Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 43 / Thursday, March 5, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 11859 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2015–05061 Filed 3–4–15; 08:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0383; Special 

Conditions No. 25–578–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bombardier 

Aerospace, Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11 Series Airplanes; 

Alternate Fuel Tank Structural 

Lightning Protection Requirements 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Bombardier Aerospace 

Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500– 

1A11 series airplanes. These airplanes 

will have a novel or unusual design 

feature when compared to the state of 

technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transport 

category airplanes. This design feature 

is a nitrogen generation system (NGS) 

for all fuel tanks that actively reduces 

flammability exposure within the fuel 

tanks significantly below that required 

by the fuel tank flammability 

regulations. Among other benefits, the 

NGS significantly reduces the potential 

for fuel vapor ignition caused by 

lightning strikes. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on 

Bombardier Aerospace on April 6, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Margaret Langsted, FAA, Propulsion 

and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANM– 

112, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–2677; 

facsimile 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On December 10, 2009, Bombardier 

Aerospace applied for a type certificate 

for their new Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11 series airplanes (hereafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘CSeries’’). 

The CSeries airplanes are swept-wing 

monoplanes with a composite wing fuel 

tank structure and an aluminum alloy 

fuselage that is sized for 5-abreast 

seating. Passenger capacity is designated 

as 110 for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 

125 for the Model BD–500–1A11. 

Maximum takeoff weight is 131,000 

pounds for the Model BD–500–1A10 

and 144,000 pounds for the Model BD– 

500–1A11. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, 

Bombardier Aerospace must show that 

the CSeries airplanes meet the 

applicable provisions of part 25 as 

amended by Amendments 25–1 through 

25–129. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the CSeries airplanes because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the CSeries airplanes must 

comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 

emission requirements of 14 CFR part 

34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the 

FAA must issue a finding of regulatory 

adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 

574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.17. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The CSeries airplanes will incorporate 

the following novel or unusual design 

feature: A fuel tank nitrogen generation 

system (NGS) that is intended to control 

fuel tank flammability for all fuel tanks. 

This NGS is designed to provide a level 

of performance to all fuel tanks of the 

CSeries airplanes that applies the more 

stringent standard for warm day 

flammability performance applicable to 

normally emptied tanks within the 

fuselage contour from § 25.981(b) and 

appendix M to part 25. An NGS actively 

reduces flammability exposure within 

the fuel tanks significantly below that 

required by the fuel tank flammability 

regulations. Among other benefits, the 

NGS significantly reduces the potential 

for fuel vapor ignition caused by 

lightning strikes. This high level of NGS 

performance for all fuel tanks is a novel 

or unusual design feature compared to 

the state of technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transport 

category airplanes. 

Discussion 

The certification basis of the CSeries 

airplanes includes § 25.981, as amended 

by Amendment 25–125, as required by 

14 CFR 26.37. This amendment includes 

the ignition prevention requirements in 

§ 25.981(a), as amended by Amendment 

25–102, and it includes revised 

flammability limits for all fuel tanks and 

new specific limitations on flammability 

for all fuel tanks as defined in 

§ 25.981(b), as amended by Amendment 

25–125. 

Ignition Source Prevention 

Section 25.981(a)(3) requires 

applicants to show that an ignition 

source in the fuel tank system could not 

result from any single failure, from any 

single failure in combination with any 

latent failure condition not shown to be 

extremely remote, or from any 

combination of failures not shown to be 

extremely improbable. This requirement 

was originally adopted in Amendment 

25–102, and it requires the assumption 

that the fuel tanks are always flammable 

when showing that the probability of an 

ignition source being present is 

extremely remote. (Amendment 25–102 

included § 25.981(c) that required 

minimizing fuel tank flammability, and 

this was defined in the preamble as 

being equivalent to unheated aluminum 

fuel tanks located in the wing.) This 

requirement defines three types of 

scenarios that must be addressed in 

order to show compliance with 

§ 25.981(a)(3). The first scenario is that 

any single failure, regardless of the 

probability of occurrence of the failure, 

must not cause an ignition source. The 

second scenario is that any single 

failure, regardless of the probability of 

occurrence, in combination with any 

latent failure condition not shown to be 

at least extremely remote, must not 

cause an ignition source. The third 

scenario is that any combination of 

failures not shown to be extremely 

improbable must not cause an ignition 

source. Demonstration of compliance 

with this requirement would typically 

require a structured, quantitative safety 

analysis. Design areas that have latent 

failure conditions typically would be 

driven by these requirements to have 

multiple fault tolerance, or ‘‘triple 

redundancy.’’ This means that ignition 

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11860 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 43 / Thursday, March 5, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

sources are still prevented even after 

two independent failures. 

