Service Assessment

Northern Idaho and Western Montana 

Summer 2000 Wildfires

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Weather Service

Silver Spring, Maryland
Cover: The photograph was taken on August 6, 2000, on the East Fork of the Bitterroot River

on the Sula Fire Complex. (Courtesy of John McColgan, Alaskan Type I Incident Management

Team, Bureau of Land Management, Alaska Fire Service)
Service Assessment

Northern Idaho and Western Montana

Summer 2000 Wildfires

February 2001

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Scott B. Gudes, Administrator (Acting)

National Weather Service

John J. Kelly, Jr., Assistant Administrator
Preface

Federal and state land management organizations recognized the wildfires of 2000 as historic

in both extent and duration. Due to the impact of these wildfires, a Service Assessment Team

examined the warning and forecast services provided by the National Weather Service (NWS) to fire

control agencies, emergency managers and the public in northern Idaho and western Montana. For

the purpose of this document, Northern Rockies will be used interchangeably with northern Idaho

and western Montana. While the wildfires threatened many parts of the country, the Service

Assessment centered on the Northern Rockies due to the unprecedented magnitude of the

suppression effort, the extraordinary level of weather services provided and the critical role timely

and consistent weather information played in fire fighter and public safety and suppression activities.

Service assessments provide a valuable contribution to our ongoing efforts to improve the

quality and timeliness of our products and services for the protection of life and property. Findings

and recommendations from this assessment will help to improve techniques, products and services.

February 2001

ii
iii

Table of Contents

Page

Preface ..................................................................... ii

Service Assessment Team ...................................................... iv

Acronyms ................................................................... vi

Service Assessment Report ...................................................... 1

Facts ....................................................................... 17

Findings and Recommendations ................................................. 21

Best Practices ................................................................ 25

Appendix A Team Charge, September 22, 2000 ................................. A-1

Appendix B Incident Command System (ICS) Overview ........................... B-1

Appendix C Product Examples ............................................... C-1

Appendix D IMET Survey .................................................. D-1
iv

Service Assessment Team

On September 22, 2000, the Assistant Administrator for Weather Services, John J. Kelly,

Jr., activated a Service Assessment Team to review NWS performance in supporting wildfire

operations in the Northern Rockies. (See Appendix A for Team Charge.) The Team assembled

in Boise, Idaho, on September 24 and met with wildfire resource managers located at the

National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) and the Boise Weather Forecast Office (WFO)

personnel. The Team traveled to Missoula, Montana, and met with personnel involved in the

wildfire suppression effort in northern Idaho and western Montana. Interviews were conducted

with the Montana State Forester, the Montana State Director for Fire and Aviation, the Western

Montana Department of Emergency Services Coordinator, Forest Service Region 1 Deputy

Regional Forester, members of the Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) group for the Northern

Rockies, Incident Commanders, NWS Meteorologists in Charge (MICs) and Incident

Meteorologists (IMETs) at WFOs Missoula, Great Falls, Billings, Montana; Spokane,

Washington; and Pocatello, Idaho. The team also surveyed all the IMETs who supported the

Northern Rockies wildfire suppression efforts.

The Team was comprised of the following individuals:

D. Gregory Harmon Team Leader, Meteorologist in Charge, Weather Forecast Office

Sioux Falls, South Dakota

Phillip D. Bothwell Senior Development Meteorologist, Storm Prediction Center

(SPC), Norman, Oklahoma

Steven W. Brown Meteorologist in Charge, WFO Reno, Nevada

Nancy A. Dean Meteorologist in Charge, WFO Eureka, California

Todd A. Heitkamp Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM), WFO Sioux Falls,

South Dakota

Vince Kolar Emergency Manager, Cascade County, Montana

Patrick J. Slattery Central Region Headquarters, Public Affairs, Kansas City,

Missouri
v

Upper Nine Mile Complex in the

Lolo National Forest, Montana. 

(Courtesy of NIFC)

Other contributors:

Donald Artley Montana State Forester and Chairman of the National Wildfire

Coordinating Group, Missoula, Montana 

David Goens Meteorologist in Charge, WFO Missoula, Montana

Linda Kremkau NWS Headquarters, Office of Climate, Water and Weather

Services, Silver Spring, Maryland

William Lerner NWS Headquarters, Office of Climate, Water and Weather

Services, Silver Spring, Maryland

Kathy McAllister U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Region 1 Deputy Regional Forester,

Missoula, Montana

Tim Murphy Montana State Director for Fire and Aviation, Missoula, Montana

Rick Ochoa Staff Meteorologist to NIFC, Boise, Idaho

Bill Thomas District One Representative for the Montana Disaster and

Emergency Services, Missoula, Montana

The Service Assessment Team also acknowledges the NIFC staff and the many others

who took time to provide the Team with valuable information contained in this Report.
vi

Acronyms

ATMU Advanced Technology Meteorological Unit

CJIN Criminal Justice Information Network

CPC Climate Prediction Center

HPC Hydrometeorological Prediction Center

ICS Incident Command System

IMET Incident Meteorologist

LETS Law Enforcement Teletype System

MAC Multi-Agency Coordination

MAR Modernization and Associated Restructuring

MIC Meteorologist in Charge

NAWAS National Warning System

NCEP National Centers for Environmental Prediction

NIFC National Interagency Fire Center

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NWS National Weather Service

RAWS Remote Automated Weather Station

SPC Storm Prediction Center

USFS U.S. Forest Service

WCM Warning Coordination Meteorologist

WFO Weather Forecast Office
1

Service Assessment Report

Introduction

Federal and state land management organizations recognized the wildfires of 2000 as

historic in both extent and duration. Through late September, more than 79,700 wildfires

scorched over 6.8 million acres of public and private land. This exceeds the 10-year average of

66,120 wildfires and 3.1 million acres burned annually. The number, size and intensity of these

wildfires stretched land management suppression resources to the limit, threatened entire

communities and caught the attention of the public and media throughout the world. The

suppression effort was likely the largest peacetime mobilization of resources in our Nation’s

history. The U.S. military provided valuable resources to the suppression effort.

