Service Assessment

Southeastern United States Tornadoes

April 8, 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Silver Spring, Maryland
Cover:

Tornado damage in Jefferson County, Alabama. Photographs courtesy of Bob Chartuk,

Bohemia, New York.
Service Assessment

Southeastern United States Tornadoes

April 8, 1998

July 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

William M. Daley, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

D. James Baker, Administrator

National Weather Service

John J. Kelly, Jr., Assistant Administrator

National Weather Service - Southern Region

X. William Proenza, Acting Director
ii

PREFACE

On the evening of April 8, 1998, tornadoes powerful as F5 on the Fujita Scale swept through the

northern half of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia causing considerable loss of life, injuries and

property loss. The National Weather Service’s Southern Region Headquarters in Ft. Worth,

Texas, coordinated a Regional Service Assessment Team to review the operations and

effectiveness of products and services provided during the event by NWS offices at Memphis,

Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; and Atlanta, Georgia.

The assessment team consisted of Team Leader Andy Anderson, Meteorologist in Charge of

NWSFO Lubbock, Texas; NWS Eastern Region Public Affairs Officer, Bob Chartuk; NWSO

Melbourne, Florida, Warning Coordination Meteorologist, Dennis Decker; Steve Hunter, Science

and Operations Officer at NWSO Morristown, Tennessee; Jim Stefkovich, Warning Coordination

Meteorologist, NWSFO Fort Worth, Texas; and Joe Baxter, Emergency Management Agency

Director for Lawrenceburg/Lawrence County, Tennessee.

The National Weather Service thanks the Emergency Management and News Media personnel

who generously assisted the Assessment Team during the trying and busy period that followed

this disaster. Most of all, we appreciate the storm survivors for their willingness to relate their

experiences; often while standing in their devastated neighborhoods. Thanks are also due the staff

of NWSFOs Birmingham, Atlanta and Memphis for their help and support of this assessment. 

The team members are commended for their willingness to respond, and for the hard work both in

the field and in the preparation of this Service Assessment Report.

X. William Proenza

Acting Director, Southern Region Headquarters

July 1998
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale ....................................................v

Assessment Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Facts, Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
iv

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFOS Automation of Field Operations and Services

ASOS Automated Surface Observing System

AWIPS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System

CAPE Convective Available Potential Energy

dBz Decibels (with respect to reflectivity Z)

EAS Emergency Alert System

EMA Emergency Management Agency

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

HMT Hydrometeorological Technician

J/Kg Joules/Kilogram

Kg/M Kilogram/Square Meter 2

mb Millibar

MIC Meteorologist In Charge

m/s Meters per second

N-AWIPS National Centers-Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System

NAWAS National Warning System

nm Nautical Mile

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NWR NOAA Weather Radio

NWS National Weather Service

NWSFO NEXRAD Weather Service Forecast Office

NWWS NOAA Weather Wire Service

PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency

PUP Principal User Processor

RAMSDIS (RAMM [Regional and Mesoscale Meteorology]

Advanced Meteorological Satellite Demonstration 

and Interpretation System)

Rmax Maximum Unambiguous Range

ROAMS Remote On-Air Monitoring System

RPS Routine Product Set

SAME Specific-Area Message Encoder

SOO Science and Operations Officer

SPC Storm Prediction Center

UTC Coordinated Universal Time

VCP Volume Coverage Pattern

VIL Vertically Integrated Liquid Water Content

WCM Warning Coordination Meteorologist

WSR-88D Weather Surveillance Radar-1988 Doppler (NEXRAD)
v

FUJITA TORNADO INTENSITY SCALE

Category Definition-Effect

(F0) Gale tornado (40-72 mph): Light damage. Some damage to chimneys; break

branches off trees; push over shallow-rooted trees; damage sign boards.

(F1) Moderate tornado (73-112 mph): Moderate damage. The lower limit is the

beginning of hurricane wind speed; peel surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off

foundations or overturned; moving autos pushed off the roads.

(F2) Significant tornado (113-157): Considerable damage. Roofs torn off frame

houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees snapped or

uprooted; light-object missiles generated.

(F3) Severe tornado (158-206 mph): Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn off

well-constructed homes; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy

cars lifted off ground and thrown.

(F4) Devastating tornado (207-260 mph): Devastating damage. Well-constructed

houses leveled; structure with weak foundation blown off some distance; cars

thrown and large missiles generated.

(F5) Incredible tornado (261-318 mph): Incredible damage. Strong frame houses lifted

off foundations and carried considerable distance to disintegrate; automobile-sized

missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 yards; trees debarked; incredible

phenomena will occur.
1

ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The Event

In the late afternoon of Wednesday, April 8, 1998, severe thunderstorms quickly developed over

Mississippi, Arkansas and southwest Tennessee. During the evening, some of the more powerful

storms generated tornadoes that caused massive property damage and loss of life along a path

from northeast Mississippi through central Alabama into northern Georgia. Hardest hit were

Jefferson and St. Clair Counties in the Birmingham, Alabama, Metropolitan area. In the wake of 

these storms, 36 people lost their lives, 273 were injured and property damage was estimated at

over $300 million.

While this Service Assessment documents events and services along this three state corridor, the

bulk of the report is directed to the massive destruction and loss of life in Alabama and the

services provided by NWSFO Birmingham.

The widespread catastrophic damage in Jefferson County, caused by winds in excess of 260 miles

per hour and a damage path up to 3/4 of a mile wide, prompted visits to Birmingham from

President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. The affected counties were declared disaster

areas and drew emergency responses from the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

Department of Labor, Small Business Administration, National Guard, Red Cross, numerous

volunteers, and dozens of state and local agencies.

This path of destruction began about 6:30 p.m. CDT with one storm fatality in Pontotoc County,

Mississippi, and ended near midnight with a death in De Kalb County, Georgia. The storms killed

34 people in Alabama—32 in Jefferson County and 2 in St. Clair County. Some of the tornadoes

produced tracks greater than 30 miles long. The most intense tornado, an F5—one of the worst

in Alabama history—moved through Jefferson County destroying more than 1,100 permanent

homes and damaging almost 1,000 more. 

This was a well forecast event. Widely disseminated NWS releases throughout the day increased

public, local government and media awareness that there was an unusually high threat of severe

weather. The Storm Prediction Center (SPC) forecast a high risk of severe storms for the

northern half of Mississippi and Alabama, and northwest Georgia. Thunderstorm Outlooks from

NWSFOs Memphis, Birmingham and Atlanta all emphasized the likelihood of a significant severe

weather outbreak. Severe storms were also reflected in the Zone Forecasts throughout the day.

Emergency management and the media told the Service Assessment Team they were in a state of

high alert and Emergency Operations Centers were open and functioning when storm warnings

were posted. Some television meteorologists met with station management that afternoon to
2

advise that severe weather coverage was likely, as was the disruption of regular programming for

on-air warnings and updates. One TV meteorologist visited the Birmingham NWS office on the

way to work. He said when he left the office, “I felt part of the team,” and upon arriving at work,

briefed station management and prepared graphics on severe weather safety rules.

The SPC issued the first Tornado Watch (#188) at 2:00 p.m. CDT for northern and central

Mississippi and northern and central Alabama, valid until 8:00 p.m. All meteorological

ingredients were in place for supercell storms, but a strong 700 mb capping inversion delayed

convection in the western part of the watch area until late in the afternoon. Once convection

began, it was explosive and fast moving. Tornado Watch #188 was replaced by Tornado Watch

#194 at 7:30 p.m. CDT for the same general area of Mississippi and Alabama, valid until 2:00

a.m. CDT. In Georgia, Tornado Watch #192, issued at 7:36 p.m. EDT, covered the northern half

of the state until 2:00 a.m., April 9. At 1:15 a.m. EDT, it was replaced by Tornado Watch #196,

which was valid for essentially the same area until 7:00 a.m. EDT.