Flammability Limits 

Section 25.981(b) states that no fuel 

tank fleet average flammability exposure 

may exceed 3 percent of the 

flammability exposure evaluation time 

calculated using the method in part 25, 

appendix N, or the fleet average 

flammability of a fuel tank within the 

wing of the airplane being evaluated, 

whichever is greater. If the wing is not 

a conventional unheated aluminum 

wing, the analysis must be based on an 

assumed equivalent conventional 

construction unheated aluminum wing. 

In addition, for fuel tanks that are 

normally emptied during operation and 

that have any part of the tank located 

within the fuselage contour, the fleet 

average flammability for warm days 

(above 80 °F) must be limited to 3 

percent as calculated using the method 

in part 25, appendix M. 

Application of Existing Regulations 

Inappropriate Due to Impracticality 

Since the issuance of § 25.981(a)(3), as 

amended by Amendment 25–102, the 

FAA has conducted certification 

projects in which applicants found it 

impractical to meet the requirements of 

that regulation for some areas of 

lightning protection for fuel tank 

structure. Partial exemptions were 

issued for these projects. These same 

difficulties exist for the CSeries project. 

The difficulty of designing multiplefault-tolerant structure, and the 

difficulty of detecting failures of hidden 

structural design features in general, 

makes compliance with § 25.981(a)(3) 

uniquely challenging and impractical 

for certain aspects of the electrical 

bonding of structural elements. Such 

bonding is needed to prevent 

occurrence of fuel tank ignition sources 

from lightning strikes. The effectiveness 

and fault tolerance of electrical bonding 

features for structural joints and 

fasteners is partially dependent on 

design features that cannot be 

effectively inspected or tested after 

assembly without damaging the 

structure, joint, or fastener. Examples of 

such features include a required 

interference fit between the shank of a 

fastener and the hole in which the 

fastener is installed, metal foil or mesh 

imbedded in composite material, a 

required clamping force provided by a 

fastener to pull two structural parts 

together, and a required faying surface 

bond between the flush surfaces of 

adjacent pieces of structural material 

such as in a wing skin joint or a 

mounting bracket installation. In 

addition, other features that can be 

physically inspected or tested may be 

located within the fuel tanks; therefore, 

it is not practical to inspect for failures 

of those features at short intervals. 

Examples of such failures include 

separation or loosening of cap seals over 

fastener ends and actual structural 

failures of internal fasteners. This 

inability to practically detect 

manufacturing errors and failures of 

structural design features critical to 

lightning protection results in degraded 

conditions that occur and remain in 

place for a very long time, possibly for 

the remaining life of the airplane. 

Accounting for such long failure 

latency periods in the system safety 

analysis required by § 25.981(a)(3) 

would require multiple fault tolerance 

in the structural lightning protection 

design. As part of the design 

development activity for the CSeries, 

Bombardier has examined possible 

design provisions to provide multiple 

fault tolerance in the structural design 

to prevent ignition sources from 

occurring in the event of lightning 

attachment to the airplane in critical 

locations. Bombardier has concluded 

from this examination that providing 

multiple fault tolerance for some 

structural elements is not practical. 

Bombardier has also identified some 

areas of the CSeries design where it is 

impractical to provide even single fault 

tolerance in the structural design to 

prevent ignition sources from occurring 

in the event of lightning attachment 

after a single failure. The FAA has 

reviewed this examination with 

Bombardier in detail and has agreed that 

providing fault tolerance beyond that in 

the proposed CSeries design for these 

areas would be impractical. 

