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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

YVETTE J. HARRELL,

Case No

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CITY OF OPA-LOCKA

Defendant. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT

This is an action by Plaintiff, Yvette Harrell, for discrimination due to her gender in 

violation and retaliation 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“Title VII”); 42 U.S.C. §1981 (“§1981); the Florida 

Civil Rights Act of 1992 Section 760.01-760.11 (“FCRA”), Florida’s Whistleblower Act, Fla. Stat. 

§ 112.3187, and breach of contract, to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex 

and to provide appropriate relief to the Plaintiff, Yvette Harrell (“Ms. Harrell” or “Harrell”), who 

was adversely affected by such practices of the Defendant, City of Opa- Locka, (“City”).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 as this 

action arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Jurisdiction also exists pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §1343 (a)(4) in that it seeks to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief 

under actions of Congress, specifically 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 42 U.S.C. §2000e which provide 

causes of action for the protection of Constitutional and civil rights, injunctive remedies, damages 

and reasonable attorney’s fees. Plaintiff further invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 

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28 USC §1332 as diversity exists between the parties. Finally, the court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367.

2. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because the DEFENDANTS 

conduct business in the Southern District of Florida, and further because a substantial part of the 

events giving rise to the Complaint occurred in the Southern District of Florida. 

3. This is an action for damages exceeding $75,000.00, exclusive of costs, interest and 

attorneys’ fees.

PARTIES

4. Yvette Harrell is a citizen of the United States and is a resident of Miami-Dade County, 

Florida. At all times relevant herein, Harrell worked for the City.

5. City of Opa-Locka is a municipal corporation established under the constitution of the State 

of Florida.

6. At all times relevant, City has done business in Florida and has been an employer affecting 

commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 

(g) and (h).

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

7. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Ms. Harrell filed a dual Charge 

of Discrimination with the EEOC and the Florida Civil Rights Commission alleging that the City 

violated Title VII.

8. EEOC sent the Charge to the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice issued a 

Right to Sue letter on January 31, 2020. Ms. Harrell received the certified letter on February 8, 

2020. See Exhibit 1 and 2.

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9. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

10. Ms. Harrell is a female with over 15 years of experience as an attorney at law.

11. Ms. Harrell was hired as the assistant City Manager from June 2015 to March 2016. 

12. Ms. Harrell was retained again as the assistant City Manager for the time period of March 

2016 to April 2016, in where she worked as the acting interim and permanent City Manager from 

April 2016 to July 2017.

13. Ms. Harrell became the City Manager in the midst of a financially chaotic and uncertain

time which involved a State Oversight Board and which was accompanied investigations by 

several agencies, including one that included the arrest and conviction of high-level city officials.

14. Faced with issues of the most significant magnitude (insolvency of the City was 

considered), Ms. Harrell took the position and using her business acumen and legal skills, went to 

work for the people of the City of Opa-locka. 

15. While working during her first tenure, under her administration, Ms. Harrell reduced 

spending in the City by hundreds of thousands of dollars, identified monies available to the City, 

terminated non-beneficial agreements and identified redundant personnel positions.

16. In spite of the City’s obvious progression under her administration, Commissioner Kelley 

would often state that because of Ms. Harrell’s ineptitude, he desired to have the former male City 

Manager return. 

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17. During this time, Commissioner Joseph Kelley would constantly undermine and minimize 

Ms. Harrell’s efforts, blatantly disregard her authority as the City Manager, require staff to work 

directly with him in contradiction of her directives and belittle her in the public Commission 

meetings.

18. At one point, after yet another maligning interaction with Commissioner Kelley, Ms. 

Harrell, advised the City in a written email that she would no longer tolerate the hostile work 

environment and discriminatory treatment of Commissioner Kelley.

19. In spite of this illegal treatment, Ms. Harrell continued to try to work with Commissioner 

Kelley for the betterment of the City, to no avail.

20. Finally after having accomplished her goal of stabilizing the City’s finances to a point 

where insolvency was no longer a public discussion, she decided she would relieve herself of the 

discriminatory and unrelenting treatment of Commissioner Kelley.

21. Having a heart for the people of Opa-locka and a desire to help “right” the decades of 

“wrongs” against them, Ms. Harrell returned to the City as City Manager to once again assist with 

the financial disclosures that were overdue to the State.

