J-S56039-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GREGORY STRICKLAND,

Appellant No. 65 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005034-2007

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 13, 2016

Appellant Gregory Strickland appeals pro se following the Order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County on December 30, 

2015, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA).1 Upon our review of the record, we affirm. 

On March 8, 2010, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted in 

absentia of criminal use of a communication facility, two counts of hindering 

apprehension, and obstructing administration of law enforcement.2 On 

August 27, 2010, the trial court sentenced appellant in absentia to an 

aggregate term of nine years to twenty-three years in prison. His postsentence motion was denied on September 3, 2010, and Appellant filed a 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7512, 5105(a)(2) and (5), and 5101, respectively. 
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timely notice of appeal with this Court wherein he averred the sentence 

imposed was manifestly excessive and that the trial court had erred in failing 

to suppress statements he had made to police on the basis that his alleged 

intoxication rendered the statements involuntary. Finding no merit to these 

claims, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on February 16, 2012, 

in an unpublished memorandum decision. Commonwealth v. Strickland, 

43 A.3d 513 (Pa.Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did 

not seek allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

On May 8, 2012, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, pro se, and 

counsel was appointed. On August 22, 2012, Appellant filed an amended 

PCRA petition wherein he averred trial counsel had been ineffective for 

failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. The trial court granted the requested relief on October 10, 

2012, and reinstated Appellant’s right to petition for allowance of appeal. 

On November 9, 2012, Appellant filed his petition with our Supreme Court, 

and that petition was denied on June 11, 2013. 

Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition, pro se, on March 7, 

2014. New counsel was appointed and filed an Amended PCRA Petition on 

September 12, 2014, wherein he identified one meritorious issue that had 

not yet been litigated, namely, whether both trial counsel and PCRA counsel 

had been ineffective for failing to raise the issue of whether Appellant’s trial 
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properly had been held in absentia when he failed to appear.3 A PCRA 

evidentiary hearing was held on February 2, 2015, at which time PCRA 

counsel requested that six, additional issues Appellant wished to raise be 

explored as part of the hearing.4 Following the hearing and upon finding 

that the additional issues raised at the hearing lacked merit and were largely 

addressed in the context of Appellant’s motion for post-sentence relief and in 

his direct appeal, the trial court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on January 14, 

2016, and an application to proceed pro se on January 27, 2016. 

Subsequently, this Court entered an order on January 27, 2016, wherein we 

directed the trial court to conduct an on-the-record inquiry to determine 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant maintained “acute medical issues” prevented him from attending 

the trial. See Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, filed 9/12/14, at 

¶ 20.

4 The trial court summarized these issues as follows: 

1) Impermissible hearsay that occurred during trial but not 

properly preserved and addressed by Trial Counsel on direct 

appeal; 2) the lack of a current presentence investigation used 

at the time of [Appellant’s] sentencing; 3) Trial Counsel’s failure 

to raise issued regarding credibility of a Commonwealth witness 

at trial; 4) the use of a digital camera by law enforcement that 

was prejudicial and impermissible to [Appellant]; 5) Attorney 

Hobie Crystal’s representation of [Appellant] at his preliminary 

hearing and a conflict of interest regarding Mr. Crystal’s 

representation of [Appellant’s] wife and co-defendant; and 6) a 

letter sent by PCRA Counsel to [Appellant] stating that the trial 

judge had recused herself from [Appellant’s] case. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/30/15, at 3. 
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whether Appellant wished to proceed with the assistance of PCRA counsel or 

pro se; if Appellant chose the latter route, we further instructed the trial 

court to determine whether Appellant’s waiver of counsel had been knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary under Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 

A.2d 81 (1988). We indicated that the trial court should notify this Court, in 

writing, within thirty days of its course of action and its subsequent findings. 

The trial court complied and in its order of February 19, 2016, indicated that 

following a Grazier hearing, it was satisfied Appellant’s decision to proceed 

pro se was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and suggested that this Court 

grant his application to proceed pro se. In light of the trial court’s order, this 

Court entered an order on March 2, 2016, granting Appellant’s January 27, 

2016, application to proceed pro se. 

In his brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions 

Involved:

1. Whether the Appellant was denied due process by the 

egregious bad acts of several issues of prosecutorial misconduct?