As a result of the CSeries and other 

certifications projects, the FAA has now 

determined that compliance with 

§ 25.981(a)(3) is impractical for some 

areas of lightning protection for fuel 

tank structure, and that application of 

§ 25.981(a)(3) to those design areas is 

therefore inappropriate. The FAA plans 

further rulemaking to revise 

§ 25.981(a)(3). As appropriate, the FAA 

plans to issue special conditions or 

exemptions, for certification projects 

progressing before the revision is 

complete. This is discussed in FAA 

Memorandum ANM–112–08–002, 

Policy on Issuance of Special Conditions 

and Exemptions Related to Lightning 

Protection of Fuel Tank Structure, dated 

May 26, 2009. 

Application of Existing Regulations 

Inappropriate Due to Compensating 

Feature That Provides Equivalent Level 

of Safety 

Section 25.981(b) sets specific 

standards for fuel tank flammability as 

discussed above under ‘‘Flammability 

Limits.’’ Under that regulation, the fleet 

average flammability exposure of all 

fuel tanks on the CSeries airplanes may 

not exceed 3 percent of the flammability 

exposure evaluation time calculated 

using the method in part 25, appendix 

N, or the fleet average flammability of a 

wing main tank within an equivalent 

construction conventional unheated 

aluminum wing fuel tank, whichever is 

greater. The typical fleet average fuel 

tank flammability of fuel tanks located 

in the wing ranges between 1 and 5 

percent. If it is assumed that a CSeries 

equivalent conventional unheated 

aluminum wing fuel tank would not 

exceed a fleet average flammability time 

of 3 percent, the actual composite 

airplane wing fuel tank design would be 

required to comply with the 3 percent 

fleet average flammability standard, and 

therefore a means to reduce the 

flammability to 3 percent would be 

required. However, the proposed 

CSeries design includes NGS for all fuel 

tanks that will also be shown to meet 

the additional, more stringent warm day 

average flammability standard in part 

25, appendix M, which is only required 

for normally emptied fuel tanks with 

some part of the tank within the 

fuselage contour. Fuel tanks that meet 

this requirement typically have average 

fuel tank flammability levels well below 

the required 3 percent. 

Since the proposed NGS for all fuel 

tanks on the CSeries provides 

performance that meets part 25, 

appendix M, the FAA has determined 

that the risk reduction provided by this 

additional performance will provide 

compensation for some relief from the 

ignition prevention requirements of 

§ 25.981(a)(3) while still establishing a 

level of safety equivalent to that 

established in the regulations. 

In determining the appropriate 

amount of relief from the ignition 

prevention requirements of § 25.981(a), 

the FAA considered the original overall 

intent of Amendment 25–102, which 

was to ensure the prevention of 

catastrophic events due to fuel tank 

vapor explosion. These special 

conditions are intended to achieve that 

objective through a prescriptive 

requirement that fault tolerance (with 

respect to the creation of an ignition 

source) be provided for all structural 

lightning protection design features 

where providing such fault tolerance is 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 43 / Thursday, March 5, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 11861 

practical, and through a performancebased standard for the risk due to any 

single failure vulnerability that exists in 

the design. In addition, for any 

structural lightning protection design 

features for which Bombardier shows 

that providing fault tolerance is 

impractical, these special conditions 

would require Bombardier to show that 

a fuel tank vapor ignition event due to 

the summed risk of all non-fault-tolerant 

design features is extremely improbable. 

Bombardier would be required to show 

that this safety objective is met by the 

proposed design using a structured 

system safety assessment similar to that 

currently used for demonstrating 

compliance with §§ 25.901 and 25.1309. 

Given these novel or unusual design 

features, and the compliance challenges 

noted earlier in this document, the FAA 

has determined that application of 

§ 25.981(a)(3) is inappropriate in that it 

is neither practical nor necessary to 

apply the ignition source prevention 

provisions of § 25.981(a)(3) to the 

specific fuel tank structural lightning 

protection features of the Bombardier 

CSeries airplanes. However, without the 

§ 25.981(a)(3) provisions, the remaining 

applicable regulations in the CSeries 

certification basis would be inadequate 

to set an appropriate standard for fuel 

tank ignition prevention. Therefore, in 

accordance with provisions of § 21.16, 

the FAA has determined that, instead of 

§ 25.981(a)(3), alternative fuel tank 

structural lightning protection 

requirements be applied to fuel tank 

lightning protection features that are 

integral to the airframe structure of the 

CSeries airplanes. These alternative 

requirements are intended to provide 

the level of safety intended by 

§ 25.981(a)(3), based on our recognition, 

as discussed above, that a highly 

effective NGS for the fuel tanks makes 

it unnecessary to assume that the fuel 

tank is always flammable. As discussed 

previously, the assumption that the fuel 

tanks are always flammable was 

required when demonstrating 

compliance to the ignition prevention 

requirements of § 25.981(a)(3). 

One resulting difference between 

these special conditions and the 

§ 25.981(a)(3) provisions they are meant 

to replace is the outcome being 

prevented—fuel vapor ignition versus 

an ignition source. These special 

conditions acknowledge that the 

application of fuel tank flammability 

performance standards will reduce fuel 

tank flammability to an extent that it is 

appropriate to consider the beneficial 

effects of flammability reduction when 

considering design areas where it is 

impractical to comply with 

§ 25.981(a)(3). 

One of the core requirements of these 

special conditions is a prescriptive 

requirement that structural lightning 

protection design features must be fault 

tolerant. (An exception wherein 

Bombardier can show that providing 

fault tolerance is impractical, and 

associated requirements, is discussed 

below.) The other core requirement is 

that Bombardier must show that the 

design, manufacturing processes, and 

Airworthiness Limitations section of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness include all practical 

measures to prevent, and detect and 

correct, failures of structural lightning 

protection features due to 

manufacturing variability, aging, wear, 

corrosion, and likely damage. The FAA 

has determined that, if these core 

requirements are met, a fuel tank vapor 

ignition event due to lightning is not 

anticipated to occur in the life of the 

airplane fleet. This conclusion is based 

on the fact that a critical lightning strike 

to any given airplane is itself a remote 

event, and on the fact that fuel tanks 

must be shown to be flammable for only 

a relatively small portion of the fleet 

operational life. 

For any non-fault-tolerant features 

proposed in the design, Bombardier 

must show that eliminating these 

features or making them fault tolerant is 

impractical. The requirements and 

considerations for showing it is 

impractical to provide fault tolerance 

are described in FAA Memorandum 

ANM–112–08–002. This requirement is 

intended to minimize the number of 

non-fault tolerant features in the design. 

For areas of the design where 

Bombardier shows that providing fault 

tolerant structural lightning protection 

features is impractical, non-faulttolerant features will be allowed 

provided Bombardier can show that a 

fuel tank vapor ignition event due to the 

non-fault-tolerant features is extremely 

improbable when the sum of 

probabilities of those events due to all 

non-fault-tolerant features is considered. 

Bombardier will be required to submit 

a structured, quantitative assessment of 

fleet average risk for a fuel tank vapor 

ignition event due to all non-faulttolerant design features included in the 

design. This will require determination 

of the number of non-fault tolerant 

design features, estimates of the 

probability of the failure of each nonfault-tolerant design feature, and 

estimates of the exposure time for those 

failures. This analysis must include 

failures due to manufacturing 

variability, aging, wear, corrosion, and 

likely damage. 

It is acceptable to consider the 

probability of fuel tank flammability, 

the probability of a lightning strike to 

the airplane, the probability of a 

lightning strike to specific zones of the 

airplane (for example, Zone 2 behind 

the nacelle, but not a specific location 

or feature), and a distribution of 

lightning strike amplitude in performing 

the assessment provided the associated 

assumptions are acceptable to the FAA. 

The analysis must account for any 

dependencies among these factors, if 

they are used. The assessment must also 

account for operation with inoperative 

features and systems, including any 

proposed or anticipated dispatch relief. 

This risk assessment requirement is 

intended to ensure that an acceptable 

level of safety is provided given the 

non-fault-tolerant features in the 

proposed design. 

Part 25, appendix N, as adopted in 

Amendment 25–125, in conjunction 

with these special conditions, 

constitutes the standard for how to 

determine flammability probability. In 

performing the safety analysis required 

by these special conditions, relevant 

§ 25.981(a)(3) compliance guidance is 

still applicable. Appropriate credit for 

the conditional probability of 

environmental or operational conditions 

occurring is normally limited to those 

provisions involving multiple failures, 

and this type of credit is not normally 

allowed in evaluation of single failures. 

However, these special conditions 

would allow consideration of the 

probability of occurrence of lightning 

attachment and flammable conditions 

when assessing the probability of 

structural failures resulting in a fuel 

tank vapor ignition event. 

The FAA understands that lightning 

protection safety for airplane structure 

is inherently different from lightning 

protection for systems. We intend to 

apply these special conditions only to 

structural lightning protection features 

of fuel systems. We do not intend to 

apply the alternative standards used 

under these special conditions to other 

areas of the airplane design evaluation. 

Requirements Provide Equivalent Level 

of Safety 

In recognition of the unusual design 

feature discussed above, and the 

impracticality of requiring multiple 

fault tolerance for lightning protection 

of certain aspects of fuel tank structure, 

the FAA has determined that a level of 

safety that is equivalent to direct 

compliance with § 25.981(a)(3) will be 

achieved for the CSeries by applying 

these requirements. The FAA considers 

that, instead of only concentrating on 

fault tolerance for ignition source 

prevention, significantly reducing fuel 

tank flammability exposure in addition 

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11862 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 43 / Thursday, March 5, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

to preventing ignition sources is a better 

approach to lightning protection for the 

fuel tanks. In addition, the level of 

average fuel tank flammability achieved 

by compliance with these special 

conditions is low enough that it is not 

appropriate or accurate to assume in a 

safety analysis that the fuel tanks may 

always be flammable. 

Section 25.981(b), as amended by 

Amendment 25–125, sets limits on the 

allowable fuel tank flammability for the 

CSeries airplanes. Paragraph 2(a) of 

these special conditions applies the 

more stringent standard for warm day 

flammability performance applicable to 

normally emptied tanks within the 

fuselage contour from § 25.981(b) and 

part 25, appendix M, to all of the fuel 

tanks of the CSeries airplanes. 

Because of the more stringent fuel 

tank flammability requirements in these 

special conditions, and because the 

flammability state of a fuel tank is 

independent of the various failures of 

structural elements that could lead to an 

ignition source in the event of lightning 

attachment, the FAA has agreed that it 

is appropriate in this case to allow 

treatment of flammability as an 

independent factor in the safety 

analysis. The positive control of 

flammability and the lower flammability 

that is required by these special 

conditions exceeds the minimum 

requirements of § 25.981(b). This offsets 

a reduction of the stringent standard for 

ignition source prevention in 

§ 25.981(a)(3), which assumes that the 

fuel tank is flammable at all times. 

Given the stringent requirements for 

fuel tank flammability, the fuel vapor 

ignition prevention and the ignition 

source prevention requirements in these 

special conditions will prevent ‘‘. . . 

catastrophic failure . . . due to ignition 

of fuel or vapors’’ as stated in 

§ 25.981(a). Thus, the overall level of 

safety achieved by these special 

conditions is considered equivalent to 

that which would be required by 

compliance with § 25.981(a)(3) and (b). 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–14–05 for the Bombardier 

CSeries airplanes was published in the 

Federal Register on July 25, 2014 (79 FR 

43318). No comments were received, 

and the special conditions are adopted 

as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. Should Bombardier 

Aerospace apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, the 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on two 

model series of airplanes. It is not a rule 

of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the following special conditions are 

issued as part of the type certification 

basis for Bombardier Aerospace Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. 

Alternate Fuel Tank Structural 

Lightning Protection Requirements 

1. Definitions 

Most of the terms used in these 

special conditions either have the 

common dictionary meaning or are 

defined in Advisory Circular 25.1309– 

1A, System Design and Analysis, dated 

June 21, 1988. The following definitions 

are the only terms intended to have a 

specialized meaning when used in these 

special conditions: 

(a) Basic Airframe Structure. Includes 

design elements such as structural 

members, structural joint features, and 

fastener systems including airplane 

skins, ribs, spars, stringers, etc., and 

associated fasteners, joints, coatings, 

and sealant. Basic airframe structure 

may also include those structural 

elements that are expected to be 

removed for maintenance, such as 

exterior fuel tank access panels and 

fairing attachment features, provided 

maintenance errors that could 

compromise associated lightning 

protection features would be evident 

upon an exterior preflight inspection of 

the airplane and would be corrected 

prior to flight. 