22. Ms. Harrell was retained again to act as the City Manager from October 2018 to until 

December 12, 2018, when she was unlawfully terminated and defamed by Commissioner Kelley 

and his co-conspirators.

23. Commissioner Kelley stated on various occasions immediately prior to and upon Ms. 

Harrell’s return that he would not work with “that lady” because Ms. Harrell refused to recognize 

him as the “Senior Stateman” in the City.

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24. True to his word, Commissioner Kelley began to disparage and threaten to do “whatever 

[he] had to” to either prevent Ms. Harrell’s return or make sure she was terminated. 

25. Prior to the Contract being presented to the City Commission for approval, it was discussed 

with and encouraged by the then head of the State Oversight Board which governed the City’s 

expenditures, prior to being presented to the City Commission.

26. In fact, when asked about the possibility of a contract for Ms. Harrell, the then head of the 

State Oversight Board stated, “of course. No one would take that job without some assurances.”

27. In spite of Commissioner Kelley’s efforts, he failed at preventing Ms. Harrell’s reemployment with the City and the City Commission approved her return and her employment 

contract (the “Contract).

28. Immediately upon her return to the City as Manager, Ms. Harrell began to work on the 

budget and other financial disclosures.

29. Having an intimate knowledge of the pressure often placed on employees by outside 

influences, Ms. Harrell also began to meet with the employees to discuss any concerns they may 

have concerning the City’s operation.

30. In those initial meetings with employees, two employees on different occasions revealed 

that they were pressured to work for the personal benefit of one of the commissioners during Citywork hours.

31. Both employees, one of whom was a manager, advised Ms. Harrell that they felt that if 

they failed to perform as required, they would be terminated.

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32. Upon learning of yet another instance of unethical and potentially illegal activities in the 

City, Ms. Harrell forwarded communication to the City Commission and City Attorney advising 

of her concerns and requesting whistleblower protection under Florida’s Whistleblower Act, Fla. 

Stat. § 112.3187.

33. Ms. Harrell also reported what she had become aware of to the Miami-Dade County Ethics 

Commission (“Ethics”) among others the correspondence forwarded to the City Commission 

included Ethics in the list of recipients.

34. During another meeting with personnel, Ms. Harrell also became aware of an incident 

involving the wife of Commissioner Kelley and her attempt at interfering in a law enforcement 

investigation concerning her family member.

35. Ms. Harrell was immediately retaliated against once the City received the email concerning 

the investigations that she was conducting.

36. Specifically, the hostile work environment conditions as caused by Commissioner Kelley 

worsened.

37. During this time, the City was preparing for an election for several seats on the 

Commission.

38. Commissioner Kelley assured individuals in the City that he would work to get certain 

individuals elected and once elected he would guarantee that Ms. Harrell would be terminated 

shortly thereafter.

39. The City did not respond to Ms. Harrell’s investigation disclosure or her request for 

whistleblower protection.

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40. However, at least one of the then-seated elected officials individually informally inquired 

into Ms. Harrell’s investigations and advised that they supported the investigation and elimination 

of any wrongdoings, especially as it related to City employees.

41. As Ms. Harrell was investigating the incidents, she was cooperating with Ethics, and 

provided them with documents, names and other information she had uncovered. 

42. Throughout this time, Commissioner Kelley continued to disparage and belittle Ms. 

Harrell, refused to directly speak with her, publicly announced that he would see to it that the 

former male City manager would return and she would be terminated.

43. During these investigations and Ms. Harrell’s other administrative duties, Commissioner 

Kelley was multiple individuals that if “she” would meet with him “and reassure him” that she 

would treat him the way she treated the then-Mayor Myra Taylor, he would reconsider the item to 

terminate her.

44. Although humiliated by having to address the individual who had constantly caused a 

hostile work environment and treated her with disdain and disregard simply because of her gender, 

Ms. Harrell agreed to meet with the Commissioner for what she believed to be the “good of the 

City.”

45. During that meeting, the Commissioner reiterated his role as the “Senior Stateman” and 

reprimanded Ms. Harrell for not seeking his direction before making decisions in the City, 

including the undergoing investigations.

46. Ms. Harrell advised the Commissioner that she was aware of the disparaging comments he 

made about her (even giving direct examples) and that she was aware of the fact that he desired 

the return of the former city manager who was male.

