### The Honorable Henry Woods, United States District Judge for 1 

### the Eastern District of Arkansas. ___________ No. 95-3453

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Lorenzo J. Cotroneo, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 14, 1996 Filed: July 11, 1996

___________ Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

While Lorenzo J. Cotroneo was serving two concurrent terms o f sup ervised release on convictions for credit card fraud and escape, th e government sought revocation of Cotroneo's supervised release on the groun d that he had violated certain conditions of release. After a revocatio n hear ing, the District Court revoked Cotroneo's supervised release, an d 1 senten ced him to consecutive periods of imprisonment on the tw o
conv ictions. On appeal, Cotroneo argues that upon revocation of hi s supervi sed release, the District Court should have imposed concurren t rather than consecuti ve sentences, and that the District Court abused its discret ion in denying his request for a continuance of the revocatio n hearing. We affirm.

### A "petition for warrant" is a pleading by which th e 2 

### government formally initiates a court proceeding for the rev ocation of an individual's supervised release.
-2- I.

On June 1 9, 1992, Cotroneo pled guilty to credit card fraud and was sentenced in the Unit ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to twenty-fo ur months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. While serving his sentence for credit card fraud , Cotro neo escaped from a halfway facility in Tennessee. On October 20 , 1994, Cotroneo pled guilty to escape and was sentenced in the United State s District Court for th e Western District of Tennessee to fifteen months of imprisonment followedby three years of supervised release. The sentence for th e escape conviction was imposed concurrently with the sentenc e Cotroneo had been ser ving for credit card fraud. In October 1994, having comp leted serving the concurrent terms of imprisonment, Cotroneo bega n serving his terms of supervised release.

Me anwhile, on January 25, 1995, Cotroneo's probation officer file d a petition for warrant in the United States District Court for the Eastern 2 District of Arkansas. The petition alleged that Cotroneo had violated th e condition s of his supervised release, in that he: (1) failed to submi t monthly reports to the probation office; (2) fai led to report in person to the probation office; and (3) moved from his res idence in Arkansas without notifying the probation office. See Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Superv ision, No. LR-CR-91-200(1) (E.D. Ark. filed Jan. 25, 1995). On September 5, 1995, Cotroneo waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the petition and requested the District Court to proceed to a fi nal revocation hearing. Cotroneo, recognizing that the violation s allege d in the petition also affected his concurrent supervised releas e term in Tennessee, agreed to its consolidation with the hearing on th e Arkansas term

### N either in his brief nor at oral argument did Cotrone o 3 

### identify, by name or descripti on, the "evidence" that he claims he received only one day before the hearing. The government ha s identified these materials as government's hearing exhibits 7 and 8. See Brief of Government at 9. Government Exhibit 7 is a copy of a California driver's license, issued to a Brad Magruder, bu t bearin g Cotroneo's photograph. Government Exhibit 8 consists o f tw o Odessa Police Department photograph identification forms, i n whi chhis victims identify Cotroneo as the perpetrator of credi t card fraud. See Addendum to B rief of Government at 4-6. Cotroneo does not dispute, and we therefore accept for present purpos es, the government's identification of exhibits 7 and 8 as the "evidence" allegedly turned over to Cotro neo insufficiently in advance of the revocation hearing.
-3- of supervi sed release. On September 11, 1995, jurisdiction as to th e escape charge was transferred from the Western District of Tennessee to th e Eastern District of Arkansas.

On Sept ember 12, 1995, Cotroneo's probation officer filed a supplemental petition for warrant in the Distric t Court. The supplemental petition realleged th e violations mentioned in the original petition, and further alleged that Cotroneo had committed additional violations of the general conditions of his supervised release, including: (1) use of false information concerning his social security number on an employmen t application, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)( 7)(B); (2) providing false informati on to the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (3 ) fraudulent use of credit cards in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1); and (4) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of Texas state law. See Co rrected Supplemental Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offende r Under Supervision, No. LR-CR-91-200(1) (E.D. Ark. filed Sept. 20, 1995).

The Distr ict Court held a revocation hearing on September 20, 1995. At that hearing, Cotr oneo admitted to violating his supervised release as alleged in the government's original petition, but objected to proceeding on the four violation s alleged in the government's supplemental petition. Cotroneo argued that because he had not received certain "evidence" until the day before the hearing, he needed additional time to prepare his case. 3 The

### In a supervised release revocation hearin g a court may revoke 4 

### a defendant's supervised release if the court finds by a prep onderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condit ion of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3 ) (1994).
-4- District Court denied Cotroneo's request for a continuance. The governmen t cal led as witnesses William Ross, a United States postal inspector, an d Gregory Stemis, a special agent with the United States Secret Service, who testif ied with respect to their involvement in investigating th e supple mental allegations against Cotroneo. During the course of th e hearing, the governme nt also introduced thirteen exhibits relating to the supplemental allegations. Cotroneo's counsel cross-examined both of the govern ment's witnesses. At the conclusion of the government's case , Cotroneo elected not to present any evidence. The court found tha t Cotroneo had violated the conditions of his supervised release. The court 4

ac cepted Cotroneo's admission to violating his supervised release a s alleged in the government's initial petition. The court further found tha t Cotroneo had violated his supervised release as alleged in the government' s supplemental petition . The court revoked Cotroneo's two concurrent terms of supervised release that he was serving for credit card fraud and escape , and imposed sentences of twenty-four months of imprisonment on each o f those convictions, to be served consecutively.

II.

Cotroneo argues that the District Court erred in sentencing him t o consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms of im prisonment upon revocation of his supervised release. We reject this argument.

### -5- The decision to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence upo n revocation of supervised release is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994); cf. United States v. Smitherman , 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting discretion of court in se ntencing defendant to concurrent or consecutive sentences upo n conviction), cert. denied , 494 U.S. 1036 (1990). When imposing multiple sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (1994), the dis trict court is directed to refer to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994), which enumerates the factors tha t shall b e considered in imposing sentences under § 3584, including th e nature, circumstances , and seriousness of the offense; the history of the defendant; and the need for adequate deterrence.

At the ti me of the revocation hearing, Cotroneo was serving tw o concurrent terms of supervised release: one for a credit card frau d convict ion, a Class C Felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2), 3559(a)(3 ) (1994); and one for a n escape conviction, a Class D Felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 75 1(a), 3559(a)(4) (1994). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994) th e court ma y, upon finding that the defendant violated a condition o f supervised release, r evoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve all or part of the supervised release in prison

. Section 3583(e)(3) pr ovides that "a defendant whose term is revoked . . . may not be r equired to serve . . . more than 2 years in prison if suc h offense is a class C or D felony." Therefore, the District Court acte d properly (and Cotrone o does not contend otherwise) in sentencing Cotroneo to two years of impri sonment for the credit card fraud conviction and two years of imprisonment for the escape conviction. The only issue is whethe r the District Court erred in running the sentences consecutively rather tha n concurrently.

We concl ude that the District Court acted within its discretion i n sentencing Cotroneo to consecutive terms of impr isonment. Section 3584(a) provides: "If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, . . . the

### Indeed, her e, the District Court for the Western District of 5 

### Te nnessee, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), ran Cotroneo' s initial period of supervised release on the escape convictio n concurrently with the initial period of supervised release t hat the court for the Eastern District of Arkansas had imposed on Cotroneo on the credit card conviction.
-6- terms may run concurrently or consecutively . . . . " Because § 3584(a) is not limited, in te rms, to the imposition of sentence at the conclusion of trial (as distinguished from the imposition of sentence after revocatio n of a defendant's supe rvised release), we conclude that the District Court retains discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentence s after revocation of a defendant's supervised release. We see nothing in the record to indicate that the District Court abused its discretion i n imposing consecutive sentences under § 3584(a) or that it failed t o consider the relevant factors set forth in § 3553(a).

Cotroneo suggests that, notwithstanding the seemingly discretionary langu age of § 3584(a), the sentencing judge is required by a differen t statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (1994), to run concurrently terms of imprisonment imposed after revocation of supervised release. We do not , however, believe that § 3624(e) bears the weight that Cotroneo would place upon it. Section 3624(e) does not control the imposition of sentence afte r
revoca tion of supervised release; rather § 3624(e) provides that "[t]h e term of supervised release . . . runs concurrently with any Federal, State , or local term of probation or supervised release." Section 3624(e) thus by its ter ms governs the trial court's initial imposition of terms o f superv ised release, not its subsequent sentencing discretion upo n revocationof that supervised release. Cf. United States v. Gullickson , 5 982 F.2d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding tha t § 3624(e) requires court to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, t erms of supervised release to follow terms of imprisonment on multiple convictions). We conclude tha t § 3584(a) allowed the District Court to impose consecutive rather

### Although the government suggests that the United State s 6 

### Sent encing Guidelines also lend support to the District Court' s de cision to sentence Cotroneo to consecutive, rather tha n concur rent sentences, we need not and do not address tha t conten tion because we are satisfied that the District Court wa s authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3 584(a) to impose the sentence in the manner in which it did.
-7- than concurrent sentences upon revocation of Cotroneo's concurrent terms of supervised release. 6

III.

Cotroneo argues that the District Court abused its discretion b y denying his motion for a continuance. We do not agree. During th e revocation hearing, Cotroneo's counsel represent ed to the court that "[w]e didn't get all the evidence until, like, yesterday," Hearing Transcript at 4, a nd that "we are not ready because [Cotroneo] is indicating to m e there is evidence and individuals and witnesses he would like to have, and I believe would be properly available to him," id. at 5.
District courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on re quests for continuances. Mo rris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). Continuances generally are not favored and should be granted only when the part y requestin g one has shown a compelling reason. Id. We will reverse a district court's decision to deny a motion for a continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party was prejudiced by th e denial. See Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 939 F.2d 647, 65 1 (8th Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Ulrich , 953 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir

. 1991) (criminal case).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cotr oneo's request f or a continuance. Cotroneo told the court that he needed mor e time to prepare for the revocation hearing primarily because he ha d received certain "evidence" only one day before the

### Cotroneo also argues that the government violated Federa l 7 

### Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(2) in delivering to him th e aforementioned exhibits only one day before the revocation h earing. This argument is without merit. Rule 32.1(a)(2) provides that an individual against whom the government has initiated a revocation hearing is entitled to certain due process protections, including "written notice of the alleged violations" and "disclosure of the evidence against the person." Here, the government comported with the rule by giving Cotroneo no tice of the allegations and evidence against him in the detailed and specific supplemental petiti on, and by making its hearing exhibits available to Cotroneo prior to the com mencement of the revocation hearing. See United States v

. Kirtley , 5 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that petition setting forth specific condition of probation allegedly violated, tim e period of violation, basic facts, and statute violated gav e defendant adequate notice of his probation violations as required by due process).
-8- hearin g. This "evidence," however, consisted of two exhibits totallin g three pages, which were straightforward and capable of review in a short time period. See supra note 3. Although counsel also referred t o "individuals and witnesses" whose presence at th e hearing Cotroneo claimed he re quired, the record contains no suggestion as to who those person s were, why their testimony was necessary, or why their appearance had not been secured prior to the opening of the hearing. Cotroneo attended the revocation hearing an d was represented by counsel, who cross-examined the government's witnesse s at length, including questioning them with respect to government exhibits 7 and 8. Furthermore, the supplemental petition, filed by the probatio n officer and received by Cotroneo eight days before the hea ring, fully apprised Cotroneo of the nature of the allegation s against him, including specific dates, locations, names of victims, factua l details, and the likely evidence that would be presented at the hearing. In these circumstances, we hold that Cotroneo has fallen considerably shor t of demonstrating that the District Court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. 7

### -9- For the foregoing reasons, Cotroneo's sentence is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.