U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

62–929 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–759 

CIVILIAN STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: A STATUS REPORT IN ADVANCE OF THE LONDON 

CONFERENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC ..................................................... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 50 

Russell D. Feingold ................................................................................... 63 

Robert P. Casey, Jr. .................................................................................. 65 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

Miliband, Hon. David, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 

Affairs, United Kingdom ...................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

(III)

(1) 

CIVILIAN STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN: A 

STATUS REPORT IN ADVANCE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to the notice, at 3:02 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

We are absolutely delighted today to have David Miliband, the 

Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, here with us. He and I 

have worked closely together on Afghanistan and a variety of other 

issues, and I am personally grateful for the relationship that we 

share and grateful for his friendship and that of his wife Louise 

also, and grateful for their hospitality when we’ve once or twice, I 

guess, been able to stop by in London. 

Normally, the Foreign Relations Committee has not entertained 

the testimony of leaders from other countries. But there’s no real 

reason why that has been the case, and I don’t think it makes 

sense, which is why we’re delighted to welcome I think the first 

ever appearance of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom 

before this committee, because it is a way of informing us and the 

public, and in democracies, needless to say, it is vital for us to have 

that kind of dialogue. So we believe that this is a terrific way of 

joining with one of the longest and strongest allies that we have 

in helping to explore difficult policy questions that both of our 

countries, and therefore our citizens, face. 

We hope that today’s hearing will be helpful in bringing greater 

understanding to people of the global views and challenges as they 

are interpreted by different governments and by us together. 

Following the Foreign Secretary, we’re going to hear from a very 

familiar and well-respected presence before this committee, the 

President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. He is here to discuss, having just 

come back literally today, arriving back from a six-nation tour—he 

2 

is here to discuss the administration’s new Afghanistan-Pakistan 

regional stabilization strategy. 

We’re delighted to welcome the Ambassador from the United 

Kingdom here today with us also. 

Today’s hearing comes as a leadup to the London international 

conference next week, which will focus on coordinating and 

strengthening all of our nonmilitary efforts in Afghanistan. We look 

forward to hearing from both witnesses about what can be accomplished in London and beyond. 

All of us recognize the enormous sacrifices that the United Kingdom has made in Afghanistan. Mr. Secretary, we want to say 

thank you to you and to your country for your efforts in unison 

with us and with many other countries. We are especially grateful 

for the sacrifices made in the turbulent southern part, the heart of 

the Taliban insurgency. Some 250 British soldiers and civilians 

have given their lives since 2001. We are enormously grateful for 

their contribution to our shared security and we are grateful to you 

and to Prime Minister Brown for your continued commitment to 

our shared mission. 

In December the President explained his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan and, as I said then and as the President knows well, no purely military strategy in Afghanistan will 

succeed, and I know you have said that and agree with that, Mr. 

Secretary. The military is only one component in defeating an insurgency. That is why at every turn we need to empower Afghans 

to take control of their future. 

That is the rationale that guided the conditions that I personally 

set out with respect to the deployment of new troops and which I 

believe still holds today: the presence of reliable Afghan partners, 

both political and military, and the civilian capacity to make our 

military gains sustainable. 

As additional troops arrive and the new strategy is implemented, 

this committee will be closely monitoring our progress and our 

plans. Let me be clear. As the United States and our coalition partners increase our troops in Afghanistan, we and our partners are 

also sending more civilians to translate those efforts into lasting 

gains for the people of Afghanistan. But this civilian surge will also 

demand strong, coordinated, and cooperative leadership and participation from all of our allies, and we look forward to exploring 

that with you today, Mr. Secretary. 

Next week’s London conference is a real opportunity for the 

international community to commit itself to a coherent civilian 

strategy and to unified purposes. Ultimately, nothing will do more 

to bring success than helping to build effective Afghan institutions 

and leadership. 

At President Karzai’s inauguration, he renewed his commitment 

to strengthening the government’s capacity, pushing for lasting reforms and addressing the problems caused by corruption at every 

level. He made these promises, not just to the United States and 

other key donors, but more importantly to the Afghan people. The 

coming weeks will tell us a great deal about the depth of President 

Karzai’s commitment to reform. 

His selection of Cabinet officials is cause for both hope and concern. Effective officials were chosen for a number of key seats, but 

3 

others did not always appear to be selected on their merits. One 

positive sign is that the Afghan Parliament, which rejected several 

Cabinet nominees, is playing its intended role as a check on the executive branch. 

We can also expect new political challenges ahead. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place this year, but absent real 

electoral reforms and an improved security climate, we risk repeating the problems that plagued the Presidential contest of last 

August. So we’re eager to hear from our witnesses what efforts are 

under way to improve that process. 

Better governance outside of Kabul is also vital. Real reform 

means appointing effective leaders at the provincial and district 

levels. They and the officials carrying out their orders are the only 

point of contact that most Afghans have with their government. A 

new survey by the United Nations found that one of every two 

Afghans paid a bribe to a public official in the last year. Graft has 

become a part of everyday life, and that must stop. 

Alongside better governance, our civilian strategy needs to promote basic sustainable development. Many of us have expressed 

concerns about undertaking an unrealistic nation-building mission 

in one of the poorest countries on earth. But if we can provide basic 

development to meet pressing needs, we will go a long way to winning over the Afghan people and preventing the Taliban from exploiting popular frustrations. That is why we must support projects 

with a proven track record of success, like the national solidarity 

program, which has earned praise from Afghans and international 

observers alike. 

Finally, as we continue to improve our civilian partnership we 

should recognize that we have already accomplished a great deal 

together. For example, USAID in partnership with the British 

Department for International Development and the Afghan Government have turned the 2-kilometer gravel Bhost airstrip into a 

bustling civilian tarmac that will create enormous new economic 

possibilities for the people of Helmand for years to come. 

We are all committed to succeeding in Afghanistan and strengthening partnerships with key allies like the United Kingdom, and 

that is central to our effort. So we look forward to hearing from 

you, Mr. Secretary. 

I’ll just ask Senator Lugar if he has any opening comments, and 

then we’ll look to your testimony. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you 

in welcoming our distinguished guests to the committee. Foreign 

Secretary David Miliband will be playing a leading role in the London Afghanistan Conference on January 28. We look forward to 

learning his views on how this conference can contribute to 

strengthening and stabilizing Afghanistan. The civilian component 

of the multinational effort in Afghanistan has been neglected somewhat as discussion of the way forward has centered on military 

resources. The London Afghanistan Conference is an opportunity to 

consolidate the civilian response in ways that achieve greater 

accountability and more demonstrable progress in developing the 

4 

country. The proposal for the London conference called on participants to ‘‘formulate a joint framework for our transition phase in 

Afghanistan; i.e., to set our expectations of ownership and the clear 

view to hand over responsibility step by step to the Afghans, wherever possible.’’ This goal is reflected in the multilateral civil-military effort in Afghanistan that is employing the new ‘‘clear, hold, 

build, and transfer’’ strategy. This new paradigm for operations requires leaders and their governments, as well as our Afghan partners, to understand their respective roles and the means by which 

those goals can be accomplished. 

The London conference is a crucial opportunity for President 

Karzai to improve cooperation with international efforts in his 

country, while recognizing his own responsibility to enable reform. 

He must find the means to consolidate disparate influences within 

his own government in the pursuit of national development. Too 

often during the last decade, development efforts in Afghanistan 

have been disconnected and uncoordinated. International donors 

must agree to consolidate their efforts, narrow their focus, and harmonize their programs in order to achieve a common end with the 

Afghan people. An inconclusive outcome in London, lacking in specificity and effective guidelines, will diminish the likelihood of success in the coming years. 

I look forward to hearing Ambassador Holbrooke’s thoughts on 

the details of the new Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Given the cost and security ramifications of our efforts in the region, this strategy must include strong accountability 

elements. It is important that our collective programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan be effectively monitored and measured against 

a definable set of metrics. The United States has assigned numerous senior-level officers, ambassadors, and mission directors to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and these individuals have extensive 

experience in developing and coordinating programs across our 

agencies. They must also serve as efficient conduits of information 

and evaluation back to Washington about how programs are working. At the encouragement of Congress, USAID and the State 

Department have expanded their inspector general presence in 

these countries, which is certainly a good first step. 

A new approach to foreign aid is emerging as a priority within 

the Obama administration. This approach aims to reduce reliance 

on foreign contractors and channel more resources through local 

governments. As development experts have long suggested, the 

goal of such a strategy is to reduce the overhead costs of our assistance and empower civilian governments with resources flowing 

through, rather than around, their institutions. It is reasonable to 

consider this approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should 

be mindful that institutions in these nations have very little history of effective oversight and accountability. To the extent that we 

funnel resources through these governments, we will require creative and robust oversight mechanisms. I hope Ambassador Holbrooke will make clear today, for example, how the expected $200 

million in education programming slated for Pakistan this year will 

be monitored. Similarly, members would gain confidence if Ambassador Holbrooke could walk us through how the more than $300 

5 

million slated for the agriculture sector in Afghanistan will be overseen as it is dispersed across a volatile country. 

While the military reform process has shown considerable 

progress and NATO/ISAF continues to professionalize the Afghan 

National Army, there are two crucial civilian sectors that must be 

thoroughly reformed. The first is agriculture, the mainstay of 

Afghanistan’s legitimate economy, which must be revitalized if 

Afghans are to create jobs, feed the population, and deliver income 

for the country. The second is human security and justice, which 

have long been neglected. The rule of law must be a product of an 

essential social contract that extends across the traditional landscape and integrates governing institutions such as the police and 

the courts. 

Ambassador Holbrooke has spent much time traveling within the 

region seeking greater cooperation for stabilizing Afghanistan. I 

look forward to his testimony on efforts to convince Pakistani leaders of the importance of cooperation and the opportunities that 

stem from our partnership in routing terror elements in Pakistan. 

He has also engaged in a broader diplomatic effort to build financial and technical support for Afghanistan. He has spent a great 

deal of time since his appointment flying from the Gulf States in 

the Near East to Europe and Russia, as well as Japan and India. 

We are eager to learn more of the impact of his outreach and hope 

the London conference will serve as a rallying point for significantly increased participation, especially from the Muslim world. 

I thank the chairman again for this hearing and look forward to 

our discussion. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Mr. Secretary, again thank you for being here. It’s a great privilege for us and we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE DAVID MILIBAND, 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH 

AFFAIRS, UNITED KINGDOM 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Kaufman, Senator Shaheen. It’s a great honor for me and for my country to be able to appear here in front of you today. I associate myself very strongly with the sentiments and the substance of both 

of your remarks. I am conscious of the expertise and the experience 

that exists in this committee. We followed your hearings and your 

visits, your analysis and your reports, very closely, and I know that 

they have helped to shape the debate in this country. I can assure 

you they have also had an impact outside this country, in Europe 

and in my country in particular. 

In that context, as cochairman of the London conference I’m delighted to be here today so that your input can be added to others 

in advance of that important occasion next Thursday. 

As you know, the United Kingdom is the second largest troop 

contributor in Afghanistan and the third largest financial contributor. Our armed forces and our civilians have suffered grievous 

losses, especially over the last year, in both of our countries, and 

it’s right to acknowledge the scale of their bravery and of their sacrifice, and I very much appreciate the words of the chairman in 

that regard. 

6 

That sacrifice shows us the scale of the stakes in Afghanistan at 

the moment. But of course the stakes are wider for our national security, for the integrity and purpose of the NATO alliance, and for 

one of the most explosive regions of the world, South Asia, because 

of course Afghanistan and its neighbors—Afghanistan’s stability 

matters hugely to its neighbors. 

It’s the regional significance of the conflict that explains why I 

made the sixth of my visits to Pakistan as well as to Afghanistan 

the weekend before last. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that following the inauguration of President Karzai and then the speech of President Obama everybody realizes we’re now in a decisive moment in the Afghan campaign— 

decisive because the imperative of aligning a successful civilian 

strategy alongside the military strategy is now very clear to all. It 

is the decisive nature of the times in which we live that explains 

Prime Minister Brown’s decision to call the London conference and 

to give it the very strong focus on the development of a political 

strategy within which the military and civilian components can sit. 

My written testimony goes into some detail about the nature of 

that political strategy and I just want to highlight three elements 

for you this afternoon. The first relates to the loyalty and commitment of the Afghan people to their own government. It’s a founding 

part of any counterinsurgency doctrine that the loyalty of the citizens of the country are the greatest resource of all. 

Some of you will have seen the recent poll conducted by the BBC 

and ABC of Afghan citizens in 34 provinces. It was published last 

week. It showed overwhelming determination on the part of the 

Afghan people not to go back to Taliban misrule. But it also 

showed very high levels of dissatisfaction with corruption in the 

governance and policing system. 

So in seeking to retain the loyalty of their own citizens, it’s important to recognize that the Afghan Government doesn’t just need 

to avoid being outgunned by the insurgency; it must not be 

outgoverned by the insurgency either. For us that speaks first to 

the need to tackle corruption at all levels; second, to achieve much 

greater focus on district and provincial governance. Afghanistan is 

a country of 364 districts and 34 provinces. Each and every one 

needs effective governance to serve its people. 

Governance needs to extend beyond the formal sectors of the 

state to include the informal structures that are so important in a 

tribal society. That society has been ravaged by 30 years of civil 

war, but the community structures remain important. 

I think it’s worth saying that at the moment there is an attempt 

to support governance on the cheap. In the last year for which figures are available, some $33 million was spent by the Institute for 

Development and Local Governance, the key part of the Afghan 

governance machinery that supports local governance. That’s less 

than $1 million per province, and that explains some of the figures 

in my statement about the number of district governors who don’t 

have an office or don’t have proper transportation. 

The second part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy on the 

political side is an effective route to dividing the insurgency. That 

is important, especially important in the Afghan context, because 

the insurgency is not a monolith. It’s different insurgent groups 

7 

and within insurgent groups differences as well: full-time fighters 

from outside the tribe, local part-time fighters, narcotraffickers and 

poppy farmers, as well as people rented for $10 a day to fight for 

the insurgency. 

The commitment to reintegration, to bringing those fighters back 

into their communities, is a widely shared aspiration, not just in 

Afghanistan but in the international community. From our point of 

view, three things are essential to make it happen: first of all, security pressure, because reintegration is not an alternative to military pressure, it is a complement to it; second, the right offer to 

the insurgents, the chance to have protection, but also employment 

and a political say within their own communities; and third, an 

effective Afghan-led strategic framework within which reintegration can take place. 

Mr. Chairman, the third part of an effective political strategy 

speaks to the role of the neighbors of Afghanistan and above all its 

eastern neighbor, Pakistan. I know that for you and for Senator 

Lugar the importance of Pakistan is very, very clear, and I would 

like to place on record our very strong support for the extraordinary leadership that you’ve shown and your committee’s shown 

in piloting the Kerry-Lugar bill through the Senate and for putting 

on the table the offer of a renewed relationship between the United 

States and Pakistan. 

We know that Pakistan matters, not just because it is the location for the Afghan Taliban leadership. It’s also important in its 

own right. It’s the base for al-Qaeda. It’s a nuclear weapons state 

with the long-term risk of radicalization, and it has huge demographic and economic challenges. 

I believe that the last year has shown a major change in approach from the Afghan civilian and military leadership, recognizing the mortal threat that’s posed to the Pakistani state from 

within its own borders. The strategic reorientation of Pakistan has 

some way to go, but I believe that the efforts that are being made 

now in South Waziristan show the level of commitment that the 

Pakistani authorities are willing to devote to what is a long-term 

struggle for the survival of that country. 

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that there is a real possibility of developing shared interests between the neighbors of Afghanistan 

and Afghanistan itself, founded on a commitment to respect to sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. Crime, drugs, and insecurity are no respecters of borders in South Asia and it’s very important that we use the London conference to bring the neighbors 

of Afghanistan with the regional powers together to start a more 

positive process of dialogue. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with some of the deliverables 

that we hope to achieve in next week’s conference. First of all on 

security, we believe it’s very important to give substance to the 

idea of the transfer of lead security responsibility in Afghanistan. 

This is central to the commitment of all of our countries to build 

up Afghan security forces sufficient to defend their own country. 

I also believe that we should use the conference next week to 

give international support to Afghan-led reintegration efforts, both 

the program and the structures that I hope President Karzai will 

announce between now and next Thursday. 

8 

On governance and development, President Karzai has said that 

he wants to end the, ‘‘culture of impunity’’ that has existed in his 

country with respect to corruption. That needs international support. There also needs to be independent oversight to reinforce accountability in the Afghan system. In addition, I believe that moves 

on debt relief and development assistance could be a credible part 

of a positive offer to the Afghan people. 

On regional cooperation, as I have just mentioned, a commitment 

by the countries of the region to take more active steps to promote 

the political and economic stability of Afghanistan is essential. 

There is also a challenge for the international community, which 

needs to up its game both in terms of the coordination of its effort 

and its effectiveness. It will be very important to take forward new 

appointments which are pending in the U.N., NATO, and the European Union. 

However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the biggest deliverable of 

all from next week’s conference is an understanding among the 70 

or so Foreign Ministers who are attending, and also I hope the 

wider public, of the coherence and clarity of the plan for the future 

of Afghanistan. The confidence of the international community and 

the plans that have been developed, set out by President Obama, 

needs to be carried forward to maintain confidence in the future. 

Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, the alliance between the United 

States and the United Kingdom is deep and enduring. The sacrifices of the last century are now being matched by new sacrifices 

in this century. Last weekend in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and 

in the south, I saw the depth of the Anglo-American relationship 

at work. I saw it at the military level, but I also saw it at the civilian level. 

I’m also delighted to be able to acknowledge the cooperation that 

exists between London and Washington, not just between myself 

and Secretary Clinton, who I’ve just met, but also the outstanding 

efforts of Ambassador Holbrooke to ensure that the wider world understands the significance of the Afghan campaign, because this is 

not just a U.S.-U.K. venture. Forty-three nations are contributing 

on the military side, over 60 on the civilian side. We need to send 

out a very strong message that all of those countries need to make 

their full contribution for the success of the effort. 

Mr. Chairman, the challenges in Afghanistan are immense. It is 

a poor, tribal society, very different from our own. But its recent 

history and its place at the heart of South Asia mean that alternatives to a thorough military-civilian engagement are far, far 

worse. The plans in place need effective and sustained implementation, and it is to that goal that the London conference has been 

called and to that goal that the London conference will be judged. 

Thank you very much indeed. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miliband follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RT. HON. DAVID MILIBAND, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, UNITED KINGDOM

The London Conference on Afghanistan will bring together over 70 countries and 

international organizations to discuss the partnership between the international 

community and the Afghan Government and people. I am immensely grateful to the 

committee for the opportunity to hear its views on the aims and objectives. 

9 

The United Kingdom has been part of the international effort in Afghanistan 

since the passage of UNSCR 1368 after 9/11. Over 10,000 U.K. troops are deployed 

predominantly in Helmand province in the South of the country—the second-largest 

military contribution in Afghanistan. Our aid program for the next 3 years exceeds 

$830 million, making us the third-largest contributor financially—after the United 

States and Japan. 

It is right to pay tribute to the skill, dedication and bravery of all armed forces 

and civilians serving in Afghanistan.We owe them—and their families—a debt of 

gratitude. I would also like to honor those who have fallen in Afghanistan—from 

the British, American and other international soldiers, and the civilians that work 

alongside them, to the members of the Afghan National Army and Afghan civilians 

caught in the cross-fire. 

The war in Afghanistan, and the related challenges in Pakistan, are the No. 1 

one foreign policy priority for the British Government. Progress is vital for our 

national security. The election of a new Afghan Government and the increased U.S. 

resources in support of a refreshed counterinsurgency strategy, make the next 12– 

18 months a decisive period. That is why the British Prime Minister has convened 

the London Conference on Afghanistan on January 28. 

As cochair of the Conference, I set out in this note British thinking in three areas. 

First, the rationale and objectives of the international mission in Afghanistan. Second, how military and civilian resources can support a political strategy in Afghanistan. Third, our vision for the London Conference on Afghanistan and how it will 

drive forward progress on (a) security, (b) governance and development, and (c) regional cooperation. 

RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES

With al-Qaeda pushed out into Pakistan’s tribal areas, the original rationale for 

the war in Afghanistan—to ensure the country is not a safe haven again for 

al-Qaeda and global terrorism—has come under scrutiny. 

We do not conflate or confuse al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban government 

in Afghanistan in the 1990s provided a supportive environment for the al-Qaeda 

senior leadership. But the Taliban leadership do not have as their principal aim 

al-Qaeda’s violent global jihadist agenda. The vast majority of its low- and mid-level 

fighters are certainly not motivated by it. Their aim is the withdrawal of foreign 

forces from Afghanistan and the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate based on 

shari’a law. But the symbiosis of the Taliban and al-Qaeda senior leadership, and 

the history of al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan, explain why we continue to see 

the war in Afghanistan as critical to the fight against al-Qaeda. The 1,600 mile 

Afghan border with Pakistan, the presence of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan’s border areas, and the links between the two countries, means that their stability needs to be addressed together. 

The definition of success is clear: it is not to kill or capture every member of the 

Taliban. It is to ensure the Government of Afghanistan is able to secure its territory 

against a weakened insurgency, and deny al-Qaeda the space to operate. 

The alternatives to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy are not attractive. Retreat now would invite danger for the region and for our own countries. But 

the challenges of counterinsurgency are immense—it requires realistic objectives 

aligned with substantial international and Afghan resource and effort. It is this 

alignment which this note addresses. 

POLITICAL STRATEGY

The British Government believes that military and civilian resources need to be 

marshalled behind a clear political strategy: political, because it involves shifting 

the motivations, relationships and behaviors of critical stakeholders and powerbrokers. There are three dimensions to this. 

First, the aspirations and loyalties of ordinary Afghans need to be engaged in 

defence of their country against the Taliban. Second, the insurgency needs to be divided, separating those insurgents motivated by narrow national and local objectives, and whose aims could be accommodated within the Afghan political system, 

from those unwilling to break with al-Qaeda. Third, with the leaders of the Afghan 

Taliban in Pakistan, the international community needs to engage with Pakistan 

and Afghanistan’s other neighbors to promote enduring stability. 

A political strategy is not separate from a military strategy. Indeed, military and 

civilian resources are critical contributors to it. Reassuring citizens that the Taliban 

will not return requires security, but also governance that responds to their most 

pressing needs. Dividing the insurgency requires military pressure, but also economic and political opportunities. Regional dynamics are affected both by our miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
10 

tary presence and by diplomatic outreach. A political reconfiguration, however, is 

the lens through which our military and civilian surge must be seen. 

REASSURANCE THROUGH SECURITY

Our greatest resource in Afghanistan is the determination of the Afghan people 

not to return to Taliban rule. In a recent poll only 6 percent of those asked wanted 

the Taliban back in power. Despite this, many civilians turn a blind eye when they 

see IEDs being laid, or refuse to inform on the insurgents in their midst. The reason 

is simple: they fear Taliban retribution if they are caught. 

Building a sense of security and confidence that the Taliban will never again be 

able to return is therefore critical to mobilizing Afghan citizens to resist them. This 

also must have three dimensions: the security provided by international troops; the 

protection offered by the Afghan National Security Forces; and the defense provided 

at the local level by community security initiatives. 