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47. Commissioner Kelley never denied making any of the unprofessional and gender-based 

comments but did admit to wanting the return of the former city manager.

48. Realizing that this meeting was likely simply another way the Commissioner sought to 

further express his dominance over her, Ms. Harrell advised him that she believed she had acted 

in conformance with her duty as City Manager and that she did not believe anything she could do 

would change how he felt about her.

49. The meeting ended with formalities and with the Commissioner advising, he would “wait 

to see how she acted” before determining whether he would withdraw the item for her termination. 

50. Recognizing that she would likely be terminated, Ms. Harrell began to work with personnel 

even more diligently to ensure that the City’s overdue financial disclosures as well as the 

environmental conditions that were impacting the health of the residents were being finalized and 

addressed.

51. Within a little more than a month after being rehired, Ms. Harrell was able to present the 

City with a balanced budget that was passed and implemented and she also implemented corrective 

measures to mitigate the environmental health concerns of the City. The proof of which was welldocumented and available for review.

52. Shortly after implementing a program to address the absurdly high water bills that residents 

were receiving in addition to reviving dormant negotiations with the law enforcement union, 

Commissioner Kelley conspired with some of the newly elected officials to terminate Ms. Harrell.

53. At least one newly elected official was not able to be influenced and blatantly refused to 

accept or go along with the scheme to wrongfully terminate Ms. Harrell.

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54. In spite of the achievement realized under Ms. Harrell’s administration in such a short time, 

the City Commission wrongfully terminated Ms. Harrell and refused to honor the Contract that 

had been in operation between the City and Ms. Harrell since her return to the City.

55. Ms. Harrell stated repeatedly that she stood by the allegations made in in her Whistleblower

complaint and that she was entitled to receive all benefits due to her under the terms of the agreed 

upon and Commission-approved Contract.

56. The City ignored the known discriminatory treatment of Ms. Harrell, her request for 

Whistleblower protection as well as its obligations under her employment Contract and unlawfully 

terminated Ms. Harrell.

COUNT I -VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1981

(Disparate Treatment)

57. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein. 

58. At all times asserted herein, the PLAINTIFF was in a contractual relationship with 

DEFENDANT as a result of their employment relationship as defined within Section 1981 and as 

such, prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex. 

59. The incidents alleged previously by the PLAINTIFF, establish that the DEFENDANT 

intentionally discriminated against her due to her sex, as she was subjected to disparate treatment 

compared to her male counterparts in regard to job classifications, compensation rates, training, 

the enforcement of DEFENDANT policies and procedures and other conduct which may become 

known throughout the course of discovery, in violation of Section 1981. 

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60. The DEFENDANT’S conduct in treating the PLAINTIFF differently than her male 

counterparts was due, in whole or part, to her gender, which was a motivating factor or 

determinative factor for the disparate treatment, in violation of Section 1981. 

61. As depicted in the actions described above, the DEFENDANT’S conduct substantially 

impaired the enjoyment of the privileges and benefits of the PLAINTIFF’S employment contract 

in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 

62. DEFENDANT’S purported reasons for the actions taken against PLAINTIFF are pretext 

for discrimination.

63. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S sex discrimination, the PLAINTIFF 

suffered lost earnings and benefits, impairment of earning capacity, benefits and/or retirement 

benefits, loss of reputation, professional and personal embarrassment, and other emotional distress, 

including anxiety, anguish, humiliation and other incidental and consequential damages and 

expenses and thus is entitled to monetary and compensatory relief. 

64. The conduct of DEFENDANT, as set forth above, was intentional, willful, malicious, 

oppressive, reckless and done in complete disregard of the PLAINTIFF’S rights thereby justifying 

an award of punitive damages from the DEFENDANT. 

65. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of Section 1981, 

as heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the services of counsel in 

an effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, and hence forced to incur 

legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to the PLAINTIFF, 

who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in that regard when the same shall 

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be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests that attorneys’ fees be awarded 

pursuant to Section 1981. 

COUNT II -VIOLATION OF TITLE VII-GENDER DISCRIMINATION

(42 U.S.C. §2000E ET.SEQ.)

66. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein. 

67. At all relevant times, DEFENDANT conducted business and operated out of the Southern 

District of Florida, employing greater than 15 employees and thus was an “employer” as defined 

in Title VII, and as such prohibited from discriminating in employment on the basis of gender. 

