NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0203 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. S8015JD202200004 

The Honorable Rick A Williams, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Darrian Johnson, Jacksonville, Florida 

Appellant Father 

Robert Ian Casey, Esq., Phoenix 

Advisory Counsel for Appellant Father 

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff 

By Chad Joshua Winger 

Counsel for Appellant Mother 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Ken Sanders 

Counsel for Appellee DCS 

Bobbie Shin, Esq., Kingman 

Counsel for Appellee Children

FILED 03-28-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe 

joined. 

F O S T E R, Judge: 

¶1 Alyssa S. (“Mother”) and Darrian J. (“Father”) separately 

appeal a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to A.J. and 

A.B. For the following reasons, this Court affirms. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of A.J. and A.B., born in 

December 2018 and December 2021, respectively. Shortly after A.B. was 

born, the Department of Child Safety (“Department”) learned that both 

children were born exposed to illicit drugs and that the parents engaged in 

domestic violence in A.J.’s presence. Due to the children’s substance 

exposure, they each had significant developmental and cognitive delays, 

were particularly vulnerable, and required numerous medical and therapy 

appointments per week between the two of them. 

¶3 The Department petitioned for dependency, took custody of 

the children in January 2022, and placed them in separate foster homes. The 

Department also learned that in 2020, Mother was convicted of child 

endangerment and driving under the influence in Florida and her 

probation was transferred to Arizona. It also learned that Father was 

diagnosed with marijuana and opioid dependence. The children were 

adjudicated dependent as to Father in March 2022 and as to Mother in July 

2023. 

¶4 The Department pursued a reunification plan. To that end, it 

required that Mother and Father maintain sobriety, provide a home free of 

alcohol and substance abuse, and demonstrate an ability to provide for the 

children’s basic and special needs. The Department offered the parents the 

following services: child and family team meetings, individual counseling, 

parent aide services, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, 

transportation, and visitation. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

¶5 During this time, the Department connected with Mother, but 

she failed to maintain contact or engage in reunification services. In 

February 2023, Mother was arrested in Nevada and extradited to Florida, 

where she remained. Despite attempts to reach her through the Florida 

Department of Corrections, there was no response. 

¶6 Father initially participated in the services offered. But he 

regularly canceled visits and was not consistent with the required drug 

testing. He moved to Florida during these proceedings for assistance with 

stability but failed to follow through when the Department made a request 

to initiate placement of the children with him under the Interstate Compact 

on the Placement of Children. 

¶7 In May 2023, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights on three grounds: abandonment, chronic substance abuse, 

and time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (3), (8). As for Father, two grounds 

were alleged: chronic substance abuse and time-in-care. Id. at (B)(3), (8). At 

the termination hearing in September 2023, the Department’s child safety 

specialist testified that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests. 

¶8 Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights. It found the Department had proven by clear 

and convincing evidence the grounds for termination, and by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parents’ rights was 

in the best interests of A.J. and A.B. Mother and Father timely appealed. 

This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 

12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

¶9 Termination of the parent-child relationship entails a twostep inquiry. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 8 (2018). 

First, the juvenile court must determine by clear and convincing evidence 

that a statutory ground for termination listed in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists. Id.

If a ground for termination has been appropriately established, “the court 

must [then] determine by a preponderance of the evidence that severance 

is in the child’s best interests.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 

471, 477, ¶ 20 (2023) (quoting Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 

227, ¶ 12 (2020)) (alteration in original). 

¶10 Termination orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 213, ¶ 5 (App. 2016). Because 

“the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

witness credibility,” this Court will uphold the juvenile court’s termination 

unless clearly erroneous and will accept its findings of fact if supported by 

reasonable evidence and inferences. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 

3, ¶ 9 (2016). The juvenile court’s findings of fact are viewed in the light 

most favorable to affirming the court’s order. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000). 

¶11 Here, Mother challenges the termination of her parental 

rights to A.J. and A.B., arguing the juvenile court’s best-interests finding 

was based on insufficient evidence and lacked the requisite specificity. 