President Obama’s counterinsurgency strategy, combined with the increased coalition troop numbers (which means that since the start of 2009 there will be 51,000 

more U.S. troops, and 7,800 more from other countries, including the U.K.) is allowing ISAF to reconfigure its laydown and increase the tempo of its operations. 

The impact in Helmand—where 8,000 British troops are based—is already being 

felt. Helmand is the only southern province which provides a potential strategic 

platform for theTaliban to dominate Kandahar. It has accounted for over a third of 

all attacks in Afghanistan, yet a year ago there were only 5,000 ISAF troops in 

Helmand with very few Afghan National Security Forces alongside. 

With the deployment of the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Helmand in 

April 2009 and President Karzai’s commitment to increase significantly the Afghan 

National Army and Police numbers in the province, by next summer these figures 

will have risen to around 30,000 and 10,000 respectively. This means that ISAF is 

increasingly able to help the Afghan Government extend its authority into critical 

population centres in the central Helmand belt—including districts surrounding the 

provincial capital in Lashkar Gah, such as Babaji and Nad-e-Ali. And it means that 

international forces can both ‘‘clear’’ an area and train and mentor the Afghan national security forces to ‘‘hold’’ it. 

Since 2007, the international community has invested heavily in building up indigenous security forces. The Army now numbers over 100,000 and the police, 

96,000. Increasing them to 134,000 and 109,000 by the end of 2010 is necessary. 

But quality and conduct matter as much as size. That is why the focus on 

partnering with the Afghan National Army—working side by side on operations— 

is essential. 

However much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan. In such an underdeveloped country, where 

tribal allegiances are often stronger than national affiliations, local communitybased security initiatives are inevitable. In many cases, Afghan tribes have the desire to resist the Taliban. The international community cannot ignore or decry this 

effort, and in some circumstances will need to consider support for it. 

REASSURANCE THROUGH GOVERNANCE

Establishing security is necessary, but not enough if Afghan civilians are to turn 

their backs on the insurgency. They need to believe that the fragile improvements 

will endure and strengthen. 

In areas recaptured from the insurgents, this must start with immediate postintervention stabilization. Over the last decade, both our countries have learned important lessons in this area. Together, we have been putting these lessons into practice in Helmand. From the emphasis on local capacity (without which no amount 

of quick impact projects or infrastructure development can survive), through to community engagement at the grassroots level (with District Governors and District 

Community Shuras supported by District Stabilization Teams), or integrated civ-mil 

planning (so that stabilization experts can be on the ground within 24–48 hours of 

a military campaign), many aspects of our collective approach are now being rolled 

out elsewhere in Afghanistan. 

It is no surprise that in a recent BBC–ABC–ARD poll, Afghans identified security 

as the biggest problem their country faced. But the economy was not far behind, 

and corruption and weak governance came third. The Taliban need to be out governed not just out-gunned. 

Forty-two percent of Afghans live on less than a dollar a day. In some parts of 

the country, there are few credible alternatives to the drugs trade or mercenary activity. Helping the Afghans build schools, provide clean water, electricity and roads 

is worthwhile in its own right, but will also help to draw people away from the inVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
11 

surgency. That is why over the next 4 years the U.K. will spend over $800 million 

on development assistance. And it is why the U.K. has pushed so hard for the European Commission and EU Member States to increase their aid—which now stands 

at over $1.3 billion a year. 

However it is not just about the quantity of assistance, it is also about how it is 

spent. If such services are to outlast the international presence, they need to be administered by the Afghan Government. Yet in large parts of the country, district 

governance is almost nonexistent; half of the governors do not have an office, less 

than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only $6 a month in expenses. In 

such circumstances, the Taliban gain traction, with shadow governors allocated to 

all provinces except Kabul and a substantial district level network in place. 

There are already a number of effective schemes to support subnational government under the supervision of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, including the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (delivering District Community 

Shuras) and the District Delivery Working Group (which supports immediate capacity to deliver basic services in insecure districts). But so far these schemes have 

been patchy, and inadequately funded. 

So, in the coming months and years, a more coherent strategy needs to be developed. The focus should be on selecting and training, empowering and equipping, and 

mentoring and monitoring the 34 Provincial Governors and the 364 District Governors, just as it is with the Army and the Police. The international community 

needs to help Afghans create truly representative local shuras, that can help distribute development funds and provide the collective dispute resolution that the 

Afghans want when they talk about the rule of law. This will require significantly 

more funding for local government—in 2008 each province had less than $1m to 

spend on local administration. 

There is a unanimous message from the people of Afghanistan and the international community that the Afghan Government needs to turn its words on tackling corruption into deeds. According to the recent BBC–ABC–ARD poll, 95 percent 

of Afghans see corruption as a problem in their local area. Such widespread abuse 

has deep roots and cannot be cured overnight. But it is vital that President Karzai 

follows through his promise to tackle the culture of impunity with serious steps. The 

new anticorruption unit needs real powers both to investigate and to prosecute. 

REINTEGRATION

Just as the insurgents can be split from the ordinary Afghans who offer them 

tacit support, so too can the insurgency itself be divided, with foot soldiers, low- and 

mid-level commanders reintegrated back into society and separated from insurgent 

leaders. 

As President Obama said at the end of March, ‘‘in a country with extreme poverty 

that’s been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation 

among former enemies . . . There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They 

must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who’ve 

taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have 

the option to choose a different course.’’ 

The prospects for reintegration are significant because the insurgency is not a 

monolith. It is a broad but shallow coalition, constantly evolving, with shifting relationships, geographical bases, and tactics. 

The Afghan Taliban leadership is based primarily in Pakistan. Senior commanders there, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, provide strategic direction to 

insurgents over the border, if not operational command, directed at retaking territory and power in Afghanistan. The so-called Pakistan Taliban, a loose collection of 

insurgent leaders mainly in Waziristan, are primarily focused eastward against the 

authority of the Pakistani state. Al-Qaeda coordinates tactically with both branches 

of the Taliban, but has a separate mission and religious ideology, focused on mounting terrorist attacks outside the Pashtun tribal belt. The Haqqani network is linked 

to all the insurgent groups, and is based in Waziristan, but able directly to command and mount attacks in Afghanistan. 

Within these insurgent groups, there is also heterogeneity. In the Afghan Taliban, 

trained full-time fighters, often drawn from several tribes and reinforced by foreign 

fighters, have more ideological motivations than local part-time fighters, drawn from 

a particular village or tribe, operating often in pursuit of their own profit or power, 

or driven by local loyalties and ethnic affiliations. Alongside the fighters, there are 

shadow governors who provide intelligence, or intimidate those who support the government; warlords and aspirant powerbrokers who believe that the Taliban will win, 

and so position themselves for their own political advantage; narcotraffickers who 

rely on the Taliban for protection and the safe passage of drugs; poppy farmers who 

12 

ally with the Taliban because they protect them from eradication efforts; and the 

foot soldiers whom the Taliban pay $10 a day—more than a local policeman. 

Repeated, intelligence-led strikes against particular key positions in the insurgent 

hierarchy can force low and mid-level commanders to reassess their interests. This 

requires careful work. For example, Ghulam Yahya, a Taliban commander in Herat 

leading 600 fighters, was killed last October in an ISAF strike and his deputy was 

arrested by the Afghan National Police. Leaderless, the structure of the group started to disintegrate, and former fighters returned to their villages, leaving an opportunity for reintegration. 

Pressure can be applied by international and Afghan forces, but it can also be 

applied through local communities resisting the Taliban, thereby creating the conditions for insurgents to switch sides. For example, in Acheen, a small district in 

Eastern Afghanistan, when the Taliban demanded that a tribal leader’s son be 

handed over for joining the Afghan National Army, the Shinwari tribe drove out the 

Taliban, and conducted a local peace jirga with the Afridi tribe over the border in 

Pakistan. The area has now been free from the Taliban for 6 months. 

In Acheen, the role of ISAF was minimal, providing boots and warm jackets so 

that the local people could patrol the outlying areas, and a promise that they would 

provide backup if the Taliban launched a major offensive. Across Helmand, however, 

the model has been different, involving much more intensive military engagement. 

Last summer, the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deployed in South 

Helmand with such force density that it was able to have an immediate impact on 

security and the calculations of ordinary Afghans and low-level insurgents. 

Alongside military force and community mobilization to apply pressure, reintegration requires incentives: the offer of protection from retaliation by former allies and 

alternative employment. This demands a structured program that targets the right 

people, and ensures that the support continues over time. In some cases, reintegration may involve relocation and deradicalization programs. The international community can provide valuable support—for example, through the creation of the 

Afghan Reintegration Fund—but ultimately this must be a process led by the 

Afghan Government. An immediate priority is therefore to develop a strategic 

framework with President Karzai for reintegration. This will need to assign clear 

lead responsibility for reintegration within his government, with a dedicated organization geared to reaching out to insurgents. 

Reintegration refers specifically to the co-option of foot soldiers, low- and mid-level 

commanders. Done successfully and at scale it can weaken the insurgency and lay 

the ground for more senior members to switch sides. When it comes to higher level 

commanders, the Afghan Government needs to separate the hard-line ideologues, 

who are unwilling to break their links with al-Qaeda, and who must be pursued relentlessly, from those who can be drawn into domestic political processes. President 

Karzai committed himself to this in his inauguration speech, ‘‘the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan has placed national reconciliation at the top of its peace-building policy. We welcome and will provide necessary help to all disenchanted compatriots 

who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution.’’ 

Reconciliation involves difficult decisions about motivation and justice. But the 

evidence of successful counterinsurgency is that it is necessary for political stabilization. In Afghanistan, it will need to be led by Afghans and supported by the international community. 

REGIONAL COOPERATION

The third element in weakening the insurgency is a new relationship between 

Afghanistan and its neighbors. 

The fighters within Afghanistan draw on external funding, support, and shelter. 

Militants move freely across the border with Pakistan. The insurgencies in the 

South and East of Afghanistan are directed partly from across the border in Quetta, 

Peshawar, and Waziristan. 

The Pakistani offensives over the last year in Swat, Dir, Buner and more recently 

in Waziristan are therefore a significant development. For the first time, elements 

of the insurgency are being squeezed from both sides of the border. With more than 

3,000 Pakistanis killed over the last year, the focus of the military operations has 

been terrorists who attack Pakistan. Over time, however, Pakistan’s leaders will 

need to broaden its fight to address al-Qaeda’s leadership and the full range of other 

militant groups, not just those who pose the most direct threat to Pakistan. And 

as well as security in the border regions, the international community will need to 

help Pakistan create the political and economic conditions that will ensure lasting 

stability. 

13 

The U.K. has longstanding links with Pakistan—800,000 Britons are of Pakistani 

origin. Pakistan will soon receive our second-largest aid program. We have strongly 

supported the restoration of civilian government in Pakistan. 

Britain welcomes developments in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The U.S. has 

made clear its intent to build a long-term trust-based partnership with Pakistan— 

and the Kerry Lugar Act is a major step toward that goal. Last year, we held the 

first EU-Pakistan summit, which I hope will be the start of a much deeper engagement on security, trade, development and more. And the Friends of Democratic 

Pakistan group provides us with a wider political forum for aligning international 

support behind Pakistan. 

Perhaps the most significant shift required though is to develop a new consensus 

within the region that Afghanistan’s future lies in being an independent, sovereign 

state—a client of none and a friend to all. Pakistan, Iran, and others within the region, are affected by the crime, drugs, terrorism, and migration that spills over 

Afghanistan’s borders. A stable Afghanistan that once again becomes the commercial and cultural cross-roads for South West Asia is a shared interest. However, the 

trust deficit within the region means that neighboring countries fear Afghanistan 

will one day return to being a chessboard on which the geopolitical struggles of 

others are played out by proxy. As a result, they continue to hedge their bets, 

maintaining former relationships and not taking the steps needed to stabilize the 

country. 

Encouraging each of the regional stakeholders, Afghanistan’s neighbors and nearneighbors, to accept that the conflict in Afghanistan is a regional problem, and thus 

a regional responsibility, will require much more focus on the regional dimension 

than has been given so far. It will demand a new hard-headed attention to what 

reassurances both Afghanistan and other players in the region need about each other’s behavior and intentions. It will also call for consistency and clarity about the 

presence, activities, and intentions of the international forces in Afghanistan, so 

that these too are properly understood to be a force for stabilization and not a 

threat. A sense of regional ownership must be built through a process of systematic 

and serious regional engagement, in which the regional players, instead of confronting each other face to face, or by proxy, acquire the habit of working side by 

side to focus on a problem from whose solution all will benefit. Only the countries 

of the region can decide whether they want to build on the multitude of existing 

regional bodies, or create something new and Afghanistan-specific. 

LONDON CONFERENCE

The aim of the London Conference, which will take place on January 28, is, as 

Prime Minister Gordon Brown said when he announced it on November 28: ‘‘to 

match the increase in military forces with an increased political momentum, to focus 

the international community on a clear set of priorities across the 43-nation coalition and marshal the maximum international effort to help the Afghan Government 

deliver.’’ 

London is the venue, but the conference is a joint effort between the British Government, the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations. I will chair it 

alongside Foreign Minister Spanta and the UNSG’s Special Representative Kai 

Eide. 

Together, we have invited the Foreign Ministers of all ISAF partner countries, 

Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors and the key regional players, as well as representatives of NATO, the U.N., the EU and other international organisations such 

as the World Bank. 

Discussions will focus on three areas: security, governance, and development, and 

regional relations. 

With respect to security, the Conference will consider how the respective roles of 

the international and Afghan forces should evolve over time. Because as the Afghan 

National Security Forces develop, they will need gradually to assume—district by 

district and province by province, as the necessary conditions are met—lead responsibility for security. The Conference will also address how to support Afghan-led reintegration efforts. 

Although London is not a force generation conference it will be an opportunity to 

encourage allies to increase their commitments in critical areas, particularly with 

respect to the training of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. 

The NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan still has a shortfall of 1,600 trainers, and 

despite EU promises to increase the size of its Police Mission (EUPOL) to 400 trainers, the total staffing remains at only 267. 

With respect to governance and development, the London Conference aims to lead 

to concrete steps by the Afghan authorities to tackle corruption and improve its 

14 

financial management. But it is also the opportunity for the international community to consider how its development assistance is supporting Afghan leadership, 

and in particular to ensure it is effectively aligned behind the Afghan Government’s 

Economic Plan. 

In terms of regional relations, by bringing together Afghanistan’s neighbors and 

the key regional powers, the London Conference aims to promote progress toward 

more systematic and cooperative engagement by and between all of the regional 

stakeholders, building on the range of existing structures. I have been in close contact with my Turkish counterpart on this in recent weeks, and am pleased that in 

the few days before London he will hold a meeting with Afghanistan’s neighbors to 

develop ideas for improving regional cooperation. 

CONCLUSION

Amidst the losses of 2009—keenly felt on both sides of the Atlantic—and the 

drawn-out Afghan Presidential election process, I believe that we have begun to address the issues crucial to any future success. Under U.S. leadership, the International Security Assistance Force has reinvigorated the military strategy and redoubled its military commitments. 

But while necessary, military reinforcements alone will not be enough to achieve 

success. In 2010, the international community needs to fully align military and civilian resources behind a political strategy that engages the Afghan people in defense 

of their country, divides the insurgency and builds regional cooperation. This strategy needs to be led by the Afghans, but it requires international support. That is 

the task ahead of us in London next week. I look forward to discussing it with you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

That’s helpful, important testimony. 

What I wanted to do is ask—Mr. Secretary, we have this little 

thing that happens around here called voting. Right now we’re on 

the back end of a vote, which is why Senator Shaheen went over. 

We thought she’d be back here before—here she is, terrific. 

Would you wait to begin your round of questioning until we get 

back, and that way we can run without having to interrupt. So it 

works out fine, and we’ll get back just as fast as we can. 

Thanks. You’re up. 

[Pause.] 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Thank you very much. I want to 

begin by echoing what you heard from Senators Kerry and Lugar, 

our thanks for your being here today and a recognition of the very 

special relationship that the United States and the United Kingdom have. It remains one of the cornerstones of stability around 

the world. So I think it’s important for all of us to reiterate that. 

So you can take that back with you. 

I also want to recognize the service of the men and women of the 

British military in Afghanistan. I had the opportunity, like many 

of us here, to visit Afghanistan last May and we went down to 

Helmand province, where the PRT is led by the British, and it was 

very impressive to see what’s going on there and to hear the commitment of all of the members who are there from Britain. So 

thank you very much for that. 

One of the things that we’ve been talking about here is how to 

measure what’s happening in Afghanistan and how do we determine what progress is. I wonder if that’s a debate that you all are 

having and what specific measures you think are important for us 

to look at for progress in Afghanistan, and specifically with respect 

to President Karzai, whether there are specific measures of 

progress that you’re looking for. 

15 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you 

very much for your kind words, and I’m glad that your visit to 

Helmand province went well. 

I think that there are inputs and outputs that help us to measure progress. Inputs I think are best measured on the Afghan side, 

but I think, for example, the development of the Afghan National 

Army, which currently is some 96,000 strong, is a significant development in that country and one that speaks to the need to develop 

Afghan capacity to defend themselves. 

I think it’s also significant to look at the development of the police force, which has been a much more vexed and difficult project. 

But I have a lot of confidence in the efforts of Minister Atmar, the 

Interior Minister for the last 15 or 18 months. He has one of the 

most difficult jobs in international politics. But I think that the development of Afghan capacity there is very significant. 

So I think there are a range of inputs on the Afghan side that 

are worth documenting. But obviously the most important test is 

the outputs, what’s actually changing in the country. And here 

there are a number of important proxies for the progress that we 

are seeking to achieve. One that will be important in the next few 

years is the transfer of lead security responsibility across the country to Afghans. President Karzai said in his inauguration speech 

that he wanted half the country to have Afghan security leadership 

within 3 years, the whole country within 5 years. 

I think that it’s also significant to look at the figures on poppy 

production; 20 provinces are now poppy-free. The U.N. reports in 

last year some 19 percent fall in poppy production, last year 22 

percent. Governor Mangal gave me a positive report when I was in 

Helmand province last weekend about this year’s figures. 

The third area, which I think General McChrystal would highlight as being of primary importance, concerns the protection of the 

Afghan people. He’s made it the centerpiece of the military campaign to protect the Afghan people. That I think is going to become 

a very, very important measure in the future. 

I think, finally, there are a range of economic and social measures that it’s worth reminding oneself of. First of all, some 4 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Some 6 million children are now in school in Afghanistan. And the development of the 

agricultural economy that Senator Lugar referred to I think is also 

going to be important. 

Let me just make one point about that. We do not have military 

forces in Afghanistan in order to allow children to go to school. We 

have military forces in Afghanistan because of the security threat 

to both of our countries. But it’s quite a good indication of the 

change that’s going on that those children, especially girls, are able 

to go to school, because evidently they weren’t in the 1990s. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that, and also agree 

with your assessment of Minister Atmar. We had the opportunity 

to meet with him and he was very impressive, and we heard that 

reinforced by some of the trainers that we talked to who are working on developing Afghanistan law enforcement capacity. 

One of the things that we’ve been debating here is the possibility 

of drawing moderate elements of the Taliban away from the more 

ideological leaders and reintegrating them into Afghan society. Is 

16 

that something that the U.K. also believes is possible, and do you 

support President Karzai’s latest reconciliation plan? Do you think 

it’s feasible? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think this is a very important aspect of the 

campaign. I think you were voting when I talked about the second 

aspect of the political strategy, which is to divide the insurgency 

and to create space in the Afghan political system, notably at the 

local level, for those elements of conservative Pashtun communities 

to find a political voice and to drain their support from the insurgency. 

That obviously requires the division between those who are, as 

you’ve put it, ideologically motivated, especially those who are 

linked to al-Qaeda, and those who are pursuing local grievances 

that would better fit within their own communities. This drive for 

so-called reintegration seems to me to be one of the most important 

aspects of the campaign in the future. It’s striking that General 

McChrystal should put this political outreach at the center of his 

military strategy, not as an alternative to it but as a complement 

to it. 

From the United Kingdom point of view, we very strongly support the emphasis that’s being put on this in the new strategy set 

out by President Obama, but also, as you referred to, President 

Karzai has talked about this. He’s talked about summoning a loya 

jirga, a traditional Afghan form of consultation, for a rather wider 

project of what you rightly refer to as reconciliation. That involves 

difficult issues. It involves engaging with mid and high-level commanders, which poses rather different challenges than the attempt 

to reintegrate farmers and peasants into their communities at local 

level. 

But we think that this drive for reintegration and reconciliation 

is going to be an important part of the future. The redline is obviously the links with al-Qaeda that provided the danger for the rest 

of us from Afghanistan’s development in the 1990s. But I believe 

that these political processes are absolutely essential to Afghanistan’s future and to our campaign there. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you have any thoughts about what’s a realistic timeframe to think about how we begin those reconciliation 

efforts? I don’t know that Iraq is a fair comparison, but it’s the one 

that we have here. Do we think this is going to be possible within 

the 18-month timeline that we’re talking about before we reassess 

beginning to drawdown troops? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think it’s important to say that reintegration has started. In my written testimony I’ve given a couple of examples from different parts of the country of where reintegration 

efforts have already borne fruit, and I think it’s important to recognize them. As you indicate, the parallel with Iraq is tempting, but 

it can also be misleading. Iraq is obviously a very different kind of 

country from Afghanistan, not least in, first, its wealth. Afghanistan, after all, is the fourth or fifth poorest country in the world. 

It’s very different in its state structure. Iraq has had a history of 

a centralized state, brutal rule at that, whereas Afghanistan has 

not. 

But I think that some of the lessons that have been learned in 

Iraq can be used in thinking through the Afghan approach. I think 

17 

that for reintegration there’s no time like now. The increasing military pressure that is a feature of life in the south and east of 

Afghanistan is an important spur to reintegration efforts. 

In respect to reconciliation, that’s a much more difficult thing to 

talk about in public because the messages can be misunderstood. 

I think in that context, though, President Karzai has said he wants 

to summon this loya jirga to kick off the process, and I think that 

that is something that we should support. 

Could I just take the opportunity to pick up your reference to the 

July 2011 timeline that has been set by President Obama, because 

it’s obviously important. The first thing to say is that some of the 

misunderstandings that were associated with reporting of this 

timeline are slowly being corrected, both in Afghanistan and 

amongst the neighbors. After all, President Obama went out of his 

way to highlight the fact that this was the moment when U.S. 

forces would begin a drawdown. I think he subsequently or his 

staffers subsequently referred to it as a ramp and not a cliff edge, 

and I think that’s an important part of this understanding. 

But second, I can report from the region that the sense of urgency that is felt in this country is increasingly concentrating 

minds, not just in Afghanistan, but amongst some of its neighbors. 

People are beginning to realize that July 2011 does not mean the 

end of American or coalition engagement, but it does mean that the 

commitment of this country and others is to build up Afghan capacity to govern themselves. It’s made concrete the commitments that 

many of us have made over the last few years that our project in 

Afghanistan is not one of colonization, it is one of defense and empowerment of the Afghan people. 

I hope that as this year proceeds, the sense of urgency that has 

been injected will be properly understood alongside the long-term 

development commitment that is clearly part of the international 

engagement in Afghanistan. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Given all of our support for recognition of the 

importance of the civilian effort in Afghanistan, what do you think 

the prospects are for additional EU support for that civilian effort? 

