IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

July 11, 2019 Session

SANDRA ANN PIPPIN v. CHRISTINA MICHELLE PIPPIN

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Wilson County

No. 2018-CV-2, 18-AD-242 John Thomas Gwin, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2018-00376-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

The non-biological parent of a child born by artificial insemination to a woman with 

whom the non-biological parent had maintained a long term relationship and who had 

lived with the child, holding herself out as one of the child’s parents, filed a petition to 

establish her parentage of the child and to set a parenting schedule; the petition was 

dismissed on the basis that she lacked standing; the trial court also awarded the petitioner 

visitation with the child. Upon our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition and 

vacate the order setting visitation. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court 

Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; Case Remanded

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL 

MCBRAYER, J., joined. ANDY D. BENNETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Abby R. Rubenfeld, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sandra Pippin

Jacqueline B. Dixon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Christina Pippin

Tiffany D. Hagar, Lebanon, Tennessee, Guardian ad Litem

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves a petition for parentage that was dismissed pursuant to Rule 

12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. A child (“Child”) was born in 

November 2011 through artificial insemination after his biological mother, Christina 

Pippin, and her partner, Sandra Pippin, made the mutual decision to have a child and to 

have Christina carry the baby. Child was raised by both Christina and Sandra together as 

05/14/2020
2

what Sandra characterizes as “equal parents” until December 2016, when the couple 

ended their 9 1/2 year relationship. Though Christina legally changed her last name to 

that of Sandra’s in the spring of 2011 when she was pregnant with Child, the couple 

never married. When they ended their relationship, Sandra moved out of the parties’ 

home along with her son (“J.”), whom she had adopted prior to beginning the relationship 

with Christina. 

On January 4, 2018, Sandra filed a petition in the Wilson County General Sessions 

Court, Family Court Division,1seeking to establish what she called “de facto parentage” 

of Child and to set a schedule to allow her to have parenting time with him. Among other 

things, the petition alleged:

10. . . . 

d. In 2009, the parties began discussing adding another child to their 

family, which they also discussed with their extended families and 

friends, based on their mutual intent and commitment to have and 

raise another child together as equal parents;

e. In late 2010/early 2011, the parties executed a sworn Domestic 

Partner Affidavit to verify that they were a family, together 

supporting each other and both children, which allowed Respondent 

and both children to be added to Petitioner’s employee health plan;

f. Because same sex marriage was not yet legal throughout the 

country, including in Tennessee, the parties discussed that their 

relationship and their commitment to each other and their family was 

just as strong without that legal recognition, although Petitioner 

proposed to Respondent nonetheless and gave her a bread-tie ring, 

later replacing that with a real ring and then a larger one when 

Respondent legally changed her surname to Petitioner’s.

***

13. . . . 

f. Petitioner was present for [Child]’s birth . . . was the first person to 

hold [Child] after birth, accompanied [Child] to the neonatal 

intensive care unit (NICU) immediately after his premature birth,

and was the first person to change [Child]’s diaper;

***

i. Petitioner’s family members, friends, and colleagues were told and 

understand that she has two sons, and she has photographs of both 

[Child] and [J.] in her office; and,

 

1 Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-104(f) gives juvenile courts jurisdiction to establish the 

paternity of children born out of wedlock; section 16-15-501 gives general sessions courts concurrent 

jurisdiction with circuit and chancery courts in domestic relations cases. 
3

j. Petitioner was known to [Child] from birth as “Momma Sandy”

and Respondent was known to him as “Momma Christy,” by 

agreement of and equal participation by the parties.

14. Since birth, both parties have taught [Child] that they are his equal 

parents, and he has never questioned that and never been told that the 

parties are anything other than equal parents to him; [Child] has grown up 

knowing [J.] as his brother, and the four members of the household have 

functioned as a nuclear family of two parents and two children for the 

entirety of [Child]’s life.

15. The record is clear that the parties regarded themselves as a committed 

couple raising two sons together, regardless of who had what legal 

relationship with each child . . .