The wildfire season started in the early spring in the southeast United States and

progressed west and north as hot, dry, summer weather settled over the western half of the

country. The first IMET of the season was dispatched to a wildfire in Louisiana on March 9,

2000. IMETs are meteorologists who, in addition to their regular forecasting duties, are specially

trained to provide onsite weather support to fire fighting teams. IMETs were deployed onsite in

16 states from March through September. This involved a record 64 IMETs dispatched

246 times for a record 1,772 IMET days. Routine and specific fire weather services were

provided nationwide for an extended period.

The focus of this Service Assessment Report is limited to NWS services provided to the

wildfire suppression effort in northern Idaho and western Montana from mid-July to midSeptember. The Northern Rockies was chosen due to the unprecedented duration and magnitude

of the suppression effort, the extraordinary level of services provided and the critical role timely

and consistent weather information played in fire fighter and public safety and suppression

activities.

In the Northern Rockies, a 3-year period of dry weather and above normal temperatures

created tinder dry forests that led to this prolonged wildfire season. A mid-summer series of

lightning storms and strong winds caused an unusually large number of wildfire starts with swift

wildfire spread. Initial relief to the critical wildfire situation came in the form of cooler

temperatures and rain over the Labor Day weekend. More than one million acres burned and fire

danger forced federal and state officials to close millions of acres of public land for extended

periods. Interstate commerce was impacted and the interstate freeway was closed at times. 

Thick smoke filled valleys for extended periods, disrupting the lives of residents and visitors. A

record 40 to 50 Incident Management Teams were in the Northern Rockies at one time. Some of

these teams came from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. All were provided quality weather

information and services from the NWS.
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Fire Weather Services 

Fire weather services date back to the 1910s. The growth and changes in the NWS Fire

Weather Program have been linked to the evolving needs of land management agencies coupled

with the inclusion of new technologies and forecasting concepts. Prior to the NWS

modernization and associated restructuring (MAR), only the Missoula and Billings offices

provided fire weather services in Montana and northern Idaho. Two fire weather forecasters in

Missoula and one fire weather forecaster with part-time help from the MIC at Billings provided

for 8- to 12-hour support during the fire season. With the MAR completion, fire weather

services are now provided around the clock by trained meteorologists at all four offices in the

area: Missoula, Great Falls, Billings and Spokane.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the NWS began upgrading IMET support. Deployment of

IMETs onsite to wildfires changed from slow and restrictive trucks and campers to an air mobile

system. Air Transportable Mobile Units renamed Advanced Technology Meteorological Units

(ATMUs) include a Communications Module (satellite dish) and a Field Support Module (pilot

balloon). The number of stored ATMUs has increased from 22 to 25 across the continental

United States, with three other units in Alaska. There are also 15 ATMU Lites (satellite dish

only) assigned to selected NWS offices. More remains to be done. Some fire weather laptop

computers used by IMETs do not have the connections needed for the ATMU satellite

equipment. Remote weather data can be obtained from 26 portable Remote Automated Weather

Station (RAWS) weather observing platforms owned by land management agencies and deployed

to wildfires as needed. RAWS provides valuable real-time weather information to WFO

forecasters, IMETs and fire management officials. However, not all IMETs in the Northern

Rockies had access to these systems due to the lack of sufficient RAWS units, and not all units

are configured the same. For example, some RAWS do not have satellite interrogation

capability, limiting access to weather data.

NWS offices have traditionally developed new capabilities to enhance weather services to

land managers. One recent example is the development of a Web-based Spot Forecast service

(see WFO Products and Services for an explanation of the Spot Forecast Program). Pioneered at

WFO Missoula, it is an interactive graphic request-reply program, providing site-specific weather

information to land managers up to 20 percent faster than manual methods. This efficiency is

especially important for initial wildfire suppression. Another example is the Web-based current

weather map available from the WFO Great Falls Fire Weather Home Page. This map,

developed for the 2000 fire season, displays color contoured relative humidity, wind and

temperature and is automatically updated every 20 minutes using fire weather RAWS, aviation

weather observations and data from the Montana Department of Transportation. The map

provides a one-stop, near-real-time source for the latest weather conditions.
3

Figure 1. Snowpack in the western United States as of May 1, 2000. 

(Courtesy of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resource

Conservation Service)

Preconditions and Significant Weather Events

As mentioned before, a 3-year period of dry weather and above normal temperatures

created tinder dry forests that led to this prolonged wildfire season across northern Idaho and

western Montana. During the winter of 1999-2000, there was less snow and rain than usual. The

snowpack was at or below 70 percent of normal (Figure 1). Warm spring temperatures caused

what snow there was to melt early. Rainfall in May and June was below normal and by summer

forests became tinder dry. See Figure 2 for precipitation deficits across the area. The moisture

remaining in trees and vegetation (i.e., fuel moisture) reached record low values by mid-July. At

many locations in the Northern Rockies, fuel moisture fell below 10 percent of normal.
4

Figure 2. Monthly Accumulated Precipitation Deficits, October 1999 to August 2000, for

Idaho and Montana. (Courtesy of Larry Bradshaw of the USFS Intermountain Fire Sciences

Laboratory)

A period of widespread rain occurred the first week of July but provided only temporary

relief. A persistent area of high pressure in the upper levels of the atmosphere developed over

the western United States and remained in place through August. This produced daytime sunny

skies, hot temperatures and low relative humidity that further dried the fuels. While nighttime

temperatures cooled in the valleys, higher elevations remained warm with continued low

humidity. This helped keep the forests at dangerously dry levels. The spark that ignited the

explosive fire development came on July 13 in the form of dry thunderstorms (dry thunderstorms

are storms that produce less than a tenth of an inch of rain).

The July 13 lightning event was the first of several significant lightning or wind events

that occurred over the next 6 weeks across the Northern Rockies. Conditions were so dry across

the region that one land manager stated he had never seen such efficient wildfire producing

lightning during his 30-year career.

Figure 3 shows the number of new fire starts each day in the Northern Rockies from July

to mid-September. Nearly 3,900 fires were ignited; all but 10 were caused by lightning. Once

the fires started, periodic strong winds and low relative humidity caused widespread containment
5

Figure 3. New fire starts in the Northern Rockies, July to mid-September 2000. 

