1

Filed 11/10/20 Seaton v. Lightbourne CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

GUY SEATON,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

WILL LIGHTBOURNE, as Director 

of Department of Social Services, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

C089790

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002998CUWMGDS)

A person who wishes to manage, operate, or provide direct care services for

clients in a community care facility must obtain from the Department of Social Services 

(department) either a criminal record clearance or, if the person was previously convicted 

of a crime other than a minor traffic violation, a criminal record exemption (exemption). 
2

(Health & Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (a)(1), (a)(3)(A); Cal. Code Regs.,1tit. 22, § 80019, 

subd. (c).) Petitioner Guy Seaton, who was convicted of four federal felonies in 2002, 

requested an exemption from the department in connection with his applications for 

certification as an administrator of two types of community care facilities. His request 

was denied. Petitioner’s subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Petitioner 

then filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 petition for administrative mandate in 

superior court (petition), arguing the department abused its discretion in denying his 

request for an exemption because the department failed to adequately consider the 

evidence of his rehabilitation and good character and denied him a fair hearing. The 

superior court disagreed and denied the petition. Petitioner appeals.

Petitioner asserts the department erred in denying his exemption request because 

the department failed to consider the evidence petitioner presented to rebut the rebuttable 

presumption that petitioner does not have sufficient good character. We conclude 

petitioner forfeited his appeal for failing to set forth all material evidence pertaining to 

the department’s decision. We thus affirm.

BACKGROUND

I

Legal Background

To request an exemption, a license applicant must submit “substantial and 

convincing evidence satisfactory to the Department that he/she has been rehabilitated and 

presently is of such good character as to justify being issued or maintaining a license, 

employment, presence, or residence in a licensed facility.” (§ 80019.1, subds. (c)(4), 

(d).) The department shall consider factors including, but not limited to, the following as 

evidence of good character and rehabilitation: the nature of the crime, the period of time 

1 All further section references are to title 22 of the California Code of Regulations 

unless otherwise specified.
3

since the crime was committed and the number of offenses, the circumstances 

surrounding the commission of the crime that would demonstrate the unlikelihood of 

repetition, the applicant’s activities since conviction, character references, and evidence 

of honesty and truthfulness as revealed in the exemption application documents or 

interviews and conversations with the department. (Id., subd. (e).)

There is a rebuttable presumption “an individual is not of such good character as 

to justify the issuance of an exemption” if, among other things and as applicable here, the 

applicant fails to show that he or she “has been convicted of two or more nonviolent 

felonies and ten consecutive years have lapsed since completing the most recent period of 

incarceration, probation or parole, whichever is latest.” (§ 80019.1, subds. (k)(5), (l).)

II

Factual And Procedural Background

Several of the facts recited herein are taken from the superior court’s ruling in 

support of the judgment (ruling). In the ruling, the superior court explained the facts 

relating to petitioner’s conviction, incarceration, and supervised release were taken from 

the unchallenged, and thus presumed true, findings in the department’s decision. 

Petitioner does not challenge any of the factual findings on appeal.

In 2002, a federal jury found petitioner guilty of four felonies for committing, 

conspiring to commit, and/or aiding and abetting violations of federal law based on 

“(1) the submission of false cost reports, (2) the creation of false time cards and payroll 

reports, (3) the creation of false nursing logs and nursing schedules, (4) the presentation 

of false nursing schedules and logs to Medicare auditors, and (5) making false statements 

to Medicare auditors” during the administration of a nursing home, where petitioner 

served as the president, chief operating officer, owner, and operator. Petitioner was 

sentenced to 78 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and 

ordered to pay restitution. “Petitioner appealed the conviction and remained free on bond 
4

pending appeal. In March 2007, after his appeal was denied, Petitioner began serving his 

time in custody.” 

“In August 2011, Petitioner was released to home confinement. In February 2012, 

he began supervised release. As of October 2012, Petitioner was placed on the low-risk 

caseload for supervised release. In February 2015, Petitioner’s supervised release ended.

“In September 2017, Petitioner applied to the Department for certification to serve 

as an administrator at two types of community care facilities: adult residential facilities 

and residential care facilities for the elderly. [Citation.] Soon after Petitioner applied, the 

Department informed him that, based on his criminal record, he would need to obtain a 

criminal record exemption. Petitioner then applied for a criminal record exemption.

“In January 2018, the Department denied Petitioner’s request for a criminal record 

exemption. The Department reasoned that Petitioner’s criminal history was 

‘incompatible’ with the care of vulnerable clients, and that Petitioner had failed to show 

he was sufficiently rehabilitated to grant an exemption. The Department relied on the 

relatively short amount of time since the termination of Petitioner’s supervised release, 

Petitioner’s failure to accept responsibility for the convictions, and Petitioner’s failure to 

submit any compelling proof of rehabilitation. [Citation.] Petitioner appealed and the 

matter was scheduled for an administrative hearing.” (Fn. omitted.) 

At the administrative hearing, the department called three witnesses to testify: 

Gate Su, an associate governmental program analyst for the department’s community 

care licensing background check bureau; Jennifer Encalade, a staff services manager for 

the department’s community care licensing division; and Ryan Boruff, a staff services 

manager for the department’s caregiver background check bureau. Petitioner was the 

sole witness to testify in his favor. 

Su testified she processed and recommended denial of petitioner’s exemption 

request. Su recommended denial because petitioner had not been “off of formal 

probation for at least ten years,” he did not accept responsibility for his actions and 
5

blamed others instead, he failed to provide proof of rehabilitation, and the nature of his 

convictions was concerning because he had made false statements to the government. 

Su’s manager, Boruff, reviewed her recommendation. On cross-examination, petitioner 

asked Su whether she had considered his three character references and deemed them to 

be positive; Su answered in the affirmative. The character references were admitted into 

evidence as administrative hearsay. 

Boruff testified he agreed with Su’s recommendation to deny the exemption 

request because: “[A]fter reviewing both Mr. Seaton’s statement as well [as] the court 

documents I made a determination that he wasn’t being truthful, and he was minimizing 

his role within the convictions. I also felt a little bit of concern for the safety of clients in 

care because he was applying to be an administrator, so his role would be very similar to 

his previous role when he had the four felony convictions. [¶] So he would have access 

to confidential information, he may have access to financial information, and given that 

there’s four convictions where there’s Medicare fraud coupled with the fact that within 

his statement he was blaming the State auditor . . . [objection made and overruled] . . . he 

spoke about how that he himself didn’t have anything to do with the documentation or 

the documents that were represented to the government, that he just signed off on them, 

but he personally himself had no role in that. So even though he was in charge and did 

have to sign off on all the transactions, he minimized his role.

“And why that’s important to us is because it all goes back towards rehabilitation. 

And that’s what we’re looking for. So we went and looked from the time somebody is 

convicted to the time that somebody wants to work for a community care license facility, 

we want to see what they’ve done since that point in order to improve their character. 

What they’ve done to improve themselves.” 

Boruff testified he did not see any evidence that petitioner had been rehabilitated. 

Boruff did not credit petitioner’s administration training because “that’s something he has 

to do in order to complete his process to become an administrator.” 
6

Encalade testified an administrator of a residential care facility for the elderly 

would manage “food, finances, possibly transportation to and from doctor’s 

appointments, any care, any assistance they would need living day to day.” The 

administrator submits reports, manages money, and is tasked with keeping confidential 

information. 

Petitioner briefly testified at the administrative hearing, predominantly relying on 

his declaration, portions of which were admitted as direct evidence and others as 

administrative hearsay. The declaration detailed petitioner’s military service, education 

and work history; the federal criminal proceeding, his incarceration, subsequent release, 

and activities during probation; the termination of his probation; the department-approved 

training he had completed; his passing of a department examination; and the exemption 

request process. Petitioner further requested to introduce two good moral character 

affidavits as exhibits. The administrative law judge admitted the exhibits as 

administrative hearsay. 

Following the administrative hearing, the administrative law judge issued a 

proposed decision denying the appeal. The department adopted the proposed decision 

and the petition followed. 

The trial court admonished petitioner for “failing to include in his brief a fair 

statement of the material evidence, accompanied by citations to the record,” citing legal 

precedent and explaining that, “[i]f a party fails to do so, that portion of the brief may be 

stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.” The trial court nonetheless 

addressed the merits of petitioner’s arguments and found the department’s decision was 

supported by substantial evidence and petitioner was not denied a fair hearing. 