***

17. The parties continued their joint commitment to being equal parents of 

[Child] after his birth, as evidenced by the following, among other things:

a. [Child] has grown up being taught and considering Petitioner’s 

extended family as his family, calling Petitioner’s mother “Grandma 

Marilyn,” Petitioner’s sisters “Aunt Jenny,” “Aunt Debby,” and 

“Aunt Clara,” and Petitioner’s nieces and nephews his “cousins”;

***

c. Throughout [Child]’s life, the parties shared household 

responsibilities for the family, with Respondent as a stay-home mom 

with responsibility for most of the domestic chores, and Petitioner 

being the primary breadwinner for the family and paying most 

family expenses, including providing health insurance coverage for 

the entire family through her employment, and most other expenses 

associated with raising [Child];

d. Petitioner regularly took both children shopping for clothing, 

school supplies, and other necessities;

***

i. By agreement with and the approval of Respondent, Petitioner was 

listed as [Child]’s other parent on all registration forms and in all 

directories, and regularly attended parent/teacher conferences for 

him;

j. Petitioner was also listed as [Child]’s other parent on registration 

forms for his extra-curricular soccer and wrestling classes, for which 

she paid;

k. When not traveling for work, Petitioner regularly woke [Child], 

got him dressed and ready for the day, made and fed him breakfast, 

and dropped him off at daycare or school; and,

***

45. Petitioner relied on the representations and behavior of Respondent that 
4

the parties are equal co-parents and she has considered [Child] to be her son 

since his birth, willingly and joyfully assuming all obligations of 

parenthood, without any expectation of financial compensation, including 

providing financial assistance for [Child], taking care of him physically and 

emotionally, and engaging in all of the things that parents do for their 

children.

46. In addition, Petitioner has been [Child]’s primary source of financial 

support since his birth, even after the separation of the parties, and she is 

prepared to continue doing that since she is and has always been his second 

parent.

47. Petitioner has been in a parental role to [Child] for his entire six years 

of life, and thus has established a bonded, dependent relationship with him, 

completely parental in nature. 

***

90. There is functionally no difference between a married and an unmarried partner where the biological parent chooses to conceive using 

donor insemination and where she specifically invites and intends for a 

partner to raise the child together with her as an equal parent — as the facts

plainly establish here. See, e.g., Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 

(Mass. 2016) (in related context, person without biological connection to 

child may be child’s “presumed parent” under statute providing man is 

presumed to be father of child born out of wedlock if he, jointly with 

mother, received the child into their home and openly held out child as their 

child).

In motions filed on January 9, Sandra sought to have a guardian ad litem appointed and 

for a temporary parenting schedule “so as to preserve the status quo by allowing Child to 

continue seeing, and to maintain the close, loving, and parent/child relationship he has 

with both of the people he has been taught to consider his parents.” On January 18, the 

court held a hearing on the motions; by order entered January 22, the court appointed 

guardian ad litem and reserved the other matters for hearing on February 1.

Following the February 1 hearing, the court entered an order holding that it was in 

Child’s best interest to continue having parenting time with Sandra and setting a 

temporary parenting schedule that permitted Sandra to have time with him every other 

weekend; the court also ordered the parties to submit a proposed temporary parenting 

schedule. On February 2, Christina filed a motion to dismiss the petition and to stay the 

overnight visitation pending a hearing on the motion. The motion to dismiss, filed 

pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, asserted that the 

petition failed to state a claim for relief as “the parties were never married, and [Child] is 

the biological child of Respondent, and is not the biological child, adopted child, or stepchild of Petitioner, [thus] Petitioner has no standing under Tennessee law to seek 

parenting time.” 
5

A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on February 15, at the end of which 

time the court orally granted the motion; Sandra moved for a stay to allow visitation to 

continue pending her appeal. On February 26, the trial court entered the order 

memorializing its oral ruling and denying the stay sought by Sandra. On March 14 

Sandra moved to alter or amend that portion of the order denying the stay so that 

visitation could continue pending resolution of the appeal; following a hearing, the court 

granted the motion and permitted visitation between Sandra and Child on the first and 

third Saturdays of each month.