Data gathered from daily NIFC Incident Reports. (Storm Prediction Center, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA])

and suppression problems. The most critical weather days for wildfire starts or spreads were

July 13, and August 9, 10 and 19. 

NWS Performance Overview

Fire control representatives interviewed by the Service Assessment Team unanimously

stated that the unprecedented wildfire season in the Northern Rockies was matched by an equally

unprecedented level of timely, accurate and consistent NWS products. These included routine

weather products, as well as special products and services tailored to the needs of individual fire

control managers. Extensive coordination among WFOs and IMETs resulted in a consistent

weather message. Kathy McAllister, USFS Region 1 Deputy Regional Forester, indicated the

Forest Service could not have achieved its wildfire suppression goals and accomplished the fire

line safety it had throughout the long and tiring fire season without the outstanding cooperation,

expertise and service from the NWS. Ms. McAllister concluded the relationship between USFS

Region 1 and the NWS is perhaps the best in the country. (See Figure 4 for USFS Region 1

map.)
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Figure 4. U.S. Forest Service Region 1. (Courtesy of USFS)

The unprecedented level and quality of NWS service was a direct result of committed and

talented people working with new technological tools. Service before self was the norm among

NWS employees committed to meeting the needs of the fire suppression community. Forty-one

different IMETs were dispatched 105 times for a total of 915 IMET days in USFS Region 1. 

This was about two-thirds of all the IMETs used during the 2000 fire season. Some came from

as far away as Florida and Alaska. Many of these forecasters were called more than once for

duty, each time working long hours for an extended period. A typical IMET workday can extend

beyond 16 hours. Prolonged IMET deployment, up to 14 days, can be exhausting. This service

commitment was not limited to IMETs but included the staffs at WFOs. In several cases, NWS

personnel adjusted or canceled approved annual leave to help relieve operational pressures

brought about by the extreme fire season.

This fire season reaffirmed the importance of the Staff Meteorologist position to NIFC. 

This individual is the liaison between NWS and NIFC officials. The understanding of land

managers’ needs and the skill in communicating current and future weather conditions to forestry

officials led to a high level of confidence and trust. The Staff Meteorologist is also responsible

for the selection and deployment of IMETs to fire sites. This was accomplished efficiently

despite the record number of IMETs involved.

The escalating wildfire situation and the likely need for multiple NWS on-site support

services was recognized early. Assistant Administrator for Weather Services John J. Kelly, Jr.,

and Regional Directors ensured IMETs were available as needed. While some suppression
7

resources were in short supply, all requests for IMETs were satisfied not only for the Northern

Rockies but across the entire country. 

As mentioned before, four days were critical wildfire days. The August 9, 10 and 19

episodes were preceded by timely Fire Weather Watch and Red Flag Warning products. Fire

Weather Watches were in effect in advance of the July 13 lightning event. However, the watches

were canceled and Red Flag Warnings not issued. Scattered dry thunderstorms were forecast but

land managers and forecasters believed moisture from recent rains would limit fire starts. The

July 13 lightning triggered numerous fires and clearly indicated the forests were critically dry. 

On August 9, very low relative humidity, hot temperatures and strong winds caused the fires to

expand, forcing hundreds of residences to be evacuated. More than 100,000 acres burned during

a 2-day period ending August 9 (i.e., approximately 10 percent of total acreage destroyed during

the entire season). In excess of 13,000 lightning strikes on August 10 triggered more than 500

new fires. The August 19 wind event was predicted by the NWS nearly a week in advance,

allowing for significant pre-positioning of fire fighting resources.

The allocation of limited fire fighter personnel, fire suppression resources and public

safety was dependent on accurate and timely weather information. One MAC group leader

stated, “All MAC group decisions are based on weather. The information from the NWS was

instrumental in achieving its tactical suppression goals with no loss of life or serious injury.” See

Appendix B for the role of the MAC group. The cooperation and trust between NWS personnel

and land managers grew as the wildfire situation worsened in the Northern Rockies. Local NWS

managers and IMETs recognized the need for a coordinated “weather message” when

communicating with fire control managers. Daily group coordination calls were initiated by the

NWS Western Region Meteorological Services Division and involved IMETs, the NIFC Staff

Meteorologist and affected WFOs. This helped facilitate consistent weather forecasts. Montana

Governor Marc Racicot remarked to the Missoula MIC that he was impressed with the detail and

consistent weather information he received from IMETs as he traveled from fire to fire. The

Governor’s remarks were echoed by several key fire control managers. The Service Assessment

Team did not receive any negative comments from those interviewed. Based on the information

and data gathered from this assessment, weather services exceeded the expectations of fire

control managers in northern Idaho and western Montana and aided in fire fighter and public

safety and suppression activities.
8

Fire control vehicles from Massachusetts pre-positioned for the

 August 19 wind event. (Courtesy of WFO Missoula, MT.)

National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) 

Products and Services

Climate Prediction Center (CPC)

The CPC products most used before and during the fire season were the 6- to 10-Day,

30-Day and 90-Day Temperature and Precipitation Outlooks.

Some WFOs routinely appended 6- to 10-Day Temperature and Precipitation Outlooks to

the Fire Weather Zone Forecast, providing valuable planning information for land managers. 

This product was also important for the MAC group. Since the MAC group makes broad

strategic decisions, longer range weather forecasts were critical. On August 12, the WFO

Missoula MIC briefed the MAC group on the potential for strong gusty westerly winds on or

about August 19. The MAC group was sensitive to this long-range wind forecast because of

public interest in the anniversary of a historical wind event for the Northern Rockies. On

August 20, 1910, strong winds resulted in more than two million acres of land burned in 2 days

and the deaths of almost 100 fire fighters and citizens. Based on the strong wind forecast, the

MAC group decided to pre-position 75 fire engines, 15 hot shot fire fighting crews, 60 bulldozers

and 6 Blackhawk helicopters. NIFC approved the resource order. Resources came from as far

away as Massachusetts and Delaware. The wind event occurred on August 19, as forecast, and

those pre-positioned resources were put to good use controlling new fires while they were still

small.
9

Another example of the utility of the 6- to 10-Day Outlook was the one issued on

August 25 for the Labor Day weekend. This gave the first indication of a change in the

prolonged hot, dry weather across the Northern Rockies. The information led to a shift in fire

managers’ resource planning. The graphic portion of the Outlooks proved to be an excellent

NWS briefing tool for fire control managers.