Pertinent to petitioner’s argument on appeal, the trial court found the period of 

supervised release by a federal court is equivalent to parole for purposes of 
7

section 80019.1, subdivision (k)(5).2 “[B]ecause less than ten years had lapsed from the 

time that Petitioner completed his ‘parole,’ Petitioner did not meet the requirements of 

section 80019.1, subdivision (k)(5) at the time he requested an exemption. As a result, 

there was a ‘rebuttable presumption’ that Petitioner was not of good character. To 

overcome the adverse presumption, Petitioner had to present ‘substantial and convincing 

evidence,’ satisfactory to the Department, that he is rehabilitated and of good character.” 

The trial court explained that, “[i]n attempting to prove his case, Petitioner relied 

heavily on the fact that he exhibited ‘good conduct’ while on probation, that he took 

classes to improve his administrative skills, and that he submitted positive character 

references. This is weak evidence. As the Department noted, probationers are expected 

to comply with the terms of their probation; Petitioner was required to take the classes to 

apply for certification; and Petitioner’s character references failed to acknowledge his 

criminal conviction.” 

The court found “Petitioner’s evidence is not sufficient to overcome the other 

evidence supporting a finding that he is not sufficiently rehabilitated, which includes the 

nature of his crime, the number of offenses, the short length of time since his ‘probation’ 

ended, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, his failure to accept 

personal responsibility for the convictions, and the vulnerability of clients in a 

community care setting. [¶] There is substantial evidence to support the Department’s 

finding. The Department did not abuse its discretion.” 

Petitioner appeals.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner acknowledges the rebuttable presumption that petitioner “is not of such 

good character as to justify the issuance of an exemption” applies. (§80019.1, 

2 Petitioner does not challenge this finding.
8

subds. (k)(5), (l).) Petitioner argues the department “elevated the rebuttable presumption 

into an unrebuttable presumption” because the department based its denial “on the fact 

that less than ten years had passed since the end of [petitioner’s] sentence.” In 

petitioner’s view, the department “clarified that it viewed the evidence proffered by 

[petitioner] as irrelevant, in direct contradiction of the appeal process established by the 

statute.” Petitioner asserts the evidence he introduced of “personal efforts, character 

references, lack of violence, and honesty in the application process” rebutted the 

presumption, shifting the burden to the department “to provide facts and evidence that 

[petitioner] is not presently of good character and has not been rehabilitated,” which the 

department failed to do. Petitioner’s argument is essentially that the department’s 

decision is not supported by substantial evidence, as he asserted in the trial court.

The appeal is forfeited. Petitioner failed to fairly put forward all material evidence 

on the issue raised. “An appealed judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant must 

affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citation.] An appellant challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the judgment must cite the evidence in the record supporting the 

judgment and explain why such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. [Citations.]

An appellant who fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot 

demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient. The fact that there was substantial 

evidence in the record to support a contrary finding does not compel the conclusion that 

there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment. An appellant, such as 

[petitioner], who cites and discusses only evidence in [his or] her favor fails to 

demonstrate any error and waives the contention that the evidence is insufficient to 

support the judgment.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) Pro. per. 

parties are not exempt from procedural rules. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

1229, 1246-1247.)

The trial court admonished petitioner that failing to include a fair statement of the 

material evidence in his briefing may result in forfeiture of his challenge to the 
9

department’s decision. Petitioner did not heed the trial court’s admonishment, again 

failing to fairly present the material facts on appeal -- e.g., failing to include in his 

statement of facts the department employees’ testimony detailing why the department 

denied petitioner’s exemption request. Their testimony directly contradicts petitioner’s 

assertion that the department’s denial was based solely on the fact that less than 10 years 

had passed since the end of petitioner’s supervised release and that the department 

considered the evidence presented by petitioner as irrelevant. The testimony establishes

that the department considered petitioner’s evidence relevant but not substantial and 

convincing, as required under section 80019.1, subdivisions (c)(4) and (d).

Petitioner included in his factual background only the portion of Su’s testimony 

that petitioner believes assists him. Petitioner’s effort to disregard all evidence 

unfavorable to him and cull from the record only such evidence as might be helpful to his 

position on appeal does not meet his burden of showing no substantial evidence in the 

record supports the department’s decision. Accordingly, petitioner has shown no error

and we affirm the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The department shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Raye, P. J.

/s/ 

Blease, J.