1 

010-9098-2177/1/AMERICAS 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

) 

Case No. 1:20-cv-21815 

Judge Darrin P. Gayles 

GV KB Store LLC et al., ) 

Plaintiffs, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

Scottsdale Insurance Company ) 

) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

) 

DEFENDANT SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFS’ COMPLAINT 

AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Scottsdale 

Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”) moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a 

claim. Plaintiffs seek coverage under policies that expressly exclude coverage for loss or damage 

resulting from a virus and, in any event, cannot identify any civil authority that precludes access 

to their property. Scottsdale also moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(2). 

I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiffs, two ice cream restaurants in Florida, allege they have policies that provide 

coverage for the business losses they suffered stemming from the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus and/or 

its resulting disease, COVID-19. However, Plaintiffs’ policies (which are identical) both contain 

a virus exclusion, which expressly excludes coverage in this case: 

We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any 

virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable 

of inducing physical distress, illness or disease. 

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See Complaint Exs. A & B (Exclusion Of Loss Due To Virus Or Bacteria § B); see also Policy 

Excerpts attached hereto as Ex. A. 

It is black-letter law that this Court should apply the policy – including the clear and 

unambiguous virus exclusion – as written. This Court repeatedly has enforced clear and 

unambiguous policy exclusions, including similar mold/bacteria exclusions. See, e.g., United 

Specialty Ins. Co. v. Davis, No. 18-cv-62451-Smith, 2020 WL 1445484 at *3-5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 

2020) (holding alleged “injuries are excluded from coverage under the Policy by the Mold 

Exclusion”). This Court should do the same here. While the coronavirus is a health concern, this 

is not grounds to rewrite Plaintiffs’ insurance contract. As the Florida Supreme Court has 

cautioned, courts should not “rewrite contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach 

results contrary to the intentions of the parties.” Deni Assocs. Of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 1998) (quoting State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 

Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1986)). 

In apparent recognition that the virus exclusion plainly bars coverage in this case, Plaintiffs 

do not mention it anywhere in the Complaint. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that their policies provide 

coverage under “Business Income and Extra Expense” and “Additional Coverages-Civil 

Authority” provisions. The virus exclusion, however, plainly applies to and bars coverage under 

these provisions. 

Furthermore, “Business Income and Extra Expense” and “Additional Coverages-Civil 

Authority” coverage only applies where Plaintiffs have been prohibited from accessing their 

premises and where there has been a suspension of operations. See Ex. A, Business Income (And 

Extra Expense) Coverage Form §§ A & A(5)(a). Neither occurred here. Plaintiffs concede that 

their restaurants have been permitted to continue providing customers with take-out and delivery 

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services. See Compl. ¶ 52. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no claim for coverage under the terms of the Policy, and 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.1

II. BACKGROUND. 

A. Complaint Allegations. 

Plaintiffs GV KB Store LLC and GV Siestakey LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege they 

“own operate, manage and control restaurants that serve ice cream and related food and 

beverages.” See Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs allege defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company issued 

commercial property insurance policy numbers CPS3308111 and CPS3308113. See Compl. ¶ 23; 

see also Compl. Exs. A & B (collectively, the “Policy” or “Policies”).

Generally, Plaintiffs allege that the Policies provide coverage under “Business Income and 

Extra Expense” and “Additional Coverages-Civil Authority” provisions. See Compl. ¶¶ 37-39. 

Plaintiffs allege that certain governmental orders from the Florida Governor and the Mayor of 

Miami-Dade County restricted operating times for restaurants “other than for delivery.” See 

Compl. ¶ 48-49. Plaintiffs further concede that they have been permitted to continue operation of 

their restaurants “for take-out and delivery.” See Compl. ¶ 52. Plaintiffs allege that as a “direct 

result of the existence of the national COVID-19 emergency” they have incurred “business income 

loss and other expenses.” See Compl. ¶ 52. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for declaratory judgment and 

anticipatory breach of contract. See Compl. Counts I & II. Plaintiffs also seek certification of a 

national class and a Florida subclass of insureds with policies issued by Scottsdale. See Compl. 