2. Whether the Appellant due process was denied because he 

did not have the right to an impartial judge?

3. Whether the several hearsay statements that was deemed 

by the court prejudicial but not inadmissible, a violation of the 

Appellant’s due process and shows the extreme bias, ill-will, 

partiality and prejudice against the Appellant because Appellant 

was tried in absentia and could not cross examine the veracity of 

the statements of witnesses that were all available?

4. Whether all of my previous counsel’s [sic] were ineffective 

assistance of counsel, Herbert Moss Crystle pretrial, Michael V. 
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Marinaro trial, and the two PCRA counsels. R. Russell Pugh and 

Roger C. Renteria all failed the Appellant by failure to pursue 

available avenues of appellate review and Appellant avers all 

attorneys abandoned the Appellant in violation of the rules and 

case law? 

5. Whether the trial court applied bias and ill-will to the 

Appellant by imposing a punishment so wildly out of proportion 

to the offense that it should not be allowed to stand because of 

the Draconian nature and egregious prejudice applied to the 

Appellant? 

Brief for Appellant at 1 (random capitalization omitted). 

“Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is clear; we are 

limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by 

the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 951 

A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). 

To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his or her conviction or sentence 

resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2). These circumstances include a violation of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution or the United States Constitution and ineffective assistance of 

counsel which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(2)(ii). In addition, a petitioner must establish that the claims of 

error he raised in the PCRA petition have “not been previously litigated or 

waived,” and that “the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial, 

during unitary review or on direct appeal could not have been the result of 
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any rational, strategic or tactical decision by counsel.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(3) and (4). An issue has been waived “if the petitioner could have 

raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on 

appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9544(b). An issue has been previously litigated if “the highest appellate 

court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has 

ruled on the merits of the issue; or [] it has been raised and decided in a 

proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9544(a)(2). See also Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 

2015). 

In addition, in cases wherein an appellant raises a claim of trial error 

under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our Supreme 

Court has cautioned: 

PCRA claims are not merely direct appeal claims that are made 

at a later stage of the proceedings, cloaked in a boilerplate 

assertion of counsel's ineffectiveness. In essence, they are 

extraordinary assertions that the system broke down. To 

establish claims of constitutional error or ineffectiveness of 

counsel, the petitioner must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of evidence that the system failed (i.e., for an 

ineffectiveness or constitutional error claim, that in the 

circumstances of his case, including the facts established at trial, 

guilt or innocence could not have been adjudicated reliably), that 

his claim has not been previously litigated or waived, and where 

a claim was not raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings, 

that counsel could not have had a rational strategic or tactical 

reason for failing to litigate these claims earlier.

Commonwealth v. Rivers, 567 Pa. 239, 249, 786 A.2d 923, 929 (2001).
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As a prefatory matter, we note that Appellant’s pro se brief is a 

photocopy which spans eighty-eight handwritten pages. On many of those 

pages, several words are completely or partially omitted due to uneven 

photocopying. In addition, while Appellant purports to divide his argument 

to coincide with each of his numbered issues, his discussion is comprised of 

disjointed, often repetitive and overlapping statements. 

[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no 

special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant 

must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or 

dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the 

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. For example,

The argument [section] shall be divided into as many 

parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have as the head of each part-in distinctive type or in 

type distinctively displayed-the particular point treated 

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). In the instant case, the defects in Appellant's 

brief are substantial.... See Pa.R.A.P. 2116, 2119. Appellant's ... 

argument is rambling, repetitive and often incoherent. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice we 

address the arguments that can reasonably be discerned from 

this defective brief.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal 

denied, 583 Pa. 695, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (case citation omitted). As 

did the Lyons court, in the interest of justice, we shall address the 

arguments that reasonably may be construed from Appellant's brief. See 

id. However, before we can address Appellant’s issues on the merits, we 

must first determine whether they have been previously litigated and 
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whether Appellant properly preserved them for appeal and, if so, whether 

they are cognizable for the purposes of collateral review. 