This was not an event where an office could focus on a few severe storms. Supercell

thunderstorms were widespread, especially in central and northern Alabama. Almost 300 severe

storm warnings were issued by NWSFOs Memphis, Birmingham and Atlanta on April 8. The

offices’ staffs were extremely busy. NWSFO Birmingham had been working severe weather

periodically since mid-morning.

During the evening, warnings were required in Alabama for many areas outside of what later

proved to be the main path of destruction through Tuscaloosa, Jefferson, and St. Clair Counties. 

At the height of the event, NWSFO Birmingham issued 28 warnings from 7:01 p.m. to 8:49 p.m.

CDT. Fourteen warnings were required between the 7:01 p.m. CDT Tuscaloosa County Tornado

Warning and the 7:45 p.m. Tornado Warning for Jefferson County. Another 14 warnings were

issued between the Tornado Warning for Jefferson County and the 8:49 p.m. Tornado Warning

for St. Clair County. Additional warnings for these same three counties were needed later in the

evening as other severe storms moved across this already damaged area.

The heavy and fast-paced workload required call back and the granting of overtime for

employees. During the peak of the event, staffing levels at NWSFO Birmingham and Atlanta rose

to 10 people, a significant percentage of their total contingent of meteorologists and

hydrometeorological technicians. Both MICs stated they could have used more people. 

Additional off duty people were called for assistance but could not be reached.

All three NWS field offices involved in this event performed very well. In the Birmingham area, a

review of the mesocyclone track across county lines indicates approximately 4 minutes of lead

time for the first Tuscaloosa County tornado—an F2— and 41 minutes for the second tornado

that would move into Jefferson County. There were 8 minutes of lead time for the Jefferson

County warning. Lead time for the area where the first fatalities occurred in Jefferson County
3

was approximately 15 minutes. For St. Clair County, the tornado warning lead time was 7

minutes, and for the two fatalities about 23 minutes.

Clearly, the warning system worked well. As one Birmingham weathercaster said, “Everyone was

on board on this one and did an outstanding job,” referring to Emergency Management, media

and the NWS. In the Birmingham area, timely and accurate NWS warnings were widely

disseminated by Emergency Management and the news media. Sirens were sounded where they

existed. Some television stations preempted regular programming for “wall-to-wall” storm

coverage for hours. Many radio stations carried the warnings and broke into programming with

frequent updates. The NWS warnings, response by Emergency Management, and excellent media

dissemination and coverage were credited with saving numerous lives.

Prior outreach and coordination efforts by the NWS were cited as important factors in helping

residents and officials develop tornado response plans and react appropriately as the tornadoes

approached. The team talked to many survivors who took the proper protective actions. Upon

hearing the Jefferson County Tornado Warning on NWR and TV, one couple in a mobile home

ran two doors down to a friend’s wood frame home. They took shelter and survived unhurt, but

their mobile home was completely destroyed. There were numerous other instances of people

hearing the warnings, taking the proper protective actions, and surviving the storm with injuries. 

But for some, even taking the proper precautions was not enough because of the destructive

power of the tornadoes that moved through Jefferson and St. Clair Counties.

 

Service Assessment Team Strategy

The Service Assessment Team assembled at NWSFO Birmingham, Alabama, on Monday, April

13. The Birmingham Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM) and Science and Operations

Officer (SOO) had prepared information packages for each team member and presented an

extensive overview of the Alabama event. Later, the team met individually with staff who had

worked the event. Arrangements were made for a telephone briefing the following morning from

the Atlanta NWS office.

Following the telephone briefing on the storms that moved through north Georgia, the team spent

Tuesday examining the path of destruction through Jefferson County and talking to survivors. 

There were meetings with more Birmingham staff late in the day. A decision was made to send

two team members to Georgia on Wednesday morning. At that time, five people were thought to

have died in the tornadoes near Atlanta. During their visit, storm deaths were revised from five to

one. The other four deaths were in a fire that officials decided was not storm related. The two

team members returned to Birmingham Thursday evening. 