See 42 U.S.C. §2000e.

68. At all relevant times it was unlawful for DEFENDANT, as an employer, discriminate 

against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of 

employment, because of gender. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.

69. At all relevant times, the PLAINTIFF was an employee within the meaning of Title VII, 

protected against discrimination in employment on the basis of her gender. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e.

70. Throughout her employment and up until her employment ended DEFENDANT, by and 

through agents, discriminated against PLAINTIFF on the basis of her gender as alleged previously 

herein. As such, the PLAINTIFF’S gender was a determining factor in DEFENDANT’S 

employment decisions, including her compensation, terms and conditions of employment. 

71. Through the actions described above, the DEFENDANT knowingly and willfully 

discriminated against the PLAINTIFF on the basis of her gender, in violation of Title VII. 

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72. DEFENDANT’S purported reasons for the actions taken against PLAINTIFF are pretext 

for discrimination.

73. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S gender discrimination, the 

PLAINTIFF suffered lost earnings and fringe benefits, loss of reputation, professional and 

personal embarrassment, and other emotional distress, including anxiety, anguish, humiliation and 

other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, and thus is entitled to monetary 

compensatory relief. 

74. The conduct of DEFENDANT, as set forth above, was intentional, willful, malicious, 

oppressive, reckless and done in complete disregard of the PLAINTIFF’S rights thereby justifying 

an award of punitive damages from the DEFENDANT. 

75. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of Title VII, as 

heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the services of counsel in an 

effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, and hence forced to incur 

legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to the PLAINTIFF, 

who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in that regard when the same shall 

be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests that attorneys’ fees be awarded 

pursuant to Title VII. 

COUNT III-VIOLATION FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(GENDER DISCRIMINATION)

75. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein. 

76. At all relevant times, DEFENDANT’S conducted business and operated out of the 

Southern District of Florida, employing greater than 15 employees and thus was an “employer” as 

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defined in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, ss. 760.02, and as such prohibited from 

discriminating in employment on the basis of gender. 

77. At all relevant times it was unlawful for DEFENDANT, as employers, to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of 

employment, because of gender under the Florida Civil Rights Act. 

78. At all relevant times, the PLAINTIFF was an employee within the meaning of the Florida 

Civil Rights Act of 1992, protected against discrimination in employment on the basis of her 

gender. 

79. Throughout her employment and up until her employment ended DEFENDANT, by and 

through agents, discriminated against PLAINTIFF on the basis of her gender as alleged previously 

herein. As such, the PLAINTIFF’S gender was a determining factor in DEFENDANT’S 

employment decisions, including her compensation, terms and conditions of employment and 

ultimate departure.

80. Through the actions described above, the Defendant knowingly and willfully discriminated 

against the PLAINTIFF on the basis of her gender, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 

1992. 

81. DEFENDANT’S purported reasons for the actions taken against PLAINTIFF are pretext 

for discrimination.

82. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S gender discrimination, the 

PLAINTIFF suffered lost earnings and benefits, impairment of earning capacity, loss of reputation, 

professional and personal embarrassment, and other emotional distress, including anxiety, anguish, 

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humiliation and other incidental and consequential damages and expenses, and thus is entitled to 

monetary and compensatory relief. 

83. The conduct of DEFENDANT, as set forth above, was intentional, willful, malicious, 

oppressive, reckless and done in complete disregard of the PLAINTIFF’S rights thereby justifying 

an award of liquidated and punitive damages from the DEFENDANT.

84. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of the Florida 

Civil Rights Act, as heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the 

services of counsel in an effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, 

and hence forced to incur legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently 

unknown to the PLAINTIFF, who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in 

that regard when the same shall be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests 

that attorneys’ fees be awarded pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act. 

COUNT IV-VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1981

(RETALIATION)

85. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein.

86. At all times asserted herein, the PLAINTIFF was in a contractual relationship with 

DEFENDANT as a result of their employment relationship as defined within Section 1981 and as 

such, DEFENDANT was prohibited from discriminating against PLAINTIFF on the basis of her 

race. 

87. The incidents alleged previously by the PLAINTIFF, establish that the DEFENDANT 

intentionally discriminated against her due to her sex, or that she reasonably perceived the 

DEFENDANT’S conduct as sexual discriminatory. 

