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IMPROVEMENTS TO DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING

CAPABILITIES—VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL

INTELLIGENCE

HEARING

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 

COUNTERTERROSIM

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 24, 2003

Serial No. 108–21

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, 

U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada, Chairman 

JOHN SWEENEY, New York, Vice Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PORTER GOSS, Florida 

PETER KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex officio 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable John Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism .................................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington 4 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 41

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Rhode Island ..................................................................................................... 44

The Honorable Edward J. Marky, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 56 

The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Missouri 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 60

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 5

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Darin Daniels, Preparedness Planning and Training Manager, Maricopa 

County, Arizona 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

Mr. George W. Foresman, Deputy Assistant to the Governor on 

Counterterrorism 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 29

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30

Mr. James Kallstrom, Senior Adviser to the Governor on Counterrosim 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17

Mr. V. Phillip Lago, Deputy Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

Mr. Steven McCraw, Assistant Director Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau 

of Investigations 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25
Page

IV

Mr. William Parrish, Acting Assitant Secretary, For Information Analysis, 

Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12

APPENDIX 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. William Parrish ................... 73

Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. Steven C. McCraw .............. 75

Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. James K. Kallstrom ............ 78
(1)

IMPROVEMENTS TO DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION 

SHARING CAPABILITIES VERTICAL 

AND HORIZONTAL INTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNICATIONS 

Thursday, July 24, 2003

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

AND COUNTERTERRORISM, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in Room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Gibbons [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gibbons, Sweeney, Dunn, Cox (ex officio), McCarthy, Langevin, Markey, Lowey, Meek and Turner (ex 

officio). 

Mr. GIBBONS. The House Subcommittee on Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism for the House Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. 

I would like to begin by welcoming everybody here to our hearing 

today. We are going to start, and hopefully my colleague and friend 

Karen McCarthy from Missouri will be here shortly for our statement as well, and what I will do is begin my statement and then 

allow for Ms. McCarthy to enter her statement. Hopefully she’ll be 

here by then and then we will open it up for other members of 

panel statement and then we will turn to our witnesses. 

This looks like it is going to be a great hearing for us, very interesting panel we have before us today, and we are all looking forward to the information we are going to receive. 

Let me begin by saying that since September the 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress has focused on the performance of the Intelligence Community and whether intelligence and other information are effectively shared to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack. 

Today governments at all levels recognize that they have a greater role to play in protecting the Nation from terrorist attacks, and 

to achieve this collective goal, homeland security stakeholders must 

effectively work together to strengthen the process by which critical 

information can be shared, analyzed, integrated and disseminated 

to help prevent or minimize terrorist activities. 

The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability 

of all levels of government to communicate and cooperate effec-
2

tively with one another. Activities that are hampered by organizational fragmentation, technology impediments or ineffective collaboration blunt the Nation’s collective efforts in this matter. 

As it is with so many other homeland security areas, it is also 

the case for intelligence and information sharing that there are 

many stakeholders who must work together to achieve common 

goals. Effective analysis, integration and dissemination of intelligence and other information critical to homeland security requires 

the cooperative involvement of the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a myriad of other agencies. 

State and local governments have critical roles to play as well. 

Information is shared—is already being shared between and among 

numerous government agencies, information sharing practices benefit critical infrastructure protection by establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of Federal and nonFederal entities that 

may be in a position to provide potentially useful information and 

advice on vulnerabilities and incidences, to develop standards and 

agreements on how information will be used and protected. It also 

establishes effective and appropriate secure communication mechanisms and finally takes steps to ensure that sensitive information 

is not inappropriately disseminated, which may require a statutory 

change in some cases. 

Clearly, these practices are applicable to intelligence and information sharing in the broadest sense. To optimize such an information sharing network, it is important to have a strong strategic 

planning framework and a supporting policy structure. The national homeland security strategy describes a number of incentives 

to better develop opportunities for leveraging information sharing 

among stakeholders, including integrated information sharing 

across the Federal Government, integrated information sharing 

across State and local governments, improved public safety emergency communication and reliable public health information and 

communications, all of which needs to be shared both horizontally 

and vertically. 

Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are rapidly occurring and are expected to continue for the long term, but there are 

costs and requirements as the new department faces communications, human capital, information technology and other integration 

challenges. 

All of these changes of course will take time to fully implement. 

Today we focus on how effective the Department of Homeland Security is in information sharing, both vertically and horizontally. I 

would like to welcome the following witnesses from the Department 

of Homeland Security, acting Assistant Secretary for Information 

Analysis, Mr. William Parrish. From the Central Intelligence Agency, deputy executive director Philip Lago. From the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, assistant director, Office of Intelligence Steven 

McCraw. From the State of New York, senior adviser to the governor on counterterrorism, James Kallstrom, which I will turn for 

further introduction to my cochairman here in a minute. And from 

the State of Virginia, senior adviser to the governor for commonwealth preparedness George Foresman. And from Maricopa, Arizona, preparedness planning and training manager Darin Daniels. 
3

That looks exactly like the number of people I have in front of 

me, and I will turn now to the vice chairman of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Sweeney from New York, for any comments he may have and 

an introduction of his special guest. 

[The statement of Mr. Gibbons follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GIBBONS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress has focused on the performance of the intelligence community and whether intelligence and other information are effectively shared to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack. 

Today, governments at all levels, recognize that they have a greater role to play in 

protecting the nation from terrorist attacks. To achieve this collective goal, homeland security stakeholders must effectively work together to strengthen the process 

by which critical information can be shared, analyzed, integrated and disseminated 

to help prevent or minimize terrorist activities. 

The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability of all levels of government to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another. Activities that 

are hampered by organizational fragmentation, technological impediments, or ineffective collaboration blunt the nation’s collective efforts. 

As it is with so many other homeland security areas, it is also the case for intelligence and information sharing that there are many stakeholders who must work 

together to achieve common goals. Effective analysis, integration, and dissemination 

of intelligence and other information critical to homeland security require the cooperative involvement of the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a myriad of other agencies. 

State and local governments have critical roles to play. Information is already being 

shared between and among numerous government organizations. 

Information sharing practices benefit critical infrastructure protection by: 

- Establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and nonfederal 

entities that may be in a position to provide potentially useful information and 

advice on vulnerabilities and incidents; 

- Developing standards and agreements on how information will be used and 

protected; 

- Establishing effective and appropriately secure communications mechanisms; 

and 

- Taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not inappropriately disseminated, which may require statutory change. 

Clearly, these practices are applicable to intelligence and information sharing in the 

broadest sense. 

To optimize, such a information sharing network, it is important to have a strong, 

strategic planning framework and a supporting policy structure. 

The national homeland security strategy describes a number of initiatives to better 

develop opportunities for leveraging information sharing among stakeholders, including: 

- Integrated information sharing across the federal government. 

- Integrated information sharing across state and local governments. 

- Improved public safety emergency communications. 

- Reliable public health information and communications. 

Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are rapidly occurring and are expected 

to continue for the long term, but there are costs and requirements, as the new department faces communications, human capital, information technology, and other 

integrationchallenges. 

All of these changes of course, will take time to fully implement. Today we focus 

on how effective the Department of Homeland Security is in information sharing, 

both vertically and horizontally.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say that—

congratulate you on your leadership and thank you for your leadership in putting together this fine panel and say that in a year and 

a half’s time, I have been, in one form or the other, whether it is 

the appropriations process or the authorization process, participating in a variety of hearings and oversights into the questions of 

homeland security, the questions of intelligence gathering and 
4

counterterrorism, the linkages, the connecting of the dots that 

needs to happen, and I don’t think I have ever been as excited 

about a panel as I am about this one, because I think that this 

panel and opportunity we have here today is really to do some constructive planning forward by virtue of the testimony that each of 

you have already submitted and that is all be submitting. 

I am going to use my statement to introduce a friend and a fellow New Yorker and someone that we are very proud of, and I am 

particularly proud that he is here, because Jim Kallstrom is a 

model for the country to help us win the war on terrorism. He 

served in the Marine Corps. He has had a distinguished career at 

the FBI and was stationed in New York on three tours in 1971, 

1976 to 1990, 1993 to 1997, including a special agent in charge and 

assistant director in charge of the largest bureau in the country, 

and including in that, overseeing the operations of a Joint Terrorism Task Force in one of the most critical areas of this Nation. 

He has worked in the private sector as a senior vice president 

for security and management, committee member of the MBNA of 

America, and this is the part that I am most particularly proud of 

Jim Kallstrom. He was asked by Governor Pataki to be New York’s 

first director of the Office of Public Security. He has left his private 

sector responsibilities and dedicated himself once again to public 

service. He is still serving his State and his country as a senior adviser for counterterrorism to the governor, and most importantly, 

he was ahead of the curve on the terrorist threat and knows from 

the inside what is needed to strengthen the intelligence and information sharing, and he will share with us today his realistic initiatives that I believe the country should accept and I think this is 

a good—as is the case with each of you, this is a good opportunity 

to start down a very constructive path, and I thank you. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Sweeney, and let me 

turn to the vice chairman of the full committee, Jennifer Dunn 

from Washington, if she has any remarks or opening statement. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. While I too am 

looking forward to your testimony, we have heard Mr. Parrish most 

recently, I think. He gave excellent testimony and answers, and 

today is a chance for us to investigate how we communicate all this 

information that you all have access to. 

Unfortunately, we are going to be interrupted by a series of eight 

votes, and so don’t know how the chairman is going to handle that, 

but we will have to leave you hanging for a while. Please understand it is not our choice. It is the last couple of days of our session, and a lot is being accomplished in these days. A lot of it I 

think is going to be helpful to us if we get our appropriations right 

and make sure that homeland security is funded to the degree it 

should be. 

Thanks for being with us. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Ms. dunn, and I will turn 

to the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Turner of Texas, 

for any remarks he may have, opening remarks. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief, because I do know we have votes. In the nearly two years that have 

expired since September 11th, I think we have identified a number 

of things that we all can agree we must do to protect our home-
5

land, but it seems at the heart of the effort has to be an improved 

effort to share information about the terrorist threat. Our committee has had a lot of hearings on this particular subject, and it 

seems to me that we could do a lot better job than we are doing 

defining our responsibilities and determining who it is at the Federal level that our State and local law enforcement and other officials, as well as the private sector, is supposed to be communicating with, whether providing information up the chain or receiving information back from the Federal Government. 

So I am pleased today, Mr. Chairman, that we have on this panel 

officials from three different States who can talk to us about the 

information flow issue and how we can improve it. It seems to me 

that there is some confusion here that we ought to be able to easily 

clear up. I have no doubt that everyone involved at the State, Federal and local level has good intentions, but I think it is our responsibility as a committee to be sure that we ask the right questions and help you accomplish the tasks that I know each of you 

are jointly committed to achieving for us. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And Mr. Meek of Florida for any opening remarks 

he may have. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it will definitely be 

brief. I am excited about being here and getting an opportunity to 

hear all of your perspectives as it relates to intelligence. As you 

know, the great debate here on the Hill and in Washington is good 

intelligence, what is good and what is bad. I am hoping as we go 

through that struggle of finding out what is good and bad, that it 

doesn’t jeopardize the security of the homeland, and State, Federal, 

me being a creature from the State Legislature in Florida myself, 

being able to share information, being a past law enforcement person myself, is sometimes very difficult as it relates to the different 

entities and agencies; but I am interested to hear the camaraderie 

that you have now, and hopefully the camaraderie that you will 

have in the future in the times of doing a good job and being able 

to seek out and find out and flush out individuals that are going 

to harm the homeland. 

Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward after our 

series of eight votes to hear from our witnesses. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Meek. And to our witnesses, first of all, let me extend the apology of the subcommittee, 

because as you realize, the series of votes that are being called call 

us away from our duty here, and all of us are here to hear your 

testimony, and we know that this is going to inconvenience you by 

delaying your ability to communicate with our panel. I want to advise the committee here we have a series of eight votes. There is 

about 8 minutes remaining or 7 minutes remaining on the first 

vote followed by seven 5-minute votes. So as we can see, that is 

about—it is going to be about 40-some minutes, 45 minutes from 

now before we can get back here. So I would like to apologize once 

again and just recess the committee until we return from this vote. 

And we ask for your patience and your indulgence in the process 

here today, and we will be right back. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 
6

Mr. GIBBONS. The subcommittee will come back to order and first 

again let me apologize to our witnesses. There were three dilatory 

motions that were held that cost an additional 15 minutes per vote, 

and there were three of them. So it took an extra 45 minutes, and 

I do apologize for that.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, 

CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

Good afternoon. I join Chairman Gibbons and Ranking Member McCarthy in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon to what should be a significant and informative 

discussion. Our topic today—‘‘Improvements to DHS Information Sharing Capabilities—Vertical and Horizontal Intelligence Communications’’—has a variety of dimensions—and could be no more timely than to fall on the very day the intelligence 

committees have released their joint report on the 9/11 attacks. [Our own committee 

looks forward to exploring aspects of that topic in a hearing later this year.] 

We are, today, first talking about information sharing. If it is true that, as the 

tragedy of the 9/11 attacks teaches, information—good intelligence—is the lifeblood 

of homeland security, then it is also true that information must move, must circulate. Sadly, that hasn’t always happened. An article in this morning’s New York 

Times states that the 9/11 investigation found that ‘‘key National Security Agency 

communications intercepts never were circulated.’’ We must, today, talk about the 

timely sharing of all relevant information—about where it goes and how it gets 

there. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to look forward. We want to ensure that key 

information, regardless of its origin, now can and will get to the right place at the 

right time. We are here to probe, not to politicize; to point the way, not to point 

fingers. 

We are focusing on the Department of Homeland Security and its capabilities—

both human and technical. The Department is the very core of the solution to the 

9/11 information sharing problem. It is the tool Congress and the President devised 

soon after the 9/11 attacks in order to make absolutely certain that all information 

that might shed light on terrorist capabilities, intentions, plans, and activities is 

comprehensively analyzed and moves in the ways and to the places it must go, if 

we are to frustrate the intentions of those who seek to mount the next massive terrorist attack. The Department—in particular, its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate—must, in short, succeed. And, on behalf of the 

President and the Congress, this committee will do everything in its power to make 

sure that it does. 

I will say again: What we don’t know empowers our enemies—and what we do 

know will help defeat them. In this new war—the ongoing battle for our future—

knowledge is the very essence of power. If information doesn’t move, people may 

die—it’s that simple—that’s the lesson of 9/11. We simply must get key information 

to those who need it most, and we cannot be satisfied with inefficiency or delay. 

What must happen must be made to happen. 

We in the Congress and on this committee will also do our part. We will insist 

on breaking down barriers, on revising the ill-fitting regulations of the past so as 

to enable, rather than impede, the flow of information. Our ability to defend the 

American people, our homeland and interests, our economy and way of life depend 

on it. We have learned the lesson of 9/11. We will insist on effective information 

sharing. There is no acceptable alternative. 

Let me be clear. In this new world—in this great battle to protect our people, 

homeland, and way of life—we cannot tolerate parochialism. We cannot allow the 

information taxpayer dollars have bought to be held by Government agency collectors as their exclusive property, protected behind a wall of antique regulations. All 

the information we have must be used to protect us all. The President recognized 

that long since, and we in the Congress have acted upon it in passing the Homeland 

Security Act and the USA-PATRIOT Act. Barriers are coming down—but stovepiped cultures and proprietary habits die far harder. 

Today’s witnesses represent both ends of a new spectrum, a new two-way information sharing partnership in which federal agencies that collect and provide information—through the new Department—to their new state and local government customers also wait eagerly to receive the information those same customers provide 

to them. 

In this new war, federal, state and local officials are equal players. We must overcome the notion that the federal Government is the source of everything worth 

knowing—federal agencies must learn to listen. State and local governments, as 
7

well as businesses may also be sources of key information. That, of course, makes 

sense, since they are where the action is, out where the rubber hits the road—as 

they will always be. Federal government agencies must support them. State, local, 

and private sector officials are now among the Intelligence Community’s key customers—and each federal agency represented here today must learn to serve them 

well—largely through the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. Where 

homeland security is concerned, it is not an act of largesse for the federal government to share threat-related information with state and local officials; it is essential—and the Homeland Security Act requires it. 

We must also discard the common assumption that the most important information is classified—because in this new world, it may not be. The long-haul trucker 

in the small hours of the night may be the only one who sees the critical, anomalous 

act that indicates a possible terrorist attack—and we must have a system to ensure 

that what that trucker sees moves upstream quickly and reliably to the local, state, 

and federal government officials for whom it may be the critical, missing piece of 

a complex puzzle. Information sharing is not, in short, some grand gesture of noblesse oblige by a privileged coterie of federal agencies. To indulge the assumption 

that the federal Government—including CIA and FBI—has collected, and therefore 

knows, all that is most worth knowing at any given time is dangerous paternalism. 

But where state and local officials—including our ‘‘first responders’’ and law enforcement officers—do need access to classified information in order to protect us, they 

must have it—period. We must speed the clumsy clearance processes that keep 

them from the information that they need. 

Each of today’s federal government witnesses represents a member agency of the 

Intelligence Community. Each is involved in the federal government’s effort to implement the Homeland Security Act. It was, in fact, last October, testifying before 

joint intelligence committees during their investigation into the 9/11 attacks, that 

the Director of Central Intelligence expressed the critical new commitment we stress 

today. He said: 

‘‘We must move information in ways and to places it has never before had to 

move. . . We need to improve our multiple communications links—both within 

the Intelligence Community and now in the Homeland Security community. . . . Now, more than ever before, we need to make sure our customers get 

from us exactly what they need—which generally means exactly what they 

want—fast and free of unnecessary restrictions.’’ 

He was right. And we need to make sure that the implications of that statement 

are well understood. Because the implications of full commitment to information 

sharing in the homeland security context—the kind of commitment Congress intended and the Homeland Security Act requires—are enormous. It may even mean 

that an agency must, to protect the American people from attack, ‘‘lose control of’’ 

the information it originates—for example, in a networked environment where each 

recipient of a piece of information can, in turn, augment it—as the Markle Foundation suggested in a report last year. 

The good news is that we’re not starting from scratch. In early March, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence took a major step towards implementing the information sharing requirements of the Homeland Security Act. They signed a Memorandum of Understanding 

binding all Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement agencies, as well 

as the disparate entities that comprise the Department of Homeland Security. They 

didn’t blink; they knew the stakes. They stated that: 

‘‘Providing all timely and relevant [homeland security-related information] to 

those who have a need-to-know it in order to assist them in meeting their homeland security-related responsibilities is fundamental to the success of the Department and [to] all other efforts to ensure the security of the homeland from 

terrorist attack. Delay in providing such information risks frustrating efforts to 

meet these critical responsibilities and could result in preventable attacks 

against U.S. persons or interests failing to be preempted, prevented, or disrupted.’’ [MOU at sec. 3(h)] 

The information sharing MOU commits intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security agencies alike to certain core principles and specific actions to implement the Homeland Security Act. It provides, for example, that those entities must 

generally disclose homeland security-related information—and intelligence is just 

relevant information—‘‘free of any originator controls or information use restrictions.’’ {3(k)] It says that providing homeland security-related information to one organization does not discharge or diminish the originating agency’s obligation to 

share that same information with any other entity that has responsibilities for protecting the homeland. {3(m)] 
8

The MOU goes on to say that ‘‘homeland-security related analytic efforts. . .

must be informed by the most comprehensive, accurate, and timely information 

available, regardless of its nature and source,’’ and it recognizes that ‘‘the Federal 

government must, to the greatest extent possible, speak with one voice to state and 

local officials, private industry, and the public, in order to prevent confusion, mixed 

signals, and, potentially, dangerous operational conflicts.’’ {4(b)] It requires that 

classified homeland security-related information ‘‘reaches DHS promptly with accompanying high-content ‘tear lines’ suitable for onward passage at an unclassified 

level.’’ {6(a)(i)] 

And the MOU states that if this new mission requires ‘‘more expansive’’ information sharing than existing departmental policies and procedures do, then the MOU’s 

more expansive information sharing mandates will prevail. These are new standards for our new, post-9/11, reality. They recognize that the irreducible minimum 

any government owes its citizens is to protect them—that homeland security is now 

everyone’s number-one priority. 

To prevent the unthinkable, we must, in short, reach beyond the limits we have 

tolerated in the past. It is a message worth stressing today, as we absorb the report 

of the intelligence committees’ investigation into the 9/11 attacks. 

And I am grateful to our witnesses for giving us their agencies’ status report 

today—and grateful to Chairman Gibbons and Ranking Member McCarthy for convening this important hearing. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER, CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

Today’s hearing of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism continues the Committee’s focus on how we are sharing information about terrorists intending to attack America. 

In the nearly two years following the attacks of September 11, we have identified 

a number of things we need to do to protect the homeland, such as improved border 

security and preparing first responders. But even if we make these improvements, 

we will not be safe unless we are effectively sharing information about the terrorists’ intentions against us. 

The Committee has held a number of hearings to address whether terrorism information is being provided to all those who need it, whether they serve at the Federal, 

State or local level. Earlier this week, the Committee heard from the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and the FBI. My impression from the hearing was that while the federal agencies were working hard 

to improve performance, their roles were not clearly defined. This was especially 

true with respect to the responsibilities for communicating information to state and 

local officials. Both the FBI, through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the Department of Homeland Security are providing terrorism information to state and 

local governments, but there did not appear to be a clear division of responsibility 

or established mechanisms for coordinating the flow of information. 

Today we have the opportunity to find out from officials from three different 

states whether the information really is flowing, and whether it is useful. 

According to one of our witnesses, Mr. Foresman, there is currently more confusion than clarity. As a Cabinet-rank state homeland security official for Virginia, he 

has found a lack of clarity in the coordination of information and intelligence flow, 

and that the current confusion only adds to the dangers we face. 

For example, he finds that the Department of Homeland Security has become a 

new layer in the communication between the federal agencies and the states. But 

this new layer has not been coordinated with existing channels of communication, 

and has resulted in more confusion. He is receiving information from the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and then finding that Department of Homeland Security officials 

are unaware of the information. On other occasions, he has received information 

about potential security threats from the Department of Homeland Security and 

then finding that other federal officials in the field did not have the same information. 

The confusion sometimes extends to the quality of the information. Mr. 

Foresman’s written testimony relates one instance when he received information 

from the Department of Homeland Security, only to have another federal agency attack that information as ‘‘old news’’ and unreliable, having been over taken by 

events. As a state homeland security official, Mr. Foresman was then left to try to 

determine whether this was a case of ‘‘turf war’’ or whether there were substantive 

problems with the information. 
9

As we have learned from the report released today from the congressional intelligence committees, one of the contributing factors to 9/11 was the failure of federal 

agencies to share and act upon information about the hijackers in their possession. 

We know that we are a nation still at risk, as terrorists could be plotting another 

attack on the United States. In order to thwart the next attack, we must ensure 

that information about terrorist threats gets to every official with homeland security 

responsibilities. That can only happen if everyone involved has a clear understanding of standards that define the movement of information across all levels of 

government. 

I am very pleased that we have the officials representing the federal agencies as 

well as the state and local homeland security offices here with us today to speak 

on this vital issue. I look forward to your testimony.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KAREN McCARTHY, 

RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 

COUNTERERRORISM, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that we have the opportunity today 

to examine the issue of information sharing within the federal government and with 

state and local officials. 

One of the many tragic aspects of the attacks of September 11 is that the federal 

government did have some information about the hijackers in the files of various 

agencies. Although we cannot be sure that we could have prevented the attacks by 

connecting these dots, we must do everything in our power to make sure that information about the next plot does not slip through the cracks. 

We as a nation have taken a number of steps to get at this problem. We have 

created a Department of Homeland Security, and the President ordered the creation 

of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. We have also emphasized the importance 

of the federal government sharing terrorism information with the officers at the 

state and local level who have responsibilities for the security of their communities. 

But do we actually have improved information sharing, as we approach the second 

anniversary of 9/11? That is what I hope this hearing will answer. On Tuesday, we 

heard during the full Committee hearing on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

that threat information is being fed to both the TTIC and the Department of Homeland Security. We did not get a clear answer on what TTIC and the Department 

of Homeland Security do with the information. As for sharing with the state and 

local officials, we heard that the FBI shares information through its Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces, and that Homeland Security also pushes information to its state and 

local ‘‘customers.’’ What we did not learn was whether the FBI and Homeland Security are coordinating what they provide to state and local governments, or if there 

is a clear understanding of the roles of each agency. 

The basic problem is very simple. If all the players in homeland security, at whatever level of government, do not have the same understanding of their roles and responsibilities, it will be all too easy for another failure in information sharing to 

occur. The consequences of such a failure, as we know, are grave. 

I am very pleased to have representatives from the Federal, State, and local levels 

of government with us today so they can inform us on the status of information 

sharing and to alert us to problems that remain. Hearing from those on the front 

lines will assist us to do our part in breaking down barriers to sharing information 

critical to our homeland security. Thank you.

Mr. GIBBONS. I am going to turn now to the witness statements 

and I will begin with Mr. William Parrish from the Department of 

Homeland Security. Welcome, Mr. Parrish. The floor is yours. We 

look forward to your testimony. And to all our witnesses, your full 

complete and written statement will be entered into the record. If 

you wish to summarize and shorten your statement, that is okay 

too, because we realize the time is short and you have been here 

a while, and it is only getting longer each day. 

So Mr. Parrish, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PARRISH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY; 

Mr. PARRISH. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am delighted 
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and honored to be here this afternoon. This hearing is very important to the Department of Homeland Security, as I too believe it 

presents an opportunity to provide the status of a critical element 

within the Department, and that is the information analysis directorate. 

It is also a special hearing, as it represents the 100th Congressional hearing for the Department of Homeland Security, since our 

beginning on March 1st, something I will proudly be able to share 

with my grandson. I am the Acting Assistant Secretary for information analysis in the Information Analysis and Insfrastructive 

Protection Directorate. Prior to assuming that position on July 3rd 

of this year, I was the senior Department of Homeland Security 

representative to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. In this 

capacity, I served in the senior leadership position as the Associate 

Director for Homeland Security, and prior to my assignment with 

DHS, I served as the first Executive Director for the Office of 

Antiterrorism at U.S. customs. 

During my tenure with Customs, the importance of information 

sharing became more evident. What I saw firsthand was the 

amount of information that Customs inspectors were able to acquire on the movement of people, goods and materials entering into 

our country. 

Information that when analyzed could produce critical pieces of 

intelligence that may lead to connecting the dots and the detection 

or prevention of terrorist attacks to our homeland. 

Today, within the Department of Homeland Security, we have 

the operational organizations that have access to potentially valuable information, such as that acquired by Customs. For example, 

today with the integration of the Customs and Border Protection 

Organization, the opportunity to acquire critical pieces of information enhances the analytical process within the information analysis directorate. Our ability to assess and then correlate this information against other agencies’ information both within the Department and external to the Department supports our ability to connect the dots. 

For example, on a daily basis, the Customs and Border Protection entities process over 1.1 million passengers arriving into our 

Nation and seaports, inspecting over 57,000 trucks daily and 580 

vessels, 2,500 aircraft and over almost 325,000 vehicles across our 

borders. 

Significant amounts of information could be acquired through 

each and that data could provide information that may tie it to potential terrorist nexus. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

entities investigate cases involving alien smuggling, terrorist financial operations and other crimes associated with terrorist organizations, and the Transportation Security Administration screening 

approximately 1.5 million passengers aboard commercial aircraft. 