And is this something that you expect to see really delineated at 

the conference next week in London? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that a number of countries will use 

the conference next week to announce increased civilian and military contributions. Obviously, since President Obama’s speech on 

the 1st of December a number of countries have committed extra 

troops. I think that totals about 7,500, 7,800 in the 6 or 7 weeks 

since December 1. I think on the civilian side you’re right to point 

up the need for the EU, both as individual countries and as a collective, to step up its role. That’s part of burden-sharing. I think 

that’s in part with respect to the policing mission, one where the 

EU has got some specific responsibilities that it needs to fulfill, but 

also more generally on the development side. The EU is a very 

large development partner and I think that one of the things that 

the European Union will have to do is make sure that both in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan its development effort matches the scale 

of the need. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

18 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, in the course of your statement you mentioned a 

sentiment expressed in a recent public opinion poll. Specifically, I 

believe you cited the ABC–BBC–ARD poll that indicated a turnaround in popular sentiment over the last 12 months in Afghanistan. Certainly such good news is welcome because the trends in 

those same polls from 2005 all the way to this point were headed 

in the other direction. 

I am just curious as to why, in the last 6 months, there has been 

this change in sentiment. I ask this because at the same time we 

have been debating these issues in this committee, the American 

people have frequently said there seems to be very little appreciation in Afghanistan for what is occurring. As a matter of fact, data 

on the polling of the question: ‘‘Do you like Americans or not?’’ 

shows that sentiment has been decreasing pretty consistently. 

Suddenly one poll seems to indicate that we are becoming more 

liked. Would you be able to provide us with some background as 

to why this poll may have turned out the way it did? Is this just 

a blip of optimism or is there something more fundamental going 

on there that we may not have observed before? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, Senator, to be absolutely honest, I’m quite 

skeptical of some of the figures, notably the one which I think 

you’re referring to, which suggests that, instead of 40 percent of 

Afghans being optimistic about the next year, 70 percent are. That 

is a—one’s always got to be concerned about one opinion poll. 

I would say two things, though. First of all, the poll does have 

consistent findings with previous polls in this series in respect of 

the Afghan people’s revulsion at the Taliban and their support for 

foreign troops. Quite surprisingly, 68 percent in respect to the 

United States, 62 percent in respect to the U.K., of Afghans say 

that they want those troops to stay, and that is something which 

has been borne out in successive polls in this BBC series. 

Senator LUGAR. This is really astonishing in comparison to Pakistan, where public opinion of the United States still seems to be 

on a very steep downward slope. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that’s a very important point, and 

maybe we can come to the issue of the popular mood in Pakistan, 

because I think it is different. 

However, I do think that one factor which could explain why levels of optimism have risen relates to the very significant efforts 

that General McChrystal has made since last spring to cut the 

number of civilian casualties. If you think back a year, the level of 

civilian casualties in Afghanistan—certainly if you think back to 

the year 2008, the level of civilian casualties, the almost weekly reporting of civilian casualties, was a permanent drain on the sense 

of confidence of the Afghan people in the mission that was being 

pursued. 

I do think that the commitment to reduce civilian casualties has 

been a significant factor in helping to change some of the climate 

in Afghanistan. I also think it’s worth saying that the fact that the 

election is now behind the people of Afghanistan has helped create 

a sense that there is someone in charge. I think that’s part of the 

factor there. 

19 

Senator LUGAR. How do you explain the sentiment within the 

Afghan Legislature regarding the decision on the part of some 

members to block several of President Karzai’s Cabinet appointments? Efforts to this end are continuing into the second round. 

While apparently some Cabinet officials were acceptable to legislators, a good number of them were not. President Karzai appears to 

be accepting these rejections and is trying to appoint some more 

people. 

But does this trend have something to do with the figure you 

cited—that a fairly large percentage of Afghans reported they had 

bribed someone during the course of the last year? You pointed out 

this is totally unacceptable, which it is, but some would say, ‘‘this 

is life in Afghanistan,’’ and ‘‘get real; this is what the predicament 

is.’’ 

What is this sentiment within the Afghan Legislature? Is a 

change going on there? Is there a check and balance being established that is likely to lead to better governance? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that the first thing to say is that 

the Afghan Parliament is flexing its muscles. That’s probably not 

something that’s completely alien to this body. That’s been known 

to happen in many of our systems. 

Senator LUGAR. But in Afghanistan, wouldn’t this be unusual? 

The executive has been pretty powerful prior to this time. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. That’s certainly true. But I think it partly reflects the fact that they’re in a pre-election year in Afghanistan. 

That can often be a spur to independence of thought on the part 

of legislators. Second, the fact that some of the nominees have been 

given a very thorough going over by the parliamentarians reflects 

the Afghan constitution and the exercise of rights under it. That’s 

what the chairman referred to. 

I think third—and one has to tread delicately here—Afghanistan 

is a significantly tribal society, and what you are seeing is somewhat of the fissures in that society being reflected in votes in Parliament. And some of the nominees—because you will know that, 

notably, the Hezaras and Uzbeks have not been ratified when 

they’ve been put forward. That reflects some tensions within the 

Hezara and Uzbek communities. So I think you’re seeing some of 

the tribal divisions being reflected in the votes that are taking 

place in Parliament. 

I’m pleased to say that in some of the absolutely key ministries— 

Finance, where I met the Finance Minister on Saturday; Interior, 

ditto; Defense, ditto; Foreign Affairs, ditto; Agriculture—you’re seeing people go through and you’re seeing people of merit being appointed. One of the absolutely key things for this second term of 

President Karzai is that his cabinet is empowered to govern. A 

country as diverse and as complicated as Afghanistan cannot be 

run by simple fiat from the Presidential palace. It needs functioning ministries, and I think that one of the most important indicators of progress is going to be the ability of those men and 

women appointed to Cabinet posts to go off and do their work. 

Senator LUGAR. In recent debates we’ve had on how responsibility might be turned over to the Afghans, there have othen been 

estimates made of how many persons will need to be in the Afghan 

Army, and of how many of these must be well-trained persons who 

20 

have some literacy and are able to assume leadership roles. The 

total numbers mount up; some say 150,000 while others say at 

least 200,000. Some folks have even formulated rather extravagant 

estimates and say 300,000 people are required to maintain order 

as troops from the United Kingdom and the United States are 

withdrawn. 

The dilemma then, pointed out by President Karzai, is that these 

troops cost money and the total budget of Afghanistan would not 

be able to support perhaps even 100,000 troops, quite apart from 

these other rather enlarged numbers. This implies that someone— 

the United Kingdom, the United States, or others—must be prepared to really support the budget of Afghanistan for some time, 

even once fewer of our troops are in the country. 

Has that debate occurred in Parliament at all? If so, what sort 

of readings do you get in terms of sustained financial support, leaving aside the military support on the ground? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think that’s a really important question, Senator. I’m grateful to you for raising it. I say in my mission—in my 

testimony here that the mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that 

the Government of Afghanistan is able to secure its territory 

against a weakened insurgency. Hence the importance of the reintegration efforts that Senator Shaheen asked me about while you 

were away. 

As you know, the current plans are for 134,000-strong Afghan 

National Army by November of this year, as a staging post toward 

further growth. You’re absolutely right that the Afghan state is not 

going to be able to fund that on its own. So those who talk about 

continuing commitment to Afghanistan that is nonmilitary are 

right to do so. 

Equally, the scale of the formal institutions of security in 

Afghanistan is different than in a country like ours, because, as I 

point out in my written testimony, the state is not going to have 

a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan. The equilibrium 

that’s going to exist in parts of the south and the east is not only 

going to be between a weakened insurgency and a formal security 

forces. It’s also going to be within communities, with informal 

mechanisms for justice as well as for security. 

I think that the truthful answer is that those things need to be 

supported, not neglected. We cannot substitute the formal institutions of security of the state in short order. But I do think that the 

buildup that’s being anticipated with the partnering that General 

McChrystal has proposed suggests that we could see a stronger 

Afghan National Army if we’re willing to pay for it. And paying for 

it is going to be the price of being able to withdraw our own combat 

troops. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

Lugar. 

Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned earlier—and you referred to it— 

the British people are sacrificing significantly here, and obviously 

American families likewise have sacrificed greatly and will continue to. We don’t often get a chance to hear this firsthand. I think 

maybe you can help here today to articulate to Americans why you 

folks are making these sacrifices. 

21 

What is it that you see in Great Britain that brings your government to make this kind of commitment? And help define, perhaps 

in different words than we might or just from your perspective, 

why America needs to care about this, why all of us, 43 nations, 

are committed here? What do you see as at stake? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it’s an important question. It’s one I’m asked often when I talk to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you move the mike? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a question 

I’m asked often in Britain, where people ask why are we there and 

is it worth it. The reason that we are there is that the primary national security challenge that the British people face is no longer 

that of invading armies from neighboring countries. The primary 

security challenge that we face is that of international terrorism. 

We know that in terms of our territorial integrity as a country 

Britain has rarely been safer. Probably you could say that for a 

thousand years we haven’t been safer. But the British people going 

about their business, whether at home or abroad, are less safe, and 

they’re less safe because they, whatever their race or their religion, 

can become victims of international terrorism. 

We also know, second, that 70 percent of the terrorist plots that 

are aimed at the United Kingdom can trace their links back to the 

badlands of the Afghan-Pakistan border. So we have a very clear 

national security interest there. 

Third, we know from the 1990s that Afghanistan is the incubator 

of choice for global jihad for al-Qaeda. We know that the Taliban 

government of the 1990s provided, sponsored, provided a supportive environment, it sponsored, al-Qaeda’s development within 

its own borders. 

So for those reasons I feel confident in saying to the British people that we would not risk the lives and welfare of our Armed 

Forces, but also our diplomats and our aid workers, if our national 

security was not at stake. But we believe it’s very important that 

the insurgency that threatens the country of Afghanistan is not 

allowed again to provide an umbrella for al-Qaeda. 

We know too that al-Qaeda is currently—the al-Qaeda senior 

leadership is based on the Pakistan side of the border. That does 

not in my view invalidate the campaign in Afghanistan. What it 

does is emphasize the interdependence between stability in Afghanistan and stability in Pakistan. 

For the first time in a very long time, there is complementary 

military pressure on both sides of the Durand Line, the 1,600-mile 

border that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The losses 

that are being suffered by the Pakistani Army and people on the 

Pakistani side of the border are testimony to the fact that the 

insurgency understands the significance of that line and that it 

understands the significance of the campaign on both sides of the 

border. 

So we have a difficult and complicated argument to put to our 

people, but it’s one that speaks to the nature of national insecurity 

in the modern world, and that’s the basis upon which we try to 

prosecute our case. 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s a very articulate and important answer and 

I appreciate it. I’d like to follow up with a question about the 

22 

nature of this threat of the umbrella, which fundamentally comes 

from the Taliban. In today’s New York Times there is an important 

article, the headline of which is ‘‘Taliban Using Lighter Touch to 

Win Allies.’’ The gist of the story it is: ‘‘Now, as the Taliban deepen 

their presence in more of Afghanistan, they are in greater need of 

popular support and are recasting themselves increasingly as a 

local liberation movement independent of al-Qaeda, capitalizing on 

the mounting frustration of Afghans with their own government 

and the presence of foreign troops. The effect has been to make 

them a more potent insurgency, some NATO officials say.’’ 

A number of us have expressed concern about this potential evolution of the Taliban, what it might mean in the longer term. I 

wonder if you would address your sense of that and where that 

concern might fit into the London conference and the strategy that 

needs to come out of it. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. I think that the asymmetric tactics of the insurgency speak first to their use of IEDs, improvised explosive devices, 

that are so deadly. It is one import from Iraq, which Senator 

Shaheen was asking about while you were voting. 

Second, however, I think we should be clear that for those insurgents who want to pursue local grievances within their political 

system, that’s precisely what the political system is for. And it’s important that the political system provides a space for conservative 

Pashtuns to argue for their kind of social and economic development within their local communities. 

So it seems to me that this speaks directly to the issue of reintegration which Senator Shaheen was asking me about. I think 

General Petraeus has said, perhaps to this committee, that 70 to 

80 percent of the insurgency have no business even aligning themselves with a movement that is linked to al-Qaeda and that it 

should be a primary objective of our civilian-military strategy to 

bring them back into their local communities. 

You’ll know from your own detailed work in Afghanistan that 

concerns about corruption on the part of the Afghan people are real 

and in many cases well founded. That provides fertile ground for 

people to argue that they need alternatives to their own government. That needn’t mean that they adhere themselves to an alternative that would provide cover for al-Qaeda. It seems to me that 

we have to be clear enough about the political settlement that we 

are seeking, especially in the south and east of Afghanistan, that 

it has space to incorporate concerns about corruption or concerns 

about social policy. 

The CHAIRMAN. So your sense is that if they became a sort of 

quasi, ‘‘legitimate’’ party or a legitimate force for change and participate in the process, that that can be translated into the reintegration process. What if it’s just a cover for their increased spread 

of violence and support? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that it will then be rejected by the 

Afghan people. I think that it’s important to say first, I think 

‘‘party’’ probably isn’t right. It’s not really going to be a party system in Afghanistan, certainly not a party system of the kind that 

we understand. But there will be blocs and movements, and they 

should represent all shades of political opinion that’s willing to live 

within the Afghan Constitution. 

23 

Second, you know from your visits to Pakistan that one of the 

major changes in the last year has been the fact that the Pakistani 

people are now backing their own government in taking on the socalled Pakistan Taliban. Why is that? Not just because of our 

urgings. We don’t believe that. The video that was published I 

think last June of Taliban ‘‘justice,’’ so-called, being administered 

to a 17-year-old girl created a wave of revulsion in Pakistan. And 

you can be sure that the vast, vast majority of Afghans remember 

what Taliban rule meant, and the best inoculation against that is 

those memories. 

So of course the Afghan people will be wary of Taliban trying to 

present themselves as a moderate, reformed political party or political movement. Their good sense is our best defense as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. I might mention that the Georgian Ambassador, 

Batu Kutalaya, is here and we’re very happy to welcome you here. 

The Georgians currently have hundreds of troops being trained by 

the Marines to take part with ISAF, and we’re very appreciative 

for that support and for your participation. 

Senator Risch. You’ll yield? 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony and your presence 

here. We had the chance in August to visit Afghanistan for 2 days 

and had a chance to interact with and learn from a number of your 

troops, especially in Helmand province. 

Let me first lay down or set forth a predicate for the question 

I’m going to ask. It relates to President Karzai. I’ve had the opportunity to meet him and to talk to him on two occasions, once in 

2008 and once in August on that trip I just referred to. Two meetings does not a full understanding make or give you the opportunity to fully assess someone’s commitment. But I have to say in 

the two meetings I had, and especially the one in August, I came 

away very concerned, for a number of reasons. 

One of the questions that I posed to him in that meeting—and 

you know what they’re like when Members of Congress meet. You 

might have a half an hour or an hour. But one question I asked 

him was, I said to him that the patience of the American people 

is not unlimited for our engagement and we need to see progress. 

And I said to him: Pretend for a moment that you’re one of my constituents; tell me what you’ve done in the last year or so on the 

basic concerns that we have apart from the basic security question. 

Tell us what you’ve done on building a stronger system of justice, 

rooting out corruption and prosecuting corruption, delivering basic 

services to your people? 

Now, when we were meeting it was about 48 hours after his reelection campaign had concluded. I would have thought—and I look 

at this as an American politician—that when you’re running for reelection you’re looking in the rear view mirror and you’re also looking ahead. You’re telling people this is what I’ve done and this is 

what I hope to do if you reelect me. I thought he would have had 

a reelection message or speech, literally, that would be able to recite chapter and verse on what he had done. His answer was—to 

say it was inadequate is an understatement. 

24 

So that’s the predicate. I want you to know the skepticism that 

I bring to this question. But do you believe there is a way—I’m 

assuming you’d say this should happen. But do you believe there 

is a way to impose more accountability in what is a very corrupt 

system, meaning—is there a way and will President Karzai lead 

the effort to provide more disclosure of, say, income and assets, the 

seizing of assets when someone is engaged, who’s a public official 

engaged in corruption, removal from office of those who are engaged in corruption? 

I realize that that would be a sea change in that political culture. 

But tell us what you believe to be not only his commitment, but 

what is the evidence that that commitment has integrity, just on 

the political corruption question? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, it’s a profoundly important question, Senator. It’s not for me to speak for President Karzai, obviously. He 

speaks for himself. Let me take the two parts of the question. 

The first part, can we impose accountability? Well, in some 

aspects of our work we can. We can say very clearly that we will 

not spend money through those parts of the Afghan Government 

where we do not have confidence that the money will reach its intended beneficiaries. We can be very clear about that. We audit the 

way our money is spent when the Afghans spend it, and we’re a 

country which spends I think the largest proportion of our money 

through the Afghan system. And we should have very, very tough 

accountability rules about what the money’s for and who it reaches. 

And if there are ministries who are not spending the money on the 

things that they’re meant to be spending it on, we can do something about that. 

The second example: Corruption isn’t just national. It can be 

local. If you want to travel from Lashka Gar to Kandahar and you 

want to travel along the route between them, the likelihood is that 

you will be stopped many times on that route, especially if you are 

trying to take goods to market, or even if you’re not. The security 

between population centers is a very important way of establishing 

order in a society. At the moment that route between Kandahar 

and Lashka Gar is not run the way it should be. 

So I think, second, we can make a difference with our international forces and we can ensure that the Afghans are supporting 

it. 

The second aspect, though, concerns the role of the Afghan people, because President Karzai doesn’t only have a contract with us; 

he has a contract with his own people. This is where the role of 

Parliament, the role of the opposition—Dr. Abila, who I met in 

Kabul on Saturday, as a continuing role as a defeated Presidential 

candidate—and where the other ministers of the government are 

important. 

Here is an area I think where words matter. To take the corruption example, President Karzai said in his inauguration speech 

that he wanted to end the culture of impunity that has blighted 

Afghanistan. Those are very strong words, for which he will now 

be held to account. The fact that since then he has set up an 

anticorruption commission and oversight board are good starts. But 

they then need to be followed through. 

25 

I think, as your government said on November 18 after President 

Karzai’s inauguration speech and as we said, words have to be 

turned into deeds. Some of that work can be done by us. Others 

has to be done by Afghans because, as the chairman said in his introductory comments, the future of Afghanistan needs to be above 

all driven by the Afghans themselves. 

Senator CASEY. I have a related question, but I may have to ask 

it in another round or in writing, a related question on just governance and security, or I should say internal security, with regard to 

the police. I know in your testimony you speak on page 3 of President Karzai’s commitment to increase—and I’m summarizing— 

army and police. You’re citing the police as going from 96,000 to 

109,000 by the end of 2010. 

We can answer this—let me just lay the question down. One is 

a real doubt about whether—a doubt that I have and I think others 

have expressed, about whether the 96,000 is a real number; and 

two about the doubt about the ability to grow that. But we’ll try 

to do it in another round. I know we’re out of time. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, Senator Casey, that because of 

the time—we have Ambassador Holbrooke afterward, and because 

of the Minister’s schedule, we’re not going to have a second round. 

I apologize for that, but I think it’s fine if the Secretary would like 

to just answer the question if he wants to. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. I’d be very happy to write you afterward. I think 

that your degree of concern about the police is very well merited. 

I said to Senator Shaheen earlier that I thought that Minister 

Atmar had one of the most difficult jobs in politics as the Interior 

Minister of Afghanistan. 

I think that the fact that NATO has moved into police training 

in a serious way is a very significant and positive development. I 

think the European Union needs to do more for officer training on 

the police side, especially those European nations with a gendarmerie tradition, for obvious reasons. But I think that, on the issue 

of policing, that the balance between formal and informal institutions of security reaches its heart. 

One obvious question for those who are being reintegrated into 

Afghan society is how they relate to the security forces, and the 

governance of the security forces goes to the heart of that question. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, first of all I apologize to our witness. I’ve been on the floor of the Senate involved in debate there. 

I know you were asked about where Great Britain is in all of 

this. Let me expand the question briefly, just one question to you, 

because I know Richard Holbrooke is here with us. That is, in 

Europe itself, obviously the commitment of Europe at large to this 

effort is very, very important. I think most of us feel a level of confidence that our closest ally in the world and friend Great Britain 

is committed to this. But beyond the confines of Great Britain, to 

what extent is the rest of Europe committed to this, and how politically viable is that commitment, given some of the expressions of 

opposition that have emerged, not only there but here as well? 

26 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think it’s a very important question, Senator. I think that the first thing to say is that I think all European 

nations recognize the importance of this and all European nations 

are doing something, most on the military side, but also on the 

civilian side. 

Do we together need to do more to match the moment? The answer is yes, because the fate of Afghanistan is going to be decided 

in the forthcoming period and the time is now for commitments to 

be made. 

I think it’s important to say that some European countries, especially the smaller ones, have made outstanding contributions. Next 

to us in the south of Afghanistan, the Danes and the Estonians 

have shown remarkable commitment and remarkable bravery, and 

that needs to be acknowledged. 

But it’s also the case that the political temperature in Europe is 

tough, as it is here. We believe that this is a mission that is essential. It’s a necessary mission and it’s one that needs to be explained 

to people. As I was saying just before you came in, the countries 

of Europe, especially the countries of the European Union, have 

never been safer in respect to their territorial integrity, but their 

citizens are less safe because of international terrorism. And we 

have to explain to people why the armies that we have need to be 

deployed for different purposes. That’s a message that needs to be 

heard. 

I believe this, though. The essence of calling people to rally behind the mission is a coherent and clear plan. I think the coherence 

and clarity of the plan that now exists, both the priorities that 

have been set out by the Afghans and, critically, the security strategy that’s been set out by President Obama and General 

McChrystal, gives no one excuses to say that they don’t know what 

the plan is. There are no excuses to say that it’s not a plan that 

genuinely speaks to the needs of Afghanistan. And there’s no possibility of saying it isn’t integrated with a civilian strategy. 

I think that’s why I said in my opening statement that the greatest deliverable from the London conference will be clarity, cohesion, 

and confidence that the politicians take back to their own people? 

Senator DODD. Are we doing enough to advance this? What suggestions might you have on how we could better work together, 

putting aside the differences that may exist both here and there in 

Europe regarding the policy itself? It seems very important to me, 

to the extent you want to sustain support that there is clarity—and 

I think clarity is critically important. To what extent are we able 

to work better at this than we presently are? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, I think that it’s important, first of all, to 

say that American leadership is not something that Europeans 

fear. American leadership is something that is recognized as essential, because this is a more complicated world than during the cold 

war, but this is a world where America is still the world’s superpower. It’s still the country that many look to, and it’s the country 

with the resources to be able to take on the great challenges. 

But I think that there is an ability to combine our resources better, and the themes of mutual respect and mutual responsibility 

that the administration and in some ways you yourself, sir, in the 

way you’ve asked your question, those themes of mutual respect 

27 

and mutual responsibility are the only basis, the right basis, on 

which to combine our efforts. 

I also think that the Afghans need to speak more for themselves. 

One feature of the London conference is that there will be an opening speech from President Karzai. But when it comes to the discussion of sanction, Defense Minister Wardak and Interior Minister 

Atmar will also speak. When it comes to discussion of governance, 

Economics Minister Zakowa and head of the Ideology Popol will 

speak. When it comes to the regional role, Foreign Minister Rasul 

will speak. 