Father challenges the termination seemingly on the substance-abuse and 

fifteen-month out-of-home placement grounds and challenges the 

adequacy of the Department’s reunification efforts. 

I. Mother Waived Her Claim. 

¶12 On appeal, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s 

findings that the termination of her parental rights was warranted on the 

grounds of abandonment, substance abuse, or out-of-home placement. 

Therefore, Mother has waived these issues on appeal and conceded the 

accuracy of the juvenile court’s findings on those issues. Britz v. Kinsvater, 

87 Ariz. 385, 388 (1960). Instead, Mother challenges the best interests 

finding, claiming that it is based on insufficient evidence and lacks the 

requisite specificity. 

¶13 Mother also waived this issue by failing to raise it in the 

juvenile court. “Generally, failure to raise an argument in the juvenile court 

waives the issue on appeal.” Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 

536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (citation omitted). This includes “when a party first 

raises the issue of insufficient findings on appeal and the order includes at 

least some statutorily required factual findings.” Id. at 536, ¶ 10; see also, e.g.,

Aleise H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 569, 572–73, ¶¶ 11–13 (App. 2018) 

(applying waiver doctrine to a claim that the juvenile court’s findings were 

inadequate); Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 371, ¶¶ 5–

6 (App. 2009) (finding waiver where party challenged the specificity of 

factual findings for the first time on appeal and the order contained some 

factual findings). “[T]he decision to find waiver is discretionary.” Logan B., 

244 Ariz. at 536, ¶ 9.

¶14 Mother did not object to the evidence that was presented 

during trial. After the juvenile court issued its written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, Mother did not object or move to alter or amend the 

final order on the ground that the court did not enter sufficient findings of 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

fact or legal conclusions as required by law. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 317(a)(2). 

Because she has failed to challenge the findings before the juvenile court, 

Mother’s argument is waived. 

II. The Best-Interests Finding Was Sufficient. 

¶15 Although Mother waived her challenge to the best-interests 

findings, this Court may address the merits of an argument in its discretion, 

as it does here. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 536, ¶ 9. 

¶16 Mother contends that the juvenile court’s determination of the 

children’s best interests amounted to an abuse of discretion. She argues the 

court’s termination of her parental rights would not ensure the children’s 

requisite stability and permanence, because the Department never 

attempted to preserve the family. 

¶17 “At the best-interests stage of the analysis, we can presume 

that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has 

already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12 (internal 

quotations omitted). Therefore, when, as here, the court finds “that a parent 

is unfit, the focus shifts to the interests of the child as distinct from those of 

the parent.” Id.

¶18 The court’s best-interests determination must include a 

finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed 

by the continuation of the relationship. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990) (citations omitted). The court may consider a 

child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, 

¶ 1. The court is not required to state, “every fact upon which his or her 

findings are based.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 452, 

¶ 19.

¶19 Here, Mother does not dispute that the juvenile court made 

the following specific best-interests findings: (1) termination would benefit 

the children because it would further the case plan of adoption since they 

are in potential adoptive placements; (2) the adoptive placements meet the 

children’s higher needs; (3) the adoptive placements provide structure, 

consistency, and the ability to take the children to required medical visits; 

(4) the children would suffer a detriment if returned to the parents care due 

to the parents’ ongoing substance abuse; and (5) neither parent was in a 

position to provide the children with safety, stability, and a sober home. No 

contradictory evidence was presented. Further, the Department did make 

efforts to preserve the family, but Mother failed to cooperate with those 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

efforts. This reasonable evidence and the inferences from it support the 

court’s factual findings and legal conclusion that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. See Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 

231, ¶¶ 32–33 (2020) (affirming best-interests analysis because reasonable 

evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that severance would 

benefit the children). 

III. Father Waived His Claim. 

¶20 Father separately contends that his rights should not be 

terminated as he is working on reunification. However, Father’s failure to 

cite law or reference the record in his opening brief prevents this Court’s 

review of his claims. 