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88. The PLAINTIFF complained of and opposed sexual discrimination during the contractual 

employment relationship with the DEFENDANT specifically, by complaining that she was 

enduring a hostile work environment by opposing the differential enforcement of policies between 

herself and male counterparts. 

89. As a result of opposing sexual discrimination, the PLAINTIFF enjoyed the protections 

afforded under 42 U.S.C. §1981 against retaliation in employment. 

90. The aforesaid actions created a hostile working environment ultimately causing the 

PLAINTIFF emotional stress, anxiety, embarrassment and defamation.

91. A causal connection exists between the PLAINTIFF’S protected activities as described 

above and the aforementioned conduct. 

92. The aforementioned acts of retaliation occurred during PLAINTIFF’S tenure of 

employment with DEFENDANT and after she opposed gender discrimination.

93. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANT pervaded the workplace and resulted in fear 

of, and actual adverse actions against the PLAINTIFF.

94. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANT were intentional, mean spirited, done with 

malice and ill will and consistent with the mindset that discriminatory behavior was acceptable, 

and that any such complaints were to be responded to by an unrelenting barrage of retaliatory 

conduct including but not limited to isolation, demeaning work-assignments and comments, 

decreased compensation, and false accusations of impropriety. 

95. As a direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S actions as described above, the 

PLAINTIFF has suffered compensatory damages including, back pay, front pay, loss of income 

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and benefits, pension and/or retirement benefits, impairment of earning capacity, emotional 

distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and 

expenses. 

96. The DEFENDANT’S actions were intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless and 

conducted in callous disregard of causing harm to the PLAINTIFF, entitling her to punitive 

damages under 42 U.S.C. §1981. 

97. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of Section 1981, 

as heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the services of counsel in 

an effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, and hence forced to incur 

legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to the PLAINTIFF, 

who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in that regard when the same shall 

be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests that attorneys’ fees be awarded. 

COUNT V- VIOLATION OF TITLE VII- RETALIATION

(42 U.S.C. §2000E ET.SEQ.)

98. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein.

99. At all times mentioned herein, PLAINTIFF was an employee within the meaning of Title 

VII protected against retaliation due to her opposition to and complaints about gender 

discrimination.

100. The incidents alleged previously by the PLAINTIFF, establish that the DEFENDANT 

intentionally discriminated against her due to her gender, or that she reasonably perceived the 

DEFENDANT’S conduct as discriminatory. 

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101. The PLAINTIFF complained of and opposed gender discrimination during her tenure, 

specifically, by complaining that she was enduring a hostile work environment by opposing the 

differential enforcement of policies between herself and male employees. 

102. The PLAINTIFF’S actions in opposing gender discrimination and complaining about such 

conduct were protected activities under Title VII. 

103. The DEFENDANT subjected PLAINTIFF to materially adverse employment actions after 

she engaged in the aforesaid protected activities. Such as reducing her voice as the City Manager 

in public meetings.

104. A causal connection exists between the PLAINTIFF’S protected activities as described 

above and the aforementioned conduct. 

105. PLAINTIFF was treated less favorably than non-complaining co-workers, disciplined and 

ultimately terminated by the DEFENDANT in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of Title 

VII for opposing and complaining about gender discrimination she was being subjected to by her 

male colleagues; and further for questioning the DEFENDANT’S failure to properly investigate 

her complaints. 

106. The aforementioned acts of retaliation occurred during PLAINTIFF’S tenure of 

employment with DEFENDANT and after she opposed gender discrimination.

107. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANT pervaded the workplace and resulted in fear 

of, and actual adverse actions against the PLAINTIFF.

108. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANT were intentional, mean spirited, done with 

malice and ill will and consistent with the mindset that discriminatory behavior was acceptable, 

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and that any such complaints were to be responded to by an unrelenting barrage of retaliatory 

conduct including but not limited to isolation, demeaning work-assignments and comments, 

decreased compensation, and false accusations of impropriety. 

109. As a direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S actions as described above, the 

PLAINTIFF has suffered compensatory damages including, back pay, front pay, loss of income 

and benefits, pension and/or retirement benefits, impairment of earning capacity, emotional 

distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and 

expenses. 

110. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of Title VII, as 

heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the services of counsel in an 

effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, and hence forced to incur 

legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently unknown to the PLAINTIFF, 

who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in that regard when the same shall 

be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests that attorneys’ fees be awarded 

pursuant to Title VII. 

