## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Gaytan , 2013 IL App (4th) 120217

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. J OSE GAYTAN , Def

endant- Appellant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-0217

Rule 23 Order

filed Rule 23 Order
withdrawn Opinion filed May 21, 2013

J une 11, 2013 May 21, 2013

Held (Note : This sy ll abus

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In a prosec ution for unlawful possession of canna bis with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of canna bis arising from a traff

ic stop for having

a license plate obstructed by a trailer hitch, the trial court err ed in denying defe ndant ’s m otion to suppress, since section 3-413(b) of the I llinois Vehicle Code prohibits obstructing materia ls attache d to the plate itself,
not objects such as the trailer hitch here
, which was not connec ted to the plate and only

partially obstructed the plate; t here fore
, section 3-413(b) did not provide a ba sis for stopping de fenda nt.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circui t C ourt of McL ean County
, No. 10-CF- 864; the Hon. Robert L . Fr eitag , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pelletier, Kar en Munoz, and Colleen Morg an, all of State Appellate D efe nder’ s Offic e, of Spring field, for appellant.

Ronald C

. Dozier, State’s Attorney
, of Blooming ton (Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman, and Thomas R. Do d egge, all of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor’s O ffice , of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE KNECHT delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Pope and Holder Whit e concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In Septemb er 2 010, a McL ean County grand jury indicted defe ndant, J ose Gay tan, for unlawful possession of canna bis with intent to deliver (720 I L CS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful possession of canna bis (720 I L CS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). Def endant filed a motion to suppr ess evidenc e, arguing the police office rs did not have articula ble suspicion a crime had been committed or was being committed when they stopped defe ndant for an obstructed license plate. In October 2011, the trial cou rt h eld a stipulated bench trial and found defe ndant guilty

. The court sentenc ed defe ndant to 30 m o n t h s ’ probation, including a condition that he serve 120 day s in the county jail. ¶ 2 On appea l, defe ndant argues the trial court im p ro p er l y d en ied the motion to suppress evidenc e. Def

endant asser

ts section 3-413(b) of the I l l inois Vehicle Code (Ve hicle Code) (625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)) only prohibits materia ls phy sically att ac h ed t o the
reg istration plate itself and not obstructions, such as a trailer hitch, no t attache d to the
reg istration plate. We agree and re verse

.

¶ 3 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 In September 2010, a McL ean County grand jury i n d i ct ed d ef en d an t fo r u nlawful possession of canna

bis with intent to deliver (720 I L CS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful possession of canna

bis (720 I L CS 55 0 / 4(d) (West 2010)). These charg es resulted from a traff ic stop and a se arc h of the ve hicle in which de fenda nt was a pa sseng er. ¶ 5 In November 2010, defe ndant filed a motion “t o qu as h arrest and suppress evide nce”
arguing the traff

ic stop resulting in his arr est was improper. (We note the proper title for such

a m otion is “motion to suppress evidenc e.” See People v. Hansen
, 2012 I L App (4 t h ) 110603, ¶¶ 61-63, 968 N.E.2d 164.) In J anuar y 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Offic ers Kar l L adtkow and Dan Crowley of the Chenoa polic e d epar tment wer e running stationary rada

r detec tion on Interstate 55. L adtkow’s attention was drawn to a

-2-purple L incoln Mark V beca use of “the color of the vehicle and the big tires on the vehicle.” As the vehicle passed, L adtkow observe d “t h e v ehicle had a trailer hitch on the back and there was a ball on the back that obscure d the license plate” and the trailer hitch “wa s

