and depot levels of maintenance and 

not having to ship as many items to faraway depots for repair. In addition, 

34 percent of the group’s net implementation savings for this 

recommendation is derived from other one-time unique savings accrued 

from one-time reductions in spare parts inventories. 

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each of the 

industrial group’s recommendations that was approved by DOD, 

particularly those with minimal financial impact and where minimal 

realignment and consolidation of workload was proposed. At the same 

time, however, we offer a number of broad-based observations about 

selected proposed recommendations regarding high payback periods and 

uncertain savings that the BRAC Commission may want to consider in its 

review. 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 179 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Navy’s Fleet Readiness 

Centers

The recommendation on fleet readiness centers is essentially a Navy 

business process reengineering effort to transform the way the Navy 

conducts aircraft maintenance by integrating existing, non-deployable, 

intermediate and depot maintenance levels into a single, seamless 

maintenance level. The fleet readiness center construct focuses on the 

philosophy that some depot level maintenance actions are best 

accomplished at or near the operational fleet. Although the data suggests 

the potential for savings, we believe there is some uncertainty regarding 

the magnitude of the industrial group’s expected savings for these 

readiness centers because its estimates are based on assumptions that have 

undergone limited testing, and full savings realization depends upon the 

transformation of the Navy’s supply system. In determining the amount of 

savings resulting from the establishment of the fleet readiness centers, the 

industrial group and the Navy made a series of assumptions that focused on 

combining depot and intermediate maintenance in a way that would reduce 

the time an item is being repaired at the intermediate level, which in turn, 

would simultaneously reduce the number of items needed to be kept in 

inventory and the number of items sent to a depot for repair. These 

assumptions, which were the major determinant of realignment savings, 

were based on historical data and pilot projects and have not been 

independently reviewed or verified by the Naval Audit Service, DOD 

Inspector General, or us. Moreover, how well these actions, if approved, 

are implemented will be key to determining the amount of savings realized.

According to the group, two types of savings account for the majority of the 

projected savings from the fleet readiness center recommendation. First, 

one-time savings are projected to accrue from reductions in inventory 

maintained at several Navy shore locations because item repair cycle time 

for components is reduced with more depot level maintenance being 

performed at or near the fleet, generally at an intermediate facility. 

According to group officials, this reduction is accomplished by stationing 

several depot level repair personnel at an intermediate facility to assist in 

repairing an item on site rather that spending time re-packing and shipping 

the item to a depot for repair. By reducing the turnaround time for an 

item—that is, time spent in transit to and from a depot level repair facility, 

group officials estimate that the average time an item is in the repair 

pipeline will decrease from 28 hours to 9 hours, with nearly all that time 

spent on the actual repair. The industrial group maintains this reduction in 

turnaround time will allow for savings since fewer items will need to be 

kept in the shore based aviation consolidated inventory because
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 180 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

items will be getting repaired quicker and returned to the inventory faster.5

The second type of savings is recurring overhead savings that are projected 

to accrue from fewer items being sent to depots for repair. According to 

group officials, establishing fleet readiness centers will result in fewer 

items being sent to a depot to be repaired, thus reducing per item 

maintenance costs. These savings are captured in the COBRA model under 

overhead as miscellaneous recurring savings. As explained by group 

officials, when an item is sent to a depot, two charges are applied to the 

cost to repair the item—a component unit price and a cost recovery rate. 

So, if fewer items are sent to a depot, then fewer repair charges are 

incurred and less overhead costs are incurred. 

However, according to an industrial group official, since the depots will 

have fewer items to repair, they will have fewer opportunities to generate 

revenue to support their working capital fund operations.6

 This situation, in 

turn, could create an incentive for the depot to increase its cost recovery 

rate for items it does repair to make up for reduced revenues. If this were 

to occur, then the projected savings would not materialize because most of 

the fleet readiness center savings are based on a reduction in the number of 

items sent to depots and are contingent on the supply system not 

drastically raising the cost recovery rate. According to industrial group 

officials, it will be important to overall transformation efforts that DOD 

follow through on eliminating management structures and duplicate layers 

of inventory in the supply system. Also, according to these officials, some 

of this supply-side transformation is already underway at the retail level in 

the form of a partnership between fleet industrial supply centers and the 

naval air depots where material management for the depots was handed 

over to the supply centers to standardize supply chain processes, improve 

material availability, and reduce the material excesses that have been a 

difficult problem for the naval air depots. In addition, group officials stated 

that the supply and storage joint cross-service group’s recommendation to 

realign supply, storage, and distribution management should also further 

this transformation by eliminating unnecessary redundancies and 

5

 The shore based aviation consolidated allowance list inventory is a consolidated list of 

components, repair parts, and consumable items and depot and field level repairable items 

required to support planned operational and maintenance missions at designated naval and 

Marine Corps air stations.

6

 The Navy working capital fund is a revolving fund that relies on sales revenue rather than 

direct appropriations to finance its operations. Activities under the fund are supposed to 

generate sufficient revenues to recover expenses incurred in their operations and are 

expected to operate on a break-even basis over time.
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 181 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

duplication and by streamlining supply and storage processes, which will 

reduce costs and help prevent a large increase in the cost recovery rate.

In addition, we believe there is some potential risk in properly accounting 

for depot level work to meet legislatively mandated reporting requirements 

on the percentage of depot workload performed in government and 

contractor facilities,7

 absent efforts to ensure adequate differentiation of 

work completed for intermediate and depot level maintenance. We 

previously reported on similar difficulties in 2001 involving a consolidation 

of intermediate and depot level work at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, 

Hawaii.8

 We noted that, prior to consolidation, the Navy’s determination of 

depot and intermediate maintenance work was based on which facility 

performed it—the former Pearl Harbor shipyard performed depot work, 

and the former intermediate maintenance facility performed intermediate 

work. However, because Pacific Fleet and Pearl Harbor officials asserted 

that all work was considered and classified the same at the consolidated 

facility, the management and financial systems did not differentiate 

between depot and intermediate categories of work. As a result, the lines 

between what was considered intermediate and depot maintenance 

became blurred, making it harder to report what was intermediate and 

depot maintenance. The industrial group maintains that during the first few 

years of implementing the fleet readiness center recommendation, the 

Navy will continue to operate depot maintenance within the working 

capital fund (setting up a separate holding account) and perform 

intermediate maintenance with mission funding. During this period, depot 

maintenance will be reported as depot maintenance and intermediate 

maintenance will be reported as intermediate maintenance. While this 

should mitigate the accounting issue in the short-term, it is unclear to what 

extent longer term measures will be needed to ensure proper reporting of 

depot work to meet statutory requirements. 

7

 Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, not more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding 

provided to the military departments and defense agencies can be used for work 

accomplished by private-sector contractors. Section 2466 also requires annual reporting to 

the congress on the distribution of depot maintenance funding between the public and 

private sectors.

8

 GAO, Depot Maintenance: Key Financial Issues for Consolidations at Pearl Harbor and 

Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved, GAO-01-19 (Washington, D.C: Jan. 22, 2001). 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 182 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Savings for Chemical 

Depots after 

Implementation

The net annual recurring savings may be overstated for the three chemical 

depots recommended for closure—Newport, Umatilla, and Deseret—and it 

is unclear whether such facilities are appropriately included in the BRAC 

process.9

 The industrial group estimated net annual recurring savings of 

$127 million for the three chemical demilitarization facilities, $20 million of 

which is from anticipated savings by not recapitalizing these closed BRAC 

installations. However, the current missions of each of these installations 

are focused on the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles, 

and after the stockpiles are destroyed, the destruction facilities themselves 

are scheduled to be dismantled and disposed of in accordance with 

applicable laws and agreements with the governors of the states in which 

they are located. With the exception of the recommended transfer of 

storage igloos and magazines from Deseret to Tooele Army Depot, Utah, 

Army officials have not identified any existing plans for future missions at 

these depots once the chemical destruction mission is complete. 

Consequently, it is unclear how the closure of the depots will result in 

recapitalization savings. Additionally, given the general delays in the Army’s 

chemical weapons destruction program10 it is uncertain that it will be able 

to complete the chemical weapons destruction mission and close these 

depots within the 6-year BRAC statutory implementation period. 

Hawthorne Army Depot There is uncertainty surrounding the Army’s ability to close the Hawthorne 

Army Depot, Nevada, by 2011, the final year as prescribed by the BRAC 

legislation for implementing BRAC actions. The Army may be unable to 

demilitarize all the unserviceable munitions stored at the depot by 2011, 

thereby placing the Army at risk for closing the depot by that date. Army 

officials told us that demilitarization funds have not been fully used for 

demilitarization purposes in recent years, but for other purposes. As a 

9

Pueblo Chemical Depot was removed from the BRAC closure list two weeks before the 

recommendations were released. During the BRAC process, we expressed our concerns 

that Pueblo would not be able to successfully demilitarize its stockpiles within the statutory 

BRAC timeframe because a plant has yet to be built.

10GAO, Chemical Weapons: Destruction Schedule Delays and Cost Growth Continue to 

Challenge Program Management, GAO-04-634T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2004), GAO, 

Nonproliferation: Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise 

Concerns About Proliferation, GAO-04-361 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004), and GAO, 

Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, 

Is Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 

2003). 
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 183 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

result, the stockpile of unserviceable munitions is growing. The funding 

situation is of such concern that an Army official told us they intend to 

request the DOD Comptroller issue a memorandum that would 

administratively “fence” funding in the demilitarization account to better 

ensure that the funds will be used for reducing the stockpiles of 

unserviceable munitions. This official also told us that this funding 

situation could be further exacerbated with the potential for the return to 

the United States of additional unserviceable munition stockpiles that are 

currently stored in Korea, even though the group considered these stocks 

in its analysis. This official stated that if these unserviceable munitions are 

returned for demilitarization to Hawthorne, there will be added pressure to 

finish the demilitarization process in time to close the facility by 2011. 

Closure of Ammunition 

Plants

Currently, the Army leases some property at its ammunition plants through 

the Army’s program called the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing 

Support Initiative. DOD has recommended for closure four ammunition 

plants that are part of this initiative—Mississippi, Kansas, Lone Star, and 

Riverbank. We previously reported that, while this initiative has offset 

some of the Army’s maintenance costs, maintaining ammunition plants in 

an inactive status still represents a significant cost to the federal 

government.11 Through this initiative, the Army contracts with an operating 

contractor that conducts maintenance, repair, restoration, and remediation 

in return for use of the inactive part of the facility. The operating 

contractor, in turn, locates and negotiates with tenants regarding lease 

rates, facility improvements, and contract terms. However, the effect on 

these tenants of closing the four ammunition plants involved with the 

initiative is currently unknown. Army officials responsible for the initiative 

told us that past transfers of such property outside of the BRAC process 

have been handled poorly in that the General Services Administration or 

Army Corps of Engineers, the agencies responsible for transferring excess 

property, evicted the tenants and then sold the property separately, as was 

the case in past closures such as the Indiana Army Ammunition Plant. 

Army officials said that property transfers conducted in this manner could 

be costly because the government must incur some costs that were paid by 

the tenants, such as for security and maintenance. For example, an Army 

analysis showed that retaining the ARMS tenants on Indiana Army 

Ammunition plant rather than evicting them would have saved about 

11GAO, Military Bases: Cost to Maintain Inactive Ammunition Plants and Closed Bases 

Could be Reduced, GAO/NSIAD-97-56 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 1997).
Appendix VIII

Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 184 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

$41 million. Additionally, DOD may incur some costs if leases are 

terminated early. An industrial group official told us that the group 

included termination costs for leases that extended past the proposed 

closure date but only for tenants performing DOD work, not for other 

tenants. We believe that lease termination costs should have been included 

for any tenant’s lease that extends past the proposed closure date, since 

there may be a cost incurred for breaking the lease early. However Army 

officials said that it would be difficult to estimate such potential costs at 

this time. 

Watervliet Arsenal, New 

York

Despite having a payback period of 18 years, the industrial group proposed 

the realignment of Watervliet Arsenal, New York, because it has 

considerable excess capacity and DOD will no longer require some of its 

capabilities. The group had originally considered either moving the entire 

workload of the arsenal to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, or moving the 

entire workload of Rock Island Arsenal to Watervliet Arsenal. However, 

according to industrial group officials environmental issues regarding 

potential chromium discharges into the Mississippi River and costs 

associated with moving heavy industrial equipment precluded a costeffective realignment of moving the work at Watervliet Arsenal to Rock 

Island Arsenal. Similarly, air quality issues regarding sulfur dioxide 

emissions along with the costs to move equipment precluded a costeffective realignment of moving the work at Rock Island Arsenal work to 

Watervliet Arsenal, since the Northeast region already exceeds allowable 

limits for sulfur dioxide emissions. As shown in the table 29, the Watervliet 

recommendation has a payback period of 18 years, with about $63.7 million 

in one time unique costs and only $5.2 million in net annual recurring 

savings. According to industrial group officials, these one-time costs reflect 

the costs of “shrinking the footprint,” (i.e., moving out of buildings and 

eliminating and moving excess equipment at both the arsenal and the 

accompanying research laboratories also located at the arsenal). 
Page 185 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations ApendxiIX

The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group followed the common 

analytical framework established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) in reviewing its functions and facilities. The Intelligence Joint CrossService Group produced two recommendations that it projects will yield 

about $588 million in 20-year net present value savings, with a payback 

period of 8 years for each recommendation. The majority of savings in the 

two recommendations result from lease terminations. Unlike the services 

or other groups, there is little savings projected from personnel reductions 

because, according to officials, almost all of the personnel will relocate and 

end strength is projected to increase as a result of program growth. The 

DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies, which performed audits 

of the data, concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for use during 

the BRAC process.

Organization and 

Focus

The intelligence group was responsible for reviewing intelligence functions 

throughout DOD. Previous BRAC rounds did not involve the participation 

of any joint cross-service group dedicated to analyzing intelligence 

functions. The intelligence group was chaired by the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence & Security).1

 The Group’s 

principals included senior members from the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, 

National Security Agency, each military department, and the Joint Staff 

Directorate for Intelligence, along with representation from the offices of 

the Director, Central Intelligence Community Management Staff, and the 

Department of Defense Inspector General. 

The intelligence group formed four functional subgroups: Sources and 

Methods; Correlation, Collaboration, Analysis, and Access; Management 

Activities; and National Decisionmaking and Warfighting Capabilities. The 

first three subgroups each created an analytical construct for measuring 

defense intelligence capacity that resulted in a capacity data call. These 

subgroups were eventually replaced by a single Core Team that included 

membership from each organization represented in the Intelligence Joint 

Cross-Service Group. This team created a single, consolidated analytical 

construct for measuring the military value of defense intelligence facilities. 

The team also performed detailed capacity and military value analysis, 

1

 At the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the 

Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the 

DOD-wide process.
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 186 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

evaluated scenario ideas, executed scenario data calls, and prepared 

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group candidate recommendations for 

deliberation. 

The overarching intelligence principle the group worked to support was 

that DOD needs intelligence capabilities to support the National Military 

Strategy by delivering predictive analyses, warning of impending crises, 

providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving 

“horizontal” (that is, interagency) integration of networks and databases. 

To do so, the group focused on four key objectives:

• Locating and upgrading facilities on protected installations as 

appropriate.

• Reducing vulnerable commercial leased space.

• Realigning selected intelligence functions/activities and establishing 

facilities to support continuity of operations and mission assurance 

requirements.

• Providing infrastructure to facilitate robust information flow between 

analysts, collectors, and operators at all echelons and achieve mission 

synergy.

The group conducted an assessment of defense intelligence for buildings, 

facilities, and personnel performing the intelligence function. The objective 

was to project an alignment of present capabilities, with current 

organizational compositions and business processes, to desired future 

operational capabilities, using DOD’s transformational concepts and 

preferred organizational construct. 

Framework for 

Analysis

The intelligence group initially identified five broad functions to analyze in 

defense intelligence: Sources and Methods (Acquisition and Collection); 

Analysis; Dissemination; Management Activities; and Sustainability. Based 

on subsequent Infrastructure Steering Group guidance, these five broad 

functions were consolidated into a single function—defense intelligence—

in the final military value scoring plan. Capacity analysis and then military 

value analysis were the starting points for the BRAC analytical process. 

The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies performed an 

important role in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these analyses 

through extensive audits of data gathered at various locations.
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 187 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Capacity Analysis To assess capacity, the intelligence group identified buildings and facilities 

performing the intelligence function and developed related attributes, 

metrics, and questions for analysis. Data calls were issued to the defense 

intelligence community to gather certified data on intelligence buildings 

and facilities. The capacity analysis identified limited excess capacity in 

some organizations, but no overall excess capacity, as shown in table 30. 

Table 30: Excess Capacity Identified by the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Source: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: Excess capacity measured in square feet.

The negative excess capacity shown in table 30 differs from the group’s 

initial capacity data results, which showed an overall excess capacity of 

18 percent. However, after reviewing the initial data, the intelligence group 

made two adjustments. First, the group removed buildings with no direct 

intelligence mission, such as barracks, pump houses, tunnels, or 

warehouses. Then the group increased its estimate of the area of square 

feet required for personnel temporarily working at another intelligence

Organization

Percentage of excess

capacity (shortage)

Air Force 0.01

Army (3)

Marine Corps (20)

Navy (4)

Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence (17)

Counter Intelligence Field Agency 2

Joint Staff (Combatant Commands) (58)

Defense Intelligence Agency (24)

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 11

National Reconnaissance Office 2

National Security Agency 0.3

Total (1.9)
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 188 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

entity and for contractor personnel by 50 percent.2 The group did not 

identify any known documented requirements for the defense intelligence 

community to set aside space or facilities for surge. The intelligence 

community has historically handled surge operations by reassigning and 

reallocating existing resources within the current square footage. 

Military Value Analysis All BRAC 2005 selection criteria were applied by the intelligence group 

across the defense intelligence functional support area and used with the 

force structure plan and infrastructure inventory to perform analyses. 

Priority consideration was given to military value by evaluating and scoring 

activities based on the first four selection criteria. Table 31 below shows 

the weighted value the intelligence group gave to the criteria, based on a 

100-point scale. 

Table 31: Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

2

 Initially, the group developed a space allowance of 100 square foot for detailees and 

contractors. However, the group subsequently found out that detailees and contractors 

consisted of all levels of personnel, including high ranking liaisons, managers, and analysts. 

As a result, the group raised the space allowance 150 square foot per person, which they 

believe more accurately reflects the intelligence community average for government, 

military and civilian personnel.