COUNT VI- FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(RETALIATION)

111. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein.

112. At all times mentioned herein, PLAINTIFF was an employee within the meaning of the 

Florida Civil Rights Act protected against retaliation due to her opposition to and complaints about 

gender discrimination. 

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113. The incidents alleged previously by the PLAINTIFF, establish that the DEFENDANT 

intentionally discriminated against her due to her gender, or that she reasonably perceived the 

DEFENDANT’S conduct as discriminatory. 

114. The PLAINTIFF complained of and opposed gender discrimination during her tenure, 

specifically, by complaining that she was enduring a hostile work environment by opposing the 

differential enforcement of policies between herself and male employees. 

115. The PLAINTIFF’S actions in opposing gender discrimination and complaining about such 

conduct were protected activities under the Florida Civil Rights Act.

116. The DEFENDANT subjected PLAINTIFF to materially adverse employment actions after

she engaged in the aforesaid protected activities. The actions include engaging in conduct 

intended to isolate her from colleagues; initiating investigations into her conduct, stripping her of 

supervisory and other actions intended to negatively impact the PLAINTIFF’S ability to perform 

her duties. 

117. A causal connection exists between the PLAINTIFF’S protected activities as described 

above and the aforementioned conduct.

118. PLAINTIFF was treated less favorably than non-complaining co-workers, disciplined and 

ultimately terminated by the DEFENDANTS in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of the 

Florida Civil Rights Act for opposing and complaining about the gender discrimination she was 

being subjected to by her male colleagues; and further for questioning the DEFENDANT’S failure 

to properly investigate her complaints. 

119. The aforementioned acts of retaliation occurred during PLAINTIFFS tenure of 

employment with DEFENDANT and after she opposed gender discrimination.

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120. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANT pervaded the workplace and resulted in fear 

of, and actual adverse actions against the PLAINTIFF.

121. The aforementioned acts of the DEFENDANTS were intentional, mean spirited, done with 

malice and ill will and consistent with the mindset that discriminatory behavior was acceptable, 

and that any such complaints were to be responded to by an unrelenting barrage of retaliatory 

conduct including but not limited to isolation, demeaning work-assignments and comments, 

decreased compensation, and false accusations of impropriety.

122. As a direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S actions as described above, the 

PLAINTIFF has suffered compensatory damages including, back pay, front pay, loss of income 

and benefits, pension and/or retirement benefits, impairment of earning capacity, emotional 

distress, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, and other incidental and consequential damages and 

expenses. 

123. As further direct and proximate result of the DEFENDANT’S violations of the Florida 

Civil Rights Act, as heretofore described, the PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the 

services of counsel in an effort to enforce the laws of this State prohibiting such discrimination, 

and hence forced to incur legal fees and costs, the full nature and extent of which are presently 

unknown to the PLAINTIFF, who therefore will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint in 

that regard when the same shall be fully and finally ascertained. As such, PLAINTIFF requests 

that attorneys’ fees be awarded pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act. 

COUNT VII-Violation of Florida’s Whistleblower Statute

Fla. Stat. § 112.3187

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124. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein.

125. At all relevant times, DEFENDANT conducted business and operated out of Miami-Dade 

County, Florida, was and is an “Agency” as defined under Fla. Stat. Ch. 112.3187(3)(a) and was 

the employer of PLAINTIFF. 

126. All conditions precedent to the bringing of this action including compliance with Fla. State. 

Ch.112.3187(8), have occurred, or have been attempted by the PLANITIFF, to no avail due to 

DEFENDANT’S refusal to investigate her timely submitted complaints; or alternatively, there are 

no conditions precedent required of the PLANTIFF to exhaust administratively prior to bringing 

the subject complaint.

127. DEFENDANT is responsible for all acts committed by its officers, agents and employees 

within the scope of their employment, including the board of City commissioners.

128. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’s unlawful retaliatory action, 

PLANTIFF was terminated and thus denied the opportunities attendant to same including the 

ability to earn income, pay increases, fringe benefits and promotional opportunities as associated 

and provided through employment with the DEFENDANT. Further, as a result of 

DEFENDANT’S unlawful practices, PLAINTIFF will continue to lose substantial income 

including, but not limited to, wages, commissions and fringe benefits, loss of potential for 

promotion within her career track, damage to her personal and professional reputations, loss of 

self-esteem, loss of sense of personal and professional security, as such PLAINTIFF requests an 

award of back and front pay as determined by the proofs.