1

 Additional grounds to exclude coverage under the Policy exist, including that the coronavirus 

has not caused direct physical damage to the covered property. In filing this motion to dismiss, 

Scottsdale not waiving the right to raise such additional grounds at a later time, if necessary. 

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¶¶ 70-71. Notably, Plaintiffs allege they seek a “proposed class of policyholders” whose policies 

“do not include exclusions for pandemics or presence of viruses.” See Compl. ¶ 10. Yet here, 

Plaintiffs’ own Policies contain just such an express virus exclusion. 

B. Relevant Terms Of The Subject Policies.

Generally, the Policies provide coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to Covered 

Property at the premises described in the Declarations caused by or resulting from any Covered 

Cause of Loss.” See Ex. A, Building And Personal Property Coverage Form § A. More 

specifically, the Policies provide coverage for loss of “Business Income” as follows: 

We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due 

to the necessary "suspension" of your "operations" during the 

"period of restoration". The "suspension" must be caused by direct 

physical loss of or damage to property at premises which are 

described in the Declarations and for which a Business Income 

Limit Of Insurance is shown in the Declarations. The loss or damage 

must be caused by or result from a Covered Cause of Loss. 

See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form § A. Additional “Civil 

Authority” coverage is provided “[w]hen a Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property 

other than the property at the described premises . . . caused by action of civil authority that 

prohibits access to the described premises[.]” See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) 

Coverage Form § A(5)(a). In short, regardless of provision, the Policies only provide coverage for 

a “Covered Cause of Loss.” 

The definition of a “Covered Cause of Loss,” however, clearly and unambiguously states 

that coverage is not provided for losses excluded from the policy: 

When Special is shown in the Declarations, Covered Causes of Loss 

means direct physical loss unless the loss is excluded or limited in 

this policy. 

See Ex. A, Causes Of Loss – Special Form § A. The Policies, in turn, clearly and unambiguously 

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exclude losses caused by or resulting from a virus: 

EXCLUSION OF LOSS DUE TO VIRUS OR BACTERIA 

* * * * 

A. The exclusion set forth in Paragraph B. applies to all coverage

under all forms and endorsements that comprise this Coverage Part 

or Policy, including but not limited to forms or endorsements that 

cover property damage to buildings or personal property and forms 

or endorsements that cover business income, extra expense or action 

of civil authority. 

B. We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from 

any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is 

capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease. 

See Ex. A, Exclusion Of Loss Due To Virus Or Bacteria §§ A & B (emphasis added). 

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS.

A. Motion To Dismiss. 

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must proffer 

“more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. In other words, plaintiffs must 

“nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Applying these standards, a complaint 

that fails to allege a plausible claim for relief should be dismissed as a matter of law. See Iqbal at 

679; Twombly at 570. 

B. Construction Of Insurance Policy Terms.

Because this case arises out of this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Florida law governs the 

interpretation of the insurance contract at issue. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 

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1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2000). “Florida courts start with ‘the plain language of the policy, as 

bargained for by the parties’ . . . ‘[i]f that language is unambiguous, it governs.’” Id. (citing AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000)). “Courts may not put ‘a strained and 

unnatural construction on the terms of a policy in order to create an uncertainty or ambiguity.’ . . . 

There must, in fact, be a ‘genuine inconsistency, uncertainty or ambiguity in meaning.’” Med. 

Imaging Sols. Grp., Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., No. 1:18-cv-20132-Gayles/Otazo-Reyes, 2018 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 163151 at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “A provision 

is not ambiguous merely because it requires analysis to interpret.” Id. Furthermore, “[u]nless 

restricted by statute or public policy, insurance companies have the same right as individuals to 

limit their liability and impose conditions upon their obligations.” Canal Ins. Co. v. Giesenschlag, 

454 So. 2d 88, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 730 So. 2d 782, 

784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (enforcing bodily injury cap for uninsured motorist coverage). 