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational 

readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the 

impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

40

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace 

(including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces 

throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the 

use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing 

and potential receiving locations.

30

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future 

total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to 

support operations and training.

20

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 10

Total 100
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 189 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The intelligence group assessed the military value of its facilities based on 

those facilities’ capabilities to support the intelligence function. A single 

scoring plan measured the value of both the infrastructure and the 

personnel performing the defense intelligence function at a given facility. 

Attributes and weighted metrics were used to compute the military value of 

a building by assessing the facility’s physical infrastructure and locations as 

they related to selection criteria 1 through 4. After computing military value 

scores, a rank-ordered listing of the 267 intelligence facilities was 

developed for the defense intelligence function. Subsequently, strategydriven scenarios were validated by analyses of military value data and 

military judgment. Figure 16 illustrates how the military value attributes, 

metrics, and data questions were linked to the military value criteria using 

selected attributes, metrics, and questions.

Figure 16: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of an Intelligence Facility

Military value 

criteriaa

Military value

attributesb

Sample data call

questionsd Military value

metricsc

 Source: GAO analysis of Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group data.

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and airspace. 

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total 

 force requirements. 

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications. Location within National Capital 

Region; proximity to another high 

value target; number and type of 

transportation nodes with a 100 

mile radius of the facility. 

Facility location and/or equipment 

constraints by geography and/or 

physics.

Monitoring and controlling orbital 

and/or suborbital vehicles through 

the full spectrum of operations; 

experiment and demonstrate new 

capabilities to reduce manning, 

promote unmanned operations or 

enhance situational awareness; 

highly customized signals 

equipment

Capability of communications/ 

information technology (including 

bandwidth and redundancy); 

percent utilization of secure data 

storage; redundant/back-up power 

supply and distribution systems. 

Physical

Infrastructure 

Facility

capability 

Specialized

equipment 

Geophysical

constraints 

Mission assurance/

continuity of operations 

Location
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 190 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

a The BRAC military value criteria are the first 4 BRAC selection criteria.

b Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service 

Group used a total of 2 military value attributes.

c Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

used a total of 12 military value metrics.

d The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group used a total of 59 data call questions. 

A similar process was followed for all of the 267 intelligence facilities.

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Role in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies reviewed the data 

and processes used by the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group to 

develop its recommendations. The overall objective was to evaluate the 

validity, integrity, and documentation of data used by the subgroups. The 

DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies used real-time audit 

coverage of data collection and analysis processes to ensure that the data 

used in the groups’ capacity analysis, military value analysis, and use of 

optimization models was certified and was used as intended. Through 

extensive audits of the data collected from field activities during the 

process, the DOD Inspector General notified the group of data 

discrepancies for the purpose of follow-on corrective action. The DOD 

Inspector General ultimately determined, once the corrections to all the 

discrepancies were noted, the intelligence data to be sufficiently reliable 

for use in the BRAC process. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group developed 13 scenarios, which 

after further analysis led to 6 candidate recommendations being presented 

to the Infrastructure Steering Group and the Infrastructure Executive 

Council, the latter of which approved 3 candidate recommendations. One 

of these 3 approved candidate recommendations was subsequently 

incorporated into a recommendation proposed by the headquarters group. 

Some scenarios were eliminated because they were alternatives to a 

proposed recommendation. Other scenarios were eliminated because of 

concerns over high implementation costs and long payback periods—that 

is, the length of time required for the savings to offset closure costs. For 

example, the group developed a scenario to establish selected continuity of 

operations and mission assurance functions at White Sands Missile Range, 

New Mexico, but it was disapproved by the Infrastructure Executive 

Council because it had a one-time cost of $1.8 billion and a projected 

payback period of never.
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 191 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group projects that its two 

recommendations will produce almost $588 million in 20-year net present 

value savings, and almost $138 million in net annual recurring savings. 

Table 32 below provides a summary of the financial aspects of the group’s 

recommendations.

Table 32: Financial Aspects of the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

The majority of the net annual recurring savings in the two 

recommendations is from the avoidance of future leased cost when 

activities move from leased space to military installations. Intelligence 

Joint Cross-Service Group officials noted that about one-half of the 

estimated $1.1 billion one-time costs for the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency move will be paid from National Intelligence Program 

funds. 

Issue Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

The recommendation to move the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

from various leased sites to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, will have a significant 

impact on the local community when added to other proposals to move 

activities to Fort Belvoir.3

 This one proposal would move about 8,500 

personnel to Fort Belvoir from Bethesda, Maryland, Washington, DC and 

the northern Virginia area. The BRAC Commission may wish to consider 

the impact on the local community infrastructure, such as roads and public 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net

implementation

(costs) savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value savingsb

Close National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency leased locations, relocate to Fort 

Belvoir, VA

Int-4 ($1,117.3) ($796.7) $127.7 8 years $535.1

Realign Defense Intelligence Agency 

functions

Int-3 (96.7) (48.8) 10.1 8 years 52.8

Total ($1,214.0) ($845.5) $137.8 $587.9
Appendix IX

Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 192 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

transportation, when evaluating this and other proposals affecting Fort 

Belvoir. 

3

 The headquarters group has several recommendations that propose to move activities to 

Fort Belvoir.
Page 193 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiX

The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group followed the common analytical 

framework established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for 

reviewing the military health care system. It produced 22 candidate 

recommendations; one was disapproved late in the process by the 

Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), and one was integrated with a 

service recommendation. The remaining 20 recommendations were 

combined into 6 recommendations that were ultimately approved by DOD. 

These 6 recommendations are projected to produce about $2.7 billion in 

estimated net present value savings over a 20-year period. The expected 

payback period, or length of time for the savings to offset costs associated 

with the recommendations, varies from immediately to 10 years. We have 

identified various issues regarding the recommendations that may warrant 

further attention by the BRAC Commission. These include the likelihood 

that some estimated savings could be less than projected, lengthy or no 

payback periods for certain proposed actions imbedded within the more 

complex recommendations, and uncertainties about future requirements 

and their impact on the viability of the recommendations. While the group 

encountered some challenges in obtaining accurate and consistent certified 

data on a cross-service basis, the DOD Inspector General and the military 

service audit agencies ultimately concluded that the data used by the 

medical group were sufficiently reliable for use in the BRAC process. 

Organization and 

Focus

The medical group was chaired by the Surgeon General of the Air Force 

and included the Surgeon General of the Navy, the Deputy Surgeon General 

of the Army, the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps, and the Acting 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy. In 

carrying out its BRAC analyses, the medical group established functional 

area working groups and subgroups consisting of subject matter experts 

and analysts from each of the military services and the OSD Health Affairs.1

The group’s objectives were to develop recommendations to:

• support the warfighters and their families, 

• maximize military value while reducing infrastructure and maintaining 

an adequate surge capability, 

1

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the IEC provided overall coordination 

and direction to the DOD-wide process. 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 194 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• maintain and improve access to care for all beneficiaries, including 

military retirees, 

• enhance jointness, 

• identify and maximize synergies from co-location or consolidation, and 

• examine outsourcing opportunities, such as increasing the use of 

civilian care providers, to allow DOD to leverage its efforts across the 

overall United States health care system.

Framework for 

Analysis

The medical group organized and conducted its BRAC analyses of DOD’s 

military health care system focusing on three broad functions: (1) health 

care services; (2) health care education and training; and (3) medical and 

dental research, development, and acquisition. As with other military 

services and joint cross-service groups, capacity and military value 

analyses were the starting points for the group’s analyses. The DOD 

Inspector General and service audit agencies performed an important role 

in ensuring the accuracy of data used in these analyses through extensive 

audits of data gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis In establishing the analytical framework for developing its 

recommendations, the medical group analyzed the military health system’s 

capacity in terms of services, workloads, and facilities. The group 

developed specific functional area metrics for measuring capacity and 

collected certified data associated with these metrics from military 

installations across the country. It used a range of metrics, depending on 

the functional area being assessed, such as military health care population 

and workloads, number of hospital beds, available and currently used 

building space, length and frequency of education and training programs, 

personnel requirements, and equipment usage, to measure capacity.

Based on the group’s capacity analysis, the military health system was 

found to have excess capacity within two of the three functional areas it 

reviewed. As shown in table 33, the excess capacity resides predominantly 

in the health care services and education and training functions. Within the 

health care services function, the analysis showed that dental care has 

virtually no excess capacity because of the use of contract providers and 

substantial infrastructure adjustments since previous BRAC rounds. The 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 195 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

group’s capacity analysis report acknowledged that even though 

adjustments have been made to the health care system since the BRAC 

1995 round, the medical system infrastructure is still generally based on a 

Cold War strategy with minimal reliance on civilian health care providers.

Table 33: Excess Capacity Identified by the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group

Source: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group data.

a

A variety of metrics was used depending on the functional areas being assessed. For example, the 

number of procedures was used for assessing health care services while the number of full-time 

equivalents was used in assessing health care research, development, and acquisition functions. 

The group developed surge factors for its analysis of inpatient and 

research, development, and acquisition functions, which are part of the 

percentages in table 33. It determined that the high operational tempo 

would be maintained for 30 days. However, the group determined that 

surge factors were not necessary for other functional areas because of their 

inherent surge capabilities to handle potential workload increases. It 

assumed that potential workload surge requirements could be handled 

through various sources, such as the use of civilian providers in the

Functional areasa

Percentage of

excess capacity

Health care services

Health care - primary care 38

Health care - specialty care 14

Health care inpatient 48

Health care dental 0

Health care education and training 

Laboratories 77

Clinical 15

Classrooms 56

Health care research, development, and acquisition

Personnel 3
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 196 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

TRICARE network,2 civilian medical education and training programs, and 

extended operations.

According to DOD medical officials, the Department of Health and Human 

Services, rather than DOD, is responsible for domestic homeland medical 

support, but defense medical personnel and infrastructure could be used to 

assist in handling domestic medical emergency situations. According to 

DOD officials, since this support is not part of DOD’s defined mission, it 

was not included in the medical group’s analysis. However, DOD officials 

also told us that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OSD had coordinated the 

BRAC analysis with major commands that would be impacted by BRAC 

proposals, including the U.S. Northern Command, which is responsible for 

the homeland defense mission.

DOD is in the process of reviewing the military health care system’s ability 

to meet future medical readiness requirements, including an evaluation of 

medical infrastructure at various levels of operations from contingencies to 

full operational surges. DOD intends to include Department of Homeland 

Security policies in this review. According to DOD officials, the results of 

this ongoing assessment were not included in the medical group’s capacity 

analysis because the assessment is not expected to be completed until after 

the BRAC recommendations are finalized, following reviews by the BRAC 

Commission, the President, and Congress. Nevertheless, the medical group 

made a determination that the current medical force size3

 was adequate to 

meet the requirements of various war plans, and after reviewing the fiscal 

year 2006 program objective memorandum and the 20-year force structure 

plan, it decided to use the current force structure for its analysis. Further, 

the group concluded that deployment force sizing, a readiness issue, did 

not have direct influence on determining excess facility capacity. 

The medical group estimates that its recommendations, if adopted, would 

result in a 12 percent reduction in excess inpatient medical capacity and an 

approximately 7.4 million square feet net reduction in overall facility space.

2

 Medical care under TRICARE is provided by DOD personnel in military treatment facilities 

or through civilian providers in civilian facilities. During the 1990s, DOD restructured its 

health care system into TRICARE to improve beneficiaries’ access to health care while 

maintaining quality and controlling costs.

3

 The DOD health care system included about 163,000 medical personnel worldwide in fiscal 

year 2004, some of whom are active duty military personnel assigned to deployable units 

that may rotate back to military treatment facilities.
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 197 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Military Value Analysis The medical group’s assessment of military value, like its excess capacity 

assessment, focused on the same three functional areas: (1) health care 

services; (2) health care education and training; and (3) medical and dental 

research, development, and acquisition.

The military value analysis helped to establish the basis for realigning 

medical functions across the various installations or closing specific 

activities within the medical infrastructure. It also helped to gauge the 

impact of the group’s proposed scenarios on the overall DOD health care 

system. The military value methodology for this BRAC round was similar, 

in many respects, to the one used in the 1995 round, especially for medical 

functions. For example, both rounds identified affected populations and 

local civilian providers within catchment areas.4

 In both rounds, military 

value played a predominant role in formulating recommendations. 

Moreover, during the 2005 round, the medical group considered the impact 

on local beneficiaries, such as military retirees, from downsizing or 

eliminating medical facilities, which included input from a DOD-chartered 

military health benefit working group.5

 This working group included 

independent members who represented TRICARE regions throughout the 

United States. 

The medical group’s functional military value analysis assessed the relative 

capabilities of various activities and facilities supporting the military health 

care system’s mission and operational needs. Its military value analysis was 

directly linked to the four military value criteria required by the BRAC 

legislation. For example, the military value analysis gave greater weight to 

services supporting active duty members in order to emphasize force 

readiness. Table 34 shows the relative weights that the group developed for 

each of the four selection criteria that relate to military value.

4

 Catchment areas are geographic areas determined by the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Health Affairs that are defined by five-digit zip codes, usually within an approximate 

40-mile radius of military treatment facilities with inpatient care.

5

 The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136, Section 726 

[Nov. 24, 2003]) required the Secretary of Defense to consult with the working group in 

developing recommendations in the 2005 BRAC round. The working group is expected to 

provide a plan to the Secretary of Defense in order to provide health care services to 

persons who are entitled to and are receiving health care and whose accessibility to it will 

be affected by 2005 BRAC actions. 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 198 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 34: Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and Medical Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

In developing its analysis in accordance with the criteria above, the group 

developed specific functional area attributes, metrics, and data call 

questions to assist in assessing military value. Figure 17 provides an 

example of such analysis for the health care services functional area and its 

linkage to the BRAC legislation.

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

Health care

services

weight 

Health care

education

and training

weight

Medical and

dental research,

development,

and acquisition

weight

1. The current and future mission 

capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of 

the Department of Defense, including the 

impact on joint warfighting, training, and 

readiness.

45 45 55

2. The availability and condition of land, 

facilities, and associated airspace 

(including training areas suitable for 

maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces 

throughout a diversity of climate and 

terrain areas and staging areas for the 

use of the Armed Forces in homeland 

defense missions) at both existing and 

potential receiving locations.

25 20 5

3. The ability to accommodate 

contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at both 

existing and potential receiving locations 

to support operations and training.

10 25 23

4. The cost of operations and the 

manpower implications.

20 10 17

Total 100 100 100
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 199 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 17: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Health Care Services

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The medical group used a total of six 

military value attributes in its health care services functional area analysis.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The medical group used a total of 16 military 

value metrics in its military value analysis of health care services functions.

d

The medical group used a total of 24 data call questions in its health care services military value 

analysis.

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Roles in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and the service audit agencies played 

important roles in ensuring that the data used in the medical group’s 

analyses were certified and properly supported. The involvement of these 

audit groups included validation of data submitted by the military services, 

compliance with data certification requirements, the integrity of the 

group’s databases, accuracy of the analytical process in terms of 

calculations, and the adequacy of supporting documentation. These audit 

groups conducted extensive audits of the data collected from the military 

installations, and in some instances data discrepancies were identified for 

follow-on corrective actions. While the process for detecting and 

correcting data errors was quite lengthy, the DOD Inspector General and 

audit agencies determined that the medical-related data were sufficiently 

reliable for use in the BRAC process. 

1) Current and future mission

 capabilities. 

Contingency

beds 

Facilities

Cost efficiency

Demand

Military value 

criteriaa

Military value 

attributesb

Sample data call 

questionsd

Population—active duty, dependents, 

and other beneficiaries—eligible to 

receive medical care from the military 

health system.

Age and condition of medical treatment 

facilities.

Hospital potential capabilities for 

providing inpatient care to casualties.

Total costs for inpatient and outpatient 

services. 

2) Availability and condition of 

 land, facilities, and airspace.

Military value 

metricsc

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total force 

 requirements.

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

Eligible

population

Enrolled

population

Physical capacity

and condition

Operational/

mission

responsiveness

Inpatient and 

outpatient costs

Source: GAO analysis of Medical Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 200 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The medical group’s study objectives, military judgment, and capacity and 

military value analyses helped to identify closure and realignment 

scenarios for consideration. Identification and evaluation of scenarios was 

also facilitated by use of an optimization model to identify 

recommendations that could aid in optimizing medical health care 

workloads and infrastructure.6

 The group also developed scenarios that 

included establishing a minimum level of average daily patient workload 

for inpatient facilities and by reducing excess capacity in multiservice 

markets to achieve efficiencies.7

 It also used the Cost of Base Realignment 

Actions (COBRA) model to estimate the potential net costs or savings for 

its scenario proposals. The group also considered the scenarios’ impact on 

the local economy, the DOD medical beneficiary population and graduate 

medical education requirements, and the environment.

The medical group submitted 22 recommendations to the IEC, which 

disapproved one of the recommendations—the proposal to close the 

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences at Bethesda, 

Maryland. This matter is discussed further in the next section of this 

appendix. Further, another recommendation was integrated with a service 

realignment and closure action. The remaining 20 recommendations were 

combined into 6 recommendations that were ultimately approved by DOD.

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The group produced 6 recommendations which they reported will yield an 

estimated $2.7 billion in 20-year net present value savings and $412 million 

in net annual recurring savings. Table 35 below provides a summary of the 

financial aspects of the group’s recommendations. However, the group 

acknowledges that it incorrectly reported certain financial data for its 

recommendation involving the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Based on 

our analysis, the revised estimates are shown as a note to table 35.

6

 The medical group used a DOD-approved optimization model developed by the Navy. 

Depending on the assumptions used in the model and level of capacity reduction, the model 

provided a set of potential closure or realignment alternatives for further consideration by 

decision makers.

7

 Multiservice markets exist where two or more service military treatment facilities are colocated geographically with shared beneficiary populations. The medical group concluded 

that a substantial portion of total inpatient excess capacity was in multiservice markets.
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 201 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 35: Financial Aspects of the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

c

The medical group acknowledges inaccuracies in calculating its reported estimates. Our analysis 

indicates that the revised estimated net annual recurring savings are about $145 million, the payback 

year is 6 years, and the 20-year net present value savings is about $831 million. 