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129. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S willful, knowing and intentional 

conduct, the PLAINTIFF has suffered and will continue to suffer emotional mental anguish and 

distress, outrage and anxiety about his future and ability to support herself, harm to her 

employability and earning capacity; embarrassment among friend, and colleagues; undermining 

of self-esteem and motivation, disruption of his personal life and loss of enjoyment of the ordinary 

pleasures of everyday life, as such she is entitled to general and compensatory damages in an 

amount to be proven at trial. 

130. As a further direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S violations of Fla. Stat. Ch. 

§112.3187, et. Seq., PLAINTIFF has been compelled to retain the services of counsel in an effort 

to enforce the law of this State prohibiting such conduct, and hence forced to incur legal fees and 

costs, in an amount to be proven at trial. 

COUNT VIII-Breach of Contract

131. PLAINTIFF adopts and re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth in Paragraphs ten 

(10) to fifty-six (56) above as thought fully rewritten herein.

132. The is an action for breach of an agreed upon contract for employment as the City Manager 

for the City of Opa-Locka and the Plaintiff.

133. Both parties agreed to the terms of the contract and the agreement was unanimously 

approved and voted on by the City Commission during a public meeting.1

134. Defendant beached the agreement and failed to pay the Plaintiff all monies and benefits 

due under the agreement since December 12, 2018.

1 Defendant never gave finalized agreement to Plaintiff but operated under the agreement until the unlawful 

termination of Plaintiff.

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135. Defendant remains liable for all monies and benefits due and owing to the Plaintiff.

136. Plaintiff has suffered damages as result of the Defendant’s breach of the approved 

agreement in a presently indeterminable amount.

137. All conditions precedent necessary of the institution of the claim has been complied with 

by the Plaintiff and the same has been waived or excused by the Defendant.

138. Plaintiff has incurred costs and has retained the undersigned attorney to bring this action 

and is obligated to pay said attorney a reasonable fee for its services.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF, Yvette Harrell, seeks judgment against DEFENDANTS, and 

respectfully requests the entry of a Judgment as follows:

(a) Declare and adjudge that DEFENDANT has violated the PLAINTIFF’S 

rights under 42 U.S.C. §1981 et. seq., 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq. (Title VII), 

and Fla. Stat. Ch. 760, et. seq. (Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992); 

(b) Award compensatory and punitive damages to the PLAINTIFF against

DEFENDANT to the full extent allowed under 42 U.S.C.§1981, Title VII 

and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, in amount(s) to be determined at 

trial;

(c) Award monetary, general, equitable and/or special damages to the 

PLAINTIFF under 42 U.S.C. §1981 et. seq., 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq., and 

Fla. Stat. Ch. 760, et. seq., including but not limited to back pay [wages, 

salary, fringe benefits and pre-judgment interest], front pay, and medical 

and retirement benefits, preferential rights to jobs and other damages for 

lost compensation and job benefits with pre-judgment and post-judgment 

interest suffered by the PLAINTIFF, to be determined at trial;

(d) Award PLAINTIFF the costs and expenses incurred in this action, including 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses as provided by 42 

U.S.C. §1981 et. seq., 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq., and Fla. Stat. Ch. 760, et. 

seq.; 

(e) Award statutory interest to the full extent provided 42 U.S.C. §1981 et. seq., 

42 U.S.C. §2000e, et. seq., and Fla. Stat. Ch. 760, et. seq.;

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(f) Award PLANTIFF compensatory and punitive damages against DEFENDANT to 

the full extent allowed under Fla. Stat. § 112.3187; 

(g) Award damages for Breach of Contract and,

(h) Award the PLAINTIFF any such additional relief as this Court deems just 

and proper.

JURY DEMAND

PLAINTIFF, Yvette Harrell, hereby requests a trial by jury on all issues. 

Dated: May 7, 2020. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

/S/Arnold S. Gaines

Arnold S. Gaines, Esq. [FBN 670928] 

Law Offices of Gaines & Nolan 

2100 SE Hillmoor Drive, Suite 106 

Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 

asg@gainesnolan.com

772-200-4600 office

772-200-4575 fax

Counsel for Plaintiff

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