The team spent the remainder of the week in the Birmingham area, meeting with news media,

Emergency Management, and NWS staff, visiting Jefferson and St. Clair Counties and working

toward a rough draft. The team departed for home Saturday afternoon, April 18.
4

FACTS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Observations

FACT A: The Birmingham office used data from four WSR-88D radars. These are at Alabaster

(KBMX), Hytop (KHTX), and Maxwell AFB (KMXX), Alabama, and Columbus AFB,

Mississippi (KGWX). The Atlanta office utilized the Peachtree City (KFFC), and Robins AFB

(KJGX) Georgia radars, as well as KHTX. The Memphis office used KGWX and the Memphis

WSR-88D (KNQA). These were the primary sources of data for the issuance of warnings. All

radars were fully operational throughout this event. Major supporting data systems, including NAWIPS, ASOS, AFOS, and RAMSDIS, were also operational.

FACT B: The signatures of rotation on all the radars were strong, persistent, and unmistakable

across Alabama and Georgia. These signatures included intense and deep mesocyclones, gate-togate shears, bounded weak echo regions, and hook echoes. The supercells that produced the

tornadoes were long-lived and had long tracks. NWSFO Memphis also noted strong rotation and

reflectivity in the storm that produced deadly straight-line thunderstorm winds in Mississippi. 

Finding 1: At NWSFO Atlanta, narrowband load shedding developed on the KJGX Principal

User Processor (PUP), leading to the loss of some radar data. This was solved by changing the

Volume Coverage Pattern (VCP) from 11 to 21. An abbreviated Routine Product Set (RPS) and

dialup macro for load shedding situations were available but not used.

Recommendation 1: Ensure the NWSFO Atlanta staff is aware of the abbreviated RPS and

dialup macro so that they may be used during load shedding, without resorting to VCP 21 (which

has decreased vertical sampling).

Guidance

FACT C: NCEP numerical model performance accurately highlighted the severe weather threat,

indicating moderate-strong instability (e.g., CAPE up to 1500 J/kg) and extremely high

environmental potential for rotating supercells and tornadoes (e.g., storm relative helicity up to

700 [m/s] ). Although other models located the threat area well, the Eta model forecast the 2

strongest parameters related to the intensity of severe weather.

FACT D: Early on the afternoon of April 8, the SPC followed up by issuing a high risk of

severe thunderstorms for most of the northern and central parts of Mississippi, Alabama and

Georgia during the evening. A large moderate risk area surrounded the high risk zone, covering

most of the rest of the named states.
5

Predictions

FACT E: The three NWSFOs portrayed the seriousness of the event early and accurately. 

NWSFO Memphis communicated an early awareness of the threat, noting the high risk area in

their 4:51 a.m. CDT Hazardous Weather Outlook. They notified emergency managers who

opened emergency operations centers early on April 8. NWSFO Birmingham issued a Hazardous

Weather Outlook as early as 5:15 a.m. CDT, stating that “...INGREDIENTS ARE COMING

TOGETHER FOR AN EXTENDED SEVERE THUNDERSTORM EPISODE OVER

PORTIONS OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL ALABAMA TODAY AND TONIGHT.” A

subsequent Special Weather Statement at 6:30 a.m. CDT mentioned the likelihood of supercells

and accompanying strong tornadoes.

Forecasts issued by NWSFO Atlanta also clearly indicated the severe threat well in advance. The

zone forecasts for northern Georgia, issued about 4:00 a.m. CDT, mentioned "TONIGHT...

SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS LIKELY. SOME STORMS MAY BE SEVERE." The

accompanying State Forecast Discussion alluded to the SPC outlook of severe storms, and the

high risk in northwest Georgia, in the forecast reasoning. At 9:38 a.m. EDT, the NWSFO issued

a Hazardous Weather Outlook that stated “THERE IS A MODERATE TO HIGH RISK OF

SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS FOR NORTH AND WEST CENTRAL GEORGIA TODAY

INTO TONIGHT.”

FACT F: A tornado warning was in effect for Pontotoc County, Mississippi, prior to the time of

the lone fatality. Eyewitness accounts vary as to when the storm struck, but warning lead time for

the severe thunderstorm was between 6 and 20 minutes. The fatality occurred in a mobile home

with the damage attributed to severe thunderstorm winds near 85 miles an hour.

Finding 2: At the Birmingham office, 110 county warnings were issued in 21 hours. Several

staff members worked beyond their scheduled shifts to help. In addition to their regular duties,

the Atlanta office issued 183 county warnings from April 8 through the morning hours of April 9,

with a number of the staff interpreting WSR-88D data for 8 hours or longer. Additional off-duty

staff members were called for assistance but could not be reached. There was consensus at both

offices that their current “bulge staffing” levels were barely adequate to handle such a severe

weather outbreak. Further staff reduction would greatly limit the pool of people to recall to duty. 

The Southeast United States is such an area where severe convective weather may strike during

any season.

Recommendation 2: The NWS should continue the careful review of the end-state staffing

required to achieve an adequate workforce, especially in areas of the country that are prone to

numerous severe weather episodes. 
6

FACT G: Listed below are the tornado warnings and lead times for counties relevant to this

report in Alabama and Georgia.

 ALABAMA

 COUNTY TYPE START END LEAD TIME

Pickens TOR 6:26 p.m. 7:15 p.m. 35 min

An F2 tornado touched down about 1 mile south of Gordo in Pickens County at 7:01 p.m.

CDT.

Tuscaloosa TOR 7:01 p.m. 7:50 p.m. 4 min

 

 Tuscaloosa TOR 7:01 p.m. 7:50 p.m. 41 min

 The F2 tornado moved from Pickens County into Tuscaloosa County about 2 miles north 

 of Highway 82 at 7:05 p.m. The tornado lifted, and an F5 tornado touched down in the 

 eastern part of Tuscaloosa County about 5 miles northwest of Kellerman at 7:42 p.m. 

 Lead time on this second tornado was 41 minutes.

Jefferson TOR 7:45 p.m. 8:35 p.m. 8 min

At 7:53 p.m., the F5 tornado moved into Jefferson County along Highway 15/59 about 9

miles west southwest of Oak Grove. The tornado remained on the ground for 30.6 miles. 

It lifted at 8:30 p.m. in Jefferson County in the north part of Birmingham, 3 miles north of

Interstate 20 along Highway 78. Path width was up to 3/4 mile.

St. Clair TOR 8:49 p.m. 9:35 p.m. 7 min

An F2 tornado touched down in St. Clair County near Twin Lake and Highway 411 at

8:56 p.m. The tornado moved east northeast for 14.4 miles and lifted about 8 miles north

of Riverside. The average width was 200 yards. The two fatalities occurred at 9:12 p.m.

near Mt. Mariah and Highway 231 with a warning lead time of about 23 minutes.

 GEORGIA

Haralson TOR 11:29 a.m. 12:00 a.m. 1 min

At 11:30 p.m. EDT, an F1 tornado touched down just west of Tallapoosa and traveled

3.5 miles damaging 30 buildings, including mobile homes, churches and a strip mall.
7

 Cobb TOR 12:07 a.m. 12:45 a.m. 13 min

Fulton TOR 12:23 a.m. 1:00 a.m. 12 min

At 12:20 a.m., an F2 tornado touched down in Cobb County near Smyrna and moved into

Fulton County at 12:35 a.m. The tornado produced a 3-mile-long track and damaged 30

buildings, including heavy damage to a service station.