Lastly, in announcing “the rule to be followed in the interpretation of exclusionary clauses 

in insurance policies,” the Florida Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should not “rewrite 

contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the intentions of 

the parties.” Deni Assocs. Of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1138 

(Fla. 1998) (quoting State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1986)). 

“As a court, we cannot place limitations upon the plain language of a policy exclusion simply 

because we may think it should have been written that way.” Id. at 1139. Indeed, “[a]lthough 

ambiguous provisions are construed in favor of the coverage, to allow for such a construction the 

provision must actually be ambiguous.” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 

913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (emphasis added).

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IV. THE VIRUS EXCLUSION IN THE POLICIES BARS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AS 

A MATTER OF LAW. 

This Court must apply the language of the Policies as written. Here, the applicable 

language is clear and unambiguous: the Policies expressly exclude from coverage any loss or 

damage caused by or resulting from a virus. Specifically, the Policies provide as follows: “We 

will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other 

microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.” Ex. 

A, Exclusion Of Loss Due To Virus Or Bacteria §§ A & B (emphasis added). Furthermore, this 

virus exclusion expressly applies to “all coverage under all forms and endorsements” including 

“forms or endorsements that cover business income, extra expense or action of civil authority.” 

Id. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in this language. 

Plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within the plain language of the Policies’ virus exclusion 

because Plaintiffs allege that their losses were a “direct result” of the coronavirus: 

25. Coronaviruses are a type of virus that often cause respiratory 

diseases in humans . . . . 

* * * * 

27. Within months of COVID-19 being identified and named, 

the virus quickly spread from China to other parts of the world, 

including the United States . . . . 

* * * * 

30. Transmission of the coronavirus is particularly acute in 

places the public normally gathers to socialize, eat, drink, shop, be 

entertained, and go for recreation . . . . 

* * * * 

51. The civil authority orders expressly state that the closing of 

non-essential businesses, reductions in permitted operating hours, 

and social distancing restrictions placed on the public are necessary 

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emergency measures to protect the health and safety of all residents 

in the nation intended to stop the spread of COVID-19 through 

human-to-human and surface-to-human contact with the virus. 

52. The nature of each Plaintiff’s business is food and beverage 

service to the public and each Plaintiff’s property is a place where 

individuals socialize and gather in close proximity. As a direct 

result of the existence of the national COVID-19 emergency

Plaintiffs have a physical loss of their property for regular business 

operations including its food and beverage operations other than 

for take-out and delivery. The physical loss of the property has 

resulted in significant business income loss and other expenses. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27, 30, 51-52 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs plainly allege losses resulting from the coronavirus – a “virus . . . that induces or 

is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease” – which is a cause of loss or damage 

expressly excluded from coverage under the terms of the Policies. This Court must apply the clear 

and unambiguous Policy language as written. Indeed, this Court and other courts have enforced 

similar mold/bacteria exclusions under Florida law. See, e.g., United Specialty, 2020 WL 1445484 

at *3-5 (holding alleged “injuries are excluded from coverage under the Policy by the Mold 

Exclusion”); Rolyn Cos. v. R&J Sales of Texas, Inc., 671 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1332-1333 (S.D. Fla. 

2009) (enforcing mold exclusion); Boran Craig Barber Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty 

Co., No. 2:06-cv-89, 2009 WL 10670850 at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009) (“the mold exclusion 

clearly excludes coverage for any damage caused by or expenses incurred in remediating the 

mold”); Clarendon America Ins. Co. v. Taylor Ranch, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-2015-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 

10671266 at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2009) (“The Court has examined the Mold Exclusion . . . The 

plain language of the exclusion excludes coverage”); Empire Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Winsett, 325 

Fed. Appx. 849, 850-851 (11th Cir. 2009) (enforcing mold exclusion); see also Hathaway 

Development Co., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 274 Fed. Appx. 787, 792 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(enforcing mold/bacteria exclusion under Georgia law). This Court should apply the virus 

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exclusion as written and Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.2

V. THE CIVIL AUTHORITY PROVISION OF THE POLICIES DO NOT PROVIDE 

COVERAGE TO PLAINTIFFS. 