WFO forecasters, land managers and emergency managers used CPC’s 30- and 90-Day

Temperature and Precipitation Outlooks prior to the start of the 2000 fire season. Information

contained in these Outlooks enabled land managers to establish contingency plans for the

upcoming fire season. The Outlooks were accurate in detailing warmer, drier weather than

normal across the Northern Rockies.

Another product issued by CPC is the U.S. Threats Assessment graphic, a Web-based

product covering weather conditions in the 3- to 10-day range. The Threats Assessment was not

routinely used by WFO forecasters, IMETs or land managers in the Northern Rockies who

thought it did not add to information available from other NWS products. The Threat

Assessment was available to emergency managers and the general public through WFO Internet

home pages.

Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPC)

HPC is responsible for basic weather forecast guidance out to 7 days and for quantitative

precipitation forecasts out to 5 days. Use of the HPC guidance products varied among IMETs

and WFO forecasters in the Northern Rockies. Some forecasters found the HPC narratives too

broad to support the detail needed in fire weather products; others used the information as a basis

for local forecasts. HPC graphics, such as location of fronts and high and low pressure systems,

aided in daily briefings to fire control officials.

Storm Prediction Center (SPC)

SPC issues Fire Weather Outlooks describing areas where fire danger is high to extreme

and, combined with expected thunderstorms producing at least 100 cloud-to-ground lightning

strikes and less than one-tenth of an inch of rain, pose a threat of wildfires.

Many IMETs and forecasters that served in the Northern Rockies indicated Fire Weather

Outlooks were too broad in detailing critical fire weather areas and provided little new

information. Therefore, the product was not used by a majority of the meteorologists. Since this

was the first operational year for the Fire Weather Outlook and to determine if this perception by

forecasters was correct, SPC provided product verification on 10 important weather events that

impacted the Northern Rockies from mid-July to September. The SPC correctly forecast 9 out of

10 events in its Day 1 Fire Weather Outlook and 7 out of 10 events in the Day 2 period.
10

WFO Products and Services

All WFOs with a Fire Weather Program issue a suite of fire weather products and provide

a variety of services to land management agencies. Products include Fire Weather Zone

Forecasts, Fire Weather Watches, Red Flag Warnings and Spot Forecasts. Appendix C shows

examples.

The basic product is the twice daily Fire Weather Zone Forecast. This 5-day forecast

provides weather information to fire control agencies and any IMETs assigned onsite to fires in

the forecast area. These forecasts allow land management agencies to effectively marshal

resources and prepare for meeting fire weather threats.

During the fire emergency for northern Idaho and western Montana, the extended 3- to

5-day portion of the Fire Weather Zone Forecast proved critical. For example, forecasters alerted

fire control managers verbally and through the Zone Forecast on August 19 of a significant wind

event. This forecast confirmed the 6- to 10-Day Outlook mentioned before, and validated the

heightened state of readiness and marshaling of additional fire fighting resources. However, the

inclusion of wind information in the extended forecast is not uniform across the country.

Fire Weather Watches are issued when there is a high potential for severe fire weather

conditions in a 12- to 72-hour time frame. Information includes wind, fuel moisture,

temperature, relative humidity and the likelihood of dry thunderstorms. This product provides

land managers with the information to prepare for critical weather events that will impact fire

behavior.

Red Flag Warnings are issued when severe fire weather conditions are expected to occur

within 24 hours. Issuance criteria are established by a WFO and the local land management

organizations prior to each fire season. Red Flag Warnings are normally disseminated to the land

management agencies and headlined in the Fire Weather Zone Forecasts. During this wildfire

emergency, these warnings were also broadcast over the National Warning System (NAWAS) to

state emergency service warning points. An indicator of the severe fire weather conditions for

the 2000 season was the 500 Red Flag Warnings issued for the Northern Rockies—2 1⁄2 times the

seasonal average. The importance of Red Flag Warnings is exemplified by those issued for the

lightning event of August 10. With lead times of more than 18 hours, these warnings provided

fire control agencies with time to react to the approaching threat.

The above three products, Fire Weather Zone Forecast, Fire Weather Watch and Red

Flag Warning, all contain fire weather zone numbers but do not always include corresponding

geographic references. This caused confusion for fire control officials from outside the local

area.
11

Spot forecasts are requested by land management agencies to obtain weather information

to aid the initial attack on new fires or for fires that are not staffed with an IMET. These

forecasts contain highly specific information tailored for the fire area, including winds (impact of

local terrain such as mountain slopes, time of wind shifts due to weather systems or terrain, etc.),

temperature and humidity (times of minimum and maximum) and a 12-hour outlook. For July

and August 2000, the Missoula, Great Falls, Billings and Spokane WFOs issued a total of

623 Spot Forecasts. Most of these were prepared and disseminated in less than 30 minutes. This

rapid production was due to the use of a Web-based software program. This program was an

efficient way for fire control agencies to use the Internet to request a Spot Forecast and for the

servicing WFO to prepare and return the forecast. However, not all Western Region WFOs used

this new capability in 2000 and offices outside the Western Region do not have access to the

software and data base.

Many aircraft were involved in the fire suppression effort. The fires produced areas of

dense smoke, hindering aircraft operations and safety. The NWS responded by providing daily

aviation weather briefings. This service was well received and contributed to an accident-free

aviation record throughout the fire suppression effort in the Northern Rockies.

The extensive fire activity in northern Idaho and western Montana generated the added

responsibility to transmit fire weather information to emergency managers and the general public. 

In order to accomplish this, NWS managers added additional fire weather shifts and used

overtime as needed. Several offices minimized or eliminated the use of IMETs on midnight

shifts during the fire weather season. These IMETs focused on meeting the weather needs of

land managers and were available to be dispatched to fires.