The payback period, or length of time for the savings to offset 

implementation costs for these recommendations, ranged from 

immediately to 10 years. Four of the six recommendations are expected to 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD 

report 

page

One-time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year 

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Close Brooks City-Base, San Antonio, TX, by 

relocating functions to Randolph Air Force Base, 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Lackland Air 

Force Base, Fort Sam Houston, and Aberdeen 

Proving Ground

Med-6 ($325.3) ($45.9) $102.1 2 $ 940.7

Realign various activities by converting inpatient 

services to clinics at Marine Corps Air Station 

Cherry Point, Fort Eustis, U.S. Air Force Academy, 

Andrews Air Force Base, MacDill Air Force Base, 

Keesler Air Force Base, Scott Air Force Base, 

Naval Station Great Lakes, and Fort Knox

Med-12 (12.9) 250.9 60.2 immediate 818.1

Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center at 

Fort Sam Houston, Brooke Army Medical Center; 

and realign basic and specialty enlisted medical 

training to Fort Sam Houston

Med-10 (1,040.9) (826.7) 129.0 10 476.2

Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center (all 

tertiary care to Bethesda National Naval Medical 

Center and primary and specialty care to Fort 

Belvoir)c

Med-4 (988.8) (724.2) 99.6 10 301.2

Realign McChord Air Force Base by relocating all 

medical functions to Fort Lewis

Med-9 (1.1) 55.1 11.6 immediate 164.4

Realign various activities to create joint centers of 

excellence for chemical, biological, and medical 

research, development, and acquisition (at Fort 

Sam Houston, Walter Reed Army Medical Center—

Forrest Glen Annex, Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, Fort Detrick, and Aberdeen Proving Ground)

Med-15 (73.9) (45.9) 9.2 7 46.0

Total ($2,442.9) ($1,336.7) $411.7 $2,746.6
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 202 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

result in nearly all of the expected savings—over 90 percent of the total 

estimated 20-year net present value savings of about $2.7 billion, and of the 

net annual recurring savings of about $411.7 million. Two of the six 

recommendations have high one-time upfront costs—about $2 billion, or 

over 80 percent of the total one-time costs for the six recommendations.

Two multiservice market area recommendations—the establishment of the 

San Antonio Regional Medical Center in Texas and realignment of the 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C.—are ultimately 

expected to (1) produce over 50 percent of the net annual recurring savings 

and (2) incur most of the up-front costs for the recommendations as a 

whole. The group’s primary motivation for these recommendations was to 

transform the existing medical infrastructure into premier modernized 

joint operational medical centers. In the case of the Walter Reed Medical 

Center recommendation, the group also justified the recommendation 

based on a shift in the beneficiary population from the northern tier of the 

Washington, D.C., area to the southern tier near Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Another recommendation with substantial estimated net annual recurring 

savings is the closure of the Brooks City-Base in Texas, which is projected 

to achieve efficiencies in research, development, and acquisition by 

relocating similar functions to a single location. However, as discussed 

below, a significant portion of the savings from this as well as other 

recommendations involve claimed military personnel savings, which are 

somewhat uncertain. The recommendation that involves the downsizing of 

inpatient facilities at nine locations is expected to achieve efficiencies and 

reduce personnel as well as provide enhanced training opportunities for 

medical personnel transferring to other locations. 

The medical group included within its recommendations various 

realignments that were described or partially justified as promoting 

jointness, such as those in the centers of excellence for chemical, 

biological, and medical research, development, and acquisition. Our review 

of the documentation showed that the supporting analysis was not always 

clear with respect to how these actions would result in jointness. For 

example, the group anticipated that jointness would emerge from 

recommendations that co-located but did not integrate research, 

development, and acquisition functions among services at an installation. It 

appears that they primarily will result in the co-locating of similar military 

services’ functional areas rather than creating integrated joint medical 

operations with joint management structures. However, according to a 

DOD official, the co-location of military services with similar functions on a 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 203 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

base will help foster jointness in the long term. Based on our analysis, it is 

not obvious whether some of these proposed realignments will truly result 

in joint military operations. 

Issues Identified with 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each of the 

medical group’s recommendations, particularly where operations proposed 

for consolidations or realignments extend across functional areas, 

geographical areas, or both. At the same time, we offer a number of broadbased observations about some of the proposed recommendations as they 

relate to military medical personnel savings, payback periods, jointness, 

and medical wartime requirements that may warrant further review by the 

BRAC Commission.

Military Medical Personnel 

Savings 

Our analysis shows that military personnel savings account for about $201 

million or nearly 50 percent of the group’s estimated net annual recurring 

savings. However, the amount of projected dollar savings is uncertain 

because the medical group indicated that reductions in end strength are not 

planned. Indirectly, some savings could occur based on the group’s 

expectation that medical personnel would be reassigned on an individual 

basis to specific and varied locations, depending on where the need exists 

for military medical specialists. In some cases, the group noted that these 

military personnel reassignments could displace civilian and/or contractor 

medical providers. When or to what extent these reallocations would occur 

has not yet been determined. At the time of the group’s analysis, these 

specific moves had not been identified and thus the group did not estimate 

costs related to such potential moves in its cost and savings analysis.

Bundling of 

Recommendations

Some of the earlier proposed recommendations with lengthy or no payback 

periods were integrated with ones having shorter paybacks, therefore 

concealing the amount of time it would take for the savings to offset costs. 

For example, the group developed a stand alone recommendation colocating initial enlisted medical education and training to Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas, which, by itself, had a payback period of 21 years. 

However, the group later bundled it with the recommendation establishing 

the San Antonio Regional Medical Center that downsized inpatient care at 

Lackland Air Force Base also in Texas and expanded medical facilities at 

nearby Fort Sam Houston. This recommendation had a payback period of 

11 years. When the two recommendations were combined, the payback 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 204 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

period was determined to be 10 years. The common linkage of the two 

recommendations is location, with the expectation that the enlisted medics 

will benefit from the location of the Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas, 

which has a trauma center suited for combat casualty training. Another 

example is the initial realignment of medical research, development, and 

acquisition functions at Brooks City-Base, which had no payback before 

DOD combined this recommendation with other related recommendations 

to close the base. 

Future Wartime Medical 

Requirements

DOD’s ongoing assessment of its future wartime medical requirements, as 

mentioned earlier, will not be completed until after BRAC decisions are 

finalized, following reviews by the BRAC Commission, the President, and 

Congress; therefore, this assessment was not included in the medical 

group’s analysis. Without having such requirements available during the 

BRAC process, it is difficult for DOD to identify the appropriate medical 

infrastructure changes that are needed or to determine the appropriate size 

of the military health care system. Also, the group recognized that medical 

operations are changing with casualties rapidly moved to medical facilities 

outside the theater of operations and that these changes may affect the 

future sizing of medical forces. 

Nevertheless, the group expressed belief that the current medical force size 

was adequate to meet the requirements of the various war plans despite the 

group’s recommendations that will reduce system-wide excess inpatient 

capacity by 622 beds. 

Use of Veterans’ Hospitals While the medical group examined the capacity and proximity of 

Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) hospitals to existing military medical 

facilities in its analysis, it did not coordinate with VA to determine whether 

military beneficiaries who normally receive care at military medical 

facilities could also receive care at VA hospitals in the vicinity. During the 

scenario development phase, the group intended to develop a 

recommendation for a partnership involving VA facilities, but group 

officials noted that the BRAC nondisclosure agreements and the need to 

negotiate costs under such a partnership made it difficult to seriously plan 

for VA involvement prior to the announcement of the recommendations. 

However, a DOD official told us that during the BRAC implementation 

phase, negotiations with VA at the local levels are possible regarding the 

potential use of its services for military beneficiaries in various locations, 

especially those locations where DOD intends to eliminate inpatient care in 
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 205 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

existing medical facilities.8 While the official told us that VA involvement 

had the potential for providing services and benefiting the department, 

another official added that the group’s analysis indicated that sufficient 

capacity exists, without VA support, within the private sector to 

accommodate military beneficiaries in those locations where inpatient care 

at the military facilities is being eliminated. However, we were unable to 

verify the results of this analysis because the group did not fully document 

its analysis. 

Closure of the Uniformed 

Services University of the 

Health Sciences Rejected by 

IEC

The medical group had initially developed a candidate recommendation to 

close DOD’s medical school, known as the Uniformed Services University 

of the Health Sciences, which is located on the grounds of the National 

Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland.9

 The group had concluded 

that it was more costly than alternative scholarship programs, and that the 

department could rely on civilian universities to educate military 

physicians. The group projected the closure will yield net annual recurring 

savings of about $58 million, and 20-year net present value savings of 

approximately $575 million. In a series of reports from 1995 through 2000, 

we also concluded at the time that the university was a more costly way to 

educate military physicians.10

However, late in the deliberative process, the IEC rejected this candidate 

recommendation citing education as a core competency for the department 

and therefore it was considered too risky to rely on the private sector to 

provide this function. A DOD official indicated that with the 

recommendation to realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda, 

Maryland, it would be highly desirable to have a military medical college 

8

One of the medical group’s recommendations includes disestablishing the inpatient mission 

at 9 military treatment facilities. A VA hospital was located near inpatient facilities at 

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; Fort Eustis, Virginia; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Keesler Air 

Force Base, Mississippi; MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois; 

and Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. 

9

The medical group developed this candidate recommendation with the knowledge of a 

specific provision of federal law (10 U.S.C. 2112a) that could preclude closure of the 

university.

10GAO, Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2001, 

GAO/OCG-00-8 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000); GAO, Budget Issues: Budgetary 

Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2000, GAO/OCG-99-26 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 16, 1999); and GAO, Military Physicians: DOD’s Medical School and Scholarship 

Program, GAO/HEHS-95-244 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1995).
Appendix X

Medical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations

Page 206 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

associated with this medical facility in order for it to be a world-class 

medical center. According to another official, DOD will need to make 

investments in the university in order to elevate its status and attract 

leading medical scholars who could make the university more competitive. 
Page 207 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations ApendxiXI

The Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group followed the common 

analytical framework established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) for reviewing the supply, storage, and distribution system within 

DOD. The group initially produced five recommendations that were 

presented to the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure 

Executive Council (IEC). Three of the five recommendations were merged 

into one recommendation by the IEC. If adopted, the three approved 

recommendations are projected to generate about $5.6 billion in estimated 

20-year net present value savings and $406 million in net annual recurring 

savings for the department with an immediate payback (i.e., time required 

to recoup up-front investment costs) on the cost of implementing these 

recommendations. While the number of recommendations is small, each 

encompasses multiple realignment actions of workloads affecting many 

locations. Our analysis shows that the anticipated savings would result 

primarily from business process reengineering—expanded use of 

performance-based logistics1

—, infrastructure and inventory reductions, 

and reduced civilian personnel costs. We identified a number of issues 

associated with several recommendations that may warrant additional 

attention by the BRAC Commission. The group encountered some 

challenges in obtaining accurate and consistent certified data, but the DOD 

Inspector General and the military service audit agencies, which performed 

audits of the data, ultimately concluded that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for use during the BRAC process.

Organization and 

Focus

The supply and storage group consisted of six senior-level principal 

members from the logistics directorates for each service, the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was supported by 

staff from these organizations.2

 The Director, DLA, chaired the group, 

following the retirement of the original chairman from the Joint Staff. The 

group’s overarching goal was to identify potential closures, realignments, 

or both that would enhance economies and efficiencies in operations as 

traditional military forces and logistics processes become more joint and 

increasingly take on expeditionary characteristics.

1

 Performance-based logistics is defined as the purchase of weapon system sustainment as 

part of an affordable integrated weapon system package based on output measures, such as 

weapon system availability, rather than input measures, such as parts and technical 

services.

2

 At OSD, the ISG and the IEC provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide 

process.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 208 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Framework for 

Analysis

The group organized its BRAC efforts around the three core logistics 

functions of supply, storage, and distribution. These functions are inherent 

in the military services’ operations as well as for DLA, whose mission is to 

provide wholesale-level support in these functions for the services in 

common supply classes. In collecting and analyzing data to formulate its 

recommendations, the group sought to assess the supply and storage 

infrastructure in the following four distinct activity areas: (1) military 

service and DLA inventory control points (2) defense distribution depots, 

(3) defense reutilization and marketing offices and (4) other activities such 

as installation-level supply operations. As with other military services and 

joint cross-service groups, capacity and military value analyses served as 

starting points for the group’s analyses. While the group initially tried to 

analyze both the wholesale3

 and retail supply and storage activities, it later 

terminated most retail-level efforts because of difficulties in collecting 

reliable data and a desire by the group’s principals to not impact the retail 

support to operational and other deploying units. The DOD Inspector 

General and service audit agencies performed an important role in ensuring 

the accuracy of data used in these analyses through extensive audits of 

data gathered at various locations. 

Capacity Analysis To form the basis for its analysis, the group developed metrics in each of 

the functional areas (supply, storage, and distribution) to measure capacity 

and subsequently sought to collect certified data linked to these metrics 

from various defense activities whose missions resided within these 

functional categories. The group developed 14 separate reporting metrics 

within these categories that included, for example, special indoor storage 

space and technical labor work hours, and measured excess capacity under 

normal demand as well as under surge conditions of 10 and 20 percent. 

Because of its general inability to collect reliable retail-level data and a 

desire not to impact operational support to deploying units whose support 

comes from the retail area, the group dropped this area, with one

3

 DOD maintains supply within a two-tiered system typically referred to as the wholesale 

and retail levels. Wholesale generally includes activities that procure, hold, and manage 

materiel not specific to individual operating units, and is also referred to as “above 

installation activities.” Retail refers to activities that support organizational level needs for 

supplies and materiel and is also referred to as “installation and below activities.”
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 209 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

exception,4 from further consideration in the succeeding analyses leading 

to recommended actions. 

The group’s capacity analysis showed that excess capacity5

 exists, even 

when surge factors were considered, within three of the four supply and 

storage activity areas it examined. As shown in table 36, the excesses 

ranged from 20 percent to 75 percent under normal demand conditions 

across various capacity metrics in the functional areas, with the excesses 

somewhat less under surge conditions. 

Table 36: Excess Capacity Identified by the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group

Source: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group.

a FTEs are full-time equivalents and are used as measures of work hours performed. One FTE is 

equivalent to 2,080 hours of work per year. 

4

 Limited retail-level data were collected with the cooperation of the Industrial Joint CrossService Group to support one recommendation that contained some service retail supply 

consolidations with DLA wholesale supply activities.

5

 The group defined excess capacity as the difference between current capacity and current 

usage. Under increased surge conditions, excess capacity will be reduced.

Percentage of excess capacity

Functional/activity 

category Capacity metric Normal demand 10 percent surge 20 percent surge

Supply/inventory control 

points

Purchasing labor (FTE)a 29 22 14

Supply labor (FTE) 35 29 22

Technical labor (FTE) 75 72 69

Work space (square feet) 47 42 37

Storage and distribution/

defense distribution 

depots

Regular covered storage (cubic feet) 32 25 19

Special covered storage (cubic feet) 37 31 24

Open storage (square feet) 43 38 32

Distribution capacity (number of loading 

bays)

39 33 27

Supply and storage/

defense reutilization and 

marketing offices 

Wage grade labor (FTE) 46 40 35

Supply labor (FTE) 40 34 28

Work space (square feet) 53 48 44

Regular covered storage (cubic feet) 57 52 48

Special covered storage (cubic feet) 20 12 4

Open storage (square feet) 58 54 50
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 210 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

According to the group’s staff, its recommendation regarding restructuring 

of defense distribution depots, if approved and implemented, is expected to 

reduce current covered storage of about 51 million square feet (both 

regular and special) by over 50 percent, or about 27 million square feet. In 

addition, the recommendation regarding inventory control points is 

expected to increase infrastructure by about 4,700 square feet because the 

inventory control points would be absorbing more space than they would 

be vacating. The group has no recommendations that would affect the 

capacity of DLA’s defense marketing and reutilization offices.

Military Value Analysis The supply and storage group’s assessment of military value, like its excess 

capacity assessment, focused on the same three core logistics functions of 

supply, storage, and distribution. By linking its military analysis directly to 

OSD’s four military selection criteria required by the BRAC legislation, the 

group established a sound basis for developing its recommendations. As 

shown in table 37, the group developed a weighting system for the military 

value criteria with the first and third criteria having relatively larger 

weights, or importance, than the remaining two criteria. 

Table 37: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria 

Weights

Source: DOD and Supply and Storage Joint-Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, 

including impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

35

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace in (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and 

staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense 

missions in) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 

20

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 

future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving 

locations to support operations and training.

35

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 10

Total 100
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 211 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

As with the capacity analysis, the group’s assessment of military value 

included development of attributes and metrics in each of the core 

functional areas to measure military value, and it subsequently sought to 

collect certified data linked to these metrics from various defense activities 

whose missions resided within these categories. The group developed 55 

individual metrics within the three functional areas, addressing 

information such as the percentage of demand for stocked items and cost 

of operations per person. The attributes and metrics were linked back to 

the military value selection criteria, as illustrated in figure 18. 

Figure 18: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of Supply and Storage Activities

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. Four of 28 military value attributes used 

by the group.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. Four of 55 military value metrics used by the 

group.

d

Four of 55 military value data call questions used by the group. Many of these questions have multiple 

parts.

Using certified data collected during the BRAC process and applying the 

weighting system, the group developed military value scores and rankings 

for 16 inventory control points, 19 defense distribution depots, and 67 

defense reutilization and marketing offices. As with the capacity analysis, 

the group was generally unable to develop sufficient reliable data at the 

Military value 

criteriaa

Military value 

attributesb

Military 

value metricsc

Sample data call 

questionsd

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and airspace.

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization, 

 surge, and future total force 

 requirements.

4) Cost of operations 

 and manpower implications.

Total number of retrievals from 

automated system.

List the name and number of all 

distribution nodes for each 

transportation mode within a 50 mile 

radius of the supply and storage facility.

Provide the activities annual cost of 

operations and the number of 

personnel assigned.

Effective 

requirements 

determination 

process

Percent of 

demand received

for stocked items

Number of 

retrievals from 

automated system

Automated 

materiel retrieval 

systems

Distribution 

flexibility

Cost of 

operations

Density of multiple 

distribution nodes

Cost of operations 

per person

Total number of customer orders and 

total number received for stocked 

items.

Source: GAO analysis of Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 212 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

retail level to complete a military value analysis at that level. In many 

respects, the military value methodology for this round was comparable to 

that used in the 1995 BRAC round, particularly for DLA activities. In both 

BRAC rounds, the military value ranking of an activity played a 

predominant role in formulating recommendations. 