Those Afghan voices and the voices of Afghan civil society, men 

and women, who will also be heard at that conference also need to 

be heard. We have said all along that we are not on a mission of 

colonization and so Afghan voices are very important support for 

that. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. I think civilian strategy here is key with our new COIN 

strategy, key in how we deal with it. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming, and thank you for 

your government convening this London conference. It’s clearly a 

positive thing. 

There’s been a lot of discussion here about the depth of U.S.– 

U.K. relations. I have my three youngest grandchildren in Hammersmith and they sound a lot more like you than they do like me. 

So the depth of my commitment is total. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. It’s the mission of colonization that we’re on. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Kind of reverse colonization. [Laughter.] 

The other thing I want to say, because I’ve been to Helmand 

province twice, the intelligence, the professionalism, the courage of 

the British troops there and the British civilians is clearly incredibly impressive. I mean, talking to your folks about what’s going on 

over there and what we should be doing and how we should be 

doing it, I feel very, very strongly about the professionalism, intelligence, and courage of our troops, but you are a great ally to have 

in this difficult venture. 

To follow a little bit up on Senator Casey’s comment about the 

police, you know, you don’t have to be in Afghanistan for 45 minutes to not realize that the Afghan National Police force is questionable. What went wrong? I mean, we had—obviously, we did a 

lot of things wrong there. We left early. But we have had NATO 

involved in training the police for a long time. 

First off, what do you think went wrong? And mainly, more important, looking forward, what leads us to believe that this 

100,000-some troops, police, we have will actually be a force for 

positive, as to their present status, which is one of the great forces 

for negative in the country? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Well, Senator, thank you very much for the 

words about the civilian and military efforts of our people in the 

south, which I think will mean a lot to people in the U.K. So thank 

you for saying that. 

28 

I think what went wrong—the first answer to that question 

doesn’t lie at our door. What went wrong was an Afghan project for 

the police that was not carried forward in the right way, and it 

wasn’t carried forward in the right way at ministerial level and it 

wasn’t carried forward in the right way down the line. 

I think it’s also right to say that the training mission has been 

underresourced for the police. It’s also been poorly conceptualized, 

because the role of the police in Afghanistan is fundamentally different from the role of the police in our country or in your country 

or in Europe. 

I think that the importance of the local police engagement is 

something that is right, because this is a tribal society and locality 

is very important. So that the idea of the Afghan National Police 

is quite challenging in that society. 

Second, the massive educational problems of the Afghan population are mirrored in the police force. This is a society without the 

sort of schooling system that you might take for granted. So those 

being recruited into the police, before you can teach them how to 

be policemen and women they have more fundamental challenges. 

Third, it’s no secret that drugs are a huge problem within the 

police force, especially in the south, and that’s something that’s not 

going to be cured within the police force on its own. 

I think it’s important to be very, very sober about how long it 

will take to turn the police around. The confidence of the Afghan 

people in their army is much greater than the confidence of the 

Afghan people in their police force. However, I do think that the 

way in which over the last 18 months in which NATO has taken 

seriously the police training mission has given it a whole new dimension, and that is I think one of the few positive aspects that 

I would point to. 

The other positive aspect is that it is being properly led now from 

the top of the Afghan Interior Ministry. That simply didn’t happen 

until 15 or 18 months ago. There is now a serious plan for the 

Afghan police. It’s one that I have confidence in Minister Atmar as 

the leader of it. He is gathering around him some very brave people who are trying to prosecute their police reform strategy, and it’s 

something I think we should be proud to back. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I agree with something you said earlier when 

I was not here about how the—which I thought was one of the 

geniuses of the Obama proposal, is the setting of a deadline of July 

2011 for us to leave, for the very reason that I think you said, 

which is it concentrates the mind. There’s nothing like the prospect 

of a hanging to concentrate the mind, and I think for the Government in Afghanistan that will do it. 

How do you feel about—do you get a feeling—I know what the 

President said, the good things the President said since then. He’s 

still being critical of NATO forces when it suits him. How do you 

feel that’s going? Do you think the deadline—do you still feel the 

deadline for July 2011 is concentrating their mind and having 

them move forward? 

Mr. MILLIBAND. I was in the south of Afghanistan and in Kabul 

last weekend and in Pakistan the weekend before. It’s important 

to say, to maybe repeat because I think a lot of you were voting— 

I think there was a lot of misunderstanding about the original refVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
29 

erence to July 2011 when the President first made it in his speech. 

It’s not a withdrawal date; it is a change in the balance between 

the American forces or the international forces and the Afghan 

forces. 

Second, it’s true that it has made real the commitment of the 

United States and of the wider international community to empower Afghans to run their own society. But that is a good thing, 

not a bad thing. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. After all, even before the President’s speech we 

were all saying this is not an endless war where we’re going to be 

endlessly committed. So I think he has struck a balance between 

being clear about our commitment to empower Afghans, while also 

being responsible in saying that July 2011 is not the day when 

American responsibility ends; it’s the day when the beginning of 

troop withdrawal can start. That’s a very important difference. I 

think, as I said earlier, it’s a ramp, not a cliff edge, and that’s an 

important distinction. 

However, I think it has concentrated minds in a way that I think 

I underestimated when I first heard about this commitment. And 

it’s concentrated minds in Afghanistan and it’s also concentrated 

minds in the wider international community. It’s given credence 

and credibility to the plan that is being developed by General 

McChrystal. It’s also concentrated minds in the region. 

While the first response wasn’t one that spoke to regional cooperation, I think over the last 3 or 4 weeks you’ve seen the 

stirrings of a different attitude. On Tuesday I will be in Turkey, 

where the Turkish Foreign Minister has summoned a meeting of 

all the neighbors of Afghanistan and the regional powers. And now 

the essence of American commitment, both its scale, but also the 

determination to build up a sustainable capacity within the Afghan 

state, is something that I think is having a beneficial effect. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I want to thank you very much and I want 

to wish you the best of luck in the London conference. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much, Senator Kaufman. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be very brief. 

Mr. Secretary, I just came really out of respect for you. I know 

we’ve worked on numbers of issues in the past together. We’ve gone 

through your testimony and we thank you for what’s taking place 

next week in London. I just came to show support for that—I’ve got 

a conflict ongoing in another room—and also for the work that 

Richard Holbrooke is doing. I thank you both for that and certainly 

look forward to a very good outcome in London in the next couple 

weeks. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks a lot, Senator Corker. And we appreciate 

your coming by to share a moment here. 

Mr. Secretary, we could easily go for another round and ask, obviously, a lot more questions. But you’ve been very generous with 

your time. We do also have an opportunity to hear from AmbasVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
30 

sador Holbrooke, obviously, and I know members of the committee 

want to do that. So we’re going to end at this round. 

Normally with our witnesses we leave the record open. But I 

think it’s a bad precedent with respect to guests like yourself, representing other countries. We are not going to leave the record 

open with respect to your testimony. I think people need to be here 

to ask those questions and we don’t want to burden you with additional efforts to answer our questions. 

So we’re grateful to you, very, very grateful to you, for coming 

here today. Again let me just say to you quickly, we are working 

on the U.K.–U.S. defense treaty. I know it is of great concern to 

you and your country. Senator Lugar and I have held a recent 

hearing. We have information that was requested at that hearing 

that we’re waiting on from the State Department and Justice 

Department. We expect it, I think next Monday, at which time Senator Lugar and I will converse and work through what modality 

might be the most effective to move forward. 

We are determined to move forward. We understand your interest in it, our interest in it, and we want to try to get this done. 

Our hope also is to have the START Treaty completed at some 

point in the near term so we can also proceed forward on that. So 

we have a fairly mutually important agenda ahead of us. 

Now, I was going to ask you as a final question whether you prefer questions in Parliament to questions in the Foreign Relations 

Committee, but I’m not going to put you on the spot and expect an 

answer to that. 

Again, we really do thank you. Thanks for the great work you’re 

doing. Your partnership is essential to our success in Afghanistan 

and we believe that success in Afghanistan is critical to Pakistan 

and the region, and we are going to continue to stay focused on this 

issue. 

What I would like to do is as I excuse you ask Ambassador 

Holbrooke just to come right up and fill in. 

Mr. MILLIBAND. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Secretary, you can move through the 

back here with the Ambassador and others in your entourage. 

We’ll just literally stand in recess for about a minute while we 

transition here. 

[Brief recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come back to order. 

Ambassador Holbrooke has been a terrific friend to this committee, and to me personally, for years, and I appreciate his sharing and choosing this forum to unveil the administration’s new 

Afghanistan and Pakistan regional stabilization strategy. I also 

want to express my appreciation—he is just back from a long trip. 

I saw him catch at least one yawn a little while ago, so I know he’s 

struggling with jet lag here. 

But I want to express my appreciation for the job he is doing and 

the work he has undertaken. It is tough, tough work, as complex 

and as challenging as any foreign policy challenge that we have 

today, and I think everybody is appreciative of the time that he is 

taking to commit to it and of the job that he is doing. 

The new report that he is setting out today sets out key initiatives, specific milestones, and resource requirements to meet the 

31 

goals. These are really things that many in Congress have been 

waiting for and asking for, a formal plan for the civilian side of our 

efforts, and I’m very pleased the administration has put such care 

and attention into shaping this response. 

Obviously, success in Afghanistan is going to be profoundly 

affected by what happens across the border in Pakistan, and I welcome the chance to hear from you today, Mr. Ambassador, your 

thoughts about the progress toward meeting the economic, security, 

and governance challenges there. 

We also appreciate receiving the first report mandated by the 

Kerry-Lugar-Berman Pakistan bill, and I think that’s a source of 

greater transparency and accountability for how American money 

is going to be spent over the next 5 years. 

So thank you again, Ambassador, for being here. 

Senator Holbrooke—‘‘Senator Holbrooke.’’ Senator Lugar, do you 

have any additional? 

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome your testimony. Your full testimony 

will be placed in the record as usual, as if read in full, and we look 

forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What a 

great honor to be back in front of you and your committee again. 

I am delighted that you suggested that we have this hearing. We 

have timed the report you just mentioned so that it is released 

today in conjunction with this hearing in order to emphasize our 

strong sense of obligation to your committee. 

As you said, I have just returned last night from a trip to Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, 

and France, and will be leaving for London again in a few days. 

I congratulate you on having David Miliband here today. I think 

it’s terrific to hear other voices, responsible voices, with similar but 

slightly different points of view, and I thought his testimony was 

extraordinary. 

The London conference is important. The last time we had an 

Afghanistan conference was March 31 in The Hague. Ten months 

later, following the elections in Afghanistan in which you, Senator 

Kerry, played such a critical role, and following the President’s 

December 1 announcement of the troops, it was time for the world 

to get together again. 

We’re grateful to Gordon Brown, David Miliband, and their government for summoning us to London, and we go with great enthusiasm. Our delegation will be led by Secretary Clinton and I will 

be honored to be part of it. 

I would like to discuss briefly my trip, cover a few other issues. 

I am accompanied here by certain key members of my staff. As you 

and I discussed many weeks ago, we both felt that the best way 

to illustrate the ‘‘whole of government’’ approach that the Obama 

administration has to this issue is to illustrate it in the most dramatic possible way, and I have brought with me, not all of course, 

32 

but some key members of the staff, and I would like, with your permission, to ask them to rise when I finish my brief trip report. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we welcome that. Let me just 

say for my part, and I know many of them and I know some of 

them personally, that you have assembled sort of an A Team of 

capacity for this endeavor, and that’s as it ought to be, and I congratulate you for doing that. We welcome them here. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In that case, Mr. Chairman, maybe I 

ought to introduce them right now before we lose the moment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead. Do that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I’m going to do this in the order they 

claim they’re seated in, and I want to just preface this by saying 

that I brought representatives of all—of 9 of the 10 agencies that 

work—excuse me, 8 of the 10 agencies that work together. The CIA 

representatives are not here, for obvious reasons, and our Department of Agriculture representative, Otto Gonzalez, is in Doha today 

on a very important mission. 

But if I’ve got this right, starting with Paul Jones—I’d ask each 

of you to stand up as I introduce you. Paul Jones is my senior deputy, a career Foreign Service officer. 

Next to him is supposed to be and is Vali Nasser, our senior adviser. I believe he’s testified more than once before your committee. 

Next to him is Rena Miree, who we managed to steal from 

George Soros’ foundation. She worked for the U.N. She was at the 

Bonn conference. She is our expert on Afghan internal politics. 

Next to her is Barney Reuben, who I think you all know. He’s 

testified before your committee. We’re immensely proud that the 

man that I personally consider America’s leading expert on Afghanistan has left the sanctuary of academia and is being introduced to 

bureaucracy. 

Next to him is my senior adviser Ashley Baumer, who is an expert on communications and has worked with me for the last 

decade. 

Next to Ashley is your former staff member, Dan Feldman, my 

other deputy, who is well known to you and also had a close association with Senator Mark Warner. 

In the second row is Derek Hogan. Derek is our expert on the 

provincial reconstruction teams. He is absolutely instrumental. 

He’s served in the field and claims to speak Dari. 

Next to him is our Treasury representative, Romi Shie. We never 

ever get to the subject, but it is enormously important, our 

attempts to interdict the flow of funds from the gulf. It’s not true 

that the drug trade is the major source. It’s one of three major 

sources. Another is illicit funds and the third I regret to say is extortion off the international contracts. Romi, who was with me on 

this trip, has been traveling around the region with his colleagues 

at Treasury. We’re setting up a lot of task forces on this. The Senate majority leader, Senator Reid, has already had a personal briefing on these issues. If you wish additional information beyond the 

scope of today’s hearing, we’d be happy to supply it. 

Next to Romi is our Office of Secretary of Defense representative 

Vikram Singh, also an expert in communications. 

Next to Vikram is Sepada Kavanshah from USAID. 

33 

Next to Sepada is Tim List from the Department of Homeland 

Security. He is working full-time now on this hand security measures issue, which I will just say in parentheses—we won’t get to 

it later—has got the Pakistanis extremely upset, these new measures. Tim List from DHS is working on that. 

Next to Tim is Maj. Gen. Bert Field, one of our two representatives assigned to us by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

In the third row, from the FBI Chris Ryman. 

Next to Chris is Alexander Evans, a loan officer from the British 

Government and an expert on politics and reintegration, reconciliation. 

Next to Alex is Matt Stiglis from the Department of Justice. 

Next to Matt is Beth Dunford, our other USAID person. 

Now, somebody said earlier they should all be back working and 

not up here, but I disagree, Mr. Chairman. I wanted you and anyone else who’s watching to understand what ‘‘whole of government’’ 

means in its most visual sense. And everyone here needs to also 

understand the role of your committee, and I hope you will feel free 

to call on any and all of their resources during this hearing or at 

any time. I know you have been down to our office for breakfast. 

You’ve spent hours with these people. You know them all already. 

I know that Senator Casey has been there. We’ve had some 20 

Members of the Senate and many senior Members of the House 

have breakfast with us. So you know what we’re trying to do. 

Secretary Clinton and President Obama put together this interagency team in order to do what we’re doing. With your permission, I would ask that the report that they assembled and which 

you already mentioned be also entered in the record in addition to 

my testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Without objection, it will be. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The report referred to above was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the 

permanent record of the committee.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, I think it’s terrific to have the 

people, the sort of faces, if you will, and more than that, the people 

affiliated with this effort, and to recognize all of you and for people 

to see the coordinated effort that is taking place here. I think it’s 

important and helpful. And if you’re able to coordinate all of that, 

Afghanistan ought to be a piece of cake. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is—and I say this with no discredit 

to the many other people I’ve worked with over the last decades in 

the Department. But this is the best team I’ve ever been privileged 

to work with. And Secretary Clinton I think, who knows every one 

of these people personally, is very pleased with it. 

Mr. Chairman, let me start with Afghanistan and let me try not 

to duplicate what you already heard from David Miliband. But I 

would like to go back to the question that Senator Casey asked and 

add my own comments right at the outset. I was there with you 

in Afghanistan on August 22 and 23 when you saw President 

Karzai. We talked at the time, and I understand fully why you said 

what you said. 

So let me say something that may surprise you. When I saw Senator—when I saw President Karzai a few days ago, I found cause 

34 

for encouragement, and I choose my words very carefully. I think 

each of you when you go back will see this. 

Let me put it in perspective. Today is 1 year since we started 

work in the Department of State, the day after the inauguration. 

In that 12-month period, 10 months were dominated by one issue 

and that was the elections, and you were there during that period, 

as was Senator Kerry. You came in August. Senator Kerry came 

at the crunch, deciding point. 

That election created so much tension and it so overshadowed everything else we were trying to do. It prevented certain programs 

from getting off the ground at all. It inhibited others. It raised an 

enormous challenge to our policy. In the end, we got through, again 

with tremendous assist from Chairman Kerry. 

While the press regarded the election as messy and the President 

of the United States used that term accurately—it was messy—the 

fact is that the procedures of the election were fulfilled. The independent election commission, which you visited while you were 

there, decided no one got 50 percent. Everyone acknowledged massive irregularities. And then, in a very dramatic set of events, 

President Karzai decided he would go along with the second round, 

and that of course was where Senator Kerry made what I think 

was a historically significant intervention in the process, and we— 

although he was working independently, we were coordinating 

closely. When President Karzai agreed to that election, his challenger withdrew. 

So I need to stress at the outset that President Karzai is the 

legitimately reelected President of the country. When I got to 

Kabul a few days ago and saw President Karzai, of all the meetings 

I’ve had with him going back over the last 6 years, I felt that this 

was the one in which he was most focused on the future, looking 

at the issues, and ready to move forward. 

We talked at length about London. We talked about the reintegration program that Foreign Secretary Miliband has discussed 

and many other issues. I don’t want to promise you that corruption 

will disappear tomorrow. It won’t, and President Karzai can’t fix 

that problem on his own. I don’t want to promise you that reintegration will suddenly bring thousands and thousands of people 

off the battlefield. All I can tell you, Senator, and for the rest of 

the committee, is that I found the situation in Kabul in a better 

position than it’s been at any time in the year since we took office, 

and we inherited a very difficult situation, to put it bluntly. 

So that would be my first comment about Afghanistan, in the 

form of an answer to your very important question. There are some 

very good ministers who have been confirmed and some very bad 

ministers who were rejected. I regret very much that the minister 

of public health was rejected because she was outstanding. But 

that as I understand it was internal politics of the sort everyone 

here is familiar with. 

I do not regard to failure to confirm all the members of the Cabinet as a sign of confusion. We’re slow in our confirmation processes, too. But I am very pleased with what we’ve seen, and I’ll be 

happy to answer the question that Senator Lugar put in his introduction in a moment. 

35 

Let me turn to Pakistan. Pakistan is an immensely complicated 

situation, far more complicated than Afghanistan in my mind, and 

our influence there is necessarily much less. Pakistan’s economy is 

in difficult shape. IMF standby agreements are coming up. We’re 

very concerned about it. We’re doing everything we can do to help. 

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation is enormously important, 

both symbolically and for its actual value. I found the understanding and appreciation of that significantly up since your trip 

to Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that we will fully fund it 

in each of its 5 years that’s called for. Personally, as I’ve said many 

times, I think the international community should do much, much 

more for Pakistan. 

So much for the economy. Now, in terms of what’s happening in 

the west, the Pakistanis have undertaken two major offensives in 

the last year, one against—one in Swat and one in South 

Waziristan. These have been successful offensives. If we were sitting here a year ago—and in fact, when I first appeared before this 

committee early last year this was our major subject of concern. 

Well, they’ve begun to move. I know that all of you feel that they 

ought to do more and I understand that. We all hope that they will 

be able to find ways to deal with all of the militants in the frontier 

areas. 

But there are two full Pakistani divisions right now just in Swat, 

and they have pulled over 100,000 troops off their eastern border 

in order to deal with this. And there are capacity issues here. 

That’s why, in addition to asking for the Kerry-Lugar-Berman 

legislation, we’ve asked for increases in FMF and other forms of 

military assistance. Pakistan is undoubtedly the key to the region 

because of its location, because of its peculiar history in terms of 

its interrelationship with Afghanistan. 

So while we understand that Pakistan and Afghanistan affect 

each other and are closely related, we also need to deal with Pakistan in and of itself as a critically important country for all the reasons you know—nuclear weapons, its relations with its giant neighbor to the east, its weak economy which needs tremendous support. 

And that is, by the way, why we’re so, so hopeful that the ROZ legislation will pass the Senate—it passed the House in the last session—because it is both symbolically and substantively important. 

Pakistan is a country that deserves our sympathetic support, 

even though, as no one knows better than your chairman, they 

sometimes push us to the limits. Their reaction to the Kerry-Lugar 

legislation, their initial reaction, which I believe was based on a 

completely—a complete misunderstanding of what was in the legislation, their initial reaction was one that was understandably 

annoying to people up here. But thanks to Foreign Minister 

Koreshi’s emergency trip here, Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar’s 

intervention on behalf of that process, the explanations, your flying 

trip out there, I think we turned the corner on that. 

Finally on the countries I visited, Mr. Chairman, let me comment 

on India. India is not formally part of my mandate, but with the 

support of the Indians I try to go to New Delhi as often as I can 

to keep them informed and to discuss the situation with them. I 

don’t think it would be valuable to go into details in the public 

forum, but I do want to stress that the Indians are very, very anxVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
36 

ious that we succeed in Afghanistan. They’re supporting us. 

They’re giving Afghanistan a lot of aid, particularly in the field of 

agriculture, which is also our primary nonsecurity priority, agriculture. And I want to be sure that everyone here recognizes how 

centrally important India will be to this. 

Finally, Senator Lugar raised in his initial questions comments 

about regional strategy and other countries, so let me try very 

briefly to touch on some of our emerging bilateral relationships. I 

won’t deal with the old relationships with our NATO allies and 

Japan, which you’re familiar with, but the six countries we have 

developed emerging efforts to work with over the last year, and 

each one is different, Senator. 

The six we are developing strong relationships with and coordination are Egypt, UAE, Turkey, Jordan, China, and Russia. In 

each case—and there will be more. In each case, we have sent 

teams out to the area—I’ve headed some myself, Paul Jones has 

headed some, your former colleague, Dan Feldman, or your former 

staff member, Dan Feldman, has headed some—and we’re developing bilateral relationships. 

You will note that Egypt, UAE, Jordan are all members of the 

OIC, and we are putting very heavy attention on that. Turkey is 

a critically important regional player which can help us. We have 

the same strategic goals. They’re concerned about the Turkmen 

minority in Afghanistan and they have great influence in both 

countries. 

UAE is increasingly supportive. We have had a team in Cairo 

twice. I led one, Dan Feldman led the other. We’re working out 

joint programs. 

Jordan is increasing its military and economic support and is 

willing to train Afghan police and army. 

China we’re in preliminary discussions with, but I’ve been there 

twice and Dan Feldman led a team there, and President Obama 

raised the issue with Hu Jin Tao and it is mentioned in the communique. 

We have started the dialogue with Russia. Paul Jones and I went 

there. Paul is going back. 

So, Mr. Chairman, that is a very brief introduction to an enormous panoply of issues we’re trying to deal with. I’m grateful and 

I’ll be happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, thank you for your invitation to appear before 

this committee to discuss our civilian strategy and efforts in Afghanistan. I would 

like to begin by thanking our friend from the United Kingdom, David Miliband, for 

the U.K.’s indispensable leadership and commitment to our mission in Afghanistan. 

