### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 19
- 00771
- CV

Erik Leonard, Appellant

v. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas; the Harris County
- Houston Sports Authority;

Harris County; and the City of Houston, Appellee s

FROM THE 345TH DIS T RICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 06
- 000810 , THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDG E PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant Erik Le onard filed a not ic e of appeal in th is C ourt on October 4, 2019. Leonard is on the State of Texas ’ s list of vexatious litigants and is subject to a prefiling order filed in Tr avis County. 1 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Cod e 11.101(a) ( g enerally authorizing court to enter order prohibiting person from filing “ new litigation ” pro se without permission fro m l o cal administrative judge when court finds that person is “vexatious litigant” after notice and

1 Chapter 11 o f the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code r equires th at the Office of Court Administration “post on t he agency’s Internet website a list of vexatious litigants subject to prefiling orders.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.104(b). The lis t reflects that on April 21, 2003, the 200th District Co urt of T ra vis County signed an order declaring Leonard a vexatious litigant and prohibiting Leonard from filing, pro se, new litigation in a court to which the order applies without seeking and obtain ing the permission of the local administrative judge of the type o f court in which he intends to file

. See htt ps://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/JudicialInformation/oca/pdf/vex/ErikLeonar d.pdf (last visited Apr

. 8 , 2020).2

hearing)

. We will dismiss the appeal because Leonard has not complied with Texas Ci vil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 11, which governs vexatious litiga n ts. See id . §§ 11.001

– .104.

Chapter 11 prov ides that a clerk of a court may not file a “ litigation, original proceeding, appeal, or other clai m presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order under Section 11.101 unless the litiga n t ob t ains an order from the appropriate local administrative judge described by Section 11.102(a) permitting the filing. ” Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem . Code § 11.103 ; see Douglas v. Gov ernment Emp s . Ins. , No. 01

- 12

- 00129

- CV,
2013 WL 1490497, at *1

– 2 (Te x. App.

— H o u ston [1st Dist.] Apr. 11, 2013, no pet.) ( mem. op.) ( per curiam) ( describing Cha pter 11 prefiling requirements for vexatious litigants)

. Consequently , by order dated February 2 8, 2020, we stayed th is appeal and notified Leonard that he was requi red to o b t ain the permission of the local administrative judge to file this appeal, provided him with the address of the local administrative judge, and ordered him within fifte en days of the date of the order to demonstrate to this Court that he had obtai ned perm i s sion from the local administrative judge to file this appeal. We notified Leonard that, if he failed to comply with the order, we would dismiss h is appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.1035 (on receiving notice from cle r k that litigation was mistakenly filed by vexatious litiga nt, court shall immediately stay litigation and dismiss litigation unless plaintiff obtains permission under Section 11.102(a)) ; Douglas , 2013 WL 1490497, at *2 (dismissing appeal because v exatious l itigant failed to co mply with appellate court ’ s request that he file proof that he had obtained permission from local administrative judge)

.

To date, Leonard has failed to demonstrate that he obtained the local administrative judge ’s permission t o file t h i s appeal . Instead, he has filed a motion for reconsideration

. Construing his motion liberally , see Hou sing Auth ority of City of Austin3

v. Elbendary , 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2019, no pet.) ( explaining that courts

“ construe pro se filin gs liberally and with patience ”) , he argues that he is not required to obtain permission from the local administrative judg e. He does not dispute tha t this Court upheld a prefiling order rend ered against him , s ee generally Leonard v. Abbott , 171 S .W.3d 45 1 , 454

– 64 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2005, pet. denied) , o r that the order requires him to obtain permission before filing “a new litigation ” in the cour t s of this state , see https :// www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/JudicialInformation/oca/pdf/vex/Er ikLeonar d. pdf (last visited Apr . 24 , 2020). Instead, he argues that the prese nt case

— filed almost three years after the pre filing order was rendered

— does not constitute “ a new litigation , ” se e Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Cod e 11.101 (a), because it concerns the s ame su bject matter as A bbott

. We agree that both cases c oncern Leonard ’ s challenge to the issuance of the same municipal bonds , s e e Abbott , 171 S.W.3d at 454

– 55 ( traci ng Leonard ’s “ long history of filing lawsuits and appeals to contest the issuance and approval of bonds in Harris County related to the construction of new sports arenas in that locale ” ) , but that does not exempt it from th e prefiling order. On the contr ary, preventing suc h repeated filings is the c ore purpose behind chapter 11. See In r e Potts , 399 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, orig . proceeding ) ( “ The purpose of [chapter 11] is to make it possible for courts to control their dockets rather than permitting courts to be burdened with repeated filings of frivolous an d malici ous litigation by litigants without hope of success while, at the same time, providing protections for liti gants ’ constitutional rights to open courts when they have genuine claims [.] ” )

. W e deny Leonard ’s motion for re consideration

. Having conclu ded Leon ard is subject to the prefiling order, w e dismiss th is appeal for want of jurisdiction

.4 __________________________________________ Edwar d Smith , Justice Before Justices Goodwin, Kelly, and Smith Dism issed for W a nt of Jur isdiction Filed: April 10, 2020