To further enhance the process of correlating information from 

other agencies, we have within IAIP the Homeland Security Operations Center, with representation from over 15 Federal agencies. 

Their presence, their connectivity back to their parent agencies, 

provides a very robust and comprehensive exchange of information, 

both horizontally and vertically. 
11

IA has initiatives underway to reach out to another very important and relevant source of information, and that is our customers 

and our partners at the State and local government, as well as the 

private sector receiving reports from these organizations regarding 

suspicious activities, surveillance operations or stopping suspect individuals with potential terrorist nexus. 

As these reports are received into Homeland Security Operations 

Center, they are passed to the information analysis directorate 

where we analyze the information and coordinate with other agencies including the FBI in order to identify any possible correlation 

or ties to terrorist activities. 

For example, a report of a suspicious person videotaping the entrance to a nuclear power facility in one location and two days later 

a similar description is reported at another facility 100 miles away. 

In order to assess if there is a correlation to these incidents, the 

information analysis directorate will coordinate with appropriate 

State, local and Federal agencies to assess any and all information 

that may be related to these two incidents. 

IAIP is working aggressively to implement the necessary information technology connectivity as well as the associated logistics 

requirements for this initiative to begin. 

Currently within our Homeland Security Operations Centers, we 

are communicating with members of the State, and local governments as well as the private sector as our IT program continues 

to expand. The processes and procedures that I have described will 

further enhance our efficiency and analysis and assessment of potential terrorist activities. 

I am confident, sir, that the procedures and the process that I 

have described ensures that IAIP is in full compliance with the legislation passed by Congress in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Each day we are making further progress to enhance our capabilities in the 19 functions outlined in the Homeland Security Act. 

Secretary of Homeland Security has placed the highest priority on 

expeditiously completing the new home for IAIP, and when completed will give us more personnel, and appropriate electronic 

connectivity. 

However, in the meantime, we have identified procedures to ensure we are meeting our tasks and accomplishing our mission. Procedures such as employing liaison personnel from other agencies, 

bringing in members into our Homeland Security Operations Center, as well as into the information analysis directorate. 

I have recently initiated a program for our analysts to be able 

to coordinate directly with analysts of the FBI, the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center, and other members of the Intelligence Community. This exchange of personnel and direct access to other analysts 

will provide the face-to-face and the voice-to-voice connectivity that 

provides essential connectivity to ensure that all information is 

shared. 

I am confident that these work-around measures are succeeding 

in ensuring a timely and efficient flow of information both into as 

well as out of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Hearings such as yours today provides each of us an opportunity 

to look back at where we have come from since the Nation’s dark 

day in our history on September 11th. 
12

We need to recognize and extend thanks to you, to your staffs, 

our Federal agencies to include our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the dedicated State and local authorities and the 

private sector and the American people in general. We have all 

risen to the challenges of combatting the new enemy threatening 

our security. Because of the coordinated efforts of all of us in sharing challenges as well as the responsibilities, we have made a difference in our Nation—and our Nation has not suffered another attack. 

However, we must not become complacent nor tired nor weary. 

The dedication and commitment must continue and above all, continue as prayers for the safety and security of this great Nation. 

Sir, I thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Parrish, and we do appreciate your testimony. It is always a pleasure to have you before 

the committee, and especially your agency, and we have always felt 

that it has contributed to our better understanding of how the 

progress is going of this important agency as we move along. 

[The statement of Mr. Parrish follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. PARRISH 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. I am 

delighted to appear before you today to discuss The Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility in information sharing both vertically and horizontally. 

I am currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). Prior to assuming this position on July 3rd of this year I was the Senior DHS representative to 

the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior 

leadership position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. My tenure in 

US Customs as the Executive Director of Anti-terrorism provided the opportunity 

to gain an appreciation for the criticality of information sharing and the necessity 

for recognition and understanding of individual agencies’ capabilities in the fight 

against terrorism.

Although only four months old, I can assure you that IAIP is moving forward in 

carrying out our statutory responsibilities, and the key missions of Information 

Analysis which include: 

• Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership 

• With IP, mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against our assessed 

vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attacks 

• Conducting independent analysis and assessments of terrorist threats, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and ‘‘red teaming’’

• Integrating the work of all of DHS’ components as well as managing the collection and processing of information into usable and actionable information 

from DHS’ intelligence components, e.g., the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration Coast Guard, and Secret Service 

• Working closely to maintain transparent information exchange between those 

DHS/IA officers assigned to work on DHS’ behalf at the TTIC, IA officers conducting the threat analysis mission at DHS Headquarters, our TTIC partners 

and Federal Agencies, state and local officials governments and the private sector 

• Disseminating time sensitive alerts and advisories to federal, state, local governments and private sector infrastructure owners and operators 

IAIP is unique among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement elements in authority, responsibility, and access to information. IAIP has robust, comprehensive, and 

independent access; as mandated by the President and in the law, to information 

relevant to homeland security, raw and processed, collected domestically and 

abroad. Accessing the information and intelligence from this mosaic of programs and 

systems of federal, state and local agencies supports our mission to analyze data 

and take action to protect against terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland. 

IA has the ability to conduct its own analysis and to leverage the information of 

the FBI, CIA, and the remainder of the Intelligence Community and federal govern-
13

ment, plus state and local law enforcement and private sector entities, to protect 

of the homeland. 

Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working relationship between the Office of Information Analysis (‘‘IA’’) and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (‘‘IP’’) to ensure threat information is correlated with critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities and protective programs. This threat and vulnerability information 

can then be used to recommend preventative and protective measures. The integration of information access and analysis on the one hand, and vulnerabilities analysis 

and protective measures on the other, is the fundamental mission of the IAIP Directorate. 

Beyond the unique IA–IP partnership; the Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC) serves as a focal point for the Nation’s efforts to protect our homeland. The 

HSOC is a 24 x 7 x 365 days a year Watch Center and is comprised of members 

from over thirteen federal agencies from the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement Agencies, emergency preparedness organizations and entities focused on infrastructure protection. Given the information provided from the parent organizations 

of these entities, and the all-source data provided by other DHS partners; information and intelligence relating to threats to the homeland is analyzed from multiple 

arenas. This all-source data-fusion performed at IAIP allows products to be tailored 

to address a specific threat to allows DHS constituents to prioritize resource allocations in the enhancement of their security posture to counter potential terrorist acts. 

IAIP is the central information nerve center of DHS’ efforts to coordinate the protection of U.S. homeland security. As such, IA supports DHS’s law enforcement components through timely and integrated analytical support. For example in a single 

day: • In coordinating with BCBP which process over 1.1 million passengers arriving 

in our Nation’s airports and seaports, inspection of over 57,006 trucks and containers, 580 vessels, 2,459 aircraft, and 323,622 vehicles coming into this country, IA has immediate access to valuable information of potential terrorist activities which further enhances our ability to develop threat plot lines—connecting the dots 

• In coordinating with BICE; which investigates cases involving alien smuggling, terrorist financial dealings and other crimes associated with terrorist operations, IA analysis and assessments have the ability to identify potential 

trends of terrorist related activity 

• In coordinating with the Transportation Security Administration; which 

screens approximately 1.5 million passengers before they board commercial aircraft, IA assists in determining individuals to be entered on the ‘‘No–Fly list’’ 

and Watch Lists 

IA ensures that homeland security products derived from the fusing of disparate 

types of information is shared with Federal, state, and local governments, as well 

as the private sector. Recent products include; 

• Information Bulletin discussing July 4th General Awareness issues 

• Advisory on the Potential Al Qaeda Threats to the U.S. Water Supply 

• Advisory on reconnaissance tactics and techniques operatives have employed 

in attacks overseas; i.e. Riyadh Bombing of 12 May 

• Information Bulletin discussing Compromised Private Branch Exchange 

(PBX) and Telephone Voicemail systems 

• Information Bulletin speaking to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials and Effects 

• Information Bulletin speaking to Potential Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) 

Additionally, IA coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in publishing 

combined DHS–FBI Intelligence Bulletins. 

In addition to mapping terrorist threats to the homeland, and carrying out its many 

other intelligence-support and analytic functions, IA is a full participant in the 

TTIC, with IA personnel physically located at the TTIC. The assignment of IA analysts to assist in the carrying out of DHS’ analytic mission as full partners in TTIC 

ensures the timely and relevant information flow to and from the IAIP directorate. 

This is not a substitute for the receipt of information directly at DHS Headquarters, 

but rather represents a recognition that, as provided by Congress and the President, 

authorities and capabilities to deter and disrupt terrorist threats, particularly overseas, are shared among a number of departments and agencies and such activities 

often must be undertaken in concert with state, local, and foreign governments. 

Recent experience has shown that terrorist groups may attempt to coordinate 

multiple attacks, both overseas and within the United States, and that threats that 

appear to be directed overseas may actually be directed towards the homeland, and 

vice versa. The threat information integration and analysis that is the beginning, 
14

not the end, of DHS’ protective mission, will most effectively be carried out, as Congressional and other reviews have recommended, when all terrorism threat-related 

activities of the U.S. Government work together seamlessly. This includes counterterrorism activities directed against threats overseas, as well as criminal investigation and prosecution activities, which the President and Congress did not, and, as 

a matter of effective government and common sense, should not, direct be carried 

out exclusively by DHS. 

The direct receipt at DHS Headquarters of information provided by statute and 

Presidential direction to DHS, the complimentary work of IA personnel assigned to 

TTIC, IA analysts detailed to other Intelligence Community partners, coupled with 

the multi-agency representation in the HSOC, ensures IA a robust, comprehensive, 

and independent access to information; raw and processed, collected domestically 

and abroad; relevant to analyzing terrorist threats to the homeland 

I come before you today to tell you that progress has been, and continues to be 

made on a daily basis in the IAIP Directorate. As with any new organization, there 

is work to be done. I will be the first to admit that we are not where we wish to 

be, but we are moving rapidly in a well-conceived and strategic way to get there 

in the very near future. IAIP is building a strong team of professionals and assigning dedicated and knowledgeable individuals in key liaison positions within our 

partnering agencies. This will further enhance the timely access to critical information that when placed in the hands of the dedicated and competent members of DHS 

serving at our borders, airports, seaports across America, will increase our ability 

to detect, prevent and deny terrorists from striking our Homeland. With the continued support of Congress, I am confident that IAIP and our partners in the war 

against terrorism can succeed in meeting the challenges presented before us. 

As Secretary Ridge has stated on numerous occasions, ‘‘When our hometowns are 

secure, our homeland will be secure.’’ That is not merely rhetoric, but a fundamental 

principle of the nation’s homeland security effort. Everyone is a partner in the effort. We must be aggressive in connecting and staying connected with our partners 

to provide an extraordinary and unprecedented exchange of information. This information must be actionable by local law enforcement and first responders, but must 

also empower the average citizen to do their part in assisting with securing our 

homeland. 

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

Mr. GIBBONS. Gentlemen, if I may, I have been advised that Mr. 

Kallstrom has a time constraint that is going to affect his time that 

he can be before us, and with that and your concurrence, I would 

like to invite Mr. Kallstrom to submit his testimony right now, and 

then we will move back for the rest. So Mr. Kallstrom, I apologize 

for the delay in getting to you. I appreciate the fact that you have 

come down to testify and would welcome you to speak now, and we 

are looking forward to hearing what you have to say. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES KALLSTROM, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE 

GOVERNOR ON COUNTERTERRORISM 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

great service. I was reading your bio. It is quite impressive. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, Mr. Kallstrom that and about $3.50 at any 

Starbucks Coffee will buy you the regular decaffeinated version. So 

thank you. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Thank you Congressman Sweeney, who I have 

had a great year and a half working with in New York, and Congressman Meek, thank you for being here. 

Good afternoon. I would like to begin by thanking you for inviting me to participate I think in this very important hearing. From 

those terrible moments on September 11th, the security of the 

United States and its interests has become our Nation’s highest 

priority. Some 22 months later, our country’s most urgent objective 

remains the prevention of another devastating terrorist attack. In 

meeting this immense responsibility, we must immediately recog-
15

nize that the extraordinary security challenges we face, in large 

part, can best be met by implementing an effective and workable 

intergovernmental approach. We must align the walls separating 

Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies and State and 

local law enforcement. We must redefine the appropriate roles for 

authorities at all levels of government and in so doing, give State 

and local law enforcement the tools they need, timely and relevant 

counterterrorism information to partner in the national effort to 

protect our country and our citizens. We must find ways to empower State and local police and others to identify indications and 

warnings of potential terrorist activity. 

Although many challenges lie ahead, much has been accomplished since September 11th. Within weeks of the attacks, Governor Pataki created one of the Nation’s first State homeland security offices, the New York State Office of Public Security. He asked 

me to become the Office’s first directorate and tasked us with developing a comprehensive statewide strategy to prevent, deter and 

respond to terrorist threats and events. He asked us to do everything we could do as a State to, in his words, never let this happen 

again. 

Our first order of business was to more fully engage the State’s 

75,000 sworn law enforcement officers. Our eyes and ears in our 

neighborhoods and communities in the war on terrorism. To do 

this, we divided our State into 16 counterterrorism zones. Within 

each zone, law enforcement agencies now operate in a coordinated 

manner to best share resources, information, training and best 

practices relevant to counterterrorism. 

In addition, we developed and deployed a New York State 

counterterrorism network throughout these zones. This network 

has effectively linked all of our State’s police and sheriffs in a secure stand-alone counterterrorism information-only communications system. 

In a little over a year and a half, more than 350 dedicated 

counterterrorism network computer terminals have been installed 

in virtually every corner of the State. To date, almost 200 terroristrelated advisories and alerts have been disseminated to local law 

enforcement and related health, education, fire, first responder and 

private sector communities. 

In August, New York State will open its Counterterrorism Center. The Center will serve as a central State clearinghouse for information sharing and in particular, counterterrorism information 

at all levels. 

As we recognize in our State, the inclusion of the country’s 

700,000 sworn State and local police officers and sheriffs in a systematic information-sharing loop is critical for us to succeed in the 

national war on terrorism. But in the loop, it is not necessary that 

all police officers receive access to everything, including classified 

documents within secure Federal databases. Rather, the Federal 

Government must provide the police officer on patrol with the ability under controlled and orderable circumstances to request a comprehensive search of Federal databases, including outstanding warrants and intelligence indices, including terrorist watchlists in 

order to receive a green light, yellow light, red light indication regarding a subject of interest as a possible link to terrorist activity. 
16

By means of connectivity with a central clearinghouse like the 

New York State Counterterrorism Center, the cop on the street 

could receive focused and vetted guidance as to the immediate action he or she should take with respect to the individual in question. This can be done without providing the details of sensitive information or the methods and sources of collection. Better decisions 

can and will be made on the street in realtime. 

We advocate the creation of a green light, red light, yellow light 

system that would make lawful use of the information currently 

maintained by relevant Federal agencies coupled with State information, and thus provide local law enforcement with the timely answer to a very basic question, does this individual have a known 

or suspected relationship to terrorism? And if so, what are my next 

steps? 

The September 11th hijackers lived among us before they perpetrated their lethal attacks. Several of those hijackers had interception with State and local law enforcement officers during traffic 

stops. If the officers involved in these incidents were fully aware 

of the patents and indications of the terrorist threat to the United 

States and had appropriate and timely access to the Federal Government’s various databases and watchlists, the September 11th 

attacks just might have been uncovered. 

We will never know this for sure, but one lesson learned is that 

local and State law enforcement officers in the field must have access to a one-stop shopping resource where in realtime they can 

query an individual’s name or identity against all terrorism-related 

databases. 

We are well aware that this system must be appropriately tailored to be used only in connection with counterterrorism efforts. 

Comply with existing law and be subject to audit and review. 

I must stress that the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces have 

been at the forefront and instrumental in handling terrorism-related investigations on a nationwide basis and have successfully 

apprehended individuals with a nexus to terrorism or organized 

terror groups on many, many occasions. I can speak from personal 

experience that these task forces are absolutely vital in the war 

against terrorism. 

However, we have found important information obtained from 

these national investigations does not reach the offices responsible 

for patrolling the cities, towns, highways, villages and neighborhoods of our country in all cases. State and local police officers 

comprise far less than 1 percent of these task forces. Their scope 

and breadth of mission and their ability to learn what they now do 

not know mandates the use of State and local police as eyes and 

ears in their support. 

To use a military metaphor, State and local police can be effective listening posts and forward observers for the task forces. Our 

concern is not only what the task forces do not know. It is what 

we as State and local communities have not been empowered to do 

to assist these task forces. 

With means readily and routinely at our disposal, they will know 

more and be better positioned to protect our country. 

Almost one year ago, the ten northeastern States from Delaware 

to Maine, including New York form the northeast region of home-
17

land security agreement as a consortium to combine the homeland 

security efforts of our States. The northeast regional agreement has 

focused on developing, among other things, regional information 

and intelligence sharing strategies. We have worked diligently with 

the Department of Homeland Security on these concerns, and 

strongly believe the northeast regional agreement would make an 

excellent starting point for a pilot project envisioned in the recently 

passed Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, H.R. 2417. 

At the State level, intelligence centers like the New York State 

Counterterrorism Center can be created, either within each State 

or as appropriate on a regionalized basis. A staff of cleared personnel assigned to the center while maintaining a direct secure line 

of communications with a Federal coordination center would interact both with State police and all local police departments. 

Partnering with the Federal Government effective 

counterterrorism information sharing could be almost immediately 

accomplished on a regional basis. 

As the Department of Homeland Security becomes increasingly 

operational, we must continue to connect the counterterrorism 

pipes to enable interagency and both international and national information on intelligence sharing on a regular basis. 

America’s State and local police officers are one of our country’s 

first lines of defense against another terrorist attack. They are our 

forward observers. They are our boots on the ground. In this extraordinary and historic effort, they must be fully empowered and 

given the necessary tools to wage this great fight of our times. 

We look forward to continuing to work with you to meet this 

challenge. Thank you. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Kallstrom, and I appreciate that. 

[The statement of Mr. Kallstrom follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES KALLSTROM 

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. 

I would like to begin by thanking you for inviting me to participate in this important hearing. 

From those terrible moments on September 11th, the security of the United 

States and its interests has become our nation’s highest priority. Some twenty-two 

months later, our country’s most urgent objective remains the prevention of another 

devastating terror attack. In meeting this immense responsibility, we must immediately recognize that the extraordinary security challenges we face in large part 

can best be met by implementing an effective and workable intergovernmental approach. We must realign the walls separating federal intelligence agencies and state 

and local law enforcement. We must redefine the appropriate roles for authorities 

at all levels of government and in so doing, give state and local law enforcement 

the tools they need—timely and relevant counter-terrorism information—to partner 

in the national effort to protect our country and citizens; we must find ways to empower state and local police and others to identify indications and warnings of potential terrorist activity. 

My remarks today will concentrate on the significantly enhanced function state 

and local law enforcement must assume in matters related to homeland security. 

In addition, I will outline the need to expeditiously build a bridge over the information-sharing gap that exists between the federal and state and local governments. 

I will share several positive and innovative steps New York State has already taken 

to close that gap. But because the states cannot do this alone, I will ask your support to enable a unified and workable plan for the prevention of terrorism in our 

country, states, cities and neighborhoods. 

Although many challenges lie ahead, much has been accomplished since September 11th. Within weeks of the attacks, Governor Pataki created one of the na-
18

tion’s first state homeland security offices, the New York State Office of Public Security. He asked me to become the Office’s first Director and tasked us with developing a comprehensive statewide strategy to prevent, deter and respond to terrorist 

threats and events. He asked us to do everything we could do as a state to, in his 

words, ‘‘Never let this happen again.’’

Our first order of business was to more fully engage the state’s 75,000 sworn law 

enforcement officers, our eyes and ears in our neighborhoods and communities, in 

the war on terrorism. To do this, we divided our state into 16 Counter-Terrorism 

Zones. Within each zone, law enforcement agencies now operate in a coordinated 

manner to best share resources, information, training and best practices relevant to 

counter-terrorism. In addition, we developed and deployed the New York State 

Counter-Terrorism Network throughout these zones. This Network has effectively 

linked all of our state’s police and sheriffs in a secure, stand-alone counter terrorism 

information-only communications system. 

In a little over a year and a half, more than 350 dedicated Counter-Terrorism 

Network computer terminals have been installed in virtually every corner of the 

state. The Counter-Terrorism Network has become a national model for counter-terrorism information sharing among state and local law enforcement authorities. To 

date, almost 200 terrorism-related advisories and alerts have been disseminated to 

local law enforcement and related health, education, fire and first responder and 

private sector communities. 

In August, New York State will open its Counter-Terrorism Center. The creation 

of this Center is part of an integrated program that will provide for the routine and 

coordinated exchange of information and intelligence between federal, state and 

local law enforcement. The Center will serve as a central state clearinghouse for information sharing and in particular counter-terrorism information. 

As we recognized in our state, the inclusion of the country’s 700,000 sworn state 

and local police officers and sheriffs in a systematic information-sharing loop is critical for us to succeed in the national war on terrorism. By ‘‘in the loop,’’ it is not 

necessary that all police officers receive access to everything, including classified 

documents, within secure federal databases. Rather, the federal government must 

provide the police officer on patrol with the ability, under controlled and auditable 

circumstances, to request a comprehensive search of federal databases, including 

outstanding warrants and intelligence indices (including terrorist watch lists) in 

order to receive a ‘‘green light—yellow light—red light’’ indication regarding a subject of interest’s possible link to terrorist activity. By means of connectivity with a 

central clearinghouse like the New York State Counter-Terrorism Center, the cop 

on the street could receive focused and vetted guidance as to the immediate action 

he or she should take with respect to the individual in question. This can be done 

without providing the details of sensitive compartmented information or the methods and sources of collection. Better decisions can and will be made on the street 

in real time. 

We advocate the creation of a ‘‘green light—yellow light—red light’’ system that 

would make lawful use of the information currently maintained by relevant federal 

agencies coupled with state information and thus provide local law enforcement 

with the timely answer to a very basic question—‘‘Does this individual have a 

known or suspected relationship to terrorism and if so, what are my next steps?’’ 

With guidance and information already maintained by the government and provided 

through contact with such a center, a state or local police officer could then be guided to take appropriate action. 

The September 11th hijackers lived among us before they perpetrated their lethal 

attacks. Several of those hijackers, including Mohammed Atta, Hani Hanjour, and 

Ziad Jarrah had interaction with state and local law enforcement officers during 

traffic stops. If the officers involved in those incidents were fully aware of the patterns and indications of the terrorist threat to the United States and had appropriate and timely access to the federal government’s various databases and watch 

lists, the September 11th attacks just might have been uncovered. We will never 

know this for sure, but one lesson learned is that local and state law enforcement 

officers in the field must have access to a ′′one stop shopping′′ resource where in 

real time they can query an individual’s name or identity(s) against all terrorismrelated databases. We are well aware that this system must be appropriately tailored to be used only in connection with counter terrorism efforts, comply with existing law and be subject to audit and review. 

At the Federal level it is essential that various agencies that constitute the intelligence community create one central repository for terrorist-related information or 

a method to rapidly check these repositories. The post September 11th investigation 

has exposed examples where critical information was ‘‘stovepiped’’ in the hands of 

one agency failing to get to appropriate people in another agency. The most telling 
19

example of such a case is information collected on September 11th hijackers Khalid 

al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi Midhar. Sectors of the federal intelligence community had determined the two men were al Qaeda operatives. One carried a U.S. multiple-entry visa and there were indications the two might attempt travel to the 

United States. However, other relevant federal agencies were not fully enlisted in 

the effort to track these individuals. In hindsight, it is evident that agencies like 

the FAA and INS might have been able to thwart entry of the hijackers into this 

country if there had been broader knowledge and access to just a portion of this information. 

I must stress that the FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Forces have been at the forefront 

and instrumental in handling terrorism-related investigations on a nationwide basis 

and have successfully apprehended individuals with a nexus to terrorism or organized terror groups on many, many occasions. I can speak from personal experience 

that these Task Forces are vital in the war against terrorism. 

However, we have found important information obtained from these national investigations does not reach the officers responsible for patrolling the cities, towns, 

highways, villages and neighborhoods of our country. State and local police officers 

comprise far less than one percent of these Task Forces; their scope and breadth 

of mission and their ability to learn what they now do not know mandates the use 

of state and local police as eyes and ears in their support. To use a military metaphor, state and local police can be effective listening posts and forward observers 

for the Task Forces. Our concern is not what the Task Forces cannot do; it is what 

we, as a state and local community, have not been empowered to do to assist these 

Task Forces. With means readily and routinely at our disposal they will know more 

and be better positioned to protect our country. 

The Department of Homeland Security is now the cabinet-level agency responsible 

for coordinating the protection of America’s citizens and infrastructure from the 

threat of terrorist attacks. Charged also with coordinating state and local government efforts for that purpose, it is logical that the DHS take the initiative in accomplishing this mission. Under whose auspices the system would fall should not be the 

crucial issue - the quick creation of such a system and the capacity to render it fully 

functional must be our ultimate goal. 

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 2417), which recently passed the House by an overwhelming margin, moves toward the goal of 

greater information sharing between the federal, state and local governments. Section 336 of the bill would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize 

the DHS Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

(IAIP) to conduct 3 year pilot projects in several cities to encourage state and local 

governments, and representatives of various industries with critical infrastructure 

in the project areas, to collect and pass on counter-terrorism information to the federal government. As part of the proposed pilot projects, DHS would be allowed to 

share with state and local governments intelligence information in its possession 

through the use of tear-line reports. The bill would also allow the Director of Central Intelligence to establish an orientation and training program for certain state 

and local officials. The Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center would be 

mandated to establish two advisory councils, one of which would have as its primary 

focus privacy and civil liberties and the other would focus on the information needs 

of state and local governments. While this bill and its companion, S.1025, will need 

further strengthening, it provides a suitable template for airing the concerns of the 

intelligence communities of both state and local governments and would greatly facilitate the exchange of information between the different levels of government. 

Almost one year ago, the ten northeastern states from Delaware to Maine, including New York, formed the Northeast Regional Homeland Security Agreement as a 

consortium to combine the homeland security efforts of our states. The Northeast 

Regional Agreement has focused on developing, among other things, regional information and intelligence-sharing strategies. We have worked diligently with the Department of Homeland Security on these concerns and strongly believe the Northeast Regional Agreement would make an excellent starting point for a pilot project 

envisioned by this bill. At the state level, intelligence centers like the New York 

State Counter-Terrorism Center can be created, either within each state or as appropriate, on a ‘‘regionalized’’ basis. A staff of cleared personnel assigned to the center, while maintaining a direct, secure line of communication with a federal coordination center, would interact both with state police and all local police departments. 

Partnering with the federal government, effective counter-terrorism information 

sharing could be almost immediately accomplished on a regional basis. 

In preparation for effective and meaningful sharing of sensitive information, New 

York State agencies have been working with the Department of Homeland Security 

to obtain varying levels of security clearances to appropriate personnel. It is impera-
20

tive that selected and cleared individuals on a state level receive tear line intelligence reports relevant to terrorist activity so they can prepare appropriate response action plans and overlay them with the ‘‘fabric of their community.’’ Working 

in tandem with select local officials awarded the same security clearance will help 

coordinate counterterrorism efforts from the federal level down to police officers on 

the street. Currently, a top-secret clearance issued by the Department of Defense 

may not be recognized or deemed comparable by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, thus halting the flow of vital and often timely intelligence. Therefore, New 

York State supports federal efforts to streamline and standardize security clearances among all Federal agencies. 