American and British soldiers are fighting side by side to achieve peace and security 

in Afghanistan. And American and British civilians are working side by side to help 

Afghans develop and govern their country so it will never become an al-Qaeda sanctuary again. The United States and United Kingdom will continue to stand together 

with the Afghan people to accomplish our shared mission. 

We are looking ahead with great enthusiasm to the London Conference on 

Afghanistan next week. It will be cohosted by U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown 

and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and cochaired by the U.K. and Afghan 

Foreign Ministers, along with the U.N. Secretary of State Clinton will represent the 

37 

United States. We will join Afghanistan, the U.N., and over 75 nations and international organizations to renew the international community’s partnership with 

Afghanistan. Our objective for the London Conference is clear: to demonstrate the 

international community’s support for Afghanistan’s future, and the agenda outlined 

by President Karzai in his November 19 inauguration speech. The London Conference will focus on Afghanistan’s security, governance and development, and international coordination. We need to maintain momentum so that we continue to deliver progress in Afghanistan and set out the conditions for Afghanistan to take full 

control of its own security. If conditions are right, we expect that the London Conference will be followed by an international conference in Kabul later this year to 

present the Afghan Government’s commitments to the people of Afghanistan. 

President Obama outlined a strategy in March 2009 that includes supporting the 

Afghan Government’s efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. As he made clear at West Point on December 1, our civilian engagement in Afghanistan will continue long after our combat troops come home. While 

our military mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, we are committed to building 

lasting partnership with Afghanistan. In line with the President goals, the London 

conference aims to enhance the international community’s partnership with Afghanistan. 

Now is a good time for us to take stock of the past year. On January 20, 2009, 

the situation in Afghanistan was more precarious than many realized. Our basic 

strategy needed an overhaul. Our Embassy in Kabul lacked personnel, programs, 

and resources. The international community perceived that Afghanistan was not a 

top U.S. priority. Key regional actors, such as China and Russia, as well as Muslim 

partners, were not engaged in Afghanistan’s future. In Washington there was no serious effort at coordination for our civilian effort and no agreed civilian strategy. 

Our relationship with Afghanistan looks much better than it did at this time last 

year. We have reclaimed the initiative. We have brought strategic coherence to our 

nonmilitary efforts; made major changes in our civilian priorities; overcome political 

crises; greatly increased American civilian resources; and mobilized significant 

international support for stabilizing Afghanistan. 

Before I go into greater detail on the progress we’ve seen this year and the strategy for the way forward, I want to elaborate on our engagement with international 

partners to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been a major focus of Secretary Clinton and my efforts, and just yesterday I returned from a trip that took 

me to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia aimed at bolstering the international effort to help Afghanistan. As President Obama said, the future stability 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan affects ‘‘the security of our allies, and the common security of the world.’’ Based on that insight, we have engaged in intensive diplomatic 

outreach to build a broad international coalition in support of our common objectives 

in the region. 

Of course this includes working with our closest partners, and I am pleased that 

Foreign Secretary Miliband was able to brief you on the London Conference next 

week. The European Union has announced an Action Plan for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan that focuses on civilian assistance in vital sectors. Turkey continues to be 

a vital partner, increasing their military commitment and managing innovative 

projects in agricultural exports and other fields. Russia is providing overflight 

rights, and China has engaged in productive consultations over our common objectives. Countries throughout the wider Muslim region are also playing a leading role. 

The United Arab Emirates announced the appointment of a resident Ambassador 

in Kabul last week, one day before hosting a meeting of my counterparts from 

almost 30 countries and international organizations, including some of the most active countries in the region. 

Through the international group of my counterparts—the ‘‘SRAP’’ collective—and 

by strengthening international civilian institutions in Kabul, we are also working 

to ensure that increased international resources are well-coordinated and well-used. 

The London Conference should be able to announce important progress in strengthening civilian coordination in Kabul under the leadership of the United Nations but 

with strong support from ISAF, the EU, and others. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to summarize a few of the key civilian-led initiatives underway in Afghanistan—which is summarized in the comprehensive civilian 

strategy that we are releasing today. We are implementing a new civilian-military 

agriculture redevelopment strategy that will sap the insurgency not only of foot soldiers, but also of income from the narcotics trade. We are expanding subnational 

capacity-building efforts, focused mainly in key population centers in the East and 

South, through new civ-mil initiatives, such as the District Development Working 

Groups and District Support Teams, and supporting programs that give Afghans a 

greater stake in their own government, such as the National Solidarity Program. 

38 

And we are improving coordination of international assistance by consulting with 

our allies and partners to strengthen the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan and enhancing civilian coordination among ISAF partners. 

Last week, Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack visited Kabul to highlight the fact 

that agriculture is our most important nonsecurity program. We are very pleased 

with the efforts and progress to date we have made with our Afghan partners; 2009 

was the best agricultural year Afghanistan has had in the last 30 years—a reflection of good weather, increased security in agriculture areas in the South, and our 

robust civilian assistance efforts. We have dozens of USDA advisers in the field 

working closely with Agribusiness Development Teams from National Guard units 

from such states as Nebraska, Missouri, and Texas. These agriculture experts work 

closely with their local and provincial Afghan counterparts to revitalize this historically successful economic sector, boost job creation, and encourage the population to 

stop opium production and wean Afghan youths from joining the Taliban and supporting terrorists. Our military and civilian success in former Taliban-controlled 

areas will generate word of mouth in Afghanistan and create additional momentum 

to enable the Afghan Government to more effectively deliver services in these areas 

and successfully fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

To help implement this strategy, we have bolstered our diplomatic and development presence in the field, and work very closely with Ambassador Eikenberry and 

his team in Kabul. In Washington, we are also pursuing a whole-of-government approach. I lead a team of experts and senior advisers from 10 U.S. Government departments and agencies, headquartered at the State Department. They represent 

USAID, Treasury, the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, FBI, CIA, OSD, and USDA. We work seamlessly with the NSC and 

CENTCOM, as well as in close coordination with Ambassador Eikenberry and his 

strong team in Kabul. Together, we are implementing our political, economic, and 

diplomatic efforts. 

We have nearly tripled the number of civilians on the ground since January 

2009—but the numbers are not the only measure. We need to do more than just 

fill personnel slots—we need to be sure that we are putting the right people in the 

right places. We also have true civ-mil integration and cooperation nationwide—not 

just in Kabul, but also at RC-East and RC-South. This is possible because of the 

efforts we have made to recruit and send more qualified civilians into the field. 

Today key civilian experts are able to deploy with military units in places like 

Helmand province where insurgents operated uncontested just a few months ago. 

A final note on civilian staffing in Afghanistan: unlike their military counterparts, 

civilians are selected and deploy as individuals, not units. That is what makes this 

huge increase in civilians to Afghanistan so impressive. The civilian impact is far 

greater than numbers: the average civilian leverages 10 partners—locally employed 

staff, Afghan and international experts from U.S.-funded NGOs. There is a different 

purpose and way of working on the civilian side: we want the civilians supporting 

and building the capacity of their Afghan counterparts who must be the forward 

face of these shared programs. 

Mr. Chairman, we have no illusions about what faces us in Afghanistan. The challenges there are immense. The Afghan Government is under assault from the 

Taliban and struggling to provide security, jobs, and basic justice to a society devastated by more than 30 years of war. 

One weapon that the Taliban and al-Qaeda use very successfully is information, 

seeking to dominate the information space through direct communications or intimidation, and by working through religious or nationalist media outlets. They have a 

well-oiled rapid-reaction propaganda machine that constantly uses graphic images, 

intimidating telephone calls, and CDs and DVDs distributed in local bazaars, while 

disavowing responsibility for bombings they conduct which kill large numbers of 

civilians. Therefore, while our previous strategy focused largely on traditional public 

diplomacy and communications tools, we are now elevating our communications 

efforts in importance and innovation. We are helping to build communications infrastructure and capacity; conducting sustained media and outreach strategies in both 

countries; and fostering a localized grassroots movement on the ground through 

mobile and radio initiatives—including leveraging new technology to foster socioeconomic benefits though e-banking, learning, and health. 

Secretary Clinton has said that while only the Afghan people ‘‘can defeat the 

insurgency once and for all’’ and ‘‘build a successful democracy that lasts,’’ it remains the responsibility of the United States to partner with the Afghan Government over the long term to achieve these goals. We cannot do so unless we implement an integrated civil-military strategy in Afghanistan. 

Achieving progress will require continued sacrifice not only by our military 

personnel, but also by the more than 1,500 U.S. Government civilians serving in 

39 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. But for the first time since the conflict in Afghanistan 

began 8 years ago, we have an innovative, whole-of-government strategy to protect 

our vital national security interests in this region—the strategy as articulated by 

President Obama last year and spelled out in more detail in this document before 

you today. When combined with U.S. military efforts to build Afghan and Pakistani 

security capacity, our political, economic, and diplomatic efforts constitute an unprecedented interagency undertaking. And as I saw again during my recent visit to 

the region, our civilian personnel are working together with our Afghan and international partners as never before. Their efforts are vital to our success in protecting 

and advancing American interests. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close on the most important point: we could not do this 

without the support of this committee or the Congress. You have been indispensable 

partners. Over the past several months, many of you have come to the State Department to meet members of my interagency team; you have led numerous delegations 

to both Afghanistan and Pakistan to better assess the needs on the ground; and 

worked closely with us on important legislation, like the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. 

I hope we can continue the open, frank, and regular dialogue we have had over the 

past year. Secretary Clinton and I are deeply committed to doing more in order to 

protect and advance American interests side by side with Congress. 

I believe the President’s strategy—as spelled out in detail in this document— 

offers our best prospect for stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, and to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies so they are no longer a 

threat to the United States and our interests. I look forward to continuing to work 

with you and the Congress to secure the resources we need to achieve our mission 

and to signal our continued commitment to Afghanistan and our international 

partners. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Let me begin by asking you for sort of a general assessment of 

the civilian piece. A lot of us have been saying for a long time, and 

I think you’ve been in agreement, that since there is no military 

solution, the key here is to be able to get the Afghans to start doing 

things, delivery of services, delivery of governance at the local 

level. 

Give the committee, if you would, your best summary and judgment of what progress we’ve really made since the inauguration, 

since this moment of new opportunity for President Karzai to 

change the dynamics? Give us your assessment of what that state 

of progress really is on the ground and of where we stand with respect to the civilian capacity to come in under these additional 

troops and make this transition work? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I want to be clear I understand your 

question. You’re referring not to reintegration, but to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not referring to reintegration except to the 

degree that it’s just part of the larger strategy. I’m referring to the 

civilian capacity to deliver governance, deliver services, do development, come in underneath the clear and hold, so that you’re building and transitioning and transferring. I’d like to get your sense of 

where we are in terms of the personnel and capacity to empower 

the district and provincial governance that is so critical here. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We’re just starting, Senator. That is— 

we have on paper a plan that takes you from the clear phase, 

which the U.S. military and its NATO allies do so well, through the 

hold phase. But when you get to build and transfer, we are just 

starting, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. 

You take Nawah District in southern Helmand, which has gotten 

a lot of publicity, ‘‘60 Minutes’’ profiles and so on. The Marines 

went in with a thousand people, took over the area, which greeted 

them with great excitement. That was the Little America area that 

the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had done so much in, 

40 

and a lot of the people remembered the Americans or had heard 

about them from their parents. 

But there were no Afghans, so to speak, with the American military and civilians when they went in. And when they do go in, they 

don’t have office space, they don’t have telephones, they don’t have 

resources. It’s a long, long way from Kabul to Lashkah Gar or 

Nawah. 

The CHAIRMAN. What does that say about our prospects here, 

then? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I’m giving you—you wanted a 

snapshot. The snapshot is a blueprint which has got to be filled in. 

These things—I hate to say this because time is not always our 

ally, but these things do take a certain amount of time. Until that 

election was behind us—and that was only 2 months and 2 days 

ago from today, November 19—until that election was over, we 

couldn’t get to that issue, Mr. Chairman. 

We could do agriculture. Agriculture is the big success story of 

2009. It is creating jobs and stopping the poppy eradication was a 

tremendous achievement. But when you get to governance, then 

we’re talking about a much more difficult issue. Derek Hogan, who 

I introduced to you a minute ago, his focus is on this issue. We call 

it subnational governance. What it means is what are we going to 

do at the district level? 

Well, we have got a ton of plans. They’re outlined in here, and 

I would be happy to submit for the record a much more detailed 

explanation. But I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let’s put them into the record and let me sort 

of extend the question a little bit. As an example of the kind of 

thing that I think represents the challenge, you’re more than 

familiar with, obviously, the national solidarity program. It’s really 

been in many people’s judgment one of the most successful Afghanrun—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The most successful. 

The CHAIRMAN. The most successful, and I would agree with 

that. It’s touched the lives of two out of three people in the rural 

arena. It’s the only program I know of that’s reached all of the 

country’s 34 provinces, and really that’s affected the lives of about 

13 million villagers. 

I am told that as a result of that program about 28 percent of 

the population now has drinking water where they didn’t, 25 percent have better roads, access to markets, marketplaces, 18 percent 

have better irrigation systems, 16 percent now have access to 

power, 11 percent of the children are studying in reconstructed 

schools. 

These are all big deals. That’s the up side that you never hear 

about with respect to Afghanistan. But—and here’s the ‘‘but,’’ and 

it goes to this question of President Karzai and the direction we’re 

taking. The ministry of rural rehabilitation and development runs 

that program, and we’ve invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 

it. The new MRRD Minister, Jarullah Mansuri, is essentially a 

political pick who—I hate to say it, but he simply doesn’t have the 

experience or the level of ability to manage a program like this. 

And worse, he has made public comments suggesting that he plans 

41 

to scale back those programs drastically, which then jeopardizes 

the one big success story that we have. 

So how do we—where are we with respect to that, and how does 

that fit into this notion that this is sort of the moment of opportunity and truth, where these kinds of setbacks just aren’t tolerable? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We agree with you about the NSP. It 

is the most successful program, and we are expanding it and 

enlarging it with the enthusiastic support of the Senate, which has 

repeatedly told us it’s your favorite program as well, and we will 

continue to do so. 

The reason it’s so successful goes to a central point that goes 

back to Senator Casey’s question. The United States has a tendency to personalize the country’s government and put everything 

on the head of President Karzai, but that isn’t consistent with 

Afghan history, tradition, and no government can ever flow 

through the top. But this has not been a highly centralized government most of its history, and certainly not after the last 30 years. 

So programs that go directly to the district level and below are 

valuable, and whatever the references you’ve made, we are going 

to continue to emphasize this program. 

The CHAIRMAN. Have you raised that issue about its leadership 

with the President? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I’ve not discussed the minister, Mr. 

Chairman. I’ve discussed the program, and President Karzai has 

reassured us—Ambassador Eikenberry, myself—that this is an 

issue that he will support, this is a program he’ll support. 

But, based on what you’re saying, we’ll go back and batten down 

the hatches and my crack team behind me will send out a cable 

tonight asking for more information, and we’ll get back to you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Because this program 

should be expanded. In fact, the World Bank did a study in conjunction with Harvard and the ministry recently. They looked at 

500 villages in the south, and what they found, and I’ll quote. The 

assessment was that ‘‘NSP overwhelmingly demonstrated a positive 

impact on economic development, local governance, female involvement in local government, girls school attendance, and perceptions 

of the government from Karzai on down, and security at the village 

level.’’ 

Then they went on in this memo I have. The researchers and the 

World Bank not only welcome the U.S. commitment to NSP, they 

were happy to hear about our plan for putting another $300 million 

into NSP. Remember, the program phased out, so we inherited a 

good idea with an empty piggy bank, and we had to come back to 

you. Another one of these inexplicable inheritances. 

But they went on to say that they stressed ‘‘The next phase of 

NSP’s development will require nearly a billion dollars.’’ Now, that 

doesn’t need all come from the United States. The World Bank is 

a big supporter, and other countries. But we are big, big supporters. 

The CHAIRMAN. And for good reason. 

[The written information from Ambassador Holbrooke to the 

above question follows:] 

42 

The U.S. must be willing and prepared to work closely with duly appointed ministers such as Jarullah Mansoori, who was appointed as the Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development by President Karzai, and confirmed in the position by 

Parliament on January 16, 2010. Prior to his appointment as Minister, Jarullah 

Mansoori served as an adviser to Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar while the latter 

was the MRRD Minister. He also worked as an adviser to former Minister of Justice 

Abdul Rahim Karimi, and as Deputy General of the Afghan National Environmental 

Protection Agency (NEPA). 

Ambassador Eikenberry met personally with the newly appointed Minister on 

January 26 to specifically raise some of the issues and concerns you have highlighted. In addition to his commitment to fighting corruption and restoring the 

rightful place of women in society, as highlighted in his presentation to Parliament, 

Minister Mansoori confirmed his strong support for the National Solidarity Program 

(NSP), among other key initiatives. The NSP forms a critical element of subnational 

governance programs, and a mechanism that has proved successful—as you have 

rightly identified—in connecting the Government of Afghanistan to the population. 

Minister Mansoori has stressed his willingness for national inclusion in MRRD 

projects, and the need to focus on sustainability and capacity-building of the systems currently in place. We will therefore continue to support MRRD, and Minister 

Mansoori, in developing these systems (including programs such as NSP) to 

strengthen the links between central, provincial, district, and community levels to 

enable GIROA delivery of a package of basic services to the population. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, let me ask a question about relationships 

between the remarkable staff that you have coordinated, which I 

understand is comprised of as many as 40 persons in Washington, 

and the country team in Pakistan. The reason I ask the question 

is that after returning from staff visits, members of our Foreign 

Relations Committee staff have indicated that certain arguments 

and tensions exist between your staff and the country team. I suppose those are unavoidable, but the fact is that this is an unusual 

situation, in which there is an ambassador and a country team in 

Pakistan, in addition your very large staff that’s also there from 

time to time. 

How are you coordinating the relationships between these groups 

of people? Who is in charge, and can you describe the process of 

reconciling these views in a bit of detail? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The easiest way to explain the situation, Senator, is to simply point out what my job is. I’m not a special envoy like George Mitchell or Todd Stern. The title ‘‘Special 

Representative’’ was designed to indicate that two Embassies, 

Kabul and Islamabad, were put under our direct supervision, working in close conjunction with, but separate from, the South and 

Central Asia Bureau, headed by Assistant Secretary Bob Blake. In 

fact, Paul Jones, my senior deputy, is dual-hatted as a deputy 

assistant secretary in that Bureau. 

Therefore, we have a seamless relationship with the Bureau 

that’s responsible for India and Central Asia. Our job, as stated by 

the President, is to oversee the embassies in the regular chain of 

command. In other words, they’re instructed ambassadors who 

report through us to the Secretary of State, just like any other 

ambassadors in the world. 

I’ve been in and out of the State Department now for over 40 

years and almost every embassy and every home office has disagreements. There have been some well publicized disagreements 

over the size of our aid commitments in both countries. I think 

that’s in the normal course of affairs. 

43 

There is no problem between the Embassy in Islamabad and our 

office, except the routine bureaucratic things that go on day after 

day, 90 percent of which, Senator Lugar, are in the end results of 

inadequate communication across 101⁄2 time zones. 

I was just in Islamabad and Lahore with Ambassador Patterson 

and her team for 3 days and there was no problem and no friction. 

There was one area, however, that Secretary Clinton and I and 

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale all have been 

deeply concerned about. That goes back to things you said earlier, 

both of you: Americans are not well appreciated in Pakistan, despite the fact that we give them a massive amount of assistance. 

Both Secretary Clinton and Under Secretary McHale and I all felt 

that our public diplomacy programs were inadequate and we had 

to revamp them top to bottom. We had to bring in new personnel 

and we had to change the whole method of operations there. 

This is an ongoing effort. I know that Senator Kaufman has been 

particularly interested in this and I’m very grateful for his constant 

assistance by nudging us, because it’s a very difficult situation 

when you authorize and appropriate vast amounts of money for a 

country and it is misrepresented in the press. We had no—there 

was no plan in place to explain the Kerry-Lugar bill to the Pakistanis the day you passed it. So what happened? All the publicity 

came in without any warning, misrepresenting it. 

Again, I express my appreciation to all of you for what you did 

to unravel it. But it should never have happened. I speak not only 

for myself, but for the Secretary, who has said this publicly, that 

we had to do better. 

Two of the people sitting behind you, Vikram Singh and Ashley 

Baumer, are particularly focused on that. It’s part of a larger issue 

about communications and counterpropaganda. 

But that was not a source of friction, Senator Lugar. It was an 

identified gap. It was a legacy issue, and we have turned to it as 

one of our highest priorities and will continue to. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me mention that Senator Kaufman and I 

were in the front row to hear Secretary Clinton’s speech this morning on the use of the Internet and other communications as a vital 

part of our new public diplomacy strategy. I thought it was a very 

important speech and one which hopefully illustrates some of the 

points you have just made. 

Let me just touch—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I interject one quick point, Senator. I would add that several of the examples in her speech were 

either directly from what we’re doing in Pakistan and Afghanistan 

or, in the case of Haiti, 20222 on your dial, we had pioneered that 

in Swat when the refugees hit. So the technology was in place and 

we were able to simply transfer it to Haiti, where they’ve raised 

$25 million in just a few days. 

Senator LUGAR. That is a very important point, and she did mention Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as Haiti. 

Let me follow up on a question I raised in my opening statement. 

What is the plan for the $200 million directed this year to education in Pakistan? How do you even begin to approach this issue? 

What sort of organized effort is there in a country which, as we 

have often commented in our hearings has virtually no public 

44 

school system? It is hard to tell whether there is any organization, 

quite apart from bureaucracy. How do you disburse and supervise 

$200 million? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In a country of 180 million people, the 

education system must be reformed by the country itself. No 

amount of outside money can do it, and yet we have to give them 

money to support it. 

You said $200 million. Actually, the $200 million was fiscal year 

2009. For this year it’s slightly larger. It’s gone up to $265 million 

under Kerry-Lugar. 

With your permission, I’d just like to answer your question as 

follows. There’s basic education and higher education. The basic 

education is $265 million in the fiscal year 2010 budget and in accordance with the parameters laid out in your own legislation. This 

is basic education to support education reform programs to build 

and rehabilitate schools, provide essential teacher and learning 

materials, strengthen local school management, improve teacher 

training. AID’s going to support innovative approaches to increase 

school enrollment through public-private partnerships. In the Federally Administered Tribal programs, we’re going to help increase 

enrollment. 

You know, the literacy rates are in the single digits and half of 

that for women in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It’s a 

huge problem. The reason it’s so important goes back to the communications issue. When you look at what’s happening out there, 

people who are illiterate and do not know what the Koran says are 

being misled by fiery radicals misrepresenting it. There’s a direct 

correlation. 

Three weeks ago a teenager suicide bomber killed over 100 people—a small headline in the press here—in a volleyball area in his 

home village. What the press didn’t emphasize was that that man, 

that boy, killed two of his brothers and all his friends. 

You have to think about that. It’s quite different than the Nigerian on the plane to Detroit or the Jordanian who went in and 

killed our brave CIA colleagues. This is a kid who was completely 

misled by radio and never went to school, and he killed his own 

family. That’s why this program is so important. 

Turning to higher education, we have another $70 million, so 

this year it’ll be over $300 million in higher education, to increase 

enrollment and improve quality through strengthening tertiary institutions, providing scholarships for colleges; $45 million is going 

for the Pakistan higher education commission and $20 million to 

Fulbrights. 