2

 

Sandra filed a timely notice of appeal and states the following issues for 

resolution:

I. Do the Tennessee parentage presumption statutes, read in a gender-neutral 

way as required by T.C.A. §1-3-104 and by established constitutional law, 

provide standing for an unmarried adult who is not related to a child by 

biology or adoption, particularly where, as here, that adult participated in 

the intentional conception of that child, voluntarily and without expectation 

of compensation helped raise him for years until this case, supported him 

financially and emotionally, took him into her home and held him out to 

the world as her natural son, and whom that child was taught by his 

biological parent is his other parent?

II. Does Tennessee common law provide standing for an unmarried adult who 

is not related to a child by biology or adoption if the statutory parentage 

scheme does not apply, particularly where, as here, that adult participated in 

the intentional conception of that child, voluntarily and without expectation 

of compensation helped raise him for the first 6 years of his life until this 

case, supported him financially and emotionally, held him out to the world 

as her natural child, loved him, and parented him, and whom that child was 

taught by his biological parent is his other parent?

III. Does an unmarried legal parent waive her superior constitutional right to 

raise and control her child when she voluntarily and intentionally permits 

and encourages that child to have a bonded, parent/child relationship with 

another adult who lives with, supports, loves, and coparents her child for 

almost all of the child’s life, and where it will cause harm to the child to 

 

2 The court entered an “Abstract Order Regarding Petitioner’s Visitation and Contact with Child” on 

April 6 in which it: awarded visitation to Sandra on the first and third Saturday of each month as well as 

one phone call per week, awarded holiday visitation to Sandra on December 26 of each year, restrained 

the parties from discussing the case with Child, and ordered the parties “to facilitate and encourage a 

relationship between the child and the other party consistent with the best interest of the child.” 
6

suddenly sever the relationship his legal parent encouraged him to have 

with the person he regards as his other parent?

IV. Are In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. App. 1999), and In re Hayden 

C.G.-J, S.W.3d (Tenn. App. 2013), 2013 WL 6040348, based on 

Thompson, no longer controlling of the issue presented here given the 

reversals of the authority on which they were based and since they have 

been substantially undermined by changes in Tennessee law, Tennessee 

families, and federal constitutional law since they were decided?

Christina raises the following additional issues:

[I]. The issue of whether Appellant is a parent, based on the language of Tenn. 

Code Ann. [§] 36-2-304, the presumption of parentage statute, with 

standing to pursue this action was not raised in the trial court and is not 

properly before this Court.

[II]. The trial court erred when it granted visitation to appellant after it 

dismissed her petition.

[III]. This case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the 

amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by Appellant to appellee pursuant to 

Tenn. Code Ann. [§] 20-12-119(c)(1) and other authority.

[IV]. Appellee should be awarded her attorney’s fees on appeal or awarded 

damages for a frivolous appeal and the costs of this appeal should be 

assessed to appellant.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The purpose of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is to determine 

whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12 motion 

only challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. It does not challenge the strength 

of the plaintiff’s proof. See Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & 

Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999). “[M]atters outside the pleadings 

should not be considered in deciding whether to grant the motion.” In re Francis P., 532 

S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), appeal denied (Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Trau–

Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002)). In reviewing a 

motion to dismiss, we must liberally construe the complaint, presuming all factual 

allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See 

Pursell v. First American National Bank, 937 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1996); see also 

Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696-97 (Tenn. 2002). Thus, a 

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears that the 
7

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would warrant relief. 

See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999); Fuerst v. Methodist Hospital 

South, 566 S.W.2d 847, 878 (Tenn. 1978). Making such a determination is a question of 

law. Our review of a trial court’s determinations on issues of law is de novo, with no 

presumption of correctness. Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, P. C., 70 S.W.3d 

710, 713 (Tenn. 2002); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn 2000); Ganzevoort v. 

Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).

The issues raised require that we construe several statutes. The construction of a 

statute is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Lee v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist. 