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Roles in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and the service audit agencies played 

important roles in helping to ensure that the data used in the group’s data 

analyses were certified and properly supported and that decision-making 

models (e.g., military value and optimization) were logically designed and 

operating as intended. Through extensive audits of the data collected from 

field activities during the process, these audit agencies notified the group 

when they identified data discrepancies for follow-on corrective action. 

While the process for detecting and correcting data errors was quite 

lengthy and challenging, the audit agencies ultimately deemed the supply 

and storage-related data to be sufficiently reliable for use in the BRAC 

process. 

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group did not have accurate 

and complete capacity and military value data when it initially started 

developing potential closure and realignment scenarios and, therefore, had 

to rely on incomplete data, as well as military judgment based on the 

group’s collective knowledge of the supply and storage area, to formulate 

its initial closure and realignment scenarios for evaluation. Although the 

data improved as additional information was requested and received from 

field locations, the lack of useable data initially limited the use of an 

optimization model to help identify and analyze scenarios. As time 

progressed, however, the group obtained the needed data, for the most 

part, to inform and support its scenarios. The DOD Inspector General 

validated the data. The group also focused on a number of OSD supplied 

transformational options, as outlined below, to guide its efforts in the 

recommendation development process: 

• Establishing a consolidated multi-service supply, storage, and 

distribution system focused on creating joint activities in areas with 

heavy DOD concentration.

• Privatizing the wholesale storage and distribution processes.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 213 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• Migrating oversight and management of all service depot-level 

reparables to a single DOD agency/activity.6

• Establishing a single inventory control point within each service or 

consolidate into a joint activity. 

• Examining the effect of reducing functions by 20, 30, and 40 percent 

from the existing baseline, or reducing excess capacity by an additional 

5 percent beyond the analyzed excess capacity.

The group developed a total of 51 scenarios based on these 

transformational options. With the maturation of the data and the 

application of the COBRA model to estimate costs and savings, along with 

military judgment, the group was able to narrow its proposals to five 

candidate recommendations that were forwarded to the ISG and ultimately 

approved by the IEC. Further integration of three of these 

recommendations into a single recommendation left the group with three 

approved recommendations. 

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The group’s recommendations are projected to produce substantial 

savings—about $406 million in estimated net annual recurring savings and 

about $5.6 billion in estimated net present value savings for DOD over the 

next 20 years. All are realignment actions, even though one of the 

recommended actions will close two defense distribution depots at 

Columbus, Ohio, and Texarkana, Texas and another one will close four 

inventory control points at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey; Rock Island, Illinois; and Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, while, at 

the same time, opening a new one at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 

The group’s recommendations also helped facilitate the closures of Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey, and Red River Army Depot, Texas, both of which 

are reported in the Army’s BRAC report. Table 38 provides a summary of 

the financial aspects of the group’s three DOD-approved recommendations. 

6

 Depot level reparables are supply items that are designed to be repaired at the depot level.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 214 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 38: Financial Aspects of the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

This represents net cost or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

Most of the projected net annual recurring savings—about $291 million or 

nearly 72 percent of the total—are expected to result from business 

process reengineering improvements in the form of expanded use of 

performance-based logistics and reductions to duplicate inventory. Most of 

the remaining net annual savings are expected to materialize from 

reductions to infrastructure costs at the wholesale supply and storage level 

(about $100 million annually) and from reductions in civilian personnel 

costs (about $68 million annually), with adjustments of about $54 million in 

annual recurring costs to reflect additional contract support costs. Further, 

the recommendations are expected to have immediate paybacks with 

relatively low up-front costs and savings over the 6-year implementation 

period. We believe that implementation of these recommendations could 

result in more efficient operations within DOD, and we consider the 

recommendation involving DLA management of the inventory control 

points and depot-level reparables to be transformational because it 

advances DOD’s goal of having one DOD activity manage these activities, 

although, as discussed later, the full magnitude of savings likely to be 

realized is somewhat uncertain.

The recommendation regarding the realignment of supply, storage, and 

distribution management creates four support regions across the country. 

Each region will have one strategic distribution site that will supply the 

region and multiple forward distribution points that will solely support 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommendations

DOD report 

page

One time

(costs)

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Realign supply, storage, and 

distribution management 

S&S-13 ($192.7) $1,047.3 $203.2 immediate $2,925.8

Realign inventory control points and 

consolidate depot-level reparable 

procurement management 

S&S-7 (127.0) 369.8 159.3 immediate 1,889.6

Realign management of select 

commodities

S&S-5 (6.4) 333.7 43.8 immediate $735.9

Total ($326.1) $1,750.8 $406.3 $5,551.3
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 215 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

industrial customers, such as maintenance depots, shipyards, and air 

logistics centers. The strategic distribution sites are located at 

Susquehanna, Pennsylvania; Warner Robins, Georgia; Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma; and San Joaquin, California. It is also designed to realign service 

retail supply and storage functions along with personnel and infrastructure 

for these industrial customers in an “in-place, no-cost transfer” to DLA. 

This recommendation supports the closures of the defense distribution 

depots at Columbus, Ohio, and Texarkana, Texas, and realigns each of the 

remaining 17 defense distribution depots. 

The recommendation regarding the realignment of the inventory control 

points transfers certain inventory control point functions, such as 

contracting, budgeting and inventory management, to DLA and allows 

further consolidation of service and DLA inventory control points by the 

supply chains they manage.7

 In addition, it supports the movement of the 

management of essentially all service consumable items8

 and the 

procurement management and related support functions for the 

procurement of essentially all depot level reparables from the military 

services to DLA. This recommendation realigns all 16 of the current DLA 

and service inventory control points and closes 4 through consolidation—

Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Rock Island, Illinois; 

and Lackland Air Force Base, Texas—while opening a new inventory 

control point at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The recommendation 

also supports the Army’s closure of Fort Monmouth by moving supply and 

storage functions to other locations. 

The recommendation regarding the realignment of commodity 

management disestablishes the wholesale supply, storage, and distribution 

functions within the department for all tires; packaged petroleum, oils, and 

lubricants; and compressed gases used by DOD. As a result, these 

commodities will be supplied directly by private industry, which will free 

up space and personnel used to manage these items. It realigns all of the 

remaining defense distribution depots by disestablishing all storage and 

distribution for the commodities.

7

 The Defense Supply Center Columbus Ohio, manages the maritime and land supply chain. 

The Defense Supply Center Richmond Virginia, manages the aviation supply chain, and the 

Defense Supply Center Philadelphia Pennsylvania, manages the troop support supply chain. 

8

 Consumable items are either not repairable or not economically repairable.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 216 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations 

Although time did not permit us to fully assess the operational impact of 

each recommendation, particularly where operations proposed 

consolidation across multiple and varied locations, available information 

suggests these recommendations have the potential for more efficient 

operations within DOD. At the same time, there are some issues we 

identified that we believe the BRAC Commission may wish to consider 

during its review process because of potentially overstated savings 

estimates. In this regard, the supply and storage group claimed savings for 

future cost avoidances for sustainment and facilities’ recapitalization 

related to the facilities’ space that is expected to be vacated under the 

recommended actions. However, as discussed below, it is uncertain 

whether these savings will actually materialize if these facilities are not 

closed and remain open—even with reduced usage of the space.

Additionally, the group did not develop recommendations for several areas 

within the scope of its responsibility that may have further contributed to 

the accomplishment of DOD’s BRAC objectives, such as additional 

consolidations in DLA and service inventory control points.

Estimated Savings Related 

to Business Process 

Improvements Are 

Uncertain

The largest portion of the supply and storage group’s savings—about 

$291 million out of total net annual recurring savings of $406 million—

comes from business process reengineering improvements in the form of 

expanded use of performance-based logistics and reductions to duplicate 

inventory. According to supply and storage staff, these savings accrue from 

reduced contract prices because DLA will have increased buying power 

since it is responsible for purchasing many more items that had been 

purchased by each of the services. In addition, savings accrue from 

increased use of performance-based agreements,9

 a key component of 

performance-based logistics. The group estimates DLA can save 2.8 cents 

on each contract dollar placed on performance-based agreements. In 

addition, savings come from reductions in the amount of stock that must be 

held in inventory. Supply and storage staff said that the savings component 

for the cost to hold this inventory has three parts: (1) cost of money, 

(2) cost of stock losses due to obsolescence, and (3) cost of storage. The 

group estimates that together these three factors save about 17 percent of 

the estimated value of the acquisition cost of the stock that is no longer 

9

 Performance-based agreements are the negotiated agreements between the major 

stakeholders that formally document the performance and support expectations and 

resources to achieve the desired outcome.
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 217 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

required to be held in inventory. Although the group had some supporting 

documentation for its assumptions, time did not allow us to fully evaluate 

the documentation. Nevertheless, the full magnitude of savings likely to be 

realized will depend on how well the actions, if approved, are implemented 

in line with the assumptions made.

Estimated Savings Related 

to Vacated Facility Space 

May Be Overstated

All of the supply and storage group’s recommendations taken together 

show significant projected savings from expected reductions to excess or 

unnecessary infrastructure. According to the group’s estimates, it is 

claiming BRAC savings on about 27 million square feet of vacated space—

an estimated savings of about $100 million annually or about 25 percent of 

the group’s total net annual recurring savings. In developing its costs and 

savings estimates, the group assumed that all of the excess infrastructure 

that was made possible by the recommendations would generate BRAC 

savings because it was further assumed that the infrastructure would no 

longer be used and therefore would not require sustainment and 

recapitalization funding. However, we believe these assumptions are not 

necessarily valid because it is not clear that the freed-up infrastructure will 

be eliminated and could potentially be occupied by other users following 

the BRAC process. At present the group does not have plans for this space. 

Under the BRAC process, if these vacated facilities or portions thereof are 

reoccupied by other defense organizations, there is a corresponding cost 

for this reoccupation. Likewise, additional BRAC costs are required for 

facilities that remain empty to minimally maintain them, and costs are 

incurred if buildings are demolished. Supply and storage officials told us 

they were aware of this issue and said that their goal is to vacate as much 

space as possible by re-warehousing inventory and by reducing personnel 

spaces, but they do not have a specific plan for what will happen to the 

space once it is vacated. In addition, until these recommendations are 

ultimately approved and implemented, it will not be known exactly how 

much space is available or how this space will be disposed of or utilized. As 

a result, it is unclear as to how much of the estimated $100 million net 

annual recurring savings will actually occur. 

Potential for Additional 

Savings Exists

The recommendation that was approved by the IEC to consolidate some 

service inventory control point functions within DLA will move about 1,345 

of the services’ staff performing inventory control point functions to DLA 

and is estimated by the supply and storage group to save about $1.9 billion 

over the next 20 years. However, the group also analyzed a scenario that 

would have moved more inventory control point functions and more than 
Appendix XI

Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service 

Group Selection Process and 

Recommendations

Page 218 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

6,500 service staff to DLA and was estimated by the group to save 

$2.9 billion over the same 20-year period. The latter scenario would leave 

nearly 3,900 service technical and engineering support personnel of the 

more than 10,300 service staff at existing service inventory control points. 

Senior-level principal members of the supply and storage group consider 

the technical and engineering support personnel positions to be more 

closely related to weapon system readiness and support to the warfighter 

than other inventory control point functions, such as contracting, 

budgeting, and inventory management, which are being transferred to DLA. 

These officials were not willing to suggest transferring the technical 

positions to DLA because of the perceived additional risk involved of not 

being able to supply the critical parts to the warfighter when needed. 

Therefore, they approved the recommendation that generated less savings, 

but also less risk to weapon system readiness and moved fewer inventory 

control point functions and fewer service staff to DLA. The Commission 

may wish to further examine the potential for greater savings regarding the 

transfer of more inventory control point functions versus the potential risk 

of not being able to supply critical parts when needed.

The group also did not pursue the development of recommendations 

regarding the defense reutilization and marketing office activities, even 

though considerable excess capacity exists, as shown in table 36, in that 

area. Group officials told us that these activities, which are managed by 

DLA, are considered follower organizations10 that are currently undergoing 

an extensive A-7611 initiative outside the BRAC process that is expected to 

either close or consolidate several activities and reduce staff levels at 

others. DLA data indicate that 61 of the 67 reutilization and marketing 

office activities analyzed by the supply and storage group are involved in 

the effort and that the agency expects to save about $36 million through 

2011 with the A-76 effort.

10 Follower organizations exist only because there is a larger organization that they serve at 

their locations.

11 A-76 is competitive sourcing where the federal government determines whether functions 

described as “commercial in nature” are best provided by the private sector, by government 

personnel, or by another agency through a fee-for-service agreement.
Page 219 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Selection 

Process and Recommendations ApendxiXI

The Technical Joint Cross-Service Group followed the common analytical 

framework established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 

reviewing its functions and facilities. The group included in its report 13 

recommendations that it projects would generate about $2.2 billion in 20-

year net present value savings for DOD. These 13 recommendations 

incorporate a total of 6 closures, 62 realignments, and 1 disestablishment 

action. Additionally, the technical group transferred parts of nine 

recommendations to other joint cross-service groups or military services, 

which combined with other actions resulting in three additional closures.1

The majority of the projected annual recurring savings result from 

eliminating civilian and contractor personnel and vacating leased space. 

The recommendations have payback periods—the time required for 

savings to offset closure and realignment costs—ranging from 1 to 26 

years. Limited progress was made to foster greater jointness and 

transformation. The DOD Inspector General and the military service audit 

agencies, which performed audits of the data used in the process, 

concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for use during the BRAC 

process. While available data supporting the recommendations suggest 

their implementation should provide for more efficient operations within 

the department, we believe there are some issues that the BRAC 

Commission may wish to examine more closely during its review process.

Organization and 

Focus

The technical group was chaired by the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering; it consisted of senior members from each military department 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2

 The group created five subgroups to evaluate 

the technical facilities: (1) Command, Control, Communications, and 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); 

(2) Air, Land, Sea, and Space Systems; (3) Weapons and Armaments; 

(4) Innovative Systems; and (5) Enabling Technologies. In addition, the 

group also created a Capabilities Integration Team and an Analytical Team 

to support the efforts of the subgroups. 

1

 These additional closures are Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which is included in the Army 

section of DOD’s report; Naval Support Activity Corona, California, which is included in the 

Navy section; and Brooks City-Base, Texas, which is included in the Medical Joint CrossService Group section.

2

 At OSD, the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) and the Infrastructure Executive Council 

(IEC) provided overall coordination and direction to the DOD-wide process.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 220 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Framework for 

Analysis

The technical group established two principles to guide its analysis and 

recommendation development: (1) provide efficiency of operations by 

consolidating technical facilities to enhance synergy and reduce excess 

capacity and (2) maintain competition of ideas by retaining at least two 

geographically separated sites. The group analyzed three functional areas 

within DOD: research, development and acquisition, and test and 

evaluation.3

 It focused its analysis of the 3 functions across 13 technical 

capability areas—air platforms; battlespace environments; biomedical; 

chemical and biological defense; ground vehicles; human systems; 

information systems; materials and processes; nuclear technology; sea 

vehicles; sensors, electronics, and electronic warfare; space platforms; and 

weapons and armaments.4

 Each of the military services and some defense 

agencies perform work in the functions and technical capability areas. The 

group developed a strategic framework based on its two principles that 

focused on establishing multifunctional and multidisciplinary centers of 

excellence,5

 which served as the starting point for developing scenarios. 

These strategy-driven scenarios were later confirmed by capacity and 

military value data and military judgment. The DOD Inspector General and 

service audit agencies performed an important role in ensuring the 

accuracy of data used in these analyses through extensive audits of data 

gathered at various locations.

Capacity Analysis The technical group’s analysis of DOD’s technical infrastructure across 

each of the 3 functions and 13 technical capability areas resulted in a total 

of 39 “technical facility categories” around which the group focused its 

analysis.6

 The group used two capacity measures—work years, as 

quantified by the number of full-time staff, and the number of test hours—

3

 Test ranges were in the technical group’s domain; open-air ranges were analyzed by the 

Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group with input from the technical group.

4

 The 13 technical capability areas are based on the Defense Technology Area Plan 2003, 

which lists 12 areas; however the technical group separated ground vehicles and sea 

vehicles into two technical capability areas for subgroup review and analysis.

5

 Multifunctional refers to combining activities across the three functions of research, 

development and acquisition, and test and evaluation. Multidisciplinary refers to combining 

activities across 1 or more of the 13 technical capability areas.

6

 The group defined a technical facility category as a collection of people and physical 

infrastructure that performs a technical function (or functions) in a specific technical 

capability area at a specific location. 
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 221 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

and subsequently collected certified data on these measures from the 

technical facilities performing work in each of the technical facility 

categories. Excess capacity was defined as the difference between current 

usage plus a surge factor and peak capacity. Current usage was defined as 

the average usage for fiscal years 2001 through 2003, and peak capacity was 

defined as the maximum capacity for the measure. The group set the surge 

factor at 10 percent of current capacity, based on military judgment of how 

the technical community has approached surge in the past.

The group calculated excess capacity for each of the 39 technical facility 

categories; however, the aggregated data provide more insight into the 

amount of excess capacity. Table 39 shows the excess capacity that the 

technical group found through its analysis.

Table 39: Excess Capacity Identified by the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Source: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group. 

The group reported that the current required capacity, including surge, 

across all technical capability areas and functions is 169,596 work years. 

The group found the equivalent of 13,368 work years, or 7.9 percent, excess 

capacity across the three functions. The group reports that its 

recommendations eliminate approximately 3,000 work years. Based on 

these calculations, approximately 6 percent excess capacity would remain 

if all of the group’s recommended actions are implemented. The work year 

reductions include the reductions made through the technical group’s 13 

recommendations. The work year reductions do not include reductions in 

technical excess capacity through the closure of Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey, and Brooks City-Base, Texas, for example, which are included in the 

Army and Medical Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations, 

respectively.

Figures in work years

Function

Peak

capacity

Current usage

plus surge

Excess

capacity

Percentage

of excess

capacity

Research 31,168 28,069 3,099 11.0

Development and 

acquisition

106,944 101,208 5,736 5.7

Test and evaluation 44,852 40,319 4,533 11.2

Total 182,964 169,596 13,368 7.9
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 222 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Military Value Analysis As with capacity analysis, the technical group’s assessment of military 

value included an assessment of the technical infrastructure across the 39 

technical facility categories. The group weighted each of the four military 

value criteria based on the importance of the criterion to the technical 

function. The group used the same weights for the research and 

development and acquisition functions, but different weights for the test 

and evaluation function due to differences in the type of work conducted at 

these facilities. Table 40 shows the weights for the three functions. 