IMET Products and Services

The NWS IMETs go through a well-defined training and certification program. This

program includes a week-long workshop, local on-station training, completion of an IMET task

book and hands-on experience at an ongoing wildfire or prescribed burn. The number of

certified IMETs has increased from 35 in the mid-90s to more than 60 by the end of the 2000 fire

season.

IMETs deploy to a specific fire and are responsible for providing onsite weather support. 

Since IMETs are requested by land management agencies, not all fires have an assigned IMET. 

IMETs prepare forecasts, conduct crew briefings, attend planning meetings and work closely

with Incident Fire Behavior Analysts to provide specific information to the Incident Commander

and other support personnel for wildfire suppression planning, fire fighter safety planning and

resource management. This weather information also was used by county emergency managers

to decide on community evacuations and other related public safety measures. Between July 15

and September 20, 41 different IMETs furnished weather services in northern Idaho and western

Montana.
12

Communication and data acquisition while onsite at wildfires is one of the greatest

challenges for IMETs. The current main data delivery method is through the Internet but satellite

communication capability provided by ATMUs is also used. Approximately 4 percent of the

time during the 2000 fire season, satellite data was old or unavailable due to periodic problems

with the Western Region data server, the onsite setup and/or the contract data delivery system. 

Though infrequent, these data gaps impacted the service capability of IMETs.

In addition to routine products and services, IMETs provided to the Incident Commanders

and crews special alert statements for developing thunderstorm activity that could impact the fire

control operation and fire fighter safety. On the Wilderness Fire, south of Missoula, Montana,

an IMET alert of impending thunderstorm winds allowed fire crews to be pulled from the fire

line well before the winds hit. In the words of the Incident Commander, this timely weather

information saved lives. This level of service was provided on a 24-hour basis. At the Boulder

Creek Fire, near Boulder, Montana, on August 10, an IMET issued three special alert statements

at 12:30 p.m., 5 p.m. and 1 a.m., with lead times ranging from 10 minutes to 1 1⁄2 hours. This

heightened awareness of impending critical weather resulted in the Incident Commander taking

action. Updates to routine forecasts and verbal briefings to key support personnel were provided

anytime IMETs thought significant weather was possible. This free flow of weather information

created an effective communication link between IMETs and Incident Commanders and helped

build credibility. When requested by fire control officials, IMETs assisted in community

briefings as frequently as once a day. IMETs also conducted media interviews.

There are only four interagency Incident Command System (ICS) Area Command Teams

in the United States (Appendix B). All four were active in western Montana at the same time, an

unprecedented occurrence. Due to the large number of fires, many management teams were

forced to oversee fires much more complex than they had previously experienced. It was the

opinion of at least two Area Commanders that these teams were able to handle the more complex

fires because of the high-level IMET support and excellent forecast services they provided.

Weather support to the MAC group was initially provided by WFO Missoula. During the

initial stages around July 20, the MAC group met at the Missoula WFO, reflecting well on the

interagency cooperation between the NWS and the fire control organizations in western

Montana. By mid-August, a separate IMET provided weather support to the MAC group. The

MAC group makes broad strategic decisions. This IMET focused on those parts of the NWS

product suite that were most important, namely longer range weather information.

On Friday, August 25, the CPC issued a 6- to 10-Day Outlook calling for above normal

precipitation and below normal temperatures. This was the first indication of a possible change

in the hot, dry weather since the Northern Rockies’ fires began in mid-July. This information

was first conveyed to the MAC group on August 26. This extended forecast led the MAC group

to shift its strategic resource planning strategy, even before the rain started. At subsequent MAC

group meetings, a consistent message of cooler, wetter weather continued to be conveyed. The

rains came as forecast over the Labor Day weekend, substantially reducing the fire activity across
13

northern Idaho and western Montana and eventually eliminating any further need for MAC group

resource management.

Coordination

Coordination played a major role in the successful delivery of products and services from

the NWS to land managers during the 2000 fire season. Intensive coordination efforts took place

between WFOs and IMETs and their local fire weather customers. This increased level of

coordination was unprecedented due to the length of the fire season and scope of the wildfire

emergency. All WFOs serving northern Idaho and Montana conducted preseason workshops. 

These meetings were well attended and set a positive tone with customers. For the purpose of

this Assessment, the Team focused on three levels of NWS coordination: WFO to WFO; WFO

to IMET; and IMET to the MAC group, Area Command or Incident Commander.

WFO to WFO: As the fire season approached, the WFOs serving USFS Region 1 discussed

the threat of a very active fire season. These discussions took on added importance because the

Great Falls and Pocatello offices would be providing fire weather services for the first time. 

Preseason coordination laid the foundation for the summer 2000 success by establishing an early

consistent message to customers. Coordination among WFOs increased as the wildfire threat

materialized, especially when issuing Fire Weather Watches or Red Flag Warnings.

Twice-daily coordination calls are standard procedure for Western Region WFOs. They

routinely include the discussion of models, temperatures, etc. During the fire season, there was

an added focus on radar information. This radar information was passed on to IMETs, resulting

in 2- to 3-hour lead times when thunderstorms moved toward a fire. In more than one case, this

lead time allowed fire crews to be pulled off the line for safety or repositioned to better fight the

fire.

WFO to IMET: In a survey of IMETs dispatched into northern Idaho or western Montana

(see Appendix D), a majority of IMETs rated the level of supporting WFO coordination as a five

on a scale of six. IMETs were especially complimentary toward the support provided by WFO

Missoula. The IMETs suggested daily coordination calls be conducted when three or more

IMETs are onsite within a WFO forecast area. However, not all IMETs immediately made

contact with the supporting WFO, delaying this coordination effort.

IMET to MAC Group, Area Command or Incident Commander: Rick Haffenfeld,

who served as the Operations Chief for the western Montana MAC group, stated, “All MAC

group decisions were made based on a lot of information, beginning with the weather.” Twice

daily weather briefings were provided to the MAC group and Incident Commanders to help with

fire suppression, tactical and strategic planning and fire fighter safety. Earlier coordination with

WFOs allowed IMETs to relay a unified message to their Incident Commanders. This resulted in

a high level of confidence with the forecasts. Besides “scheduled” briefings, IMETs kept the fire
14

IMET Dave Schmidt conducting a

daily briefing at the Ryan Gulch

Fire. (Courtesy of WFO

Missoula, MT.)