De Kalb TOR 12:31 a.m. 1:00 a.m. 4 min

Gwinnett TOR 12:31 a.m. 1:00 a.m. 8 min

At 12:35 a.m., an F2 tornado touched down in De Kalb County 1 mile southeast of

Dunwoody and moved into Gwinnett County at 12:39 a.m. The tornado traveled 19 miles

and damaged 5,000 homes. Path width was .4 of a mile. One person was killed in De

Kalb County when a tree fell on a home.

Finding 3: Personnel at NWSFO Memphis made at least one telephone call to NWSFO

Birmingham as the severe storms in Mississippi approached the Alabama state line. The Memphis

office usually maintains a telephone log during severe weather, but some calls were not logged in

this event.

Recommendation 3: NWSFO Memphis should reemphasize the policy of maintaining telephone

logs during severe weather events.

FACT H: Severe weather operations plans were in place at the three NWS offices. Everyone

interviewed indicated that they were followed closely prior to, and during, this episode. The plans

contain information for different staffing levels depending on the severity of the outbreak.

FACT I: There were at least three coordination calls from/to NWSFO Birmingham prior to the

tornadic storms moving into Georgia from Alabama. NWSFO Birmingham informed the Atlanta

office that a supercell storm with a history of tornadoes and casualties in Alabama was moving

toward western Georgia. Moreover, dialup data requests from Alabama WSR-88D radars

(KHTX and KMXX) clearly showed a mesocyclone and other tornadic signatures with these

storms, giving NWSFO Atlanta a clear picture of the tornadic potential well before the storms

moved into Georgia.

FACT J: The Southeast River Forecast Center (SERFC) and NWSFO Atlanta are co-located. 

Two SERFC staff members assisted the NWSFO during this event, constructing dialup user

functions at their PUP in the RFC for acquisition of WSR-88D data from two eastern Alabama

radars (KHTX and KMXX). These data helped provide early warning of the tornadic potential of

storms just crossing from Alabama into the NWSFO Atlanta County Warning Area, particularly

for the storm that produced a tornado in Haralson County near Tallapoosa. This is an excellent

example of an RFC and NWSFO working effectively as a team during an emergency event.
8

External Coordination and Dissemination

FACT K: All surveyed counties affected by tornadoes in northern Mississippi, northern Alabama

and northern Georgia are covered by NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) broadcasts from the

Memphis, Birmingham and Atlanta NWS offices, respectively. Warnings are coded on the

Specific Area Message Encoder (SAME) for input into the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and

are given the 1050 MHZ tone.

FACT L: Emergency management agencies and the electronic media affected by the event in

northern Mississippi, northern and central Alabama and northern Georgia were aware of the threat

of severe weather well before it occurred and received warnings in a timely manner. This

included information received through both private vendors and/or NWR.

FACT M: All of the television stations interviewed that serve north Mississippi, north Georgia

and central and north Alabama received and disseminated severe weather information in a timely

manner. They had high praise for the Memphis, Birmingham and Atlanta NWS offices. 

FACT N: NWR broadcasts were available for Pontotoc County, Mississippi. Local television

stations carried the tornado warning, and the SKYWARN spotter net was activated.

FACT O: A number of spotter training sessions were held in northern Mississippi during the past

year, including two sessions in Pontotoc County between December 1997 and March 1998. 

FACT P: The Pontotoc Emergency Management Agency (EMA), Rescue personnel, American

Red Cross and media all commended NWSFO Memphis for their performance during this event.

Finding 4: Use of the EAS system in an automatic override mode allowing the NWR voice on

radio or television is done on a volunteer basis. The Service Assessment Team was told by the

personnel at almost every interviewed radio and television station in Alabama that they were

pleased with the human voice broadcasts but would not allow the synthetic voice to override their

system. They found it too offensive and difficult to understand.

Recommendation 4: The NWS should procure an artificial voice for CRS that is more 

acceptable to the media and general public.

FACT Q: Amateur Radio Operators are incorporated into the Birmingham NWS warning and

verification process. They are able to receive incoming reports via UHF and VHF repeater

systems as well as through a packet radio Internet system.