Table 40: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group Military Value Criteria Weights 

Source: DOD and the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group.

Note: The system of weights provided a basis for assigning relative value to data collected and 

tabulated across each military value dimension.

The group developed attributes and metrics across each of the four military 

value criteria to measure military value and subsequently collected 

certified data for these capacity measures from the technical facilities 

performing work in each of the technical facility categories. The group 

examined the capabilities of each technical facility based on five attributes:

Figures in percentages

Military value criteria 

Research,

development

and acquisition

Test and

evaluation

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the 

impact on operational readiness of the total force of the 

Department of Defense, including impact on joint 

warfighting, training, and readiness.

53 53

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and 

associated airspace (including training areas suitable for 

maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a 

diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas 

for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense 

missions) at both existing and potential receiving 

locations.

12 18

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, 

mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements 

at both existing and potential receiving locations to 

support operations and training.

25 19

4. The cost of operations and the manpower 

implications. 

10 10

Total 100 100
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 223 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• people, which measures intellectual capital; 

• physical environment, which measures special features of technical 

facilities;

• physical structures and equipment, which measure the presence of 

physical structures unique within DOD and the value, condition, and use 

of these structures; 

• operational impact, which measures the output of the three functional 

areas (research, development and acquisition, and test and evaluation); 

and

• synergy, which measures working on multiple technical capability areas 

and functions and jointness.

The technical group developed weights for the 5 attributes that were 

applied to each of the criteria and 30 metrics divided among the 5 

attributes. While the group allowed the evaluative weights for the metrics 

to vary across its subgroups, it used the same weights for the five 

attributes. The evaluative weight assigned to attributes varied among the 

three functions because a particular attribute could have greater 

importance for one function than another. For example, the technical 

group weighted the people attribute for criterion 1 at 17 percent of the total 

military value score for research, 13 percent for development and 

acquisition, and 16 percent for test and evaluation. While the attribute 

weights were the same for activities across subgroups, the metric weights 

varied by subgroup. For example, the Air, Land, Sea, and Space Systems 

subgroup weighted the patents, publications, and awards metric of 

criterion 1 for the research function at 30 percent of the total for the people 

attribute, while the Weapons and Armaments subgroup weighted the same 

metric at 18 percent.

Figure 19 provides an example of the technical group’s military value 

attributes, metrics, data sources, and their link to the four BRAC military 

value criteria.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 224 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Figure 19: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value of a Technical Facility

a

The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria.

b

Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The technical group used a total of five 

military value attributes.

c

Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The technical group used a total of 30 military 

value metrics.

d

The technical group used a total of 44 data call questions.

All technical facilities were analyzed using the technical group’s military 

value approach, regardless of whether the recommendation ended up with 

the technical group’s 13 recommendations or in another services’ or joint 

cross-service groups’ recommendations. For example, part of the Army’s 

recommendation to close Fort Monmouth relocates the information 

systems research and development and acquisition to Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Maryland. The technical group followed the same process in 

gathering data and calculating a military value score for these functions as 

they did all other technical functions.

DOD Inspector General’s 

and Service Audit Agencies’ 

Role in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and the service audit agencies played 

important roles in ensuring that the data used in the technical group’s data 

analyses were certified. To determine the validity of the group’s data, the 

DOD Inspector General examined (1) whether the group used certified data 

and created an adequate audit trail for capacity and military value analyses 

and (2) whether the group created an adequate audit trail for inputting data 

into the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model. The DOD 

People

Military value 

criteriaa

Military value 

metricsc

Military value 

attributesb

Highest education level for 

professional/technical workforce. 

Number and funding for other services’ 

programs executed at the facility. 

Education

Sample data call 

questionsd

Synergy Jointness

2) Availability and 

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and airspace. 

3) Ability to accommodate 

 contingency, mobilization,

 surge, and future total

 force requirements.

4) Cost of operations and 

 manpower implications.

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities.

Source: GAO analysis of Technical Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 225 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Inspector General found that certified data were used for the group’s 

capacity and military value analyses, and there was an adequate audit trail 

for the capacity and military value analyses, and COBRA input data. 

Through extensive audits of the data collected from technical facilities 

during the process, the service audit agencies notified the technical facility 

of identified data discrepancies and the technical facility was to take 

corrective action. While the process for detecting and correcting data 

errors was quite lengthy and challenging, the DOD Inspector General and 

service audit agencies deemed the technical data to be sufficiently reliable 

for use in the BRAC process.

Identification and 

Assessment of 

Alternate Scenarios 

and Selection of 

Recommendations

The technical group used its strategic framework to identify 69 potential 

closure or realignment scenarios and then select 23 candidate 

recommendations. The group confirmed its scenarios and 

recommendations with its capacity and military value data and military 

judgment. In most cases, each scenario that did not become a candidate 

recommendation was one of several alternatives for moving the same work 

to different locations. The ISG and IEC accepted 22 of the technical group’s 

candidate recommendations. One recommendation, which realigned 

technical functions at Naval Support Activity Corona, California, to several 

different bases, was disapproved by the ISG because the Navy wanted to 

keep these functions together, according to a technical group official. The 

official said that the ISG allowed the Navy to construct a different 

recommendation, which moved these functions to Naval Air Station Point 

Mugu, California, and this recommendation was approved and is presented 

with the Navy’s recommendations.7

 Nine of the group’s recommendations 

were transferred to the services or other joint cross-service groups, which 

left the technical group with 13 recommendations. The 13 

recommendations included in the group’s report result in a total projected 

net savings of $2.2 billion over 20 years, with net annual recurring savings 

of $265.5 million per year and payback periods ranging from 1 to 26 years. 

Personnel savings account for over half of the group’s projected annual 

recurring savings, three-quarters of which comes from civilian personnel 

savings. While available data supporting the recommendations suggest 

7

 The group also provided a recommendation to relocate Naval Support Activity Corona to 

March Air Reserve Base. According to technical group officials, when the closure of Naval 

Support Activity Corona is included in the data, both their original recommendation and 

alternative had shorter payback periods and higher 20-year net present value savings than 

the Navy’s final recommendation.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 226 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

their implementation should provide for more efficient operations within 

the department, we believe there are some issues that the BRAC 

Commission may wish to examine more closely during its review process. 

Recommendations 

Approved by DOD

The technical group’s proposed recommendations result in a total 

projected net savings of $2.2 billion over 20 years, with net annual recurring 

savings of $265.5 million per year. Table 41 provides a summary of the 

financial aspects of the group’s recommendations, most of which are 

realignment actions.

Table 41: Financial Aspects of the Technical Joint Cross-Service Group’s Recommendations 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

costs

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb

Realign and close to co-locate extramural 

research program managers (at the National 

Naval Medical Center, Bethesda)c

Tech-5 ($153.5) $107.1 $49.4 2 $572.7

Realign to consolidate maritime C4ISR 

RDAT&E (at Naval Amphibious Base, Little 

Creek; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division; Naval Station Newport; Naval 

Submarine Base Point Loma; Naval Weapons 

Station Charleston; and Naval Station Norfolk)

Tech-9 (106.1) 88.6 38.7 1 455.1

Realign to create a naval integrated weapons 

and armaments RDAT&E center (at Naval Air 

Weapons Station China Lake, Naval Surface 

Warfare Center Indian Head, and Naval 

Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren)

Tech-15 (358.1) (148.7) 59.7 7 433.4

Realign and close to consolidate defense 

research service-led laboratories (at WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Kirtland Air Force 

Base, Hanscom Air Force Base, and Aberdeen 

Proving Ground)

Tech-22 (164.6) (45.0) 41.1 4 357.3

Realign to consolidate air and space C4ISR 

RDAT&E (at Hanscom Air Force Base and 

Edwards Air Force Base)

Tech-6 (254.4) (115.3) 36.2 8 238.0

Realign to consolidate Navy strategic T&E (at 

Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay)

Tech-12 (86.4) (76.7) 13.4 7 61.4
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 227 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: R denotes the research functions, D&A denotes the development and acquisition functions, and 

T&E denotes the test and evaluation functions. C4ISR denotes command, control, communications, 

and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

c We identified an additional $12.8 million that was included as a one-time savings but should have 

been an annual recurring savings for the recommendation to co-locate extramural research program 

managers. If this amount were included, the annual recurring savings increases to $62.2 million and 

the 20-year net present value increases to a savings of $698.6 million.

d We identified errors, including antiterrorism force protection savings listed as a recurring, rather than 

a one-time, savings, that overstated the annual recurring savings for the recommendation to 

consolidate ground vehicle development and acquisition in a joint center. When these errors are 

corrected, there is an annual recurring cost of $59,000, a 20-year net present value a cost of $4.3 

million, and the recommendation never pays back.

Realign to create an integrated weapons and 

armaments specialty site for guns and 

ammunition (at Picatinny Arsenal)

Tech-19 (116.3) (81.2) 11.3 13 32.6

Realign to establish centers for fixed wing air 

platform RDAT&E (at Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base and Naval Air Weapons Station 

China Lake)

Tech-24 (17.7) (7.9) 2.7 9 17.9

Realign to create an air integrated weapons 

and armaments RDAT&E center (at Eglin Air 

Force Base)

Tech-18 (2.7) 4.9 1.4 2 17.9

Realign to consolidate ground vehicle D&A in a 

joint center (at Detroit Arsenal)d

Tech-7 (3.8) (1.9) 1.9 2 17.1

Realign to create a Navy sensors, electronic 

warfare, and electronics RDAT&E center (at 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

China Lake)

Tech-28 (72.7) (50.9) 6.7 12 16.9

Realign to consolidate sea vehicle D&A (at 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock and 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington 

Navy Yard)

Tech-13 (1.5) (0.1) 0.2 7 2.0

Realign to establish centers for rotary wing air 

platform DAT&E (at Patuxent River and 

Redstone Arsenal)

Tech-26 (49.4) (40.2) 2.8 26 (11.8)

Total ($1,387.2) ($367.4) $265.5 $2,210.5

(Continued From Previous Page)

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommended actions

DOD report 

page

One-time

costs

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net

annual

recurring

(costs) or

savings

Payback

period

(years)

20-year

net present

value (costs)

or savingsb
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 228 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The majority of the projected net annual recurring savings are based on 

eliminating civilian and contractor personnel ($167.7 million) as functions 

are realigned between installations and vacating leased space 

($51.8 million). On the other hand, the majority of the projected costs are 

for constructing new facilities ($644.6 million) and moving personnel and 

equipment ($326.7 million) to the gaining installations. The group’s 13 

recommendations include 6 closures, 62 realignments, and 1 

disestablishment for a total of 69 actions. For example, the group’s 

recommendation to consolidate maritime C4ISR research, development 

and acquisition, and test and evaluation includes 16 realignment actions 

and 1 disestablishment action.

The technical group’s recommendations support, to a limited extent, the 

goals of maximizing jointness and furthering transformation efforts within 

the department. Eight of the group’s 13 recommendations move functions 

from one service or defense agency’s installation to another service’s 

installation. For example, the recommendation to create an integrated 

weapons and armaments specialty site for guns and ammunition moves 

seven Navy functions to an Army installation. While the chairman of the 

group’s Capabilities Integration Team told us that all of the group’s 

recommendations were transformational, the supporting information often 

suggested the recommendations were more focused on combining like 

work at a single location without a clear indication of how it provided for 

transformation. Two of the group’s recommendations specifically mention 

transformation in their justification statements, but the transformational 

effects are not clear in the documentation. For example, the 

recommendation to create an air integrated weapons and armaments 

research, development and acquisition, and test and evaluation center 

states that it supports transformation because it moves and consolidates 

smaller weapons and armaments efforts into high military value integrated 

centers and leverages synergy among the three functions; however, the 

documentation does not discuss how these actions are transformational.

Issues Identified with 

Approved 

Recommendations

Time did not permit us to assess the operational impact of each of the 

technical group’s recommendations, particularly where operations 

proposed for consolidation extend across multiple locations outside of a 

single geographic area. At the same time, we offer a number of broad-based 

observations about the proposed recommendations.

While available data supporting the recommendations suggest their 

implementation should provide for more efficient operations within DOD, 
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 229 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

there are some issues that the BRAC Commission may wish to consider 

during its review process. Specifically, the Commission may want to 

consider whether the level of personnel reductions is attainable, issues 

related to projected savings from vacating leased space, the long payback 

period and relatively small savings for some recommendations, and the 

economic impact of one recommendation.

Personnel Reductions The technical group developed a standard assumption to eliminate 15 

percent of military and civilian personnel affected by the recommendation 

for consolidation and joint actions based on personnel eliminations at 

technical facilities in previous BRAC rounds.8

 The group used a different 

assumption (5.5 percent reduction in affected military and civilian 

personnel) for co-location actions because it is believed that there are 

likely to be fewer efficiency gains for co-locations than consolidations or 

joint actions. A technical group official told us that in some cases the group 

used higher personnel reduction estimates than the standard because the 

military department provided for higher estimated personnel reductions in 

the certified data, and the military services agreed with all personnel 

eliminations in the group’s recommendations. We believe there is some 

uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the group’s expected savings for 

these personnel reductions because its estimates are based on assumptions 

that have undergone limited testing and full savings realization depends 

upon the attainment of these personnel reductions. Eight of the group’s 13 

recommendations eliminate at least 15 percent of military and civilian 

personnel positions affected by the recommendation. Personnel savings 

account for at least 40 percent, and as much as 100 percent, of the group’s 

projected annual recurring savings for each of these 8 recommendations. 

Almost three-quarters of all personnel savings come from civilian 

personnel eliminations. 

8

 The group found that the Navy’s 1995 BRAC recommendations projected that the Navy 

would eliminate 4,000 technical positions. Comparable information was not available for the 

Air Force and Army; however, the group assumed that the Air Force and Army eliminated 

the same number of personnel, for an approximate 12 percent reduction of the technical 

workforce through BRAC 1995. The group rounded this up to 15 percent for a standard 

assumption for military and civilian personnel reductions. Based on our analysis of the 1995 

BRAC recommendations, it is unlikely that the Air Force and Army reduced their technical 

workforces by 4,000 positions because neither had BRAC recommendations that closed 

significant technical facilities. 
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 230 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Similar to military and civilian personnel, the technical group developed a 

standard assumption that the subgroups could eliminate 15 percent of 

contractor personnel and could take $200,000 in recurring savings for each 

contractor position eliminated. It is unclear from the data what percentage 

of contractor positions were eliminated because the total number of 

contractor personnel is not included in the COBRA data. Seven of the 

group’s recommendations include savings from eliminating contractor 

personnel, for a total of $53.9 million in net annual recurring savings.9

 In 

contrast, the data on economic impact (criterion 6 of the BRAC selection 

criteria) show a net loss of 508 contractor personnel in 10 

recommendations, which would have totaled $101.6 million in net annual 

recurring savings. Technical group officials told us that both sets of 

numbers are based on certified data from the services; however, they added 

that the contractor data were difficult to collect because they were 

provided by the services through the scenario data calls, rather than as 

standard data in the COBRA model. 

It is unclear to what extent the personnel reductions assumed in the 

group’s recommendations will be attained, largely because of uncertainties 

associated with the group’s assumptions. For example, the group’s 

recommendation to create a naval integrated weapons and armaments 

research, development and acquisition, and test and evaluation center 

includes the reduction of 15 percent of military and civilian personnel. As 

mentioned above, the technical group assumed a standard 15 percent 

reduction in military and civilian personnel for consolidation and joint 

actions and a 5.5 percent reduction in military and civilian personnel for colocation actions. Because we are uncertain whether the 15 percent 

reduction in military and civilian personnel for consolidations and joint 

actions is attainable, we determined the costs and savings of the 

recommendation with the 5.5 percent personnel reduction for co-locations. 

Table 42 shows the financial aspects of DOD’s original recommendation 

with a 15 percent reduction in military and civilian personnel, our analysis 

of the recommendation with a 5.5 percent reduction in military and civilian 

personnel, and the difference between the two recommendations. 

9

 We identified an additional $12.8 million savings for eliminating contractors for the 

recommendation to co-locate extramural research program managers that was included as a 

one-time savings but should have been an annual recurring savings. The total annual 

recurring savings for eliminating contractors would increase to $66.7 million if this error is 

corrected.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 231 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 42: Comparison of Alternatives to Personnel Reductions for the 

Recommendation to Create a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments Research, 

Development and Acquisition, and Test and Evaluation Center

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Leased Space Our analysis identified some inconsistencies in projecting annual recurring 

savings and one-time savings in three recommendations10 to move activities 

from leased space.11 The technical group used two different methodologies 

to project annual recurring savings from vacating leased space. In one 

recommendation, the group projected annual recurring savings based on 

future leased costs12 while in the other two, the group used actual lease 

costs data provided by the military services and defense agencies. 

Furthermore, the recommendation to co-locate the extramural research 

program managers also includes $2.7 million in annual recurring savings 

for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency vacating leased space; however, 

the agency is already scheduled to move to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in 

January 2006. 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Recommendation

Net annual

recurring savings

Payback period

(years)

20-year net

present value

savings (cost)

DOD’s recommendation $59.7 7 $433.4

GAO’s analysis (5.5 

percent military and civilian 

personnel reduction)

42.0 10 201.8

Difference $17.7 (3) $231.6

10 The recommendations are the co-location of extramural research program managers, 

consolidation of ground vehicle development and acquisition, and co-location of the 

Defense research service-led laboratories.

11 The eight locations are the Air Force Research Laboratory, Mesa City, Arizona; United 

States Marine Corps Direct Reporting Program Manager Advanced Amphibious Assault 

facilities, Virginia; Office of Naval Research, Virginia; Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

facility, Virginia; Army Research Office, North Carolina; Army Research Office, Virginia; 

Defense Advanced Research Project Agency facility, Virginia; and Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which is currently in leased space in Virginia.

12 The projected savings were determined using the Headquarters and Support Activities 

Joint Cross-Service Group’s methodology of a savings of $37.29 per square foot of space 

being vacated within the Washington, D.C. area. The group assumed that 160 square feet 

would be vacated for each person moved or eliminated. 
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 232 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

The technical group also included $14.5 million in one-time savings for 

seven of the eight activities13 vacating leased space for the cost of 

upgrading existing leased space to meet DOD’s antiterrorism and force 

protection standards.14 The group did not collect data that would indicate 

whether existing leases met the antiterrorism and force protection 

standards. Our analysis indicates that excluding these one-time savings 

would have minimal impact on the overall projected savings of the 

technical group’s recommendations. 

Limited Savings during 

Implementation Period

Only 3 of the 13 recommendations achieve savings during the 6-year 

implementation period, and 3 of the group’s recommendations take longer 

than 10 years to achieve savings, far longer than typically occurred in the 

1995 BRAC round. According to a technical group official, the 

recommendation to establish a center for rotary wing air platform 

research, development and acquisition, and test and evaluation, which has 

a 26-year payback, was retained because it realigns the technical-related 

work away from a test range at Fort Rucker, Alabama, which will provide 

for expanded training space. An Army official agreed that a potential 

benefit of realigning the test range at Fort Rucker is that it would make 

available hangars, facilities, and airspace for trainers. For example, the 

Army said that the vacated hangar space could potentially be used to 

accommodate the Aviation Logistic School’s proposed move to Fort Rucker 

and the reduced demand for airspace will make additional airspace 

available to meet the current and future needs for manned and unmanned 

aviation training. 

The group’s recommendation to create an integrated weapons and 

armaments specialty site for guns and ammunition, which has one-time 

costs of $116.3 million and a 20-year net present value savings of 

$32.6 million, has a payback of 13 years. Technical group officials told us 

that this recommendation was determined to be worth the costs and longer 

payback period because it provides synergy and jointness, as well as 

eliminating some duplication, in research and development and acquisition 

of guns and ammunition for the Army and Navy. 

13 The technical group did not take a one-time savings for the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency because, according to an agency official, the agency is scheduled to move to Fort 

Belvoir in January 2006. 

14 See app. VII for further discussion of antiterrorism and force protection standards.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 233 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

According to a group official, the group’s recommendation regarding Navy 

sensors, electronic warfare, and electronics research, development and 

acquisition, and test and evaluation, which has a 12-year payback period, is 

beneficial because it consolidates similar work currently performed at 

locations that are in proximity to each other and clears out laboratory 

space at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, that is needed for 

personnel moving in from Naval Support Activity Corona, California, 

through a Navy recommendation. The official added that while the payback 

for this recommendation is long, it should be put into perspective with the 

savings from closing Naval Support Activity Corona because the savings 

from closing that facility (net annual recurring savings of $6.0 million and a 

20-year net present value of $0.4 million) would be smaller had the 

laboratory space not been available at Point Mugu.15

Economic Impact One of DOD’s BRAC selection criteria, criterion 6, required the department 

to consider the economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 

military installations when determining realignments and closures. In most 

cases, the group’s recommendations had a cumulative impact on 

communities of less than 1 percent as measured by direct and indirect job 

loss as a percentage of employment for the economic area of the military 

installation. However, the exception is the recommendations that realign 

activities from Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, Indiana, which would 

result in an economic impact of 9.3 percent. A technical group official 

stated that realigning the technical infrastructure to respond to defense 

needs over the next 20 years took priority over the economic impact of the 

proposed recommendation. Two of the group’s recommendations realign or 

eliminate approximately 460 military and civilian personnel and 80 

contractor personnel from Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, for a 

cumulative reduction of 9.3 percent of employment in Martin County, 

Indiana, when direct and indirect jobs are considered.16

15 As previously mentioned, the technical group originally provided other options for the 

Navy’s recommendation to close Naval Support Activity Corona, which were disapproved 

by the ISG.

16 When the impact of other joint cross-service group and service recommendations is 

included, this increases to 683 direct jobs lost and an 11.6 percent reduction in direct and 

indirect jobs in Martin County.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 234 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Personnel Realignments 

from Point Mugu

There is some uncertainty on the number of civilian personnel that would 

be realigned in the technical group’s recommendation to create a naval 

integrated weapons and armaments research, development and acquisition, 

and test and evaluation center. The recommendation proposes to realign 

about 1,400 civilian employees from Naval Air Station Point Mugu, 

California, to Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California. However, 

in its data call submission, Naval Air Station Point Mugu identified 505 

civilian employees that operate or support an outdoor range that it believes 

should remain at Point Mugu; however the technical group’s 

recommendation proposes to move these personnel to China Lake.17 A 

Navy official said that if the recommendation is approved the Navy will 

decide the best way to manage the range, including the appropriate number 

of employees to retain at Point Mugu, during implementation. Our analysis 

indicates that if the 505 civilian employees remain at Point Mugu, the 20-

year net present value savings decreases by about $87.4 million but the 

payback period remains at 7 years. 

Scenario Eliminated from 

Consideration

The technical group developed a scenario that would have allowed the Air 

Force to close Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, which may have 

further contributed to the accomplishment of BRAC objectives; however, 

the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group did not approve this scenario 

due to the base’s relatively high military value and perceived operational 

risk due to a potential for schedule and performance disruption. Table 43 

provides a summary of the financial aspects of this scenario.

17 A Navy official said that most Navy activities asked to exclude large numbers of personnel 

from consideration in recommendations and the technical group was consistent in 

disregarding these exclusions.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 235 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 43: Estimated Costs and Savings for the Rejected Closure of Los Angeles Air Force Base 

Source: DOD.

a

This represents net costs or savings within the 6-year implementation period required to implement 

BRAC recommendations.

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value.

The technical group developed a scenario to realign space development 

and acquisition from Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, to Peterson 

Air Force Base, Colorado, among other actions, which would allow the Air 

Force to close the base. However, the group deleted the scenario based on 

military judgment before it finished its analysis. While the group’s meeting 

minutes do not provide the specific reason that the scenario was deleted, 

the minutes say moving the Space and Missile Center from Los Angeles Air 

Force Base to Peterson Air Force Base would involve the movement of the 

federally funded research and development center,18 there was no 

compelling reason to move the Space and Missile Center to Peterson Air 

Force Base, and the Air Force did not support the scenario. Toward the end 

of the process the ISG requested that the technical group finish its analysis. 

The group completed its analysis and presented the information to the Air 

Force Base Closure Executive Group.19 The Air Force Base Closure 

Executive Group decided not to close Los Angeles Air Force Base because 

(1) Los Angeles Air Force Base has the highest military value in space 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

Scenario

One-time

costs

Net implementation

(costs) or savingsa

Net annual

recurring (costs)

or savings

Payback period

(years)

20-year net

present value

(costs) or

savingsb

Close Los Angeles Air Force 

Base and do not provide work 

space for contractors at Peterson 

Air Force Base

($305.1) ($161.1) $52.9 6 $358.5

18 Federally funded research and development centers are nonprofit entities sponsored and 

funded by the government that typically assist government agencies with scientific research 

and analysis, systems development, and systems acquisition. The Aerospace Corporation is 

the federally funded research and development center that works with the Space and 

Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base.

19 The Air Force considered three options for closing Los Angeles Air Force Base. One 

option used a city-base construct, which had a 2-year payback and a $99.0 million 20-year 

net present value savings. Another allowed for office space for the contractors with the 

federally funded research and development center and had a 9-year payback and a 

$228.3 million 20-year net present value savings.
Appendix XII

Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Selection Process and Recommendations

Page 236 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

development and acquisition—its military value in space development and 

acquisition is four times higher than that of Peterson—and (2) the closure 

has a near-term operational risk due to a potential for schedule and 

performance disruption to development and acquisition programs and 

activities, intellectual capital, and synergy with industry based in Los 

Angeles and surrounding areas. 

Technical group officials told us that there are several reasons to close Los 

Angeles Air Force Base in addition to the net recurring savings ($52.9 

million) and relatively high 20-year net present value savings ($358.5 

million). Los Angeles Air Force Base is a single-service installation that 

primarily performs one function in one technical capability area—

development and acquisition of space platforms. The technical group 

sought to identify opportunities to consolidate smaller single-function 

locations to larger multifunction facilities, so closing Los Angeles Air Force 

Base would meet this goal. The group proposed to move the functions at 

Los Angeles Air Force Base to Peterson Air Force Base to co-locate the 

development and acquisition function with the operational user. Other 

alternatives could achieve other goals. For example, moving the space 

development and acquisition function from Los Angeles Air Force Base to 

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, which performs research on space 

platforms, could expedite the transition of technology from the research 

phase to development and acquisition. Alternatively, there could be 

increased jointness among the services if the functions at Los Angeles Air 

Force Base were moved to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, where much of the 

Army’s space platform development and acquisition work is done.
Page 237 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model ApendxXiI

DOD used a quantitative model, known as the Cost of Base Realignment 

Actions (COBRA) model, to provide consistency across the military 

services and the joint cross-service groups in estimating the costs and 

savings associated with BRAC recommendations. DOD has used the 

COBRA model in all previous BRAC rounds and over time has made 

improvements designed to provide better estimating capability. Similarly, 

DOD has continued to improve the model for its use in the 2005 BRAC 

round. We have examined COBRA in the past and during this review and 

have found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing 

potential costs and savings among candidate alternatives. As with any 

model, the quality of the output is a direct function of the input data. Also, 

as in previous rounds, the COBRA model, which relies to a large extent on 

standard factors and averages, does not represent budget quality estimates 

that will be developed once BRAC decisions are made and detailed 

implementation plans are developed. The COBRA model also does not 

include estimated costs of environmental restoration as DOD considers 

these costs a liability that must be addressed whether or not an installation 

is closed.

COBRA Used as Tool 

to Estimate Costs and 

Savings Associated 

with BRAC 

Recommendations

DOD used the COBRA model to address the BRAC 2005 selection criterion 

related to costs and savings associated with the various proposed BRAC 

recommendations.1

 It was designed to model the estimated costs and 

savings associated with actions that are necessary to implement BRAC 

recommendations over the 6-year implementation period set by the BRAC 

statute,2

 and recurring costs or savings thereafter.3 COBRA provides for 

several key outputs that may influence the decision-making process, 

including (1) estimated costs for such factors as personnel severance, 

moving costs, or military construction over the implementation period; 

(2) estimated savings for personnel reductions or eliminations, or reduced 

operations and maintenance costs over that same period; (3) the “payback” 

time required for estimated cumulative savings to outweigh cumulative 

1

 P.L. 101-510, section 2913 (c)(1) requires DOD to consider the extent and timing of 

potential costs and savings, including the number of years until savings exceed costs, in its 

BRAC selection process.

2

 BRAC legislation provides for a 6-year implementation period following the approval of 

recommended BRAC actions. Thus the final year for implementation of a closure or 

realignment action for the 2005 BRAC round is 2011. P.L. 101-510, section 2904 (a)(5).

3

 For BRAC 2005, costs and savings are in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. 
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 238 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

costs for the actions; (4) annual recurring savings; and (5) the net present 

value of BRAC actions, calculated over a 20-year time frame.4

 Collectively, 

this financial information provides important input into the selection 

process as decision makers weigh the financial implications for various 

BRAC actions along with military value and other factors (for example, 

military judgment) in arriving at final decisions regarding the suitability of 

BRAC recommendations.

The COBRA model uses a set of formulas, or algorithms, that rely on 

standardized data as well as base- and scenario-dependent data to perform 

its calculations. Standard factors are common to a class of bases and are 

applicable for all recommendations that involve those bases. Some 

standard factors apply only to one DOD component or a subset of a 

component’s bases, while others are applicable to all bases DOD-wide. 

Typical standard factors include, for example, average personnel salaries 

and costs per mile and per ton for moving personnel and equipment. Baseand recommendation-specific data, which were to be certified in 

accordance with the BRAC statute, include, for example, the number of 

authorized personnel on a base, the size of the base, and annual 

sustainment costs. As with any model, the quality of the output is a direct 

function of the quality of the input data. For this reason, the data used in 

COBRA were to be certified, in a manner similar to that employed for the 

capacity and military value data, as to their accuracy. 

COBRA Improvements 

over Time

The COBRA model has been used in the base closure process since 1988, 

and in the intervening years it has been consistently revised to address the 

problems we and others have identified after each round. DOD has once 

again made improvements to the model, as shown in table 44, that are 

designed to further refine its estimating capability.

4

 In the context of BRAC, net present value is taking into account the time value of money in 

calculating the value of future cost and savings. For fiscal year 2005, DOD used a 2.8 percent 

discount rate to calculate net present value. 
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 239 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Table 44: Major Improvements to COBRA for the BRAC 2005 Round

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

a

Square footage requirements were service specific for areas such as administrative office space.

The improvements were made by a COBRA Joint Process Action Team that 

was established early in the 2005 BRAC round process. The Joint Process 

Action Team, consisting of officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the military services, and representatives from the joint crossservice groups, met frequently over several months in late 2003 to improve 

the model. We also attended most of these meetings as observers in an 

oversight role, and we shared our observations and raised issues of 

concern as appropriate. The Joint Process Action Team, on many 

occasions, addressed our concerns by making appropriate changes to the 

model. For example, we reported in June 2003 that COBRA did not include 

estimated costs for operating and maintaining the reserve component 

BRAC 1995 shortcomings BRAC 2005 improvements

Inconsistencies across services in developing BRAC-related facility 

construction cost estimates

Consistency for construction cost estimates established through 

use of DOD-wide standards for facility categories and costs per 

square foota

Facility maintenance cost estimates often overstated because 

actual maintenance was typically underfunded 

Facility maintenance (sustainment) cost estimates adjusted to 

reflect historical service-specific funding of maintenance accounts

Facility rehabilitation cost estimates did not specify existing facility 

condition

Facility condition included as a factor in developing rehabilitation 

cost estimates

Facility recapitalization costs and cost avoidances limited to the 

short term

Facility recapitalization costs and cost avoidances considered over 

the longer term using average service-specific base recapitalization 

costs

Estimated costs for operating and maintaining retained reserve 

enclaves on closing bases were not identified

Provisions to consider reserve enclave-related estimated costs 

were included

Average civilian personnel pay cost estimates excluded locality pay 

differentials

Locality pay was included in median civilian pay costs

Civilian housing-related relocation cost estimates were based on 

adjusted national median housing costs

Housing-related relocation cost estimates were targeted to local 

housing costs associated with base-specific actions 

Algorithms for base operating support costs were not properly 

supported

Algorithms were revised, based on service-specific factors for base 

operating support 

Limited consideration was given to overall medical costs for the 

government upon closure of military treatment facilities

Increased consideration was given to medical-related costs through 

use of base-specific data related to medical beneficiary costs

No specific consideration was given to storage-in-transit costs or 

information technology costs for personnel-related moves

Standard factors were developed for storage and information 

technology costs 
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 240 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

enclaves created during the prior BRAC rounds,5 thereby having the effect 

of overstating the savings for those particular BRAC actions. Consequently, 

the Joint Process Action Team provided for the inclusion of these costs in 

the COBRA model. In another case, the Joint Process Action Team 

developed an approach to incorporate longer term estimated facility 

recapitalization costs in COBRA, thus overcoming a COBRA shortcoming 

that we identified in our 1997 report on lessons learned from the prior 

BRAC rounds.6

As was done in the 1995 BRAC round, the Army Audit Agency examined the 

improved COBRA model to determine whether the model accurately 

calculated cost and savings estimates as described in the user’s manual. 

The Army Audit Agency assumed this responsibility at the request of The 

Army Basing Study Group since the Army serves as the executive agent for 

the COBRA model. The Army Audit Agency tested all 340 algorithms in the 

model as presented in the user’s manual and reported in September 2004 

that COBRA accurately calculated costs and savings as prescribed in the 

manual.7

 Following the audit, however, multiple revisions were made to the 

model to include changes to the TRICARE and privatization algorithms 

because of programming errors in the model. The Army Audit Agency 

subsequently reexamined the revisions where these algorithms were 

modified and concluded in a similar fashion that the model accurately 

calculated the estimates. In addition, the Army Audit Agency validated the 

certified data and documentation supporting the standard factors used in 

the model.

Application of COBRA 

in the 2005 BRAC 

Round

Although the COBRA model serves as a common tool with many 

standardized features across DOD for analyzing costs and savings for 

alternative recommendations, its actual application and results depend 

heavily on the DOD guidance on what constitutes costs or savings, 

5

 GAO, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves, GAO03-723 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003). An enclave is a section of a military installation 

that remains intact after the installation is closed or realigned, and that will continue with its 

current role and functions, subject to specific modifications.

6

 GAO, Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-

151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997).

7

 U.S. Army Audit Agency, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model, Audit Report 

A-2004-0544-IMT (Alexandria, Va.: Sept. 30, 2004).
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 241 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

accuracy of the input data, and the flexibility provided to users of the 

model to consider additional input data that can affect cost and savings 

estimates. The following are examples of cases where the specific 

application of the model can have an effect on the estimates: 

• The COBRA model generates a dollar amount attributable to the 

reduction or elimination of military personnel at realigning or closing 

bases. While it has been DOD’s practice to classify these reductions or 

eliminations as recurring savings, we have consistently taken the view 

that these actions should not be counted as savings that can be used 

outside the military services’ personnel accounts unless commensurate 

reductions are made in the affected military services’ end strengths. We 

acknowledge that these actions may afford DOD the opportunity to 

redirect these personnel to serve in other roles that would benefit DOD. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicate that about 47 percent—about 

$2.6 billion—of the expected net annual recurring savings of nearly 

$5.5 billion for the 2005 round are attributable to these military 

personnel actions, for which reductions in the military personnel endstrength levels are not planned. 

• The COBRA model provides users with considerable flexibility in 

estimating one-time and miscellaneous recurring costs or savings of 

various recommendations by allowing them to consider what actions 

might constitute a cost or savings and what the expected dollar amounts 

should be. Validating the level of projected savings is less clear-cut for 

recommendations that, instead of closing facilities, realign workloads 

from one location to another, or that estimate savings in overhead or 

other consolidation efficiencies. The dollar amounts could be based on 

specific assumptions as well as certified data but nonetheless be subject 

to greater degrees of uncertainty pending implementation than would be 

actions resulting in facility closures where expected reductions are 

more clear-cut. Our analysis of the BRAC recommendations showed 

inconsistencies across some of the services and joint cross-service 

groups in applying COBRA in this area. 

• The COBRA model uses authorized base personnel levels in its 

calculations to estimate costs and savings arising from DOD’s 

recommendations. DOD decided to use authorized rather than actual 

personnel levels because of difficulties in collecting data on actual 

levels. This decision could create more imprecision in the estimates; for 

example, in cases where the actual personnel levels are higher or lower 

than those authorized for bases that are closing, the savings estimates 
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 242 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

would be either understated or overstated. Time did not permit us to 

determine the extent to which this might be the case in the proposed 

recommendations. 