covering up the bottom of the plate.” L adtkow testified the hitch was c overingsome of the numbers on the plate and the plate was obstructed when he was following behind the vehicle. On cross-e x amination, L adtkow explained he was not a ble to se e all of the numbers on the plate “unless I g ot right up on to the bumper of the vehicle and be able to look over that and
see, you know, what number that was.” L adtkow admitted once he stopped the vehicle and walked up to it, he wa s able to cle arly see the license plate despite the trailer hitch. ¶ 6 De fe n d an t s ubmitted into evidenc e a photogr aph of the L incoln taken from an ang le direc tly behind the vehicle and from a height approximately above the rea r bumper. The trial
court observe d “the ball hitch in the photogr aph is not obstructing any of the numbers” but “the photo is also obviously taken by someone who is standing right at the rea r of the vehicle, and cer tainly the office r testified that he was further back and that the ang le, there fore
, was differ ent and t h e b all was obstructing one of the numbers.” The court denied defe ndant’s motion to s uppress be cause the hitch obstructed the license plate. ¶ 7 In April 2 0 1 1
, d efendant filed a mot ion to reope n evidenc e to permit introduction of a video rec ording of the traff ic stop. By written o rd er , the trial court grante d defe ndant’s motion to reopen evide nce a nd permitted introduction of the vide o rec ording

. ¶ 8 I n J u l y 2 0 1 1
, t h e t ri al co u rt h eld a hearing on defe ndant’s motion to rec onsider. Def endant argued the statute “impl[ ies] a cover , something attached t o t h e p late.” A tow hitch “is something that’s not on the plate. It’s in front of it as you’re g oing down the road,” but if the plate is cover ed by that particula r ang le, “all you had to do is just move over a littl e bit to the left or the right a nd the letter is c learly discernible.” In making its ruling
, the trial
court explained the videotape “re ally doesn’t clea r up for me one wa

y or the other whether this thing blocked part of the letters or not. It does appea r that may be it blocks a littl e piece of one of them on the video, but I can’ t tell if it rea lly does or it’s just grainy from the video itself.” The court de nied the motion to reconsider

. ¶ 9 In October 2011, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and found defe ndant guilty of unlawful possession of canna bis with intent to deliver. The court sentenc ed defe ndant as stated. ¶ 10 This appea l followed.

¶ 11 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 12 Def

endant argues the trial court i mp ro p er l y denied the motion to suppress evide nce. Def endant asser

ts (1) based on its statutory languag e and the d o ctrine of ejusdem generis
, section 3-41 3 (b) of the Vehicle Code (625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)) only “prohibits materia ls which phy sically obscure the reg istration plate itself and is not so expansive as to include leg al use of trailer hitches and other simil ar vehicle acc essories” ; (2) the statute does
not extend the require ment that the reg istration p late be “cle arly visible” to momentary obstructions, such as properly installed trailer hitches; and (3 ) th e police office rs had no

rea son to believe a crime had been committed “by having a standard- issue trailer hitch which

-3-made it difficult to view the reg istration plate from cer tain positions.” Def

endant asser

ts no I llinois case has direc t l y co n s t rued the statutory languag e of section 3-314(b) and cites

sever al out-of- state ca ses in support of his argument. ¶ 13 The State conce des the issue prese nted in this case is not controlled by I llinois prec edent and argues (1) sectio n 3 -4 13(b)’ s use of the terms “cle arly visible” and “cle arly leg ible” require “that a reg istration plate must not be obstructed and must be fully rea dable,” and (2) “a reg istration plate that is fastene d in a place that results in it being partially obscure d by a trailer hitch” violates section 3-413(b), bec ause the plate is not “cle arly visible.” The State cites People v. W

hite
, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), and Parks v. State
, 2011 WY 19, 247 P.3d 857 (Wyo. 2011), for the proposition “a majority ofjurisdictions that have considere d this issue have conclude d that a trailer ball so positioned so as to partially obstruct a license plate constitutes a tra ffic violation.”

¶ 14 A. Standard of Review ¶ 15 In revie wing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidenc e, this court applies a two-par t standard of revie w: we will rev er s e fac tual finding s only if they are ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e; howeve r, de novo revie w applies to the trial court’s ultimate ruling of whether rea sonable suspicion or probable cause exis ts and whether suppression is

war rante d. People v. Grant
, 2013 I L 112734, ¶ 12, 983 N.E.2d 1009; People v. Mott
, 389 I ll. App. 3d 539, 542, 906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009)

.

¶ 16 B. F ourth Amendment Tr aff ic Stops ¶ 17 Gene rally , under thefourth ame ndment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const
., amend. IV), a police office r may lawfully stop a person when the office r h as re as o n able, articula ble suspicion that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio
, 392 U. S

. 1
, 21-22 (1968). See also 725 I L CS 5/107-14 (West 2010) (statutory codification of Terrystandard)

. ¶ 18 “V eh i cl e s t o ps are subject to the fourth amendment’ s rea sonablene ss require m en t

. ” People v

. Hack

ett , 2012 I L 111781, ¶ 20, 971 N.E.2d 1058. An inve stigatory stop must be justified at its inception. People v. Close
, 238 I ll. 2d 497, 505, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010). “A police office r m ay conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a pe rson wher e the office r can point to specific and articula ble fac ts which, taken toge ther with ration al i n ference s from those fac ts, rea sonably war rant the intru s i o n .” Hack

ett , 2012 I L 111781, ¶ 20, 971 N.E.2d 1058. A police office r may stop a vehicle wher e he or she has rea sonable suspicion to believe the driver is violating the Vehicle Code. Mott
, 389 I ll. App. 3d at 544, 906 N.E.2d at 164. “In judging the police office r’s conduct, we apply an objective stand ar d : ‘would the fac ts available t o the office r at the moment of the seizure *** “wa rra nt a man of rea sonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate? ’ ” Close
, 238 I ll. 2d at 505, 939 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Terry
, 392 U.S. at 21-22). A police office r conducting a traff ic stop need not alway s be correc t but must be rea sonable, a nd an off icer ’s objectively

rea sonable mistake of fa ct ra

rely violates the four

th amendment. People v. Cole
, 369 I ll. App. 3d 960, 967-68, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2007). “Howe ver, a police office r who mistakenly believes a

-4-v i olation occur red when the acts in question are not prohibited by law is not acting

rea sonably .” Cole
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 968, 874 N.E.2d at 88. See also Mott
, 389 I ll. App. 3d
at 543, 906 N.E.2d at 164 (“ W h er e a traff ic stop is based upon a mistake of law, it is unconstitutional.”).

¶ 19 C. Section 3-413 of the Ve hicle Code ¶ 20 Section 3-413(a ) of the Vehicle Code provides reg istration plates for an automobile must be attache d to the vehicle, “one in the front and one in the rea r.” 625 I L CS 5/3-413(a) (West 2010). Section 3-413(b) provides:
“Eve ry reg istration plate shal l at all times be securely fastene d in a horiz ontal position
to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to preve nt the pl at e from swing ing and at a height of not less than 5 inches from the ground, measuring from t h e b o t t o m of such plate, in a place and position to be clea rly visible and shall be maintained in a condition
to be clea rly leg ible, free f

r o m any materials that would obstruct the visibilit y of the plate
, including, but not limit ed to, g lass cover s and plastic cover s. Reg istration stickers issued as evidenc e of rene wed annual reg istration shall be attache d to reg istration plates

as require d by the Secre tary o f S t ate, and be clea rly visible at all times.” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/ 3-413(b) (West 2010). ¶ 21 We note Public Act 97-743 (Pub. Act 97- 743, § 5 (ef f. J an. 1, 2013)) amended se ction 3-413 and remove d the languag e “includin g, b u t n o t limit ed to, g lass cover s and plastic

cover s” from section 3-413(b) and added sections 3-413(g ) to (j). The new section 3-413(g ) provides, “A person may not operate any motor vehicle t h at i s eq u ipped with reg istration plate cove rs.” Pub. Act 97- 743, § 5 (ef f. Jan. 1, 2013) (adding625 I L CS 5/ 3-413(g )).

¶ 22 D. Comparative I llinois Cases ¶ 23 As defe ndant points out, the supreme court has not deter mined whether section 3-413(b) prohibits any object from partially covering or obstructing the reg istration plat e o r o nly prohibits covering or obstructing objects phy sically attache d or adher ed to the plate. Our

rese arc h confirms the appellate court has not direc tly addre ssed this i s s u e b y published opinion. See People v. Cosby
, 231 I ll. 2d 262, 286, 898 N.E.2d 603, 618 (2008) (tinted rea r license plate cover was traffic violation supporting officer’ s t ra ffic stop); People v. Bradi
, 107 I ll. App. 3d 594, 599, 437 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (1982) (“it is a violation to have a license plate so dirty that it is i lleg ible” (e mphasis in origina l)); Mott , 389 I ll. App. 3d at 547, 906 N.E.2d at 166 (This court addre ssed the materia l-obstruction statute, which prohibits objects place d or suspended betwee n the driver and front windshield, as applied to a n air fre shener and conclude d “the mere fac t defe ndant had an air fr es h ener hang ing from her rea rview mirror did not g ive rise to rea sonable suspicion of a v i olation of section 12-503(c ) [of the Vehicle Code (625 I L CS 5/ 12-503(c ) (West 2004))].”). ¶ 24 Def

endant notes two appellate case s wher e the defe ndant’s license plate was obstructed by a trailer hitch. In People v. Miller
, 242 I ll. App. 3d 423, 424, 611 N.E.2d 11, 13 (1993), the police office r indicated he stopped the defe ndant’s vehicle for three Veh i cl e Code violations, including a loud muffler
, an expired license plate, and a trailer ball hitch, which

-5-“somewhat obstructed the numbers on the license plate.” This court noted “[e]it her violation

could have provided amp l e re as o n ” for the office r to stop the vehicle and issue a ticket. Miller
, 242 I ll. App. 3d at 435, 611 N.E.2d at 20. Howeve r, the appellate court held the trial
court could have conclude d the office r was not cre dible when he testified about the expired license plate and obstruction and the office r made these observations afte r the defe ndant was impermissibly stopped for t he loud muffler

. Miller
, 242 I ll. App. 3d at 436, 611 N.E.2d at 20. In People v. P er ez , 2 5 8 I ll. App. 3d 465, 466, 631 N.E.2d 240, 241 (1994), the Fifth District considere d whether the trial court properly found the deputy direc tor of the I llinois State Police in indirect civil contempt for failing to produce documents the three defe ndants contende d wer e nece ssary to show their traff ic stops wer e prete x tual. One of the defe ndants

was stopped “bec ause two balls of a trailer hitch obscure d one of the numbers of the pickup truck’s lice nse plate a

nd beca use the truc k was obser

ved to trave l 1 1/2 f

eet over thewhite line on the edg e of the road.” Perez
, 258 I ll. App. 3d at 467, 631 N.E.2d at 242. The appellate
court reje cted the defe ndant’s claims and found the documents soug ht w e r e “immateria l” and noted “[t] he alleg ed traff

ic violations in these case s, if established at the appropriate hearing, provide a rea sonable basis for stopping a motor vehicle.” Perez
, 258 I ll. App. 3d at 472, 631 N.E.2d at 245. ¶ 25 These c ases a

re of limit ed value as they

wer e decided before the statutory amendment,

as discussed below, that added the applicable languag e, and did not direc tly addre ss whether
a tra iler hitch is a violation of sec tion 3-413(b).

¶ 26 E. The Par ties’ Out-of- State Cases ¶ 27 The parties’ briefs include leng thy discussions of out-of-state case s considering whether
a tra iler hitch obstructingthe def endant’ s license plateviolated the re levant state statute. ¶ 28 Def

endant relies on a Florida case

. In Harris v. State
, 11 So. 3d 462 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), the Florida appellate court considere d a Florida statute stating: “ ‘[A] ll letters,

numera ls, printing, writing
, and other identification marks upon the plates *** shall be clea r and distinc t a

n d fre e from defa ceme nt, mutilation, grea se, and other obscuring matter , so that they will be plainly visible and l egi b le at all times 100 fee t from the rea r or front.’ ” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Harris
, 11 So. 3d at 463 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.605(1) (2006))

. The appellate court conclude d the statutory languag e “ ‘other ob s cu ri n g m atter’ ” related to “ma t er i al place d over the plate” and “would not include a trailer hitch that is properly attache d to the truck’s bumper.” Harris
, 11 So. 3d at 463. Using the doctrine of ejusdem generis
, the court found the obstructions must be on the plate and “[m] atters external to the
t ag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle rac ks, handica p chair s, u-hauls, and the lik e ar e n o t

cover ed by the s tatute.” Harris
, 11 So. 3d at 463-64. We note the F lorida statute in Harris included a require ment that “[n] othing shall be place d upon the fac e of a Florida plate except

as permitt ed by law or by rule or regulation of a g overnme ntal ag ency .” Fla. Stat. § 316.605(1) ( 2006). ¶ 29 The State primarily relies on two case s from California and W y o m i n g. I n W h i t e , the California appellate court found the statute imposed two obliga tions “that the plate be clea rly visible when mounted on the vehicle and that it also be clea rly leg ible.” W

hite
, 113 Cal. Rptr.

-6-2d at 586. The appellate court conclude d “[a] license plate mounted in a place that results in

it being partially obstructed from view by a trailer hitch ball violates [the California Vehicle Code] and, thus, provides a law enfor ceme nt office r with a lawful basis upon which to detain the vehicle and hence its driver.” W hite
, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. The California statute did
not include qualifying languag e about the ty pes of materia ls obst ru ct i ng the plate or plate

cover s. ¶ 30 I n P a rks
, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 857, the polic e o ff i ce r co u l d n o t re ad t h e defe ndant’s license plate beca use a trail er h i t ch b all, mounted on the defe ndant’s pickup truck’s bumper, partially o b s tr u c te d the plate. The Wyoming statute require d the license plate
to be “ ‘plainly visible’ ” and “ ‘[m] aintained fre e from fore ign materia ls and in a condition
to be clea rly leg ible.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Parks
, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 8, 247 P.3d 857 (quoting Wy o. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-205( a)( iv) (L exis Nexis 2009)). The Wy oming Supreme Court held “[t] he require ments that a license plate be ‘plainly visible’ and ‘cle arly leg ible’ indicate that a license plate must not be obstructed in a ny manner .” Parks
, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 12, 247 P.3d 857. The court noted the Florida statute in Harris wa s “s ignif icantly differ ent” as the Wy oming statute’s “plainly visible” require ment was not connec ted t o any class of “obscuring matter.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Parks
, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 15, 247 P.3d 857.

¶ 31 F. De fenda nt’s Statutory

Interpre tation Claim ¶ 32 The parties disagree on whether section 3-413(b) prohibits materia ls attache d to the plate or encompasses materials external to the plate obstruc ting visibility

. Def endant asserts t he doctrine of ejusdem generis supports the conclusion the languag e “g lass cover s and plastic

cover s” limit s the “materials that would obstruct the v i s i b ility” languag e to materia ls phy sically covering the reg istration plate, and not any object, such as a trailer hitch, that may come be tween the plate and the viewer . The State a sserts the “clearly visible” requir ement applies to the “fr ee from any materia ls that would obstruct the visibil ity of the plate” clause
, and a reg istration plate must not be obstructed by any mater i al
, including objects not phy sically

connec ted to the re g istration plate.

¶ 33 1. Statutory Interpretation in General ¶ 34 The interpre tation of a statute prese nts a question of law that is revie wed de novo

. People v. Chapman , 2012 I L111896, ¶ 23, 965 N.E.2d 1119. The primary objective in construing

a statute is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the leg islative intent, and the most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory languag e itself. Id. Courts of revie w deter

min e l egislative intent by rea ding the statute as a whole and considering all rele vant parts and not by considering words or phrase s in isolation. People v. Villa
, 2011 I L 110777, ¶ 35, 959 N.E.2d 634. This court will “not dep ar t fr o m the plain languag e of the

s tatute by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict wit h t h e expressed intent.” People v. P er r y , 224 I ll. 2d 312, 323-24, 864 N.E.2d 196, 204 (2007). W h en t h e s tatutory languag e is clea r and unambiguous, it should be applied without interpre tative aids. Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n
, 2013 I L 113907, ¶ 47, 983

-7-N.E.2d 993. I f the statute is ambiguous, courts turn to extrinsi c aids of statutory construction,

including rules of construction and leg islative history

. Id. Where a statutory term is not otherwise define d it is appropriate to use a dictionary to asce rtain its meaning

. Id. ¶ 48, 983 N.E.2d 993. ¶ 35 “The doctrine of ejusdem g en er is p ro v i d es that when a statutory clause specific ally describes sever al classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is inter

prete d as mea

ning ‘other such like.’ ” People v. Davis
, 199 I ll. 2d 130, 138, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (2002). “ The interpr etation is justified on the g round that, i f t he
g ener al words we re g iven their full and ordinary meaning
, the specific words would be superf luou s as encompassed by the g ener al terms. I f the leg islature had meant the g ener al words to have their unrestric ted sense, it would not have used the specific words.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v . County of Cook, 232 I ll. 2d 463, 492, 905 N.E.2d 781, 799 (2009).

¶ 36 2. Plain Language of Section 3-413( b) ¶ 37 Be fore using rules of statutory construction, we look to the plain languag e of the statute. Section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code provides the “re g istration plate shall at all times be *** fre e from any materia ls that woul d obstruct the visibil ity of the plate, including, but not limit ed to, g lass cover s and plastic cover s.” 625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010). The Vehicle Code does not define the word “material” and “obstruct.” “Mate rial” is define d as “of, relating to, or consisting of matter.” Webster’s Third New I n t ern at i onal Dictionary 1392 (1976). See also People ex rel. State Board ofHealth v. Jones
, 92 I ll. App. 447, 449 (1900) (def ining “material” as “[r ] elating to, or consisting of matter; corpor eal; not spiritual; phy sical” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). “Matter” is define d as “the substance of which

a phy sical object is composed.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1394 (1976). The rele v a

nt d e f in itio n o f “ o b struct” is “to cut off from sight.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

801 (10th ed. 2000). ¶ 38 Obviously
, a trailer hitch is a phy sical object capa ble of obstructing a viewer ’s visibili ty

. Read in isolation, the phrase “any materia ls that would obstru ct t h e v isibil ity of the plate”
appea rs to support the State’s interpre tation any phy sical object obstructing the visibil ity of the plate is a violation of section 3-413(b)

. Howeve r, the subject matter o f th is statute is
reg istration plates and not vehicle acc essories or attachme nts. T h e statute perta ins to the require ments on a reg istration plate and that the “re g istration plate must at a ll times be *** fr ee from” obstructing materia ls. An alterna tive definition of “fr ee” is “cle ar.” Merr iam

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 463 (10th ed. 2000). “F rom” is define d as “a function word
to indicate a starting point of a phy sical movement or a starting point in measuring or

rec koning or in a s t at em en t o f l imits ” and is “used as a function word to indicate phy sical
separ ation or an a ct or c ondition of removal, abstention, exclusion, rele ase, subtra ction, or differ entiation.” Merr iam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 467-68 (10th ed. 2000). Read in totality and applyi ng the definition of “fr om” to the statute, a plain rea ding supports defe ndant’s interpre tation the reg istration plate m ust be phy sically separ ated from any materia l obstructing visibil ity of the plate. In other words, section 3-413(b) prohibits objects obstructing the reg istration plate’s visibil ity that are connec ted or attache d to the plate itself

.

-8-¶ 39 The S t at e’ s i n t erp re t at i on is premised on the “cle arly visible” and “cle arly leg ible” language contained in the clause addre ssing the plate’s visibil ity
, leg ibilit y , “plac e and position,” and “condition.” This interpre tation appe ar s to rew ord the statute by applying require ments from other clause s of the statute to the rele vant clausefor the c onclusion any object partially obstructing a police office r’s visibil ity of the plate cause s the plate to not be “c l ea rl y v i sible” and is a viol ation of section 3-413(b)

. This appea rs unworkable as, taken
to its logic al conclusion, it would prohibit any object such as a traff ic sign, post, tree , or even another vehicle from obstructing a police office r’s “cle ar visibil ity” of the plate. See People

v. Isaacson
, 409 I ll. App. 3d 1079, 1082, 950 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (2011) (“[W] e presume the leg islature did not intend absurdity , inconvenienc e, or injusti ce.” ). The se cond sente nce of section 3-413(b) require s annual reg istration stickers attache d to the reg istration plate must be “cle arly visible at all times.” This “at all times” languag e is noticeably absent from the first sentenc e of section 3-413(b)
, and its absenc e implies the leg islature does not require the visibil ity of a reg istration plate to be unobstructed “at all times” from all ang les. See People

v. Edwards
, 2012 I L 111711, ¶ 27, 969 N.E.2d 829 (“Where l an gu age i s included in one section of a statute but omitted in another section of the s am e s t atute, we presume the leg islature acte d intentionally and purposely in the inclusion o r ex cl usion.”). Section 3- 413(b) differ s signific antly from the California and Wy oming statutes discussed, beca use it has an additional obstruction require ment, simil ar to the Florida statu t e, and the clause “including
, but not limit ed to, g lass cover s and plastic co vers.” Section 3-413(b) ’s obstruction require ment differ s in construction from the Florida statute, which includes the phrase “ ‘othe r obscur ing matter.’ ” Harris , 11 So. 3d at 463. ¶ 40 Def

endant, relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis
, asser ts the languag e “including
, but not limit ed to, g lass cover s and plastic cover s” qualifies the term “material” in the clause
to limit the obstructing materia l to an object like a g lass or plastic cover

. Unlike the Florida statute, the g ener al words in the section 3-413(b) do not follow the enumer ation of particula r classes of things, i.e.
, the statute does not rea d “fr ee from g lass cover s, plastic cover s, or any other materia ls that would obstruct the visibil ity of the plate.” We note, the leg islature often

uses the phrase “ ‘including
, but not limit ed to’ ” to indicate the list following is illust rative rathe r t han ex haustive. People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 330, 864 N.E.2d 196, 208 (2007). I f “materials” is restric ted to those materia ls attached to or aff ix ed to the reg istration pla te,

as the plain languag e implies, then a g lass or plastic cover is an illustrative example of impermissible materia ls. T h i s i n terpre tation comports with our revie w of the leg islative history

.

¶ 41 3. Legislati ve H istory of Section 3-413 ¶ 42 Public Ac t 9 5 -2 9
, § 5 (e ff

. J une 1, 2008) made substantive chang es to the statutory l anguag e in section 3-413(b) (625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2006)). It remove d langua ge stating “Clear plastic cover s are permissible as long as they rema in clea r and do not obstruct the visibil ity of the plates.” Compare 625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2006), with 625 I L CS 5/3- 413(b) (West 2008). In the Senate, S en at o r M unoz testified this chang e was to make it “abunda ntly clea r that clea r l icense plate covers are il leg al.” 95th I ll. Gen. Assem., Senate Procee din gs , M ar

. 30, 2007, at 155 (statements of Senator Munoz). In the House,

-9-R epre sentative Hoffma n testified this chang e was in response to license plate covers distorting the imag e and obstructing the visibil ity of license plates to evade photo rada r and red light came ras. 95th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, J une 7, 2007, at 16 (statements of Represe ntative Hoffma n). Public Act 95-331, § 1005 (ef f. Aug

. 21, 2007) made technica l chang es to section 3-413. ¶ 43 Public Act 89-375, § 3 (ef f. Aug

. 18, 1995) added the statutory languag e “in a condition
to be clea rly leg ible” and repla ced the languag e “for eign materia ls, including tinted g lass or tinted plastic cover s, and in a condition to be clea rly leg ible” with “any materia ls that would obstruct the visibil ity of the plate, including, but not limit ed to, g lass cover s and tinted plastic

cover s” to section 3-413(b)

. Compare 625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 1994), with 625 I L CS 5/3- 413(b) (West 1996)

. In the House, Represe ntative Big g ert explained this chang e addre ssed
reg istration plate covers and woul d permit clea r pl astic covers, so long as they are visible. 89th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Pr o ce ed i n g s, May 25, 1995, at 144 (statements of Represen t ati ve Big g ert). Represe ntative Dar t asked whether this languag e would aff ect individuals whose reg istration plates hav e d eteriorated. 89th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, May 25, 1995, at 146 (statements of Represe ntative Dar t). Re p re s en tative Big g ert explained, “Well, th e l egislation does state that they shall be maintained in a condition to be cle arly

leg ible and then with a comma, ‘fr ee from any materia ls that w ould obstruct the visibil ity of the plate.’ ” 89th I ll. Ge n

. As sem., House Procee dings, May 25, 1995, at 146 (statements of Represe ntative Big g ert). Represe ntative Dar t responde d, “Well, Represe ntative, yeah that comma is very important beca use it sort of ends it there

. It say s that these license plates should be in a place in pos ition to be clea rly visible and shall be maintained, and this is your new languag e, ‘shall be maintained in a condition to be clea rly leg ible, fre e from materia ls that w ill obstruct visibil ity of the plate,’ another comma and so

on and so forth. Does this mean that individuals now, beca use of t h i s , ar e g oing to be require d to wash their license p l at es ? Ar e they g oing to be require d to repa int them themselves? ” 89th I ll. Ge n. Assem., House Procee dings, May 25, 1995, at 146 (statements of Represe ntative Dar

t). Represe ntative Big g ert explained, “It’s the intent of this leg islation to de al with the cover s and the f act that by putting on cover s, that you are not c hang ing the visibil ity of the plates.” 89th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, May 25, 1995, at 146-47 (statements of Re prese ntative B igg ert). ¶ 44 The leg islative history shows Public Act 89-375, § 3 (ef f. Aug

. 18, 1995), which added the rele vant statutory languag e, leg alized clea r license plate cover s not obstructing visibil ity of the license plate. See 625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 1996). Then, Public Act 95-29, § 5 (ef f. J un. 1, 2008), prohibited clea r license plate cover s. See 625 I L CS 5/3-413(b) (West 2008)

. As plate cover s wer e being used to evade detec tion by photo rada r and red light came ras, the leg islature decide d to prohibit their use. See 95th I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, J une 7, 2007, at 16 (statement s o f Represe ntative Hoffma n). The leg islative history shows the leg islature sought to restric t the use of materia ls such as license plate cover s used to obstruct or di stort the vi sibili ty of t he reg istration plate and not mere ly any object co m i n g betwee n the viewer and the plate. The statutory languag e and history supports defe ndant’s interpre tation of section 3-413(b) and the conclusion th e l egi s l ature soug ht to prohibit obstructing materia ls attache d to the plate it s el f– s uch as cover s–and not objects partially

-10-obstructing the plate’s visibil ity that are not connec ted to the reg istration plate. A trailer ball

hitch, such as the one in this case , differ s from a license plate cover in three way s: it has a leg itimate pur

pose independe nt from the license plate ( i.e. , to be used for towing) , it is not aff ix ed or connec ted to the plate itself, and it only partially obstructs the plate from cer tain
ang les. ¶ 45 We conclude section 3-413 does not provide a basis for justifying defe ndant’s traff ic stop at its inception. W e express no opinion whether a tra iler ball hitch obstructingvisibil ity of the re g istration sticker would be a violation of section 3-413(b)

.

¶ 46 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 47 For

the re asons stated, we reve rse the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 48 Reverse d.

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