FACT R: The victims interviewed in Alabama received the tornado warning information by

various methods. Most people were aware of the approaching tornado by seeing warnings on

television. All of the television stations serving the area carried the basic warning information. 

Several stations stopped all regular programming and commercials and were totally dedicated to

severe weather coverage. Many people took shelter when they heard the outdoor sirens or an
9

alarm from NOAA Weather Radio. There were numerous instances where the warning was

relayed to others by a telephone call from a relative or friend.

FACT S: At every Alabama media and emergency management location the Service Assessment

Team visited, we found evidence of an excellent and long-standing working relationship between

the organization and the Birmingham NWS WCM. Many counties have spotters who receive dual

spotter certification: one from the local county EMA office and one as an NWS SKYWARN

spotter.

FACT T: From interviews by the Service Assessment Team with the Birmingham NWS staff, it

was apparent that the Console Replacement System (CRS) played a large part in the office’s

success during the event in the following ways:

(1) CRS automatically selected the proper consoles to be alerted for each individual and

multiple county warning. The Birmingham NWS operates 13 transmitters. 

(2) At the height of the severe weather event, both CRS consoles were staffed, which

allowed two warnings to be recorded at the same time. This enabled the staff to stay

on top of the rapidly changing warning situation.

(3) CRS automated the removal of outdated warnings as they expired.

Finding 5: Individual tornado warnings issued by the Birmingham NWS office for Chambers,

Cleburne, Jefferson, Marshall, Pickens, Shelby, Tuscaloosa, Walker, and Winston Counties stated

a "possible tornado" in the body of the text. Numerous other tornado warnings issued by the

office stated, “developing tornado” or “tornado.” The Weather Service Operations Manual

discourages the use of “possible tornado” which implies a degree of uncertainty that may lead to

complacency by the customer.

Recommendation 5: The phrase “possible tornado” should not be used in a warning.

FACT U: Amateur Radio Operators are incorporated into the Atlanta NWS warning and

verification process and provide pertinent information to the staff. The Amateur Radio Operation

area has a color monitor slaved to the WSR-88Ds that allows visual identification and efficient

placement of field spotters. This is especially important for fast moving storms, as was the case in

this event.

Finding 6: With the exception of Haralson County, NWR reception in the northwest Georgia

counties is good. NWR broadcasts for Haralson County originate from the Birmingham NWS

through the transmission tower located at Mt. Cheaha, Alabama. Haralson County is not within

range of a transmission tower operated from the Atlanta NWS. Due to NWR tower locations 

and hilly terrain features, most of Haralson County has spotty NWR reception.
10

Recommendation 6: Review NWR service to Haralson County, assess what NWS office would

be the most logical to provide programming, and charge that office with exploring local

partnerships to expand service.

Finding 7: Two transmitters in north Georgia, located at Athens and Chatsworth, broadcast on a

frequency of 162.400 MHZ, with broadcasts tailored for each specific site. In the area between

both transmitters, some weather radios receive broadcasts not intended for their location. Thus,

some people are not receiving relevant information for their particular county. Possible fixes

include the NWR Expansion Program and technical adjustments at the Athens and/or Chatsworth

transmitter and antenna sites.

Recommendation 7: SRH/NWSFO Atlanta should explore possibilities to resolve the problem

of overlapping transmissions.

FACT V: The victims interviewed in Georgia were aware that storms were moving into their

area. However, due to the time of this tornado outbreak, many people were in bed sleeping, and

neither owned a weather radio nor had extensive knowledge of the NWR broadcasts and warning

alarm features. 

FACT W: The Peachtree City NWS has aggressively promoted NWR for a number of years in a

variety of outreach initiatives.

Finding 8: Even if they personally received little or no advanced warning for the tornadoes,

proper safety actions were generally taken by moving to the lowest floors and interior rooms or

hallways. In this instance, the warning alarm feature of NWR had great potential to alert people

of the oncoming storms. 

Recommendation 8: Even with extensive local promotion of NWR, it is evident that many of

the public still do not know of this potentially life-saving tool. Assistance is needed at the

NWSH/Public Affairs level to ensure that the NWR program, and its promotion, is a high priority.

Finding 9: Very few of the Severe Thunderstorm Warnings issued by the Atlanta NWS

contained information on the specific threat from the storms. This information can help customers

better gauge the degree of impact from a particular storm. 

Recommendation 9: NWSFO Atlanta should make every attempt to provide information on the

hail size and/or straight-line wind speeds that the storm is expected to produce. 

FACT X: The Atlanta NWS has 93 counties in its County Warning Area (CWA). Since it is

very difficult for one individual such as the WCM to provide personalized service for each county,

the office has set up an “Adopt-A-County” program. A number of forecasters and HMTs are

each responsible for being the main contact point for a subset of the CWA, allowing for

personalized customer service.
11

Response

FACT Y: The team talked with many Emergency Management and news media personnel in

Tuscaloosa, Jefferson and St. Clair Counties. Without exception, all were very complementary of

the services and performance of NWSFO Birmingham during this event.

FACT Z: A 16-year-old and his sister heard the tornado warning for Pontotoc County,

Mississippi, on a Memphis television station. The sister took shelter next door in the

grandparents permanent home. Her brother remained in the mobile home and was killed.

FACT AA: As tornado warnings were issued for Pickens and Tuscaloosa Counties, EAS

messages were scrolled on the Tuscaloosa television station. The Tuscaloosa County EMA

Director called the Birmingham NWS office for tornado track information so he could activate the

proper siren systems in the county.

FACT BB: A man in a double wide mobile home heard the tornado warning for Tuscaloosa

County, Alabama, on NOAA Weather Radio. He moved to a shelter buried near his home. The

home was destroyed, but he was not injured.

FACT CC: Bethany Baptist Church was practicing for their Easter services. They heard the

tornado warning for Tuscaloosa County over NWR and a County Emergency Management

Agency radio warning system. Everyone moved to the basement. The building was badly

damaged, people were injured and many were trapped for a period of time. No one was killed.

FACT DD: The University of Alabama Campus Police had time to notify campus dormitories,

and many students were moved to safer sections of the buildings. The tornado passed a few miles

to the north of the campus and the City of Tuscaloosa.

FACT EE: Services were ongoing at the Gary Wood Assembly Church in Jefferson County. A

member watching television at home called the church about the tornado warning. The people

moved to the basement about 15 minutes before the tornado destroyed much of the building. 

There were some injuries, but no one was killed.

FACT FF: A man was at his father’s house when he heard the Jefferson County Tornado

Warning on television. He took shelter in a dugout under the house his father had constructed. 

As a child, he and his family took shelter there during threatening weather, but he always went

under protest. After riding out the storm in the shelter, he pulled three neighbors from the

wreckage. One woman likely would have bled to death without his help.

FACT GG: Six people were in a café. They heard the Jefferson County Tornado Warning on a

Birmingham radio station and took shelter in the part of the building they believed afforded them

the most protection. The tornado hit 10 minutes later and all survived.

FACT HH: The two fatalities in St. Clair County occurred in a mobile home. The survivor, a 3-

year-old girl, was found inside a clothes dryer more than 250 yards from her home. Her parents

apparently placed her in the dryer before attempting to ride out the storm in their home.
12

Finding 10: The Service Assessment Team was at the location where the President was to visit

the following day. The FEMA advance team was on-site making preparations for the visit. The

Service Assessment Team suggested the NWS should be included with those whom the President

would recognize. The following day when the President appeared, FEMA had arranged for

survivors, all chief TV weathercasters, emergency managers, utility crews and volunteers to be

recognized. No NWS representative was present.

Recommendation 10: In future similar events, the NWS should be represented and identified as

playing a key role in the warning process. NWS Public Affairs should call this to the attention of

FEMA Public Affairs. If this does not prove successful, a meeting between NOAA/NWS and

FEMA senior managers should be arranged to discuss the issue.