(b) Permanent Systems Supporting 

Structure. Includes static, permanently 

attached structural parts (such as 

brackets) that are used to support 

system elements. It does not include any 

part intended to be removed, or any 

joint intended to be separated, to 

maintain or replace system elements or 

other parts, unless that part removal or 

joint separation is accepted by the FAA 

as being extremely remote. 

(c) Manufacturing Variability. 

Includes tolerances and variability 

allowed by the design and production 

specifications as well as anticipated 

errors or escapes from the 

manufacturing and inspection 

processes. 

(d) Extremely Remote. Conditions that 

are not anticipated to occur to each 

airplane during its total life, but which 

may occur a few times when 

considering the total operational life of 

all airplanes of one type. Extremely 

remote conditions are those having an 

average probability per flight hour on 

the order of 1 × 10¥7 or less, but greater 

than on the order of 1 × 10¥9. 

(e) Extremely Improbable. Conditions 

that are so unlikely that they are not 

anticipated to occur during the entire 

operational life of all airplanes of one 

type. Extremely improbable conditions 

are those having an average probability 

per flight hour of the order of 1 × 10¥9

or less. 

2. Alternative Fuel Tank Structural 

Lightning Protection Requirements 

For lightning protection features that 

are integral to fuel tank basic airframe 

structure or permanent systems 

supporting structure, as defined in 

Special Condition No. 1, ‘‘Definitions,’’ 

for which Bombardier shows and the 

FAA finds compliance with 

§ 25.981(a)(3) to be impractical, the 

following requirements may be applied 

in lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.981(a)(3): 

(a) Bombardier must show that the 

airplane design meets the requirements 

of part 25, appendix M, as amended by 

Amendment 25–125, for all fuel tanks 

installed on the airplane. 

(b) Bombardier must show that the 

design includes at least two 

independent, effective, and reliable 

lightning protection features (or sets of 

features) such that fault tolerance to 

prevent lightning-related ignition 

sources is provided for each area of the 

structural design proposed to be shown 

compliant with these special conditions 

in lieu of compliance with the 

requirements of § 25.981(a)(3). Fault 

tolerance is not required for any specific 

design feature if: 

(1) For that feature, providing fault 

tolerance is shown to be impractical, 

and 

(2) Fuel tank vapor ignition due to 

that feature and all other non-faulttolerant features, when their fuel tank 

vapor ignition event probabilities are 

summed, is shown to be extremely 

improbable. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 43 / Thursday, March 5, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 11863 

(c) Bombardier must perform an 

analysis to show that the design, 

manufacturing processes, and the 

airworthiness limitations section of the 

instructions for continued airworthiness 

include all practical measures to 

prevent, and detect and correct, failures 

of structural lightning protection 

features due to manufacturing 

variability, aging, wear, corrosion, and 

likely damage. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

25, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05047 Filed 3–4–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

15 CFR Part 748 

[Docket No. 150206120–5120–01] 

RIN 0694–AG50 

Amendments to Existing Validated 

End-User Authorization in the People’s 

Republic of China: Samsung China 

Semiconductor Co. Ltd. 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (BIS) amends the 

Export Administration Regulations 

(EAR) to revise the existing 

authorization for Validated End User 

Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. 

(Samsung China) in the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, 

BIS amends Supplement No. 7 to Part 

748 of the EAR to add two items to 

Samsung China’s eligible items that may 

be exported, reexported or transferred 

(in country) to the company’s eligible 

facilities (also known as ‘‘eligible 

destinations’’) in the PRC. 

DATES: This rule is effective March 5, 

2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: MiYong Kim, Chair, End-User Review 

Committee, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary, Export Administration, 

Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Phone: 202– 

482-5991; Fax: 202–482–3911; Email: 

ERC@bis.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Authorization Validated End-User 

Validated End-Users (VEUs) are 

designated entities located in eligible 

destinations to which eligible items may 

be exported, reexported, or transferred 

(in-country) under a general 

authorization instead of a license. The 

names of the VEUs, as well as the dates 

they were so designated, and their 

respective eligible destinations and 

items are identified in Supplement No. 