May I add in regard to this money another point. At your direction and the President’s direction and Secretary Clinton’s direction, 

we are trying to eliminate the intermediary contracts, which gives 

us greater flexibility, cuts the overhead. We’re throwing away 15 

to 25 percent of the money you appropriated for people—it never 

left the United States or it never left the intermediary NGOs or 

contractees. 

But I don’t want to mislead you; 180 million people, $300 million—this is going to be really tough. The earlier list of countries 

I referred to—Egypt, Jordan, Turkey—they have a unique opporVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
45 

tunity to also work in the religious educational institutions, which 

by law we cannot do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Holbrooke, I just wanted to intervene, because I need to meet with the Foreign Minister for a few 

minutes privately on a couple of those issues. I would like to be 

able to get together with you. Are you leaving—when do you leave 

for London? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Tuesday morning. 

The CHAIRMAN. You leave Tuesday morning for London. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Back Friday of next week, and 

then—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it would be possible on Monday we 

might—let me see what we can arrange—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I’d be delighted here. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. To follow up on some of what we’ve 

talked about here. 

Again, I want to thank all the members of the team. I know how 

hard you’re all working. There is no issue more important to us 

than being successful in Pakistan and, obviously, with Afghanistan. 

So we are grateful to you for that effort. 

Senator Casey and then Senator Kaufman, and Senator Lugar is 

going to chair in that period. I apologize. I need to run to this 

meeting, but I thank you very, very much. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, we’re grateful for your testimony here and the 

great work that you’re doing, especially thinking in the larger 

sense, at a time of real danger around the world and a time of 

importance to our country you’re serving it again. We’re grateful 

for that public service. 

You were kind enough to provide a briefing for me with your 

team. For those who are wondering what those morning meetings 

are like, it was very businesslike. I think I got a cup of coffee, but 

that was pretty quick. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Franken ate every piece of 

fruit available. 

Senator CASEY. I don’t remember being offered the fruit. I’ll have 

to try that the next time. [Laughter.] 

But you’ve obviously assembled a great team, and I want to commend their continuing commitment to public service on these important issues. 

Let me try to raise at least two issues with you in the time that 

we have. The first one obviously is very grave and troubling issue 

for a lot of Americans. When we hear about those who gave, as 

Lincoln said, the last full measure of devotion, those killed in action, increasingly and disturbingly it’s with IEDs. 

We know that there’s a different treatment really of ammonium 

nitrate-based fertilizer in the two relevant countries. In one place 

this kind of fertilizer is legal and in the other place it’s illegal. In 

the case of Afghanistan, although it is illegal, and we know, at 

least I’m told, that the ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer accounts 

for only 5 percent of the fertilizer in Afghanistan, but it’s used in 

the overwhelming majority of the IED attacks. 

46 

What can you tell us—as we talked earlier, I’ve submitted a letter to Secretary Clinton on this. What can you tell us about efforts 

made, that you and others have made in the administration to engage the Pakistani Government to help us with this problem where 

this fertilizer is used to kill or be part of the component parts of 

the IEDs that kill our soldiers? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Ambassador Patterson and our military people in Islamabad, Admiral LeFevre, have raised this with 

the Pakistanis on many occasions. I have raised it, too. They claim 

they’re sympathetic, but what can they do; it slips through the borders, of course. 

I was very pleased that the ISAF forces in Kandahar discovered 

that huge cache of ammonium nitrate earlier this year. I read your 

letter very carefully and we are prepared to come up here and talk 

at greater detail about it. 

Also, Under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who has been 

tasked with the anti-IED mission separate from the ammonium 

nitrate, is working on various ways to do this. 

I’m just given a note here: Karzai just outlawed ammonium nitrate, banning import, production, transportation, sale, use and 

storage of the fertilizer today. It was my understanding it was already banned, so maybe he reissued it or tightened it. But let me 

check on what that’s about. 

If we could reschedule a separate briefing for you and any colleagues who are interested in accordance with your letter to Secretary Clinton, I would be happy to do so. It’s a huge issue and I’m 

very grateful to you for highlighting it. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You know the amount of ammonium 

nitrate that they captured in that one bust in Kandahar was equal 

to 11⁄2 years at the current use of IEDs using ammonium nitrate. 

And they must have had a lot more, because they’re still doing it. 

But that was a big, big haul and it must have set them back. But 

imagine what that was, and that was a warehouse right in the city 

of Kandahar. So it was a stunning event. 

Senator CASEY. I appreciate the attention to this that you’ve 

brought, and I want to commend Secretary Clinton, not only in isolation on this issue, but more generally with the way she’s 

approached committing the resources that you and your team have 

been able to take advantage of. 

I wanted to raise one more question before my time is up, with 

regard to Pakistan and in particular President Zardari’s government. Obviously, even a casual observer in the United States of the 

challenge that both countries pose for us, both security and governance and otherwise, has to be concerned about the stability of both 

governments. I wanted to get your sense or your assessment really 

currently of President Karzai’s government in terms of just the 

day-by-day functioning of that government. The concern that I have 

and others have is if he is in any way weakened over time, and 

some of that because of internal politics and rulings by their court 

system, if he is in any way weakened and therefore the Pakistani 

People’s Party is weakened, that will downgrade or deteriorate 

their ability to go after the extremists and the terrorists that we’re 

trying to put pressure on ourselves, as well as I know the great efVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
47 

fort that the Pakistani Army, General Kiyani and others, have put 

forth already. 

So I wanted to just get your kind of general assessment of the 

government and how he’s doing, President Zardari, as their President. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We saw President Zardari in Lahore 

during this trip, and I emphasize that it was in Lahore because he 

had embarked on a barnstorming tour of the country, which is well 

described in today’s New York Times in an outstanding article by 

Sabrina Tavernezi. He had gone to Baluchistan, Lahore, Karachi. 

I think he went to several other places. He was clearly revitalized 

and reenergized by that experience. 

Now, in regard to the larger issue, I got in a little bit of hot 

water because I started talking about the internal political situation in what I thought were analytical terms in a recent interview, 

and people immediately dissected it in ways which were not what 

I intended nor what I said. But then we had to correct. So I want 

to be very careful, Senator. 

We support the civilian democratically elected Government of 

Pakistan. Internal discussions about how power is distributed and 

legal—and changes in accordance with the law is something for 

Pakistan and we do not want to infringe on their sovereignty. 

As far as the military goes, they have conducted excellent military operations recently, as I said earlier. They are facing a multitude of problems. Secretary Gates was in Islamabad today talking 

to them. I do not yet have a report on his meetings. 

But I just cannot stress any other point except that the KerryLugar bill was specifically designed to give the civilian government 

more resources on the civilian side, without in any way reducing 

the military. I think that that’s an important statement of the will 

of your Chamber and of the executive branch. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

Casey. 

Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke, for your service to the country, and to your team. Every interaction I’ve had with members of 

your team has been a positive one. You have assembled a fine 

group of professionals and I want to thank them for what they do 

every day. 

You talked a little about communications strategy. Is there anything else you want to talk about in terms of what you’re doing in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With Chairman Lugar’s permission, 

could I ask if Vikram Singh and Ashley—I don’t know if this is 

allowed, Senator, but could they respond briefly to the Senator’s 

question? 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you. 

Vikram, Ashley, why don’t you give a quick response. Just rise. 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Senator Kaufman, Mr. Chairman. 

Can you guys hear me without the mike? 

48 

In both Afghanistan and in Pakistan, we really found that we 

had a fairly traditional approach to public relations and communications overall. What we’ve started to do over the last year is to 

really revamp that entirely. In both countries we’ve created strong, 

unified teams inside the Embassy to look at all related communications issues, not just public relations meeting in one place and exchanges and people-to-people stuff being in another place, but 

somebody who is pulling everything together and who is focusing 

on what it takes in those countries to counter the pernicious influence of enemy propaganda, basically the ability of the militants in 

both countries to directly communicate and very actively communicate to populations who in general are either not reached by 

much other media or simply don’t have a lot to choose from in what 

they’re able to listen to. 

So we’re working very hard to increase the reach of communications throughout those countries. So that is getting cellphones, 

radio broadcast, television broadcast out into areas that are really 

untouched. Both countries have pretty robust media environments, 

but they don’t get out to a lot of the areas that are of most concern 

to us and where the militancy really has its roots. 

We’re also working with the Afghans and Pakistanis to support 

programming and other content that will be relevant to and will 

actually be meaningful to the people in those areas. So we reach 

out to them on the airways. 

Then we’re really leveraging new technologies, so we’re looking 

in both these countries, it’s remarkable. Afghanistan had really no 

telephones in 2002. Over 50 percent of Afghans now have access to 

cell phones. They use things like SMS. They play games on their 

cell phones. Even with a low literacy rate, people use their literate 

cousin or their literate relative to send messages back and forth. 

So we’re looking at things like Mobile Money—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Could you mention our experiment 

with payments for the police, because that addresses your concerns 

on attrition and desertion as well. 

Mr. SINGH. We’re looking at things like Mobile Money, and the 

pilot for that is actually a program with the Afghan National 

Police. One of the key problems for the police is they get their 

money in cash, which leaves them liable to be robbed or to have 

money skimmed off the top as it flows down. It also means that to 

get it to their families they have to get home, and often they’ll be 

gone for a week at a time every month to carry the money home 

to their families. 

Mobile payments actually allow the funds to be on a cellphone. 

The pilot was very successful and is now being expanded actually, 

really with the leadership of the Treasury Department and my colleague right next to me is a big part of trying to make this work. 

It’s going to be expanded to additional ministries throughout the 

course of this year. 

When that happens, they get their full pay, and many policemen 

noted in the studies that were done after the pilot, noted that they 

didn’t know how much they were actually paid. They all thought 

they were paid about 30 percent less than what they got, because 

it wasn’t all making it to them. And it means they don’t have to 

take off and you don’t have the problem of ghost soldiers. 

49 

We’re also just trying to help foster communities through these 

new technologies, so that people can share information, be it about 

criminality, about incidents on the road, about attacks, or just 

about farming, market prices in areas that farmers take their 

goods to market. So it’s a range of things, Senator, and obviously 

I can only touch on a few here for you. But there’s just really a lot 

going on and it’s a very exciting area. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We have in fiscal year 2010, we have 

$50 million for Pakistan and $90 million for Afghanistan in these 

programs. But that way understates what we’re going to spend because a lot of—there’s much more money in the Pentagon budget. 

We are working very closely with Admiral Smith on this program, 

and we have just recruited our civilian coordinator for this, who 

some of you may remember, David Ensor, former ABC–CNN correspondent, who is going to be out there within a few weeks to coordinate this program. I think we might ask him to come up and 

call on some of you before he goes, if you wish. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Are you coordinating this with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, or Radio Free 

Europe, Radio Liberty? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Very much so, very much so. In fact, 

perhaps not in this session, but there are a couple of items to bring 

to your attention in that regard, some good news actually, for a 

change. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And while they have a robust media environment in Pakistan, I think historically they’ve not let international 

broadcasters on. They’ve really controlled who gets on the air. I 

think this is a government-to-government thing. I’ve often felt that 

one of the things we should do in Pakistan is allowing the broadcasters to be on the air so that people can hear it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, Voice of America has been functional in Pakistan. 

Senator KAUFMAN. It’s functional, but it’s not on the proper stations that people listen to. There aren’t affiliates in their—the 

Pakistan National Broadcasting I don’t think broadcasts anything 

from Voice of America. So in these areas distribution is really, 

really, really key. As I say, it’s a robust market, but we’ve had a 

real problem over the years getting onto the networks, the radio 

stations, and the TV stations that people watch. 

So to the extent that you can negotiate with the Pakistan Government, I know that would be helpful. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I totally agree with that. I would, 

however, say that in the end the fight—the information war is 

what this fight is all about—when they kill people, suicide bombings and so on, it isn’t for the actual event. It’s for their view of 

its value. I think they’ve misjudged the Pakistani people, incidentally. But that is the problem, and to deal with it you need local 

voices. 

When we were in Swat a few days ago, Senator, and we met with 

the leaders, every single person said that radio was the vehicle 

through which Faisullah had terrorized Swat. It was right out of 

the history books on Rwanda 1994. He would broadcast the names 

of people he’s going to behead, the next day he would terrorize the 

50 

population. That it seems to me is exhibit A for the importance of 

this issue. 

But once again, nothing on it was being done on this a year ago. 

So it’s a work in progress. Admiral Mullen and I went out there. 

He put into place Admiral Smith. We got David Ensor. 

But I would just say that I think the backlash against the excesses of a person like Faisullah are going to end up taking them 

down. It’s just going to be a very painful struggle. If we leave the 

airwaves uncontested—and by ‘‘airwaves,’’ you start with radio in 

those areas—the price will be enormous. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I couldn’t agree with you more. The other example is Serbia, where Milosevic did exactly the same thing, and 

we won the battle of airwaves there. At the end of that, when the 

people were on the streets, you know how effective Radio Free 

Europe-Radio Liberty was. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We were able to broadcast from the air 

through Commander Solo and other factors. That technology is 

not—it’s there, but we can’t use it as easily in Pakistan. In Afghanistan we don’t need it. We can broadcast from other places. 

Senator KAUFMAN. In Afghanistan we have great listenerships. I 

was just saying, in Pakistan we don’t need Commander Solo. The 

problem is because they have a robust media; what we have to do 

is make sure that our message gets onto the local affiliates that 

people listen to, radio and television stations that the people use 

and listen to. And we can do that, and I think it’s a government 

to government. The only reason they’re going to let us on there is 

because you talk to President Zardari and he says OK. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you 

for your patience in waiting to the end to ask very important questions. 

Senator KAUFMAN. It’s a thing you learn when you’re a junior. 

Senator LUGAR. We especially thank Ambassador Holbrooke and 

Minister Miliband, and we thank the members of his staff for coming today and being a part of this hearing. We appreciate the very 

large public response. As you have noticed during the last 21⁄2

hours, a great number of persons have come because they feel this 

is important, just as we do. 

So we thank all of you for this investment of time, and we will 

do our best to use this information. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 5:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Despite the series of conferences since Bonn in 2001, no clear institutional framework for Afghanistan’s nation-building and reconstruction has emerged. Despite 

international consensus and goodwill the United Nations has yet to play a strategic 

coordinating role in Afghanistan. UNAMA challenges continue since the election 

debacle and the extension of parliamentary elections by at least 4 months as well 

as the near term departure of Kai Eide. Overlapping mandates, competitive relations, and minimal accountability for performance have hampered and diminished 

positive impact of international partners. 

51 

Question. Past conferences have delivered vague and unrealized commitments and 

merely plans to build frameworks for cooperation. How will the London Conference 

differ? 

Answer. The London Conference on Afghanistan focused on supporting the Government of Afghanistan’s leadership in key areas, including development planning. 

The Government of Afghanistan has developed an interagency process of ministry 

‘‘clusters’’ to set priorities and guide donor assistance. The U.N. Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is supporting these efforts, including by revitalizing the 

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) as a venue for coordination 

between the ministry clusters and donors. Building a cooperative framework with 

the Government of Afghanistan at its center, supported by UNAMA and others, is 

more robust and sustainable than previous coordination efforts. 

Question. What specific policies or actions has or will the Government of Afghanistan taken that implement President Karzai’s rhetoric of reform at his inauguration? 

Answer. The Afghan Government’s most significant anticorruption achievements 

in the past 18 months have been the creation of: (1) the Major-Crimes Task Force, 

a multiministry initiative responsible for investigating corruption, kidnapping, and 

organized crime cases and preparing them for prosecution; (2) an Anti-Corruption 

Unit of prosecutors within the Attorney General’s Office; and (3) an Anti-Corruption 

Tribunal of specially vetted judges to oversee high-profile cases. Additionally, the 

Afghan Government recently announced that the Cabinet has approved a bill that 

will enable the prosecution and trial of government ministers and judges. This action will take away a rationale occasionally cited by prosecutors for not pursuing 

ministerial-level corruption cases. We support all of these initiatives and continue 

to raise corruption issues in our discussions with Afghan officials. 

Question. What specific framework will the international community now use and 

how does it integrate with the Afghan Government in Kabul and in the provinces? 

Answer. The United States has led a concerted effort to strengthen international 

coordination through existing and new mechanisms. In Washington, the office of the 

Special Representative chairs monthly meetings of the SRAP Washington Liaison 

Group of the more than 30 countries who have appointed Special Representatives 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan to share U.S. views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

German Special Representative Steiner has assumed the chair of quarterly international meetings of Special Representatives, in which Ambassador Holbrooke participates. 

In Kabul, coordination among leading international representatives—UNSRSG 

Staffan de Mistura, NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill, and EU 

Special Representative Vygaudas Usackas—has grown stronger. Donor and political 

representatives in Kabul meet frequently and informally to share information on 

projects and programs. Kabul’s primary formal coordination mechanism is the Joint 

Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which is chaired by the Afghan Minister of Finance and the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General. The 

JCMB is the central platform for strategic coordination, joint policy formulation, 

problem-solving, and mutual accountability between the Afghan Government and 

the international community. It also ensures consistency with the Afghan National 

Development Strategy. The JCMB includes 7 members of the Afghan Government 

and 21 representatives of the international community. The Afghan Government 

has used the London conference to lay out its priorities for development assistance 

and to take responsibility for donor coordination. It is being supported by UNAMA 

and by other donors, including by our advisers in the ministries. 

Question. What sectors will relief efforts focus on? 

Answer. Relief efforts will focus on the areas most critical to promoting stability. 

Achieving this objective will require a multifaceted approach that: 

• Establishes human security through credible systems of justice and law enforcement, as well as a path toward reintegration and reconciliation, all the while 

respecting human rights especially those of women and children; 

• Increases licit economic opportunity through agriculture, entrepreneurship, and 

responsible natural resource extraction; 

• Enables economic activity through transportation infrastructure, affordable energy, and progressive trade and commerce regimes; 

• Fosters governance and sovereignty through independent revenue generation, a 

capable civil service, and means to discourage corruption; and 

• Improves education and public health. 

52 

Question. How will responsibilities/efforts be divided among various donors in critical sectors? 

Answer. The Government of Afghanistan is assuming greater responsibility for 

donor coordination, including by setting priorities and cochairing the JCMB and its 

standing committees. It is also seeking to improve financial management so that a 

greater percentage of donor assistance can be channeled through budget mechanisms, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Contributions 

made through budgetary mechanisms allow for clear divisions of international 

efforts, while leaving responsibility with the Government of Afghanistan. 

Question. What benchmarks will be used to measure progress in each sector? 

Answer. The Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, issued by Secretary Clinton and endorsed by Secretary Gates, outlines milestones for evaluating 

the progress of USG programs in each sector. Additionally, the National Security 

Staff has organized and implemented a comprehensive system of metrics for tracing 

the results of our implementation efforts. 

Question. Who or what entity will lead on general economic reconstruction for 

Afghanistan and from what organization and location? 

Answer. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is in 

the lead for general economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, with support from 

USAID, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other international 

partners. The primary planning document for addressing Afghan development needs 

is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). In order to focus implementation of the ANDS and improve coherence amongst various line ministries, the 

GIROA established clusters grouping relevant ministries under a senior ministry. 

The Ministry of Mines is in charge of the Economic and Infrastructure Development 

Cluster, which oversees economic reconstruction efforts by the Ministries of Transport and Civil Aviation, Public Works, Energy and Water, Commerce and Industry, 

Communication and IT, and Urban Development. 

At the same time, the clustered ministries will continue to intersect with the Joint 

Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), a multistakeholder, international coordination body officially tasked with overseeing ANDS implementation (the JCMB 

includes both Afghan Government officials and major international donors). The 

Office of Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance at the 

U.S. Embassy in Kabul will remain a central point for harmonizing and prioritizing 

U.S. development activity. 

Question. Will the recent meetings of Friends of Pakistan group recognize and 

associate progress in the one country as essential to the other? Do the Friends, and 

Pakistan, concur that progress in one strengthens progress in the other? 

Answer. The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) was launched in September 

2008 to galvanize international support behind the new democratically elected Government of Pakistan. The FODP has since developed into a policy and donor coordination mechanism for countries to work together and with government institutions 

to address challenges like post-conflict reconstruction in the Malakand division of 

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or Pakistans energy crisis. The United Nations has played a 

key role in organizing FODP activities in Islamabad. 

While the FODP itself is focused only on Pakistan, all 26 participants in the 

Group of Friends also are deeply engaged in Afghanistan and other regional fora, 

including as coalition partners or as members of the Special Representatives Contact Group. These partners understand that the futures of Afghanistan and Pakistan are interconnected but also recognize that each country faces a unique set of 

challenges that must be addressed individually. Thus, international coordination 

efforts in Pakistan reinforce international efforts in Afghanistan while addressing 

the core needs of the people of Pakistan. 

CHAIN OF COMMAND

There are innovative structures for organization of our Embassies in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, incorporating former ambassadors and senior diplomats, in order to 

deliver more comprehensive and responsive foreign assistance to achieve United 

States goals. These structures are relatively unclear in their organization and 

purpose. 

Question. How have these structures improved the management and delivery of 

U.S. assistance to date? How are they intended to achieve better results than in the 

past? 

53 

Answer. The new structure, particularly the creation of the Coordinating Directorate for Development and Economic Assistance (CDDEA), has better linked civilian efforts with military efforts to achieve the administration’s goals in Afghanistan. 

The CDDEA, under the direction of Ambassador Eikenberry, has supervisory 

responsibility to ensure that all interagency and economic development programs 

are fully integrated and working in sync. The CDDEA oversees the work of 14 sections and agencies at the Embassy. These include the economic and development 

agencies USAID, USDA, Treasury, FAA, Transportation and the State Department 

economic section. It also oversees a subgroup of entities consisting of the development and assistance portions of the rule of law section and law enforcement agencies, including Justice, DEA, FBI, Marshals Service, DHS, and INL. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border coordinator and the Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) office 

also report to CDDEA. CDDEA has succeeded in increasing coordination, reducing 

stove-piping, and better assuring that development supports U.S. foreign policy and 

a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach. 

Outside of Kabul, the Embassy has created five senior civilian representatives 

(SCRs), matching the five regional ISAF commands. Below them are civilian representatives at the task force, provincial, and district levels which report up to the 

SCRs who in turn report to the Embassy. Additionally, the Ambassador, the Deputy 

Ambassador, the Assistant Chief of Mission, the CDDEA and a new rule of law 

Ambassador oversee 14 working groups, each focusing on a specific policy goal. 

Question. While expanding our military presence in Afghanistan and our training 

and equipping efforts in Pakistan we are also providing significant additional foreign assistance to improve the civilian partner effort of a civil-military equation. 

What integrating mechanism exists and what military personnel are incorporated 

in the civilian planning and implementation of our strategy in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan? 

Answer. In Afghanistan, the U.S. Embassy and ISAF are implementing a fully integrated civilian-military strategy. The strategy was developed by a joint civ-mil 

team consisting of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and Embassy Kabul personnel. Lines of 

effort and operation are coordinated at every level—from the top in Kabul to the 

regional commands to provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to district support 

teams (DSTs) on the front lines of the war effort. For instance, our whole of government agriculture program includes USAID-administered programs that are increasingly implemented through the Afghan Government at the subnational level. These 

programs and capacity-building are facilitated by USAID and USDA advisers deployed to PRTs and DSTs in the field, which include military and civilian personnel. 

These civilian personnel also work closely with the National Guard’s Agribusiness 

Development Teams (ADTs). Similarly, our whole of government counternarcotics 

strategy brings to bear the expertise of DEA civilian personnel, law enforcement, 

financial intelligence experts (both civilian and military), and international military 

forces focused on interdiction of illicit items including heroin and precursor chemicals. 

In Pakistan, our overall goal is to build the capacity of the Pakistani civilian government to be able to provide for the needs of the Pakistani people. By building 

capacity and helping Pakistan address its immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, we will help put Pakistan on a path toward sustainable job creation 

and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability. This mission is especially challenging in the conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, where the 

security situation fluctuates greatly from place to place and day to day, but remains 

of utmost importance. We realize that humanitarian and stabilization assistance 

must go hand-in-hand with longer term capacity-building of Pakistani entities, such 

as the FATA Secretariat; without both we will not be able to hold cleared areas and 

start the process toward sustainable, civilian-led service delivery. 

While we prioritize working through civilian entities where possible, there are 

also windows of opportunity to provide community stabilization and humanitarian 

assistance via the U.S. military, who can reach insecure areas where civilians do 

not have access. Through several programs, we are building the capability of the 

Pakistani security forces to provide post combat/conflict humanitarian relief. We 

also frequently discuss with Pakistani security forces the importance of integrating 

civilian personnel in their counterinsurgency planning, and helping civilian personnel access insecure areas. The Pakistani security forces have demonstrated their 

understanding of the important role the civilian government plays in long-term 

development, and have begun to better coordinate with the Political Agent, the 

FATA Secretariat, USAID, State Department personnel, and Department of Defense 

personnel to provide security and access to civilian personnel. 

54 

More broadly, Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus have cohosted a series of intensive, day-long civ-mil coordination sessions to review all civ-mil plans 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan. These sessions featured joint presentations by civilian and military officials in charge of implementing programs on the ground in both 

countries. 

Question. To whom does the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

report? 

Answer. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan reports to the 

President of the United States through the Secretary of State. He is a standing 

member of all senior-level Afghanistan and Pakistan policy bodies, including the 

National Security Council, the Principals Committee, and the Deputies Committee. 

Question. To whom do the U.S. Ambassador for Pakistan and Ambassador for 

Afghanistan report? 

Answer. The U.S. Ambassadors to Pakistan and Afghanistan report to the President of the United States through the Secretary of State and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The reporting chain to the President through 

the Secretary of State is clearly established in Presidential guidance issued to each 

U.S. Ambassador posted across the globe. 

Question. To whom do the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan and the 

USAID Mission Director for Pakistan report? 

Answer. The USAID Mission Directors in both Embassies report to the Chief of 

Mission, through the respective U.S. Coordinators and Deputy Chiefs of Mission. 

Question. To whom do the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic 

Affairs in Afghanistan and the U.S. Coordinator for Economic and Development 

Assistance in Pakistan report? 

Answer. The Coordinating Directors for Development and Economic Affairs in 

both countries report to the Chief of Mission, through the respective Deputy Chief 

of Mission. 

Question. What steps have been taken by the State Department to properly organize to meet the criteria for assumption of the Pakistan Counter-Insurgency Capabilities Fund authority (PCCF)? 

Answer. We are continuing to develop our oversight and management procedures 

for PCCF to preserve the flexibility and agility needed to support the requirements 

in the field. Both State and DOD are committed to the successful implementation 

of PCCF as a State Department-managed program in FY 2011,with the goal being 

a seamless transition of the program. A major difference in the management of 

PCCF will be increased State Department oversight and involvement throughout 

the execution process, which will ensure that this major assistance program aligns 

with our broader foreign policy objectives in Pakistan. DOD will continue to be the 

primary program implementer. We are currently engaged in discussions with DOD 

over how best to manage PCCF so that it preserves the flexibility and agility needed 

to support requirements in the field. 

Question. When do you expect State to assume responsibilities for administering 

the PCCF? 

Answer. In line with the agreement between Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, conveyed in their May 2009 joint testimony before the Senate Appropriations 

Committee, PCF was to be provided to DOD in FY 2009, to State in FY 2010, but 

with a direct pass through of funds to DOD, and in FY 2011, to be a fully Statemanaged program. 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (SRAP) AND COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION

One of the challenges I have long sought to improve in our policy development 

has been the voice of the Ambassador and Country Team in Washington policy 

determinations. Theirs is a critical, operational, and local perspective that must 

inform our policies. I understand you have assembled a fine 40-person team in 

Washington, in the Office of the Special Representative. 

Question. What mechanisms are in place or planned to integrate field perspectives 

in decisions regarding Afghanistan and regarding Pakistan? 

Answer. Both Chiefs of Mission participate via video teleconference in all NSC 

meetings, Principals Committee meetings, and Deputies Committee meetings on 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Special Representative, key members of the Special 

Representative’s office, and the country desks are in frequent communication with 

55 

the ambassadors and country teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Field views are 

sought on all key policy issues. Expert teams in Washington and the field collaborate closely on policy development. 

Question. It is no surprise that there are tensions between HQ and the field, as 

they are evident in most situations. How are you dealing with these, apparently 

strong, concerns from the field in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan? 

Answer. Maximizing communications, including through regular face-to-face video 

teleconferences and visits, helps to manage tensions that arise from the devotion, 

in the field and in Washington, to the success of the President’s strategy and the 

obvious challenges to our efforts. In addition to frequent informal and formal engagements at lower levels, the weekly Deputies Committee process, which includes 

Ambassadors in Kabul and Pakistan by secure video teleconference, provide regular, 

frequent opportunities for frank exchanges of views, complemented by monthly Principals and National Security Council meetings—all of which include participation 

from ambassadors in the field. 

Question. How are you ensuring Washington supports the Country Team and that 

your hard-working staff is maintaining close and collaborative working relationships 

with the field? 

Answer. As is the case with any Embassy, Washington-based personnel are in frequent and close contact with their field counterparts. They participate in a variety 

of regular video-teleconferences and teleconferences and exchange daily communications via phone, e-mail, and front channel cables. Washington-based experts also 

travel frequently to the field to support Country Team implementation efforts. 

Question. How does the SRAP office coordinate with the SCA Bureau and U.S. 

Embassy Country Teams in India and Central Asian countries? 

Answer. The Special Representative’s senior deputy is dual-hatted as the Deputy 

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) of State for South-Central Asian Affairs in charge of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. In this way, the DAS reports both to the Special Representative and the 

Assistant Secretary of State for South-Central Asian Affairs. The Afghanistan and 

Pakistan desks located in the SCA Bureau report to the DAS for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. The Central Asia Desk reports to the DAS for Central Asian Affairs. The 

SRAP office coordinates with the Country Teams in India and Central Asia like any 

other office in the State Department—through the country desks, SCA Bureau front 

office, and through official communications with Chiefs of Missions, as appropriate. 

Question. The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Development (S/CRS), responsible for the organization and deployment of civilian 

government personnel to conflict areas and as partners for our military is a long 

developing and encouraging development. 

• How has the SRAP office helped to improve the utility of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction at the State Department? 

Answer. The SRAP office’s primary mission is to support development and implementation of the administration’s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. In the course of 

regular business, S/SRAP and S/SCRS have worked closely on several AfPak policy 

issues. SRAP has encouraged S/CRS contributions to the Afghanistan and Pakistan 

effort, and been very satisfied with them, in a number of important ways, including: 

deploying a long-term, senior-led team to Kabul to support the 2009 Presidential 

elections; deploying civ-mil planners to Kabul to support development of the integrated civ-mil campaign plan; and deploying civilian experts to Kabul to support the 

Embassy’s new civ-mil communications efforts. We will continue to rely on S/CRS 

and the Civilian Response Corps to support crucial functions in the Afghan mission. 

Question. Is SRAP making appropriate use of S/CRS resources and expertise? 

How will it do so going forward? 

Answer. SRAP frequently sought the resources and expertise in S/CRS. A close 

working relationship to identify how best S/CRS can contribute has resulted in a 

number of vital S/CRS deployments in Afghanistan, including those listed above. We 

will continue to rely on S/CRS and the Civilian Response Corps to support crucial 

functions in the Afghan mission. More broadly, we will remain in close contact with 

S/CRS to ensure the best appropriate use of its resources, which will contribute to 

the effort in Afghanistan as well as the further development of S/CRS. 

Question. Given the clear necessity in Afghanistan and Pakistan of a civilian response capacity, how has the SRAP office worked to strengthen the nascent S/CRS 

56 

component Civilian Response Corps (CRC) which is standing up to build our civilian 

response capacity? 

Answer. SRAP supports S/CRS and the CRC, as demonstrated by the various critical targeted activities that they have undertaken on behalf of the Afghan mission. 

We will also continue to rely on this important civilian capacity in the future. We 

are also sharing lessons learned from our oversight of the increase in civilian staffing with S/CRS in an effort to assist them in the standup of the CRC. Individuals 

who participate in the civilian increase are also made aware of the CRC and given 

the opportunity to add their name to the standby component roles. In several instances, S/CRS has helped identify personnel to fill positions with specialized skills. 

Question. Has the rapid deployment of civilians over the last year, completely depleted the ready pool of potential civilians? What are the most significant obstacles 

to identifying, preparing, and deploying civilians to Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer. The rapid deployment of civilians over the last year has not depleted the 

pool of potential civilians. The State Department’s Bureau of Human Resources 

closely tracks staffing needs in the Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Its current 

assessment is that the proposed staffing levels for Afghanistan and Pakistan, both 

Foreign Service and temporary direct hires, are sustainable. The most significant 

obstacle to deploying civilians to Pakistan and Afghanistan is matching employee 

specific skill sets to job requirements. Another significant concern is maintaining 

continuity and limiting staffing gaps. We are encouraging employees to volunteer 

for longer than the established 1-year tour, and exploring options to leverage area 

and job expertise by establishing hybrid tours; e.g., a year on the country desk followed by a year in country, or an 18-month tour in country followed by a 6-month 

stint as a trainer. 

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONAL STABILIZATION STRATEGY

Question. The strategy that you introduced for rollout at the January 21 SFRC 

hearing reiterates general plans to expand U.S. diplomatic, economic and political 

efforts in those two countries. Considerable additional information is necessary to 

help inform Americans of our efforts to meet President Obama’s goals for 2011. 

• Provide a recent benchmark for each of the milestones listed in the strategy. 

Answer. We measure our progress against the milestones according to the explicitly or implicitly stated benchmark contained in virtually all of the milestones. We 

will report on progress against the milestones later this year. We provide below a 

few illustrative examples of milestones and their benchmarks: 

• ‘‘Nearly 1,000 civilian experts deployed by early 2010’’ will be measured by 

counting the number of deployed civilians. 

• ‘‘Significantly and rapidly expand employment opportunities in the agricultural 

sector quarter by quarter’’ is measured by agriculture-related job creation. 

• ‘‘Afghan Subnational Governance Policy approved and implemented, including 

provision of additional resources to provincial officials’’ is measured by the 

approval of the Afghan policy and provision of resources to support that policy. 

Separately, the administration, through the National Security Staff, has organized 

and implemented a comprehensive system of metrics for tracking the results of our 

implementation efforts. That effort is designed to be much more detailed. It includes 

specific measures of progress across all USG efforts, whereas the milestones in the 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy focus on higher level 

measures of progress for the civilian strategy. 

Question. How do you ensure inclusive deliberation from our Country Teams in 

this strategy formulation? How will you ensure the discussion within your SRAP office is informed directly by the voices of the respective Ambassadors, Mission Directors, Working Groups, ISAF, and associated staff in regional command field offices? 

What mechanisms have you established to ensure that inclusive discussion? 

Answer. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy was reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was 

also reviewed and approved by Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, USAID Administrator Shah, National Security Advisor General Jones, CIA Director Panetta, and 

other senior administration officials. At the experts-level, it was thoroughly 

reviewed by the 10 civilian departments and agencies involved in implementing our 

policies on the ground. It is a living document and will be updated to reflect the 

dynamic nature of events on the ground and major USG programs designed to implement the President’s Strategy. 

57 

Question. What is the status of the planning and implementation process for the 

strategy? Has the strategy been circulated and commented upon by our Country 

Teams and by the military? How does the strategy align with our military strategy? 

How do other nations efforts align with our strategy? 

Answer. The Stabilization Strategy reflects the civ-mil priorities of our civilian 

and military teams on the ground. Our civilians are implementing the key initiatives outlined in the strategy. As noted in response to a previous question, the 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy was reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was further reviewed and approved by Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, USAID Administrator 

Shah, National Security Advisor General Jones, CIA Director Panetta, and other 

senior administration officials. At the experts-level, it was thoroughly reviewed by 

the 10 civilian departments and agencies involved in implementing our policies on 

the ground. 

Question. A long and thorough review of our Afghanistan and Pakistan policy 

began in the last year of the previous administration. This process continued 

through President Obama’s announcement in December of a new civil-military 

approach. These deliberative processes often caused delays and indecision. 

• During this now post-review operational phase, please indicate what steps you 

will take to ensure that implementation is not unduly delayed by overly long 

decision and approval processes. 

Answer. The National Security Staff chairs weekly Deputies Committee meetings 

focused on implementation. The Principals meet at least once a month to discuss 

implementation, and the President chairs a monthly meeting to assess implementation. Additionally, the Secretary of State provides the President with weekly and 

monthly reports on implementation. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan chairs and a representative of the National Security Staff cochairs a 

weekly meeting with more than 75 essential personnel involved in policy implementation. All of these mechanisms are aimed to ensure timely decisionmaking, coordination, and implementation. 

Moreover, the unique structure of the SRAP office, with representatives from all 

of the major departments and agencies contributing to the civilian effort, facilitates 

accelerated coordination of policy, decisionmaking, and implementation by eliminating stove-piping of efforts. 

Question. Indicate which USG agencies and/or officials will have principal responsibility for implementing each element of the strategy. 

Answer. The Secretary of State leads the overall implementation of the civilian 

effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our new civilian strategy knocks down stovepipes and encourages integration of efforts between agencies along major lines of 

effort. This integration and the role of each USG agency is outlined in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. 

Question. Provide a notional timeline that identifies the intended implementation 

of programs by sector as well as prospective parallel Afghan deliverables associated 

with each. 

Answer. The Stabilization Strategy identifies the key initiatives intended to be 

implemented in each sector. The milestones in the Stabilization Strategy provide a 

measure of anticipated results, usually within a certain timeframe. Since many of 

these programs are being implemented increasingly through, or in conjunction with, 

the Afghan Government, the ultimate ‘‘Afghan deliverable’’ will be increased Afghan 

capacity to assume responsibility for efforts. This will take more time in some areas 

than others. Our ultimate goal is to empower the Afghan Government at all levels 

so that it is in the strongest possible position to take advantage of improved security 

facilitated through the military strategy. (NOTE: We have recently provided to 

SFRC staff 16 detailed, sector-by-sector briefings covering these issues in greater 

depth, as well as spend plans.) 

Question. What specific next steps will follow from the Stabilization Strategy? 

• How does this strategy specifically relate to the deployment of military personnel to RC South and RC East? How does it integrate with efforts in RC 

North, West and Central? Provide an organizational chart for civilians and military in the RC regions. 

Answer. As noted on page iii of the Stabilization Strategy, our civilian personnel 

‘‘contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and where many of the additional 30,000 

forces announced by President Obama on December 1, 2009, will deploy.’’ The stratVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
58 

egy reflects the fully integrated civ-mil plan developed in the field and synchronized 

by Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus. 

• What specific correlation and activities does this strategy dictate for our PRT 

operations and those of our partner nations? What changes will occur? 

Answer. As described in the section of the strategy titled ‘‘Deploying Additional 

Civilian Expertise,’’ a priority of the civilian surge has been to increase civilian expertise in the field, including at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), District 

Support Teams (DSTs), and other platforms. The position of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative has been established to ensure improved civilian unity of effort 

between our ISAF allies and partners. The priorities identified in the Stabilization 

Strategy reflect broad priorities agreed at the London Conference and will inform 

donors’ priorities and efforts. Among these, there will be an increased focus on support for improved subnational governance and rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture 

sector, especially in the East and South. 

Question. The establishment of U.S. Consulates in Afghanistan and the transition 

from Provincial Reconstruction Teams provides additional opportunities for the stationing of civilians further afield in order to sustain U.S. efforts in partnership with 

Afghans. Please provide a description or map of the location and number of USG 

civilians in Afghanistan. 

• Please describe their purpose and their home agency affiliation and identify 

their Afghan institutional counterpart—i.e., Federal Ministry/Provincial Governor/District Council. 

Answer. There are more than 1,050 USG civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan, with more than 300 deployed alongside our military personnel on the front 

lines. The specific locations of USG civilian and military personnel on the ground 

is sensitive for security reasons. The mix of civilian experts in each location varies 

over time to accommodate changes in the local environment and to address the 

evolving needs of an area. For example, civilian DEA personnel routinely rotate between the field and Kabul, depending on their mission. Generally, most civ-mil platforms have at least one State officer and one USAID officer, and frequently more 

than that. 

Question. Your testimony and the Stabilization Strategy document describe the intent to channel significantly more USG resources through host government entities 

in an attempt to improve their functional capacity and to reduce overhead costs lost 

through other methods. The United States has limited information on the internal 

operations of government ministries in Pakistan and Afghanistan and what it does 

have raises real and obvious concerns for oversight. 

• Please provide a specific description of how the United States plans to work 

with Pakistan to channel assistance, as has been described, through government entities. Please use the education sector as an example to describe the 

planning, distribution, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms that will safeguard U.S. resources. 

Answer. We have taken significant steps to encourage long-term Pakistani ownership of development programs through expanded direct financing of the Government 

of Pakistan’s budgets or internal project planning processes. Doing so ensures that 

our assistance builds capacity within the Government of Pakistan to continue to 

provide for the Pakistani people. USAID, leading the implementation of this strategy, is adopting best practices to foster better management and administrative capacity-building of Pakistani institutions, including through counterpart contributions by recipients of USG funding, requirements that recipients budget for future 

costs (e.g., building maintenance) associated with USG-funded projects, and community participation. In FY 2010 we anticipate providing approximately 50 percent of 

assistance through federal and provincial agencies. 

In education specifically, we are investing in programs that have a track-record 

of results in Pakistan. In basic education, our programs are increasing enrollment 

and improving the quality of education by providing stipends to families to encourage school attendance, especially for girls; refurbishing and improving facilities of 

existing schools; and continuing to improve teacher training programs. This funding 

will be provided directly to provincial agencies in Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and 

KPk through fixed amount reimbursable agreements and other direct assistance 

mechanisms. 

We have also teamed up with the United Kingdom-Pakistan Education Task 

Force to press for structural reforms, tailored by province, that are essential to 

bring momentum to the basic education sector. 

59 

In higher education, the majority of assistance is provided through direct support 

to the Higher Education Commission (HEC). USAID has audited HEC and certified 

it for direct funding based on the determination that HEC’s procurement operations 

and financial controls meet our accountability standards. A USAID program officer 

has been assigned to provide technical oversight and there is routine interaction between USAID and HEC on planning and implementation of our activities. Additional oversight is provided through international technical specialists contracted 

through the mission for HEC, Pakistani universities and entities that support 

higher education. 

Direct assistance to HEC supports: 800 in-country scholarships, 100 professional 

exchanges, linkages between 10 Pakistan and U.S. universities, and establishment 

of Career Development Systems and Centers. Scholarships are 4-year undergraduate and 2-year graduate level awards in the fields of agriculture and business 

administration at Pakistan universities. Scholarships cover all expenses associated 

with study, including tuition, fees, books and materials, lodging, and stipends. A 

monitoring and evaluation process, overseen by the USAID technical officer, is in 

place to validate these results. 

USAID is also supporting HEC policy reform and institutional capacity-building 

by providing technical assistance in the financial aid and institutional development 

areas. We are supporting the establishment of viable financial aid development 

offices at 11 universities to further strengthen the transparency and monitoring of 

scholarships. These offices assist in managing scholarship funds and in raising 

funds through providing skills for establishing public-private partnerships toward 

university development. 

Question. Please provide a specific description of how the United States plans to 

work with Afghanistan to channel assistance, as has been described, through government entities. Please use the health sector as an example to describe the planning, distribution, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms that will safeguard U.S. 

resources. 

Answer. The following describes how we will channel assistance through the Government of Afghanistan in the health sector: 

• Capacity-Building—Since May 2003, USAID has provided technical assistance 

to the MOPH through the USAID Afghanistan Rural Expansion of Afghanistan 

Community Based Health Care (REACH). This longstanding capacity building 

has strengthened the Ministry’s procurement, project management and financial 

management capabilities. • Certification and Assessment—Before a project may utilize host country contracting, the Mission Director must certify that the procurement operations and 

financial controls within the relevant Ministry are sufficient to carry out the 

procurement actions, from solicitation to audit and closeout, in accordance with 

USAID standards and procedures. Over the past year, the Mission Contracting, 

Financial and Legal offices have conducted multiple assessments of the procurement and financial procedures, practices, capacities and controls in the MOPH 

Grants and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU). These assessments resulted 

in reports concluding that the GCMU is equipped and capable of managing procurements in accordance with USAID requirements. The Mission Director certified that the Ministry has sufficient procurement and financial management 

capabilities to carry out the procurement actions in accordance with USAID procedures. 

• Approval of Contracting Actions—All key contracting actions (including the notice to FedBizOpps, solicitation, prequalified offerors (if any), selection method, 

award decision, administration actions and contract modifications) must be approved by the USAID mission. This enables the mission to observe and mentor 

the host-country procurement staff while safeguarding the U.S. funds. 

• Advance and Liquidation Mode of Payment—The payment mechanism will be 

monthly cash advances and liquidations. Advances shall be limited to the minimum amounts needed to meet current disbursement needs (generally 30 days) 

and shall be scheduled so that the funds are available to the Ministry as close 

as is administratively feasible to the actual disbursements for program costs. 

The Mission Office of Financial Management (OFM) is providing training to the 

GCMU on the process. Full supporting documentation for the advance and liquidation requests will be required by OFM for the first three months and subsequently if needed. Financial reviews will be conducted by OFM on a periodic 

basis. 

• Auditing and Reporting—If total of all funds given to the Afghan Government 

during its fiscal year exceeds $300,000, it will be subject to an independent 

third party financial audit conducted by one of the regional audit firms apVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
60 

proved by the USAID Inspector General. We envision audits for the first several 

years conducted under an Agency Contracted Audit with significant participation from the Afghan Auditor General and Ministry of Finance. Any subcontracts with local and/or foreign organizations expending at least $300,000 in 

its fiscal year will be audited according to USAID Recipient-Contracted Audit 

Guidelines. U.S. organizations expending over $500,000 would be subject to 

OMB Circular A–133 audit requirements. • Technical Monitoring—USAID has also assigned an officer with relevant technical expertise to monitor the performance of the procurement and projects, and 

to provide technical direction to the Ministry. The USAID technical officer and 

the Ministry will work together to implement a performance monitoring and reporting process, to include monthly and 6-month progress reports. The technical 

officer will work with the Ministry to conduct technical oversight and ensure 

that the required work is being performed, the results evaluated and objectives 

achieved. • Corrective Actions—In the event that a problem arises within the GCMU, 

USAID would work with the host Government to evaluate training needs, policy 

changes or other steps required to resolve the issue. In the event that performance or cost problems arise with a host-country contract, appropriate action 

could include noncontractual remedies (such as expediting commodities through 

customs) or contractual actions (such as change order or modification, disallowance of costs, or termination of the contract). The host-country contract will include standard provisions on procedures for any disputes and appeals arising 

from the contract. Throughout the process, all mission financial approvals and 

audits, contracting approvals and technical reports and approvals will be documented. 

