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******************************************************ZBIGNIEW ROZBICKI v. EUGENE M.

GISSELBRECHT ET AL. (AC 35744)
DiPentima, C. J., and Beach and Bishop, Js. Argued March 14—officially released September 16, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Roche, J. [summary judgment]; Danaher, J. [motion for contempt, motion to disqualify].) Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Ruth Nadeau Dwyer, with whom was J. Michael Sconyers, for the appellees (defendants).Opinion BEACH, J. The plaintiff, Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, the original executor of the estate of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for contempt of the defendant, Eugene M. Gisselbrecht, individually and as the successor executor ofthe estate of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht, his sister.1 The plaintiffclaims that the trial court erred in (1) ruling on a motion for contempt at a time when the court no longerhadjurisdiction overthe matter; (2) finding him in contempt for violating an interlocutory discovery order that had not been incorporated into the judgment file; and (3) denying a motion to recuse itself. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history, as revealed by the record, are relevant to this appeal. In 2007, the plaintiffwas the executor ofthe subject estate under the will of Kathleen M. Gisselbrecht. Because of certain conduct of the plaintiff, he was removed for
cause from the position of executor in June, 2009. In March, 2010, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, individually and in his capacity as the
successor executor. In his third revised complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty as executor by depleting the assets of the estate, leaving insufficient funds to pay to the plaintiff his bequest under the will and his fiduciary fees. He also sought attorney’s fees and costs. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses claiming that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine ofelection ofremedies, resjudicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of frauds.
In August, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for a protective orderrequestingthatthe courtissue an order preventing the self-represented plaintiff from continuing his deposition of the defendant, which had begun
on July 19, 2011. He argued that the plaintiff was emotionally involved in the matter, and was using the depositionprocesstoharassthe defendant. The courtdenied the motion, but added that the defendant could have the deposition videotaped at his own expense, and that the defendant could seek additional assistance from the court, including the cost of the videotaping or any other appropriate remedy, if the conduct complained ofwas apparentinthe videotape ofthe next deposition. OnDecember5, 2011, the court,Danaher, J ., afterviewing the videotape at the request of the parties, issued
a decision regarding a motion for compliance filed by the defendant, and found that the plaintiff’s continuation of the deposition of the defendant was conducted in amannerthat served unreasonablyto harass, embarrass, oppress, and annoy the defendant, and that there would be no further deposition of the defendant. On December 15, 2011, the defendant filed a motionrequesting the court to issue an order requiring the plaintiff to reimburse him $675.32 for costs associated with videotaping the plaintiff’s deposition ofthe defendant. On January 3, 2012, the court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs for videotaping the deposition in the amount of $675.32 within thirty days. On January 23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order, and the court denied the motion two days later. Meanwhile, in August, 2011, the defendant had filed
a motion for summaryjudgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of frauds. On December 19, 2011, the court, Roche, J., grantedthe motionforsummaryjudgment. Theplaintiff filed a motion to reargue or reconsider the judgment
on January 9, 2012; the motion was denied on January 11, 2012. The plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time in which to appeal on January 23, 2012, which
was granted.
On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal from the trial court’s summaryjudgment. The plaintiff included as an issue in that appeal the January 3, 2012 order of payment. We dismissed the appeal on April 24, 2012. On October 10, 2012, our Supreme Court deniedthe plaintiff’s petitionfor certificationto appeal. Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, 307 Conn. 917, 54 A.3d 181 (2012).
On January 16, 2013, the defendant filed a proposed judgment file, which included the court’s granting of his motion for summary judgment and the January 3, 2012 ordertopaythe costofvideotapingthe deposition. On February 6, 2013, the court, Trombley, J., determined that ajudgment file was not necessary because
a valid and binding order ofJudge Danaher was issued
on January 3, 2012, which ‘‘remains in effect ordering the plaintiff, an officer ofthis court, to payto the defendantthe sum of$675.32.’’ Theplaintifffiledan objection tothatruling, seekingitsvacation, onFebruary27, 2013, which was overruled by the court on March 11, 2013.
On March 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the plaintiff had not complied with the court’s January 3, 2012 order to pay the videotapingfee of$675.32withintheallottedtime, andsought
as damages the $675.32 in costs plus $2500 in attorney’s fees. On May 9, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s motion for contempt, arguing that the court lacked personal and subject matterjurisdiction to rule on the motion for contempt after summary judgment was rendered, on December 19, 2011. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and
on May30, 2013, the court, Danaher, J ., issued amemorandum of decision regarding the defendant’s motion for contempt, in which it found that the plaintiff was inwilful contempt ofthe court’s clearandunambiguousorderto paytothe defendant $675.32 withinthirtydays. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay $675.32 to the defendant’s counsel within two weeks.
On May 28, 2013, the day on which the motion for contemptwasarguedonthe shortcalendar, theplaintiff filed a motion for disqualification of Judge Danaher, which was denied. This appeal followed.
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claims regarding the jurisdiction ofthe trial court to act on various motions. Although the plaintiff divides his argument into two issues, the claims are somewhat related, in that all involve the timing of the various rulings regarding the costs ofvideotaping against the backdrop ofthe court’s rulings on the merits ofthe case andthe appealprocess
on the merits. We have considered all of the plaintiff’s claims, but organize their discussion somewhat differently.
Ourreview ofthejurisdictionalissues isplenary. ‘‘We have longheldthatbecause [a] determinationregarding
a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question oflaw, our review is plenary.