Just as the federal government relies on state and local communities to be the 

primary first responders to a scene, we must continue to work toward the empowerment of state and local police to play a necessary role in assisting the Task Forces 

in the prevention of future acts of terrorism. Simply stated, we must have the ability to share what we gather on the streets and thereby materially bolster JTTF 

counter-terror investigations. As the Department of Homeland Security becomes increasingly operational, we must continue to connect the counter-terrorism pipes to 

enable interagency and both international and national information and intelligence 

sharing on a regular basis. 

America’s state and local police officers are our country’s first line of defense 

against another terrorist attack. They are our forward observers, and our ‘‘boots on 

the ground’’ in this extraordinary and historic effort. They must be fully empowered 

and given the necessary tools to wage the great fight of our times. We look forward 

to continuing to work with you to meet this challenge.

Mr. GIBBONS. We have been joined on the panel on the dais 

today by the ranking member, Karen McCarthy from Missouri, and 

the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Chris Cox of California. 

Welcome, and we appreciate their being here as well. 

Ms. McCarthy indicated that she will submit her opening remarks for the record, and they will be entered into the record. 

Right now we will turn to—back to the schedule of witnesses, 

and thank you, Mr. Kallstrom, for your remarks. Very helpful and 

enlightening as well. We are pleased to see New York is out there 

on the leading edge in doing what they are doing, and we certainly 

look forward to studying more of what you are doing an how it is 

working out and—. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. We will turn now to Mr. Lago for your comments. 

STATEMENT OF V. PHILLIP LAGO, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. LAGO. Good afternoon, Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Member 

McCarthy, Chairman Cox and members of the subcommittee. I 

thank you for the invitation to come here and speak with this distinguished panel. The discussion on the information flow and how 

it gets to the people who need it most is at the heart of defending 

the homeland. I also thank you for the break we have had. We 

have managed to get a lot of business done while you were gone. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That is making lemonade out of lemons. Right? 

Mr. LAGO. We do the best we can, sir. 

I also appreciate the fact that you really want to get to the question and answer period, and since I have submitted a detailed written statement, I am going to keep my opening comments very brief. 

I believe we have some good-news stories. I believe we are clearly 

not there yet. We have a long way to go, and we have a lot of challenges ahead of us. I believe that the information flow between the 

CIA and the Department of Homeland Security is good. It is getting better, and it will continue to get better. 
21

We are working with our colleagues in the Department and the 

Bureau to work with the State and locals to ensure that we get the 

information flowing both ways to get the right information to the 

right people at the right time. 

If I accomplish nothing else today, I would like to leave you with 

three messages. First—and let me be clear on this—the CIA is 

committed to providing all of the information required by the Department of Homeland Security to do the mission that it was asked 

to do in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Second, we are working with our partners to ensure that the flow 

of information goes both ways to ensure that we have the maximum amount of usable, actionable information at the right place, 

at the right time. 

And third, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security 

have a unique relationship. The missions are complementary. The 

relationship has been interactive. We will not simply throw information across a transom and walk away. We are going to work 

with them. We have been working with them from the beginning 

to ensure that the flow of information is as best as we can get it. 

We supported then-Governor Ridge when he was made the special 

assistant to the President. We sent CIA officers immediately to 

help him. 

When you enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, we immediately sent officers to the transition teams to support the transition to the Department of Homeland Security. We have CIA officers 

embedded into the Department of Homeland Security today. These 

people have been there to facilitate the flow of information back 

and forth. We were there at the beginning. We are going to be 

there now, and we are going to be there in the future. 

We believe we are off to a good start. You could argue it is not 

fast start and you could argue it was not a pretty start, but it is 

a good start. We have had interactions at all levels of the organizations. We are working desperately to find the seamless movement 

of communications from all Federal entities to the State and local 

entities. We clearly are smarter today than we were 6 months ago. 

We are going to be smarter 6 months from now. 

I tell you the only thing with certainty that I can project in the 

future is we are going to make changes. The way we look today is 

going to be different tomorrow. If we are good, it will keep evolving 

until we get a seamless mechanism to make this second nature to 

us. 

As you know, to the Central Intelligence Agency, this is a new 

mission, to have mission partners in a domestic entity has been 

something that is very, new to us. Before it was very difficult to 

find foreign information and understand that the information could 

be used to defend New York, Reno, Kansas City. It was very important for us to turn our direction. We have turned. Our director has 

been very clear to us. We will lean as far forward as possible. We 

will make sure that we work with the Department of Justice and 

make sure we protect the civil liberties and don’t get caught in 

those issues, but we will lean as far forward as possible to ensure 

that the right information is with the right people at the right 

time. 
22

I look forward to this process. I look forward to the rest of this 

hearing today, and I again appreciate the invitation. I thank you 

for your time. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Lago. We appreciate 

your consideration of all this, and we also appreciate your taking 

time to share with us those highlights. They will be very helpful. 

[The statement of Mr. Lago follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF V. PHILLIP LAGO 

Good afternoon Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Member McCarthy and the Members 

of the Subcommittee on the Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the House Select 

Committee on Homeland Security. 

I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the state and 

local law enforcement community to discuss information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security. 

At the outset, let me be clear that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is committed to providing all of the information required for the Department of Homeland 

Security to execute the mission assigned to it by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

In fact, there are significant initiatives underway within the CIA and across the intelligence Community aimed at providing intelligence support to the national effort 

to protect our homeland. This support is evolving over time, and through an interactive partnership, we are all learning as we go. 

The CIA and DHS have a very unique relationship. While our mission has always 

been to collect information upon foreign threats to our nation and, as directed by 

the President, take appropriate action to negate or reduce that threat, we now also 

have the responsibility to support DHS in its new mission to protect the homeland. 

Our missions are complimentary, and reflect the intent of Congress in both the National Security Act of 1947 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. We work together to ensure that no gaps exist in our defenses. For many years, the CIA has 

had relationships with several of the major organizations that were brought together to form DHS. As DHS stands up and evolves, our relationship with it is also 

evolving. Under Secretary Libutti and Acting Assistant Secretary Parrish have already made great strides in defining the type of information that the department 

needs to ensure it can perform its mission. We have been addressing those issues, 

we are addressing those issues today, and we will continue to address them in the 

future. One of the truths about the future that I am sure of is that this relationship 

will continue to evolve and change over time as we, as a nation, continue our discussions on how to keep the homeland secure while protecting civil liberties. 

Let me quickly walk you through the evolution of our relationship with DHS. 

Shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001, Director Tenet designated a focal 

point for coordinating DCI support to this vital mission. CIA has taken an active 

interest in identifying the needs of the homeland security community and improving 

the availability of information on terrorism. For example, the CIA significantly increased the number of reports and products that not only had compartmented information but also versions that could be released in collateral or unclassified formats. 

The CIA sponsored numerous, non Intelligence Community individuals for expedited 

security clearances to ensure that critical personnel in high-risk areas could have 

access to information. We provided officers to certain FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces to help prevent the terrorists from finding a seam in our defenses. When the 

President named, then Governor Ridge as his Homeland Security Advisor, and established the Office of Homeland Security, we made immediate contact with Governor Ridge and contributed personnel and resources to help stand up this vital office. 

We went through our next budget cycle projecting the need for us to support Governor Ridge and an Office of Homeland Security that would have about 300–400 officers. In early 2002, we announced the creation of the position of Associate Director 

of Central Intelligence for Homeland Security (ADCI/HS) including a small staff to 

help focus CIA and Intelligence Community support to this Office. Shortly after the 

announcement, the nation evolved in its planning and established a Department of 

Homeland Security with over 170,000 officers. Clearly we had to resize our efforts. 

Initially, CIA officers were assigned to both the former Office of Homeland Security 

and the transition team for the new Department. Since the activation of DHS on 

1 March, CIA has expanded the range of products and services provided to DHS. 

CIA officers are assigned to the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastruc-
23

ture Protection (IAIP) and other elements of DHS, working to provide both a core 

analytic capability and establish an infrastructure for the care and feeding of the 

new Department. These officers have supported tasks as diverse as information 

analysis, information system management, security oversight, and watch center operations management. 

In addition, CIA provides DCI Representatives to both the Homeland Security Advisor and Secretary Ridge. The representatives are senior officers who serve as the 

primary conduits for the Homeland Security Advisor, Secretary Ridge, and their 

staffs to raise issues of concern and identify topics of special interest for the Intelligence Community to address, as well as providing a mechanism for providing DHS 

requirements to the Intelligence Community. 

Secretary Ridge and his senior advisors receive daily intelligence briefings. The 

Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) is also available to numerous officers at 

the department. 

CIA is responding to intelligence requirements issued by DHS in addition to the 

standing intelligence requirements received from several organizations and components that were incorporated into DHS. We will continue to provide information directly to DHS/IAIP, in addition to information provided via the DHS representatives 

at TTIC and to DHS component agencies, while working with the Department to 

better synchronize and streamline the disparate requirements that were generated 

from legacy agreements. 

DHS is on the distribution list for all of CIA’s raw terrorism reporting, which it 

began to receive directly immediately upon the implementation of their communications system. Prior to that capability existing, CIA reporting was sent via indirect 

channels. In addition, all subordinate organizations continue to receive CIA reporting based on their requirements—as they did prior to the creation of DHS—via their 

existing communication chains, to ensure that the information is received by the action elements as well as DHS headquarters. 

Finished intelligence products and analysis are also shared with DHS and their 

components. CIASOURCE provides direct, immediate access to the Directorate of 

Intelligence’s finished intelligence products. Access to these products is determined 

by the reading requirements established by the requesting organizations. In the 

case of DHS, we are providing intelligence products based upon two distinct categories of requirements. Prior to the creation of DHS, CIA had established relationships with a number of organizations that were incorporated into the new Department. These organizations included the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, 

the old U.S. Customs Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Protective Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although these organizations are now part of 

DHS, we continue to satisfy their intelligence requirements that were established 

before the activation of DHS. In some cases, such as the new Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and FEMA, these requirements lists are more 

than 80 pages in length. In addition, the Intelligence Directorate of the U.S. Coast 

Guard is separately a member of the Intelligence Community and has access to intelligence products available to the Intelligence Community. 

We are committed to providing all necessary and relevant intelligence to the Department of Homeland Security. It is our intent to create a dialogue with DHS and 

help drive out a meaningful, manageable way to flow information, in both directions. 

We will not simply throw information over the wall and walk away declaring that 

our job is done. Our goal is to develop a full and interactive partnership with the 

DHS. 

In addition to our multiple avenues of support to DHS Headquarters elements, 

we also support the work of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a 

shared partnership including DHS, CIA, FBI, DOD and the Department of State, 

by providing: CIA staff officers assigned to TTIC—including managers, analysts, 

and support personnel—the CT-Link information system, personnel positions, and 

funding, as legally permissible. 

The TTIC partner elements use these resources, in part, to carry out the mission 

of directly supporting DHS and other organizations. Also, the Community 

Counterterrorism Board and its community warning function, with eight staff positions, has been transferred from the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center to TTIC. The 

mission of TTIC does not transfer our responsibilities to report directly to DHS. 

Thank you for this opportunity to describe CIA’s role in the evolution and support 

of DHS. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. GIBBONS. We will turn now to Mr. McCraw from the FBI and 

ask for your testimony. And welcome before the committee. We look 

forward to hearing what you have to say. 
24

STATEMENT OF STEVEN McCRAW, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be 

here today and I will dispense even with my prepared oral testimony and just get to the—first, I want to commend Mr. Parrish’s 

agency and certainly the CIA. I did in my written testimony. I 

meant it. It is earnest. At the horizontal level, there is unprecedented sharing of information. I would contend that it is seamless. 

I mean, we are side by side, whether it is out in the field or whether it is at FBI headquarters, the CTC, TTIC, that day-to-day information sharing is happening, and it is nice to see. It is critical that 

we do it, because as I pointed out in my written testimony, I mean, 

the greatest force multiplier unquestionably is the sharing of information. 

As Mr. Kallstrom pointed out, which I will kind of divert to the 

vertical sharing—I just came back from an assignment as SAC in 

San Antonio, Texas and had, you know, three JTTFs working 

under me, and of course, I would like to state for the record some 

of the best investigators I have ever supervised in counterterrorism 

weren’t necessarily FBI agents. They were State and local officers. 

They were Customs, INS analysts from the agency, and they do a 

tremendous job. And clearly it requires a combined effort. 

One of the things when I was out there, it was obvious to me was 

that we weren’t doing the type of work that we needed to do to get 

information into State and local, the vertical side of it. Tommy 

Davis, the head of the Texas Department of Public Safety, former 

agency before I got into my bureau, made it quite clear to me in 

terms that he didn’t have a shared comprehensive view of the 

threat, and it is important to note that it is these men and women 

that are charged and responsible for protecting the community. 

So they need information, and they need it fast. They need security clearances, because they don’t need just unclassified information. They need it up to certainly the top secret level many times, 

because they are charged with protecting public safety in their cities. 

Also as Mr. Kallstrom pointed out, which I think is absolutely 

right on target, you know, we are blessed in this Nation to have 

an army of dedicated professionals, men and women—the army is 

up to 700 authorization, or it is over 700,000 now, and if we can 

arm them, they need to be armed with information, because they 

need to know about trade craft. They need training, and that training needs to incorporate in terms of the latest trade craft, and the 

more we can do, the better we can do, the better educated that we 

can use them out on the particular streets because they are collectors of information. Not only the first line of defense. 

Moreover, the advantage of plugging into them is that if they 

know what the requirements are, what the collection requirements 

are, then guess what, they are going to be better armed to collect 

that type of information that goes back and gets integrated, again, 

into that shared threat. And we need to leverage them. 

Now, the FBI, I am proud to say, has always been great collectors of information. In fact, I would argue that we have always had 

a great intelligence program that has been organic to our investiga-
25

tive mission. What we haven’t done, though, however, there has 

never been a core competency to sharing information. We have 

never had an enterprise-wide plan to share information in the FBI. 

It has been done on a case-by-case basis. It has been done with the 

JTTFs person to person. However, we have not mastered that process. 

Right now we are in a 10-week program. We fortunately stole 

someone from a—a 24-year veteran from the Intelligence Community, because we are not afraid to take advice. We are working 

right now instituting in the FBI an enterprise-wide intelligence 

program, and of one of the core, basic principles that you have to 

address, and it is critical, is information sharing, which is forcing 

us to look at and where we need to be is at a customer driven or 

customer centric place. 

Now, I have laid out a number of things that the FBI has done. 

Certainly I am a big believer in the reports officers function that 

we have got trained professionals to extract the essential elements 

of information, get it out, intelligence reports back to the community, but also we need to put those people out in the field so they 

are also supporting that customer at the State and local level. 

And chiefs of police and sheriffs and heads of State police departments, they need a global view of the particular threat, because if 

you happen to be the chief of police in San Francisco, and there is 

a global threat that includes bridges in New York, you need to 

know that too. You need to see it. I mean, the world has changed. 

Events that happen in Pakistan and Yemen can make a difference 

to a chief of police in Paducah, Texas and also the sheriff. That is 

just the way it is now. 

So the director is clearly committed to doing that, and thankfully 

with the support of Congress, we have been blessed in a situation 

now to transform our entire information technology system, because that is an important part of information sharing, finding the 

information, the critical information that has to be shared and also 

pushing it to the community and pushing it to State and locals, 

leveraging the Internet, leveraging the technology that is out there. 

Post that information. Let them have access to it, because they are 

going to put a tremendous center—and I am very impressed with 

the testimony here in this 10-state initiative, and they are going 

to dedicate full-time resources into the intelligence process. That is 

good for the Nation. That is great. 

The FBI has to come through and deliver on feeding their requirements in terms of information and us letting them know what 

our requirements are so they can collect information. And, again, 

thank you, Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much Mr. McCraw. 

[The statement of Mr. McCraw follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. MCCRAW 

Good afternoon Chairman Gibbons and members of the Subcommittee. On behalf 

of the Federal Bureau of ITIvestigation (FBI), I would like to thank you for affording us the opportunity to speak to you today on this very important matter, Information Sharing. First, I would like to publicly acknowledge the outstanding support 

the FBI receives from the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and our nation’s over 17,000 local and state law enforcement agencies. Our 

ability to share information with all of our partners has been and will continue to 

be a key factor in neutralizing many threats through a variety of means. 
26

Mr. Chairman, your Subcommittee is evidence that the threat to our homeland 

is far different than ever before. Worldwide economic, political, social, and technological changes have resulted in a more dispersed, complex, asymmetric threat to 

our nation. Terrorists, criminals, and foreign intelligence collectors have significantly benefitted from these rapid changes, which have permanently shrunk the 

world. Yesterday, the most significant threat to the homeland was from nation 

states that were geographically distant and contained. Today, global networks (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and foreign intelligence operations) are no 

longer distinct activities, but rather fluid enterprises that pose a significant threat 

to the security of our homeland. 1As you are aware, Director Mueller is reshaping 

the FBI to meet these new threats. 

The FBI has always been a great collector of information; however, the sharing 

of information was primarily case oriented rather than a part of an enterprise-wide 

activity. Prior to 9/11/2001, statutory and other legal restrictions limited to some extent the degree of information sharing between the FBI and our Intelligence Community partners. Thanks to the enactment of the Patriot Act, the FBI now can 

clearly share information much more robustly than ever before. Moreover, in today’s 

threat environment, cooperation rather than competition must be the guiding principle and the recognition that the benefits of sharing information far exceed the 

risks. We and our partners must have transparency in our knowledge of terrorist 

threats to the United States. In fact, it is Director Mueller’s view that information 

sharing is the greatest force multiplier in the defense of our nation. For example, 

the globalization of crime and terrorism poses unique challenges to local and state 

law enforcement agencies. Chiefs of Police and Sheriffs need access to information 

far beyond their jurisdictional boundaries to protect the citizens of their communities. Today, events in Pakistan and Yemen can have a public safety dimension in 

San Antonio, Texas, that the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, and the Director of the 

Texas Department of Public Safety must know about in order for them to effectively 

discharge their responsibilities. 

Since 9/11/2001, the FBI has implemented several information sharing initiatives 

and others are underway. Collectively, when fully operational, these initiatives will 

provide an integrated system to quickly deliver information to our law enforcement 

and Intelligence Community partners. All who are involved in the war on terrorism 

are continuing to work through very real problems, without preventing in any way 

the full sharing of terrorism threat-related information. We must not only collect 

and share more, we much collect and share smarter. Collecting and sharing vast 

amounts of information without any thought being given to the usefulness of the 

information collected is counterproductive and wastes precious collection resources, 

while at the same time drowning the end user, whether he or she is a Chief of Police, Department Head, or Intelligence Community Analyst. 

The Intelligence process when properly executed ensures that the information 

shared is useful and meets the needs of the customer. Intelligence has always been 

a core competency of the FBI and organic to the FBI’s investigative mission. The 

Patriot Act has created new opportunities to strengthen and expand the FBI’s Intelligence capability and allowed us to move from thinking about ‘‘intelligence as a 

case’’ to finding ‘‘intelligence in the case’’ and sharing it widely with our Intelligence 

and Law Enforcement Partners. 

The collection and timely dissemination of the right information to the right people as part of an enterprise-wide business process is so critically important, the Director has elevated intelligence to program status in the FBI and hired a senior intelligence professional from the National Security Agency. Under her leadership, the 

FBI has embarked on a 10-week program to develop and implement Concepts of Operations for all nine key intelligence functions. We have already completed a concept 

of operations for dissemination that focuses on both the form and substance of FBI 

raw intelligence reports. Our aim is to move from individual production processes 

to a single process that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. One of our first improvements to our already strong Intelligence Program will be to explicitly link the 

requirements to the raw product and produce metrics to measure our performance 

against the information requirements of local and state law enforcement agencies, 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and those of 

DHS officers, our Special Agents, and other Intelligence Community officers assigned to the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), in 

which we, DHS, CIA and others are full partners. 

Before I proceed with the remainder of my testimony, I would like to take this 

opportunity on behalf of every FBI employee to thank you Mr. Chairman, members 

of the subcommittee and your colleagues for the support you have provided the FBI 

that is enabling us to overhaul its information technology infrastructure. When com-
27

pleted, every aspect of FBI operations including the sharing of information will be 

significantly improved. 

The most productive exchange of information occurs at the people level working 

side by side. Currently, there are 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the 

United States with participation from 25 different Federal gencies and hundreds of 

local and state law enforcement agencies in the 84 Task Force locations. Every 

JTTF Officer, Agent, and Analyst has a Top Secret clearance and unfiltered access 

to all of the information. 

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force located in the Strategic Information and 

Operations Center at FBIHQ is comprised of representatives from 35 different Federal agencies. Like the JTTFs, the NJTTF benefits from the combination of experience, diversity of mission and access to the databases of each member agncy. 

Even prior to 9/11/2001, the FBI benefitted from the assignment of Special Agents 

to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the CIA assignment of case officers and 

analysts to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division. Since 9/11/2001, the exchange of 

personnel has dramatically increased as has the timely flow of information. The 

benefits of co-location cannot be overstated. This is why the Administration made 

the extraordinary decision to co-locate the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the 

CIA’s Counterterrorism Operations and TTIC in the same facility next year. 

The TTIC has already had a positive impact on information sharing throughout 

the community. As the Subcommittee is aware, TTIC is an interagency joint venture 

of its partners. The TTIC members include, but are not limited to, the Department 

of Justice/FBI, DHS, CIA, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Through the 

input and participation of these partners, TTIC integrates and analyzes terrorist 

threat-related information, collected domestically and abroad, in order to form the 

most comprehensive possible threat picture, and disseminate such information to 

appropriate recipients. TTIC, through its structure, draws on the particular expertise of its participating members, thereby ensuring that the terrorist analytic product takes advantage of, and incorporates, the specialized perspectives of relevant 

federal agencies. In addition, TTIC will have access to, and will aggressively seek 

to analyze, information from state and local entities, as well as voluntarily provided 

data from the private sector. TTIC will work with appropriate partners to ensure 

that TTIC’s products reach not only federal customers, but also state and local, as 

well as private sector, partners. TTIC provides comprehensive, all-source terrorist 

threat analysis and assessments to U.S. national leadership. Mr. John Brennan, the 

Director of the TTIC, and his staff have done a tremendous job in quickly standing 

up this vital center. The FBI is proud to be full partners in this effort. 

I would now like to provide you a quick overview of other FBI information sharing 

initiatives. 

In 2002, the FBI established the position of Reports Officer whose job is to extract 

pertinent information from FBI investigations and analysis and disseminate it to 

the widest extent possible. Currently, the FBI has 18 Reports Officers that have already disseminated nearly 2,000 Intelligence Information Reports to the Intelligence 

Community. We are in the process of hiring 120 more Reports Officers 90 of whom 

will be assigned to the field, where they will support both local law enforcement and 

Intelligence Community information needs. 

Since 2002, the FBI has sent to approximately 17,000 law enforcement agencies 

a weekly bulletin concerning terrorism-related information. However, the FBI is not 

yet satisfied with its ability to provide our law enforcement partners a comprehensive view of the threat. As a result, we are currently establishing an executive briefing capability in the field to ensure senior law enforcement officials receive more 

detailed threat briefings tailored to their needs. 

In addition, senior law enforcement officials need access to classified U.S. 

Governmnt information and to do so they are required to have a security clearance. 

As you are aware, security clearances are both costly and time consuming. Nevertheless, since 9/11/2001, the FBI’s Security Division has favorably adjudicated over 

2,686 security clearances for local and state law enforcement personnel and another 

823 are pending approval. This is so important the FBI established an entire Unit 

to focus solely on the security clearances of local and state law enforcement executives and JTTF members. 

Prior to the Winter OlYmpics, Director Mueller mandated that all domestic and 

international subjects of FBI terrorism investigations be entered into the National 

Crime Information Center, providing the over 700,000 police officers in the U.S. 

query access to the names of known and suspected terrorists. This information is 

also available to Federal law enforcement agencies and the Department of State. 

Training must also be considered as an important mechanism for the sharing of 

essential information. The better we educate ourselves and our colleagues about the 
28

enemy the better we are able to defend against them. All JTTF members receive 

specialized counterterrorism training; however, local, state, and Federal officers not 

in the JTTFs also need this type of information including knowledge about the latest trade craft employed by terrorists. We have expanded our counterterrorism 

training to include another estimated 27,000 local and state officers and are currently evaluating other training initiatives to further increase training opportunities. 

An essential component of the FBI’s information sharing strategy occurs overseas 

with our law enforcement allies. Only by sharing information and working directly 

with law enforcement abroad will we have the opportunity to stop criminal and terrorist threats before they reach our shores. The FBI has 46 offices overseas where 

we have established solid cop-to-cop information sharing and working relationships, 

and provided training and forensic support. 

The internet provides a cost-effective means to quickly share unclassified information. The FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) provides a secure and easily accessible gateway to this information. Using individual log on accounts, dual certificate 

authentication, and point to point encryption, LEO will provide a host of information services and enable the FBI to push information over the internet in a costeffective manner. To further expand its reach, LEO connects to the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) which is widely used by local and state law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, through LEO, users will soon have access to OSIS.4

Certain information must be immediately brought to the attention of senior local, 

state, and federal law enforcement officials. The FBI is now implementing a National Alert Notification System which provides us the ability to instantly send text 

page messages throughout the nation alerting law enforcement agency heads or 

their designees through their cell phones and two way pagers. 

The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) is working with local and state 

law enforcement to capitalize on pre-existing data agreements to address its crime 

statistics reporting mission while at the same time provide a national indices that 

will enable police officers to link subjects and modus operandi throughout the U.S. 

Another information gap is the inability to access wide information on suspicious 

surveillances. The counterterrorism Report System on Suspicious Surveillance 

(CROSS) was developed by Department of Defense and is being piloted in the National Capitol Region. CROSS will be accessible through LEO and it enables police 

officers and Agents to report hostile surveillance activity in a Web environment and 

receive instant notification on similar activity elsewhere in the U.S.4

The St. Louis Gateway project was conceived by the local law enforcement leadership in the St. Louis area to provide law enforcement investigators and analysts 

easy access to unclassified criminal and terrorism investigative reports from multiple agencies. This initiative will employ link analysis tools and geo-spacial mapping. During the testing phase, previously unknown links between criminal and terrorism reports were identified demonstrating the efficacy of this concept. When successfully completed, this project will be expanded to other parts of the country based 

upon previously arranged agreements with law enforcement leaders in different 

areas of the country. 

The FBI is also in the process of establishing FBI web pages on Top Secret and 

Secret Intelligence Community and Department of Defense systems so that it can 

‘‘post’’ information on FBI web pages that is easily accessible to the entire community. The FBI also has several ongoing classified information sharing initiatives 

with its partners in the Intelligence Community that are providing tangible results. 

Finally, it is critically important that the FBI leverage the outstanding work that 

has already been done in the intelligence and information sharing arena. Long before 9/11/2001, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) were working 

on intelligence led policing and the information sharing issue. In August 2002, the 

IACP published a report recommending the creation of a national criminal intelligence sharing plan. As a result, the Global Intelliqence working group comprised 

of leaders from local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies was formed to 

address the goals and objectives outlined in the IACP report. The FBI is essentially 

a small but determined organization and we recognize that our future success will 

in large part be as a result of our ability to leverage one of our nation’s greatest 

assets, the over 700,000 dedicated men and women who serve in local and state law 

enforcement. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today and I look forward 

to any questions you may. have.

Mr. GIBBONS. And we will turn now to Mr. Foresman. Commonwealth of Virginia, thank you and the floor is yours. 
29

STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. FORESMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE 

GOVERNOR FOR COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

Mr. FORESMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, vice chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. 

I currently serve as a cabinet ranked State homeland security official in Virginia and was responsible for directing State-level response and recovery actions to both the Pentagon and anthrax attacks that directly impacted the commonwealth in 2001. I am also 

completing my fifth year as a member of the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons 

of mass destruction, the Gilmore Commission, created by the Congress in 1999 to advise both this body and the President on strategies to improve America’s preparedness for terrorism. I also am a 

former first responder. My detailed testimony has been submitted, 

and I will attempt to be brief and within the time constraints. 

Since the attacks of September the 11th, America has made 

great progress in our collective preparedness for emergencies and 

disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. Much work remains. 

There is no more fundamental obligation for government than to 

protect its citizens. Our collective ability to meet that obligation to 

prevent and deter terrorism and if required, to rapidly respond and 

recover requires new and innovative thinking coupled with good old 

fashioned commitment no nowhere is this more evident than in the 

areas of intelligence and information sharing. 

We have merged entire or parts of 22 Federal agencies into a single organization and now named it the Department of Homeland 

Security. With the goal of improving coordination of effort to make 

America more secure. The Department of Homeland Security mission continues to evolve. However, one thing is clear. There appears to be ambiguity across the entire Federal Government about 

the DHS role when it comes to the intelligence sharing responsibility. This is evidenced in almost the daily news articles and my 

discussions with officials from all levels and areas of government, 

the media and the private sector. 

But this ambiguity about intelligence and information sharing 

frankly is not limited to the Department of Homeland Security. It 

extends across and within a multitude of Federal agencies with intelligence responsibilities. It affects how effectively they work with 

each other, equally important it affects how well they work with 

local, State and private sector players. 

I would highlight three points in my written submission. The 

problem is not with the people, and clearly the testimony today underscored that, and interestingly enough the discussions during the 

break further emphasized that for me. 

Clearly, there is a commitment on the part of individuals across 

the Federal agencies to achieve synchronization of effort, but it is 

clear we are not achieving that as part of a national focus. We have 

no macro strategic view of how our intelligence and information 

sharing needs can and should be accomplished with all relevant 

stakeholders irrespective of the level or function of government. 

This is a government-wide strategic-wide issue. 
30

The confusion among Federal agencies filters to the State and 

local level and into the private sector. This confusion is not the 

fault of any one person, agency or branch of government. It comes 

from years of ad hoc fixes and changes to many individual components of the Nation’s intelligence enterprise without having viewed 

them as part of a whole. 

The result is unintended, but very real patchwork approach that 

is a threat to the security of the Nation and our ability to move 

information to relevant officials at the local, State, Federal level. 

Second, technology, new statutes or even organizations are not 

the end-all answer to the problems we face. We need to commit our 

Nation, that is Federal State and local officials and certain private 

sector elements, to defining what intelligence needs to be shared 

and identify existing and new pathways to make it happen. 

In short, we need a set of business rules with supporting planning effort. We must then focus on clarifying everyone’s expectations and focus on achieving improved movement of information 

and intelligence among all levels, branches, disciplines, functions, 

areas of government in key private sector entities. 

Third and finally, we must always preserve the democracy and 

our core civil liberties. 

Security at the expense of personal freedoms and rights will accomplish exactly what the 19 hijackers intended. From my way of 

thinking, for our way of thinking in Virginia and in parting with 

49 other States, 6 territories and thousands of Federal officials, we 

cannot allow this to happen. 

I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I will be 

happy to take your questions. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Foresman, for your enlightened comments. They are very helpful indeed. 

[The statement of Mr. Foresman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE FORESMAN 

Mr. Chairman, Madame Ranking Member and Members of the Committee thankyou for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the issue homeland security related intelligence and information sharing with state and local officials. 

Three perspectives inform my comments today. I currently serve as a Cabinetrank state homeland security official in Virginia and was a senior state emergency 

management official at the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent 

anthrax incidents. I also am completing my fifth year as a member of the Advisory 

Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, created by Congress in 1999 to advise this body and the President on strategies to improve America’s preparedness for terrorism. Finally, I 

should note I am a former first responder. 

We are approaching several milestones in the next several months. We will soon 

commemorate the second anniversary of the tragic events of September 11, 2001 

and the one-year anniversary of Congress having passed legislation to create the 

Department of Homeland Security. Congress has already held joint hearings to examine intelligence issues surrounding the attacks and the independent September 

11th Commission is expected to deliver its final report in May of next year. I remind 

you of these to make the point that in the context of having just celebrated our 

227th anniversary as a nation, two years is a narrow window in time. 

I would like to address three issues to the Committee today. 

First, has the flow of information from the federal government to states and communities improved since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Secondly is the quality of information sufficient to support the daily efforts of 

thousands of local and state officials who are on the front line of making our nation 

safe and secure. 
31

Finally, I want to offer some perspective as to whether we are we making 

progress.

The great challenge we face in the post September 11th environment is achieving 

common definitions of homeland security and intelligence. In response to the extraordinary events of September 11th, we have merged entire or parts of 22 federal 

agencies into a single organization called the Department of Homeland Security. 

Their mission continues to evolve reflective of statutory language and the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security. However, there appears to be great ambiguity 

about their roles within the entire federal family, especially when it comes to the 

intelligence sharing responsibilities. This is evidenced in the almost daily news articles about competing intelligence activities within the federal government. 

Each day states and communities are confronted with a multitude of sources of 

so called intelligence information. This is information that may originate at the federal level from within the intelligence, defense, law-enforcement or other federal 

communities. Some methods for passing information to communities and states were 

well established prior to the September 11th attacks and worked well, while others 

are less than efficient. Among the cornerstone arguments articulated in creating the 

Department of Homeland Security was to provide ‘‘one stop shopping’’ for states, 

communities and the private sector. 

In my opinion we have not achieved the most fundamental agreement and education concerning what is ‘‘homeland security’’ or ‘‘intelligence’’. Does the term 

homeland security describe our response to the threat of terrorism or is it something 

more. Today the Federal Emergency Management Agency is a core element in the 

Department of Homeland Security Emergency Response and Recovery Directorate. 

FEMA’s role in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies is clear. However, is disseminating precautionary information in advance of a hurricane making 

landfall a homeland security or an emergency management function. Is the data 

they utilize from the National Weather Service intelligence in the context of homeland security. If so what ‘‘pathways’’ should it follow in being disseminated to state 

and local officials. Are the pathways and business rules for moving the data sufficiently clear that critical information is being moved in a timely fashion. Today 

there appear to be no clear answers to these questions. 

The same challenge remains true when we discuss those things that tend to more 

accurately fit into the category of intelligence. But again, defining intelligence tends 

to be in the eye of the beholder. Each day law enforcement agencies at all levels 

of government investigate crimes amassing volumes of data. Is this data intelligence, especially when it may have tangential relationships to the threats we face 

from our enemies. If the information potentially has direct or indirect relationships 

to America’s war on terrorism is there a well organized structure that provides for 

the integration, passing and analysis of this data by responsible local, state and federal officials in a comprehensive fashion. I do not believe that is the case. 

I offer both of these examples to make the point that the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its intelligence responsibilities add yet another 

layer to the communication process between federal agencies and with states, communities, the private sector and citizens. This new layer, especially if it improves 

and better coordinates the flow of information and intelligence, is not the problem. 

The major obstacle that we face is adding these new responsibilities without first 

de-conflicting them with the long-standing communication pathways between the 

federal government and states and communities. I believe we have unintentionally 

added confusion because of the ambiguity of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

intelligence function as it relates to other federal agencies as well as state, local and 

private sector stakeholders. 

One would hope that among the successes we might obtain from lessons learned 

of the events of September 11th is that we must rethink our approach to defining 

the intelligence enterprise. Between elements of our federal intelligence, law enforcement and defense community’s primary responsibilities for components of our 

‘‘national intelligence enterprise’’ exist. Throughout history the Congress and Administrations have made adjustments to pieces and parts, usually in response to 

real and perceived shortcomings, without a seemingly comprehensive analysis of 

how these individual changes impact on the enterprise as a whole. The result is a 

patchwork approach that has created often times conflicting responsibilities, ambiguity and further intensified turf between responsible organizations at the federal 

level. 

Furthermore, prior to the events of September 11th, state and local agencies were 

not viewed by federal agencies as part of America’s ‘‘national intelligence enterprise’’. In the aftermath of the attacks leaders proclaimed the critical importance of 

police officers, firefighters, public health officials and other state and local officials 
32

being key to our war on terrorism. There have been great proclamations about the 

need to get critical intelligence to those who are on the front lines of keeping our 

communities and states safe. These same ideals have not been embraced by the 

rank and file staff in federal agencies. My experience tells me that it is not because 

of a lack of desire, but rather it again comes back to the ambiguity that exists within the federal intelligence enterprise as it relates to the role of the Department of 

Homeland Security and what needs to be communicated to local and state agencies. 

This is not a criticism of any one federal organization. Rather it points to the larger issue of overall federal coordination. There does not appear to be any overall federal vision and coherent plan across the entire federal government that articulates 

exactly what we are trying to accomplish in terms of information and intelligence 

fusion, analysis and sharing, especially related to the involvement of state and local 

government. My perception is that it does not appear to be clear within and between 

federal headquarters offices as well as with field personnel on the front lines of moving critical information and to us at the state and local level. In short there is no 

clear plan and direction. 

Let me be clear. These challenges at the federal level are replicated at the state 

and local level. Agencies and entire disciplines at the state and local level have 

managed the flow of information and intelligence for years in a manner that best 

suits their purposes. Law enforcement agencies tend to focus on ensuring the quality of intelligence more for the purpose of prosecution. Public health agencies have 

a focus that is on preventing the spread of disease and protecting patient confidentiality. Other emergency response agencies use information and intelligence to ensure rapid response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters. Each is legitimate within their individual context. However, when viewed as part of a larger enterprise these current approaches have the potential to create confusion and conflict. 

It is clear that state and local level government has a responsibility to effectively 

integrate information from federal intelligence, defense, law enforcement and other 

federal communities for its use. A single pathway is not going to work and is not 

appropriate. Whether it is the threat of terrorist groups, disease outbreak or even 

a severe storm our continuing focus is on the maintenance of a well-defined set of 

business rules at the state and local level that outline the pathways for moving information between those who will respond. We are seeking to enhance this in Virginia through the integration of multiple information sources into a single multiagency center. But our efforts are challenged by the lack of clarity at the federal 

level among other issues. 

My impression is that the Department of Homeland Security is making every attempt to capture significant intelligence currently available at the federal level and, 

where needed, putting the material in a useable form that can be passed to local, 

state and private sector organizations. My experience tells me that they are inhibited in their efforts by being a new organization that is still working through startup, merger and acquisition issues. Furthermore, I get the impression that cooperation of other federal agencies is superficial. 

But this misses the larger point of coordination. The Department of Homeland Security’s most important function may be to bring the multitude of federal players 

together with state and local stakeholders are develop a comprehensive approach to 

defining what is meant by information and intelligence sharing. This must be a priority. The products are not the answer. A clear set of business rules for describing 

the vertical and horizontal flow of information across the national enterprise—local, 

state, federal and private sector is the essential first step. This has not yet to my 

knowledge been done. Technology and methods of protecting classified information 

can then be applied to meet defined objectives for rapid transfer and protection of 

critical national security data. 

When I began my state career nearly 20 years ago doing contingency plans for 

nuclear attack there was a two-page description of how information should flow in 

the aftermath of an attack, taking into account the three levels of government and 

the multitude of disciplines. I have not seen a similar plan today. Effectively sharing intelligence is less an issue of technology and more good old-fashioned planning 

and commitment. 

The flow of information must be vertical between federal headquarters offices, 

field and or regional offices, states, communities and the private sector and of course 

citizens. It is imperative that federal information reflects a coordinated and not conflicting approach, less we add to the confusion. When we evaluate the flow of federal 

information we see clear disconnects between that received directly from Washington headquarters and what is known by field personnel of the various federal 

agencies. In Virginia’s case our proximity to the District of Columbia and presence 

of key federal operations necessitates a close working relationship with a wide range 

of agencies and their field personnel. It remains surprising how many times data 
33

is received from the Department of Homeland Security, or other federal headquarters functions, that is unknown to the its personnel in the field. This again 

points to an enterprise wide analysis and defining of who needs to get what and 

how. 

More is not necessarily better. Clearly the flow of information increased since the 

attacks of September 11th. With each passing day more information flows from federal agencies into communities and state agencies. But the simple flow of more information does not equate to better intelligence sharing. I would offer that the almost reactive nature of sharing information may be leading to a well intentioned 

push by federal agencies that floods state and local officials with often times conflicting data, or so much volume, that reasonable analysis is impossible. This type 

of visceral reactive approach often adds confusion rather than clarity to the efforts 

of state and local officials to meet their homeland security responsibilities. Ensuring 

the quality of information, assignment of priority for its movement and training and 

education of those who are to receive it remains critical. 

We have had mixed experiences with the quality of data received. In one case critical information being passed to us through the Department of Homeland Security 

was almost immediately attacked by field personnel from another federal agency as 

being ‘‘old news’’ and, therefore, unreliable having been over taken by events. We 

were then confronted with the challenge of validating through unofficial channels 

what had been provided to us to determine if the disagreement was based in ‘‘turf’’ 

or substance. In another case, the Department of Homeland Security provided us 

information in advance of Operation Iraqi Freedom concerning potential security 

concerns on selected sites. This information was passed to local officials but it was 

clear from discussions with federal field personnel in the affected area that they had 

not been made aware of these same concerns. Again it posed a vexing question for 

us as to its authenticity and quality. 

Most recently, I am pleased to report, that limited knowledge was made available 

to state and local law enforcement officials concerning an on-going investigation 

with alleged terrorism related ties. This occurred within the context of one of our 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces. But unfortunately the information was not disseminated within the federal agency community and when we inquired with an official 

at the Department of Homeland Security they seemed unaware of the investigation. 

These types of events, while understandable given the complexity of the issue, leave 

significant room for doubt about the quality of any intelligence received. 

I would suggest it is to early to make wholesale judgments if the quality of information we are receiving is sufficient. Anecdotal evidence suggests that we have 

much more work to do and that we must place a premium on ensuring integration 

between disciplines, organizations, levels of government, the private sector. If the 

Department of Homeland Security is to be at the forefront of intelligence and information sharing with states and communities several actions will be needed. 

First they must continue their efforts to capture and move critical federal information and intelligence to communities and states. This effort must separate they 

inevitable general information flow and time sensitive intelligence into two distinct 

categories. Information and intelligence that demands immediate attention must not 

be sent in the same manner as ‘‘good to know’’ data. 

Secondly, a clear set of business rules must be established that defines the movement of information horizontally and vertically across all areas and levels of government and with appropriate private sector elements. Right now each agency, and in 

some cases elements within agencies, acts very much on their own and there appears to be no centralized authority for ensuring the development of a strategic approach, that takes into account existing pathways, the multitude of disciplines and 

organizations, the levels of government and the private sector. This must be an effort free of the day-to-day crunches of moving information and with sufficient authority to make it happen. Agencies and organizations need not give up their individual ‘‘turf’’ but rather all of these components must be deigned to operate in harmony. This effort, whether led by the Department of Homeland Security or other 

federal agency must have the active involvement of knowledgeable local, state and 

private sector stakeholders. This, I believe, will have profound positive impact on 

our national intelligence structure including local, state and private sector entities. 

Finally, we must begin to educate. There is a fine line between our intelligence 

and information sharing needs and our desires. I note with interest virtually every 

day a new technology initiative designed to speed and empower the movement of 

intelligence and information. While these efforts may reflect the technological opportunities of today, they do not always reflect a comprehensive understanding of the 

significant policy implications of how information and intelligence is gathered, 

stored and used, especially as it relates to ordinary law abiding Americans. 
34

More importantly, we find that federal agencies are operating under antiquated 

assumptions about sharing classified information with state and local officials. 

There has been only minimal progress in obtaining security clearances for state and 

local officials. We seem compelled to operate in an environment that seeks to empower restrictions to effectively sharing critical intelligence and information rather 

than promoting best practice solutions that get needed information and intelligence 

to those who must act to save lives. Our experience has been that when the chips 

are down and the crisis is at its highest point the information will be shared irrespective of clearances. But this point is too late. This approach precludes state and 

local officials from having digested the complexity of information and developed 

well-formulated response strategies. Right now the release of secure information 

and intelligence is built upon individuals rather than a well-defined process with 

auditable standards that lay a clear framework for sharing sensitive information. 

If we can quickly share sensitive information with our Allies then we can surely find 

a way to share it with state and local officials who are responsible for keeping our 

citizens safe and secure. 

We cannot underestimate the cultural challenges of having thousands of officials 

in differing fields change the mentality about the sharing of information and intelligence. But this is essential to our ultimate success. The most significant impediment we face in this regard again goes back to the lack of a clear national strategic 

approach, one that describes what information needs to be shared and pathways for 

accomplishing its movement. Virtually every official that I have spoken to understands that they are part of a larger need, but in an absence of a global understanding of the enterprise or their part in it, they find it difficult to adjust their 

thought process. If I were to point to a major failing to date in our national reaction 

to the events of September 11th it is that we have not taken the time and energy 

to train and educate everyone from first responders to elected officials about the 

critical importance for effectively sharing information and intelligence. We have chosen to think of our enterprise as thousands of separate organizations with a similar 

intelligence and information requirements rather than a single enterprise with 

thousands of components. Consequently, each continues to look at its own and not 

the whole. 

I need to underscore that my comments do not mean centralizing all responsibilities in a single agency. But there should be clarity regarding the coordination of 

information and intelligence flow and better methods for ensuring accountability 

among federal agencies that needed information is being appropriately shared. Core 

in our national belief is the preservation of civil liberties. One could argue that current vexing confusion only adds to the dangers we face. Our inability to produce a 

comprehensive set of business rules about what information should be shared and 

how, inhibits our ability for appropriate oversight and increases the potential that 

we may unintentionally undermine our core national values in the name of security. 

The zeal of securing our nation must not trample on the ideals of living as a democracy with individual rights. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I will be happy to address any 

questions you may have.

Mr. GIBBONS. And finally, we have gotten to Mr. Daniels who has 

come a long way and has waited patiently for his opportunity to 

speak and all the way from Arizona. We want to welcome you to 

Washington, D.C., and we look forward to your testimony. Mr. 

Daniels, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DARIN DANIELS, PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 

AND TRAINING MANAGER, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 

Mr. DANIELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to 

address this committee today. I share the subcommittee’s concerns 

about the preparedness of public agencies charged with protecting 

the security of our Nation and our communities and offer my comments and insights from the local public health perspective. 

The most critical issue in preparedness today relates to the need 

to share information openly and on a timely basis. This must be 

done both vertically and horizontally, vertically between governments at the Federal, State and local level and horizontally across 
35

local public and private agencies. Indeed open and timely sharing 

of information is essential to the ability of State and local medical 

personnel to respond effectively as a principle line of defense 

against a disease outbreak, regardless of whether the outbreak is 

an act of nature or an act of terrorism. 

Unfortunately historically, this has not been the case for Maricopa County. Prior to the historic events of September 11th, 2001, 

communications were, at best, spotty and uncoordinated. Thankfully that has changed for the better. Now with the assistance of 

Federal funds, Maricopa County has been able to build programs 

and manpower dedicated to surveillance and response to any emergency situation. At Maricopa County Department of Public Health, 

we believe the key to successful information sharing is trust, respect and shared goals. These elements are the foundation of the 

partnerships and cooperative spirit needed to ensure community 

preparedness. 

To that end, we have focused on developing strong partnerships 

with a wide variety of Federal, State and local agencies, including 

the fire departments of the cities of Phoenix, Glendale, and Mesa, 

local hospitals, tribal governments, the Arizona Department of 

Health Services and the United States Department of Health and 

Human Services. 

As a result of our efforts, we have achieved a high level of interagency cooperation. Examples of this cooperation include shared 

training and table-top and field exercises. Examples which were 

the statewide strategic national stockpile exercise, a full-scale 

chemical and biological table top exercise. 

This was made possible through the full cooperation of the four 

metropolitan medical response system cities in Arizona. These joint 

exercises have resulted in open lines of communication and more 

responsive decision making. 

At public health, we understand the agencies must work together 

on an organized regular basis to create and maintain the communication links needed to share information. The Federal MMRS 

program has enhanced the relationship-building process by bringing together various agencies within the region and fostering their 

cooperation in creating a sense of inclusiveness among our partners. 

These relationships enhance the 24-7 response capabilities locally 

by allowing leaders and decision makers to know who their partners are prior to any event. Public health has benefitted directly 

from Arizona’s statewide communication system that has been developed to send information through secure and unsecured channels. The secured Internet-based communications network allows 

sharing of information among local governments and health care 

facilities. We have focused on changing the dynamics of information sharing. 

An example is the sharing of epidemiological disease surveillance 

information. During the past few months, the public has lived with 

the threat of sudden acute respiratory syndrome, monkey pox, 

West Nile virus and the potential threat of smallpox. 

Combatting these diseases requires an effective disease surveillance program and the sharing of the results through all vertical 

and horizontal channels. 
36

The electronic disease surveillance system being developed in cooperation with the State and CDC will be integrated into the statewide health alert network system. This system relies on the cooperation of agencies at State and local level, including county public health departments, hospitals and infection control practitioners. 

When this system is fully operational, surveillance data will be 

collected from these multiple sources, permitting early identification of potential public health threats and coordination of an effective response for disease control. 

In conclusion, Maricopa County Department of Public Health is 

committed to building and maintaining the partnerships and the 

vertical and horizontal communication links needed to ensure open 

and timely sharing of information. The funds we have received 

from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through the 

State of Arizona have improved communications. More importantly, 

the funding has allowed us to rebuild an infrastructure that has 

been allowed to deteriorate and to respond more effectively to public health emergencies. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I thank 

you for the privilege of addressing the subcommittee, and would be 

happy to respond at this time to any questions you or any other 

members have. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Daniels, thank you very much for your testimony as well. Bringing in a perspective from your point of view is 

just critically important for how this committee learns more and 

understands more about information sharing. 

[The statement of Mr. Daniels follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DARIN DANIELS 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

It is an honor and a privilege to address this Subcommittee. My name is Darin 

Daniels. I am the Preparedness Planning and Training Manager for the BioDefense 

Preparedness and Response Division of the Maricopa County Department of Public 

Health, in Phoenix, Arizona. I share your concerns about the preparedness of public 

agencies charged with protecting the security of our communities and our nation 

and offer my comments and insight on this matter from the local public health perspective. 

The most critical issue in preparedness today relates to the need to share information openly and on a timely basis. This must be done vertically and horizontally—

vertically between governments at the federal, state, and local level and horizontally 

across local public and private agencies. Indeed, open and timely sharing of information is essential to the ability of state and local medical personnel to respond effectively as a principal line of defense against a disease outbreak, regardless of whether the outbreak is an act of nature or an act of terrorism. 

The state of Arizona has 5.6 million people, most of whom reside in either Maricopa or Pima County. Maricopa County, located in the central part of the state, has 

3.3 million people or about 60 percent of the state’s population. The majority of the 

county lives in the Phoenix metropolitan area which is the state’s population, economic, and political center. Pima County, located in the southern part of the state, 

has about 1 million people, the majority living in the Tucson metropolitan area. 

Arizona has the distinction of having four cities that are part of the Metropolitan 

Medical Response System (MMRS), which was created in 1996. These cities are 

Mesa, Glendale, Phoenix, and Tucson. Maricopa County Department of Public 

Health, which established its BioDefense Preparedness and Response Division one 

year ago, is active partner with these MMRS cities and other public and private 

agencies in building a high quality emergency medical response system. 

Unfortunately, however, partnerships and good communication have not always 

been the case in Maricopa County. Prior to the historic events of September 11, 

2001, communications were at best spotty and uncoordinated. An incident occurred 
37

in late 1997 that demonstrates this point. An aircraft returning from Mexico arrived 

at Sky Harbor Airport with 28 very sick passengers. The airport emergency medical 

staff responded properly, and all the ill passengers were triaged and transported to 

local hospitals. There was a large failure in communications as no call was placed 

to Public Health. Without notifying Public Health and properly screening passengers on that flight, a very infectious and contagious disease could have been 

transmitted to the next city by that aircraft and its unknowing passengers. Thankfully, that has changed for the better. Now, with the assistance of federal funds, 

Maricopa County has been able to build programs and manpower dedicated to surveillance and response to any emergency situation. 

At Maricopa County Department of Public Health, we believe information sharing—vertically between governments and horizontally across local public and private agencies—requires three things: 

• Trust that information will be shared appropriately and without impediments; • Mutual respect between individuals and the organizations they represent; and • Shared commitment to the goals of preparedness and protecting the public. 

These three elements are the foundation of the partnerships and cooperative spirit 

needed to ensure community preparedness. To that end, we have focused on building and maintaining strong partnerships with a wide variety of federal, state, and 

local agencies—including the fire departments of the cities of Mesa, Glendale, and 

Phoenix, local hospitals, tribal governments, Arizona Department of Health Services, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

As a result of our efforts, we have achieved a high level of interagency cooperation, reinforcing the fundamental concepts of emergency response and incident and 

consequence management. Examples of cooperation include shared training, tabletop drills, and field exercises; these are illustrated by the following: 

• Joint incident management systems training is provided regularly to Maricopa 

County Department of Public Health, MMRS cities, law enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical response, emergency management, hospitals, and public 

schools. Since many agencies function as secondary responders, the MMRS cities 

have brought valuable information to the table, expanding the understanding of the 

secondary responder agencies. 

• A statewide Strategic National Stockpile exercise was held in November 2002. 

This event incorporated training, tabletop drills, and field activities and provided an 

opportunity for the different levels of government to interact and coordinate 

vertically and horizontally. The exercise involved the state’s two largest counties 

(Maricopa and Pima), and included Maricopa County Department of Public Health, 

Pima County Health Department, Arizona Department of Health Services, Arizona 

Department of Emergency Management, the Tucson MMRS, the Mesa MMRS, the 

Mesa public school system, the Red Cross, and other private and volunteer agencies. 

This exercise provided the participating agencies with a hands-on experience in a 

real-time multi-agency emergency response situation. 

• The city of Glendale sponsored a full-scale chemical exercise to replicate the interagency response capabilities that would be needed in the event of a deliberate release of sarin with an explosive device. Communication between the hospitals and 

the Department of Public Health was evident at the outset of the exercise; information sharing from the infection control practitioners and the Department of Public 

Health reinforced the routine communications that occur regularly. 

• The city of Glendale also sponsored a biological tabletop drill with the Maricopa 

County Department of Public Health to test leadership actions and the responses 

to the decision-making process. . The benefits of this joint exercise were opened 

lines of communication and more responsive decision-making. 

With all exercises, we learned many lessons and our systems were tested on many 

levels. The most important lesson learned from these exercises is that some agencies 

communicated well with one another, but others did not—either they did not receive 

needed information or did not know where to send it. As a result, Maricopa County 

Department of Public Health and its partner agencies now have a better understanding of the role of various agencies in incident management and what information must be communicated. This understanding is key to the information sharing 

and relationship building that is now on-going in Maricopa County and throughout 

the state. 

Maricopa County Department of Public health has also benefited directly from Arizona’s statewide redundant communication system that has been developed to send 

information through secure and unsecured channels. The secured Internet-based 

communications network, developed by Arizona Department of Health Services as 

part of the Health Alert Network, enhances the notification and information sharing 

process used by local agencies and healthcare facilities. This system will provide security, secure messaging, a public health directory, and some data translation while 
38

serving as the gateway for a statewide system with direct access by local health departments. In addition, the MMRS notification network is a system that provides 

immediate notification of events to the necessary agencies at a moment’s notice. 

This system has the capability to provide critical information and directives for a 

collaborative and coordinated response regardless of the event. 

The technical side of communication would not be effective without a strong connection between the users of the system, and the federal MMRS program has enhanced that connection. Advisory committees, subcommittees, task forces, and planning groups have served to build a response network and good relationships among 

public and private agencies by creating a sense of inclusiveness. These networks enhance the local 24/7 response capabilities by allowing leaders and decision-makers 

to know who their partners are prior to an event. These systems, alone or combined, 

allow for the exchange of information vertically and horizontally. 

In partnership with the state, we have worked aggressively to change the dynamics of information sharing, based in part on a new understanding and respect for 

roles and responsibilities. An example is the sharing of epidemiological disease surveillance information.. Epidemiological investigations and disease surveillance conducted by the Maricopa County Department of Public Health have only recently received the attention they deserve. A prior lack of understanding of the critical nature of this work resulted in diminished resources and reduced capacity within the 

public health system. As the role of surveillance has become better understood, public and private agencies have better acknowledged how this everyday function protects the public from the silent invasion of diseases. This is evidenced in new support for epidemiology and surveillance. 

Recent events have shown the importance of open and timely information sharing 

between agencies. During the past few months, the public has lived with the threat 

of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), monkeypox, West Nile virus, and 

the potential threat of smallpox. Combating these diseases requires an effective disease surveillance program and the sharing of results through vertical and horizontal 

channels. The electronic disease surveillance system being developed in cooperation 

with the state and CDC will be integrated into the statewide Health Alert Network 

system. This system relies on the cooperation of agencies at the state and local level, 

including county public health departments, hospitals, and infection control practitioners. When this system is fully operational, surveillance data will be collected 

from these multiple sources permitting early identification of potential public health 

threats and coordination of an effective response for disease control. 

In conclusion, preparedness for a terrorism event requires solid partnerships and 

open, timely communication. Maricopa County Department of Public Health is committed to building and maintaining the communication links needed vertically between federal, state, and local government and horizontally across public and private agencies. The funds we have received from the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention through the state of Arizona have improved communications. More importantly, the funding has allowed us to rebuild an infrastructure that had been allowed to deteriorate and to respond more effectively to public health emergencies.

Mr. GIBBONS. What I am going to do now is turn to the members 

of the committee for 5 minutes each for questioning and I will do 

so in the order of their arrival with one exception. I am going to 

turn now to the chairman of the full committee and yield my 5 

minutes to Chairman Cox so that he may have the first round of 

questioning. Mr. Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome again 

to our witnesses. Thank you very much for your participation on 

this panel. Mr. Parrish, thank you again for coming twice this 

week. I would like to begin with Mr. Foresman and Mr. Daniels, 

because I think you might be able to help us with questions we 

have about how the Washington system is working in disseminating information. When you get threat information, this question 

is for both of you, for example, concerning change in the threat 

level, where exactly does that come from in each of your cases? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Mr. Cox, I would like to be able to say that it 

has been the same every time it has happened, but even as recently as in the last 24 hours we had yet a new process which was 

used to communicate information to us. Typically we find our best 
39

notification coming directly through the Department of Homeland 

Security into the Governor’s office into the Homeland Security 

function. 

Mr. COX. How does that work? Who is contacting you from—. 

Mr. FORESMAN. Typically what is happening is the watch center 

is making notification to us of a conference call in the case of something that is a nationwide alert and we are doing it in conference 

call fashion. In the case of specific intelligence relating to the Commonwealth of Virginia we typically will receive a call from the Secret Service and they will then be the relayer of critical intelligence 

from the Department of Homeland Security to our office which creates a little bit of a conundrum because frequently we get that information prior to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces having it over 

at the FBI. 

Mr. COX. Do you have any contact with the Under Secretary for 

Information Analysis, or with the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection? 

Mr. FORESMAN. No, sir. Typically the direct relationship has been 

through the Office of State and Local Coordination up to this point. 

Mr. COX. Okay. Mr. Daniels. 

Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Cox, the information that we receive in Maricopa County comes directly from the Arizona Department of Health 

Services and we actually have a very good relationship with our 

State partners as well as our local Federal representatives. 

Mr. COX. So you don’t have any contact directly with the Federal 

Government when it comes to threat advisories? 

Mr. DANIELS. We have limited contact with the Federal Government. 

Mr. COX. I ask these questions because the Homeland Security 

Act gives the Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary 

for IAIP primary responsibility for public advisories related to 

threats to homeland security, and it requires that he provide specific warning information and advice to State and local government 

agencies and authorities as well as the private sector and the public. And, Mr. Parrish, I wonder if you could explain why that isn’t 

happening exactly that way. 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, if I may, let me just explain a little bit about 

the organizational structure. Certainly the State and local advisor 

to the Secretary is a separate position. Within the Operation Center of Homeland Security there is a desk which is part of the operation center that is titled State and Local. The operations center 

belongs to the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The message, the report, the information that 

is received by the Commonwealth of Virginia is coming from the 

operation center in the form of a document that is prepared in the 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, so 

I think it is a little bit of just an organizational understanding of 

how the process works. 

Mr. COX. I want to jump to something that is very topical. It is 

in the news today. I am not going to rely on this open hearing for 

purpose of the questioning on an Associated Press and New York 

Times account of the 9/11 report that you are all aware is now released. One of the things we have learned in this report is that 

NSA intercepts that were in hindsight relevant to what happened 
40

on September 11 were not translated, not only were they not disseminated but they weren’t translated, and I wonder, Mr. Lago, if 

you can address that question. I know you are not here to represent NSA. But this is not the first time this has been a problem. 

In another capacity at another select committee chairmanship I ran 

into this problem of untranslated intercepts that were materially 

relevant to things that we cared about, and part of it was we didn’t 

have the trained linguists, we didn’t have the translators. Is this 

still a problem? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, there is always going to be a problem for that 

skill set. There is a finite number of people who can perform that 

service and there is a large body of us trying to go after these individuals. We have a number of programs in place. We are better 

than we were then. To get into more detail we would have to take 

this for the record and get back to you in another session, and we 

would be happy to do that. 

Mr. COX. And let’s quickly switch to dissemination. This stark 

example that for that reason made the news was an illustration of 

both failure to translate and failure to disseminate. But let’s assume that it had been translated and now the only remaining problem is that we didn’t disseminate it, and that of course is one of 

the reasons we formed the Homeland Security Department. We 

want to make sure that we have shared all of this information. At 

CIA, at FBI, how far along are we to building IT systems that will 

permit the Department of Homeland Security to have access to 

what you have got and how much are we reliant today still on people flagging information that DHS might be interested in? We have 

a statutory system that contemplates that it is all shared. We have 

real life and we are getting there in real life, but how far along are 

we? 

Mr. LAGO. Yes, sir. First of all, if it wasn’t translated it would 

not be disseminated. I mean that is just a given. 

Mr. COX. I didn’t ask that question but I am not sure that needs 

to be the case. We have a lot of resources in the Federal Government and, you know, to the extent that for years now, and at least 

in my oversight experience it has been years, we keep bumping 

into the same problem. I wouldn’t want to foreclose an agency giving up ownership of something that it doesn’t have the resources 

to translate. But that is not the question I asked you. 

Mr. LAGO. Yes, sir. We have developed a couple of parallel processes to share information with the Department of Homeland Security. One, if you will, is a push process where the information is 

in mass pushed over to the Department and they hold their hands 

out with a system try to catch it and put it in the proper bins. The 

second, which is probably going to be more beneficial in the long 

run, is the pull capability where the analysts and the Department 

can pull the information. We have given—we are giving analysts 

in Homeland Security access to CIA source, a database that they 

can pull from. They have the same user profile capability as the 

CIA analysts and they can go in and pull information, it is a more 

manageable process. They are both up and running as we are defining the profiles and we are providing the clearances for the analysts. They will have the same access that the CIA analysts have 

who work in the Directorate of Intelligence. 
41

Mr. COX. Mr. McCraw. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Yes, sir. From—I can’t give you the exact date 

when Trilogy will be fully implemented, because I am new on the 

design, and one of the exciting things about the design is the investigative data warehouse of XML tagging of data, and the normalization of data. We can actually take all the information that is legally allowable and, with the protocols that Mr. Lago pointed out, 

push that information not just to the CIA, but also the Department 

of Homeland, because sometimes they don’t know what information 

it is that they want, but actually provide them investigative data, 

investigative reports, 302s, things that can go back, all of that stuff 

we are allowed to and push it to it. Moreover, you know, often it 

is the FISA take or it is the stuff that has been translated and 

sometimes not been translated and be able to get multi-media and 

to be able to allow, you know, them access to that as well is also 

part of the Trilogy buildout, and of course it is exciting for anybody 

that has been in the FBI as long as I have and having to do without and to be able to have that capability and then maximize, to 

actually pushing information, giving information out is also exciting because it certainly does—what we are moving to is a more 

customer concentric type of model where we are actually, you 

know, putting performance metrics on how well we are doing and 

pushing information out. 

Mr. COX. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. These are important questions, but as much as I would like to pursue them beyond the time 

allotted I think I should yield in favor of the other members and 

seek possible questions on a second round. I think that is as long 

as I can talk before getting the chairman’s attention. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen, I 

want to thank you for being here today for your testimony. If I 

could, I would like to start with Mr. Parrish. 

And just so you know, one of my very first meetings with Secretary Ridge I had the opportunity to introduce him to a regional 

information sharing network that is used in Rhode Island and surrounding States known as RISSNET, and it is ostensibly a tool 

that law enforcement uses to securely share information about 

criminal activity. Information that is going to be on RISSNET 

doesn’t rise to the level of the information that would be on, for example, BCI or NCIC records, but it ostensibly is an intelligence 

sharing network among law enforcement. And I provided the Secretary with a pretty detailed memo on what the system is, and I 

also provided a copy to Chairman Gibbons and I note that he has 

had an opportunity to review it. 

I guess if I could, Mr. Parrish, I would just ask you, I would like 

to know—actually I do know that you briefly mentioned the 

RISSNET system during Tuesday’s hearing in response to a question from Mr. Etheridge about the Department’s efforts to provide 

information to and gather information from State and local first responders, and I have to say that I am a very big fan of RISSNET 

and I am excited about the demonstration project that is going on 

between RISSNET and the Department of Homeland Security. And 
42

I guess if you could provide my colleagues with a description as you 

understand RISSNET to be and the ways in which DHS is working 

with the network, I would be interested to hear about what has 

been learned from the partnership thus far because I believe that 

RISSNET could be an excellent model for regional cooperation 

across the country. And I would just like to hear your thoughts on 

that. 

Mr. PARRISH. Congressman, I am indebted to you then for bringing that to the Secretary’s attention. I think the RISKNET program does offer a capability that we are excited about in the pilot 

program. In April of this year the Global Intelligence Working 

Group met here in Virginia, in Alexandria I believe, and my predecessor Paul Redmond spoke to that group. That is comprised of numerous organizations throughout the law enforcement community, 

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs Association, 

major city police chiefs, a wide audience of the law enforcement 

community across the country. One of the things we discussed in 

that, I should say that Paul Redmond discussed along with the 

FBIs in attendance was the RISSNET program, and as we got into 

that, looking at could we develop a pilot program that might enhance the information both from the Department of Homeland Security as well as getting the information back, as Mr. Kallstrom 

said earlier, the listening posts, the eyes and the ears that are out 

there 24/7 across this great country. 

So we have a pilot program beginning and we are going to start 

with—any time you do a pilot we want to start a little small and 

not get too large. But essentially we are going to connect with the 

nuclear power facilities in six States. What we will get from that 

then is a potential surveillance operation that may come in and, as 

you indicated, RISSNET provides—it is not a classified system but 

it is a secure Internet program. It also has a great backbone that 

we look upon possibly building a Web-based site which would be 

password protected of which now IAIP could then put out its daily 

intelligence bulletin that would go across the country to all of its 

subscribers. I think the significance about RISSNET is that it 

reaches out in addition to your major metropolitan areas, but more 

critically to your small rural areas, areas that sometimes are overlooked when we get into some of these big programs. So your small 

police departments that may not be on a system would be able to 

get this critical information. 

So again, sir, we appreciate you bringing that to our attention 

and we look forward to this pilot program. We hope to turn a 

switch August 15. I am not big on long, elaborated tests. I want 

to see quick results and then let’s move on with this and hoping 

we will have that program, the pilot over with by the first of October, to press on. And again, sir, we thank you for your bringing 

that to our attention. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I appreciate your comments and I 

look forward to monitoring the program to see how it progresses. 

I know that our first responders across the country are hungry, are 

anxious to be as connected with the Department of Homeland Security and both share and receive as much information as possible, 

and it is obviously going to be critical to the success of the Department of Homeland Security and ultimately our ability to protect 
43

the country from terrorists. So thank you for the work that you are 

doing and I look forward to working with you. 

Mr. PARRISH. Thank you, sir. We will certainly get back to you 

and keep you informed on the pilot program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Turn now to Mr. 

Sweeney of New York. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me note that 

Mr. Kallstrom is staying here for as long as he can, running the 

risk of not being able to get back home because of flight pattern 

problems. Jim, if you need a place to stay tonight you are always 

welcome at my place. And I will get the questions to you as quickly 

as I can. 

We have had a lot of discussion, in particular leading up to this 

hearing, about the horizontal system. It is a great challenge. I salute you folks for all of your work. It is what the President talked 

about when he talked about the need for America to remain vigilant, and I think some of the work that you have done is the best 

example of the successes we have had. I want to talk a little bit 

more about the vertical system, and therefore I will start with my 

friend Mr. Kallstrom. And as it relates to your idea about the 

Northeast Regional Consortium, it sounds to me to be a very solid 

proposition that offers us great opportunity on this dual track to 

really try to expedite the kind of dissemination and a two-way 

process. I am wondering if you have ever asked Secretary Ridge to 

obtain DOD authority to let individuals who have DOD clearances 

use them once a State has given individuals a formal need to know 

authorization for the purposes of homeland and maybe just very 

quickly tell us what the status—what the response you are getting 

from DHS on the idea. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Well, yes, sir, we have. First off let me say our 

number one priority is the same as everyone else here, and that is 

to stop the next event. Clearly it is important to clean it up if it 

happens. And that has to all happen. But I believe that we could, 

together, have a much higher percentage of chance of stopping the 

next event. We have worked greatly with Governor Ridge when he 

was the adviser to the President and now that he is the Security 

Secretary. I can’t—we have had hundreds of meetings on this issue. 

He has been very supportive. But like this big aircraft carrier we 

are trying to turn around in this country, now that we are all pretty much awake as to what we have to do, it is going to take some 

time. We have got a lot of this put together. What hasn’t been put 

together in fact, the recess you took to vote I think was incredibly 

important, because we solved about 90 percent of our problems 

right here while you were voting, at least at his level. 

Mr. SWEENEY. We might keep you here a little longer. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. But there has been great cooperation. The Department has only been stood up for what, two or 3 months or 

whatever it is. So I think now we are in the position to connect the 

pipes to the States in the test bed or in a regional or however we 

want to do it. I can tell you the cops are ready to play a role, and 

a focused role, a role that is sensitive to our privacy, the privacy 

that we fight and die for in this country. But they are ready to play 

an important role and we have the hooks and the wires hooked up 
44

in New York State to do that. And what we really need to do now 

is have that pipe and have that ability to pick up the phone and 

talk to people that are in the know about actions that we are seeing in front of our eyes and some training that we can give. And 

I think, you know, in the next few months if we can put this together we will add another whole layer of protection for our society. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Is there interest among the other States? Has 

there been an exchange of ideas among States? 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Well, the 10-State consortium is just totally, totally interested in doing this. We sent a letter to Governor Ridge 

signed by all 10 States, and I would guess if we talked to 50 States, 

the 50 States would all be interested in having, you know, a better 

hookup, a better arrangement so that we can vet and train and be 

better eyes and ears. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Foresman, I was interested in something you 

said just a second ago that typically primarily that the information 

on threats comes from DHS and that was actually good news, I 

think, for those of us here. And I am wondering, Mr. Parrish, Mr. 

Lago and Mr. McCraw, and maybe Mr. McCraw the most, by virtue 

of sort of the interaction with general law enforcement and such, 

have you developed similar kinds of models, or are you in the process of developing models that, you know, relate to that issue of the 

vertical transference and I am interested in your response and your 

thoughts on the Northeast Consortium. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, first of all, my thoughts. I think it is outstanding. In fact the more of groups that set up intelligence components in those types of arrangements, fantastic. The Bureau’s job 

has been strictly to address local and State law enforcement and 

feed them intelligence and we have done it in a number of ways. 

We are not satisfied that we have met our obligation to provide 

them the type of information that they need to do their jobs, and 

we have got a number of initiatives that I detailed in my testimony. But I am convinced that when we take this as the whole and 

look at it from an integrated standpoint it will do the job. 

Now we have to, you know, we have to make it—you know obviously not treat it as just a by-product of what we do, but actually 

make it a core function and have performance metrics and talk to 

the customer and treat, you know, individuals like Mr. Kallstrom 

and treat others that are involved in the State and local law enforcement as customers, whether it is a briefing program, whether 

we are pushing information, whether it is LEO, whether it is 

RiskNet, which finally surprisingly we have actually for good government’s sake combined or provided connectivity between LEO 

and RiskNet so that customer on RiskNet has access to the same 

information, and I can assure you in week seven of our concept of 

operations it will become an enterprisewide activity. 

Mr. SWEENEY. Let me thank you. I have to go preside over the 

House. Let me say I am glad we were productive, at least bringing 

you together. I look toward to working with each of you and all of 

you and I thank you for your service. I thank the chairman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. And Ms. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am delighted to welcome the panel, and I guess 

Mr. Kallstrom is the man of the hour. We are two New Yorkers 

here today and thank you so much for appearing before us. And I 
45

apologize, we are all running from one hearing to another. But I 

would like to pick up on where our Chair Chris Cox left off and 

I think because I have 5 minutes, and I know you are a quick 

study, I am going to just go through a series of questions and then 

if you can respond to the whole issue I would be most appreciative, 

Jim. That would be great. 

One of the questions was, number one, who provides you with information about terrorist threats? The Department of Homeland 

Security, the FBI, another agency? And if you receive the information from both, can you determine what types of information are 

being channeled through DHS or the FBI? And is it a problem to 

receive—I don’t want you to take notes, but I think you can kind 

of get it as I am going down. Is it a problem to receive terrorism 

information from the Federal Government through more than one 

channel? 

Following up on that—. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. No, it is not. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Then we can go back to the other, and if you can 

compare as you are talking about this. Can you compare the status 

of information sharing prior to the passage of the Homeland Security Act to the present situation? Has anything changed? Do you 

have a sense that the information you receive from the Federal 

Government is coordinated? Do you ever receive conflicting information from different Federal agencies? If you care to provide some 

examples, you certainly can. And how do you do deal with it, and 

has the Information Analysis Office ever contacted you to coordinate training for your employees regarding information sharing? 

Has another Federal agency provided such training? 

Maybe I will stop at that point. You get what I am trying to say. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. We work a lot together so>

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I appreciate it. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. We love getting information from multiple 

sources. We would like it by the wheelbarrow full. I have to congratulate the Federal Government and maybe it is a function of the 

fact that I spent my whole life in the FBI and have personal relationships and have maintained a security clearance. But the CIA, 

for instance, has been incredibly responsive. 

George Tenet sent someone to New York—maybe I shouldn’t say 

that—but for the sole purpose of sharing information with us, and 

it couldn’t be better. 

Mrs. LOWEY. On a regular basis? 

Mr. KALLSTROM. On a regular basis. Of course it doesn’t solve the 

bigger problem, but the cooperation has been great. The people trying to, you know, hook up the wires in a system that isn’t quite 

organized yet the way it needs to be. Everyone is interested in 

doing that. The three FBI task forces in New York State have been 

great in sharing information about their investigations although 

they don’t have, in my view, the bigger picture that they need. So 

we have had those great relationships. What I—and Homeland Security has been great. I mean since they have been stood up, since 

Bill Parrish has been over there, Frank Libutti is a 20-year friend 

of mine back from the Marine Corps, we talk almost every day. 

And we talk about the issues, the priorities that were faced. So I 

think the intent, the human heart throb intent emotion to fix this 
46

thing is there. What we have to do now with the help of Congress 

is figure out a way of more systematically and routinely and real 

time—I mean, yes, there is a need to go to a Web site and look at 

stuff and that is all part of training. But I need a cop on the Taconic Parkway tonight that has got a car pulled over with a potential terrorist in it. We don’t know. But for whatever reason his suspicion has been raised as we trained him to be a more observant 

person. I want that person to call a center in New York State, or 

if he is in Boston to call a center, you know, in Massachusetts or 

whatever State, and to put that information into the center which 

is connected to Washington, all these guys and others that aren’t 

here, and get some real information in the center about the, you 

know, how important it is that we have this guy on the side of the 

road. Do we let him go, do we bring him in, do we do something 

else because of the information that we have so we can make better 

decisions. And then the flip side of that is in New York State we 

have got 75,000 cops, and you know a lot of them. They talk to you 

all the time in Westchester. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I was going to let you finish the sentence because 

if you could expand on that, because I hear that over and over 

again. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Right. And there is about less than 1 percent 

of them that are part of the three terrorist task forces and that is 

through no fault—I mean that’s the amount of local police, State 

police, local police we have on the task forces. I ran the one in New 

York City for 4 years, and it is a very effective, it is a fabulous 

thing to do. The problem is the other 74,750 that are on the streets 

were not effectively using their eyes and ears. 

So we need to train them. We need to enable them. We need a 

system so we can communicate, you know, right from the street 

down to Washington and from Washington back again in the 

counterterrorism business only. You know we are not looking to 

make cops a new band of intelligence gatherers at political events 

or any of that stuff. I am talking about countering terrorism. And 

we can do this. They are ready to do it. In New York State we have 

hooked up all the cops. We have secure communications with every 

police chief, every sheriff in the State, and so we are ready. We 

have got the pipe. And now we want Washington to organize themselves so we can talk to them and, yes, we need archived information. Yes, we need stuff that we can go to Web sites and find stuff. 

But we also need to pick up the phone and talk to someone that 

has access to all this information so we can make better decisions. 

I see the State center as being sort of a tangent to Washington, 

sort of their guys in the State that are trained, have the right security clearances, understand the sensitivities of this information, understand the legal rules of how we store information, how it is retrievable and we can let cops without top secret clearances, without 

secret clearances communicate with us with real time information. 

And guess what? We can all be safer because we have got 700,000 

more pairs of eyes and ears out there that are being more effective 

to protect us against the next act. 

So, you know, I don’t know if I answered your question. 

Mrs. LOWEY. You sure did, Jim. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. But that is what we are trying to do. 
47

Mrs. LOWEY. You sure did. And rather than my going through 

more questions I really want to pursue that for a minute, because 

you know I have been meeting with the police, the firefighters, everybody. Now, I heard that a year ago. I heard it 6 months ago. 

I am hearing it now. We just appropriated on our committee, on 

which Sweeney and I—well, we all, many of us serve, $39 billion 

for Homeland Security. The gentleman—I forgot his name—who 

appeared before us was telling me on the interoperability issue, 

which is a little different from the issue you are presenting, that 

they are going out with an RFP within a year. We will get the 

equipment so everyone can talk to each other. And I said great. Are 

you going to have a buyback program because my guys aren’t waiting for you to go out with the RFP 6 months from now, a year from 

now. You will get back the information. How—. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Just give us some secure phones. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, how can we be of help to, I mean, the problem—you and I have talked. This is an issue we have been hearing 

a long time. Charlie Cole in Yonkers is still complaining about this. 

How can we help you? 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Congresswoman, I think we are on the verge of 

making this happen. I think, you know, the Homeland Security Act 

I think that the House Intelligence Appropriations Act of 2004, 

with some work, it needs a little bit of work, is a good vehicle for 

authorizing this type of exchange if we need authorization. I don’t 

see any legal impediments to doing this. I just think we need to 

get everyone down here to hook this thing up. And if we start off 

at, you know, if our engine can go 10,000 RPM and we start off at 

2000 RPM, that is okay. We can make this thing work and we can 

develop it along the way. And I think we are ready to go. I really 

do. 

Now, are all the States, have they done what New York state 

has? I don’t know. But I mean we are willing in our 10-State consortium—I don’t know if you were here when I talked about that. 

We got all the New England States and New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 

Delaware and New York, that have formed a group just to share 

information. They are ready to go and they are ready to use a regional center for this very reason. So I think this is not that hard 

to do. I think we just have to get everybody in the same room and 

do it. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I am probably out of time, but I just—I see the red 

light. I just wanted to thank you very much and thank you all and 

hope with the efforts of all you good people you can push us and 

help us move this forward so a year from now we are not still talking about how we can get it through. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Yeah, and money would be helpful at some 

point. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Ms. Lowey. 

Mr. Meek. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like I started out in the 

opening statement, I am glad to be here today because I have been 

wearing many hats over there the last couple of years in Florida. 

We followed New York as relates to passing Homeland Security 

legislation in the legislature there. Also, in my past I have been a 

first responder, and now I have had an opportunity to serve with 
48

these very fine men and women in the Congress. I have been in 

a lot of circles where folks are saying that they are sharing information and we are all getting along and we are all hugging and 

carrying on and saying good things about one another. 

But I think, like I said at the beginning, of some of the events 

that have recently taken place in the area of intelligence. Is it good 

or is it bad? Who is sharing it with what and who said what? I 

watched Director Tenet’s body taken from the Senate intelligence 

chairman over in the Senate, thrown from the train as it relates 

to who gave what bad. Neither here or there, no one will ever know 

the prevention that all of you provide every day of being able to 

seek and find out and inform law enforcement agencies on what 

they need to know as it relates to potential terrorists in this country. But also I want to direct my question towards the fact that 

what are we doing as it relates to individuals, especially as it relates to State and local law enforcement and even the FBI who—

what I may call home grown terrorists those individuals that are 

in the heartland and in Miami and in Chicago and these individuals that prey upon us not being prepared? I don’t know how they 

play into this bigger role. Many Americans feel that our 

counterterrorism efforts are targeted towards individuals from the 

Middle East or targeted from individuals that may be from a country or a state outside of our homeland here that may bring about 

a threat to our country. And I think that it is important because 

when it comes down to homeland security, unfortunately, and folks 

from New York here, I want to apologize for the events that took 

place in the city yesterday, but automatically the thought that it 

was a terrorist attack. So I want to find out how does that play 

into the role of some of you that are sitting at the table, number 

one. Number two, as it relates to the front line guy or gal that is 

in the patrol car like the Oklahoma situation, it was an officer pulling an individual over. How are they getting that information because I guarantee you this committee room may not be full today, 

but let something happen and someone knew something and someone else didn’t know it, and I guarantee you could get members 

who don’t even serve on this committee trying to get into this room 

because they are looking at who is going to be at the lynching at 

high noon the next day because they don’t want the burden to be 

on them. 

So I am saying a lot, but I want to make sure that we are actually talking. I take some comfort in the fact that y’all were able to 

complete some business while we were on the floor voting, but I 

want to know outside, and the people that serve under you, is there 

real communications, you feel comfortable with those communications? Because I don’t believe that is something that we can legislate, to be honest with you. We can try, but I don’t believe that is 

something that we can legislate. Historically in law enforcement or 

any sense of power or even here in the Congress, there is some information that even we don’t share with one another, but in this 

case it is imperative. 

Mr. PARRISH. Let me if I could just open up because in your 

opening remarks you made a very relevant and germane statement 

when you said that the information that is provided to the State 

and local authorities must be relevant. One of the things that we 
49

do in the Information Analysis Directorate is we take in volumes 

of intelligence at the very sensitive level. In reviewing that with 

our counterparts at the CIA, at the Terrorist Threat Interrogation 

Center or the FBI, what we are looking for is getting something 

that is relevant in the hands of a police officer on the street and 

working with the FBI to get that information to him, something 

that is relevant to a private sector to enhance their security posture at either a chemical facility or a shopping mall. The intelligence that we get sometimes is very general in nature. What we 

try to do is to take a look at it and pull out what can be actionable 

intelligence to get out there to the people to look at. 

One of the initiatives I have now is to draw upon the successes 

of our country’s great Americans wearing a uniform serving in the 

military and the captured individuals involved with terrorist organizations from Afghanistan. Also the FBI has made numerous arrests and the CIA has seized many. Our allies in some other countries have picked up significant members of the al Qaeda leadership organization. What the IA is doing right now is reaching out 

to the CIA, to the FBI and coming together to sit down and analyze 

the intelligence that is being pulled from these individuals. What 

I want to be able to do is to assess the capabilities of the threat 

that they say they have to take down a bridge, to take down a tall 

building. What were the skill sets taught in the training camps? 

Did they in fact really have that capability? Did they really analyze 

and take a look at the amount of resources required to do that? 

Those to me are the nuggets of information that we can get out to 

our State, local, and private sector when we put out a threat 

against a bridge, against a tall building, against an apartment 

complex. Help them prioritize the expenditure of their minimum 

resources they have in a prioritization of how to expend that. 

Working with the FBI, again, their information is getting out to the 

State and local law enforcement entities. Our customer base is a 

little bit different, but yet it is important we get that information 

out there. 

So we are taking a very close look at this very sensitive, classified information. We must realize we have to protect sources and 

we are sensitive to that. But we want to get that down to the level 

that a police officer on the street, a Wackenhut security guard actually understands what this means to him or her in the performance of their duties. And I think probably, Steve, I would turn it 

to you. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Yeah. I think that is a very astute observation. We 

must be mindful, you know, prior to 9/11 that Oklahoma City took 

more lives on American soil than any other international terrorist 

act and that Eric Robert Rudolph was caught by a State and local 

officer, a local officer in Andrews, or in fact Murphy, North Carolina and not by the Federal Government. You know, point in case 

why you want to leverage those opportunities. The FBI still has domestic terrorism. The JTTF still works domestic terrorism. We still 

are focused on the Phineas Priesthood, the Aryan Brotherhood, the 

ALF, ELF and the myriad of other domestic terrorist organizations 

that have been documented that are out there that are active and 

in conducting day-to-day investigations on those. And it has to be 
50

done that way and we have to be mindful and we have to infiltrate 

them as well to prevent the next act of terrorism. 

So I think that is an outstanding point. And again you do it the 

same way, you know, working relationships, cop to cops, and what 

is good for international terrorism in terms of information sharing 

that the FBI is doing and adopting is also the same for domestic 

terrorism. It has to be shared to the widest extent possible. And 

thank you. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, just a closing comment. I know that 

I am out of time, but I just want to say I think we have two choices 

here, one, to work together in times of prevention and when the 

waters are calm, and to work together but somewhat be suspicious 

of one another in a time of crisis. And after 9/11 a lot happened. 

This Congress moved in an unprecedented way in passing legislation, authorizing dollars, flying and having special meetings and 

joint sessions. And I think it is important that we do everything 

we can do and while the waters are calm to get—pay justice to that 

individual out in the patrol car, at the same time pay justice to 

those individuals in State agencies that are trying to do the best 

they can do to be able to make things happen. And I know that 

the FBI, CIA, you know, after the joint commission and the 9/11 

report and all of that from out of this Congress, from Mr. Porter 

Goss’ committee, that you are now working together. We are all 

better now. We want to make sure that we get better. 

One of you made the comment—I am sorry I had to step out for 

a minute—of the fact that we are better now than we were 6 

months ago and hopefully we will be better as we move along. We 

hope that that is the case. Please let us know if there is anything 

that we can do to make sure that the line of communications are 

there. But I think only the people in the law enforcement and prevention agencies that are out there, even within the Department, 

can even move better than we can because we can’t legislate that. 

That is something that just has to come together on behalf of our 

country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COX. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. Chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes. I want to talk about clearances. 

Mr. Foresman, Mr. Daniels, are you finding that the people at 

the local level are able to get clearances in a timely fashion? 

Mr. FORESMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. COX. What has been your direct experience? 

Mr. FORESMAN. We have had a multitude of direct experiences 

and, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to say I don’t think clearances are as much the issue as developing an auditable process to 

share information much the same way we do with our allies on a 

day-to-day basis because we don’t clear our allies to get classified 

information but we do have an auditable process that allows us to 

share it with them. But having said that, I think the big challenge 

that we run into is just the length of time that it takes to clear 

individuals. We happen to have one-term governors in the Commonwealth of Virginia. We started this process, I had a clearance 

previous to coming into this Cabinet position. Others who are in 

this office did not. We are just now getting the first of what are 

supposed to be seven or eight clearances. We have not cleared our 
51

Chief of Staff. We do have a clearance for the Governor. We are 

doing the Governors much the same way that we do Members of 

Congress. 

Mr. COX. How long did it take the Governor to get cleared? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Interestingly enough, Mr. Chairman, we suggested at a hearing up here on the Hill, and this is a prime example of where Congress stepped up to the plate, that if you as Members of Congress could receive classified information by signing a 

nondisclosure agreement certainly Governors could as well, and 

DHS moved rapidly to get the Governors to sign nondisclosure 

agreements. 

Mr. COX. And that was all it took? 

Mr. FORESMAN. That was all it took. 

Mr. COX. But, now, with respect to the seven or eight clearances 

that are coming to the floor as we speak, how long has that process 

taken? 

Mr. FORESMAN. We have been in the process for over a year, Mr. 

Chairman. And again, the issue is if you look across the universe 

of people who have a need to know information in Virginia, it is 

in the hundreds if not thousands. And the simple fact is developing 

a process to clear all of those individuals may not be as important 

as developing a process to sanitize information as appropriate and 

to rapidly get it into their hands in a form and fashion that they 

can act on it quickly. Because with even the simple turnover, if it 

is taking a year or 18 months to clear an individual, we could theoretically start a state police superintendent today and in 18 months 

have to start over again because he or she has left the job. 

Mr. COX. Now, when Secretary Ridge was in California we had 

a discussion with the California law enforcement officials in Los 

Angeles. It was suggested, and nobody objected to the notion, that 

we could democratize the process a bit, share the workload. Obviously it is a Federal function to clear people, but there isn’t any 

reason in the world that we cannot rely on the manpower in the 

States to do some of this work. If you have got requirements, if not 

in the hundreds then possibly over a thousand people that have a 

need to know in Virginia, need to know something, and it would 

be useful to have access to information at those levels, then surely 

the Virginia State police or Virginia law enforcement can do some 

of the knocking on doors and interviewing and so on that comprises 

a large part of this burden. Has anybody suggested to you that we 

have a joint Federal-State arrangement for clearances? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have actually suggested that 

on a number of occasions, but I think what we are finding now is 

that the background can be done quickly, whether we are using retired FBI agents or other Federal law enforcement personnel, State 

law enforcement personnel. But then we have to adjudicate the 

clearances once the background information has been done by the 

Federal agencies. But this points to a larger issue, Mr. Chairman, 

that if I get a clearance through the Department of Defense, is it 

going to be recognized through the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

and is it going to be recognized by the CIA and is it going to be 

recognized by the Department of Homeland Security, and I will tell 

you the simple answer is today still no. 
52

Mr. COX. And so the seven clearances that you have gotten or 

about to get are valid where and invalid where? 

Mr. FORESMAN. It depends. It is in the eye of the beholder, Mr. 

Chairman. And again that is not an indictment of the fact that we 

have got a very diffused enterprise across the Federal Government 

in how we manage the clearance process in much the same way 

that we have a very diffused enterprise in terms of how we manage 

the flow and the movement of intelligence and information horizontally or vertically. 

Mr. COX. For your purposes and for purposes of the clearances 

that we are using as examples in this question, who is the Federal 

agency with which you are dealing? 

Mr. FORESMAN. It has transformed over a period of time because 

in one case, and this is actually a little bit interesting, DHS is on 

the front of seven of them. For a period of time before the merger 

and acquisition went through it was the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Those individuals who were associated with our 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces it is being done through the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. Those individuals with—that have to work 

closely on DOD installations across the Commonwealth on response 

issues, it is being done by DOD. And the most recent is the U.S. 

department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety is currently 

in the process of doing some folks. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Parrish, let me ask you that. You may not know 

or you may know precisely the answer to this question. But does 

the Secretary or his delegate within the Department have the authority to grant clearances to State and local officials? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, I will get you a definite answer back to you. 

We do work the process with Secret Service to coordinate the 

issuances of clearances. We are looking at that. With regard to Mr. 

Foresman’s comments of different Federal agencies granting clearances, my experience holding a Top Secret/SCI for as long as I can 

remember, when I was in the military, I worked in the counter 

drug business with the FBI and DEA. All of that was honored as 

well as with the CIA, so that is one I think we need to get back 

to Mr. Foresman and the Commonwealth on, and we will follow up 

on that. 

I would like to say if I could, I think Mr. Foresman is exactly 

right. It is the process of information sharing that goes back to 

what I commented to Congressman Meek, is one of the things that 

IA is doing right now, is taking a look at this sensitive information 

to see what is relevant, what really could a State and local authority do with this piece of information when it is analyzed and assessed. Some of this intelligence at the very sensitive level is so 

general that it is really when they get it they say what does this 

mean to me, Patrolman Smith, in Topeka, Kansas. One the things 

we have in IA’s initiative as we are following up is to get a training 

program to train the intelligence analysts within State and local 

communities so that when they do get this intelligence they know 

what the method of looking at it as well as following up and going 

back and asking for what we call RFIs, requests for information, 

additional requirements that they may have germane to their mission. The other piece we are looking at is a fellowship program 

within our, Fusion cell. It will probably become the information fu-
53

sion cell within IA where we will have DHS law enforcement personnel from the Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs enforcement, but also a fellowship to bring in analysis from 

Stat/Local Agencies from around the country to spend perhaps 2 

weeks in our operations, than having just rather the fusion cell 

looking at this intelligence at the classified secret level. We would 

get them interim secret clearances to come in there to be able to 

understand our operations. Part of the problem when we deal with 

this information is analysts have to understand when they look at 

a report ‘‘they must ask themselves what is it that I know and who 

needs to know it.’’ And that is the essence of information sharing, 

is getting people trained to understand what it is they are looking 

at, understand who needs to get this information. 

Mr. COX. I want to take us back, although I certainly think that 

your point about information sharing as against clearances is a 

transcendent one, is the purpose of today’s hearing fact in fact. I 

want to take us back to this clearance question, because the question that I asked, I don’t know the answer to either, a moment ago, 

about whether the Secretary or his delegate has the authority to 

grant clearances to the State and local officials. The reason I don’t 

know the answer is that the best we have been able to come up 

with on the committee is the President’s executive order of January 

23 of this year, which gives to you, gives to the Secretary—I will 

read the categories of people: The Secretary of Homeland Security, 

the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary 

for Information Analysis Information Protection and the Assistant 

Secretary for Information Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, each shall be considered a senior official of the Intelligence 

Community for purposes of Executive Order 12–333, and then you 

know, on and on. And then it goes on to say that specifically you 

have the authority to recognize and give effect to and make clearance and access determinations pursuant to Executive Order 12–

968 back in 1995 with respect to all employees of the Department 

of Homeland Security, all applicants for employment at the Department of Homeland Security and all people in the private sector. It 

doesn’t say anything about State and local governments. Now this 

is an EO and it is not perfect, obviously, but I don’t know whether 

that loophole or that gap is filled somewhere else, whether you 

think you have the statutory or executive authority to do this. But 

surely we would like the Department of Homeland Security to be 

able to address the problem of clearances among State and local 

law enforcement, public health officials, and the harmonization of 

those clearances for Federal purposes because we are trying to 

share here. That is the main purpose of Homeland Security, and 

it remains a puzzlement to you as you sit here at this hearing and 

to me as chairman and to our staff, and so it probably requires a 

little bit of work. 

Mr. McCraw. 

Mr. MCCRAW. Mr. Chairman, if you don’t mind, from the local 

and State law enforcement standpoint the FBI has taken on that 

responsibility. In fact, if it is not working well, I mean we are the 

ones that need to be held accountable as it relates to local and 

State law enforcement specifically and we—I know we have made 

a number of gains under Assistant Director Senser’s leadership. We 
54

stood up a unit just specifically to address State and local law enforcement clearances, and I know close to 3,000 have been cleared 

and another 800 are in background right now. We see for a secret 

clearance we can make it as quick right now, in terms of setup, 60 

days for a secret clearance. And as most of the gentlemen know at 

this table, the secret clearance will get you to where you need to 

be most of the time and top secret takes much longer obviously for 

the JTTFs. 

Mr. COX. Would the support of State and local law enforcement 

assets and resources help speed up the FBI process? 

Mr. MCCRAW. I think we are in good shape right now. There are 

some things that can’t go any faster. You can’t force it through 

even with more people, Chairman. However, when we can make 

that 60-day to 90-day window for the secret clearance for State and 

locals and the chiefs of police, that works real well. And they have 

been very vocal. The chiefs of police are not very shy about letting 

us know when we are falling down on that, on getting their clearances through. And so the good news is it is one clearance for all. 

I mean whether you are in the Homeland Security, the agency, the 

military or if you are a Governor given a clearance, that counts 

across the board. It doesn’t matter who got it for you. 

Mr. COX. Mr.Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lago, the now declassified National Intelligence Estimate said that if we didn’t attack Saddam then it is unlikely that he would use biological, chemical, nuclear materials, but if we did attack and we destabilized the 

government that there would be a significant increase in the likelihood that he would align with al Qaeda, he would align with other 

terrorist groups. In view of the fact that we have yet to find the 

chemical, biological, nuclear materials that were reported to be 

there before our attack upon that country and that the scenario 

which the National Intelligence Estimate is most concerned about 

is now in place; that is, that he is not in government, is he telling 

you, you are not authorized to this question that—have you 

changed now your recommendation, for example, Mr. Daniels, over 

here? Have you told him to be on the alert for biological, chemical, 

and nuclear materials that might be in the hands of al Qaeda? 

Mr. LAGO. Congressman, we should be on the alert today regardless of the information—. 

Mr. MARKEY. Have you notified Mr. Daniels that he should be on 

higher alert because the scenario in the national intelligence estimate has now unfolded? 

Mr. LAGO. No, sir. 

Mr. MARKEY. You have not. Why is that? 

Mr. LAGO. Congressman, again, we should be on the alert for 

those attacks today. We have no specific information, no specific actionable information—. 

Mr. MARKEY. The national intelligence estimate said that there 

would be a significant increase in the threat if we went in and we 

did—. 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, I understand that. We have no specific actionable 

information to pass on to Mr. Daniels today. 

Mr. MARKEY. You do not. So has there been a change in the national intelligence estimate now in terms of what the threat is that 
55

is posed to our country? Was that wrong? Was the information 

prior to the war wrong? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, I—. 

Mr. MARKEY. You can answer. 

Mr. LAGO. I am not an expert in this field. I will take that back 

for the record and we can get back to you. 

Mr. MARKEY. I think America has a right to know whether or not 

the national intelligence estimate on that subject was correct; and 

if it wasn’t, then they probably should say that the Intelligence 

Community has changed its mind, that there is no heightened risk 

now that the uranium, the biological and chemical materials are 

not accounted for. 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, as I said, I will take that back for the record. 

Mr. MARKEY. Because it seems to me that was the major justification for the war. 

Colonel Parrish, I am interested in finding out the process by 

which the Homeland Security Department’s information analysis 

and infrastructure protection unit operates under various scenarios. As you know, 22 percent of all cargo is transported on passenger planes and isn’t physically screened at all. In fact, packages 

and mail weighing less than 16 ounces aren’t even subject to the 

Bush administration’s flawed known shipper program which relies 

on the shipper’s paperwork as a guarantee that the cargo was safe. 

It just goes right on the passenger plane unscreened. 

As you know, Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, 

was brought down with a small quantity of plastic explosives in an 

unscreened bag. Richard Reid had 10 ounces of plastic explosives. 

So let me ask you these questions, if I may, Mr. Parrish. If IAIP 

received intelligence indicating that there was a credible threat 

that the terrorist was planning to use the security holes in the 

cargo screening program to use plastic explosives to blow up a passenger plane, who would IAIP inform? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, for intelligence received on that information, 

we work very closely with the Transportation Security Administration with that regard. At the same time, if there is indication of 

potential smuggling operations to move those materials in across 

the borders of our country, this information is conveyed to the Customs and Border Protection. 

Mr. MARKEY. So would you inform FBI? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, that would be done in coordination with the 

FBI. Again, the FBI is represented within IAIP at our headquarters. 

Mr. MARKEY. If the CIA receives intelligence about a terrorist 

threat against a commercial airline using an explosive device in the 

cargo, who would you inform, Mr. Lago? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, we would use the same mechanism that is set up 

to inform all members of the community to pass information to the 

Bureau, to pass information to the Department so they can pass information to the channels that have been established for the necessary individuals to be notified. 

Mr. MARKEY. Would you pass it directly to homeland security 

automatically? 

Mr. LAGO. Absolutely. 
56

Mr. MARKEY. If you were instructed by your CIA supervisors not 

to share that information, what would you do? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, that is a hypothetical. I have never been asked 

not to share information like that. I imagine if I was, I would share 

it. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. McCraw, if the FBI received intelligence about 

an explosive threat against a commercial airline using an explosive 

device in the cargo, who would you inform? 

Mr. MCCRAW. All involved parties, including homeland security, 

the Agency, the entire Intelligence Community, and certainly the 

local and State law enforcement officials in that area that have a 

vested interest in that geography. 

Mr. MARKEY. So you automatically, under the law, have to deliver it directly to Homeland Security? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, I don’t know the law, but from the FBI’s 

standpoint, we are going to, whether the law says we are going to 

or not. We are absolutely going to. In fact, the example used in 

such specificity, I can absolutely guarantee you that that information would get out to all those individuals, and under that scenario, 

probably the head of the airline company as well. 

Mr. MARKEY. If IAIP received intelligence about an Al Qaeda potential attack against U.S. nuclear facilities, who would IAIP give 

that information to? 

Mr. PARRISH. That piece of intelligence that comes in would go 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is responsible for the 

security of the nuclear facilities. At the same time, sir, we would 

reach out to the private sector within that geographic region. Certainly at the same time all of those communities, if we could narrow down the location, reach out to the governors and the State 

and local authorities within that region. First would be the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission responsible for the security of the nuclear 

facility to enhance their security posture. 

Mr. MARKEY. Would you give it to TTIC as well simultaneously? 

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir. That information—and that scenario you 

present would be coming in simultaneously to all those organizations. They would be assessing it at the same time as IA. 

Mr. MARKEY. So there would be no additional screening of the information after you were passing it on to the NRC? If the NRC 

asks you not to pass it on to others until they had time to investigate, would you wait or would you automatically give it to TTIC 

and to the FBI and to others? 

Mr. PARRISH. No, sir. That would be automatic. 

Mr. MARKEY. You would give it to the governors automatically 

even if the NRC said wait? 

Mr. PARRISH. No, sir. That would go out to the State and local 

authorities as well in a timely fashion. The relationship we have 

with the NRC, I do not see that as a realistic scenario. 

Mr. MARKEY. And finally, if I may, on the question of staffers, 

Mr. McCraw, how many FBI staffers are qualified to administer 

polygraph tests in Arabic? 

Mr. MCCRAW. I don’t have that answer for you, but I will find 

out. Not nearly enough. 

Mr. MARKEY. Are we talking about ten or 100? 

Mr. MCCRAW. I don’t know. I know it is not 100. 
57

Mr. MARKEY. You really don’t know the answer to that? 

Mr. MCCRAW. I absolutely don’t know it. 

Mr. MARKEY. How about you, Mr. Lago? How many are trained 

to conduct those kinds of polygraph tests in Arabic? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, I don’t know the answer to that question. We will 

take it for the record and get back to you. 

Mr. MARKEY. And has there been a damage assessment done to 

determine how costly our failure to collect information from walkins and other sources pre9–11 from Arab sources was in protecting 

Americans from terrorist attacks? Either one of you. Have you guys 

done an assessment of that, going through the volume of information. I know that a lot of information was never actually translated, 

and I am just wondering have you done an assessment now in retrospect of how serious that was as a whole in our intelligence gathering that all of that information remained untranslated? 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, we will take that for the record. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. McCraw? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Obviously we didn’t have enough sources to prevent the act, which clearly that is the basis we do all damage now 

is prevention of the act, not in terms of what we figured it out after 

the fact, Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. You haven’t determined after the fact that you actually didn’t have enough people who can actually speak Arabic in 

order to actually read all of the translations or to translate all of 

the information that was being gathered? 

Mr. MCCRAW. As it relates to the translations, that has occurred 

on that. I thought you meant, more importantly, the walk-ins, 

whether we had source coverage, whether we have infiltrated the 

particular cells, and the answer is clearly we know right now we 

did not. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that 

has been always puzzling to me is why we have had such a difficulty coming up with a single consolidated watchlist. I know the 

General Accounting Office recently issued a report, and they say 

we have 12 different terrorist watchlists maintained by nine different Federal agencies. If any of you disagree, please advise me, 

but I think everyone agrees that we should work from one 

watchlist. But it appears that there is some confusion about who 

is supposed to be creating this consolidated, single watchlist. 

I noted that in July of 2002, the President’s national strategy for 

homeland security stated that the FBI would establish a consolidated terrorist watchlist. Then in February of 2003, the White 

House issued the fact sheet on the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center, and it stated that the center would maintain a database of 

known and suspected terrorists. And finally, in April of this year, 

the General Accounting Office report indicated that the Department of Homeland Security had taken the responsibility for creating the consolidated watchlist. 

Who among you can tell me who is supposed to create the consolidated watchlist, whose responsibility is it: the FBI, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, or the Department of Homeland 
58

Security? It seems totally unacceptable that we can’t solve what 

would appear to be a simple problem. 

Mr. Parrish, do you want to start? 

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir. First, there is the term ‘‘watchlist,’’ and 

then the term ‘‘database.’’ The multiple databases that existed by 

the independent agencies—they had those databases based on their 

mission of their organization. From these databases, then you could 

produce the watchlists of the names of the individuals that you 

were looking for or to be aware of. 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is in the process now of 

developing the identities tracking database, which will be, if I could 

I guess, describe as the mother of all databases as we talked about 

over at TTIC, of integrating all of these databases of the Federal 

agencies into a single database. 

Obviously that is resource-intensive. When you start integrating 

this to maintain this database, one of the things we learned is that 

people’s names got on lists early on, and there needs to be a mechanism to get their names off once it is proven that individuals are 

not associated with the terrorist nexus. 

But when you take a look at the resources that are out there to 

bring these databases together, and once that is done, then the concept of a national watchlist center, which is really kind of the 

switchboard that people would call into to be able to determine if 

an individual they have in front of them is someone that they need 

to be concerned about. This will really fall into alignment with the 

discussion that Mr. Kallstrom is talking about in these regional operation centers that we are talking about. 

Using that scenario, when this process is in effect, when that patrolman out there in Lackawanna pulls someone over and calls 

back into that regional operations center of New York and says, I 

have in front of me a certain individual by the following name, that 

center calls into the National Watchlist Center—which currently is 

under review right now regarding should it reside in the Department of Homeland Security under our umbrella, or is it more appropriate in the FBI, we hope to come to a rapid decision on that 

in working with the White House. But under that scenario, then 

this National Watchlist Center would pull that name from this integrated tracking database to say here is the background on this 

individual. 

Now, what that does then is give that patrolman on the street 

a little bit more information of what he should be looking for. 

Again, to be consistent with the privacy laws, but he may now be 

able to take a look and gain a little bit more information about this 

individual that allows us to take a look at connecting the dots. 

So the database, you are right, sir, it requires the integration. 

We are looking at databases from State Department and TOPOFF. 

We are looking at Treasury Enforcement Communication Systems 

and their database and the FBI database. You are exactly right, 

but I think there is a process in place, and we are moving fast on 

this to be able to get this up and running. 

Mr. TURNER. It just seems to me that in the short term, 

untilthere is a National Watchlist Center, set up in the manner 

that you suggested, that there should be some entity that you create that everybody goes to. We should be capable of at least having 
59

having the same terrorists on all the watchlists. And apparently we 

don’t do that. So I am not sure when you talk about the local patrolman on the beat; I guess he goes to the FBI watchlist. I guess 

that is where he turns, I would assume. I don’t know. 

Mr. PARRISH. His initial entry point would be—and I will let Mr. 

McCraw talk about that, but as he goes in, it would be through the 

national criminal index computer system. You are right. 

If I could, even though it seems there is a disparity here with 

the databases, there are success stories. You all may recall reading 

in the paper of an individual by the name of Omar Shishani in Detroit, and I will quickly tell you in January of 2002, when the FBI 

called me from one of the document exploitation centers and said 

I have a roster here of about 150 names that was found in the terrorist training camp in Kabul, would you be interested in it? And 

I said, sure. Bring it over. 

As we looked at it, very generic names, Al Hindi the Indian, Mohammed the Egyptian, Omar Shishani, the Chechnyan. I said, let’s 

put it in the TECS computer system, the Treasury Enforcement 

Computer System, with a footnote on the bottom that says, ‘‘name 

associated with terrorist training camp,’’ and as you know how that 

system works, we then do our advanced passenger information system sweeps on all international flights coming into the United 

States. 

In July of 2000, a flight coming in from Tokyo to Detroit ran 

through that sweep, and on it appeared Omar Shishani. No date 

of birth, no passport number, but on the bottom was ‘‘name associated with terrorist training camp.’’ An astute Customs inspector 

pulled him aside in a secondary and opened his suitcase, and we 

found $12 million of counterfeit checks with an individual who has 

a long history of association with the Russian Mafia and some of 

the terrorist activities in Chechnya. 

So there are systems that are working in place. You are right, 

sir, we need to integrate these databases to become more efficient, 

and I think the plan is in place to make this happen. 

Mr. TURNER. I think that is an excellent example of why we need 

watchlists. You mention Omar Shishani and how putting him on 

the list resulted in something positive occurring. But, my question 

would be was Omar Shishani on everybody’s watchlist, the 12 different watchlists that are maintained by apparently nine different 

agencies? 

Mr. MCCRAW. Congressman, I can go ahead and try to answer 

your question. First of all, as important it is to improve it—and 

there is a plan in place and TTIC is going to play an important 

part of that plan, the situation is not as bad as it appears on the 

face. First of all, there is really two actual lists, and everything else 

are extracts thereof. The no-fly list is an extract of information provided either by the FBI or the intel community that is either maintained in tipoff or vigtoff, which is a file system within NCIC. Is 

that perfect? No. Clearly there needs to be and they are working 

towards it, and Mr. Parrish talked about the plans in place for a 

watchlist center, and I think appropriately briefed you in terms of 

where we are going. 