Comparability of 

COBRA Estimates and 

Actual Costs and 

Savings

Although COBRA has provided DOD with a standard quantitative approach 

enabling it to compare the estimated costs and savings associated with 

various proposed BRAC recommendations, it should be noted that it does 

not necessarily reflect with a high degree of precision the actual costs or 

savings that are ultimately associated with the implementation of a 

particular BRAC action. COBRA is not intended to produce budget-quality 

data and is not used to develop the budgets for implementing BRAC 

actions, which are formulated following the BRAC decision-making 

process. COBRA estimates may vary from the actual costs and savings of 

BRAC actions for a variety of reasons, including the following:

• COBRA estimates, particularly those based on standard cost factors, are 

imprecise and are later refined during implementation planning for 

budget purposes. The use of averages has an effect on precision. For 

example, as noted previously, COBRA uses authorized, rather than 

actual, base civilian personnel figures in its calculations. Our work has 

shown that the actual number of personnel may be lower or higher than 

that which is authorized. The authorized personnel levels are 

documented estimates, which can be readily audited. COBRA also uses 

a median national civilian personnel salary figure (adjusted by locality 

pay), rather than average pay at a particular base, in its calculations. 

Further, COBRA estimates are expressed in constant-year dollars, 

whereas budgets are expressed in then-year dollars. 

• Some costs are not fully captured in COBRA. For example, COBRA 

estimates do not include the cost of environmental restoration for 

BRAC-affected bases, in keeping with DOD’s long-standing policy of not 

considering such costs in its BRAC decision making.8

 We reported in 

January 2005 that these costs can be substantial,9

 accounting for about 

8

 This policy is based on the fact DOD is obligated to restore contaminated sites on military 

bases regardless of whether they are closed. We agree with DOD’s position that such costs 

are a liability to DOD regardless of its base closure recommendations. While such costs are 

not included in COBRA, they are included in developing BRAC implementation budgets. 

9

 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, 

GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005). 
Appendix XIII

Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model

Page 243 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

36 percent, or $8.3 million, of the $23.3 million in costs incurred through 

fiscal year 2003 for implementing BRAC actions for the previous four 

BRAC rounds. Further, COBRA does not include estimates for some 

other costs to the federal government, particularly those related to other 

federal agencies or DOD providing assistance to BRAC-affected 

communities. That is because assistance costs depend on specific 

implementation plans that are unknown at the time COBRA estimates 

are developed. In our January 2005 report on the previous BRAC rounds, 

we noted that about $1.9 billion in such costs had been incurred through 

fiscal year 2004. 

• Some savings are not fully captured in COBRA as well. COBRA does not 

include estimates, for example, for anticipated sales of BRAC surplus 

property or other revenue that may be collected in the future through 

property leasing arrangements with BRAC-affected entities. These 

revenues can help offset some of the costs incurred in implementing 

BRAC actions. While such estimates had been included in COBRA in the 

previous rounds, the Joint Process Action Team decided not to include 

any such estimates for the 2005 round because of the difficulty in 

estimating the amount of these revenues.

Nonetheless, while COBRA estimates do not necessarily reflect the actual 

costs and savings ultimately attributable to BRAC, we have recognized in 

the past and continue to believe that COBRA is a reasonably effective tool 

for the purpose for which it was designed: to aid in BRAC decision making. 

It provides a means for comparing cost and savings estimates across 

alternative closure and realignment recommendations.
Page 244 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments ApendxXiIV

One of the eight selection criteria used to make BRAC decisions was the 

economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military 

installations coming from BRAC recommendations. DOD measured the 

economic impact of BRAC recommendations on the affected community’s 

economy in terms of total potential job change—measured both in absolute 

terms (estimated total job changes) and relative terms (total job changes as 

a percentage of the economic area’s total employment). This approach to 

measuring economic impact is essentially the same approach DOD used in 

the 1995 BRAC round. In a series of reports, that examine the progress in 

implementing closures and realignments in prior BRAC rounds,1

 we 

examined how the communities surrounding closed bases were faring in 

relation to key national indicators. In our last status report,2

 we observed 

that most communities surrounding closed bases were faring well 

economically in relation to key national economic indicators. While some 

communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than others, 

most have recovered or are continuing to recover from the impact of 

BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative 

impact from the 2001 recession.

While there will be other economic impacts from 2005 BRAC actions that 

DOD did not consider, such as changes in the value of real estate or 

changes in the value of businesses in the economic area, we believe that 

the magnitude of job changes would be correlated with the changes in 

these other dimensions of economic impact. Although not a precise 

predictor of the economic impact, we and an independent panel of experts 

assembled by DOD agree that the methodology used by DOD makes a 

reasonable attempt to measure economic impact of BRAC actions, both in 

terms of communities losing and gaining jobs as a result of BRAC actions.3

1

 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, 

GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005); GAO, Military Base Closures: Progress in 

Completing Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, GAO-02-433 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002); and GAO, Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and 

Closures Rounds, GAO/NSAID-99-36 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 1998).

2

 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, 

GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005). 

3

 An independent review panel of four members, three Ph.D. economists and one policy 

analyst, who were all experienced in conducting local economic impact studies and who 

were not otherwise associated with the BRAC 2005 process was formed to review the 

methodology and to determine if it conformed to accepted economic practices.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 245 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Economic Impact 

Methodology

DOD assessed the economic impact of realignments and closures using a 

methodology that sought to estimate the total direct and indirect job 

changes. To perform its assessment, DOD established the Economic 

Impact Joint Process Action Team with members of the services and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop an economic impact 

model for the services and joint cross-service groups to use as they 

considered potential recommendations. The team met many times to 

develop the economic methodology. We attended and observed those 

meetings as the methodology was developed. DOD also retained a private 

firm, Booz Allen Hamilton, to provide technical assistance in developing 

the methodology and computer database used by the military services and 

joint cross-service groups in calculating economic impacts in communities 

for which they were considering closure or realignment actions. 

Using a list of candidate bases provided by the representatives from each 

service and OSD, the primary counties in which the bases were located 

were derived and the regions of economic influence (economic areas) for 

those bases were determined from those counties.4

 The economic area for 

each base was defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or 

Micropolitan Statistical Area in which the base’s primary county or 

counties lie.5

 For bases in MSAs that are divided into Metropolitan 

Divisions, the economic area is defined as the Metropolitan Division in

4

 Based on the primary counties in which bases were located, the Federal Information 

Processing Standards (FIPS) codes were determined. A mapping of the county FIPS codes 

to Statistical Areas as determined by OMB was done to establish the economic area.

5

 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is a core based statistical area associated with at least 

one urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000. A core based statistical area is a 

statistical geographic entity consisting of the county or counties associated with at least one 

core (urbanized area or urban cluster) of at least 10,000 population, plus adjacent counties 

having a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured through 

commuting ties with the counties containing the core. The MSA comprises the central 

county or counties containing the core, plus adjacent outlaying counties having a high 

degree of social and economic integration with the central country as measured through 

commuting. While a MSA has at least 50,000 people, a Micropolitan Statistical Area has at 

least one urban cluster that has a population of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000. The 

Micropolitan Statistical Area comprises the central county or counties containing the core, 

plus adjacent outlaying counties having a high degree of social and economic integration 

with the central county as measured through commuting. 
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 246 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

which the base’s primary county or counties lie.6 For bases in counties not 

in a MSA, Micropolitan Statistical Area, or a Metropolitan Division the 

economic area was defined as the county itself.

The economic impact of a potential action on an area was measured in 

terms of direct and indirect job changes estimated from 2006 through 2011 

as shown below. 

Estimated Total Job Changes = Direct Job Changes x (1 + indirect 

multiplier + induced multiplier). 

Direct job changes are the estimated net addition or loss of jobs for military 

personnel, military students, civilian employees, and contractor mission 

support employees.7

 The indirect job changes are the estimated net 

addition or loss of jobs in each economic area that could potentially occur 

as a result of the direct job changes. DOD considered two types of indirect 

job changes: (1) indirect job changes that are associated with the 

production of goods or the provision of services that are direct inputs to a 

product, such as a subcontractor producing components for a weapon 

system and (2) induced job changes that are affected as a result of local 

spending by direct and indirect workers, such as retail sales. 

DOD used multipliers to estimate the indirect and induced job changes. 

Employment multipliers for various civilian industry sectors were obtained 

from the Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. (MIG) for each MSA, Micropolitan 

Statistical Area, Metropolitan Division, and county in which a candidate 

6

 A Metropolitan Division is used to refer to a county or group of counties within a MSA that 

has a population core of at least 2.5 million people.

7

 Contractor mission support employees perform one or more of the military missions on 

the base, and whose work tasks are virtually identical to government civil servants or 

military personnel. Examples include intelligence analysts; technicians; aircraft, ship, 

vehicle, or weapon system maintenance staff; and information technology specialists.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 247 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

base was located.8 Indirect multipliers were estimated by mapping Military 

Occupational Specialties (MOSes) to economically similar civilian sectors.9

Each of these similar economic sectors multipliers were weighted by the 

number of military personnel mapped to each sector divided by the total 

number of employees in the sector. Examples of these economically similar 

sectors are educational services, administration and support services, 

scientific research and development services, aerospace product and parts 

manufacturing, and electronic repair and maintenance. Judgment was used 

to place all MOSes into one of the industrial sectors. A weighted average of 

the indirect multipliers, based on the weights discussed above, for each 

base was used to estimate the indirect job changes from military personnel. 

This weighted average of indirect multipliers used to estimate the military 

indirect multiplier for each base was used to estimate the indirect job 

changes from civilian personnel job changes, as well as the indirect job 

changes for mission-support contractors for each base. 

Estimating the induced job changes from military and civilian job changes 

was more straightforward. For each economic area, MIG used one induced 

multiplier for military personnel job changes and one for nonmilitary 

government jobs changes. These multipliers were used to estimate the 

induced job changes for each base in that economic area. Summing the 

products of the weights for each of the civilian industries calculated for the 

military indirect multipliers, and the induced multipliers for each of the 

industries from MIG, produced the induced multiplier used for mission 

support contractor job changes.

8

 MIG are the developers of the IMPLAN economic impact modeling system. The firm 

provides tools, data, and support to perform in-depth examinations of state, county, or 

multi-county regions. Over 1,000 public and private institutions use its tools. MIG does not 

have data for Puerto Rico or Guam. Based on recommendations of the Independent Review 

Panel of the BRAC economic impact methodology, MIG experts, and the Chief Economist of 

the Guam Department of Labor, multipliers for Key West-Marathon Florida Micropolitan 

Statistical Area (Monroe County, Florida) were assigned to the San Juan – Caguas –

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico Metropolitan Statistical Area. Multipliers for the Honolulu, Hawaii 

MSA were assigned to the Guam economic area.

9

 MOSes are specific military occupations performed by military personnel. Examples of 

some of the many MOSes within the military include administrative clerk, rifleman, logistics 

specialist, machinist, and ammunition technician. To aid in the crosswalk from MOSes to 

industry sectors (represented by codes from the North American Industrial Classification 

(NAICS)), the MOSes were mapped to the Standard Occupational Classification, which were 

in turned mapped into the NAICS codes.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 248 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Because of a concern about the lower spending of military trainees at 

recruit training facilities, an adjustment was made to reduce the values of 

the induced multipliers used for job changes of military trainees at recruit 

training bases. The Economic Impact Joint Process Action Team was also 

concerned about overestimating induced job changes for military trainees 

at recruit training bases and thought that military trainees at such bases 

have a smaller economic impact than civilian employees and regular 

military personnel, including those military personnel who receive more 

advanced training. The team thought this because such students receive a 

relatively smaller income and are generally transient. Student multipliers 

for bases with recruit training programs were estimated by multiplying the 

military induced multiplier for an economic area by the ratio of basic 

training wages to average military wages (slightly more than a third). 

Student induced multipliers for bases without basic training programs were 

set equal to the military induced multiplier for the base’s economic area. 

The team thought that these more advanced students were likely to have 

incomes and spending habits similar to the average military in the 

economic area.

Some of the joint cross-service groups subsequently considered a small 

number of bases (leased spaces or Reserve/Guard centers) that were not 

included in the initial set of defined economic areas. For these economic 

areas, a generic set of multipliers was developed by averaging each of the 

multipliers of the five categories (military, civilian, contractor, student, and 

recruit training student) over the existing economic areas.10

The calculation of job change either positive or negative could be 

performed in three ways:

• by individual actions for one specific action for a base,

• by base (net result of multiple actions for a base), and 

10 Most of these new economic areas appeared to have populations smaller than the average 

of the existing populations. Generally, it is expected that the larger the population for an 

area, the larger the multipliers, and vice-versa. An area with a larger population would be 

expected to have more of its expenditures remaining in the area and have fewer of its 

expenditures leak out to other areas. As a result, the multipliers of areas with larger 

populations would be expected to be larger than average and vice-versa. Thus, these 

economic areas would be expected to have multipliers smaller than the average. Using the 

average multipliers would tend to overestimate the indirect/induced job impact on these 

economic areas.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 249 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• by economic area (net result of all actions for the economic area).

The total potential job change and the total potential job changes as a 

percentage of total in an economic area were to be considered in the 

context of historical economic data. For historical context, the services 

and the joint cross-service groups considered the following for each 

economic area:

• total employment: 1988 to 2002,

• annual unemployment rates: 1990 to 2003, and

• real per capita income: 1988 to 2002.

In addition, the latest available numbers on population would be provided.

These dates were chosen to reflect the latest available data from federal 

sources.

In the 1995 BRAC round, DOD developed a separate method of assessing 

cumulative economic impact because some of the closures and 

realignments from the prior rounds had not been fully implemented, so 

special consideration was given to the economic impacts that were yet to 

occur. However in 2005, given the passage of time since all four of the 

previous BRAC rounds, which extended from 1988 to 1995, and other 

factors contributing to changing economic conditions in the interim period, 

DOD decided not to consider the cumulative economic impact of the prior 

BRAC rounds in assessing the impact of the current round. We believe 

DOD’s decision not to assess a cumulative economic impact for the 2005 

round has merit. 

DOD had extensive documentation controls to protect how documents for 

economic impact were prepared, handled, and processed. Procedures were 

used to ensure that the inputs, such as the values of the multipliers, used to 

make calculations on job changes were correct. A review by qualified 

analysts who did not participate in the initial calculations was also 

conducted.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 250 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Methodology Has 

Limitations but Is 

Reasonable for BRAC 

Purposes

DOD’s approach to measuring economic impact did not measure all the 

dimensions of the economic impact coming from a BRAC action. There will 

be other economic impacts on the economic area, such as changes in the 

value of real estate or the value of businesses in the area. The DOD 

approach did not estimate these effects, but it is reasonable to assume that 

the magnitude of job losses would be correlated with the changes in these 

values.

 DOD’s methodology does have some limitations. Specifically, it tended to 

overstate the employment impact for economic areas. One of DOD’s goals 

for the methodology was to produce credible estimates but to err on the 

side of overstating the actual impacts in order to prevent others from 

arguing that DOD was underestimating economic impact. The Joint 

Process Action Team was aware that the methodology had factors that 

might offset the estimated job losses. For example, the methodology 

assumed that that jobs are lost all at once and does not recognize that 

employees may be released over the 6-year implementation period and be 

reemployed in other local businesses or outside the economic area, which 

would reduce the estimated job loss. The methodology does not recognize 

the possible civilian reuse of the affected base and the resulting 

reemployment of workers, which would reduce the estimated job losses.

In examining the construction of the indirect multipliers, it is possible to 

question how they were created. The indirect multiplier being used to 

estimate job changes from military job changes for a base is constructed as 

a weighted average multiplier where the weights are the fraction of total 

base personnel being judged to be similar to a particular civilian industry. 

Questions could be raised about judgments made to map particular Military 

Occupation Specialties to activities in civilian industries. In some cases, the 

mapping from military jobs to industries was easier, such as military jobs in 

the medical area being mapped to the medical industry. However, in other 

areas where the jobs are uniquely military, such as infantry, the mapping 

would be more problematic. If a mistake was made in mapping a job that is 

uniquely military to a civilian sector, the result would depend on the 

relative size of the multiplier of the correct civilian sector versus the 

civilian sector used. It could lead to overestimation or underestimation of 

the indirect job change. Time did not permit us to examine this mapping. 

Nonetheless, we believe the overall approach seemed to be a sound 

attempt to produce a credible multiplier.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 251 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Finally, in using the ratio of estimated job losses from 2006 through 2011 to 

total employment as of 2002 (the latest figure for total employment) as a 

measure of economic impact, the economic impact was likely overstated. 

This occurs because total employment is likely to grow for many economic 

areas over the 2006-2011 implementation period as local economies grow, 

which would reduce the overall percentage of job losses. 

DOD’s methodology for assessing economic impact was reviewed by an 

independent panel of four economists and policy analysts from the private 

and academic sectors in August 2004.11 DOD formed the panel of four 

members to review the methodology and to determine if it conformed to 

accepted economic practices. Three of the panel members were Ph.D. 

economists and the other was a policy analyst. All four were experienced in 

conducting local economic impact studies and were not otherwise 

associated with the BRAC process. The panel found the methodology to be 

reasonable. The experts agreed that the use of direct and indirect job 

changes was a logical method to characterize the impact of proposed 

closures and realignments. The reviewers also concluded that DOD’s 

methodology represents a “worst-case” estimate of economic impact. We 

contacted each member of the panel to discuss their review of the 

methodology to ensure that DOD had adequately summarized the results of 

the panel meeting and that they agreed that the methodology was sound. 

We and the experts agreed that DOD had adequately summarized the 

review meeting and agreed that the methodology was reasonable to use.

Economic Areas Most 

Impacted and Least 

Impacted by BRAC 

Recommendations

In examining the economic impact of the 222 proposed recommendations 

as measured by the percent of employment, most economic areas were 

affected very little. Almost 83 percent of the 244 economic areas affected 

by BRAC recommendations fell between a one percent loss and a one 

percent gain in employment.12 Slightly more than 9 percent of the economic 

areas had a negative economic impact of greater than one percent. Almost 

8 percent of the economic areas had a positive economic impact greater 

than one percent. Tables 45 and 46 show the five economic areas with the 

11 The methodology for the 1995 BRAC process, which was similar to the methodology used 

for the 2005 BRAC process, was also reviewed by an independent panel comprised of 6 

members.

12 Some of the recommendations had multiple actions that affected more than one economic 

area.
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 252 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

greatest negative employment change and the greatest positive 

employment change.

Table 45: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Negative Impact on Employment

Source: DOD.