Bd. of Educ., 237 S.W.3d 322, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). When construing a statute, a 

court must “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Home Builders Ass’n of 

Middle Tenn. v. Williamson Cnty., 304 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tenn. 2010). Ordinarily, we 

derive this legislative intent “‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory 

language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction 

that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’” Id. (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 

S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000)). Where “the language of a statute is ambiguous in that it 

is subject to varied interpretations producing contrary results, Walker [v. Sunrise 

Pontiac–GMC Truck, Inc.,] 249 S.W.3d [301,] 309 [(Tenn. 2008)], we construe the 

statute’s meaning by examining ‘the broader statutory scheme, the history of the 

legislation, or other sources.’” Id. (quoting State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn.

2008)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

The trial court dismissed the petition, stating that it was “being asked to create a 

new category of parent in Tennessee” — “a de facto parent.” The court further opined 

that there “is no such thing in Tennessee . . . except on the street and in real life; there are 

all sorts of de facto parents, but the law gives them no rights.” The court concluded that 

Sandra had no standing to pursue being named the parent of Child. Sandra asserts that 

Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-3-306 and 36-2-304(a)(4), read and applied in a 

gender-neutral manner, give her standing to seek to establish parentage and visitation 

rights. We address the statutes separately. 

Standing is a judicial doctrine used to determine whether a party is “entitled to 

have a court decide the merits of a dispute.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. 

Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. 2006). The doctrine of standing precludes courts 

from adjudicating “‘an action at the instance of one whose rights have not been invaded 

or infringed.’” Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 59 

AM.JUR.2D. Parties § 30 (1987)). More specifically, this doctrine “restricts ‘[t]he 

exercise of judicial power . . . to litigants who can show ‘injury in fact’ resulting from the 
8

action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.’” In re Estate of Farmer, No. 

M2013-02506-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 5308226, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) 

(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)). Where the person seeks to base his or her standing 

on a statute, he or she must show that the “‘claim falls within the zone of interests 

protected or regulated by the statute in question.’” State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 28 

(Tenn. 2008) (quoting Wood v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty, 196 S.W.3d 

152, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). 

Pertinent to the issue of standing presented in this case is the following holding 

from In re Thompson, in which this Court considered the question of “whether a petition 

for visitation may be brought by a woman who, in the context of a long-term relationship, 

planned for, participated in the conception and birth of, provided financial assistance for, 

and until foreclosed from doing so by the biological mother, acted as a parent to the child 

ultimately borne by her partner.” In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1999). We held:

While Tennessee’s legislature has generally conferred upon parents 

the right of custody and control of their children, it has not conferred upon . 

. . a nonparent who is not and has not been married to either of the 

children’s parents, but who previously maintained an intimate relationship 

with such a parent and who previously provided care and support to the 

children[] any right of visitation. Absent statutory authority establishing 

such a third-party’s right to visitation, parents retain the right to determine 

with whom their children associate.

Id. at 918–19, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

1. Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306

Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306, which provides that “[a] child born 

to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination, with consent of the married 

woman’s husband, is deemed to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife,” is a part 

of the Vital Records Act of 1977, codified in Chapter 3 of Title 68, part 3 of which relates 

to births. Section 306 follows section 305, entitled “Father’s name on birth certificate –

Surname of child,” and which sets out in great detail the manner by which a child’s 

father’s name is entered on the child’s birth certificate and, particularly, the manner in 

which the father’s name is determined and added to the certificate, if the father is not 

married to the mother.3 Consistent with the wording and intent of section 305, section 

 

3

Section 305(a)(1) provides that “[i]f the mother was married at the time of either conception or birth, or 

anytime between conception or birth, to the natural father of the child, the name of the natural father shall 

be entered on the certificate . . . .” 
9

306 declares that a child born to a married woman by artificial insemination is also a 

child of the woman’s husband, thereby allowing the name of the husband of the married 

woman who has borne the child to be entered as the child’s father on the birth certificate. 

In the context of the broader statutory scheme, section 306 does not create the 

relationship that Sandra advocates or confer any rights of parentage; the “marriageneutral” construction Sandra urges is a strained interpretation of the natural and ordinary 

meaning of the statutory language. 

