[Cite as D.B. v. J.P., 2024-Ohio-2489.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

[D.B.]

 Appellee

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[J.P.]

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 30063

Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 00629

(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on June 28, 2024

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J.P., Pro Se Appellant

 

D.B., Pro Se Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent J.P. appeals pro se from the trial court’s judgment granting 

D.B.’s petition for a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) against J.P. after a full hearing. 

Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that J.P. may not challenge the granting of the 

CSPO on appeal because she failed to file timely objections to the trial court’s adoption 

of the magistrate’s decision, as required by Civ.R. 65.1(G). Accordingly, the judgment of 
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the trial court will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 5, 2024, D.B. filed a pro se petition for a CSPO alleging that 

J.P. had threatened to kill her and had posted photographs of D.B. on social media in an 

effort to harm D.B.’s reputation. A full hearing occurred before the magistrate on February 

22, 2024. Following the hearing, the magistrate found that the credible evidence led to 

the conclusion that J.P. had threatened to kill D.B. in a live video streamed on social 

media on February 1, 2024, and then had assaulted D.B. by striking her outside of a 

public building on February 5, 2024. The magistrate concluded that D.B.’s fear of J.P.

was reasonable and that J.P.’s actions constituted a pattern of conduct that met the 

definition of menacing by stalking by a preponderance of the evidence; the magistrate 

therefore granted the CSPO. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision on 

February 27, 2024. J.P. did not file objections to the magistrate’s opinion and, on March 

1, 2024, J.P. filed her timely notice of appeal.

{¶ 3} On March 18, 2024, J.P. filed an “appeal letter for fair judgment regarding 

restraining order.” J.P. did not provide the hearing transcript or any record for our review. 

D.B. did not file a responsive brief.

II. Discussion 

{¶ 4} R.C. 2903.214 permits a person to seek a protection order against anyone 

over the age of 18 who has engaged in menacing by stalking, in violation of R.C. 

2903.211. That offense includes “engaging in a pattern of conduct” that knowingly causes 

“another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person 
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* * * or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A). 

{¶ 5} Civ.R. 65.1 governs civil protection orders. A trial court “may refer the 

proceedings under these special statutory proceedings to a magistrate.” R.C. 65.1(F)(1). 

If the matter is referred for a full hearing and determination, “the magistrate shall conduct 

the full hearing and, upon conclusion of the hearing, deny or grant a protection order.” 

Civ.R. 65(F)(3)(a). “A magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after a full 

hearing shall comply with the statutory requirements relating to such orders and is not 

effective unless adopted by the court.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(i). “When a magistrate has 

denied or granted a protection order after a full hearing, the court may adopt the 

magistrate’s denial or granting of the protection order upon review of the order and a 

determination that there is no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the order.” 

Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). “A court’s adoption * * * of a magistrate’s denial or granting of a 

protection order after a full hearing shall be effective when signed by the court and filed 

with the clerk.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(v). 

{¶ 6} “A party may file written objections to a court’s adoption, modification, or 

rejection of a magistrate’s denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing, or 

any terms of such an order, within fourteen days of the court’s filing of the order. * * *.” 

Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). A party objecting “under this division has the burden of showing 

that an error of law or other defect is evident on the face of the order, or that the credible 

evidence of record is insufficient to support the granting or denial of the protection order, 

or that the magistrate abused the magistrate’s discretion in including or failing to include 

specific terms in the protection order.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii). 
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{¶ 7} Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv) provides:

Objections based upon evidence of record shall be supported by a transcript 

of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate or an affidavit of that 

evidence if a transcript is not available. * * * The objecting party shall file the 

transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections 

unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript 

or other good cause. * * *

{¶ 8} Most significantly,

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order entered by the 

court under division (F)(3)(c) * * * of this rule is a final, appealable order. 

However, a party must timely file objections to such an order under division 

(F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the timely filing of such 

objections shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the 

court’s ruling on the objections. 

(Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 65.1(G).

{¶ 9} Civ.R. 65.1 was amended in 2016 “to preclude challenges to civil protection 

orders when an appellant fails to object to a trial court decision.” Curry v. Bettison, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 29662, 2023-Ohio-1911, ¶ 41. Here, the record reflects that J.P.

did not file objections to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision granting 

D.B.’s petition for a CSPO against J.P. before filing her appeal. 

{¶ 10} Curry further discussed whether a plain error analysis applies in these 

cases, noting that “Civ.R. 65.1, unlike Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), does not provide for plain 
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error review where a party fails to object to a decision in the trial court.” Id. at ¶ 2. Curry 

clarified and summarized the analysis that should occur in Civ.R. 65.1 appeals, stating: 

(1) where litigants fail to comply with Civ.R. 65.1(G)’s requirement of filing 

of objections, they cannot challenge the trial court’s decision on appeal, and 

the decision must be affirmed; (2) no issues that are raised, whether they 

are phrased as error or plain error, can be considered; (3) this court should 

not engage in any analysis that directly or indirectly involves the merits of 

the trial court order; (4) where a litigant has objected in the trial court as 

specified by Civ.R. 65.1, this court retains the ability to consider error that 

is raised on appeal, including plain error, if the latter type of error is raised 

by a party * * *; and (5) when a party fails to file objections, the court of 

appeals cannot consider or cite the content of the transcript.

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 67.

{¶ 11} Because J.P. failed to file objections in the trial court before filing her appeal, 

we are precluded from considering her arguments. The judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

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EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.