Note: Subsequent to the issuance of the recommendations, DOD identified an error with the economic 

impact reported for Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada. The revised economic impact is -13.6 percent of 

employment and not -0.1 percent as DOD initially reported.

Table 46: Five Economic Areas with the Greatest Positive Economic Impact on 

Employment

Source: DOD.

Economic area

Changes as

percentage of

employment Reason for change

Clovis, NM Micropolitan Statistical 

Area

-20.5 Closure of Cannon Air Force 

Base, NM

Martin County, IN -11.6 Realignment of Naval Support 

Activity Crane, IN

Norwich-New London, CT 

Metropolitan Statistical Area

-9.4 Closure of Submarine Base New 

London, CT

Fairbanks, AK Metropolitan 

Statistical Area

-8.6 Realignment of Eielson Air Force 

Base, AK

Rapid City, SD Metropolitan 

Statistical Area

-8.5 Closure of Ellsworth Air Force 

Base, SD

Economic area

Changes as

percentage of

employment Gaining installation 

St. Mary’s, GA Micropolitan 

Statistical Area

21.9 Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA

Lawton, OK Metropolitan Statistical 

Area

9.0 Fort Sill, OK

Columbus, GA-AL Metropolitan 

Statistical Area

8.5 Fort Benning, GA

Enterprise-Ozark, AL Micropolitan 

Statistical Area

7.4 Fort Rucker, AL

Manhattan, KS Micropolitan 

Statistical Area

6.5 Fort Riley, KS
Appendix XIV

Economic Impact Assessments

Page 253 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

As noted in prior reports, we examined how the communities surrounding 

closed bases were faring in relation to two key national economic 

indicators—the national unemployment rate and the average annual real 

per capita income growth rate. In our last status report, we observed that 

most communities surrounding closed bases were faring well economically 

in relation to these key national economic indicators. While some 

communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than others, 

most have recovered or are continuing to recover from the impact of 

BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative 

impact from the 2001 recession.
Page 254 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval ApendxiXV
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 255 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Transformational Options

Recommend Approval:

1. Consolidate Management at Installations with Shared Boundaries. Create a single 

manager for installations that share boundaries. Source & Application: H&SA

2. Regionalize Installation Support. Regionalize management of the provision of 

installation support activities across Military Departments within areas of 

significant Department of Defense (DoD) concentration, identified as Geographic 

Clusters. Option will evaluate designating organizations to provide a range of 

services, regionally, as well as aligning regional efforts to specific functions. For 

example, a possible outcome might be designation of a single organization with the 

responsibility to provide installation management services to DoD installations

within the statutory National Capital Region (NCR). Source and Application:

H&SA

3. Consolidate or collocate Regional Civilian Personnel Offices to create joint civilian 

personnel centers. Source and Application: H&SA

4. Consolidate active and Reserve Military Personnel Centers of the same service. 

Source and Application: H&SA

5. Collocate active and/or Reserve Military Personnel Centers across Military 

Departments. Source and Application: H&SA

6. Consolidate same service active and Reserve local Military Personnel Offices 

within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

7. Collocate active and/or Reserve local Military Personnel Offices across Military 

Departments located within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

8. Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Central and Field 

Sites. Consolidate DFAS business line workload and administrative/staff functions 

and locations. Source and Application: H&SA

9. Consolidate Local DFAS Finance & Accounting (F&A). Merge/consolidate local 

DFAS F&A within Geographic Clusters. Source and Application: H&SA

10. Consolidate remaining mainframe processing and high capacity data storage 

operations to existing Defense Mega Centers (Defense Enterprise Computing 

Centers). Source and Application: H&SA
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 256 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

11. Establish and consolidate mobilization sites at installations able to adequately 

prepare, train and deploy service members. Source and Application: H&SA

12. Establish joint pre-deployment/re-deployment processing sites. Source and 

Application: H&SA

13. Rationalize Presence in the DC Area. Assess the need for headquarters, commands 

and activities to be located within 100 miles of the Pentagon. Evaluation will 

include analysis of realignment of those organizations found to be eligible to move 

to DoD-owned space outside of a 100-miles radius. Source and Application:

H&SA

14. Minimize leased space across the US and movement of organizations residing in 

leased space to DoD-owned space. Source and Application: H&SA

15. Consolidate HQs at Single Locations. Consolidate multi-location headquarters at 

single locations. Source and Application: H&SA

16. Eliminate locations of stand-alone headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA

17. Consolidate correctional facilities into fewer locations across Military Departments. 

Source and Application: H&SA

18. Collocate Reserve Component (RC) Headquarters. Determine alternative facility 

alignments to support RC headquarters’ administrative missions. Alternatives could 

consider collocation and/or movement of RC headquarters to operational bases. 

Source: H&SA; Application: MILDEPS

19. Collocate Recruiting Headquarters. Analyze alternative Recruiting Headquarters 

alignments. Consider co-location of RC and Active Component (AC) Recruiting 

headquarters. Source and Application: H&SA

20. Establish a consolidated multi-service supply, storage and distribution system that 

enhances the strategic deployment and sustainment of expeditionary joint forces 

worldwide. Focus the analysis on creating joint activities in heavy (US) DoD 

concentration areas, i.e. locations where more than one Department is based and 

within close proximity to another. Source: Supply & Storage; Application: Supply

and Storage and Industrial

21. Privatize the wholesale storage and distribution processes from DoD activities that 

perform these functions. Source and Application: Supply & Storage 
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 257 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

22. Migrate oversight and management of all service depot level reparables to a single 

DoD agency/activity. Source and Application: Supply & Storage

23. Decentralize Depot level maintenance by reclassifying work from depot-level to Ilevel. Source and Application: Industrial

24. Centralize I-level maintenance and decentralize depot-level maintenance to the 

existing (or remaining) depots.

• Eliminate over-redundancy in functions.

• Consolidate Intermediate and Depot-level regional activities

 Source and Application: Industrial

25. Regionalize severable and similar work at the intermediate level. Source and 

Application: Industrial

26. Partnerships Expansions. Under a partnership, have government personnel work in

contractor owned/leased facilities and realign or close facilities where personnel are 

currently working. Source and Application: Industrial

27. Collocate depots: Two Services use the same facility(s). Separate command 

structures but shared common operations. Source and Application: Industrial

28. Consolidate similar commodities under Centers of Technical Excellence. Source 

and Application: Industrial

29. Implement concept of Vertical Integration by putting entire life cycle at same site to 

increase synergies, e.g. production of raw materials to the manufacture of finished 

parts, co-locating storage, maintenance and demil. Source and Application: 

Industrial

30. Implement concept of Horizontal Integration by taking some of the most costly 

elements of the M&A processes and put them at the same site to increase

efficiencies, e.g. put Load, Assemble and Pack (LAP) of all related munitions at 

same site. Source and Application: Industrial

31. Maintain a multi-service distribution and deployment network consolidating on 

regional joint service nodes. Source and Application: Industrial

32. Evaluate Joint Centers for classes and types of weapons systems and/or 

technologies used by more than one Military Department:

• Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) Capability Area

• Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & 

Evaluation)
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 258 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

• Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical

33. Evaluate Service-Centric concentration, i.e. consolidate within each Service:

• Within a Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP) capability area

• Across multiple functions (Research; Development & Acquisition; Test & 

Evaluation)

• Across multiple DTAP capability areas. Source and Application: Technical

34. Privatize graduate-level education. Source and Application: Education & Training

35. Integrate military and DoD civilian full-time professional development education 

programs. Source and Application: Education & Training

36. 36. Establish Centers of Excellence for Joint or Inter-service education and 

training by combining or co-locating like schools (e.g., form a “DoD University” 

with satellite training sites provided by Service-lead or civilian institutions). Source 

and Application: Education & Training

37. Establish “joint” officer and enlisted specialized skill training (initial skill, skill 

progression & functional training). Source and Application: Education & Training

38. Establish a single "Center of Excellence" to provide Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

initial (a.k.a. undergraduate) training. Source and Application: Education &

Training

39. Establish regional Cross-Service and Cross-Functional ranges that will support 

Service collective, interoperability and joint training as well as test and evaluation 

of weapon systems. Source and Application: Education & Training

40. Integrate selected range capabilities across Services to enhance Service collective, 

interoperability and joint training, such as Urban Operations, Littoral, training in 

unique settings (arctic, mountain, desert, and tropical). Source and Application: 

Education & Training

41. Combine Services' T&E Open Air Range (OAR) management into one joint 

management office. Although organizational/managerial, this option could 

engender further transformation. Joint management of OAR resources could

encourage a healthy competition among OARs to increase efficiency and maximum 

utility DoD-wide. Source and Application: Education & Training

42. Consolidate or collocate at a single installation all services' primary phase of pilot 

training that uses the same aircraft (T-6). Source and Application: Education & 

Training
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 259 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

43. Locate (division/corps) UEx and (corps/Army) UEy on Joint bases where practical 

to leverage capabilities of other services (e.g., strategic lift to enhance strategic 

responsiveness). Source and Application: Army

44. Locate (brigades) Units of Action at installations DoD-wide, capable of training 

modular formations, both mounted and dismounted, at home station with sufficient 

land and facilities to test, simulate, or fire all organic weapons. Source and 

Application: Army

45. Collocate Army War College and Command and General Staff College at a single 

location. Source: Army; Application: Education & Training

46. Locate Special Operations Forces (SOF) in locations that best support specialized 

training needs, training with conventional forces and other service SOF units and 

wartime alignment deployment requirements. Source and Application: Army

47. Collocate or consolidate multiple branch schools and centers on single locations 

(preferably with MTOE units and RDTE facilities) based on warfighting 

requirements, training strategy, and doctrine, to gain efficiencies from reducing 

overhead and sharing of program-of-instruction resources. Source and Application: 

Army

48. Reshape installations, RC facilities and RC major training centers to support home 

station mobilization and demobilization and implement the Train/Alert/Deploy 

model. Source and Application: Army

49. Increase the number of multi-functional training areas able to simultaneously serve 

multiple purposes and minimize the number of single focus training areas for the 

Reserve Components where possible. Source and Application: Army

50. Collocate institutional training, MTOE units, RDTE organizations and other TDA 

units in large numbers on single installations to support force stabilization and 

enhance training. Army

51. Locate units/activities to enhance home station operations and force protection. 

Source and Application: Army

52. Consolidate aviation training with sister services for like-type aircraft to gain

efficiencies. Source: Army; Application: all services.

53. Collocate functions and headquarters in “Joint Campuses” to enhance 

interoperability and reduce costs. Source: Army; Application: H&SA
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 260 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

54. Consolidate Army RDT&E organizations to capitalize on technical synergy across 

DoD, academia and industry. Source: Army; Application: Technical

55. Reduce the number of USAR regional headquarters to reflect Federal Reserve 

Restructuring Initiative (FRRI). Source and Application: Army

56. Consolidate RDT&E functions on fewer installations through inter-service support 

agreements to enable multidisciplinary efforts to increase efficiencies and reduce 

redundancy within DoD. Source: Army; Application: Technical, MilDeps.

57. Establish a single inventory control point (ICP) within each Service or consolidating 

into joint ICPs. Application: Supply and Storage

58. Expand Guard and Reserve force integration with the Active force. Examples:

(1) Blended organizations.

(2) Reserve Associate, Guard Associate, and Active Associate

(3) Sponsored Reserve. 

(4) Blending of Guard units across state lines to unify mission areas, reduce 

infrastructure, and improve readiness.

Application: MilDeps

59. Consolidate National Capital Region (NCR) intelligence community activities now 

occupying small government facilities and privately owned leased space to fewer,

secure DoD-owned locations in the region. Application: Intel

60. Collocate Guard and Reserve units at active bases or consolidate the Guard and 

Reserve units that are located in close proximity to one another at one location if 

practical, i.e., joint use facilities. Application: MilDeps

61. Consolidate the Army’s five separate Active Component recruit training sites and 

the Marine Corps’ two Active Component recruit training sites into one recruit

training installation each. Source: Education and Training; Application: Army & 

Marine Corps

62. Privatize Household Goods and Personal Property Shipping function. Source:

BENS; Application: Supply and Storage, MilDeps

63. Privatize long-haul communications in the Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA). Source: BENS; Application: H&SA

64. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter graduate flight training and maintenance training.

65. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter graduate flight training.
Appendix XV

Draft DOD Transformational Options 

Recommended for Approval

Page 261 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

66. Collocate Joint Strike Fighter maintenance training.

67. Consolidate aviation assets of two or more Military Services on the same base.

Application: MilDeps

68. Collocate Service special operations units where they further reduce infrastructure 

requirements and enable improved training opportunities.

69. Collocate Service Professional Military Education (PME) schools at the 

intermediate and senior levels. Application: E&T

70. Consolidate/Collocate Service specific test pilot schools. Application: MilDeps

71. Collocate ground and signals intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps

72. Collocate ground and airborne intelligence systems. Application: Intel & MilDeps

73. Consolidate pilot training and maintenance training for rotary wing and fixed wing 

aircraft using Executive Agency. Application: Education and Training.

74. Each Military Department and Joint Cross Service Group will look at the effects of 

either reducing their functions by 20%, 30%, and 40% from the current baseline, or 

reducing excess capacity by an additional 5% beyond the analyzed excess capacity, 

whichever is greater. The objective of this analysis is to uncover ways in which 

additional gains could be achieved, rather reasons why they could not. Source: 

DON; Application: MilDeps and JCSGs

75. Establish a “space test range” for satellite ground testing, threat assessment, and 

tactics development. Elements of the “range” should be networked using a 

minimum number of ground facilities to virtually simulate on-orbit operations.

Source and Application: Air Force

76. Establish an Army Joint Network Science Technology and Experimentation Center 

to fully realize the transformational capabilities of interdependent Joint Network 

Centric Warfare. Source: Army; Application: Technical

77. Air Force use optimum flying squadron sizing and organizational constructs to 

disproportionately increase combat capability and transform the capability of its 

AEFs. Source and Application: Air Force
Page 262 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XVI

Key GAO and Other Defense Audit Agency 

Products Related to DOD’s 2005 Base 

Realignments and Closures ApendxXiVI

Government Accountability 

Office 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for 

a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 

Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2004.

Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 

Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations 

for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: 

April 14, 1995.

Department of Defense

Office of Inspector General 

Infrastructure and Environment: Technical Joint Cross-Service Group 

Data Integrity and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and 

Closure 2005. D-2005-086. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Education and Training Joint Cross-Service 

Group Data Integrity and Internal Control Processes for Base 

Realignment and Closure 2005. D-2005-084. Arlington, Va.: June 10, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group Data 

Integrity and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and 

Closure 2005. D-2005-082. Arlington, Va.: June 9, 2005.

Infrastructure and Environment: Washington Headquarters Services 

Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base 

Realignment and Closure 2005. D-2005-079. Arlington, Va.: June 8, 2005.
Appendix XVI

Key GAO and Other Defense Audit Agency 

Products Related to DOD’s 2005 Base 

Realignments and Closures

Page 263 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Defense Infrastructure: Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group 

Data Integrity and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and 

Closure 2005. D-2005-081. Arlington, Va.: June 6, 2005.

Infrastructure and Environment: Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base 

Realignment and Closure 2005. D-2005-075. Arlington, Va.: May 27, 2005.

DOD Inspector General plans to issue reports on the Defense Logistics 

Agency, the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 

Group, and the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group.

Department of the Army

U.S. Army Audit Agency

Reserve Component Process Action Team, The Army Basing Study 2005. 

A-2005-0165-ALT. Alexandria, Va.: April 29, 2005.

The Army Basing Study 2005 Process. A-2005-0164-ALT. Alexandria, Va.: 

April 22, 2005.

Validation of Army Responses for Joint Cross-Service Group Questions. 

A-2005-0169-ALT. Alexandria, Va.: April 22, 2005.

Army Military Value Data, The Army Basing Study 2005. A-2005-0083-

ALT. Alexandria, Va.: December 21, 2004.

Army Capacity Data, The Army Basing Study 2005. A-2005-0056-ALT. 

Alexandria, Va.: November 30, 2004. 

Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) Model. A-2004-0544-IMT.

Alexandria, Va.: September 30, 2004.

Department of the Navy

Naval Audit Service

The Department of the Navy’s Implementation of the FY 2005 Base 

Realignment and Closure Process. N2005-0046. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 

2005. 

Risk Assessment of the Department of the Navy Base Realignment and 

Closure 2005 Information Transfer System. N2005-0042. Washington, 

D.C.: April 25, 2005.

Base Realignment and Closure Optimization Methodology. N2004-0058. 

Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004. 
Appendix XVI

Key GAO and Other Defense Audit Agency 

Products Related to DOD’s 2005 Base 

Realignments and Closures

Page 264 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Department of the Air Force

Air Force Audit Agency

BRAC Cueing and Analysis Tools. F2005-0007-FB2000. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 2005.

2005 Base Realignment and Closure-Installation Visualization Tool Data 

Reliability. F2005-0004-FB4000. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2005.

Base Realignment and Closure Data Collection System. F2004-0008-

FB40000. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2004.

2005 Base Realignment and Closure: Installation Capacity Analysis 

Questionnaire. F2004-0007-FB4000. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2004.

2005 Base Realignment and Closure: Installations Inventory. F2004-0005-

FB4000. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2004.

2005 Base Realignment and Closure: Air Force Internal Control Plan. 

F2004-0001-FB4000. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 2003.

The Air Force Audit Agency plans to release 7 additional reports on the Air 

Force and joint cross-service group data collection, the Air Force analysis, 

and the use of various BRAC tools.
Page 265 GAO-05-785 Military Bases

Appendix XVII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiXVI

GAO Contact Barry W. Holman (202) 512-5581

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Mike Kennedy, Jim Reifsnyder, 

Nelsie Alcoser, Shawn Arbogast, Raymond Bickert, Alissa Czyz, Andrew 

Edelson, Glenn Knoepfle, Nancy Lively, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, 

David Mayfield, Richard Meeks, Hilary Murrish, Charles Perdue, Robert 

Poetta, James Reynolds, Laura Talbott, and Cheryl Weissman made key 

contributions to this report.

Other individuals also contributing to this report included, Tommy Baril, 

Carl Barden, Angela Bourciquot, Steve Boyles, Delaney Branch, Joel 

Christenson, Kenneth Cooper, Paul Gvoth, Larry Junek, Mark Little, Philip 

Longee, Ricardo Marquez, Gary Phillips, Greg Pugnetti, Sharon Reid, John 

Strong, Roger Tomlinson, and Kimberly Young.

(350443)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548