Even if the virus exclusion somehow did not apply – and it does apply here – Plaintiffs still 

do not have any coverage under the Policies for their alleged losses. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not 

have coverage under the Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form, which contains a 

“Civil Authority” coverage provision. 

A. The Virus Exclusion Precludes Civil Authority Coverage. 

No Civil Authority coverage exists here because coverage is excluded by the virus 

exclusion. Specifically, Civil Authority coverage only exists where there is a “Covered Cause of 

Loss.” See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form § A(5)(a). A “Covered 

Cause of Loss,” in turn, “means direct physical loss unless the loss is excluded or limited in this 

policy.” See Ex. A, Causes Of Loss – Special Form § A (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, the virus exclusion itself makes clear that it “applies to all coverage under all 

forms and endorsements . . . including but not limited to forms or endorsements that cover property 

damage to buildings or personal property and forms or endorsements that cover business income, 

extra expense or action of civil authority.” See Ex. A, Exclusion Of Loss Due To Virus Or Bacteria 

§ A (emphasis added). 

Because the virus exclusion excludes coverage for loss or damage caused by or resulting 

2

 In fact, this Court repeatedly has enforced unambiguous policy exclusions in a variety of 

contexts. See, e.g., First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. GRS Management Associates, Inc., No. 08-81356-

cv-Marra, 2009 WL 2524613 at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2009) (“the substance in the swimming 

pool was a viral contaminant and a harmful microbe. Thus, the pollutant exclusion applies here”); 

Nova Casualty Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1333-1335 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (enforcing 

pollutant exclusion); Century Surety Co. v. Hallandale Beach Service Station LLC, No. 10-214-

30-cv-Jordan, 2011 WL 13174906 at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. March 21, 2011) (enforcing “harmful 

material” exclusion). 

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from the coronavirus, there is no “Covered Cause of Loss,” and Plaintiffs have no coverage under 

the Civil Authority provision – or any other provision – of the Policies as a matter of law. 

B. No Order Has Prohibited Access To Plaintiffs’ Premises.

Even absent the virus exclusion, no Civil Authority coverage exists because access to 

Plaintiffs’ premises has not been prohibited. Specifically, Civil Authority coverage only exists for 

“the actual loss of Business Income . . . caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access

to the described premises[.]” See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form 

§ A(5)(a) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs, however, do not (and cannot) allege that access to their locations has been 

prohibited, let alone by any civil authority. To the contrary, Plaintiffs expressly allege that the 

governmental orders from the Miami-Dade County Mayor and the Florida Governor allowed 

restaurants to continue pick-up, take out, and delivery operations. See Compl. ¶¶ 47, 48. In fact, 

the Miami-Dade governmental order cited by Plaintiffs expressly permits restaurants to provide 

“delivery services, pick-up, or take out services” and provides for access to the premises for those 

purposes. See March 17, 2020 Miami-Dade County Emergency Order 03-20 at ¶¶ 1-3 (attached 

as Ex. B). The Florida Governor’s Order cited by Plaintiffs permits restaurants to continue 

operating so long as they limit occupancy to 50%. See Florida Executive Order 20-68 at § 3(A) 

(attached as Ex. C). Consistent with these orders, Plaintiffs expressly admit that they have been 

permitted to continue “take-out and delivery.” Compl. ¶ 52. By their own allegations, Plaintiffs, 

as operators of ice cream restaurants, have not been prohibited from accessing their premises.3

3

 Plaintiff GV Siestakey LLC is not even located in Miami Dade County and is not subject to the 

Miami-Dade County order cited in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 18 (alleging GV Siestakey LLC 

is located in Siesta Key, which is Sarasota County). This Court may take judicial notice of the 

governmental orders cited by Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (allowing judicial notice of facts 

not subject to reasonable dispute where they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by 

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C. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Damage To Other Property.