At the outset, we find Appellant has waived his first three issues, as he 

could have raised them on direct appeal but failed to do so. Moreover, 

Appellant could have raised these challenges in his prior PCRA petition 

wherein he requested, and was granted, the opportunity to seek allocator 

with our Supreme Court. Appellant does not allege that his failure to raise 

these claims with the trial court was a result of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

In addition, Appellant’s fourth issue challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence which was the focus of this Court’s analysis in our 

January 6, 2012, memorandum decision wherein we find this claim lacked 

merit. Commonwealth v. Strickland, No. 103 MDA 2011, unpublished 

memorandum at 5. (Pa.Super. filed January 6, 2012). Our Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal following our decision, 

and Appellant does not couch this challenge in terms of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. “[T]he fact that a petitioner presents a new argument or 

advances a new theory in support of a previously litigated issue will not 

circumvent the previous litigation bar.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 

1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010) citing Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 

50 (Pa.Super. 2000). As such, this issue has been previously litigated by a 
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previous panel of this Court and is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. 9544(a)(2).

Appellant’s fourth issue generally challenges the assistance of all prior 

counsel. When considering whether counsel were ineffective, we are mindful 

that “[i]t is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut 

that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's 

performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.” 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (2012) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687-91 (1984)). To prevail on 

an ineffectiveness claim, the petitioner has the burden to prove that “(1) the 

underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose 

effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or 

her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a 

result of counsel's deficient performance.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 616 

Pa. 1, 17, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce,

567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001)). The failure to satisfy any one of 

the prongs will cause the entire claim to fail. Id.

While Appellant frames this issue in his Statement of Questions 

Presented in terms of all prior counsel’s failure to seeks proper appellate 

review, we note that Appellant was granted the opportunity to file a petition 

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court nunc pro tunc which 

remedied any failure in this regard. Also, while Appellant seeks relief in light 
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of prior counsel’s abandonment of him, PCRA counsel filed an amended 

petition on his behalf, and Appellant filed a petition to proceed pro se with 

this Court, which the trial court determined had been done knowingly and 

voluntarily. 

Appellant sprinkles the argument portion of his brief with disjointed 

claims of various counsel’s ineffectiveness. For example, he asserts that 

preliminary hearing counsel was ineffective for permitting Appellant to waive 

his preliminary hearing, for representing his co-defendant wife and for failing 

to properly deal with alleged prosecutorial misconduct surrounding a digital 

camera. Brief for Appellant at 17-20. Appellant did not assert such 

challenges in his PCRA petition. As such, they are arguably waived for 

failure to raise them below. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). The same is true for 

Appellant’s averments that trial counsel had been ineffective for signing 

continuances without his consent, for failing to conduct a pre-trial 

investigation and to object to allegedly erroneous jury instructions. 

Appellant’s Brief at 21-28. 

To the extent these averments may be deemed preserved as having 

been raised before the trial court during the PCRA hearing held on February 

2, 2015, Appellant had failed to develop a meaningful analysis by applying 

the Pierce test to PCRA counsels’ performance. Indeed, Appellant provides a 

single citation to Pierce on page 84 of his appellate brief. While Appellant 

further asserts that PCRA counsel had been ineffective for various reasons, 
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Appellant’s Brief at 28-32, 83-85, he similarly fails to employ a Pierce

analysis. Thus, these claims lack merit. 

At the PCRA hearing held on February 2, 2015, PCRA counsel 

developed the issue asserted in Appellant’s amended PCRA petition of 

whether trial counsel and first PCRA counsel had been ineffective for failing 

to appeal the trial court’s decision to hold Appellant’s trial in absentia. 

However, in his appellate brief, Appellant seems to abandon this argument 

for lack of development, although it is encompassed in his third question set 

forth for this Court’s for review. Therefore, to the extent Appellant has 

attempted to pursue this claim in his appellate brief, the Honorable Margaret 

C. Miller sitting as the trial court, has authored a thorough and wellreasoned analysis of this issue, citing to the record and relevant caselaw and 

carefully detailing her reasons for finding that Appellant is not entitled to 

PCRA relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. Trial Court 

Opinion, filed 12/30/15, at 3-8. We find no error in the trial court’s analysis 

and further find that Appellant has failed to establish any prong of the 

Pierce test. As such, Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Sneed, supra. 
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2016