IMET Chuck Redman

conducting a daily briefing at

the Upper Nine Mile

Complex, Lolo National

Forest. (Courtesy of WFO

Missoula, MT.)

control managers well informed as weather conditions changed. These one-to-one interfaces

allowed many resource and safety decisions to be made by the MAC group, Area Command or

Incident Commander. Paul Hefner, who served as an Incident Commander at three separate

incidents, stated, “The success of the fire fight and many of the decisions that were made was due

in part to excellent weather information provided by IMETs in a timely manner.” 

Emergency Management Response

State and county emergency management throughout Montana and Idaho were unanimous

in their praise for the NWS. This was due to the strong partnership between local offices and

emergency management officials. When the Service Assessment Team interviewed emergency

management personnel, the emergency managers cited coordination meetings initiated by each

WFO as one indicator of the high-level NWS service they received. As the fire season unfolded,

emergency managers began working closely with fire control agencies but remained in contact

with the local WFO through phone calls or the WFO Internet home page. Several emergency

managers stated the NWS home pages were critical to their operation. Lacy Marks, Emergency

Manager for Ravalli County in western Montana, stated, “The WFO Missoula Home Page was

critical to my operation. I used the information from the Web as a tool to help me brief the
15

residents within my county.” She also used this information during the evacuation process. 

Ravalli County experienced an extreme level of fire activity and at one point, up to 1,500 people

were evacuated from their homes.

Forecasts and information from the IMETs were helpful in planning and prioritizing

community evacuations. If emergency managers had any weather questions, they would go

directly to the NWS for further clarification or additional information. Paul Spengler,

Emergency Manager for Lewis and Clark County in western Montana, stated, “The NWS did an

excellent job of fire weather forecasting. I called the Great Falls office many times this summer

during the three major fires in Lewis and Clark County and always received the latest data. They

were very responsive and I’m a satisfied customer!”

Red Flag Warnings were disseminated through direct contact with the emergency

managers, on WFO home pages, broadcast over NAWAS and transmitted through the State Law

Enforcement Teletype System (LETS). In Montana, the State LETS is the Criminal Justice

Information Network (CJIN). CJIN would pass all Red Flag Warnings to the affected counties

and if the emergency manager had any questions, they would contact the issuing WFO. Cindy

Mullaney, Emergency Manager for Pondera County in northern Montana, stated, “I found the

NWS to be very responsive to my needs during the fire season. In addition to the information

that was available over the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network and on the

Internet, at my request I was called whenever the weather was expected to meet certain

parameters the NWS and I agreed too. I really liked the personal touch and appreciated the heads

up, particularly during a time which must have been extremely busy for the Great Falls office.”

Bill Thomas, District One Representative for the Montana Disaster and Emergency

Services, summarized the general feelings of the emergency management community. He stated,

“Nothing negative was ever said concerning the NWS. The level of service was fantastic for an

unprecedented disaster such as this was.”

Media Response

NOAA and NWS Offices of Public and Constituent Affairs instituted new practices to

keep the media and public well informed. Regional public affairs officers, especially those in

Western and Central Regions, coordinated closely with the NOAA Webmaster to establish and

maintain new Internet avenues for collecting and disseminating timely information via the

NOAA Home Page. Frequent Web site updates ensured media and public access to the latest

information. Local, regional and national media contacts commented to the NOAA Webmaster

that the summaries and links were quickly assimilated to assist them in guiding their daily search

for wildfire news. The Internet proved to be a valuable communication tool.

Information on the Internet to some degree reduced media contact with WFOs and

IMETs. However, the sense of urgency in covering such a large number of wildfires still drew
16

Valley Complex in the Bitterroot National Forest, Montana. 

(Courtesy of Karen Wattenmaker)

intense media focus. For example, the local Missoula newspaper, Missoulian, had wildfire in its

headlines for 40 straight days.

Several people noted how IMETs and WFO forecasters avoided what could have been a

confusing situation by focusing their information only in their area of expertise: weather

elements. Several fire control officials praised the IMETs and other forecasters for sticking with

what they knew during media interviews and public presentations. For example, the NWS

forecasters gave information about the weather and didn’t venture into unfamiliar areas like fire

behavior. The consistent reports helped fire management agencies gain the confidence of local

residents, which was vital to public safety.
17

Portable Remote Automated Weather

Station. (Courtesy of WFO Missoula, MT.)

Facts

FACT: Federal and state land management organizations recognized the wildfires of 2000

as historic in both extent and duration. In the Northern Rockies, more than one

million acres burned. The fire threat forced federal and state officials to close

millions of acres of public land for extended periods. Interstate commerce was

impacted and the interstate freeway was closed at times. Thick smoke filled

valleys for extended periods, disrupting the lives of residents and visitors.

FACT: A record 40 to 50 Incident Management Teams were in the Northern Rockies at

one time. Some of these teams came from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 

All were provided quality weather information and services from the NWS.

FACT: Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS) provided valuable real-time

weather information to WFO forecasters, IMETs and fire management officials.

FACT: Kathy McAllister, USFS Region 1 Deputy Regional Forester, indicated the Forest

Service could not have achieved its wildfire suppression goals without the

outstanding cooperation, expertise and service from the NWS. 

FACT: 41 different IMETs were dispatched 105 times for a total of 915 IMET days in

USFS Region 1. 
18

Figure 5. Lightning activity in the Northern

Rockies on August 10, 2000. (Courtesy of Global

Atmospherics, Inc.)

FACT: This fire season reaffirmed the importance of the Staff Meteorologist position to

NIFC.

FACT: Nearly all of the fires within USFS Region 1 were caused by lightning. In one

case on August 10, lightning caused more than 500 new fire starts (see Figure 5).

FACT: All requests for IMETs were satisfied.

FACT: There were no wildfire-related loss of life or serious injury within USFS

Region 1.

FACT: The Internet proved to be a valuable communication tool.

FACT: The local Missoula newspaper, Missoulian, had wildfire in its headlines for

40 straight days.
19

Flags of cooperating countries at the Nine

Mile Complex, Montana. (Courtesy of

WFO Missoula, MT.)

Valley Complex in Bitterroot National

Forest, Montana. (Courtesy of Karen

Wattenmaker)

Helicopter water drop over Burgdorf Fire

in Payette National Forest, Idaho. 

(Courtesy of NIFC)
20

Bomber dropping fire retardant over Blodgett Fire

in Bitterroot National Forest, Montana. (Courtesy

of NIFC)

Trail Creek Fire in Idaho. (Courtesy of Ric

Holmes, Atlanta resident)
21

Findings and Recommendations

Fire Weather Services

Finding 1: Some fire weather laptop computers used by IMETs do not have the

connections needed for the ATMU satellite equipment.

Recommendation 1: NWS should ensure that all fire weather laptops have standard

connections needed for the ATMU satellite equipment.

Finding 2: The 26 portable RAWS provides valuable real-time weather

information. Not all IMETs had access to these fire control agency

systems due to their limited number. Some RAWS do not have a

satellite interrogation capability, limiting access to weather data.

Recommendation 2: The NWS should recommend to land management agencies to increase

the number of portable RAWS units to match the 40 ATMUs available

and equip all RAWS with satellite interrogation capability.

NWS Performance Overview

Finding 3: The USFS Region 1 Deputy Regional Forester indicated the Forest

Service could not have achieved its wildfire suppression goals and

accomplished the fire line safety it had throughout the long and tiring

fire season without the outstanding cooperation, expertise and service

from the NWS.

Recommendation 3: Formally recognize the contributions of the NIFC Staff Meteorologist,

the IMETs that served in the Northern Rockies and the staffs at WFOs

Billings, Great Falls, Missoula, Pocatello and Spokane.

Finding 4: A typical IMET workday can extend beyond 16 hours. Prolonged

IMET deployment, up to 14 days, can be exhausting.

Recommendation 4: The NWS should establish national guidelines for IMET dispatch by

August 1, 2001.
22

NCEP Products and Services

Finding 5: The SPC Fire Weather Outlook product was not used by a majority of

meteorologists in the Northern Rockies.

Recommendation 5: The Regions should instruct forecasters to use the Fire Weather

Outlook as they would any other guidance product.

WFO Products and Services

Finding 6: Providing wind information in the 3- to 5-day extended portion of a

Fire Weather Zone Forecast proved critical. Inclusion of wind

information in the 3- to 5-day forecast period is not uniform across the

country.

Recommendation 6: Include wind information in the 3- to 5-day portion of all Fire Weather

Zone Forecast products by August 1, 2001.

Finding 7: Fire weather products that used only zone numbers confused customers

from outside the local area.

Recommendation 7: Geographic names, similar to those used in the public zone forecast

products, should be used with the zone numbers in fire weather

products by August 1, 2001.

Finding 8: The Web-based Spot Forecast program was an efficient way for fire

control agencies to use the Internet to request a Spot Forecast and for

the servicing WFO to prepare and return the forecast. However, not all

Western Region WFOs used this new capability in 2000 and offices

outside the Western Region do not have access to the software and

data base.

Recommendation 8a: Western Region should implement the Web-based Spot Forecast

service regionwide by August 1, 2001.

Recommendation 8b: NWS should determine whether to implement the Web-based Spot

Forecast service nationwide.
23

IMET Products and Services

Finding 9: Approximately 4 percent of the time during the 2000 fire season,

satellite data was old or unavailable due to periodic problems with the

Western Region data server, the onsite setup and/or the contract data

delivery system. Though infrequent, these data gaps impacted the

service capability of IMETs.

Recommendation 9a: NWS should ensure a server and data reliability standard of 98 percent.

Recommendation 9b: NWS should develop a methodology of limiting data loss to a

maximum of 30 minutes upon notification of interruption.

Recommendation 9c: ATMU setup and problem diagnosis instructions should be kept

current and emphasized in all IMET training.

Coordination

Finding 10: Not all IMETs immediately made contact with the supporting WFO

upon arrival at a fire incident.

Recommendation 10: Implement policy by August 1, 2001, requiring IMETs to notify the

supporting WFO and the NIFC Staff Meteorologist upon their arrival

and departure from an incident.
24

Clear Creek Fire in Salmon-Challis National Forest in Idaho. 

(Courtesy of NIFC)
25

Best Practices

1. Preseason Coordination Workshops

WFOs providing fire weather services to northern Idaho and Montana all hosted

preseason coordination meetings with land management officials. These workshops were well

attended and helped establish a baseline understanding between the WFO staff and the fire

weather customer. Several land managers commented about the trust and confidence that comes

from knowing who is providing the weather information. These preseason customer workshops

went a long way to establish the communication and a working relationship for these offices to

be successful during the prolonged wildfire emergency. This was especially true at WFOs

Pocatello and Great Falls because these offices assumed full fire weather responsibility for the

first time this year.

2. Post-season Customer Feedback

WFO Great Falls conducted a post-season customer feedback meeting with all fire

weather customers. This is an excellent way to ensure NWS products and services meet

customer needs in preparation for the next fire season.

3. WFO/IMET Coordination Conference Calls

A daily conference call was conducted between supporting WFOs and IMETs in northern

Idaho and western Montana during the height of the fire emergency. These calls proved

successful in detailing the “meteorology of the day” and coordinating watch/warning

requirements. These calls helped establish a common weather message among WFOs and

IMETs, enhancing the confidence of both the forecasters and the customers receiving the final

forecast product.

4. MIC Visits to IMETs

MIC involvement during a fire weather emergency is crucial to the success of the services

provided by the NWS. The WFO Missoula MIC made a point of personally visiting as many

IMETs deployed into the Missoula fire weather district as possible. This interest and personal

touch from the MIC helped connect the IMETs to the WFO, making them feel valued and

enhancing their motivation and effectiveness.
26

5. Weather Support to the MAC Group

The Missoula MAC group was supported first by WFO Missoula, although an IMET was

eventually detailed to this duty. IMET support to the Missoula MAC group proved very

beneficial to their strategic planning and resource management.

6. Pre-positioning IMETs

Based on long-range forecasts and the threat of a major wind event in the extended

period, several IMETs were pre-positioned into Missoula, Montana, for rapid deployment. This

action helped minimize the NWS response time to a number of IMET requests.

7. Internet Delivery of Event-Specific Weather Information

WFOs supporting the wildfire suppression effort in northern Idaho and Montana made a

high priority of providing as much information as possible through their office Web pages. This

suite of Web-based weather information met the need of fire control public relations officials,

emergency managers, state officials and the general public. Local and national media were

directed to these Internet sources for fire and weather information. Spot Forecast services were

provided over the Internet via a unique program developed at WFO Missoula. Internet access to

NWS products and information reduced the number of direct calls and personal contact with the

WFO.

8. Using NAWAS

NAWAS was used to communicate Red Flag Warnings to state emergency warning

points.
A-1

Road closures near Clear Creek Fire. 

(Courtesy of NIFC)

Helicopter with water bucket over the

Crooked Fire in Clearwater National Forest,

Idaho. (Courtesy of NIFC)

Appendix A

Team Charge

September 22, 2000

The Service Assessment Team is charged with evaluating NWS products and services

provided to the land management agencies and the emergency management communities affected

by the wildfires in northern Idaho and western Montana from mid-July to mid-September 2000. 

This includes products and services from Incident Meteorologists as well as from Weather

Forecast Offices. The team will evaluate (1) services to the Area Commands and the MultiAgency Coordination group for the Northern Rockies Coordination Area in Missoula, Montana,

(2) coordination of products and services between IMETs and WFOs and (3) forecast

coordination between WFOs in and adjacent to the Northern Rockies during this period.
B-1

Appendix B

Incident Command System (ICS) Overview

Wildfire control agencies use the ICS for command and control of an incident. This

provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the

common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting life, property and the environment. ICS is

designed to allow its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity

and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. 

The Incident Commander is the individual responsible for the management of all operations at

the incident. The Incident Commander is supported by general and command staff, if required by

the incident. The general staff consists of the plans, operations, logistics and finance section

chiefs and their staff. The planning section’s function includes the collection, evaluation,

dissemination and use of information about the development of the incident and status of

resources. The IMET is part of the planning staff as a technical specialist.

A manageable span of control is defined as the number of individuals one supervisor can

manage effectively. In ICS, the span of control for any supervisor falls within a range of three

to seven resources, with five being the optimum. When there are an extremely large number of

incidents which will exceed the optimum five as occurred in western Montana, Area Commands

are established. Area Commands have the responsibility to set overall strategy and priorities,

allocate critical resources based on priorities, ensure that incidents are properly managed and

ensure that objectives are met and strategies followed.

When there are incidents which involve a number of jurisdictions and where resources are

limited, representatives of the involved agencies come together to make decisions regarding the

prioritizing of incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources. This MAC group sets the

overall objectives and strategies of the various Area Commands under their jurisdiction.
C-1

Appendix C

Product Examples

Fire Weather Zone Forecast
C-2
C-3

Fire Weather Watch

GTFRFWGTF

TTAA00 KGTF DDHHMM

FIRE WEATHER WATCH

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE GREAT FALLS MT

200 PM MDT TUE AUG 22 2000

MTZ012-014-015-230300-

...FIRE WEATHER WATCH FOR DRY THUNDERSTORMS SOUTHWEST MONTANA

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING...

FIRE WEATHER ZONE INCLUDED IN THE WATCH IS: 118

THIS INCLUDES: TOWNSEND RANGER DISTRICT OF THE HELENA NATIONAL

FOREST

DISCUSSION: MONSOONAL MOISTURE FROM THE SOUTHWESTERN UNITED

STATES WILL BE DRAWN INTO THE AREA LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON.

THUS...THE POSSIBILITY OF DRY THUNDERSTORMS WITH GUSTY WINDS WILL

EXIST FOR ZONE 118 LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON THROUGH EVENING. 

PLEASE ADVISE THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OR FIRE CREWS IN THE FIELD OF

THIS FIRE WEATHER WATCH.
C-4

Red Flag Warning
C-5

Spot Forecast (Using Web-based Program)
C-6
D-1

Appendix D

IMET Survey

Note: Responses are provided to the questions where data can be

tabulated. Some responses have been kept deliberately vague to

protect the confidentiality of the IMETs as promised. Thirty-five of

41 IMETs responded to the survey. 

1. How many total days were you deployed as an IMET into Region 1?

Shortest time: 4 days

Longest time: 40 days

2. On average, how many briefings and forecasts did you provide per day?

Answer: 2 regular scheduled briefings per day but also on an as-needed basis (weather

dependent)

3. Was the data available to you adequate? If not, what else was needed?

The majority responded YES

4. Was the data timely and reliable? If not, why not?

YES, except for occasional interruptions with satellite packet data

5. What WFO did you coordinate with?

# of IMETs

WFO Missoula, MT 30

WFO Pocatello, ID 15

WFO Great Falls, MT 12

WFO Boise, ID 8

WFO Billings, MT 3
D-2

For each of the offices in question five, please answer questions six through eight.

6. On a scale from one to six (one being poor and six being excellent), how would you rate

the coordination between you and the WFO?

Answers ranged from 3 to 6

7. On a scale from one to six (one being poor and six being excellent), how would you rate

the service you received from the WFO? Please provide examples:

Answers ranged from 3 to 6

8. Did you ever receive a phone call or other contact from a WFO to advise you of a

significant change in their forecast products or rapidly changing weather situation that

would impact your incident? If so, please provide the details.

30 IMETs responded YES

9. Are you aware of any success stories? (For example, where your forecast saved property,

lives or resources)

10. Did you use the SPC Fire Weather Outlook product while at an incident? If yes, how?

30 IMETs responded NO

5 IMETs responded YES; graphic was used during briefings

11. Please feel free to provide any additional comments you feel would aid the Assessment

Team.