Even if section 68-3-306 were construed to create a right of visitation on the part 

of the husband of a woman who has given birth to a child by artificial insemination, that 

right would be predicated upon the child being born to a married woman. Inasmuch as 

Sandra’s petition stated that she and Christina were not married at the time of Child’s 

birth nor at any time afterward, section 68-3-306 does not provide Sandra with standing 

and thus cannot be used to support a claim for visitation with Child. 

2. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304 provides in pertinent part that “[a] 

man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if: . . . While the child is under the 

age of majority, the man receives the child into the man’s home and openly holds the 

child out as the man’s natural child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-304(a)(4). Sandra pled 

that she received Child into her home and held him out as her natural child, and argues 

that “us[ing] the actual language of the statute but substituting feminine for masculine 

words,” she “fits within the presumptions that makes a person a ‘parent’ under the 

Tennessee Code, and thus has standing to pursue this case.” 

As an initial matter, we address Sandra’s contention that reading section 36-2-304 

in a gender-neutral way is required by section 1-3-104(b) (“Words importing the 

masculine gender include the feminine and neuter, except when the contrary intention is 

manifest”), thereby creating a rebuttable presumption of parentage when a person like her 

receives a child, who is under the age of majority, into his or her home and openly holds 

the child out as that person’s child. Applying the principles of statutory construction set 

forth above, we do not agree that recourse to section 1-3-104 is required or necessary to 

resolve the issue presented. The parentage statutes are not ambiguous, and to the extent 

applicable to our inquiry, the Legislative intent of the statutes is clear and can be derived 

“from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of 

the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the 

statute’s meaning.” Home Builders Ass’n of Middle Tenn., 304 S.W.3d 817. Moreover, 

to substitute “comparable feminine terms” for the words like “man” or “father,” as 

Sandra proposes, goes beyond allowing words written in one gender be construed, where 

necessary, to apply to the other, and exceed the purpose of the parentage statute as stated 

in section 36-2-301, as more fully explained below. See Sneed v. Henderson, 366 S.W.2d 

758, 759 (Tenn. 1963) (Allowing suit to proceed for the wrongful death of an infant’s 
10

mother, where wrongful death statute provided that action would pass “to his children or 

to his next of kin” but “applie[d] equally whether the deceased injured party be male or 

female.”). No rights or relationships are created by the parentage statutes, only a 

procedure by which the father is able to establish parentage; as such, recourse to section 

1-3-104(b) for other purposes is not warranted. 

Chapter 2 of Title 36 of the Code addresses parentage; section 36-2-301 states that 

the purpose of the chapter is to “provide[] a single cause of action to establish parentage 

of children other than establishment by adoption pursuant to chapter 1 of this title, or by 

acknowledgement of parentage pursuant to §§ 68-3-203(g), 68-3-302 or 68-3-305(b).”4

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-301. Section 36-2-302(5) defines “parent” to mean “the 

biological mother or biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the 

father and mother”; it also defines “mother” as “the biological mother of a child born out 

of wedlock” (section 36-2-302(4)), and “father” as “the biological father of a child born 

out of wedlock.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-302(4)(3). Section 36-2-305 permits a 

complaint to establish parentage of a child to be filed by the child, the child’s mother, “a 

man claiming to be the child’s father,” or the department of human services or its 

contractor. Inasmuch as the Legislature has defined “father” in section 36-2-302, we 

cannot give a gender-neutral meaning to that term for purposes of section 36-2-304; to do 

so would extend both statutes’ meanings beyond that set forth in the chapter. Like the 

statutes in chapter 1 of title 36, the statutes governing parentage contemplate a biological 

or genetic connection between the child and the putative parent. Sandra does not have a 

biological connection to Child and, accordingly, cannot fit this definition. 

The Legislature has expressly created rights relative to child custody and visitation 

for biological parents, potential adoptive parents, grandparents, stepparents, and parents 

of “children born of donated embryo transfer.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-101 et seq. 

(adoption); 36-2-301 et seq. (biological fathers) 36-6-301 et seq. (grandparents and 

stepparents); 36-2-401 et seq. (children born of donated embryo transfer). It has not 

created the same such rights outside of these relationships. As Sandra does not fit into 

any of these categories, her claim falls outside the zone of interests protected or regulated 

by the statutes she references, rendering her without standing to pursue a parentage action 

or visitation with Child.