. . . Subject matterjurisdiction involves the authority ofthe court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.

. . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is withoutjurisdiction

. . . . ’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)FergusonMechanical Co

. v. Dept. ofPublic Works, 282 Conn. 764, 770–71, 924 A.2d 846 (2007).
A
Theplaintiffclaimsthatthetrialcourtlackedjurisdiction to rule on the motion for contempt, which was filed approximately eleven months after the appeal on the merits of the summary judgment was dismissed. We agree that the trial court lackedjurisdiction to find the plaintiffin contempt unless the contempt orderwas
an exercise of the trial court’s inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders. We assume, for the purpose of this subpart of the opinion, that the January 3, 2012 ruling of the court ordering the payment of the videotaping costs was valid, and that the court had the authority to make the order at the time it was made.2
The Superior Court has the inherent authority to enforce its orders. See AvalonBay Communities, Inc.

v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 246, 796 A.2d 1164 (2002); see also Bauer v. Bauer, 308 Conn. 124, 130, 60 A.3d 950 (2013). ‘‘[E]ven in the absence of
a finding of contempt, the trial court has broad discretion to make whole any party who has suffered as a result of another party’s failure to comply with a court order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 243.Although ordinarily our trial courts lackjurisdiction to act in a case after the passage of four months from the date of judgment; see General Statutes § 52-212a; there are exceptions. One exception arises when the exercise ofjurisdiction is necessary to effectuate prior judgments or otherwise enforceable orders. Our Supreme Court has explained the continuing jurisdiction exception to § 52-212a as follows: ‘‘We reject [a] hypertechnicalunderstandingofthetrialcourt’s continuingjurisdictionto effectuate priorjudgments. We conclude, instead, that the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather, derives from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments.

. . . Moreover, we hold that such equitable authority

. . . [derives] from its inherent powers.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 260 Conn. 243. ‘‘[T]he trial court’s continuingjurisdiction to effectuate its priorjudgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clearjudgment or by interpreting an ambiguousjudgment and entering orders to effectuate thejudgment as interpreted, is grounded in its inherent powers, and is not limited to cases wherein the noncompliant party is in contempt, family cases, cases involving injunctions, or cases whereinthe parties have agreed to continuing jurisdiction.’’ Id., 246 (continuing jurisdiction existed in case where trial court ordered planningandzoningcommissiontoimpose onlyreasonable and necessary conditions on approval of applicant’s affordable housing application); see also Papa

v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725, 737, 444 A.2d 196 (1982) (recognizing ‘‘the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders’’); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A