7 to Part 748 of the EAR. Under the 

terms described in that supplement, 

VEUs may obtain eligible items without 

an export license from BIS, in 

conformity with Section 748.15 of the 

EAR. Eligible items vary between VEUs 

and may include commodities, software, 

and technology, except those controlled 

for missile technology or crime control 

reasons on the Commerce Control List 

(CCL) (part 774 of the EAR). 

VEUs are reviewed and approved by 

the U.S. Government in accordance with 

the provisions of Section 748.15 and 

Supplement Nos. 8 and 9 to Part 748 of 

the EAR. The End-User Review 

Committee (ERC), composed of 

representatives from the Departments of 

State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce, 

and other agencies, as appropriate, is 

responsible for administering the VEU 

program. BIS amended the EAR in a 

final rule published on June 19, 2007 

(72 FR 33646) to create Authorization 

VEU. 

Amendment to Existing VEU 

Authorization for Samsung China 

Semiconductor Co. Ltd (Samsung 

China) in the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) 

Revision to the List of ‘‘Eligible Items (by 

ECCN)’’ for Samsung China 

In this final rule, BIS amends 

Supplement No. 7 to Part 748 to add 

two Export Control Classification 

Numbers (ECCNs), 2B006.a and 

2B006.b.1.d, to the list of items that may 

be exported, reexported or transferred 

(in-country) to Samsung China’s facility 

in the PRC under Authorization VEU. 

The revised list of eligible items for 

Samsung China is as follows: 

Eligible Items (by ECCN) That May Be 

Exported, Reexported or Transferred 

(In-Country) to the Eligible Destination 

Identified Under Samsung China 

Semiconductor Co. Ltd.’s Validated 

End-User Authorization 

1C350.c.3, 1C350.d.7, 2B006.a, 

2B006.b.1.d, 2B230, 2B350.d.2, 

2B350.g.3, 2B350.i.3, 3A233, 3B001.a.1, 

3B001.b, 3B001.c, 3B001.e, 3B001.f, 

3B001.h, 3C002, 3C004, 3D002, and 

3E001 (limited to ‘‘technology’’ for 

items classified under 3C002 and 3C004 

and ‘‘technology’’ for use consistent 

with the International Technology 

Roadmap for Semiconductors process 

for items classified under ECCNs 3B001 

and 3B002). 

Export Administration Act 

Since August 21, 2001, the Export 

Administration Act of 1979, as 

amended, has been in lapse. However, 

the President, through Executive Order 

13222 of August 17, 2001, 3 CFR 2001 

Comp., p. 783 (2002), as amended by 

Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 

2013, 78 FR 16129 (March 13, 2013), 

and as extended by the Notice of August 

7, 2014, 79 FR 46959 (August 11, 2014) 

has continued the EAR in effect under 

the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). BIS 

continues to carry out the provisions of 

the Export Administration Act, as 

appropriate and to the extent permitted 

by law, pursuant to Executive Order 

13222, as amended by Executive Order 

13637. 

Rulemaking Requirements 

1. Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 

direct agencies to assess all costs and 

benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

(including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects, distributive impacts, and 

equity). Executive Order 13563 

emphasizes the importance of 

quantifying both costs and benefits, 

reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and 

promoting flexibility. This rule has been 

determined to be not significant for 

purposes of Executive Order 12866. 

2. This rule involves collections 

previously approved by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) under 

Control Number 0694–0088, ‘‘MultiPurpose Application,’’ which carries a 

burden hour estimate of 43.8 minutes to 

prepare and submit form BIS–748; and 

for recordkeeping, reporting and review 

requirements in connection with 

Authorization VEU, which carries an 

estimated burden of 30 minutes per 

submission. This rule is expected to 

result in a decrease in license 

applications submitted to BIS. Total 

burden hours associated with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA) and OMB 

Control Number 0694–0088 are not 

expected to increase significantly as a 

result of this rule. Notwithstanding any 

other provisions of law, no person is 

required to respond to, nor be subject to 

a penalty for failure to comply with a 

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