¶21 For every issue raised in an opening brief there must be 

supporting reasons for each, with citations to supporting legal authorities 

and references to the record on appeal. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7); Ariz. 

R.P. Juv. Ct. 607(b). “[O]pening briefs must present significant arguments, 

supported by authority, setting forth an appellant’s position on the issues 

raised[; f]ailure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and 

waiver of that claim.” State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989). “Arguments 

that are unsupported by legal authority and adequate citation to the record 

are waived.” J.W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, 188, ¶ 11 (App. 2021). 

This Court “may reject an argument based on [the] lack of proper and 

meaningful argument alone.” Id. A self-represented party is held to the 

same standards as a represented party. See Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 

83, ¶ 24 (2017) (“We hold unrepresented litigants in Arizona to the same 

standards as attorneys.”). 

¶22 Father’s failure to comply with Civil Appellate Procedure 

Rule 13 waives any issues he may have wished to submit for this Court’s 

review. Nevertheless, this Court may address the merits of an argument in 

its discretion. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 536, ¶ 9. 

IV. Father’s Termination. 

¶23 Father seemingly argues that the court did not have adequate 

evidence to support the termination and that the Department’s efforts at 

reunification were inadequate. 

¶24 The juvenile court may terminate the rights of a parent who 

is “unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol” if 

“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

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a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). “Chronic 

substance abuse is long-lasting but not necessarily constant substance 

abuse.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016). 

¶25 In March 2022, Father was diagnosed with marijuana and 

opioid dependence, and his mental-health provider recommended 

maintaining sobriety. However, while the court recognized Father did 

make some progress, he refused to participate in substance-abuse group 

counseling, frequently missed visitations and required urinalysis tests, and 

consistently tested positive for alcohol and THC. The juvenile court 

acknowledged that alcohol and THC were legal substances, but it noted 

that Father had not demonstrated an ability to use such substances in a way 

that also allowed him to maintain a stable lifestyle, which posed a risk of 

danger to the children. Further, Father failed to acknowledge his substance 

abuse and its effect on his ability to care for the children. The court noted 

these reasons contributed to Father’s inability to provide stability and to 

overcome the substance abuse ground. 

¶26 Father also contends that the Department failed to provide 

adequate reunification services. “Although [the Department] need not 

provide ‘every conceivable service,’ it must provide a parent with the time 

and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the 

parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 37 (App. 1999) (citation omitted). 

¶27 Here, the record is replete with evidence that Father did not 

follow through with the requirements to ensure the safety of the children. 

First, although Father completed a parenting class, the Department 

recommended that he take additional classes because he needed more 

“hands-on” help. Father continually missed and canceled visits with the 

children and refused to make up missed visits. Father also declined to 

participate in the substance-abuse group counseling that was 

recommended to him by his mental-health provider. He was also 

discharged from a substance-abuse program for failing to comply with its 

conditions. When Father moved to Florida in 2023, his participation 

declined even more. He repeatedly failed to submit to testing and was 

suspended from testing multiple times due to his poor conduct toward the 

testing staff. Still, the Department submitted a request through the 

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children to reunify the children 

with him in Florida. But the request was denied because Father did not 

“cooperate with the process.”
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J. and A.B. 

Decision of the Court 

8 

¶28 Though Father may disagree with the juvenile court’s 

assessments, this Court may not reweigh the evidence, even when sharply 

disputed facts exist. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. Based on the foregoing 

reasons, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s termination of 

Father’s parental rights due to substance abuse. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, 

¶ 30. The juvenile court’s conclusion that this ground was established by 

clear and convincing evidence was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31 

(noting that this Court will not disturb the juvenile court’s conclusion 

unless this Court “determines as a matter of law that no one could 

reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing” (citation and 

internal quotations omitted)). 

¶29 Because this Court affirms on one statutory ground, this 

Court need not consider the time-in-care ground. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

353(a); Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–78, ¶ 5 (App. 

2017). 

CONCLUSION 

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms.