* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

October 6, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-60024 Summary Calendar

MANIRUL HOQUE,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A7 043 873

--------------------

Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Manirul Hoque, a citizen of Bangla desh, petitions this

court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision

denying his application for political asylum and his request for

withholding of removal. Hoque argues that the BIA is “churning

out” d ecisions, demonstrating that there has been a systematic

application of the affirmance-without-opinion (AWO) procedure that

has adversely prejudiced his statutory right to appeal.-2- We have agreed with Albathani v. INS , 318 F.3d 365 (1st

Cir. 2003), cited by Hoque, that the use of the AWO procedure does

not lead to the inference that the BIA did not conduct the required

review. S ee Soadjede v. As hcroft , 324 F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir.

2003). Accordingly, Hoque’s argument that he did not receive

appropriate BIA review is without merit.

Hoque also argues that the BIA im properly used the AWO

procedure because the immigration judge (IJ) was required to, but

did not, make a credibility finding. However, the IJ implicitly

found Hoque credible. Hoque also argues that the BIA’s use of the

AWO procedure was inappropriate because the IJ’s decision was not

well-reasoned and because the BIA di d not consider his appeal

arguments. Hoque’s argument fails because the BIA’s affirmance

without opinion could not include a discussion of the IJ’s reasoning or lack thereof or a discussion of Hoque’s arguments on appeal.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii).

Hoque argues that he has made a prima facie case that he

is a refugee and entitled to asylum based on past persecution and

his well-founded fear of pe rsecution from the Bangladesh

Nationalist Party (BNP) for his activities as a member of the

Jatiyo Party. Hoque did not establish past persecution. Hoque was

able to live and work openly as a garment-factory sales

representa tive and director in Bangladesh for a couple of years

after the BNP gained control of the government.-3- Moreover, Hoque’s testimony does not establish a

particularized connection between his pol itical activity and his

current fear of persecution. S ee Faddoul v. INS

, 37 F.3d 185, 188

(5th Cir. 1994). The political climate has changed since Hoque

left Bangladesh, with Jati yo Party members now serving in the

government. Hoque gave no specific reason as to why the BNP would

still be interested in persecuting him after a decade has passed,

in light of the changes in the government. Thus, Hoque has not

established by substantial evidence that he is entitled to asylum.

See Efe v. Ashcroft , 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002).

Hoque also challenges the BIA’s determination that he was

not entitled to a withholding of deportation. Because Hoque is not

eligible for asylum, he does not meet the standard for withholding

of deportation. See id.

Finally, Hoque asserts that the IJ abused his discretion

in failing to grant 60 d ays for voluntary departure. Hoque has

offered no reason that this court can review the IJ’s grant of 30

days to voluntarily depart given the plain language of the

regulation extant at the time of the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 240.26(e)(1998); 8 C.F.R. § 240.26(g)(1998). Hoque’s petition

for review of the BIA decision is DENIED.