. v. Melahn, 148 Conn. App. 1, 85 A.3d 1 (2014) (continuingjurisdiction existed where as part of judgment of strict foreclosure bank
wasrequiredtosendnoticetononappearingdefendants before filing certificate of foreclosure and bank falsely certificated to court that notice requirement had been satisfied). ‘‘In a contempt proceeding, even in the absence ofafinding ofcontempt, atrial courthasbroad discretion to make whole a party who has suffered as
a result of another party’s failure to comply with the court order.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clementv. Clement, 34 Conn. App. 641, 647, 643 A.2d 874 (1994).
The trial court in the present case had ordered the plaintiffto pay videotaping costs to the defendant. The plaintiffhadnevercompliedwiththe order. Thepassage oftime itselfdid not serve to deprive the court ofjurisdiction to enforce its order.
Theplaintiff, however, hasraisedseveralrelatedchallenges to the court’s exercise ofjurisdiction; these may be addressed more summarily. One is that the court lostjurisdiction byvirtue ofGeneral Statutes § 51-183b,which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny judge of the Superior Court

. . . who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have powerto continue such trial and shall renderjudgmentnotlaterthanonehundredand twenty daysfrom the completion date ofthe trial ofsuch civil
cause.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The court heard the motion on May 28, 2013, and granted it on May 30, 2013, two days later. The primary purpose of § 51-183b is to compel timely completion of matters in the trial court; see, e.g., Building Supply Corp. v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 40 Conn. App. 89. 96–97, 669A.2d 620, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 929, 674 A.2d 1326 (1996); and the trial court in the present case could hardly have acted more efficiently. The effort to peg the starting point of the 120 day period to the judgment on the merits, or perhaps to the argument on the motion for summaryjudgment, is entirely inconsistent with the concept of continuing jurisdiction to enforce judgments and orders.
An additional argument raised by the plaintiffis that the court’s order to pay the costs of videotaping was notspecificallyincludedinthejudgmentfile, and, therefore, was not part of the judgment that the court had continuingjurisdiction to enforce. This contention fails for at leasttwo reasons: thejudgment file is ministerial; see, e.g., Wesleyv. SchallerSubaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 529 n.1, 893 A.2d 389 (2006); and the contempt order related to an independent order of the court, issued shortly after judgment, in any event.
B
Part I A ofthis opinion is predicated on the assumption that the January 3, 2012 order was issued within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The plaintiff claims that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue the order. He contends that the order was an interlocutory discovery order, which ordinarily would be subsumed in the judgment, rather than an independent judicial order, and that it was issued after judgment was rendered on the merits, so that it was not properly subsumed in the judgment in any event. In the unusual circumstances of this case, we disagree.
The timing in this case was complicated bythe parallel short calendar scheduling of the motions regarding payment for discovery costs and the motion for summaryjudgment. Significantly, the motions regardingthe order ofthe payment ofthe videotaping costs no longer directly concernedthe preparation ofevidence fortrial, but, rather, involved the payment of costs. Ordinarily, orders regarding what may be discoverable, the scheduling of discovery, and related matters do conclude with the judgment, and ordinarily such orders are not immediately appealable, but, rather, may be raised as issues on appeal.3 The orderforpayment, however, was not an order directing the progress ofdiscoverytoward trial, but, rather, was anindependentorderto effectuatethe authority ofthe court. Inthe unusual circumstances ofthis case, the order properly served as the predicate for the order of contempt.4
The facts ofthis case are analogous to those of CFM ofConnecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 400– 404, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999). There, the plaintiff’s attorney was ordered to pay $10,000 to the defendant as sanctions for bad faith behavior. Our Supreme Court held that the sanction was a final judgment for the purpose of appeal because the orderwas not dependent on further proceedings and the amount would be owed irrespective of the eventual outcome of the case; the rights affected were solely between the attorney and the defendant.5 See also Bryant v. Bryant, 228 Conn. 630, 636, 637 A.2d 1111 (1994).
Thesecondsubsidiaryissueiswhether, inthecircumstances ofthis case, the court had the authority to rule
on the defendant’s motion for order after its granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. At the time the court granted the motion for summary judgmentonDecember 19, 2011, the defendant’smotion for order, which had been filed on December 15, 2011,
was pending. Less than two weeks after granting the motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2011, the court ruled on the defendant’s pending motion for order on January 3, 2012.
At the time of the court’s January 3, 2012 ruling on the motion for order, the trial court was fully engaged in managing the case, and no appeal had yet been filed. As noted previously, motions for reargument of trial court rulings and decisions were pending. On January 23, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal on the ground that the trial court had yet to rule ‘‘on discovery motions which shall be included in the issues on appeal.’’ The motion was granted, and the plaintiff included on appeal issues regarding the court’s ruling on the motion for order of payment. Ordinarily, the trial courthasjurisdictionto entertain motions until the expiration of four months from the date ofjudgment. Kim v

. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 107, 733 A.2d 80 (1999); see also Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 432–33, 881 A.2d 230 (2005). Especiallyinlight ofthepractical circumstances inthis case,
we see no reasonwhythe court didnothavethe authority to rule on outstanding motions. The order that formed the predicate for the contempt order, then, was properly granted by the trial court.
II
The plaintiff claims that the court, Danaher, J., improperly denied his motion for judicial disqualification on the ground of bias. We disagree.‘‘In reviewing a claim of judicial bias, this court employs a plain error standard of review.

. . . The standard to be employed is an objective one, not the judge’s subjective view as to whether he or she can be fair and impartial in hearing the case.

. . . Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that thejudge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for thejudge’s disqualification.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committeev.Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 416, 10A.3d 507 (2011);
see also Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 (a).
The plaintiffclaims that the court improperly denied his May 28, 2013 motion for judicial disqualification. He essentially argues that the court improperly failed to refer the motion to another judge and improperly deniedthemotionwhenthe courtexhibitedbiastoward him, asevidencedbythe court’sadverserulings. He also claims that the court called him ‘‘a liar.’’ We disagree.
A hearing before another judge was not required in this case. In order to require an evidentiary hearing before another judge on a motion for disqualification, the party asserting bias of the trial judge must ‘‘state facts on the record which, if true, give fair support to his claim. If those facts, taken as true, give that fair support, the party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on those facts before another judge.’’ Szypula v. Szypula, 2 Conn. App. 650, 656, 482 A.2d 85 (1984). The facts alleged in this case, however, do not give fair support to the claim ofjudicial bias.
The plaintiff’s claim ofjudicial bias was based essentially on claims that Judge Danaher had exhibited bias by issuing rulings adverse to him. ‘‘It is axiomatic, however, that an adverse or unfavorable ruling is not, in itself, evidence of judicial bias against a litigant.’’ Traystman v. Traystman, 141 Conn. App. 789, 803, 62 A.3d 1149 (2013). Theplaintiffalso assertsthatthe court exhibited bias by calling him a liar ‘‘in a deposition controversy in a companion case.’’ There is nothing in the recordbefore us showingthatJudge Danahercalled the plaintiff a liar. In his appellate brief, the plaintiff has cited transcript excerpts in which Judge Danaher statedthathebelievedthataclaimmadebytheplaintiff, to the effect that the court had not read a document prepared by the plaintiff, was false. Characterizing a claim as false is different from calling someone a liar. We have thoroughly reviewed the materials presented and conclude that, although relations may have been strained; compare Traystman v. Traystman, supra, 803; Judge Danaher did not act improperly in denying the plaintiff’s motion for judicial disqualification.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We refer to Eugene M. Gisselbrecht in both capacities as the defendant.2 The issue whether the court had the jurisdiction to make the order on January 3, 2012, will be discussed in the following subpart of this opinion.

3 The plaintiff correctly asserts that most discovery orders are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. The issuance ofa contempt order may alter the situation. See Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 498, 736 A.2d 851 (1999). Here, we are not directly concerned with the question of whether the order for payment was independently appealable, because the appeal has been taken from the subsequent order of contempt.
4 The analysis is complicated by the fact that the self-represented party

was also an attorney. Ordinarily, findings ofcontempt where nonparties are involved are reviewed by means of writs of error.
5 Similarto thepresent case, the sanctions orderwas deemedto be equivalent to ajudgment, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on a contempt action. CFMofConnecticut, Inc

. v. Chowdhury, supra, 239 Conn. 404.