• Continued Support—Additional support continues to be provided to the GCMU 

through the USAID/MSH project to help it comply with all USAID requirements 

and ensure that management and oversight functions continue to be strengthened. USAID through MSH will support GCMU by adding three senior Afghan 

and one International staff members to the current team of 16 Afghan and 1 

International staff members. The expected outcome of this additional support 

will be a GCMU that is fully integrated in terms of the management systems 

and tools used to supervise grants and contracts, financial management and 

oversight, and field monitoring and evaluation. 

• Ongoing Training—The mission through Regional Inspector General (RIG) has 

provided the Fraud Awareness Training to MOPH/GCMU staff. It has also provided training on Recipient Contracted Audits. 

Question. Please describe the challenges that remain and compare the new methods with past delivery practices in those sectors using specific examples. 

Answer. Challenges to Direct Assistance: 

Security situation: Security concerns will continue to significantly limit the ability 

of USG personnel to access areas where operations continue. In order to achieve our 

goals in Afghanistan and the conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, we will continue 

to rely on flexible and innovative funding and accountability mechanisms that enable U.S. and Pakistani personnel, both civilian and military, to quickly react and 

provide humanitarian and stabilization assistance to hold cleared areas as the Pakistani military makes progress in their fight against terrorism. 

For example, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives continues to help expand 

the reach of provincial governments in the South and East of Afghanistan and 

FATA and KPk in Pakistan to provide basic services to the local populations. 

USAID is also providing assistance directly to the FATA and KPk Secretariats to 

implement reconstruction projects (e.g., roads, electricity, housing) and build capacity simultaneously. We are also pursuing innovative ways to oversee U.S. assistance 

in insecure areas, such as monitoring and evaluation by locally employed staff (LES) 

and independent CPA or engineering firms that can reach areas inaccessible to U.S. 

personnel. 

Institutional capacity: Many of our new implementing partners—particularly local 

government authorities and indigenous civil society organizations have management 

capacity issues that will require USAID to provide significant institutional strengthening and collaborative oversight. Potential areas of institutional vulnerability include budget and procurement systems, internal controls, accounting, and institutional policies. Our missions have begun working directly with public and private 

partners to enhance project management, oversight and evaluation. 

These local partnerships are essential in providing proper monitoring and evaluation because they facilitate site visits to insecure areas. In Pakistan, these new partnerships include a range of contracts to strengthen the Auditor General of Pakistan 

61 

(the Government of Pakistan’s Supreme Audit Institution) and build the audit and 

financial accounting capacity of local civil society organizations and private sector 

firms. The OIG has also established a working relationship with the National 

Accountability Bureau, the Government of Pakistan agency with the legal mandate 

to address public corruption. 

In Afghanistan, specifically in the health sector, a new method of service delivery 

in Afghanistan is Host Country Contracting (HCC). In July 2009, the U.S. Government and Afghan Government entered into the country’s first HCC which directly 

transfers large amounts of U.S. Government funding into the Ministry of Public 

Health. Having built the ministry’s capacity for several years, the Ministry of Public 

Health is the only ministry which can now receive large transfers of U.S. funds for 

implementing critical governmental services—the delivery of basic health care to the 

citizens of Afghanistan. This contract is valued at $236m over a 5-year period. This 

new method affords a shared responsibility with the Ministry of Public Health to 

award and manage the NGO contracts to deliver health services. USAID has provided capacity building and system strengthening to the Ministry of Public Health 

since 2002 and is confident in the Ministry’s ability to manage the funding and 

contracts. 

Large number of new partnerships: As we shift our funds to increasingly build 

local capacity, our partnerships will grow, which will require considerable capacitybuilding in the area of public fiscal management. USAID performs preaward assessments for all new prospective partner organizations to ensure that our new local 

partners have an appropriate level of accountability and capacity to absorb USG 

funds. 

Question. Describe the status of the traditional justice system in Afghanistan and 

the status and relation to its formal counterpart. 

• What programs are established or planned in the near term, in what provinces, 

to strengthen traditional justice sector? 

Answer. Justice mechanisms in Afghanistan essentially fall into three categories: 

‘‘formal justice,’’ (i.e., police, prosecutors and courts); ‘‘informal’’ or ‘‘traditional justice,’’ by which traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are encouraged to reemerge at the local level (e.g., through Shuras); and ‘‘Taliban justice.’’ A key priority 

of our new rule of law (ROL) strategy is improving Afghans’ access to reliable, efficient, and transparent dispute resolution. 

This is especially critical in areas where the Taliban’s swift but brutal form of justice has ‘‘outperformed’’ the Afghan Government’s more limited formal justice structure. As we evaluate how to best improve Afghan capacity to deliver legitimate and 

effective formal systems, we are supporting targeted informal justice programs in 

areas where the Afghan Government lacks a strong presence. Protection of women’s 

rights under the Afghan Constitution and ensuring women’s access to justice are 

also priorities. 

In the traditional sector, our ‘‘clear-to-hold’’ approach refers to focusing first on 

eliminating Taliban influence in the justice sector, improving access to traditional 

and state justice systems, and reducing official corruption and removing corrupt officials. This sequence also applies to geographic priorities, as determined by prevailing security conditions. In the first year, greater emphasis will be placed on districts in the South and East that were controlled by insurgents or narcotraffickers. 

In these ‘‘priority’’ districts, the Afghan Government lacks credibility with a population that has lost (or never had) confidence in formal government. Increasing security and providing space for traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to reemerge 

is the top priority. 

This will be done in close consultation with and through Afghan authorities, including district and provincial governors, state justice institutions, the police, the 

Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and, in coordination with JTF 

435, ISAF, NTM–A, and other military commands, including the Afghan National 

Security Forces. At the same time, attention will be paid to both traditional and 

state justice institutions in other parts of the country that have not fallen to insurgents and/or are more stable. 

This approach will maximize chances for successful implementation of programs. 

It recognizes the immediate justice needs of the country are not entirely in insurgent-affected areas. In the East, South, and West, the focus will be on increasing 

access to, and strengthening the capacity of, existing state justice sector institutions, 

as well as other executive branch offices involved in settling legal disputes. In these 

areas, the Afghan Government seeks to establish its authority in previously unstable communities. It is important to have success stories in these areas to foster stability, and for Afghans to publicize these successes. 

62 

Question. What programs are established or planned in the near term, in what 

provinces, to strengthen the formal justice sector? 

Answer. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Stabilization strategy outlines an array 

of efforts to build the capacity of the formal justice sector. These include: professional training of judges and prosecutors; technical and advisory assistance to the 

Afghan Attorney General’s Office; support to the Afghan Anti-Corruption Unit and 

Major Crimes Task Force; technical assistance and advising for the Ministry of Justice; and corrections sector support. These are nationwide efforts. 

In the provinces, our efforts focus on a ‘‘hold-to-build’’ approach where we work 

to strengthen the entire sector and expand access to it. In the areas of the North, 

East, and West, where improved security in some areas can enable business development and progress by civil society, access to justice requires building up and expanding ‘‘islands of success’’ in population centers. By expanding these ‘‘islands of 

success’’ and improving capacity, people seeking justice will be drawn from surrounding areas, particularly for civil disputes (primarily property-related), and serious criminal cases. Further, reducing corruption in the state justice sector will improve its ability to provide fair services and increase the legitimacy of the Afghan 

Government overall. 

Question. What role will the INL office in Afghanistan have in the police sector 

since the decision was taken last year to remove INL from the NTM/CSTC–A training and oversight? What reduced role will they play? Who will maintain oversight 

of the international police training effort? 

Answer. NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM–A)/Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) will continue to supervise the USG 

and international police training efforts in Afghanistan. As a key stakeholder, the 

Department of State will continue to play a vital role in Afghan law enforcement 

training through program policy, oversight, and overall direction for the police program through Ambassador Eikenberry. State remains ready to assist in advanced 

and/or specialized training. 

Question. The strategy makes passing mention to other foreign contributions to 

several of the sectors in Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction, and the 

administration has continued to seek such contributions especially in light of the 

limited military role they have chosen to adopt. 

• Which partners or potential partners have participated in the creation of this 

strategy and how have they substantively committed? 

Answer. The President’s strategy benefited from input from a number of major 

allies and partners, and we continue to work jointly on the implementation of the 

strategy through a number of fora. In addition to the North Atlantic Council for 

ISAF issues, 35 countries and international organizations have appointed SRAP 

counterparts to Ambassador Holbrooke. The SRAPs meet roughly quarterly, and 

liaisons from SRAP embassies meet in Washington roughly biweekly. The EU has 

been an especially important partner in designing our civilian strategy, and their 

regional action plan, released in fall 2009, closely tracks and complements our 

Regional Stabilization Strategy. 

Question. What progress has been made in the last year in bringing new partners 

or significant increases in partner contributions of resources and personnel? 

Answer. We have seen substantial increases in both troops and financial resources. Troops: Nearly 10,000 additional troops have been committed since the President 

announced the U.S.’s own troop increase in December. This increase includes approximately 1,000 from Italy, 900 from Georgia, 600 from Romania, 500 each from 

the U.K. and Germany, over 500 each from Poland and Spain, and 400 from South 

Korea. OIC countries including Malaysia, Jordan, and UAE are also committing new 

or additional military resources. 

Finances: Despite the international financial crisis, partners have sustained or in- creased their development assistance to Afghanistan. Japan made a $5 billion 

pledge over 5 years, Germany doubled its annual pledge to ÷430 million through 

2013, and the U.K. has increased its pledge through 2013 by 40 percent, to £710 

million. The Afghan National Security Forces also continue to receive international 

financial support. For example, Japan paid all police salaries for the first 6 months 

of 2010 and Norway pledged $110 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund 

and Law and Order Trust Fund. 

Question. Illicit Financial Flows have been identified as a center of gravity for the 

militant forces operating in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region. Though the militants have proven capable of operating on far fewer resources their lifelines are deVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
63 

pendent nonetheless on finance that has been identified as from three sources—financiers operating in or from the countries in the Arabian gulf region, proceeds from 

narcotics trafficking, and proceeds from criminal enterprise including kidnapping, 

extortion, robbery, and protection rackets. 

• How has the State Department been asked to assist other USG entities in bolstering the effort to interdict these financial flows? 

Answer. State has been asked to fund a portion of the law enforcement operations 

and capacity-building to interdict illicit finance flows. Likewise, USAID has been 

asked to provide and/or fund capacity-building efforts in the financial sector. In addition, much of the USG’s counter-illicit-finance activity is coordinated by the State 

Department, in coordination with the Department of the Treasury, both in Washington and in Afghanistan. 

Question. How has State responded or how are they organizing themselves on this 

issue? 

Answer. In addition to providing interagency leadership and coordination as specified in the preceding question, the State Department provides funding to a wide 

variety of USG agencies to ensure a whole of government approach to counterterrorism finance capacity-building initiatives. We provide funding for FIU development, bulk cash smuggling training, terrorist financing investigative training, financial regulatory training, prosecutorial development and resident law enforcement 

advisors from the USG in Afghanistan. 

Consistent with the shift in strategy to increase the focus on interdiction, alternative development programs and incentivized supply reduction efforts, State/INL 

provides support for the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the Good Performers Initiative. INL programs also strengthen drug demand reduction efforts 

through a nationwide treatment delivery system and increase public information 

efforts through improved messaging campaigns. 

USAID’s economic growth strategy also impacts these efforts by building the 

capacity of the Afghanistan Government to develop a stable, market-based economy. 

This is achieved primarily through capacity-building assistance directed to the Ministry of Finance and Afghanistan’s Central Bank—Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). At 

the Ministry of Finance, USAID supports budget and execution reforms, and tax 

policy and administration. At DAB, USAID supports the Bank’s management of 

monetary policy, statistics, and market operations; financial supervision and risk 

management; payment systems; and accounting and financial management. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Given that Pakistan is not moving comprehensively against all Taliban 

safe havens in that country, is there a danger that our military offensive in the 

South will have no lasting impact as insurgents take refuge on the other side of the 

border, beyond our reach? What steps are being taken to mitigate this danger? 

Answer. Since August 2009, Pakistan has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to confronting militant groups using its territory as a base to launch attacks into Afghanistan and elsewhere. Military operations against insurgents in the 

North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and throughout the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA) have yielded steady gains, but Pakistan has also paid a heavy 

toll—thousands of Pakistani security forces have been killed or wounded in these 

operations. Pakistan has made these heavy sacrifices on its own behalf because it 

understands that these militant groups threaten the existence of Pakistan itself. 

The recent arrests of key Taliban leaders further underscores the seriousness with 

which Pakistan is tackling this threat. Pakistan has also stepped up its cross-border 

military cooperation, evidenced by its representation in the two operating Border 

Coordination Centers. In light of these actions by our Pakistani partners, and our 

continued engagement with our Pakistani partners, we are confident our military 

efforts in RC-South will result in sustainable gains. 

Question. While we need to maintain a targeted counterterrorism capability in the 

region, I am not convinced that there is a military solution to the instability in 

Afghanistan and the region. On the contrary, I think the constant escalation in the 

use of force over the years has ultimately created more militancy and instability. 

Meanwhile, it is not clear to me that the Afghan and Pakistani Governments are 

pursuing the political solutions that are the best way to stabilize the situation. For 

example, in Afghanistan, the Presidential elections were marred by fraud. In Pakistan, although President Zardari has pushed for reforms in the FATA, they have 

64 

fallen far short of what many experts say are needed. Why are we continuing to 

pursue a military solution when we still haven’t been able to secure the political 

reforms that are key to stabilizing the situation? 

Answer. We are pursuing a multifaceted strategy in Afghanistan focused on security, economic development, and good governance. With the support of Congress, we 

are investing significantly in rehabiliting Afghanistan’s infrastructure and strengthening the delivery of health and educational services. We are also working to build 

the capacity, effectiveness, and transparency of Afghanistan’s Government institutions. 

We fully agree that there can be no military solution in Afghanistan absent steps 

to create economic opportunity and improved governance. Nor can there be economic 

or governance progress without improved security. 

Even in those areas hardest hit by the insurgency, our strategy in Afghanistan 

is a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach which integrates military and civilian components that complement each other. The military component of this strategy is essential, but not sufficient, to our efforts and draws by far the most press coverage. Military action provides security for the population and shapes the environment for our 

civilian efforts. There are now 900 civilians from across the interagency working in 

Afghanistan; hundreds of them in the more unstable provinces. This is a notable 

increase over the number of civilians in Afghanistan only a year ago and is indicative of our commitment to a whole of government approach. 

As in Afghanistan, U.S. assistance to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

(FATA) is also one piece of a multidimensional, ‘‘whole of government’’ approach, 

aimed at building provincial government capacity, pursuing development projects, 

and creating economic growth opportunities. While our military assistance efforts 

are necessary to clear and hold the region, our civilian assistance efforts are part 

of the ‘‘build phase,’’ a key part in stabilizing the region by strengthening governance in the FATA to make it less susceptible to hosting terrorist and insurgent 

groups. We are working to enhance planning coordination between the FATA Secretariat and the Frontier Corps, to better link development efforts to security gains. 

U.S. counternarcotics and law enforcement activities in FATA have centered on 

infrastructure development (roads, bridges, etc.), providing training, equipment, and 

facilities for law enforcement entities, and conducting programs to deter poppy 

cultivation. 

We fully support the political reform efforts endorsed by President Zardari in the 

FATA and recognize that rule of law and governance reform is necessary for sustainable stability and development in the FATA. We will continue to encourage the 

GOP to follow through on these and other actions. 

Recent Asistance to the FATA includes: 

• Humanitarian: Supplies and services for IDPs ($2 million in South Waziristan); 

• Social/Economic Assistance: Over 900 projects since 2008 ($143 million); 

• Infrastructure: Roads, water, and energy ($96 million committed to FATA Secretariat); 

• Law Enforcement: $4.7 million since Sept 2009 to support FATA Levies (over 

$26 million total in past 3 years). 

Question. Admiral Mullen has testified that the primary driver of the conflict in 

Afghanistan is the lack of legitimacy in the government. Yet, President Karzai 

continues to nominate problematic individuals, including the recently appointed 

Minister of Counternarcotics, Zarar Ahmed Moqbel, who has reportedly tacitly supported corruption. Do you intend to continue to work with Mr. Moqbel notwithstanding these concerns? 

Answer. We will continue working with those ministers who were confirmed. The 

selection of Cabinet ministers was a very serious Afghan process with important implications for Afghanistan’s future and reflects the ongoing development of Afghan 

Government institutions. Our revised counternarcotics strategy calls for building the 

capacity of the Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 

Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), among others. To achieve this, we have to work with Minister Zarar and 

his counterparts in other ministries. 

Question. I understand that the State Department may have recently handed over 

responsibility for training the Afghan police to the Defense Department. The former 

Minister of the Interior has written that our continued reliance on the police as a 

paramilitary force has undermined its ability to serve a law enforcement function. 

General McChrystal has acknowledged that the lack of a functioning criminal justice system has created a vacuum that the Taliban has used to garner support. AmVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:36 Dec 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
65 

bassador Holbrooke, do you have plans to begin transitioning the Afghan police to 

a law enforcement function that would fill that vacuum? 

Answer. The Department of Defense has the lead for Afghan security forces reform, including both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National 

Army (ANA), since 2005. DOD is responsible for determining overall program requirements based on policy guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission. Since 2007, 

DOD has transferred funding for police training to State. At the request of DOD, 

State uses these funds to deploy civilian police advisors to implement a training and 

mentoring program that provides basic, advanced, and specialized training to the 

ANP. 

State expects to transfer contract responsibility for police training to DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) in 2010 in order to 

streamline management of ANP training. With the transfer of contracting responsibility, DOD will establish a contract to directly provide civilian police advisers instead of transferring funds in order for State to do so. This programmatic change 

is in keeping with General McChrystal’s report recommendations to the President 

last summer. 

As acknowledged in the Afghan National Police Strategy, drafted by the Afghan 

Government and endorsed by the international community at the London Conference, the Afghan police face a challenging environment in which they must not 

only enforce the laws, but provide local security where Afghan Army and international forces are not present. This need, coupled with the high casualty rates in 

the police, has led DOD and State to concur on training Afghan police for both law 

enforcement and the higher threat environment in Afghanistan. State will continue 

to participate in Afghan law enforcement training through policy oversight and overall direction through the U.S. Ambassador. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. The New York Times reprinted on January 21 that we are helping the 

Afghan Government set up a major-crimes task force in the Interior Ministry, which 

is intended to be the government’s main agency to crack down on corruption. How 

much do we know about Interior Ministry officials working under Minister Atmar, 

who are charged with leading the anticorruption campaign? How much insight will 

coalition partners have into the ministry’s anticorruption efforts? 

Answer. The United States, in conjunction with other international donors, is 

actively supporting the implementation of a Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). Initiated in May 2009, the MCTF forms a critical element of the institutional architecture necessary to tackle corruption in Afghanistan, and includes a dedicated Corruption Investigation Unit. As of January 2010, 58 MOI and NDS investigators have 

been assigned to the MCTF, with ongoing mentoring support from the International 

Community. All Task Force members are vetted and polygraphed to ensure they do 

not have ties to the Taliban and have not been involved in corruption. Although initiated in May 2009, the MCTF is still under development—both physically and 

administratively. The formal process for enabling legislation and drafting a Memorandum of Understanding for staffing are underway. Mentors from the FBI, Department of Justice, U.K. Serious Organised Crime Agency and Australian Federal 

Police are intrinsically engaged assisting the Afghans with the establishment of the 

MCTF. 

There are ongoing concerns about corruption within the Ministry of Interior, as 

with other GIRoA Ministries; however, we believe that by establishing and supporting a task force that reports directly to Minister Atmar, and ensuring that all 

of the members of the Task Force and its supporting units are fully vetted and 

polygraphed, we can help the Afghans establish a successful anticorruption enforcement tool for the Government of Afghanistan. 

Question. While Afghanistan’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provide a 

venue for interagency coordination at the brigade level, several coalition military 

officers have told the press that they vary widely in their levels of effectiveness, cohesion, and coherence. As an example, a senior member of NATO’s International 

Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan told the press in December that he did not 

believe that he or other NATO military leaders could align the PRTs’ efforts with 

the NATO command’s specific lines of operations. Instead, he felt that the PRT 

members’ ultimate loyalties resided with their parent U.S. agencies or their home 

governments. What is your assessment of the level of coordination between PRTs 

and what do you think we can do to enhance PRT coordination? 

66 

Answer. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for 

stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions 

and empowering local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, PRTs have helped create conditions that make increased political, social, and 

economic development possible. Throughout Afghanistan, PRTs play a vital role supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Under the President’s new strategy, U.S. PRTs 

are for the most part cocommanded by a senior military officer and a senior civilian 

representative, and are integrated into military and U.S. Embassy command structures, operating under the joint civilian-military Regional Commands and ultimately 

under the authority of ISAF Commander General McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador 

Eikenberry. Other nations organize and resource their PRTs differently, but the 

United States has attached civilian experts from the State Department, USAID, and 

/or USDA to all coalition-led PRTs to help ensure a more coherent approach to 

building local government and economies. 

The overall level of coordination between PRTs is strong, and getting stronger 

over time. All PRTs share a common commitment to development and stabilization 

that is in line with the NATO/ISAF mission. Of course, some PRTs work more effectively than others and there are still areas where coordination can be improved. But 

coordination between U.S. military and civilians on PRTs has improved considerably 

as a result of an MOU between the U.S. Embassy and COMISAF/U.S. ForcesAfghanistan. We are establishing similar agreements with our coalition partners. 

Question. The State Department anticipates that the reintegration of Taliban insurgents into Afghan society will cost $100 million a year over several years—and 

that the funding is likely to come from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 

and other countries. How realistic do you think it is that Taliban fighters can be 

permanently reintegrated into society? Are there any particular keys to ensuring 

that success? 

Answer. Success of Afghan-led reintegration of Taliban fighters, their commanders and shadow government officials depends largely on Afghan political will, 

the resources backing reintegration efforts, a community-based approach rather 

than packages for individual fighters, and continued military pressure on the 

Taliban. Past reintegration efforts have lacked these essential elements. If these are 

backed by increased economic prosperity and Afghan Government accountability, we 

believe they can convince Taliban fighters to permanently reintegrate. 

President Karzai stated in his November 19 inauguration speech that his government will ‘‘welcome and provide necessary help to all disenchanted compatriots who 

are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution.’’ 

We take this as an indication reintegration will be an essential element to President 

Karzai’s second elected term. We are prepared to support him in this effort, and are 

working with our partners, including the U.K. and Japan, to fund and back this 

Afghan-led effort. Together with our Afghan and U.K. partners we are also increasing military pressure on the Taliban. Last week, we began Operation Mushtarak, 

which is the first of our ‘‘surge’’ operations to press the Taliban. 

Our ongoing economic development and governance programs are the final piece 

of this puzzle. We believe increased government accountability and economic opportunity will convince Taliban fighters to permanently disarm and accept the Afghan 

Constitution. 

Æ