 

4 Chapter 1 of Title 36 governs adoption, and section 102 defines “parent” as “any biological, legal, 

adoptive parent or parents or, for purposes of §§ 36-1-127 -- 36-1-141, stepparents.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-1-102(36). A “legal parent” is defined as the biological mother of a child; a man who is or has been 

married to the biological mother of the child or who attempted to marry the mother of the child; a man 

who has been adjudicated to be the legal father of the child or who has signed a sworn acknowledgement 

of paternity; or an adoptive parent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28)(A). Based on the facts alleged in the 

petition, Sandra is not a biological parent, a legal parent, or step parent, and she did not seek to adopt 

Child; thus, she does not fit within any of these statutory definitions of a parent, even giving the statutes 

the wording she urges. 
11

3. De Facto Parentage

Additionally, Sandra argues that she should be established as the de facto parent of 

Child. The guardian ad litem also urges that we adopt this concept and apply it to the 

facts at hand to conclude that Sandra has standing in this matter. Adherence to precedent 

prevents us from adopting such an approach; prior cases have expressly declined to adopt 

the “de facto” parent definition of parentage for the purposes at hand. In In re Thompson, 

this Court observed:

While it may be true that in our society the term “parent” has 

become used at times to describe more loosely a person who shares mutual 

love and affection with a child and who supplies care and support to the 

child, we find it inappropriate to legislate judicially such a broad definition 

of the term “parent” as relating to legal rights relating to child custody 

and/or visitation. Just as a grandparent who provides care and support to a 

child does not become recognized as being a parent (absent adoption) under 

Tennessee law, other persons are not recognized as being a parent under 

Tennessee law based only upon prior care and support of a child. These 

other persons include any unmarried persons who maintain a close intimate 

relationship with a child’s natural parent, whether they are of the same or 

opposite sex of that natural parent.

***

. . .[W]e are unaware of and have not been cited to any prior 

controlling precedent that has utilized the concept of either de facto

parenthood and/or in loco parentis to extend constitutional parental rights, 

including the right to visitation, to unmarried/unrelated persons in [the 

appellants’] position.

11 S.W.3d at 918–19, 923.5 Fourteen years later, in In re Hayden C.G-J., No. M2012-

02701-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 6040348, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013), this 

Court again considered facts similar to those in this case and concluded that the 

unmarried former partner of a legal parent did not have standing to seek visitation with a 

child the couple had raised together for the first 4 1/2 years of the child’s life, stating that 

 

5 We are not persuaded by Sandra’s argument that In re Thompson is “no longer controlling of the issue 

presented here given the reversals of the authority on which [it] was based.” She cites Alison D. v. 

Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), overruled by Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 

(N.Y. 2016), as being “relied heavily” on in In re Thompson; however, Alison D. is one of four cases 

discussed in In re Thompson in similar depth, and the other three cases, from the States of California, 

Vermont, Florida, have not, as of this writing, been overruled. 
12

“no statute gives [the petitioner] a legal right or interest regarding visitation with [the 

child]” and that, in light of the Legislature’s decision to not change the definition of 

parent or legal parent, the petitioner’s arguments that she had standing under the concepts 

of in loco parentis and/or de facto parent also “lack[ed] a legal foundation.” Id. at *1, *4. 

Although significant changes in the legal landscape regarding the recognition of samesex marriage have taken place since In re Hayden C.G-J. was decided, the holding in that 

case remains applicable to the facts of this case because the parties were unmarried.6 