Tipoff right now will be incorporated into TTIC, and they will 

take over that particular responsibility. And all of that information 
60

will go into that particular place, and one of the plans in which 

needs to happen—although the FBI subjects now appear in NCIC 

for access to over 600,000 state police officers, that information in 

tipoff is under review that will also be included so that that state 

police officer has access not just in terms of the FBI subjects, but 

in terms of the collective wisdom or about bad guys involved in terrorism by the Intelligence Community and the FBI. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Foresman, you might want to weigh in on this. 

You are down there at the local level. Where would you call if you 

were trying to identify someone and wanted to look at a watchlist? 

Where do you go? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, this is probably a bad day to ask 

me this question, because we just spent the last week trying to get 

someone off of a watchlist only to find out it wasn’t an FBI 

watchlist but someone else’s watchlist that really wasn’t a 

watchlist, and I think that part of the issue here is definitional in 

nature and centralizing in nature. 

Right now we would probably go to the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force through the Bureau as the basis for doing that, but I think 

what is more important is if I have a trooper who is sitting on the 

Capital Beltway around Washington who stops a vehicle, he has no 

way to query the system today, and I think when we critically talk 

about the 700,000 law enforcement personnel, those at the local 

level, those at the State level, Federal law enforcement personnel, 

the bottom line is the beat cop on the street is not having access 

to the information to be able to do a rapid check against it. 

And while I understand that we are certainly making progress 

towards planning for integration, I remain fundamentally concerned we don’t understand what we are designing, because we 

haven’t really mapped out the larger strategic picture as of yet. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COX. Ms. McCarthy. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you very much, panelists, for sharing your thoughts with us once 

again today. 

Mr. COX. Would you yield for just a moment? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Of course. 

Mr. COX. I would like to ask unanimous consent to include my 

opening statement in the record, and I believe you wanted to make 

a similar request. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. I would like to make that request, Mr. Chairman, that my opening remarks be placed in the record as well. 

Mr. COX. Does any other member wish to make a similar request? 

Mr. TURNER. I will make a similar request, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COX. Without objection, the opening statements of all members shall be included in the record. Thank you for yielding. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Foresman, I very much appreciate your experience at the 

local and State level, and I testify there is confusion in the movement of information from the Federal Government to the State and 

the local level, and I wondered if you could share some examples 

with us and ideas on what needs to be done to clear that up. I 

know from my own experience with local responders, they are expe-
61

riencing that in Missouri as well. And I know, Mr. Parrish, based 

on your testimony and your comments yesterday, and today that 

you are very sensitive to this need, but the sources aren’t quite 

there yet to enable the training and other things that need to go 

on. 

But Mr. Foresman, if you would speak to that. I know in your 

testimony you indicated there does not appear to be any overall 

Federal vision and coherent plan across the entire Federal Government that articulates exactly what we are trying to accomplish in 

terms of information and intelligence fusion, analysis and sharing, 

especially related to the involvement of State and local governments. 

How should the Department of Homeland Security and TTIC and 

any other agency optimize information sharing? Because I am quite 

concerned and agree with all of you that the people who are going 

to carry this out are at the State and local level. The knowledge 

is here in Washington, but the people on the front lines, those 

homeland security police and fire and ambulance drivers and others are out there all over America. And how best do we get the information to them that they need so they can do the job when 

called upon? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Well, I will come back and do the two examples 

last and maybe address the latter part of your question first with 

your indulgence. 

I think this is very much an issue of empowering the Department of Homeland Security with clear authority and responsibility 

for bringing all the relevant stakeholders to the table in crafting 

a national vision, one that includes all those Federal agencies with 

component pieces in the intelligence enterprise as well as the local 

stakeholders and the relevant private sector partners. 

There have been a plethora of efforts, both through the Bureau, 

through the Central Intelligence Agency and through the Department of Homeland Security, but they still lack that overarching 

strategic national focus, and I think very much so that whether it 

is the Department of Homeland Security or any other Federal 

agency, we very much need to lock ourselves in the room and actually as we talked about earlier, about another 3 hours’ worth of 

break and we may have solved about everything here today. 

But I think it is critically important that we sit in the room and 

define expectations, do the education, define the business rules for 

sharing information that allows the Bureau to protect that information that it feels like it needs to protect, the Agency, State and 

local governments. There is certain information that State and 

local governments have that should, because of the provisions of 

Congress, not be warehouseable at the Federal level. And we all 

recognize all those things, but we have not sat everybody down and 

created that vertical and horizontal picture in the most macro of 

sense. 

The specific examples I would cite, I would like to go back to the 

fact that we are very much early in this process of this post September 11th environment, but I still—and the challenge—I have a 

great deal of faith in the people sitting at this table, whether it is 

my counterparts in Arizona or New York or the Federal agencies 

that we work with, but remember, I am just one person and I have 
62

to work with a plethora of local officials, whether they are law enforcement, public health, I have to work with elected officials. 

The two examples that come to mind is the Department of Homeland Security in advance of operation Iraqi Freedom was quite active in providing threat information to all of the States and specific 

threat information to the Commonwealth of Virginia. They provided that information in rapid fashion and form, and when we attempted to do that level of local level collaboration as we brought 

our local stakeholders to the table, I will tell you that the level of 

zeal of security of certain sites was not necessarily represented in 

the field agents of the various Federal agencies in the affected 

area, and so we were faced with the conundrum and a legitimate 

conundrum of a police chief saying what do they know in Richmond 

that the field offices don’t know, or what do they know in Washington and so what is the quality of the intelligence. 

A second example actually goes back prior to that when we had 

some credible information that we were dealing with with regard 

to the Commonwealth of Virginia and to DHS’s credit, they went 

to great pains to get that information to us rapidly and succinctly. 

They were good about making sure that all those folks that need 

to be briefed were briefed. 

The problem end is again that there was good agreement between the principals, i.e., those folks who now make up the TTIC, 

the Bureau, headquarters in DHS, headquarters offices about the 

information; but, again, when it went down to the field, the response that we got from the field personnel was that this is old information. This has already been vetted. We sent it to Washington. 

Someone got excited about something that they shouldn’t have gotten excited about. 

Well, from my standpoint, I am left with the challenge of articulating to a governor and to local officials is this credible quality information that you should act upon and do certain measures? I 

think in large part, those were early incidentals in this process, 

and things are beginning to improve, but just as we talked about 

a number of regional initiatives across the northeast, things that 

we are doing in Virginia, things that are going on within Federal 

agencies, who is the air traffic controller for all of these different 

things, and how are we making sure that we are making this whole 

effort operate in harmony and in a synchronized fashion? 

Mr. PARRISH. If I could just add, one of the things, an initiative 

of Under Secretary Libutti is we need to go out and hear from our 

customer base in a follow-up to Congressman Markey’s scenarios 

that he presented. For example, I know that you have interest with 

regard to water supplies. On June 23rd, we put out an extensive 

threat advisory to all States with regard to water safety—water 

supply threats with some protective measures on what they should 

be looking for to handle that. 

It will be valuable for us to get the feedback from Mr. 

Foresman’s office, how did the Commonwealth—how do they use 

that? Was it valuable to them? Was it a good product? What else, 

additional information? 

To Congressman Markey’s scenarios, as I mentioned it had other 

day, the morning following the attack on Riyadh as I was sitting 

at TTIC looking at the sensitive intelligence traffic going back to 
63

TTIC and to the CIA, I said I needed a downgraded product at the 

unclassified level. IA began writing protective measures against 

this new tactic and technique employed by Al Qaeda in those attacks. 

Again, a lengthy document that assessed and analyzed the actual 

tactics and techniques employed against an installation, breaking 

through the fence, assault teams coming in, we took that intelligence, got it unclassified the same day, and we put out a product 

that gave protective measures to State, local and private sectors on 

things they should consider in enhancing their security posture. 

So we put products out there like that to the State and locals, 

but we need feedback to see if that is relevant to them, is it useful 

to them. So, again, it is an initiative of the Under Secretary. We 

are going to get out there and find out exactly has needed. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Anyone else wish to comment? I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, and I thank the panel. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. I want to take the opportunity, Mr. 

Kallstrom, to ask you prospectively about how the 

Counterterrorism Center that you describe in your testimony might 

operate when it opens in August and thereafter. 

Specifically we heard from Mr. Lago that a CIA source is an IT 

solution that deliberates finished intelligence products. Is this 

something that you would expect to take advantage of at that center? 

Mr. KALLSTROM. Sir, I think we would see the center as sort of 

the filter or the go-between between all the collaborative agencies 

in Washington and internationally, for that matter. To the myriad 

of people in the State, probably the law enforcement people first, 

and then there is obviously other people that need to know things. 

And we would be in a position at that center, because we would 

have trained the people, they would have the proper clearances—

and I must just divert and tell you something in my view of 28 

years in the FBI, I see virtually no reason for but a handful of people in any State to have a top secret clearance, by the way, because 

the only reason it is top secret is the information is not anything 

that anyone needs to know. It is—secret is adequate. But the center would then take the information through collaborative efforts 

between the people in the center in Washington, discussions, phone 

discussions, summary reports, different types of intelligence that is 

put out periodically, and we would then put that into real words 

and real action for the cops in a different form to educate them as 

to what they should be looking for, what indications might be, what 

warnings might be so that their eyes and ears work better. That 

is one thing. 

The second thing is a point someone made here earlier, I think 

the gentleman from Texas. A police officer is someone on the side 

of the road that for whatever reason his level of suspicion is raised. 

Maybe there is a hidden NCIC, but maybe just because he presents 

some documentation that looks a little strange or maybe this thing 

is in plain view or whatever the reason, that police officer just radios in to the center in New York who has connectivity with Washington and says, I have this guy and maybe there is a code word 

for an all sources check, please give a check on that, and then instantaneously within minutes, you know, our people in New York 
64

who are sort of an extension of Homeland Security/FBI/CIA, are 

looking at databases to see if this person is of any interest. And 

then the center and Washington together craft what we want that 

officer to do without divulging the sensitive information. Hold the 

guy? Let him go? Delay him? You know, whatever it is, make note 

of whatever is in plain view, blah, blah, blah. And that is how we 

see the process working. 

The other point I want to make is I think it is imperative on the 

part of all of us, particularly in Washington, to break this issue of 

the protection of us as a people into two categories. Category one, 

those things we need to do to stop the next event, to not have another event happen on the soil of this country or against American 

interests elsewhere. Number two, if it does happen, clean up the 

mess. And those things obviously we have to be prepared. Our first 

responders need the right equipment. We need the right protocols. 

They need information. But it is critically important to do a dozen 

things—maybe it is 14. Maybe it is 10—to add the State and local 

resources to this problem, this challenge of not having another 

event happen, and I think we can easily do it, ladies and gentlemen. I think we can do it. I think we need to focus on it, though, 

and not combine all this stuff into one big pot and call it homeland 

security. I think we have to talk about those issues we do to stop 

the event and those issues we do to mitigate if an event happens. 

I think we would have clearer direction and clearer solutions to it 

if we looked at it that simple way. 

Mr. COX. Well, I couldn’t agree with you more on that point. 

Mr. Lago, when you described a CIA source in your testimony, 

you had reference to sharing with DHS. Is that system something 

that on a classified or unclassified basis State and local governments can tap into? 

Mr. LAGO. Today, no. We have nothing in place today. There are 

some issues that you would have to work, you will have to work 

on, on getting the CIA process that close with the State and local 

processes, but as Mr. Kallstrom said—and I think I would echo 

that—the first thing you need is to be able to translate the needs, 

the requirements needs on both sides. We could put a box out there 

and we could give a person a couple weeks training, but I would 

suggest that it has taken—it probably takes us 4 to 6 years to train 

an analyst to be proficient in doing the modeling and using the tool 

to the best of their ability. We have tried to come and work our 

way around that relationship. We have deployed a CIA officer to 

New York. We are fairly proud of the information flow that has 

gone both ways because of that. It clearly has given us more insight into their specific requirements. And quite frankly, we spoke 

different languages when we started this relationship, today we 

have an individual to help translate. 

Now, does that mean to say that we couldn’t put some kind of 

a system in that would allow them the access to those things or 

maybe send an analyst to help them? There are other ways of 

doing it. But I am not sure that just sending a system to them 

would help most of the States. 

Does that answer your question? 

Mr. COX. Well, it certainly raises an important aspect of the 

question, which is that there is judgment involved in determining 
65

what is reasonably likely to require onward passage to State, local, 

and so on, law enforcement and intelligence. 

The MOU obviously contemplates this and states that information that is classified or otherwise subjected to restricted dissemination but which reasonably appears likely to require onward passage to State, local or private sector officials, the public or other 

law enforcement officials goes to DHS with accompanying high-content tear lines suitable for onward passage at the unclassified level. 

That would certainly—and run a lot of the tougher problems that 

we have just been talking about. 

And the question is whether there is an IT solution to that or 

whether this—how is this being done? Is it being done literally 

with tear lines where pieces of paper are being faxed, or how does 

this work? 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, if I could on the access, the CIA source, CT 

link, some of those systems, IA has access to that with our analysts. As I say, we go into those systems daily. We receive that information. We analyze those pieces of intelligence to say what do 

I have here and who needs to know it, what State and local authorities need this, is this regionally oriented to the Northeast sector? Do we need to get that to California? 

We then go back in through the process to get that tear line if 

required, and then that information is provided to us. Now, oftentimes we will go back and say we need more information, that this 

tear line does not meet the needs of our constituents, and we have 

had success with that with the CIA to go back and get that. 

Then—and going back to the concept of RISSNET as we implement this, this will be a secure Internet system not at the classified 

level but it will be password protected. We envision this to be posted on a Web site or we will send it directly via e-mail up to that 

operations center in New York to convey this information to them. 

So that is our job. That is our mission in IA to make sure that 

we are pushing the IC, the Intelligence Community for every piece 

of information that is there that is classified sensitive at a level 

that we deem essential to get out into the hands of the State and 

locals, and right now the system is working. We are working it 

with TTIC, reaching back through CTC, and I am here to say that 

so far, Parrish has never been told no. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Kallstrom. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. If I can just add one thought to close the loop 

on it. You know, I think we have a very good vehicle in place now 

to stop the next attack, and that is the terrorist task forces that 

comprise all the Federal agencies and some select State and local 

police. There is just not enough people on these task forces to know 

what they don’t know, and the missing piece as we talked about 

earlier I think before you came in was we need to find a way from 

the—I am talking about prevention now. We need to find a way to 

let State and local resources be more effective eyes and ears for 

those task forces so we can broaden their knowledge base of what 

is going on in our communities, our towns, our neighborhoods, you 

know, some little town up on the northern border where maybe 

some terrorists are living. The targets may be in New York. They 

may be in Washington. They may be a few other places. The terrorists aren’t necessarily there. 
66

So I think we will go a long way. I think the Federal Government 

appears to be fairly well coordinated now. We have got problems 

with these watch lists. We have got problems with computers, but 

if we can figure out a way of harnessing the State and local assets, 

the law enforcement assets and other assets to be more effective 

lookouts, watchdogs or listening posts for the task forces we already have, I think we will make a geometric leap in the ability 

to protect our society. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could, another 

question for Mr. Parrish. I have to admit that many of us I think 

were surprised when the TTIC was created, because I think many 

of us had expected and wanted to have that type of an entity, that 

function performed by the Information Analysis Directorate, but at 

this point I think many of us are just withholding judgment as to 

whether that is going to work and we will take a wait and see attitude. 

I am concerned, though, and just want to touch on the topic of 

the type of information again that you are receiving, and I know 

this has been discussed, but I want to look at it again. Are you receiving the raw intelligence or mainly the analyzed product? And 

if you are receiving analyzed product rather than the raw intelligence, are you concerned that something might be missed that 

you would have picked up on had your analysts looked at—had direct access to the raw intelligence? And do you feel that the TTIC 

analysts are looking for the same things that you would be at the 

Information Analysis Directorate? 

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir, and I recognize your concern. First, again, 

as we mentioned the other day, is that we are a part of TTIC, the 

Department of Homeland Security. IAIP is a partnership with 

TTIC. We have Department of Homeland Security analysts, the 

IAIP analysts working in TTIC that come there with an operational 

understanding, I should say—or rather, an understanding of the 

operational environment of the Department of Homeland Security. 

A TSA analyst is located there. A Customs and Border Protection 

analyst is there, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

So they are looking at all of that raw intelligence, all of that information that is filtering through TTIC that is coming from the 

entire Intelligence Community, looking at it through the lenses of 

what is relevant to the Department of Homeland Security from the 

standpoint of what is needed for the State and local and private 

sector. 

We are also receiving that information within IA, and we do conduct independent assessments on that intelligence to identify if in 

fact there are credible threats that we need to get out to the private sector, which is State and local. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The raw intelligence as well as analyzed intelligence? 

Mr. PARRISH. Yes, sir. Again as I said the other day, you know 

what you know. I know that we are getting reports. Again, I have 

analysts from those agencies of the IC that have access to their 

systems within IAIP, members of the NSA, from the CIA. So at 

this point in time, I think your assessment is right, is that TTIC 

is a force multiplier right now. It is doing what the administration 
67

intended. At the same time IAIP is certainly in compliance with 

those 19 functions of the Homeland Security Act, of which we are 

charged. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you. We will be monitoring its 

progress, and I certainly would hope that you will share with this 

committee if you have concerns that that arrangement is not working. 

Mr. PARRISH. Sir, if it is not working, I will be right back here 

to tell you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. [Presiding] the Chair recognizes Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. Thank the Chair very much. Back to 

you, Mr. Lago, if I could. Back in October 7th, 3 days before the 

Congress voted on the resolution authorizing the President to go to 

the UN and then to use force if necessary, the President said in 

that speech to the American people and to the Congress at that 

time—he said that—he said, we have learned that Iraq has trained 

Al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases 

and we know that after September 11th Saddam Hussein’s regime 

gleefully celebrated the terrorist attack on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon 

to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists 

could allow the Iraq regime to attack America without ever leaving 

fingerprints. 

Then in the State of the Union Address that the President delivered this year, which laid out the case for why we might have to 

go to war against Saddam Hussein, the President said to the American people as he was concluding the State of the Union address, 

he says, evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications 

and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda; 

secretly and without fingerprints he could provide one of his weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own. 

I am continuing the President’s State of the Union Address. This 

is how he is concluding now. Before September 11th, many in the 

world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained, but chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not 

easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons 

and other plans, at this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would 

take only one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country 

to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do 

everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes. 

Now, we know that on Friday a senior White House official—and 

we know who that is. We just won’t say his name. We know he 

doesn’t want his name mentioned—said that in response to the 

questions about the National Intelligence Estimate that was revealed on Friday that he publicly released, showed that—and I will 

read this now from the National Intelligence Estimate: Saddam if 

sufficiently desperate might decide that only an organization such 

as al Qaeda, already engaged in a life or death struggle against the 

United States, could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he 

would hope to conduct. It went on to say that Hussein might decide 

to take the extreme step of assisting al Qaeda in a terrorist attack 
68

against the United States if it, quote, would be his last chance to 

exact vengeance or by taking a large number of victims with him. 

So thus far the intelligence assessment that Hussein might be a 

potentially bigger threat now than before the United States attacked has yet to be retracted if he wasn’t captured and if these 

materials went into the hands of al Qaeda. 

That being the case, Mr. Lago, again, it is hard for me to understand why a warning hasn’t been passed on to Mr. Daniels, Mr. 

Foresman and others to be on high alert, given the fact that al 

Qaeda has not been yet captured in that country and the materials 

are at large, none of them have yet been identified. Can you explain to me why we are not now giving warnings that reflect the 

National Intelligence Estimate that was used by the President both 

on October 7th and in the State of the Union as a justification for 

me? 

I voted for that resolution, Mr. Lago. So I was relying on the 

President’s holding out. So why isn’t it now being communicated to 

the public that this risk is real, since we haven’t identified either 

al Qaeda or the terrorists which the CIA said was there? 

Mr. Lago. 

Mr. LAGO. Congressman, again, we do not have specific threat information. If we were to give warnings on every piece of general 

information that we have, we would be warning people 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week. We need specific actionable information to put 

out those warnings. We don’t want to be in a position of spooking 

people, and we do that without specific actionable intelligence. 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand what you are saying, but doesn’t this 

intelligence reflect a greatly heightened sense of concern which we 

should have? Now we have—the basic intelligence said he is more 

dangerous if we attack in terms of these materials, and he feels 

desperate, which obviously he does, and these materials would then 

be much more likely to be put into the hands of al Qaeda and other 

terrorist groups. 

Mr. LAGO. Congressman, again, to warn—we are at an elevated 

level of warning today. To warn specific events, we have to have 

actionable intelligence. We do not have specific actionable intelligence. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Kallstrom. 

Mr. KALLSTROM. I can only speak from New York State, but we 

are at a high level of alert. New York City is still at Orange. We 

have done numerous things throughout the State, which I don’t 

want to discuss here, but involving sensors, involving special precautions around special sites. So Congressman, we actually are, 

and just before we went into Iraq, we went up to Orange, as I am 

sure you remember. 

In the New York State, we really have not come down much from 

that from the standpoint of the potential of somebody actually 

doing that, so we have taken it very, very seriously, and we continue to. 

Mr. MARKEY. See, the problem that I have, Mr. Kallstrom, is 

this, is that I agree with this conclusion, and of course the reason 

that I voted for the resolution was that I am from Boston. They 

took over the two planes in Boston. It was Bostonians who were 

on those two planes, and now the Bush administration is opposing 
69

any attempts to screen cargo that comes onto planes coming out of 

Logan Airport, and if this biological or chemical or nuclear material 

tied to an explosive is out there at heightened risk and the administration is still opposing the screening of cargo going onto passenger planes, then that means that the entire intelligence assessment before October 10th, when we voted here in Congress, was 

wrong and that the information the President was communicating 

in the State of the Union was in fact wrong. 

Then the question is was it knowingly wrong, or was it just very 

bad information which the President was relying upon? But I know 

that people in my district are still relying upon these representations by the President based upon CIA and other intelligence agencies, but you can’t have it both ways. You can’t say that it is a 

greater risk and then at the same time you are saying the very 

planes that the President said would be at greater threat if 19 terrorists had these greater weapons aren’t going to screen the cargo 

that is going on passenger planes. You can’t have it both ways. It 

is either one or the other, and the very fact that you don’t have the 

specific threat yet doesn’t mean that there isn’t a plan in place. 

You know, we still haven’t found anybody in Boston helping 

those terrorists that killed all those people from my district. They 

haven’t found anybody even helping them yet. So wouldn’t it be 

wise for us, Mr. Lago, to take the precaution of screening all cargo 

that goes on planes that have passengers on them in the United 

States given the President’s representation? 

Mr. LAGO. Congressman Markey, I am not an expert in that 

area. I do think it is wise for us to be at the elevated state of alert. 

I do think it is wise for us all to take precautions. Again, if we 

don’t have specific actionable information—. 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand that, but I am saying to you—. 

Mr. COX. [Presiding.] The gentleman’s time has expired, but let 

him answer the question. 

Mr. LAGO. There is—. 

Mr. MARKEY. —if you wait until that point in time, you are going 

to have a recurrence of September 11th in Boston, okay. That is 

all I am saying to you. They will put the cargo on the same planes, 

maybe with the same number on the flight and send it off. We 

don’t screen cargo for biological, chemical or nuclear materials that 

would go on in the cargo to find an explosive. 

Mr. LAGO. Sir, again, that is out of the scope of my expertise—

we don’t screen domestic cargo at the CIA, sir. I can’t answer that 

question. 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand, but I think your analysis before that 

the President relied upon is either accurate or inaccurate. I hope 

the President used accurate information. If he did, there is a natural consequence of that to passengers on domestic planes. 

Mr. COX. Mr.Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Parrish, you have 

been with us several times. You know where the sentiment of this 

committee is with regard to the role that the new department 

should play in information, collection and analysis. I think it is fair 

to say, at least on the part of the chairman and I, that we have 

a view based on the reading of the Homeland Security Act that 

your role is very broad, and I certainly appreciate the fact that we 
70

are at a somewhat early stage in the evolution of these relationship. I am glad when I hear Mr. Kallstrom talking about the relationship that he has with the Department. It is based on in many 

cases longtime friendships with Mr. Libutti, and those kinds of 

things are important. But with a country as large as we have, we 

have got to create a system that works for everybody, including Mr. 

Foresman. I see him shaking his head down there. 

And I guess what I hope is that at some point we will be able 

to arrive at such a system, and I hope it is sooner rather than 

later, because I think it is important to our security. 

Just a minute ago I was listening to you talk about your relationship to teinnst the threat integration center. You said we have analysts there, and of course when I hear that—and I think my chairman shares this view—I mean, we think maybe those analysts are 

supposed to be at your shop and what is happening in terms of information flow at TTIC is supposed to be coming to your shop at 

DHS. 

You made a comment that you are pushing the agencies for every 

bit of information when the Homeland Security Act by its very 

words really shouldn’t require you to have to push anybody for information. The statute says you are to get it whether you ask for 

it or not, and you said a moment ago that when you have made 

these requests you have never been told no. Under the Homeland 

Security Act, nobody has the right to ever tell you no, and so I 

think that we can get there. If somebody says no, no, we went 

down the wrong road, the Congress passed this legislation, and it 

gave you this authority, but that was a mistake, then I hope at 

some point somebody would come to us and say we need to change 

the law. Because we all come to this table from different perspectives, and many of you have worked on behalf of the people of 

America for many, many years and you do an outstanding job. We 

like to think that we come to this table with the same motivation, 

and our job is oversight, and our job is to read the statute that we 

pass and see if it is being complied with. I guess many of the frustrations that we probably exchange back and forth relates to that 

different perspective, because I know each of you are doing the 

very best you can to get to the desired goal, and that is making 

America more secure. But I hope you will work with us, because 

if what we put in the statute is wrong, we need to hear that from 

you as well. I would welcome your comment with respect to that 

if you feel I am off base with regard to that observation, I would 

welcome it now. 

Mr. PARRISH. No, sir. I do not think you are off base. As I said 

the day before yesterday, it is not a push-pull system at this point. 

It is still a pull system, but I am telling you that it is working and 

it is getting much better. In my short tenure as the Acting Assistant Secretary, I have received phone calls from members of the Intelligence Community that have said I need to make sure that you 

got this message. 

Again, we are standing up. Some of the IT connectivity is not 

there. We have the work-around because we have representatives 

from the other communities. I can tell you that I worked very late 

last night on some things, and the system was working very well, 
71

and it continued to work this morning when I got back into work 

at 6 o’clock to follow up on where we ended last night. 

Let the record show, sir, that when I am told no and if I ever 

am told no, I will be back to this committee to let you know that 

I was told no. The law is very clear. Under Secretary Libutti has 

made that very clear to his counterparts within the Intelligence 

Community, but at this point in time I have to admit I have seen 

nothing but cooperation from—again, there are personalities involved in this, and I have established some strong relationships 

with senior leadership in the FBI, senior leadership at the CIA, at 

the National Security Agency and other agencies which I meet with 

on a weekly basis, and the system is working right now. 

I think the legislation that this Congress passed is on target. I 

think the list of the 19 functions of which we are held responsible 

for, we are implementing those functions, and I think that legislation as it is written right now is going to be the things that Mr. 

Kallstrom has alluded to in the preventive measures to stop a terrorist attack. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me thank all of you for your patience with 

us today and for your time. I know it has been a long day. You had 

to wait for us to go through a series of votes, and we had lengthy 

questions, even though perhaps we haven’t been as well attended 

in the subcommittee as the panel has, but you have been very generous with your answers to our questions. And, again, each of us 

greatly appreciates your dedication to our country, your deep sense 

of patriotism and your devotion to the task that we know is important to the future of the country. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. COX. Thank you. I want to join my ranking member in 

thanking each of you, Mr. Daniels, Mr. Foresman, Mr. Kallstrom, 

Mr. McCraw, Mr. Lago, Mr. Parrish, for your extended duty today. 

We have benefitted greatly, not only from the time and the resources that you have committed to this hearing but from the fact 

that you have been here together so that we could learn jointly 

from your presentation. 

I think you have inferred from our questions today that the kind 

of commitment, the full commitment to information sharing that 

Congress intended in the Homeland Security Act, in our view at 

least, requires enormous changes in the way the government at all 

levels does its business, and it may require, for example, that agencies be willing to give up ownership and control of information that 

they generate and through IT permit not only sharing that information but also its augmentation by government at all levels in a 

networked environment. 

These are things that are under construction. It is work in 

progress. It is a new way of looking at the world, but I think that 

protecting the American people from attack necessitates these 

things in this if not strange new world in which we live, difficult 

new world in which we live. So what you are doing seems to be exactly the right thing. The fact that you are doing it together is 

more important still. 

We are going to cut you loose. We know some of you have to go, 

and, again, thank you very much for your extended stay today. It 
72

has been enormously beneficial to this committee. This hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD BY WILLAM PARRISH, ACTING ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM HEARING TITLED ‘‘IMPROVEMENTS TO DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION

SHARING CAPABILITIES’’ HELD ON JULY 24, 2003

Status of Information Analysis Office

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act requires the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate to disseminate information analyzed by 

the Department within the Department, to other Federal government agencies, 

state and local governments, and the private sector, in order to assist in the prevention of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.

Question: 1. How many products, and what types of products, has IAIP disseminated to other parts of the Department as of today? To other federal 

government agencies? To state and local governments? To the private sector? Do you consider this number to be adequate? If not, when will you be 

able to disseminate the desired number of products? 

Response: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection has disseminated 46 

products to other federal government agencies, 48 to state and local governments, 

and 41 to the private sector. Procedure dictates that a draft of a bulletin or advisory 

is vetted through twelve internal DHS divisions, as well as through outside sources, 

for approval. Once the product has been vetted, it is then disseminated to DHS. At 

no point has the necessary information or a needed product not been distributed. 

The figures above, therefore, accurately represent the number desired.

Question: 2. How frequently does IAIP disseminate intelligence products? 

Can you give some examples of the products? Will you provide them to the 

Subcommittee? 

Response: The Homeland Security Information Summary (HSIS) is briefed and distributed electronically daily to DHS leadership and component intelligence chiefs, as 

well as to selected members of the intelligence community. Additionally, IAIP compiles the information received from DHS operational elements into the Homeland 

Security Intelligence Report (HSIR) or into a restricted version (the HSIR–R). IAIP 

also produces a Spot Report in advance of the daily report when it is necessary to 

begin processing critical material immediately. Lastly, IAIP produces the Secretary’s 

Morning Brief, a daily compilation of in-depth analytical perspectives on significant 

recent, and developing, issues affecting homeland security and DHS. Although some 

products have been provided to Congress in the past, DHS, Office of Legislative Affairs is developing a more formal and automatic process to pass appropriate level 

products to a variety of committees in Congress. These products will be provided to 

the Committee as appropriate to their level of classification.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

During the joint hearing held on Tuesday on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, you testified that you hope to have about 150 analysts in your office by next 

year. Mr. Brennan, the Director of TTIC, testified that TTIC will have about 300 

analysts when fully staffed.

Question: 3. Will 150 analysts be adequate to carry out all the missions of 

the Information Analysis office? How did you determine what the correct 

number should be? How does that mission compare to the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center, which will have 300 analysts when fully staffed? If 

TTIC will have 300, how can IA only have 150 in light of its broad mission? 

Response: Yes. One hundred and fifty analysts is an adequate number to carry out 

the missions of Information Analysis. The number was determined by Information 

Analysis Division Chiefs based on years of experience in the Intelligence Community. The missions of TTIC and Information Analysis differ in that IA deals only 

in intelligence that involves threats to the Homeland. TTIC deals in all threat-related information and therefore has more information flowing in on a daily basis. 
73

Information Analysis also has the added benefit of analysts in other DHS component entities that pass threat-related information to IA.

At the hearing on TTIC on July 22, Mr. Brennan testified that an agency, such as 

the CIA, that has threat information provides it to both TTIC and the Information 

Analysis office of DHS simultaneously.

Question: 4. Can you explain what happens at that point? What does your 

office do with the information that is distinct from what TTIC does? 

Response: Information that comes into Information Analysis is independently analyzed and assembled with all domestic threat-related information flowing into the 

Department. This information is matched with known capabilities and 

vulnerabilities to produce an overall threat picture that allows IA to issue warning 

products to other federal government agencies, state and local governments and the 

private sector. TTIC receives all domestic and international threat-related information and sends reports to IA regarding domestically relevant intelligence, particularly to support its critical infrastructure protection responsibilities. TTIC does not 

communicate with anyone outside of the Intelligence Community. 

Question: 5. After TTIC and the Information Analysis office both process the 

information, what happens then? What is the ‘‘output’’ of the Information 

Analysis office? Who receives this output? How is it different from what the 

TTIC would do with the same information? 

Response: The ‘‘output’’ of the Information Analysis office is the afore-mentioned 

warning and intelligence products, based on information from DHS entities and 

members of the Intelligence Community. IA differs from TTIC in that all IA products deal solely in threats to the Homeland while TTIC deals in the overall threat 

picture. IA delivers its ‘‘output’’ to other federal government agencies, state and 

local governments and the private sector. TTIC does not communicate with the public.

Responsibilities of the Information Analysis Office

The Information Analysis office, in particular its Information & Warnings Division, 

is responsible for administering the Homeland Security Advisory System. Many 

state and local officials have complained that there is little guidance accompanying 

changes in the threat level.

Question: 6. Can you describe, specifically, what guidance the Information 

Analysis office provided to state and local officials during the recent 

changes in the threat level form yellow to orange and back to yellow? Did 

the office recommend that state and local officials take any specific actions 

other than be at a higher state of alert? 

Response: When the threat level was changed from yellow to orange on May 20, 

2003, specific protective measures were included in the Advisory that was widely 

disseminated. Upon deciding to lower the alert level back to yellow on May 30, 2003, 

DHS/IAIP distributed a product that included an overview of the existing situation 

and suggested that those receiving the product maintain surveillance of critical locations, assess emergency plans, and provide a visible presence as a viable form of 

deterrence. The report detailed such actions as the use of random or rolling patrol 

operations and encouraged individuals to report information concerning suspicious 

or criminal activity to law enforcement. Specific suggestions regarding what type of 

threat exists, recommended increased security measures, and as many details regarding suspicious activity as can be reported continue to be included in products 

issued by IA.

Question: 7. Who do you believe your ‘‘customers’’ are? Do you intend to develop intelligence products tailored to each type of ‘‘customer’’ of the Information Analysis office? 

Response: Information Analysis is dedicated to sharing information with the Intelligence Community, TTIC, DHS entities, and to serving other federal government 

agencies, state and local governments and the private sector as is relevant. Information Analysis, through these bodies and through its cooperation with other DHS entities, consequently serves the public at large.

Question: 8. Have you met with the officials and agencies that are your ‘‘customers’’ to determine what information they need from your office and in 

what form? 

Response: Information Analysis receives feedback on its communication with its 

‘‘customers’’ through a variety of channels. The State and Local and Private Sector 

Directorates within the Department of Homeland Security convey the feedback they 
74

receive from their components and IA is in regular communication with the federal 

government agencies and Intelligence Community members it works with.

In your testimony, you discussed that DHS has operational personnel, such as Border Patrol and Customs inspectors, who are in positions to collect information that 

could be useful to the rest of the Department and the government as a whole.

Question: 9. What systems are in place for regular reporting from those on 

the front lines to IAIP? Do the personnel on the front lines know what they 

should report? Can you give some examples of information that has been 

collected by Border Patrol or Customs that has been reported to IAIP and 

shared with other agencies? 

Response: The operational personnel within DHS entities such as Border and 

Transportation Security operate through their own intelligence components. IA receives threat information from these components. Personnel on the front lines diligently observe and report intelligence and threat-related information such as suspicious activity at the nation’s borders and suspect names discovered through daily 

activity.

You testified that there is work being done on a national watchlist center, and that 

there has not been a final decision on whether it would be at the Department or 

the FBI.

Question: 10. What is the time line for this process? When will the national 

watchlist be in place? What agencies are working on the problem?

The Terrorist Screening Center, now in existence, is a central point at which the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) will be consolidated and administered. TSC 

operations were phased in and became operational 1 December 2003. The TSC, a 

multi-agency effort, involves the expertise of the FBI, DHS, and State Department. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM STEVEN C. MCCRAW, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1. The FBI has been criticized in the past for its unwillingness to share information. The March, 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between the 

Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security provides that the FBI is to provide Electronic Communications (ECs) and interview summaries known as ‘‘302s’’?

Question: Is the FBI currently providing ECs and 302s to the Department of 

Homeland Security? If not, why not?

Response: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is sharing a very large 

amount of information and intelligence with the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), primarily through electronic cable message traffic. The FBI also provides information and intelligence through Electronic Communications (BCs) and FD–302s 

when these documents can independently fulfill a Request for Information (RFI) 

without revealing protected sources or methods. In either instance, the intelligence 

contained in FBI documents/ communications is made available to DHS, as provided 

for in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). To further assist in the flow of 

information, two FBI Supervisory Special Agents have been posted to DHS since 

April 2003.

Due to the internal structure of DHS, a determination was made to create two parallel RFI channels to ensure the proper sharing of information. The first channel 

was the RFI process for ‘‘emergent threat’’ information. Because of the time sensitivity of this type of RFI, the system calls for direct connectivity between the DHS 

Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the FBI Counterterrorism 

Watch. The majority of these RFIs are either by telephone or by facsimile. The 

HSOC now assigns a tracking number to all RFIs.

The Director of the HSOC has initiated a program whereby a DHS Senior Watch 

Officer (SWO) is detailed to the Counterterrorism Watch on a 90-day rotating basis. 

The SWO educates the Counterterrorism Watch on the mission and needs of the 

HSOC and, by learning how the Counterterrorism Watch defines and manages 

emergent threat matters, is additionally able to serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ of the 

HSOC.

The second channel of information sharing is the method by which all requests for 

nonemergent (i.e., routine) information, such as investigative updates and analytical 

products, are processed. Procedurally, these requests are collected and sent via cable 

from the DHS Information Management and Requirements Division (IMRD) to FBI 
75

Headquarters (FBIHQ), where they are received by the Executive Staff of the 

Counterterrorism Division. Responses are sent by FBIHQ via cable back to IMRD 

for dissemination to the request’s originator.

In addition to these RFI processes, information sharing initiatives have included numerous briefings and meetings both at DHS and the FBI, including weekly Intelligence briefings at the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center where 

DHS selects the topic to be covered and the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division provides the briefer. The FBI provides to DHS virtually all of its terrorism analytical 

products that are disseminated externally.

2. The same Memorandum of Understanding indicates that the TTIC and 

the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) will have a role in the information sharing. 

Question: Can you explain what the current roles of TTIC and JTTFs are? 

Does the FBI share information directly with the Department of Homeland 

Security, or only through the TTIC and JTTFs?

Response: The mission of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) is to enable full integration of terrorist threat information and analysis. It is a multi-agency 

joint venture that integrates and analyzes terrorist threat-related information collected domestically and abroad, and disseminates information and analysis to appropriate recipients. TTIC sponsors a website that increasingly includes products tailored to the needs of state and local officials and private industry, so that DHS and 

the FBI (who are the designated conduits of information to these entities) can readily pass this information along.

The 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are the United States Government’s 

primary counterterrorism operational entities throughout the United States. The 

JTTFs team FBI Agents with state and local law enforcement officials, as well as 

representatives of DHS and other federal agencies, to coordinate counterterrorism 

investigations and share information. The JTTFs investigate and follow up operationally on leads provided by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the FBI, 

and other intelligence agencies. The JTTFs also serve as conduits of state and local 

law enforcement information to the FBI.

In accordance with the Homeland Security Act of November 2002 and other statutory requirements and interagency agreements, the FBI furnishes information directly to the Department of Homeland Security, as discussed in response to Question 1.

3. Your office in the FBI is a new one, and was created as a response to 

the criticism of the FBI’s weaknesses in analysis.

Question: Can you explain the role of your office in relation to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of DHS, and the 

TTIC? For instance, if a FBI field office has terrorism information, is it reported to your office and then in turn to DHS and TTIC?

Response: The Office of Intelligence (OI) is the program manager for the FBI-wide 

Intelligence Program. As such, the OI manages intelligence requirements, collection 

tasking, information sharing policy, standards, the analytic cadre, and oversight of 

the FBI’s distributed intelligence production mission. The core principle of the FBI 

Intelligence program is the integration of intelligence with FBI counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal operations. The actual intelligence production mission takes place within those FBI investigative programs and in all operational divisions both at Headquarters and in the Field. The OI ensures that intelligence production is accomplished against a common set of priorities and according 

to a common set of protocols and policies regarding analysis and dissemination. Additionally, the OI develops training and certification standards for intelligence professionals, both analysts and agents.

The FBI produces two types of intelligence: 1) raw intelligence in response to intelligence requirements from the National Security and Homeland Security Councils; 

and 2) assessments to support FBI operations and those of our partners in the larger National Security Community, to include our state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners. Both raw intelligence and assessment reports are passed from 01 

elements embedded in HQ divisions and the field to our customers according to a 

common set of standards and policies.

TIIC is an intelligence analysis organization with two core functions. First, it directs 

the work of raw intelligence producers like the FBI by identifying gaps in our 

knowledge and issuing requirements for intelligence collection and production with 
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respect to key threat areas. Second, it produces all-source threat analyses for the 

larger National Security Community. The OI ensures that TIIC intelligence requirements are tasked to FBI collectors and that assessments requested by TIIC are produced in a timely fashion. In addition, the OI manages the FBI analytic cadre embedded in TTIC. FBI analysts bring the authorities and intelligence information produced by the FBI directly to TTIC by virtue of their access to FBI systems and databases from TTIC space. In this way, the FBI is able to apply all its information to 

TTIC’s mission of providing consolidated terrorist threat information to the National 

Security Community.

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) component of DHS 

is an information and analysis organization with two core functions. First, it overlays threat information from all producers in the United States and proposes countermeasures. Second, through its participation in the larger national intelligence requirements process, it directs raw intelligence producers to provide information 

based on its analysis of vulnerabilities in the U.S. infrastructure. In addition, like 

the FBI’s OI, DHS IAIP provides a full range of intelligence support to DHS leadership and manages the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of DHS information from its operational components (Coast Guard, Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcemnt, and Customs and Border Protection). DHS has assigned to the FBI a senior representative, 

who is attached to the FBI’s OI. That assignment ensures that all information required by DHS is passed to it expeditiously by the FBI.

4. The FBI has long established relationships with state and local law enforcement. The hearing held on July 22 indicated that state and local officials are receiving information from both the Department of Homeland Security and through the JTTFs.

Question: What determines whether a piece of .information from the federal 

government is shared through DHS or the JTTFs? Are there any protocols 

or guidance?

Response: The JTTFs are the operational and investigative arms of the United 

States Government in the war on terrorism. Because of this responsibility, the FBI 

is tasked with dissemination of information on terrorism (including operational and 

investigative information, as wellas general threat information) to the JTTFs, which 

utilize the information to conduct investigations and/or cover leads. This information 

is provided through the JTTF structure to state and local JTTF members who possess the appropriate security clearances. In addition, FBIHQ distributes weekly intelligence bulletins to all law enforcement officials through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Law Enforcement Online program, the 

Regional Information Sharing System, and the National Electronic Alert System. 

The Special Agent in Charge of each FBI field office is tasked with further disseminating general terrorism threat information to members of the state and local law 

enforcement community through established methods. These methods may include 

regularly scheduled briefings, working groups, newsletters, e-mails, and similar vehicles. Terrorism threat information is shared on a daily basis between the FBI and 

DHS.

DHS passes threat information on to their state Homeland Security Directors, who 

are charged with notifying first responders in each state. Because many of these 

first responders are members of the law enforcement community, they often receive 

information from both the FBI and DHS.

There is close coordination between the FBI and DHS in the dissemination of terrorism intelligence information. All weekly FBI Intelligence Bulletins are reviewed 

by DHS prior to release by the FBI. The FBI and DHS have also agreed to protocols 

requiring coordination of changes made to the Homeland Security threat level. The 

sharing of information on terrorism intelligence was formalized in the March 2003 

MOU referenced above.

5. You testified at the hearing that the FBI still has responsibility for ‘‘domestic terrorism.’’

Question: Can you define the term ‘‘domestic terrorism’’? For matters that 

fall in that definition of ′′domestic terrorism,′′ is the FBI the only agency 

with responsibilities? Does DHS have any role?

Response: As codified at 18 U.S.c. section 2331(5), the term ‘‘domestic terrorism’’ 

means activities that: 

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 

laws of the United States or of any State; 
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(B) appear to be intended 

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidationor coercion; or 

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 

(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

While the overall role of the FBI in coordinating the Federal Government’s response 

to a terrorist incident has changed pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2/28/03), the FBI still maintains responsibilities regarding domestic terrorism. DHS has assumed responsibility to coordinate the Federal Government’s 

overall response to domestic terrorism incidents, including a major terrorist attack 

on U.S. soil. The FBI’s role in domestic terrorism concentrates on criminal investigative and counterterrorism intelligence missions, tactical resolution of terrorist-related incidents, and the coordination of the law enforcement community’s response 

to a terrorist incident. The creation of DHS in no way alters the FBI’s chain of command. The Attorney General continues to have the lead responsibility for criminal 

investigation of terrorist acts and terrorist threats. The FBI continues to be the lead 

law enforcement agency to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist acts 

against the United States. While active coordination with DHS will be maintained, 

the FBI’s investigative role in domestic terrorism will be preserved.

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR JAMES K. KALLSTROM FROM CHAIRMAN 

GIBBONS 

Question: 1. Who provides you with information about terrorist threats? Is 

it the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, or another agency? If 

you receive information from both, can you determine what types of information are being channeled through DHS or the FBI? Is it a problem to receive terrorism information from the federal government through more 

than one channel?

Answer: 1. The NYS Office of Public Security (OPS) receives terrorism threat-related information from a variety of federal sources. DHS and FBI supply frequent 

informational bulletins regarding current and historical terrorist trends, potential 

targets for terrorism (in general terms), potential indicators for terrorism, suggested 

protective measures for critical infrastructure, etc. DHS and FBI normally coordinate the dissemination of such information; both agencies contribute to the content 

and therefore a specific bulletin/advisory is only disseminated through one channel. 

In addition, DHS distributes related press releases, scripts of counter-terrorism related testimonies, and daily incident reports indicating possible terrorist activity nationwide.

As discussed in my testimony, shortly after September 11th 2001, OPS created 16 

Counter-Terrorism Zones for the purpose of facilitating the dissemination of terrorrelated information and best practices, while promoting cooperation and collaboration among local, county and state law enforcement agencies on a regional basis. 

OPS also created the Counter-Terrorism Network, a secure, stand-alone system to 

distribute counter-terrorism and threat-based information and intelligence. Through 

these developed methodologies of information sharing, OPS disseminates the abovementioned advisories from DHS and other federal agencies, as well as information 

generated by our office and other state and local agencies. Therefore, statewide law 

enforcement is uniformly kept abreast of current terrorist trends and indicators, enabling them to play a more effective role in the prevention of acts of terror in our 

state and country.

Our office also maintains contacts at other federal agencies, such as the CIA and 

the DOD, as well as other state homeland security offices and law enforcement 

agencies, and therefore may receive threat information in a less formal manner (i.e. 

phone call, fax, etc.) All information classified above ′′Law Enforcement Sensitive′′

is generally relayed in person or over a secure phone line.

Our office attends meetings and conferences with international intelligence and law 

enforcement agencies in effort to share information across national borders. We 

maintain contact with Canadian, British, German and other foreign counterparts.

Question: 2. Can you compare the status of information sharing prior to the 

passage of the Homeland Security Act to the present situation? What, if 

anything, has changed?

Answer: 2. Information sharing between federal, state and local governments has 

improved significantly since the passage of the Homeland Security Act. The Depart-
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ment of Homeland Security hosts bi-weekly regional conference calls with state 

homeland security representatives, touching base on local, national and international terrorism issues. DHS formalized a method of sharing terrorism information on a continual and frequent basis by distributing information bulletins and 

advisories (see AI) to our office so we may further disseminate information to appropriate law enforcement agencies and private sector constituents within New York 

State.

In addition, state and local representatives are invited to attend FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) meetings held weekly to share and discuss current general and specific threat posture items of concern.

The creation of DHS has sparked the creation of federal information sharing centers 

like the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorism Screening 

Center (TSC). TTIC, designed to serve as a depot and analytical center for all collected foreign and domestic intelligence, will facilitate the flow of raw and analyzed 

intelligence between federal, state and local law enforcement and intelligence communities. The TSC is designed to allow a state or local law enforcement officer to 

access federal watch list information in ‘‘real time’’ when he/she comes in contact 

with a suspicious individual during routine traffic stops, etc. This process can potentially help police officers intercept a terrorist and prevent the next attack.

However, these federal systems of improved information sharing will be effective 

only if the process does indeed work in ‘‘real time’’ and is unhampered by bureaucracy and interagency cultural differences. In reality, information sharing is often 

hindered between agencies due to nonequivalence of security clearance levels. Additionally, some federal agencies classify information, which is received at an unclassified level from foreign sources, thus rendering it difficult for us to further ascertain 

credibility or corroboration with the help of our federal intelligence agencies.

New York State and the nine other states comprising the Northeast Homeland Security Agreement have advanced a feasible system of ‘‘one-stop shopping’’ to enable 

the realtime dissemination of relevant counter-terrorism information to law enforcement. As outlined in my testimony, the Northeast Homeland Security Agreement 

has proposed the implementation of this information-sharing pilot program to the 

Department of Homeland Security. The currently operational Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center (UNYRIC) will serve as the central hub of intelligence 

gathering, analysis and dissemination between law enforcement agencies in these 

northeastern states. This facilitated flow of counterterrorism information will enable 

state and locals to assist the efforts of the JTTF’s. The proposal has been detailed 

and pending with the DHS since November 2003. It is our view that the conception 

and approval of this Northeast Regional information-sharing center, rather than 

federal intelligence centers, will better serve law enforcement personnel in New 

York State and the surrounding region. Finally, sensitive threat information and information regarding threat level changes is often prematurely released to the media. 

This makes it difficult for our office to share such information in a controlled and 

secure environment, leading law enforcement to discredit the intelligence community’s ability to handle and effectively disseminate sensitive information from the 

federal to local level.

Question 3. Can you describe what happened when the threat level was 

raised or lowered in recent months? How did you find out about the 

change in the threat level? What guidance did you receive from the Department of Homeland Security at the time the threat levels changed?

Answer: 3. The national and New York State alert levels were recently elevated 

to Orange on December 21,2003. That day, the Department of Homeland Security 

held several conference calls with our office and other state homeland security representatives. Secretary Ridge and other intelligence community (IC) representatives 

shared information regarding current threat posture, including intelligence indicators requiring the US to raise its terrorism alert level. Implementing Operation Liberty Shield at the federal level was discussed on the call, thus providing guidance 

to states for implementing their own deployment plans. The conference call and subsequent DHS advisory provided detailed information on the types of critical infrastructure terrorist groups may attempt to target and supplied guidance on the steps 

state and local law enforcement should take in protecting such targets.

When the alert level was lowered to yellow on January 9,2004, DHS conducted another conference call with state homeland security representatives to explain the 

lowering of the alert level and suggested reducing resources and security personnel 

deployed at strategic locals during Orange Alert.
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Question: 4. Do you have a sense that the information you receive from the 

Federal Government is coordinated? Do you ever receive conflicting information from different Federal agencies? If so, what examples can you provide to the committee?

Answer: 4. Since its inception, OPS has received information from a wide variety 

of federal agencies. This information usually appears to have been discussed among 

the various IC agencies prior to its dissemination to state and local authorities and 

there is clearly some consensus as to the threat/analysis/credibility of the information.

However, on occasion, our office has been in receipt of information from one federal 

agency that has clearly not been coordinated with other appropriate federal agencies 

prior to dissemination. There has been occasions where federal agencies are completely unaware of this information or if it was aware, it had assessed the credibility 

of the source or analyzed the intelligence in a drastically different manner. On occasion, we have had federal agencies contact our office for information when it would 

have been more appropriate to reach out directly to another IC agency.

Question: 5. If you run across information during your duties that could indicate potential terrorist activity, where would you report that information 

at the federal level? Is it the FBI? Do you know if the FBI shares that information with the DHS or with any other federal agencies?

Answer: 5. OPS does not have an investigative arm thus the office reports all terrorist threat related info to relevant counter-terrorism agencies. For example, if intelligence reporting indicates an imminent threat, OPS would immediately contact 

911 and then the relevant federal, state and local agencies.

If the threat does not appear imminent, information is distributed based on jurisdiction. OPS reports information related to New York City to the New York City Terrorism Tip Line–(888) NYC-SAFE that is handled out of the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center (UNYRIC). UNYRIC, based in Latham, New York, serves 

as a regional center to facilitate the collection, analysis. and dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence.

If the information is specific to another part of New York State, OPS reports information to the New York State Terrorism Tip Line—(866) SAFE-NYS. Both the New 

York City and the New York State Police evaluate the information and based on 

initial investigations, either choose to conduct further in-house investigations or 

pass the intelligence to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). On occasion, 

our office has passed information directly to the JTTF’s when it appears very specific in nature to indicate federal jurisdiction.

When OPS has been in receipt of threat information pertaining to other states, we 

have reported said information to the state’s respective homeland security office 

and/or appropriate law enforcement agencies at the federal, state or local level.

Question: 6. Has the Information Analysis office ever contacted you to coordinate training for your employees regarding information sharing? If no, 

does another federal agency provide such training?

Answer: 6. Neither the DHS’ Information Analysis Office nor any other DHS division has contacted OPS with regard to training our employees or providing training 

to other relevant officials within New York State. OPS has and will continue to orchestrate and offer counter-terrorism training for state and local law enforcement 

officers and first responders throughout New York State. Our office has taken the 

approach that continuing education is essential in this field and has implemented 

many programs in this regard. OPS welcomes educational and training initiatives 

provided by DHS and other relevant agencies for both our own staff and other relevant personnel involved in the war on terror.

Our office encourages DHS to utilize the resources available in the departments 

under its command and within the agencies of the Intelligence Community to coordinate training in a variety of areas. New York can benefit from additional training 

in; analytical skills, the creation of threat matrixes, data mining, first response, 

chem/bio-terrorism, radiological terrorism, infrastructure protection, general aviation threats/security, fraudulent documents, etc.

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