Plaintiffs’ claim for civil authority coverage fails for an additional reason as well: civil 

authority coverage only exists “[w]hen a Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property other

than the property at the described premises[.]” See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) 

Coverage Form § A(5)(a) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege damage to any such 

other property. 

In sum, the virus exclusion plainly excludes coverage under the Civil Authority provision 

of the Policies. Even if there were no virus exclusion, Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege that 

access to their premises was prohibited, let alone because of damage to other property. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as a matter of law. 

VI. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT SUFFERED A SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS. 

The Policies also only provide coverage for business income loss that arises from “a 

necessary ‘suspension’ of your ‘operations.’” See Ex. A, Business Income (And Extra Expense) 

Coverage Form § A. “Suspension,” is defined as the “slowdown or cessation of your business 

activities[.]” Id. at F(6)(a). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they have experienced any such 

slowdown or cessation of their business activities. To the contrary, the governmental orders cited 

by Plaintiffs expressly authorize them to continue serving food to the public, and they admit in the 

Complaint that they have done so. See Compl. ¶ 52 (alleging premises remain open for “take-out 

and delivery”). Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot rely on any reduction in the number of customers 

served because “lessened demand does not constitute a suspension of business.” CSX Corp. v. 

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see also 10th St. Partners, 

LLC v. Cnty. Comm’n., No. 8:11-cv-2362-T-33TGW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36359 at *2 (M.D. 

Fla. March 19, 2012) (taking judicial notice under Rule 201(b) of a resolution adopted by the 

county government).

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North River Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00531-J-25MCR, 2009 WL 10671267 at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 

25, 2009) (citing cases). Based on the plain allegations of the Complaint, there simply has been 

no suspension of operations. Accordingly, no coverage exists and Plaintiffs’ claims should be 

dismissed for this reason as well. 

VII. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL.

In addition to the grounds set forth above, certain of Plaintiffs’ claims also fail for lack of 

personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Specifically, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs purport to 

seek certification of a national class of insureds. See Compl. ¶ 70. Yet, this Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over the claims of non-forum putative class members. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. 

v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017); see also Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 

2017 WL 4357916 at *4 n. 4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017) (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb). No class 

exists or should exist, and the non-forum class claims should be dismissed for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. 

Scottsdale acknowledges, however, that this Court previously has addressed this issue and 

has held that Bristol-Meyer does not prohibit the Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over 

non-forum putative class members. See Becker v. HBN Media, Inc., 314 F.Supp.3d 1342, 1344 

(S.D. Fla. 2018). Nonetheless, Scottsdale raises the issue in this brief for the record and in order 

to avoid waiver of the issue in any future proceedings. 

VIII. CONCLUSION.

As a matter of law and basic contract interpretation, Plaintiffs have no cognizable claims 

for coverage under the Policies. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with 

prejudice because Plaintiffs’ claims cannot be saved through any amendment or re-pleading. 

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Dated: July 28, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Andrew R. Kruppa 

Andrew R. Kruppa 

Florida Bar No. 63958 

E-mail: andrew.kruppa@squirepb.com 

Amanda E. Preston 

Florida Bar No. 123652 

E-Mail: amanda.preston@squirepb.com 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 4700 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone: (305) 577-7000 

Facsimile: (305) 577-7001 

Aneca E. Lasley (pro hac motion forthcoming) 

E-mail: aneca.lasley@squirepb.com 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

2000 Huntington Center 

41 South High Street 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

Telephone: (614) 365-2700 

Facsimile: (614) 365-2499 

Michael H. Carpenter (pro hac motion forthcoming) 

E-mail: carpenter@carpenterlipps.com 

CARPENTER LIPPS & LELAND LLP 

280 Plaza, Suite 1300 

280 North High Street 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

Tel: (614) 365-4100 

Fax: (614) 365-9145 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th of July 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic 

Filing to all counsel of record that are registered with the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Andrew R. Kruppa 

 Andrew R. Kruppa 

Case 1:20-cv-21815-DPG Document 7 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/28/2020 Page 13 of 13