Inasmuch as Sandra’s claim for visitation does not fall within the zones of 

interests protected by the parentage statutes, she does not have standing to pursue 

visitation; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition. 7 

B. Visitation

By order entered May 2, 2018, the trial court granted Sandra visitation with Child

pending resolution of all appeals, finding that it was not in Child’s best interest to be 

separated from Sandra through the appeal process, that minimum contacts between the 

two “are sufficient to maintain [Child’s] relationship with [Sandra],” and that such 

minimum contacts were in Child’s best interest. Christina contends that, in light of the 

fact that Sandra was not Child’s biological mother, step-mother, adoptive mother, or 

grandmother, the court erred in granting visitation. Inasmuch as we have affirmed the 

dismissal of the petition and held that Sandra does not have standing to pursue visitation 

with Child, we vacate the order granting visitation. In so doing, we acknowledge the trial 

court’s finding that Child’s best interest is served by maintaining a relationship with 

Sandra, as well as her son J., and commend the court for its thorough and heartfelt ruling 

in that regard. 

 

6

Sandra’s petition states that the parties did not marry, and she does not challenge any Tennessee 

marriage laws; thus, the issues presented in this appeal do not implicate the holdings of Obergefell v. 

Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). In Grant v. Anderson, this Court set forth the precise holdings of 

Obergefell: 

[T]he [United States Supreme] Court held that “the State laws challenged . . . in these 

cases are now . . . invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage 

on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 2605. The Court further 

held “that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex 

marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.” Id. at 2608.

No. M2016-01867-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2324359, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018), appeal denied

(Oct. 10, 2018). 

7 Our holding that Sandra does not have standing to pursue visitation pretermits our consideration of the 

issue she raises as to whether Christina waived her superior parental rights when she permitted Sandra to 

parent Child. 
13

C. Attorney’s Fees 

Christina has asked that the case be remanded for a determination of an award of 

counsel fees as authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c)(1), and 

for an award of fees as damages for a frivolous appeal. Upon a review of the petition, we 

conclude that an award of fees is precluded under subsection (c)(5)(E).

8

 

This court is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-22 to award 

damages, including attorney’s fees, against the appellant if we determine the appeal is 

frivolous or that it was taken solely for delay; the statute is to be interpreted and applied 

strictly to avoid discouraging legitimate appeals. Wakefield v. Longmire, 54 S.W.3d 300, 

304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); see Davis v. Gulf Ins. Group, 546 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tenn. 

1977) (discussing the predecessor of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122). A frivolous appeal is 

one that is devoid of merit or has no reasonable chance of success. Wakefield, 54 S.W.3d 

at 304. The award of damages for the filing of a frivolous appeal lies within the sound 

 

8 Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119 states:

(a) In all civil cases, whether tried by a jury or before the court without a jury, the 

presiding judge shall have a right to adjudge the cost.

* * *

(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) or (b), in a civil proceeding, where a trial court 

grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court shall award the 

party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending at the time the 

successful motion to dismiss was granted the costs and reasonable and necessary 

attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings as a consequence of the dismissed claims by 

that party or parties. The awarded costs and fees shall be paid by the party or parties 

whose claim or claims were dismissed as a result of the granted motion to dismiss.

* * * 

 (5) This subsection (c) shall not apply to:

 * * *

 (E) Any claim which is a good faith, non-frivolous claim filed for the express purpose 

of extending, modifying, or reversing existing precedent, law or regulation, or for the 

express purpose of establishing the meaning, lawfulness or constitutionality of a law, 

regulation or United States or Tennessee constitutional right where the meaning, 

lawfulness or constitutionality is a matter of first impression that has not been established 

by precedent in a published opinion by the Tennessee supreme court, court of appeals, 

court of criminal appeals, a United States district court in Tennessee, or by the United 

States supreme court. This subdivision (c)(5)(E) shall not apply unless at the time the 

successful motion to dismiss was filed the party that made the dismissed claim had 

specially pleaded in its latest complaint, counter-complaint or cross-complaint that the 

dismissed claim was made for one (1) of the express purposes listed above and cited the 

contrary precedent or interpretation the party seeks to distinguish or overcome, or 

whether the issue to be decided is a matter of first impression as described in this 

subdivision (c)(5)(E). 
14

discretion of this Court. GSB Contractors, Inc. v. Hess, 179 S.W.3d 535, 547 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2005). In our discretion, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is 

affirmed, and the order granting visitation between Sandra and Child is vacated. 

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE