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95–506 PDF 2005

S. Hrg. 108–754

ASSESSING AMERICA’S COUNTERTERRORISM

CAPABILITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 3, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL STERN, Deputy Staff Director for Investigations 

DAVID KASS, Chief Investigative Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

KEVIN J. LANDY, Minority Counsel 

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 2

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 19

Senator Durbin ................................................................................................. 22

Senator Specter ................................................................................................. 28

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 29

Senator Shelby .................................................................................................. 31

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 35

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 39

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 41

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 45

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2004

John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center ....................... 5

John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation ............................................... 7

Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information 

Analysis, Department of Homeland Security .................................................... 9

Philip Mudd, Deputy Director, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 10

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States ....................................................................................... 50

Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director, National Commission on 

Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States ....................................................... 50

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Brennan, John O.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73

Hughes, Lt. Gen. Patrick M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81

Kojm, Christopher A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 50

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Zelikow ................................................... 96

Mudd Philip: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89

Pistole, John S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77

Zelikow, Philip: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 50

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Kojm ....................................................... 96

APPENDIX 

Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 71

Chart entitled ‘‘The 9/11 Commission’s Recommendation for Restructuring 

the Intelligence Community’’ .............................................................................. 105

Page

IV

Table of Organization Chart ................................................................................... 106

Letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, dated August 2, 2004, to Senators 

Collins and Lieberman ........................................................................................ 107

Letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, dated August 2, 2004, to President 

Bush ...................................................................................................................... 109

Article dated August 3, 2004, The Washington Post, entitled ‘‘Intelligence 

Reform And False Urgency,’’ by Chuck Hagel ................................................... 111

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Brennen ...................................................................................................... 112

Lt. Gen. Hughes ................................................................................................ 132

Mr. Zelikow and Mr. Kojm .............................................................................. 142

Mr. Pistole, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................................................. 160

Questions for the Record for Mr. Mudd from: (Responses to these questions 

were not received by press time.) 

Senators Collins, Shelby, Akaka, and Durbin ................................................ 181

(1)

ASSESSING AMERICA’S COUNTERTERRORISM 

CAPABILITIES 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2004

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Specter, Shelby, Lieberman, 

Akaka, Durbin, Dayton, Lautenberg, Carper, and Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good 

morning, today the Governmental Affairs Committee holds its second hearing on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission calling for a restructuring of our intelligence organizations. The 9/11 

Commission provides a highly detailed picture of our intelligence 

structure on that tragic day. Ultimately, our Committee’s responsibility is to recommend how this structure should look in the future. 

We must act quickly to consider this report and to complete our assigned task of reporting legislation by October 1, and indeed we are 

acting quickly, starting with our hearing last week. 

As we move with both deliberation and speed, we should use the 

Commission’s recommendations as a thoughtful and informed 

guide. That does not mean that this Committee will be a rubber 

stamp. The final shape of our restructuring legislation will be determined by what we learn at these hearings. The informative and 

insightful testimony we heard last Friday from the Commission 

Chairman, Tom Kean, and the Vice Chairman, Lee Hamilton, was 

a very good start. The testimony focused, as our Committee has, on 

the two most important recommendations regarding the Executive 

Branch; first, establishing a National Counterterrorism Center and, 

second, creating the position of a National Intelligence Director. 

Yesterday, the administration acted on some of the same issues 

that we are considering today. I applaud the President’s swift and 

decisive action to move forward with some of the Commission’s 

most significant recommendations. The fact that two of its highest 

priorities are the restructuring recommendations before this Committee emphasizes the importance of our work. 

The two panels of witnesses before us today, one from the intelligence agencies and the other from the 9/11 Commission staff, will 

discuss the improvements that have been made to our post-9/11 inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
2

telligence capabilities, the weaknesses that still remain, and the solutions that we should consider. 

Progress has been made since September 11. The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the FBI have undergone substantial changes. 

The Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center are entirely new. But as one of our witnesses here 

today, TTIC Director John Brennan, told the 9/11 Commission in 

April, ‘‘We, as a Government and as a Nation, are not yet optimally 

configured to deal with the terrorist threat.’’

We can learn a lot from TTIC since, in many ways, the proposed 

National Counterterrorism Center would be a more robust version 

of it. This Committee has closely followed the development and implementation of TTIC, and it has held two hearings on its structure 

and its authority, an issue that has been of particular interest to 

Senator Levin and me. 

The proposed center would be a ‘‘Super TTIC.’’ If this more powerful version is to succeed, it must get what it needs, both in resources and in its place in the priorities of the agencies that collect 

intelligence. At times, getting the resources it needs, especially the 

expert and experienced personnel, has been a challenge for TTIC. 

The difficulty in resolving the resource and authority issues involving TTIC demonstrates how important it is for Congress to 

clearly define in legislation the authority and parameters of the 

proposed center. The intelligence structure that stood for 50 years 

during the Cold War performed well under many administrations 

and many different agency heads. The new intelligence system we 

are building for the war against terrorism must do the same. We 

have an obligation not just to the Americans of today, but to Americans of generations to come to accomplish that mission. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you again for calling this second hearing on the 9/11 Commission recommendations so quickly. 

The new specific terror threats that we have learned about in the 

last few days, the very fact that this morning this capital has 

checkpoints for vehicular movement that were not there yesterday, 

reminds us that we do not live in normal times, and therefore our 

normal ways of doing business here on Capitol Hill are no longer 

acceptable. Our country is under threat of attack, so we must 

move, and move rapidly, to repair what the 9/11 Commission has 

documented as the vulnerabilities in our intelligence apparatus. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman, for taking quick and decisive action in scheduling these hearings. Our hearings will be followed, as 

we have learned, by many hearings throughout this month, both 

here in the Senate and on the House side. 

Yesterday, President Bush also acted quickly in response to the 

9/11 Commission Report. I was pleased and encouraged that the 

President has embraced the two major recommendations of the 9/

11 Commission, which is the creation of a National Intelligence Director and the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. 

I am troubled that the recommendation the President is making 

for the National Intelligence Director appears to lack the powers 

3

that the Commission wants it to have, particularly the power over 

the budgets of the constituent intelligence agencies. And I think 

the challenge to us here, and in some ways the danger, is that we 

will create a new office, but not give it the strength to overcome 

the stovepiping and lack of clear command authority that the 9/11 

Commission documented. 

Today, we are going to focus on the second of the two major recommendations, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. 

There, the President’s recommendation seems to embrace the Commission’s proposal, although there are a lot of details for us to fill 

in, hopefully, in cooperation not just with one another, but with the 

White House. 

After studying what went wrong before September 11 and how 

the Federal Government has responded since September 11, the 

Commission concluded that we are still not maximizing our intelligence investments and efforts to perform our most important 

task, which is protecting the security of the American people from 

Islamist terrorist attack. The Commission found that there are still 

stovepipes, a lot of work going on within the stovepipes, but often 

not sharing of information between them and no one in charge, as 

Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton said to us in testimony 

last Friday. 

In its report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that a number of 

intelligence problems—for example, uncoordinated watch lists, the 

failure to share information, the failure to connect dots—made it 

more difficult for the United States to foresee and stop the terrorist 

attacks of September 11. 

In the place of those weaknesses that they saw, the Commission 

recommends this National Counterterrorism Center, designed to 

forge an unprecedented unity of effort, as the Commission describes 

it, against Islamist terrorism. It would replace the time-worn, Cold 

War-era stovepipe approach. All the information available to our 

government about terrorist threats to our homeland, whether from 

the CIA, the FBI, State, and local officials or open sources would 

be shared and analyzed in this one place to stop terrorists. 

But the National Counterterrorism Center, as recommended by 

the 9/11 Commission, would not only be a fusion center, it would 

also be a command center for domestic and foreign joint intelligence planning. And this is a very significant, in some ways revolutionary, change. After integrating all sources of information, the 

center would analyze and shape strategies to stop terrorists in 

their tracks before they are able to do damage here in America. 

The National Counterterrorism Center would not execute those 

operations, as I understand the Commission recommendation, but 

would help map the plan, call the plays and assign operational responsibilities to the appropriate agencies. For the first time, one 

entity would be able to look across agency boundaries and the foreign-domestic divide to make sure that intelligence is being shared, 

that joint plans are in place and that those plans are being implemented. And someone, the Director of this center, will be accountable, finally. 

The National Counterterrorism Center, as I read the 9/11 Commission’s report, should be seen by comparison to the Pentagon as 

a unified combat command, and the Director of the center would 

4

be the unified commander of our intelligence forces in the war 

against Islamist terrorism. It is very important I think to separate, 

for clarity, this Counterterrorism Center, which is focused on the 

war against Islamist terrorism and the National Intelligence Director overhead who oversees that terrorism center’s work against 

Islamist terrorism, but also all of our intelligence apparatus, foreign and domestic, dealing with weapons of mass destruction, particular regions of the world, particular problems that we are concerned with. 

So this is a bold approach, as the Commission acknowledges, but 

no one can seriously argue, after the 9/11 Commission Report, that 

the current approach has been adequate to meet these radically 

new Islamist terrorist threats of the 21st Century, and no one can 

argue that the threat we face is not grave and demands this kind 

of imagination and bold action. 

So, Madam Chairman, I look forward to hearing the views of our 

witnesses today on the Commission’s recommendation on this 

Counterterrorism Center. We have before us commanders, in their 

own right, of the front-line intelligence troops in the war on terrorism. 

I know that there are questions about the proposal the Commission has made. I have some questions myself, but what I know 

most of all is that the status quo failed us on September 11, and 

unless we change it, it will fail us again, for when everyone is in 

charge, no one is in charge; when everyone is calling their own 

plays, there is no team, and the defense of the American people 

suffers as a result. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses. This panel consists of officials from four of our most important intelligence agencies. I am very sure that their experience and expertise will help 

the Committee complete the task before us. I want to thank each 

of you for your long commitment to public service. Each of you have 

served honorably and well, and we very much appreciate your joining us today. 

John Brennan is the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center, known as TTIC, the intelligence agency created by the 

President in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. I recently 

had the privilege of visiting TTIC several weeks ago. I think I was 

the first official visitor to your new headquarters, and I was very 

impressed with the work that is being done. 

John Pistole is the executive assistant director for Counterterrorist and Counterintelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Again, this Committee has a long relationship with Mr. 

Pistole. We have worked together on several issues, including the 

terrorism financing investigation. 

Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes serves as assistant secretary 

for Information Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. 

We welcome you here today as well. 

And, finally, we will hear from Philip Mudd, the deputy director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, who clearly plays a key role. 

We welcome all of you, and we are going to begin with Mr. Brennan. 

5

1The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN O. BRENNAN,1 DIRECTOR, TERRORIST 

THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER 

Mr. BRENNAN. Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and Committee Members. It is an honor to appear before you 

today to talk about the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, 

and the President’s decision to establish a National Counterterrorism Center. 

As this Committee knows, the President has embraced the Commission’s recommendation for the creation of a centralized organization to integrate terrorist threat information. Yesterday, in the 

Rose Garden, the President formally announced that he will establish a National Counterterrorism Center and take other actions designed to continue the process underway since September 11, 2001, 

of strengthening America’s ability to win the war on terrorism. 

This is a natural extension of the work and successes the administration has already achieved through the establishment of TTIC. 

In his State of the Union speech, in January 2003, the President 

called for the creation of an integrated center to merge and analyze 

all threat information in a single location. On May 1 of last year, 

that vision became a reality with the stand-up of TTIC. Over the 

past 15 months, TTIC has endeavored to optimize the U.S. Government’s knowledge and formidable capabilities in the fight against 

terrorism. 

For the first time in our history, a multi-agency entity has access 

to information systems and databases spanning the intelligence, 

law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic and military communities that contain information related to the threat of international terrorism. In fact, TTIC has direct access connectivity 

with 26 separate U.S. Government networks, with more networks 

coming on-line, enabling information sharing as never before in the 

U.S. Government. 

This unprecedented access to information allows us to gain comprehensive insight to information related to terrorist threats, to 

U.S. interests at home and abroad. Most importantly, it enhances 

the government’s ability to provide this information and related 

analysis to those responsible for directing, disrupting, deterring 

and defending against terrorist attacks. 

In addition, there currently exists within the TTIC joint venture 

real-time collaboration among analysts from a broad array of agencies and departments who sit side-by-side, sharing information and 

piecing together the scattered pieces of the terrorism puzzle. These 

partners include not only the FBI, the CIA and Departments of 

State, Defense and Homeland Security, but also other Federal 

agencies and departments, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Health and Human Services and the Department of Energy. 

As envisioned by the President, this physical integration of expertise and sharing of information enables and empowers the key 

organizations involved in the fight against terrorism. Collectively, 

they are fulfilling their shared responsibilities in a fused environment, doing business jointly as TTIC. This fusion and synergy will 

be further enhanced when CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and the 

6

FBI’s Counterterrorism Division co-locate with TTIC in the coming 

months. 

This integrated business model not only capitalizes on our respective and cumulative expertise, but it also optimizes analytic resources in a manner that allows us to cover more effectively and 

comprehensively the vast expanse of terrorist threats that will face 

the homeland and U.S. interests worldwide for the foreseeable future. 

This integration of perspectives from multiple agencies and departments represented in TTIC is serving as a force multiplier in 

the fight against terrorism. On a strategic level, TTIC works with 

the community to provide the President and key officials a daily 

analytic product on the most serious terrorist threats and related 

terrorism information that serves as a common foundation for decisionmaking regarding the actions necessary to disrupt terrorist 

plans. 

Rather than multiple threat assessments and disparate information flows on the same subject matter being forwarded separately 

to senior policymakers, information and finished analysis are now 

fused in a multi-agency environment so that an integrated and 

comprehensive threat picture is provided. If there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threat, they 

are incorporated into the analysis. 

As is evident, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center embodies 

several of the characteristics envisioned by the 9/11 Commission 

Report for the proposed National Counterterrorist Center. TTIC is 

an existing center for ‘‘joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from 

the various agencies’’ and well-positioned to ‘‘integrate all sources 

of information to see the enemy as a whole.’’ It is likely for those 

reasons that the Commission recommends that TTIC serve as the 

foundation of a new National Counterterrorism Center. As a longtime proponent of structural reform of the Intelligence Community, 

I fully support the integration concept and the establishment of a 

National Counterterrorism Center. 

In the weeks and months ahead, I look forward to working with 

TTIC’s partner agencies, the Congress and the White House to 

build upon TTIC’s strong foundation and create a National 

Counterterrorism Center. The potential benefits of a National 

Counterterrorism Center are enormous. So too, however, are the 

challenges associated with government transformation. I have experienced those challenges firsthand over the past 15 months in 

the establishment and development of TTIC. Together, we will 

need to determine how to implement the National Counterterrorism Center in a thoughtful and evolutionary manner so that 

we do not adversely affect ongoing activities in the global war on 

terrorism which are so ably led by my colleagues on this panel. We 

all have a special obligation in this regard. 

In conclusion, I believe the benefits to be gained from the integration concept, as envisioned by the President and called for by 

the 9/11 Commission, strongly support the creation of a National 

Counterterrorism Center, and I look forward to working with you 

to implement a national counterterrorism system that maximizes 

the security and safety of all Americans wherever they live or 

work. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

7

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Pistole. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. PISTOLE,1 EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. PISTOLE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, 

and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here today and to address you. I would like to take a brief opportunity to address the work the FBI did with the 9/11 Commission 

in my introductory remarks here. 

As you are aware, the FBI has worked closely with the 9/11 Commission and its staff, and we commend it for its extraordinary efforts. Throughout the process, we have approached the Commission’s inquiry as an opportunity to gain further input from outside 

experts. We took its critique seriously, adapted our ongoing reform 

efforts and have already taken substantial steps to address its remaining concerns. We are gratified and encouraged that the Commission has embraced our vision for change and recognized the 

progress that the men and women of the FBI have made to implement that vision. We agree with the Commission that much work 

remains to be done and will consider its findings and recommendations as we refine our continuing transformation efforts. 

Following the September 11 attacks, Director Mueller implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transformed the 

FBI with one goal in mind, establishing the prevention of terrorism 

as the Bureau’s No. 1 priority. He has overhauled our 

counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, 

modernized our business practices and technology and improved coordination with our partners. In terms of priorities, Director 

Mueller established a clear set of 10 national program priorities 

that ensures that all terrorism-related matters are addressed before resources can be dedicated to other priorities. 

To implement these new priorities, since September 11, we have 

increased the number of special agents assigned to terrorism matters by 111 percent, the number of intelligence analysts by 86 percent and the number of linguists by 117 percent. We have also established a number of operational units and entities that provide 

new or improved capabilities to address a terrorist threat. These 

include things such as the 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch or CT 

Watch, the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Terrorism Financing Operation Section, deployable ‘‘fly teams’’ which lend 

counterterrorism expertise wherever it is needed, and we have 

played a key role in establishing the Terrorism Screening Center 

and Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and of course have 

added substantial assistance to the Terrorism Threat Integration 

Center. We have also created the Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section, the Counterterrorism Analysis Section and other aspects of the operational side of the FBI which has allowed us to 

perform our duty. 

We also centralized management of our CT program at Headquarters to ensure consistency of CT priorities and strategy across 

the organization to integrate CT operations domestically and overVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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seas, to improve coordination with other agencies and governments 

and to make senior managers accountable for the overall development and success of our CT efforts. 

In terms of the intelligence program, the FBI is building an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially improved 

our ability to direct strategically our intelligence collection and to 

fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism-related intelligence. 

After passage of the USA Patriot Act and the issuance of related 

Attorney General Guidelines, and the ensuing opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that brought down 

the wall that sharply limited the ability of law enforcement intelligence officers to share information, we quickly implemented a 

plan to integrate all of our capabilities to better prevent terrorist 

attacks. Director Mueller elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting in place a formal structure and concept of operations 

to govern FBI-wide intelligence functions and establish Field Intelligence Groups—or FIGS—in every field office. 

The new workforce. The FBI is actively working to build a workforce with expertise in intelligence. While much remains to be 

done, we have already taken substantive steps to ensure this transformation. On March 2 of this year, Director Mueller adopted a 

proposal to establish a career path in which new special agents are 

initially assigned to a small field office and assigned to a wide 

range of field experiences. After approximately 3 years, agents will 

be transferred to a large field office, where they will specialize in 

one of four program areas—intelligence, counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence, criminal matters, the traditional work of the 

FBI or cyber matters—and will receive advanced training tailored 

to their area of specialization. We are in the process of implementing this new career track now. 

We are also establishing a formal intelligence officer certification 

that can be earned through a combination of intelligence assignments and training. When fully implemented, this certification will 

be a prerequisite for promotion to the senior ranks of the FBI. 

We have also implemented a strategic plan to recruit, hire, and 

retain intelligence analysts. The bureau has selected veteran analysts to attend events at colleges and universities, as well as designated career fairs throughout the country. We have executed an 

aggressive marketing plan, and for the first time in FBI history, we 

are offering hiring bonuses for FBI analysts. 

In our special agent hiring program, we have updated a list of 

critical skills we are seeking in candidates to include intelligence 

experience and expertise, as well as foreign languages and technology. 

We continue to grow the Field Intelligence Groups—or FIGs—established in all 56 field offices and are on track to add some 300 

intelligence analysts to the FIGs in fiscal year 2004. The FIGs conduct analysis, direct the collection of information to fill identified 

intelligence gaps and ensure that intelligence is disseminated horizontally and vertically to internal and external customers, including our State, local, and tribal partners. We currently have 1,450 

FIG personnel, including 382 special agents and 160 employees 

from other government agencies. 

9

1The prepared statement of General Hughes appears in the Appendix on page 81. 

It is important to note that the FBI’s intelligence cadre is not 

limited to intelligence analysts, but also includes agents, language 

analysts, surveillance specialists, and others. It takes all of these 

specialists to perform quality intelligence production at the FBI. 

The FBI’s plan to create a cradle-to-grave career path for intelligence professionals at the FBI parallels one that has existed and 

functioned so well for our agents and has been codified in our Concept of Operations for Human Talent for Intelligence Production. 

To support information sharing, each Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF) has a special agent or intelligence analyst dedicated to producing raw intelligence reports for the entire national security community, including State, municipal, and tribal law enforcement 

partners and other JTTF members. 

Understanding that we cannot defeat terrorism without strong 

partnerships, we have enhanced the level of cooperation and information sharing with State and municipal law enforcement, and 

through our 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces and dissemination 

through vehicles such as the FBI Intelligence Bulletin, the Alert 

System, and the Terrorist Screening Center. 

We also improved our relationships with foreign governments, in 

both law enforcement and intel services, by building on the overseas expansion of our Legat Program, which the Congress has supported so vigorously, by offering investigative and forensic support 

and training, and by working together on task forces and joint operations. 

Finally, the FBI has expanded outreach to minority communities, 

and in concert with DHS, has improved coordination with private 

businesses involved in critical infrastructure and finance. 

As the Commission points out, we have much work still to do, 

but we have made great progress and continue to move forward in 

accordance with a clear plan. With the support and understanding 

of lawmakers and the American people, I am confident we will be 

successful in completing our transformation and ultimately prevail 

against terrorists and all adversaries who do harm to our Nation. 

The FBI looks forward to an ongoing public discussion of ways 

to support further information sharing and collaboration in the intelligence and law enforcement communities and thanks the 9/11 

Commission and this Committee for your service. 

Thank you for inviting me here again today. I look forward to 

any questions you may have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. General Hughes. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK M. HUGHES,1

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

General HUGHES. Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator 

Lieberman, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am 

privileged to appear before you today to discuss the role of the Office of Information Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security and the context of the 9/11 Commission and yesterday’s announcement by the President to support the advent of the National 

10

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd appears in the Appendix on page 89. 

Intelligence Director and the establishment of the National 

Counterterrorism Center. 

It has been my honor to serve in the U.S. Intelligence Community since 1970. During that period, many changes have occurred. 

Many changes have been the focus of our best efforts to gather and 

provide the information our Nation needs to defend, protect and 

sustain our way of life. Many of the changes that have occurred, 

however, have been driven some by technology, but many by success and unfortunately some by failure. I, personally, believe it is 

important to remember some of the successes over those years. 

Since September 11, we have not had a major attack in the 

United States, but we have seen such events from afar, and we 

know that we can suffer an attack again. I see the next evolution 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community that we are now beginning in 

that long and complex context. What makes this period and the 

changes we are discussing today so important is the fact that our 

homeland is, indeed, directly threatened and the consequences of 

that threat are so critical to our future. Thus, we all want to get 

the details of whatever changes we make right. The pathway to the 

transformation of our Intelligence Community is just beginning. 

At the Department of Homeland Security, we are working hard 

to coordinate and integrate the intelligence and information necessary to protect our people and our critical infrastructure. Our efforts are dependent for success on our Federal partners, notably 

the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, and especially in the domestic context, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, and on our partnerships and interaction with the 

States, localities, and municipalities of our country, the tribal 

groups and interaction with the private sector and, of course, with 

the citizens of this great Nation. 

We still have much work to do, but we have made tremendous 

progress. And the dedication and devotion of duty of those who do 

the work of intelligence at the Department of Homeland Security 

is unparalleled. Our goal will be to continue this landmark work 

by supporting and participating in the National Counterterrorism 

Center and by supporting and working with the new National Intelligence Director toward our common purpose to defeat terrorists 

and prevent terrorism here in our homeland. 

Thank you very much for the chance to address you this morning. I am looking forward to your questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Mudd. 

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP MUDD,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. MUDD. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, 

and others here. This is really a privilege to be here today. 

We are now years into a war with the terrorist network whose 

members planned and conducted the attacks of September 11. With 

the 9/11 Commission recommendations available to us now, we 

have a critical piece in place that helps us toward a better organization of our agencies as they engage in a war that is likely to last, 

in my view, for many years. 

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The President yesterday announced in the Rose Garden that he 

will establish a new National Center and take other actions designed to continue the process underway since September 11, 2001, 

of strengthening America’s ability to win this war. I believe the 

President’s establishment of this National Center will build on the 

concepts already in place in TTIC and the DCI Counterterrorism 

Center which I help manage. This government has the most powerful counterterrorist capability on the planet. We must commit to 

ensuring that we coordinate effectively across the government so 

that we attack and destroy this target with a unified approach. 

A National Counterterrorism Center, coordinating across the 

U.S. Government’s analytic and other elements, will strengthen 

this effort, in my view. Assigning responsibilities across the government through NCTC planning could ensure that missions are clear 

and accountability well-defined. A center that could improve the 

link between foreign intelligence and homeland defense would be 

a valuable addition. 

In short, the Kean Commission is right in focusing on the importance of collaboration and cooperation across the government and 

right to ask for an entity that is charged with ensuring and facilitating cooperation. 

As the President said, this remains a Nation in danger and at 

war, so as we try to improve our intelligence capabilities, I would 

recommend that we ensure that we protect what works well along 

the way. The President is right in counseling care: In the midst of 

calls for great change, we are prosecuting a war with great success. 

Since September 11, we have made strides toward partnerships 

across and beyond the government, including the DHS, the CIA, 

the FBI, and the U.S. military and foreign partners, steps that 

have given us a powerful weapon against this adversary. 

The CIA is a flexible organization, and we operate in that fashion 

so that we can adapt quickly to changes in world events or patterns 

we observe in this enemy. Since September 11, with the help of the 

Congress, we have had more resources to fight this war. We have 

closer collaboration with law enforcement. We are supporting not 

just military units from Washington, we are living with them, we 

are fighting with them, and we are sharing intelligence with them 

on the battlefield. We should look at additional change in the context of the substantial change we have already undertaken. 

The challenge posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates remains 

daunting. Despite the increase in resources we have committed to 

this mission, the combination of the global reach and relentless 

drive of this enemy means that we are fighting this war every day 

on many fronts, around the globe, with officers who are stretched. 

This war is hot. And due to the operational successes of the officers 

in CTC, the place I manage, and our partners in this government 

around the planet, the volume of information we have flowing in 

is huge. 

We are succeeding against this adversary because of the dedication and capability of our officers. I salute these officers. They are 

heroes to me. We also succeed because of partnerships we have 

strengthened in recent years. We have joined forces with our colleagues in law enforcement and the armed services to make this 

country safer. We see the results today in terrorists dead or capVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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tured. That said, this adversary, as we saw over the weekend, remains a deadly threat to us around the world. And so are other terrorist groups. 

This cooperation I have mentioned across government is reflected 

in the number of detailees from other agencies that we have in the 

Counterterrorist Center and in the way the DCI has directed us to 

fight this war. For example, the Acting Director has continued the 

practice of chairing a meeting each evening that includes not only 

the CIA officers but also representatives from other agencies across 

the U.S. Government. Part of what makes that meeting successful 

is the ability of these individuals to reflect the richness of their 

home agencies, each of which brings unique talents, capabilities, 

authorities, and perspectives to the table. 

The alliances we have worked to build during the past 3 years, 

including the global relationships that we cultivate, are critical. 

This war requires close cooperation with law enforcement and military entities that have capabilities that the CIA does not and 

should not have. As we study proposed changes, we need to ensure 

that change improves our alliances with these partners, law enforcement and military, and with the Department of Homeland Security, which has helped link us critically with State, local, and private sector authorities. The details of the Commission’s proposals 

are not specific enough for me to judge their impact on our ability, 

for example, to retain close coordination with the officers who represent the FBI within the Counterterrorist Center. But what I do 

know is that this partnership with people like the Bureau is an integral part of counterterrorism operations and the way that the adversary has lost. We need it to continue in the Counterterrorist 

Center and to expand upon it in the new National Center. 

Let me offer a few additional thoughts based on CIA’s experience 

with counterterrorism operations since CTC was founded in 1986. 

We need clear, clean, short lines of command and control. Opportunities to roll up a terrorist or prevent an attack demand immediate 

action. This is a war of speed. 

Analysts in the center are critical to its operations and critical 

to keeping policymakers apprised of current and future threats. 

The synergy between analysts and operations officers is the great 

strength of the Counterterrorist Center, and the information-sharing partnership between analysts and operators in the CTC could 

not be stronger. Our analysts reflect the day-by-day, and sometimes minute-by-minute, pace and scope of our operations, and our 

operators understand the target better by virtue of their partnership with analysts. 

This partnership has created a unique fusion: Our analysts may 

write intelligence for the President one day and help operators 

interview a terrorist the next. And we have many who do so. 

Counterterrorism tasks require a combined application of knowledge and tools in ways that sometimes do not allow us to distinguish between analysts and operators. The center I help manage 

needs officers like these to sustain its energy and effectiveness. So 

as we work to build the new National Center, I want to make sure 

that we enhance the important partnerships like the ones we have 

now in the center. 

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My perspective from the trenches of this war is that my colleagues and I welcome organizational change that will help us accomplish our mission. We welcome a dialogue on what change is 

needed. And, finally, I want to thank you for listening to what I 

have said today about the proposals you are considering, and I 

want to offer from myself personally whatever I can do to help you 

implement this initiative. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. We will now begin a 10-minute 

round of questions. 

Mr. Brennan, I want to start with you. I very much appreciate 

hearing your strong support today for the creation of a National 

Counterterrorism Center which, in many ways, will build on the 

TTIC model. But I want to go back to the statement that you made 

to the Commission in your testimony in April where you said that, 

in your judgment, the Federal Government was not ideally configured to deal with the terrorist threat. 

If you were going to design the intelligence structure for the U.S. 

Government, what would you recommend? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would recommend that there be an opportunity 

to understand all of the different parts of the U.S. Government involved in intelligence. It is an exceptionally complicated, complex 

system of many different components doing various parts of the 

mission. 

One of my concerns is that over the years there has been the development of individual initiatives in different parts of that community to include individual statutes that have set up different 

types of initiatives and departments that have not taken into account fully the overall architecture that needs to be in place to 

make sure that all the different parts of the Intelligence Community work together in a fused and integrated manner. As the President talked about his support for a National Intelligence Director, 

I think it is taking into account the tremendous breadth and depth 

of the Intelligence Community and the need to ensure that there 

is appropriate engineering of the different parts of that complex architecture. 

And what my recommendation would be is that just like Goldwater-Nichols, which really revamped the entire military structure, 

which took many years on the Hill here—it took about 4 years before Goldwater-Nichols was actually passed—that understanding of 

those different parts of that very complicated system are fully understood and are put together and optimize the contributions of 

each. The 9/11 Commission Report provides a high-level view of 

some of that architecture, but there really is tremendous engineering that needs to go on to make sure we understand the connections, the intricacies, the mutual dependencies that go on. 

So my recommendation is that it needs to take into account the 

many different and, in fact, growing elements of the Intelligence 

Community right now to make sure we do not lose any of the synergy and we build upon it. So my comment about we are not optimally configured is because we have not taken that step back to 

put together that system of systems that allows all those different 

parts to work together as seamlessly as possible. 

Chairman COLLINS. In your scenario, would you have a National 

Intelligence Director? 

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Mr. BRENNAN. In my scenario, I would have somebody at the top 

who is able to oversee and orchestrate the many different elements, 

like the President raised yesterday, the concept of a National Intelligence Director. I don’t want to say that would be a position like 

in the diagram shown in the 9/11 Commission because I have some 

disagreements with what is in the 9/11 Commission Report. I don’t 

think some of those recommendations take into account how these 

different pieces need to fit together. But I do endorse the concept 

of having somebody at the top, yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Mudd, I want to get a better understanding of how disputes are resolved in the current system. It is 

the issue of who makes the final call when there is a dispute over 

intelligence tasking. 

For example, let’s say that the United States has a satellite that 

is trained on Iran and the CIA wants to have that satellite moved 

to oversee a possible new al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. 

But the Department of Defense says, no, it is really important that 

it remain trained on Iran. 

Under the current system, who resolves a dispute over where a 

satellite should be positioned or where resources should be allocated to collect intelligence? 

Mr. MUDD. I am not an expert on satellites. We spend a lot more 

time on human operations. Let me try that same question with 

human operations and give you a perspective. 

I don’t see many disputes. I see a lot of conversation, and the 

conversation goes like this: When we are operating overseas, typically, if we are in a wartime experience, as we are in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, we provide support to the U.S. military with the capabilities we have. When we are running foreign operations overseas to 

collect intelligence and conduct covert action, typically that is 

something that is run by the Central Intelligence Agency with the 

support of other agencies. And then when you have domestic intelligence collection capabilities, that is typically run and led by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation with our support. 

So primacy depends on what kind of operation you are talking 

about and where you are operating, but in terms of the people sitting at this table, it is quite cooperative. The resources——

Chairman COLLINS. But who makes the call? Who decides? I 

mean, one of the problems that the 9/11 Commission identified over 

and over again was the feeling that there was not a person in 

charge. 

Mr. MUDD. Again, when we are talking about military operations 

in Afghanistan, the military is running the operations; we support. 

When we are talking about clandestine operations under the authorities that we have, which are unique, we get support and we 

run them; we can decide. And when we are talking about domestic 

operations, the FBI does and should decide; we support them. 

Chairman COLLINS. General Hughes, the 2002 Gilmore Commission also recommended the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center. But under the Gilmore conception, the center 

would be responsible for fusion of counterterrorism intelligence but 

not for planning of counterterrorism intelligence operations. This is 

a question that I am going to ask the entire panel, but I will start 

with you, Mr. Hughes. 

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Should the NCTC have an operational role? 

General HUGHES. I think as described in the President’s vision 

of the NCTC, there is some connection to the planning effort. I hate 

to characterize it because these are the kind of details that have 

to be worked out, but I believe the idea is to have enough planning 

expertise, especially at the strategic level, to oversee the kind of 

interface that has to occur between intelligence operations and intelligence activities and the operational activities undertaken by 

agencies to carry out missions. 

Chairman COLLINS. But in your judgment, should there be a 

planning role? We have a different recommendation from the 9/11 

Commission than the Gilmore report, and what I am asking is, 

given your 30 years in intelligence, do you think that the center 

should have an operational planning role? 

General HUGHES. Well, I am not quibbling with the question, but 

I do have to put it in context. The tactical and perhaps operational 

activities should—they have to engage in their own planning in 

order to undertake operations. That is what my experience has 

taught me over the years. But there is a role for planning at the 

strategic level especially to integrate features of broad planning 

that will affect everyone. And to that degree, I support the planning role at the National Counterterrorism Center. I don’t think 

that we should try to centralize the kind of planning and the kind 

of activities that result from that planning at the national level. I 

believe those should be decentralized to the operating agencies. 

That is my personal view. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, I believe the NCTC should have an operational 

role from the perspective of the planning that you mentioned and 

the development of intelligence requirements, the setting of those 

requirements, identifying gaps that may exist in existing intelligence. Where I think the distinction comes into play is in the 

operational execution of that planning. 

For example, if there is a determination that there is a lack of 

intelligence collection in Chicago, for example, looking at a domestic issue, concerning Hezbollah, well, then, they should turn to the 

FBI and say we have identified a gap in intelligence collection 

there, we think the FBI should take steps to address that. And 

then the FBI would be responsible for implementing the steps that 

would solve that gap. And that would be through additional human 

intelligence, FISA coverage of certain targets. The whole range of 

investigative activity that the FBI currently has would be brought 

into play to address that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe that the role of the center as far as overseeing some type of joint operational activity has to be very carefully crafted from the standpoint of ensuring that analysis maintains its independence and its integrity. Analysis will inform operations as well as policy, but you want to make sure that when you 

bring them together, you make sure that analysis does inform it, 

but it still maintains its independence and integrity. 

Also, you have to be very careful about the types of authorities 

that we give to this planning group and responsibilities. The 9/11 

Commission Report says that the NCTC would assign operational 

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responsibilities but would not direct the execution and implementation of those plans. But it says that the NCTC would be accountable for tracking the progress of the case and ensuring that the 

plan evolves with it. 

And so I would need to understand better exactly what are we 

talking about there as far as the role of this NCTC, and I would 

also associate myself with Mr. Mudd’s comments about speed is of 

the essence. And you want to make sure you don’t put in place anything that is going to, in fact, hamper the ability to move forward 

very quickly on that type of operational activity. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Mudd, you are in luck because my time 

has expired. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Gentlemen, in 

different ways I have gotten to know each of you, to work with you 

some, and I have great respect for each of you. Let me give you an 

impression and invite you to correct if I am wrong. 

My impression from your opening statements and the first round 

of questions that Senator Collins has asked is that you don’t fully 

embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which would inevitably deprive each of the agencies you represent of some of the 

autonomy you have now because you would be accountable, including most importantly in budget, to the National Intelligence Director. 

I believe that, as I read the 9/11 Commission Report, to take it 

one step further, in creating the National Counterterrorism Center 

they intend for all of your operations to be fused into that center 

and that you would no longer have the separate existence. 

And remember, as Senator Collins has said—and I know you 

have read the 9/11 Commission Report—it is a chilling retelling of 

how September 11 happened, and it is an indictment of the status 

quo. Just to repeat the catch phrases, but they mean something, 

we had a lot of good work going on in intelligence, but it was in 

stovepipes, too much failure to share information, and no one in 

charge. Last Friday, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton said there is still 

no one in charge, and they have still heard examples of one or another of the agencies that you represent failing to share with someone else. 

So we are operating in an emergency climate, and obviously I 

want you to say what you think is right, but I also want you to 

deal directly with this appeal from the 9/11 Commission for revolutionary change—not unprecedented, very much like what Goldwater-Nichols did to the military to force people to work together. 

In this case, we are in the middle of a war. We are under an imminent threat of attack now. So while we in Congress want to do 

this thoughtfully, we cannot delay very long, no more than a military commander in the field whose forces are having trouble with 

a strategy they are following or their organization would not 

change that as quickly as he could to turn the tide toward victory. 

The 9/11 Commission recommended a National Intelligence Director with control—who is in charge—and they guarantee that Director is in charge by giving him or her budgetary control over the 

constituent agencies. The President explicitly, according to Andy 

Card, does not intend to do that. I worry that would create a kind 

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of Potemkin National Intelligence Director, where you see the facade but there is not real authority behind it. 

How do you each feel about the National Intelligence Director 

having budget authority over the agencies you represent? Mr. 

Mudd, since you did not get a chance with Senator Collins, I invite 

you to respond first. 

Mr. MUDD. If I could go back to Senator—no. [Laughter.] 

I think I would say I embrace the panel recommendations. I 

think the National Intelligence Director is a good idea. I do think 

there is a question that has to be answered about the difference between coordination and direction, and I think that is something 

that the Congress and the White House and others, the Acting Director, should work on in the coming weeks. 

I think there is a lot of work to do. The President announced an 

outline yesterday. I am not quite sure where that outline is going, 

although I think the umbrella ideas that were presented on the 

NID and the National Center are good and should be implemented. 

The one thing I would say, which is in my area of expertise, 

counterterrorism, is to return to what I said earlier. We need to 

keep structures that allow us to operate with a speed that doesn’t 

give us hours or days but sometimes minutes. 

For example—and I will be specific—if you look at page 404 of 

the 9/11 Commission Report, in the midst of describing what I 

think is a good idea on the NCTC, there is a description of a case 

study that I think would prevent us from effectively engaging the 

enemy and prosecuting the war. It makes it too hard to move 

quickly. So I would simply say I will leave it to others to think 

about the macro issues. I am not an expert there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You don’t have a position on the budget authority in the National Intelligence Director? 

Mr. MUDD. No, I don’t, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me just say very quickly in response to 

a question that Senator Collins asked you, part of why I see the 

budget authority in the Director as important is for the appropriate 

allocation of resources. For instance, the Pentagon is in charge 

right now of all the satellites, the imaging, etc. 

It could be—there is a natural tendency for the Pentagon to want 

to use what it controls for its purposes. It might be that the National Intelligence Director at a given moment, seeing a particular 

threat of Islamist terrorism coming toward our homeland, would 

want to say, no, sir, we want those satellites now focused on this 

or that imaging focused on this. And if the Director does not have 

that budget authority, I fear that the individual stovepipes will, not 

for evil reasons, just for institutional inertia, would focus on their 

priorities, not what may be national priorities. 

General Hughes, maybe with all your experience in so many 

ways, I should ask you to get into this now. 

General HUGHES. Well, sir, I too support the National Intelligence Director concept, and I think there are many ideas here. I 

will address just the one that you ask about, the budget. 

I think it is important to have central authority over the resource 

based and the breadth and depth of the resources across the U.S. 

Intelligence Community focused in a person who can allocate, as 

you said. I think that is vital. 

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I don’t think we have had major problems in my experience in 

the past. There have been a few cases perhaps where disputes have 

arisen, but generally speaking, the characterization in our earlier 

conversation about working things out has worked. But, once 

again, I associate my views with the others here about speed, about 

precision, about the nature of the threats we are engaged in now. 

And I personally believe that some kind of direction from the central authority with regard to the allocation of resources and the 

control of some of the budgetary process is vital. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I appreciate that. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think there are compelling arguments both pro 

and con on the budgetary authority. I think the key, in addition to 

that, is that the person, the NID, has the authority—and I think 

one of the things that Andy Card mentioned yesterday, one of the 

key criteria is the access and the respect and confidence of the 

President. And whether that means budgetary authority to direct 

that satellite as outlined in the scenario, I think that still the details have to be worked out. But I think having that confidence of 

the President, being able to take the direction and be accountable, 

I think that is one of the 9/11 Commission’s key recommendations, 

that there is accountability, that there is a quarterback in charge, 

this person having that authority and responsibility, if that is delineate in budgetary terms, again, compelling reasons for that. If 

not, then there has got to be some reason for saying this is why 

that is not the case. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. As the President said, the National Intelligence 

Director needs to have—be able to oversee the national intelligence 

program and budget, and I fully endorse that. And I think it is 

going to be up to the White House and to Congress to actually define what that means as far as oversee. 

I would particularly focus on the issue of reprogramming authority, be able to move resources during the course of the year so we 

do not have to go through the process, which is frequently timeconsuming. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very time-consuming. 

Mr. BRENNAN. It is. In addition, though, on satellites, moving 

satellites, there’s a difference between needing the money to move 

a satellite and be actually able to have programmatic authority on 

that. The DCI has an Associate Director of Central Intelligence for 

Collection, Charlie Allen, who chairs a very well-run National Intelligence Collection Board that can move that satellite based on 

the priorities that are identified. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that is the kind of authority I would 

like to see the NID continue to have, and I think if you give him 

budget authority, as a few of you have said in one degree or another you think he should have, then I think it guarantees that authority. 

As I read the 9/11 Commission Report—and we are going to have 

some top staff on later, and I will ask them to clarify this—but my 

reading is that they are recommending that the four fusion centers 

that you represent, plus two more that are not here—one at the 

Northern Command and one in the Department of Justice—be 

eliminated and that all be put together in the National 

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Counterterrorism Center. In the Commission’s view, Mr. Pistole, 

you personally or the position you hold would become a deputy to 

the National Intelligence Director. But I wonder whether you read 

it the same way I do, that for efficiency in operations, in effect, and 

expense, these six centers would be fused into one big National 

Counterterrorism Center. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, clearly, there is envisioned an integration 

and fusion of resources in a way that goes beyond what exists 

today. But that is not something, as I think you said earlier, that 

would be separate—there would not be separate existence for each 

agency. Clearly, the intent, I believe, is that we have our independent functions as directed by an overarching authority. The person that you refer to is actually my colleague, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence, Maureen Baginski, who would be that 

deputy under that format. So the operations of the FBI and the 

CIA and the Department of Homeland Security would all be conducted within our agencies, but in a coordinated fashion that has 

not happened. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up, actually. I will come back. 

I was going to ask if any of you see the 9/11 Commission Report 

as I do, which is they are recommending the end of the fusion centers and that they all be fused into one big one. No? OK. I take 

the silence as a negative. We will ask the Commission staff how 

they see the recommendation. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me first 

start by thanking you for your leadership. It is unprecedented that 

we are here in recess. I don’t know if the Senate has ever come together on recess to hold Committee hearings before, but I want to 

thank you and Senator Lieberman for the speed with which you 

have moved. 

We are here at a time of war. Sometimes we forget about that. 

We are talking about macro change in the way we handle intelligence, but we are at a time of war. 

The 9/11 Commission Report was an indictment of the status quo 

on September 11. And we are going to struggle here with figuring 

out how quickly we can move, whether we can get something done 

before we get out of here in October, how quickly do we have to 

put together some legislation. 

My question, and understanding we are at a time of war, understanding that the 9/11 Commission Report is a very serious indictment of the status quo on September 11, if we were to suffer an 

attack between now and the election, there is going to be another 

commission, another review of what happened, are we going to see 

another condemnation of the status quo today? Mr. Mudd, you 

talked about substantial change being made. I am trying to understand what it is that we have to do to make sure that we are maximizing our efforts to protect the American people against terrorism. 

Tell me today, if you can, each of you, a very quick assessment of 

today versus September 11, and what is it that you need from us 

to ensure that the American public is protected in a better way 

than where we are sitting right now? Mr. Brennan. 

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Mr. BRENNAN. A lot has happened since September 11. What I 

wouldn’t want to have happen is for there to be a tragedy because 

we moved precipitously. I have tremendous respect for what the 

Commission has done, the scholarship shown in the report. But I 

strongly disagree with Governor Kean’s comment on Friday that 

the system today does not work. The system today works better 

than it ever has before. The status quo on September 11 was certainly insufficient. Could it work better? You betcha. We can improve ourselves, and we need to. And that is why continuing to 

change and to go through transformation of government is important. But moving precipitously does not take into account the tremendous interconnectedness that is the result of legacy practices 

and procedures and statutes over the past 50 years. So we have to 

move thoughtfully, but what I don’t want to do is, to move and to 

have a dropped piece of information because, in fact, we went 

through rapid change very quickly. And this does not, quite honestly, the 9/11 Commission Report, provide the detailed type of engineering blueprint that we need in order to undergo that transformation. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think the most significant changes from the FBI 

perspective have been in the areas of the collection, analysis, and 

dissemination of information. The FBI has been accused in years 

past of being a good collector, but not doing a good job of analyzing 

or sharing the information. There has been wholesale change in 

that since September 11, and I think our partners here at the table 

would agree with that based on the access to information, for example, through TTIC that non-FBI personnel have access to FBI 

files online, people in CTC and IAIP at DHS have access to that 

information. That is a clear change from pre-September 11 time. 

What do we need you to do? The key question I think in one of 

the areas is in defining the lanes that each agency has responsibility for in terms of this new directorate and this NCTC. How does 

that all flesh out when it comes down to operations, where the rubber meets the road? How does that actually—how do we take that 

overseas intel and transform it into something here today that we 

can act on? So that would be the key for me. 

General HUGHES. The entire organization that I represent is reflective of post-September 11 change. We did not exist. We do now, 

and I think tremendous differences have been made. The single 

biggest difference—and one that I think we all ought to be both 

pleased and proud about—is the connection between the Federal 

Government, especially in the intelligence context, the information 

that the Federal Government produces and holds, and the State, 

local, and municipal authorities and the private sector. That connection, which we are making more robust every day, is vital to our 

collective success. And I would like to offer that as the best possible 

example of change and improvement that has occurred, and I think 

it is continuing to evolve. I don’t want to give you the impression 

I think it is perfect. It is not. We have much to do. But the fact 

is we are on the right track in that regard. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. I think it is fundamental to keep in mind that as the 

adversary changes, so must we. We have to keep changing. We canVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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not say we have reached a point where we are comfortable because 

even if we were comfortable, the adversary will morph. 

That said, I think that the change that we have undergone in 3 

years has been fundamental, partly because the tragedy of September 11 allowed a global coalition of services to be galvanized in 

a way that was not possible before that. The world is focused on 

this target. We are toe-to-toe with the target every day. 

Let me mention two things about things that we could use help 

on. First, we talk about resources. This is a war of people. Every 

person makes a difference in this war. 

Second, the thing I fear most and that you can help with, I fear 

that there will be a sense around the world that after bin Laden 

and Zawahri are gone, that we can lose the edge, that we can lose 

our commitment. In fact, I think the dedication to maintain the 

commitment to this fight must be higher after they are gone. We 

are in a war of a generation. 

Senator COLEMAN. One of the complaints of the Commission has 

to do with this issue of who is in charge, and no one is in charge. 

It is being repeated that no one is in charge. 

Mr. Mudd, as I listened to your testimony, I got a sense—and the 

others can respond to this—that what you have now is a collaborative relationship. People have their jurisdictions. The FBI has 

their jurisdiction. The CIA has jurisdiction, DCI, and Defense have 

jurisdictions. Hopefully the walls are broken down so you are not 

in that silo effect that the Commission condemned and that was 

part of the problem on September 11. But my sense is that rather 

than having an executive fiat, one person saying this is it, what 

you have is a conversation that results in action. 

Two questions for you. The way the present structure is, does 

that facilitate the type of speed that you need? Or could you operate more quickly if you had a single person in charge? But then the 

concern that I see is if you had the single person in charge, how 

would you get the minority perspectives? And how would you get 

to the President the contrary analysis from someone who is—the 

decision is made, but someone has got something concerning them. 

How would you see in a structure with the single head that information getting through? 

Mr. MUDD. First, I think in terms of thinking about speed—when 

I think about the National Counterterrorism Center, I think about 

the essential responsibility of the government to ensure that we act 

with unity of effort. We must have this, whether it’s in the NCTC 

or elsewhere, and this is one reason I feel so strongly about the 

proposal. We’ve got to have unity of effort. And that means sitting 

us all down at the table and saying what are we doing. 

In terms of speed, I see that a bit differently, and I think the 

weekend was a good example of this. Whether or not you have a 

planning mechanism, we sit there real time on the phone and pass 

information. This has been one of the things that’s changed so fundamentally, the thinking about information sharing and information exchange in the wake of September 11. 

For example, I hope I’m not speaking out of school, General 

Hughes and I were on the phone last night about passing information to local authorities. You talk about responsibility. This is not 

my responsibility. I fully cede that to the Department of Homeland 

22

Security and the FBI. It is my responsibility to act quickly when 

DHS asks for clearance of information. We did that in minutes last 

night. 

Senator COLEMAN. Any of the gentlemen want to respond to 

that? Let me then, folks, I want to get to the issue of no one in 

charge. That is a condamnation of what is happening today, that 

somehow decisions are not being made. Can somebody help me understand that? Do we have to move quicker? I do not want to wait 

for legislation. If no one is in charge and it is impacting the safety 

and security of Americans today, I want to understand that, and 

I would hope folks would move quickly. So help me understand 

whether the status quo today is somehow resulting in decisions not 

made or a lack of speed in responding to existing threats. 

Mr. PISTOLE. No, Senator, absolutely, at least from a domestic 

perspective, I can speak clearly, that any actionable information 

that we receive—and part of this is the focus on the interdependence among our various agencies, that if there’s overseas intelligence that’s gleaned, let’s say, from Pakistan, the information 

from the weekend, that translates into action the Department of 

Homeland Security, the FBI takes to follow up on. There is no impediment to that action being taken. Whether that means the FBI 

seeking an emergency FISA to go up on somebody here in the U.S. 

that has some connections, whether it’s the Department of Homeland Security taking actions to harden targets, none of that—there 

are no impediments to that action being taken. So the impression, 

if you have, that there are impediments is, I believe, not founded. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I would say that you have to define what 

do you mean by in charge of what? The terrorism challenge has so 

many different dimensions from the standpoint of operations, investigations, mitigation, defense, analysis, collection, integration, 

etc. It reaches almost every part of the U.S. Government. It 

reaches worldwide. And you know, when you think about all of 

that, to have one person in charge of all those things that fundamentally affect the statutory responsibilities and authorities in 

the different agencies and departments throughout the government, it is a real challenge to try to ensure that there’s a system 

that will ensure that there’s going to be contrary views that will 

be able to get up to senior policy makers. So again, it’s a design 

issue. What do you want to construct architecturally, from a national architecture standpoint on the terrorism challenge. 

And the U.S. Government, still I say, is a product of the past 50 

years of individual initiatives. We have to take a look at ourselves 

and say, how can we best be configured in the future? 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Durbin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and 

thank you to all of you who are testifying here today. 

Madam Chairman, let me join in the chorus of those who are 

praising you for calling this hearing. It is unusual for us, having 

decided to go about our own business back in our States and with 

our families, to return to Washington. I know Washington’s glad to 

see us. We are glad to be here. I cannot think of anything more 

23

important that we could be doing at this moment in time than considering the 9/11 Commission Report and our response to it. 

But let us be very candid and honest about the situation and the 

circumstances that we face. We have to make certain that we are 

driven more by September 11 than by November 2. This has to be 

about September 11 and the tragedy that came to America, and not 

about a pending presidential election. We have to make certain 

that the decisions that we make here and the process that we follow is one that is extremely serious. It took some 20 months for the 

9/11 Commission to complete its work. The fact that many are urging that we finish our work in a matter of hours, I think will not 

do justice to the task that faces us. 

Let me be specific. Mr. Brennan, you gave high praise to the 

President’s announcement yesterday, and talked about TTIC and 

what it has achieved. If I am not mistaken, it was January 2003 

when TTIC was originally created, and I believe you were brought 

to head it up in March of that year; is that correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The President announced its creation in January. 

I was brought in to help design it in March. It was stood up on 

May 1 of last year. 

Senator DURBIN. I am happy that happened. I cannot see a 

dime’s worth of difference between what the President endorsed 

yesterday and what TTIC did or was created to achieve over a year 

ago. And I look at the way that your agency is presently being 

managed, and I salute you for all that you are achieving, but I 

think you would concede that there have been some fundamental 

barriers and obstacles which you have faced, not the least of which 

is the fact that it is a pickup team that you are using to run this 

Agency. It consists not so much of dedicated staffers, but those who 

have been loaned to you by other agencies, assignees from other 

agencies like the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. 

According to a Congressional Quarterly Report last night, the 

White House had hoped to have 300 analysts at TTIC. A March 

2004 report stated it only had 123, 18 from the FBI, 12 from the 

Department of Homeland Security. They expected the FBI to 

produce 65, and Department of Homeland Security to assign between 30 and 45. And the simple problem is, there just are not 

enough good people. You have had to pick up staff from other agencies to try to move forward. You have reached less than half of the 

assigned staff level that you had hoped for, and I think that is an 

indication that as we talk in glorious terms about creating boxes 

and moving them around an organization chart, the final analysis, 

it is a question of having talented and creative people in these 

agencies doing the work. 

The second issue, and one that troubles me, and I raised it at 

the last hearing, is this whole transfer in sharing of information. 

If the 9/11 Commission said nothing else, it said we have to reach 

the point where we are sharing this information. As Mr. Mudd 

said, this is a war of speed. The information has to be shared. 

Currently, TTIC, as I understand it, the analysts there access intelligence only from their own agency’s databases, according to the 

Center’s Directors. That means CIA analysts must request FBI analysts to check FBI databases and report if they find anything of 

24

interest. That does not sound like an efficient way to protect America. 

So if what the President is suggesting is more of the same, dusting off the old press release, we are not getting anywhere. I think 

what the 9/11 Commission challenged us to do was to give more 

authority to this National Counterterrorism Center by way of budgeting, by way of staffing, so that we can start forcing some merger 

of not only talented people, but valuable information. 

I would appreciate your response, Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. First of all, I have to correct the record in terms 

of access to information within TTIC. We have CIA analysts in 

TTIC who are able to access FBI case files through their electronic 

databases and systems. We have FBI analysts who are able to access the CIA’s operational traffic. So what we’re doing is trying to 

ensure an integrated structure there. And you’re absolutely right, 

if they only had access to their own individual systems, that 

wouldn’t work. That’s why we in fact have designed a system not 

to do that. 

Senator DURBIN. So is there full integration of the databases 

then of the FBI and the CIA? If you are an FBI analyst and you 

know something that you think is of interest that needs to be followed up, to protect America, can you get into the CIA database? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, you can. The issue is what do you mean by 

an integrated database. We have access to these 22 networks, and 

on those networks are countless databases and data holdings. What 

you don’t want to do is to mix all of that together, because first of 

all it’s not mixable in its current form, because individual agencies 

have designed their systems according to their own individual 

standards. 

Now, what we are doing is bringing those systems in and networks in, so we can design an architecture that allows us to search 

against them simultaneously, and in fact, we are doing that now. 

We are not at that stage, but you have to be able to do an integrated federated search simultaneously. 

Senator DURBIN. I would like to stick with this point because I 

think this gets to the heart of it. The question is whether or not 

we have an overarching architecture where we can at some day 

hope to integrate these systems and to integrate the information, 

and share the information. If I am not mistaken, we are currently 

in the situation where the Border Patrol, collecting fingerprints, 

cannot share them with the FBI, some 5 years after they have been 

tasked to do it. So what we have is a lack of integration of this 

technology base and this architecture. 

When I raised this issue in the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security, OMB screamed bloody murder: This is our jurisdiction. You stay away from it. We are the ones who integrate 

architecture of computers. And so we did nothing. I am wondering 

today, when we are talking about what you are doing and what we 

hope to achieve with the 9/11 Commission Report, are we finally 

tackling the bottom line here, that even after new titles and new 

boxes on the organization chart, we need the people and the architecture to make this mesh and work together? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. I think you’re making the point that I 

made earlier, which is that there needs to be a national architecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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ture, from a business process standpoint as far as the roles and responsibilities of those different entities, but in addition, an information technology architecture. The U.S. Government is the product of, again, the past 20 years of the revolution that has taken 

place in information technology. This Congress has funded individual initiatives and individual agencies. So what we find right 

now are disparate systems, and we’re trying to bring it together. 

Senator DURBIN. Can you for a moment understand my frustration? It is 3 years after September 11. This is not a new idea or 

concept that we would create this architecture, and here we are 3 

years later, almost 3 years later, saying, boy, we are going to have 

to do this soon, are we not? What has stopped us? What has 

stopped the Executive Branch? Is it the Congress? Have we held 

the Executive Branch back from establishing this new architecture 

so these computers can merge their information and make us a 

safer Nation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, the architecture is so complicated. You’re 

talking about multi-level security systems, top secret, secret, classified, unclassified. You’re talking about something that touches all 

different government agencies and departments. You’re talking 

about moving information from overseas and making sure that it 

can cascade throughout the government and down into the State 

and local level in law enforcement. You’re talking about a very intricate and interdependent system that is not yet in place. It needs 

to be. The U.S. Government needs to understand how we can make 

sure information moves, but the bumper sticker comments about 

we’re not sharing information doesn’t take into account the complexity of the issue. 

And when I look at the 9/11 Commission Report, the recommendation on information sharing is that information procedures should provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. It doesn’t address 

any of the issues regarding the technology challenges and the tremendous resources required, the policies and protocols and procedures that have to be put in place. 

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Brennan, with all due respect, 2 years ago, 

when we debated the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, I proposed this Manhattan Project to do exactly what you 

suggested. It was stopped by the OMB. It was not approved by the 

Administration. It did not go forward. And today we are in the 

same conversation. I really believe that unless and until we make 

a commitment, a bipartisan commitment to get this done, we are 

going to continue to feel the frustration and be unable to offer the 

protection the American people are asking for. Organization charts 

are important, but the bottom line, who is working for the Agency? 

What tools do they have to make America safer? And the most important tool, as I see it, from a technology viewpoint, is still something off in the future. That to me is troubling. 

I hope this Committee hearing moves us, not only toward a better organization chart, but toward putting the people in place as 

well as the equipment in place, technology in place, to make it happen. I think that is the thing that troubles me. The FBI—I just 

have a short time—but the FBI computer system on September 11 

was decrepit. It was embarrassing. I know efforts have been made 

26

because I have worked with Director Mueller, over and over again, 

to bring more modern computer technology to the FBI. I think most 

Americans would be shocked to learn where you were on September 11. I hope things are better today. Are they? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Senator. Tremendous strides have been 

made. There’s still a ways to go, but the key is that everybody 

within the FBI and those people who are working to access the FBI 

databases have full visibility of the information that previously, as 

you said, prior to September 11, simply was not there. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Specter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I would like to focus for just a moment on the timetable which 

we are going to be following, and offer a slightly different perspective than the one which we are moving on at the present time. 

The Chairman has gotten national acclaim for having a July 

hearing and a series of three August hearings, unprecedented, and 

deservedly so. Senator Frist and Senator Daschle did the right 

thing in asking for a bill by September 30, and when they did that, 

I think they did it in the context that it was mission virtually impossible, but this Committee can do it. I have a little different view 

as to what kind of a timetable we ought to be undertaking. 

The month of September is likely to be filled with disagreements 

as we move on the appropriations process, and likely to have a continuing resolution from what I have seen in my years around here. 

I think that if we were to turn out a bill in early September, and 

I know that is a mighty tall order, but let me give you one person’s 

perspective, that we have floor time to take it up and to move 

ahead with it. 

We have had a lot of experience in the field, and there have been 

a lot of witnesses testifing. I know that from the 9/11 Commission 

General Hughes testified and Mr. Pistole testified, and you go over 

the list, virtually everybody has testified, Powell, Albright, Cohen, 

Rumsfeld, Myers, Tenet, Berger, Clarke, Freeh, Reno, Mueller, and 

Ridge, and we are going to hear from some of them again, but we 

have a pretty good idea as to what your views are. 

We argued about this when we debated the Department of 

Homeland Security in the fall of 2002. Senator Lieberman and I introduced the bill 30 days after September 11. It took a long time 

to get administration support, and then we were debating this 

point about having the new cabinet officer have the authority to direct. Many of us have been working on a correction to that, because 

we did not get that authority, and it comes in the background 

where there is a generally recognized view that had all of the information been under one umbrella, September 11 could have been 

prevented, and that is our charge today, to make sure that does not 

happen again. 

For the past many weeks Senator Lieberman and I and our staffs 

have been working on a bill, so we have been thinking about this 

for a long time. I have been thinking about it since 1996 when I 

had proposed a similar idea in legislation when I chaired the Intelligence Committee. Then when the 9/11 Commission wanted a bill 

27

introduced with their provisions, Senator McCain and Senator 

Lieberman were the leaders there, and Senator Bayh and I joined 

them to say we would introduce that bill, not saying we agreed 

with all of it, and it ought to be in the public milieu for analysis 

and decision. 

My own ideas, as I expressed to them last Friday, are to disagree 

with the double hatting. The 9/11 Commission has said that the 

new national Director ought to have subordinates in charge of the 

CIA, the FBI, and Defense Intelligence, which would remain in 

those departments subject to the Secretaries, but also responsible 

to the Director, and maybe that is what we ought to come out with. 

I do not know. It is something that we are going to have to consider 

and we are going to have to debate it. At this stage my view is that 

we ought to take the bull by the horns, create this new national 

Director—and I compliment the President for coming out with it—

and take the counterintelligence out of the FBI, and take a big segment of counterintelligence out of the Defense Department—the 

CIA is already separate—and really provide some authority including budget authority. 

But the point is, what kind of a timetable are we going to be on? 

And at a time when America is under the threat of attack, we are 

on the spot, and we are doing exactly what we should be doing, we 

are here working. And Senator Collins is exactly right when she 

says we have got to get it right, and we cannot do it hastily. We 

have got to get it right. 

But the legislative process is a long-term process, moving beyond 

what this Committee is going to do, going to the floor debate, and 

a lot of reanalysis. Then it is going to go through the House and 

it is going to go through a Conference Committee. We want to get 

it right, but this Committee is not going to be the last word. 

This is not a good analogy, but it has some relevance. The Judiciary Committee reported out a bill on asbestos a year ago, knowing 

it had a lot of problems with getting it out of Committee to move 

it along the legislative process. And I can see this Committee finishing the hearings in August, and we are having more hearings, 

August 16 and 17. I can see the House having hearings. And I can 

see us having bills. I am going to submit one in the next few days 

for the consideration of the Committee. We are going to have the 

9/11 Statute. We will put the chairs out there, and we will sit down 

and we will really get down to business, and we will start to hear 

arguments from a lot of people who know a lot about this subject, 

have had a lot of experience with it, who are on this Committee, 

and then we will have the floor debate, and then we will have a 

conference. But I can see passing a bill in early October. 

We have passed legislation when we have had to, and that is 

what I would like to offer for consideration by the Committee and 

I have got a call in to the leadership. Our leader is in China, so 

it is a little hard to reach him, to give him my ideas as to where 

we ought to go, but we could move ahead. 

People are going to get very antsy around here in early to mid 

October because of the elections there, and a lot of us are up for 

election. We are going to be here instead of campaigning because 

our duty is to be here, but if we look backwards on the clock, I 

think we can do our job and get it done by early October. 

28

On to the subject matter, General Hughes. You have a lot of experience in the field. You were the head of the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, and we had a lot of conversations across the table when 

I chaired the Intelligence Committee in 1996. You took over as 

head of DIA in February 1996. Can the National Director of Intelligence run the job he has to do effectively without budget authority; and could you have run the Defense Intelligence Agency if the 

budget authority had been in the Director of Central Intelligence? 

General HUGHES. Yes. I think the National Intelligence Director 

can have budget authority, and the intelligence organizations that 

are subordinate to him in that regard can effectively operate. I 

think it’s one of partnerships, however, and cooperative interaction, 

and it does depend a lot—I think John Brennan may have said 

this—about how that is defined and what it is that you do with the 

resource authorities that you are given. 

Senator SPECTER. If you do not have the budget authority, how 

can you set priorities? If you do not have the authority to pick the 

people, is not a national director just a shell game and a shell operation? 

General HUGHES. Generally, I think you’re right. Once again, I 

personally believe that the personnel engaged in the work of intelligence for our country should be fungible across the intelligence organizations, and indeed, under George Tenet that began to occur 

and is occurring now, that a CIA officer can serve the DIA, and a 

DIA officer can be in the FBI, and a FBI officer can be over at the 

Department of Homeland Security. I think that’s actually on track 

to get where you would like to see it go. 

What we’re talking here, is a little bit different category. We’re 

talking about monies that were apportioned out of a broad central 

budget line, and then given for use——

Senator SPECTER. General Hughes, I hate to interrupt you. My 

time is almost up, but I am going to be within my time. We are 

going to debate that. That is going to be a hot subject for this Committee and the floor, where budget authority goes and what we are 

going to do by way of appointing authority. 

When I took a look at all the people who testified before the 9/

11 Commission, I am reminded of a comment made by Congressman Morris Udall a long time ago. He was at a place where members were speaking, and Morris Udall made a comment. He said, 

‘‘Well, everything has been said, but not by everybody.’’ And in this 

context I think everything has been said by everybody, so I am 

going to push an expedited schedule. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I want 

to compliment you for moving so swiftly on these hearings, and 

thank you for your leadership on this Committee. 

The Governmental Affairs Committee has anticipated and focused on national issues that we believe will seriously affect the future well-being of our great country. And I want to make the point 

that we should remember, the establishment of an intelligence directorate concerned with terrorism is not a new issue for this ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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mittee. During the Committee markup of S. 2452, Senator Lieberman’s bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security, Senator Levin, Senator Thompson, and I worked with Senator 

Lieberman on an amendment to form a directorate of intelligence 

within DHS as a focal point for information relating to the plans, 

intentions, and capabilities of terrorists. Unfortunately, our concept 

of a directorate of intelligence was not included in the administration’s bill, H.R. 5005, which was enacted to establish the Department. 

As we revisit this subject, I hope that some of the issues that we 

worked out in a bipartisan manner can be implemented this time 

around. 

You have all testified that your respective organizations have 

made great strides since September 11 in the area of counterterrorism. You have also testified that you support the creation of 

NCTC and believe that it will build on your current capabilities. 

What specifically are you not able to accomplish now that NCTC 

will? Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. The intention and purpose of the National 

Counterterrorism Center is to ensure that we build upon the TTIC 

foundation to ensure even greater integration and collaboration 

across the community. It is bringing it to another level, this issue 

of trying to make sure that there is some type of orchestration from 

the standpoint of the joint planning that comes out of the intelligence knowledge that we are able to accrue. 

So from the standpoint of making sure that there is this orchestration, as well as understanding of what the respective roles and 

responsibilities are, a National Counterterrorism Center in fact is 

going to try to bring into it more of those elements throughout the 

community that are engaged in the battle against terrorism. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I believe it institutionalizes some of the 

policies and practices that we are currently engaged in, and it gives 

that ownership and responsibility the 9/11 Commission addressed, 

who’s in charge, who’s the quarterback? That’s what it provides for. 

In terms of a the day-to-day operations, I think it simply allows 

the clear delineation of who’s responsible for what activity at what 

time and it enhances the information sharing that we are all working toward, but with having this new directorate overall, it again 

institutionalizes that in a way that we don’t have. 

Senator AKAKA. General Hughes. 

General HUGHES. I see it as a place where you can achieve a 

strategy for action that is more difficult if you’re dispersed. I see 

it as a place where you can discuss and come to conclusions that 

could be centrally acted upon. And I see it as a place to achieve 

synergy that might not otherwise be achievable. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. The CIA, I think, has three traditional missions: 

That’s the collection of information, the analysis of that information, all foreign related, and the conduct of covert action. We can 

conduct those in the Center. 

There are things outside the Center that we need help on. The 

first is to ensure that we are all coordinated in action, and we need 

coordination of action. And then the second is to ensure that as we 

30

look at foreign intelligence, that we fuse it with other sources, particularly domestic sources, so the President gets one view that reflects what everybody thinks. 

Senator AKAKA. One of the justifications for establishing the 

NCTC is to consolidate operations and address the lack of information sharing within the Intelligence Community by staffing representatives from the various intelligence agencies into one cohesive environment. However, we must ensure that detailing capable 

personnel from other agencies and departments to staff the NCTC 

does not undermine the intelligence and national security efforts of 

those entities. Simply putting a nameplate on a door will accomplish little unless the offices inside are filled with qualified people. 

My concern with staffing the NCTC is my same concern with staffing any Federal office—making sure that we have the right people 

in the right place at the right time. I fear that the creation of another intelligence center will just worsen the problem. 

My question to all of you is, what is the current state of recruitment and retention of skilled analysts and linguists in your respective agencies, and are you concerned that the creation of the NCTC 

will lead to the loss of your best personnel, which could compromise 

your agencies’ capabilities to fight terrorism? Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center relies on 

the partner agencies to assign analysts to us. So we don’t do any 

direct hiring ourselves. 

I am concerned about making sure that we are able to optimize 

the use of every single analyst throughout the government. That’s 

why I think it’s important that we have a framework that we all 

understand the delineation of responsibilities to make sure that 

any redundancy is thoughtful and is intentional, as opposed to nonintentional. 

And so what we’re trying to do now is to make sure that we understand what our respective roles are because the analytic resources are so precious we want to make sure we’re able to cover 

the entire horizon of challenges that are out there. The last thing 

I’d want to do is for National Counterterrorism Center to deprive 

analysts from those operations, investigative and other elements 

within the CIA, the DHS, and the FBI, that need those analysts 

to drive their operations and investigations appropriately. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator. I think the 9/11 Commission Report 

indicated the importance of what Mr. Brennan just touched on in 

terms of having the analytic cadre still close to the operations that 

are ongoing, whether in the CIA, the DHS, or the FBI. The challenge as I think you have touched upon, is that we all need those 

analysts, and we are all aggressively competing for the best and 

the brightest to come work for us, and then we take those and 

train them, and assign them, whether it’s to TTIC or to CTC or 

perhaps DHS IAIP. So that is one of our greatest challenges. 

We have been successful in the FBI of hiring hundreds of top 

flight analysts, but the challenge is to continue with that on into 

the next year, and we’ve taken great strides, as all the agencies 

have, to do that, but you have touched on one of the key points. 

Senator AKAKA. General Hughes. 

31

General HUGHES. I think the answer is yes, that there are fears 

about shortage of personnel and competition, and not being able to 

continue the departmental missions if the best and brightest of our 

capability goes elsewhere. That’s certainly true. It is a very competitive environment, and there are very few people that are experienced in regard to the Homeland Security mission. So we’re trying to build a cadre of people, and at the same time deal with the 

requirements that were given to support organizations like the National Counterterrorism Center. I believe it’s going to take a lot of 

leadership and a lot of consideration of the issues to work this out. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. Sir, you do raise an issue of concern. We’re dealing 

with a broad government, but it’s a government, and when you get 

right down to it, that has a limited pool of expertise, and we share 

this expertise across agencies, so you have to think, as you create 

one agency or affect another, that there is a relatively small pool 

of people who can do this. 

And I would also mention that on your question about recruitment, the ability of—to bring people in is one thing. The ability to 

ensure that you can spend 5, 7, or 10 years to develop that person 

where they can really bring strength to target and degrade the 

enemy, this is a long process, because we can’t just recruit them. 

To develop an expert operational analytic is a multi-year process. 

Senator AKAKA. Madam Chairman, my time has almost run out, 

but again, I want to say thank you for this hearing. It will certainly help us assess the capabilities we have and need to create. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Shelby. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY 

Senator SHELBY. I ask that my complete statement be made a 

part of the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shelby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY 

Madam Chairman, I commend you for acting so expeditiously in putting together 

a series of hearings on implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 

Especially with the Senate in recess and a major election on the horizon, the difficulties of pulling this off should not be underestimated. 

Having served on and chaired the Intelligence Committee, I have to admit to a 

certain level of satisfaction at seeing some long-overdue measures finally beginning 

to take shape. As I have pointed out in the past, only with the creation of new government entities and the reorganization that entails can the United States hope to 

prevent a recurrence of the tragic events of 9/11. 

It is ironic that more than a half-century after passage of the National Security 

Act of 1947, which was itself the product of a devastating surprise attack on the 

United States, one of its key provisions may finally come to fruition: The creation 

of a National Intelligence Director. The United States was caught by surprise by 

the Japanese fleet for the same reason we were caught off-guard by the terrorist 

strikes of September 11, 2001. This nation’s failure to construct an intelligence 

structure that ensures that information reaches those who need it in a timely manner and who have the authority to act has been at the core of numerous disasters 

over the last 50 years. The work of the 9/11 Commission, though, has provided us 

with the intellectural, moral and political foundation upon which to build the requisite governmental structure at last. 

32

The President’s announcement yesterday of his decision to follow the Commission’s recommendations was mostly welcome news. The President has agreed that 

the Intelligence Community has continued to lack the oversight and coordination 

that was envisioned in the 1947 Act. It would be irresponsible in the extreme to 

not support him in implementing this recommendation. Unfortunately, the President’s proposal omits a key requirement for effective reform: A National Intelligence 

Director must have budgetary authority over the whole of the Intelligence Community with the sole exception of military tactical intelligence, which should remain 

the provenance of the uniformed services. Those agencies that provide intelligence 

necessary for strategic decision-making must fall under the purview of the new Director. The Central Intelligence Agency—once again, the irony shouldn’t be missed 

of an agency created to address the shortcomings that resulted in Pearl Harbor—

should no longer be lead by the same individual who oversees the entire community. 

The Director of Central Intelligence had the statutory authority he needed, but 

never the political support to do the intended job. Title 50 of the U.S. Code clearly 

stipulates that the DCI had budgetary authority over the Intelligence Community. 

In practice, it never occurred. As with the outcome of Pearl Harbor, the events of 

9-11 have created the political momentum to force the fixes that should have been 

in place decades ago. 

Similarly, the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) is 

the long-overdue reaction to our failure to properly take the necessary measures to 

fix a problem most of us knew about long ago. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was, conceptually, the right idea. Problem was, it was the right idea 

poorly executed. The CIA, for which I have tremendous respect, was not the right 

venue for an operation oriented toward protecting the American homeland as well 

as U.S. assets and interests overseas. The insular, highly-secretive nature of the 

CIA was not conducive to the mission of the TTIC, which, to be effective, must interact on a daily basis with the FBI, Homeland Security, and other organizations. 

Madam Chairman, I again commend you for holding these hearings, and look forward to working with you and Senator Lieberman to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. However, I also remain committed to ensuring that 

the actions and reforms we undertake are done with thoughtful, measured progress. 

Taking action simply for the sake of taking action will not secure our homeland and 

it certainly will not honor the memory of those who lost their lives on September 

11, 2001.

Senator SHELBY. Some of us over time have proposed the creation of a national intelligence directorate to oversee all intelligence gathering, someone with total control and accountability. 

That is the budget too. I believe today’s system, as you have heard 

many times in your experience, is far too disjointed, although you 

have made a lot of progress. I have to concede that. 

I think what we are faced with here today, Madam Chairman—

and you and Senator Lieberman will be in the leadership here is 

that we must make certain the changes we propose architecturally 

here in legislation, will accomplish the goals that we set forth. In 

other words, if we do not accomplish the goals, the end game, then 

we are wasting our time, and we cannot afford that. America cannot afford that. 

I think it begs the question, what is the No. 1 problem in the Intelligence Community, made up of some 15 agencies, I suppose? Is 

it the lack of gathering of information? Is it the lack of analyzing 

information? Is it the lack of disseminating, sharing of information? 

Or is it all of them? I do not know. But all of these questions have 

been raised from time to time. 

I think Senator Durbin raised an important question earlier. 

What are we going to accomplish here if we put together a allsource or whatever you want to call it, terrorist center, analysis 

center, building on what Mr. Brennan has been doing, and I think 

we can learn from that. But what will that be? Will it be an entity 

standing on its own? Will it be fed by the other agencies? Will it 

be the prime entity in analysis of information? 

33

I think it was said earlier that the agencies—and we will talk 

about the CIA, Mr. Mudd. The CIA still would have some type if 

analysis center, you would envision, would you not, dealing with 

terrorist information? 

Mr. MUDD. That’s correct. The center I manage is both operational and analytical. 

Senator SHELBY. What would you envision the CIA having if we 

were to create the big entity for analysis and so forth, in other 

words, a counterterrorism center? 

Mr. MUDD. I’ll answer that, sir. I’d like to say, in response to 

what you first raised, which is the question about the biggest problem we face. I would say it’s people, trained people to conduct this 

war. You can talk about management, budget, etc., but getting people to fight the war. 

In terms of what the center does, the counterterrorist center that 

I manage now, and what it should do. The two operational capabilities are pretty straightforward. That’s the collection of information, 

the conduct of covert action at the director of the President. There’s 

also a responsibility, an analytic responsibility we have, both to 

support our operators, and that responsibility is very complicated. 

We haven’t talked about that much here, but it’s difficult to understand. I’d be happy to explain later. And to reflect what we know 

from our operational information and other foreign intelligence information, via TTIC to the President. TTIC can help us fuse other 

information that’s collected, for example, domestic information to 

ensure the President has a panoramic picture. 

But the center I have now has a fabric of operators and analysts 

that I think has proven very effective in the war, and I think, in 

response to a comment earlier about what we envision for this, I 

don’t think we envision that the new center would control all the 

operational or analytic assets across our community. I think the vision would be that the visibility, the transparency across the community, and having a place that can coordinate so that we are 

maximizing limited resources exists, and that’s why I think we 

need such a center. 

Senator SHELBY. As a big gatherer of information, which your 

agency would do, you could not just gather it and throw it out raw 

doing nothing to it, could you? Because you also are tasked with 

other things at the CIA, not just terrorists, which is very important 

for all of us, and what they would do, how they would attack us 

here or around the world, but other things that you deal with. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. MUDD. I think that’s correct. I think what you’re talking 

about here is balance. 

Senator SHELBY. Balance in millions. 

Mr. MUDD. The fusion mission is critical. It’s a mission that we 

cannot—let’s be absolutely clear here—we in the CIA cannot conduct this ourselves, but we also have other missions that go beyond 

that have led to success in the war that I think we should continue. 

So fusion’s important. It’s not only important to ensure we have 

people who get a picture comprehensively of the data, but it’s to ensure the President has a picture that doesn’t reflect six different 

agencies saying six different things. 

34

Senator SHELBY. General Hughes, at Homeland Security, you 

bring with you, as Senator Specter alluded to, your experience at 

DIA. What do you believe is the No. 1 obstacle or problem that we 

must overcome with your help and the Agency’s? 

General HUGHES. I have to agree with my colleague, Phil Mudd. 

People and the shortage of people, and especially the people who 

have experience and training. In my endeavor we’re kind of making 

that up as we go along, and putting in place some training mechanisms. That’s our biggest issue. That’s my direct answer. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

Mr. Pistole, at the FBI you are charged with fighting terrorism, 

and that is a big departure to some extent from what you have 

done in the past. I know you have made progress. What is your biggest problem? Is it recruiting the right people, and training the 

right people, as they have said? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator, that’s in large part is the greatest 

challenge. We have an expression in the Counterterrorism of the 

FBI, that we don’t have problems, we just have opportunities to 

demonstrate character, and we have lots of those opportunities in 

terms of recruiting, training, and deploying the right people. We 

have thousands of ongoing terrorist investigations here in the 

United States. We need the dedicated cadre of people who can focus 

on those, do both the strategic and the tactical analysis that goes 

with that, and then to integrate all of that with our partners here 

to make sure that we have the broad brush. So it is the challenge 

of the people—the personnel. 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Brennan, you bring to the table recent experience of setting up a new organization, it has to be trained people, people you can train and everything, because you cannot wait, 

can you? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That’s correct, Senator. The concept of a shortage 

of people is a relative one. The more efficient you are, the more you 

can do with the finite number of people, and I am an advocate to 

making sure that we’re able to use those people as efficiently as 

possible across the different entities involved in terrorism. 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Brennan, according to the President’s announcement, the new center would subsume the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center, your center. That of course would entail removing a unified, coordinated analysis and assessment operation from 

the CIA basically. What will be the future of terrorism analysis 

within the CIA after this, assuming it moves with legislation? In 

other words, what would the agencies’ terrorism desks look like 

after the NCTC is operational? 

Mr. BRENNAN. One of the things that’s important to keep in mind 

is that the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is not a part of the 

CIA. In fact, we are a stand alone entity. 

Senator SHELBY. It is just housed there? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, in fact, we moved out to a new facility about 

4 weeks ago. 

The responsibilities of TTIC, the NCTC, the CIA, and others in 

the future I think has to be part of a framework. I would argue 

that TTIC or the NCTC has to be the center of gravity on analysis. 

And so that there be a clear understanding of what the NCTC or 

TTIC is responsible for. But what we have to do is to identify the 

35

universe of analytic requirements across the government, and then 

assign responsibility for those different parts of that responsibility, 

just to make sure we understand what the CIA will be doing. And 

so there needs to be a framework that we are all going to be operating under, under some type of centralized orchestration that I 

think the NCTC can provide. 

Senator SHELBY. The USA Patriot Act provided Executive 

Branch agencies more authority, as we all know, to share information and to conduct domestic investigations than heretofore had 

been the case. Mr. Pistole, you are right into this. With the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center, what additional 

authorities if any will be needed to further remove impediments to 

information sharing, if you can envision this? In other words, what 

obstacles do you see or foresee to bridge the gap between foreign 

and domestic intelligence gathering and sharing? 

Mr. PISTOLE. As you mentioned, Senator, the USA Patriot Act 

has done great things for the Intelligence Community, law enforcement community in that respect. The one issue that remains unresolved which we could use your help on is obtaining administrative 

subpoena authority in counterterrorism investigations. We have 

that in drug investigations. We have it in health care fraud investigations. We don’t have that in counterterrorism investigations, 

which is an impediment to the timely collection of documentary information, maybe evidence. So that’s one legislative fix that would 

be beneficial for us. 

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Brennan, what are two of the biggest lessons from your center that would be instructive for the future for 

us to learn as we set up the architecture here? 

Mr. BRENNAN. First of all, how difficult and complicated it is. As 

I said, I’m a long time proponent of reform, and it’s one thing to 

sketch it on a board, it’s another thing actually to implement it on 

a day-to-day basis, and so therefore, it’s very complicated and difficult. 

And second, to make sure that we take into account the entire 

architecture, because what we have found out is that if you move 

something in one part of that architecture, it has impact somewhere else where you may not have even anticipated, so you may 

have to make sure that you understand the totality of what is 

being affected. 

Senator SHELBY. Madam Chairman, I know my time is up. I 

have a number of questions for the record. Could I submit those 

for the record? 

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly, without objection. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to join 

with the others in commending you for this hearing, and Senator 

Lieberman, you working together to bring us all together here. 

Director Brennan, you, in your remarks, state that the President 

called for the creation of this integrated center to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location, which then became 

TTIC, and then you go on to say that: As envisioned by the PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
36

dent, this physical integration of expertise and sharing of information enables and empowers the key organizations involved in the 

fight against terrorism. And then you go on to say that: Fusion and 

synergy will be further enhanced when the CIA’s Counterterrorist 

Center and the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division co-locate with 

TTIC in the coming months. 

When is that going to occur and why has that not yet occurred 

if that physical co-location is such an important part of your effectiveness? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, as you can imagine, trying to bring those 

three entities together, the TTIC, the Counterterrorism Division of 

the FBI, and the Counterterrorism Center from the CIA, requires 

a physical infrastructure in order to accommodate that. We have 

recently moved into this new building, a new facility. We, at TTIC, 

are there in totality. The FBI and the CIA have also started to 

move their individuals into the building. What we are doing is—

the Counterterrorism Division is still going to be responsible for 

the operational activities that the FBI runs. So it’s three parts of 

this building right now that we are moving toward. 

I think what we have to do is look at that in terms of the National Counterterrorism Center and to see whatever type of modifications might need to be made as a result of that. But there’s a 

physical infrastructural requirement whenever you do something 

like this. 

Senator DAYTON. You mean the Federal Government did not 

have a building in West Virginia somewhere, where you could all 

immediately move? [Laughter.] 

Mr. BRENNAN. There are a lot of buildings, sir, but you have to 

make sure it has the connectivity requirements and the Oklahoma 

City Standards, and all sorts of things. 

Senator DAYTON. Director Pistole and Director Mudd, that neither of you in your remarks mentioned this co-location. Is this intended? When will it occur, and is it desirable in fact to occur? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Absolutely, Senator, it is desirable, and we’re in the 

process. It’s simply a matter of the build-out of the different areas. 

The TTIC area was the first to be built out. The Counterterrorism 

Division, we’ve moved in less than 100. We should have that all 

complete by the end of September in terms of all those people from 

Counterterrorism Division are moving out. 

Mr. MUDD. Sir, in terms of the physical location, the issue here 

was simply the setting up of the infrastructure at setup. We started moving a few weeks ago. One of the other issues you should 

take note of is that there isn’t sufficient space there for the entire 

center that I manage, so one of the difficulties we’ll have—but I 

think this is a difficulty we can overcome—is managing in two 

places about three miles apart. But it’s a good idea. We should be 

talking to each other. I think co-location is underrated in terms of 

the importance for cooperation, and we have started moving. 

Senator DAYTON. So if it is important, why was not a space found 

that could allow your entire operation to co-locate? You already 

have overgrown the space or the space is already inadequate for 

the three operations? I do not understand. 

37

Mr. MUDD. I look at this as a first step. I mean, again, we’ve 

spent the last couple years fighting the war. We’re starting to focus 

more on future and infrastructural issues. 

Senator DAYTON. Just talking about finding a space that you 

would move into that would be sufficient from the outset to house 

all three of the operations that are valuable to co-locate, as I understand it correctly. Now you are already saying that there is not 

sufficient space in that site to house your entire operation? 

Mr. MUDD. That’s right. You’re talking about thousands of people 

in an infrastructure that’s quite——

Senator DAYTON. All the better to move everybody at one time 

into one location. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I would just say that there are options 

for expansion there as far as potentially co-locating other elements. 

Senator DAYTON. Why would you move into a space that is not 

adequate to begin with? 

Mr. BRENNAN. We needed to move very quickly into a place that 

had the——

Senator DAYTON. Fifteen months. 

Mr. BRENNAN. There were the options in fact to build out there. 

Senator DAYTON. It seems to me this is sort of endemic in government, and you talk about the need to move swiftly in these matters and not to move precipitously, but then to move and not even 

from the outset be moving into space that is adequate to bring 

these three entities which were supposed to be co-located according 

to the purpose of TTIC, starting presumably from the outset, or as 

close to it, and now we are 15 months later, and two of the entities 

have not moved in yet, and one of the entities is not even going 

to be able to move in its entirety because there is not enough space 

in the space that you are moving into. I just think that is more—

very counter-productive I would say. 

We have 15 different agencies, entities that are, we’re told, involved in intelligence gathering operations. Are there any of those 

15 that in your respective judgments could be consolidate or 

merged? 

General HUGHES. I think that the roles and functions can, and 

indeed the National Counterterrorism Center would be a reflection 

of that to some degree. But the departmental requirements and the 

operational requirements at the organizational level still have to be 

accounted for by some reflection of an organizational entity in 

those departments for intelligence. So I have thought a lot about 

that over the years, and I think we’re pretty much stuck with the 

kind of idea that each organization needs an intelligence entity of 

their own that is immediately accessible to them. 

Senator DAYTON. Any of the other three of you care to suggest 

a consolidation or a merger of an entity or agency? 

Mr. MUDD. I am not sure I have a suggestion on the consolidation part. I would say looking at CIA capabilities that a lot of these 

are set up by specific authorities from the President and via statute. So one of the things I would have to consider in looking at that 

and one of the things that is specific to all the agencies we manage 

is that we do have specific responsibilities by law, including, for example, in my agency covert action. So if you just say, CIA, go someplace else, I would say there are some significant legal issues to 

38

consider aside from all the cultural and other issues. So that is all 

the comment I would have. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would say intelligence reform transformation 

should take into account the broad array of intelligence agencies 

that are out there, and I think one of the worthwhile things to do 

is to take a look and see whether or not there can be structural 

reforms made, because over the years the development and the 

building of different intelligence capabilities needs to make sure 

that it fits into part of a broader architecture. And so I would say 

that it is a worthwhile review that needs to be looked at. 

Senator DAYTON. Who is going to be able to advise us on that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I think there are going to be discussions as 

they move forward with the National Intelligence Director that is 

going to take a look at the broad array of those intelligence agencies that would fall under that person’s responsibility. 

Senator DAYTON. But you are not prepared today to recommend 

any specifically that could be merged or consolidated of the 15 

agencies? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I am trying to run TTIC today and prepare for the 

NCTC. 

Senator DAYTON. All right. It seems that this is one of the dilemmas that we encounter, that if we have these entities and they are 

all going to remain separate and disparate, then we are going to 

have to put another layer of coordination on top of the other layers 

of coordination. That is exactly the problem that we run into. As 

has been said earlier, no one is in charge and no one is, therefore, 

ultimately accountable. And it seems that the President’s proposal, 

without budget control or personnel control, is going to be subjected 

to pretty much the same outcome in terms of the coordination. 

Let me just ask, and maybe it parallels what Senator Shelby just 

said, but if we could set aside the Commission’s report, set aside 

the President’s response, what today, if anything, needs to be improved? And what is not working that should, or what should our 

end goal be if we make any changes in the status quo? I will leave 

that to the four of you. Is it working well enough now that we 

should, aside from all the publicity and attention and everything 

else, just let you continue to operate it the way it is today? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I think it is certainly moving in the right 

direction. I think the more fusion of capability and the more integration of capability that we can apply against the targets and the 

mission of the U.S. Government’s Intelligence Community, the better off we are going to be. That fusion integration has to take place 

close to the mission. We have tremendous capability within the 

U.S. Government across all of the different collection agencies and 

analytic agencies. What we want to make sure is that we put together a framework that really maximizes and leverages those capabilities. And so that fusion and integration against that effort is 

really going to be able to be a very strong force multiplier for us, 

and a National Counterterrorism Center is a way to try to bring 

it together as close to the target as possible. 

Senator DAYTON. General Hughes. 

General HUGHES. I would like to use one word that I think probably would solve a lot of the issues we have talked about and perhaps some that remain. We ought to strive for greater interoperVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
39

1The article appears in the Appendix on page 111. 

ability among us. These disparate organizations have been brought 

together a great deal now by improved communications and automation, and I think I agree with John Brennan that we are on the 

right track. But that goal should remain foremost in our mind to 

make us all interoperable so we do not have different policies, we 

do not have different capabilities that are somehow disparate and 

not integrated in some way. And that should be our collective goal, 

in my view. 

Senator DAYTON. My time is up, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I join the 

others here who commend you for the haste with which you bring 

attention to this matter. And it is for me something that Senator 

Specter said in his recall of the process was a valuable introduction, I think, into the discourse and the planning. 

I don’t think that we ought to create any images out there in the 

countryside that suggest that we are going to be able to deliver this 

complicated package in short order. We are not going to find the 

cookie cutter answer to our problems and say, hey, listen, this 

would do it. 

There are fundamental questions that have not even been asked, 

like: Where are we going to get the people with the language capacity? America has never been a place where languages have been in 

the forefront of education, multi-language training. Even as you 

search for people to fill these positions that we are going to need, 

we are competing with the structure across this country, whether 

it be in the municipalities or the States or places like the port authorities that exist around the country, the regional aviation authorities, all these people searching, all these organizations searching for qualified people, competing with the needs that we will 

have if we restructure this. 

I am not for delay, but I am for thoroughness, I must say. I think 

that it is fair to say that we have had operations that have been 

meaningful, improving our security as we have gone along in these 

last 3 years, what we experienced on September 11 was such a 

milestone in the way we view things. And I make no excuses for 

lack of action on data. It crossed two Presidents’ tenures, etc. But 

to suddenly think that, well, retroactively if we had only pushed 

Button A, Button B, called this one or called that one, we might 

have prevented this. The madness of people who were hijacking 

airplanes, willing to commit suicide, it was unheard of. It was almost the equivalent of the dropping of the A-bomb. It was never 

conceived before in mankind, and it changed the world’s thinking. 

And I look today at an op-ed piece that was written by a colleague of ours, by Chuck Hagel, that appeared in The Washington 

Post. And, Madam Chairman, I want to introduce this statement 

of Senator Hagel’s into the record.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And I will take a little moment to excerpt 

some things from what he said: ‘‘But if we allow the current naVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
40

tional consensus for intelligence reform to become a tool in the partisan rancor of Presidential politics, we risk doing enormous damage to our Intelligence Community. We must not allow false urgency dictated by the political calendar to overtake the need for serious reform.’’

And he goes on to say, ‘‘A mistaken impression has developed 

that since September 11, 2001, little has been done to improve our 

intelligence capabilities.’’ That is not true. He said, ‘‘We are unquestionably a safer Nation than we were 3 years ago—even as the 

intensity to hurt us increases all over the world.’’

So I think that when Senator Specter talked about the process, 

we cannot ignore it, and we cannot just lay the blame on bureaucratic turfdom. That is, in my view, about the weakest thing that 

we could say. People who head these organizations are conscientious leaders. They do not want to see any Americans killed 

through neglect or oversight. 

And so we should not jump into this thing without realizing that, 

listen, we have got a huge problem on our hands. We have the 

prospect of a new government coming in in January. I am not talking about party. I am talking about just a change in government. 

And you cannot ignore what changes that might bring. Will President Bush rethink some of the things that he has been unwilling 

to do now, that is, to allow budgetary authority with the new Director of Counterintelligence? Or should we consider the fact that 

maybe like the Federal Reserve Bank, a professional executive 

order be brought in not subject to the change in administration, 

but to have a term of office. I have advocated that for a long time 

for the FAA. Give ourselves a chance to work out the long-term 

projects. 

The understanding that the data upon which this last alert was 

presented is kind of old information. And what does that say? And 

what do we want to accomplish, I ask you in your thinking, when 

we put out an alert like that? Would we want to shut down the financial center of the world on the basis of the data that we have 

acquired? Or should we simply move the mechanism into place to 

protect people, and without sending out these warnings that you 

cannot go here, you cannot go there? 

I got calls in my office in New Jersey because a building in Newark was identified as a possible target. ‘‘Should I go to work today? 

I have an appointment with my child to go to the doctor.’’ People 

are worried sick. And we add to the frenzy, we add to the anxiety. 

But, frankly, I do not think that we add much to the security, to 

the prospect that we would want to tell people not to go to downtown Manhattan where the financial center of the world exists and 

operates and is essential to the well-being of all of us, not just because of the financial consequences but because of the living consequences that take place. 

And so I ask, Should we be looking at a fixed term for a Director 

of the National Intelligence? Is that something that has ever occurred to any of you? Does anybody want to comment on that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I can comment, Senator, from the FBI’s perspective 

of having a Director with a 10-year fixed term, and there is obviously a benefit of that from the perspective of independence of administration, in terms of policies, procedures. There is obviously a 

41

downside depending on which way you look at it. But from the 

FBI’s perspective, where we strive to be independent in what we 

do, having a Director with a fixed term of 10 years, that transcends 

administrations, is a benefit. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Anybody disagree with that? Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. My only thought on this is, first of all, sir, I don’t 

have strong views on the term. I do believe that whoever serves 

must have the confidence of the President, and I think it is important to ensure a mechanism, however that mechanism works, to 

give the President the authority to appoint someone who he is comfortable working with. 

The only other thing I would say is, having watched Director 

Tenet over time sacrifice his family, sacrifice his time, I do not 

think 10 years is something you could reasonably expect a DCI to 

do. It is not possible. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Would you at all be concerned about the 

possibility that a President could influence decisions that might redound to his either personal philosophy or political campaigns or 

things of that nature? Would you suggest that this person who 

would head the national organization be situated right in the 

White House as they gather data from across the world and confer 

exclusively with the President’s chief person? Or should there be 

some other means of review? Should the Congress be included in 

a way that is direct and readily available? 

Mr. MUDD. Senator, I do not believe that the individual should 

sit in the White House, and I think the President made the right 

decision in that regard. We have a community that has spent many 

decades trying to build a tradition that says we should provide unvarnished and unbiased information to the President. And I think 

it is good to keep some air gap between the White House and the 

National Intelligence Director. And as I said, I think the President 

made the right decision in that regard. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Anybody else? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I fully agree. I do not think the National Intelligence Director should be in the Executive Office of the President. 

There needs to be some independence and separation there. 

General HUGHES. I certainly share that view, and one of the hallmarks of this community has been to be, maybe sometimes 

irritatingly so, independent. We ought to be able to tell the truth, 

unvarnished and unbiased. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. These questions seem rather elementary 

in their focus, but put them all together, they spell enormous complication. And the other thing that I would ask in closing is that 

when we look at distribution of resources, we look at the risk in 

the areas that we are evaluating in terms of funding. We have not 

been able to do that so far. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

A lot of questions have been asked by a lot of Senators already. 

I recall a comment that Senator Specter made earlier in his remarks. He led off by quoting Mo Udall, who is one of my favorite 

people. And I did not realize that it was Mo Udall who said—what 

42

did he say? ‘‘All the questions have been asked but not everybody 

has asked them.’’

I heard another Mo Udall quote last week. A bunch of people had 

gathered at a fundraiser, and he said, ‘‘There is good news and bad 

news.’’ He said, ‘‘The good news is we have all the money we need 

in the campaign. The bad news it is in your pockets.’’ [Laughter.] 

I think the good news here is a lot of good ideas are in your 

minds, and in the minds of those who testified last Friday and 

those who are going to testify after you here today. And part of our 

job is to get that good information not out of your pockets but out 

of your minds and into our own, to a way where we can take that 

information and turn it into a legislative form. 

I find value in a panel like this, and particularly with the panelists to follow, to help me develop a consensus about what is the 

right path to follow. And we have diverse points of view. People 

have thought about this, worked a lot in these fields. There are 

going to be some areas where you are going to agree and some that 

you will disagree. But what I really look for is for areas of consensus. 

When you look at the 9/11 panel’s recommendations—the parts 

where you think they got it right and the parts where you think 

they got it wrong—which recommendations do you think we should 

ignore? 

I think I will start off with you, Mr. Mudd, and then we will ask 

General Hughes and Mr. Pistole and others. Thank you. 

Mr. MUDD. I guess what I would do generally as we sort of start 

down this road is to think about questions I would ask generally 

and questions that I thought through as I stepped through this. I 

will try not to be tactical. I will try to be strategic. There are two 

questions, and I think they have been raised, to quote Mo Udall, 

‘‘have been raised before.’’

The first question, of course, that has been debated heavily is the 

question of authorities, the difference between a National Intelligence Director who directs and a National Intelligence Director 

who coordinates. I think that is a critical question that I am sure 

this Committee and others will be considering. 

The second question, obviously, relates to how exactly you structure the National Counterterrorist Center. Do you structure an organization that coordinates? Do you structure, as someone suggested earlier, an organization that controls everything? I would 

argue for an organization that coordinates myself, but there is 

clearly room for debate here. 

Those are the two fundamentals. There are some lesser issues 

here, but since those are the strategic issues of the day, that is how 

I think about it. 

General HUGHES. I think the Mo Udall quote went something 

like that everything has been said, it just has not been said by everyone. And in this case, when you ask a complicated question, in 

a short period of time you want a simple answer. It just does not 

work. 

Some of the ideas and some of the thoughts and the Commission’s work, which I think is wonderful—I really do. I give them 

tremendous credit, and I think it was great work and will serve the 

Nation very well. But it is complicated, and it takes some time and 

43

some care to get it right. And I would just like to echo things that 

have been said here before by Members and by members of the 

panel here, and, that is, some of this should be thought through 

very well. 

Kind of on the tail end of your question here, what we should not 

do, I would kind of like to answer it in a positive way, if I can. 

Form ever follows function has been a reasonable piece of wisdom 

that has proven through the test of time to be worth considering. 

If we make the form, we might change some of the functions, and 

so I would like to just ask for everyone to consider the possibility 

that some of these functions are not well understood yet, and some 

of the ideas behind the structure have not yet been completely 

formed or understood, and they should be before we put the form 

in place. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, General Hughes. 

Mr. PISTOLE. Senator, I think that the one recommendation that 

I would give is to be precise, and by that I mean be precise in what 

the language is, what is developed from that, because I think one 

of the things that we have all experienced in this post-September 

11 environment is that ambiguity creates voids or problems that 

we all try to solve, and in doing that we probably do not work as 

efficiently as we should as a U.S. Government, writ large. And so 

anything you can do in terms—whether it is budgetary issues, authority issues, whatever that may be, the more precision you can 

have in delineating responsibilities and authorities, the better we 

will be able to carry out those responsibilities in a clear, coordinated fashion. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I think the 9/11 Commission got it right 

at the 100,000-foot level in terms of what they called for. In each 

of the recommendations, it points out what should happen. 

‘‘Should’’ is a very powerful word, but with ‘‘should’’ comes a number of questions about how it should happen. All people should live 

in harmony. How are we going to actually accomplish that? 

So a lot of the ‘‘should’s’’ here I think are right in terms of the 

end state and the objective. But like Mr. Pistole said, there is a lot 

of precision that is required as far as how do you get to that 

‘‘should’’ end state. And this, for all of its scholarship, it really just 

skims the surface of a lot of these very important and complicated 

issues. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Pistole, let me ask you a question. This 

would, I think, just be for you, and the issue deals with dual 

hatting. Under the Commission’s proposals, as I recall, there are 

three deputies the new National Intelligence Director would operate through. They would also be deputies in their home agencies. 

Now, some have suggested that this just is not workable, and 

people in key positions like these deputies cannot answer to two 

bosses. I think it was the former CIA Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch who said—if I remember the quote 

so I get this right, ‘‘Requiring the National Intelligence Director to 

function through three double-hatted deputies who would simultaneously be running their own agencies would sharply limit his executive authority. The National Intelligence Director could become 

no more relevant than the drug czar.’’

44

Now, as someone who is involved in running your own operation 

within the FBI and also for participating in the joint venture of the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center, could you just please comment 

for us on how workable or really how desirable you think the structure proposed by the 9/11 Commission is with its double-hatted 

deputies? 

Mr. PISTOLE. Yes, Senator, and, again, just to clarify, it would be 

my colleague, Maureen Baginski, who is the Executive Assistant 

Director for Intelligence, who is envisioned for one of those three 

deputy positions, with the possibility of a fourth deputy, the Under 

Secretary for Homeland Security for Information, IAIP. That is one 

of the challenges where that precision becomes, I think, very 

important because if that person and the three deputies or four 

deputies are expected to have a full-time job of running their own 

agencies’ operations and still have a full-time job of reporting to the 

Director of National Intelligence, that is problematic. 

There is obviously the responsibility of reporting and informing 

which could be done through the mechanism that they have set up, 

but I think the challenge will be in the details of what is envisioned by that deputy position. What does the 9/11 Commission 

recommend in terms of that responsibility? So I think you have hit 

a good topic on the head there. 

Senator CARPER. Well, my last question for each of you, and I 

would ask for just a brief answer. A lot of questions have been 

asked of you. More are going to be asked later today and in the 

weeks to come in this room. 

Give me a question that we have not asked you today that we 

should have. Give me a question that we have not asked today that 

we should have asked. 

Mr. PISTOLE. If I could just start, that is something that most 

FBI agents ask at the end of an interview of somebody, so that is 

a good approach. But I will defer to my colleagues. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Brennan, give me a question we should 

have asked that we have not? 

Mr. BRENNAN. ‘‘Are the recommendations of 9/11 workable? Are 

they doable in totality?’’ I don’t think they are. I don’t think we 

would do a service to this Nation if we took these as they are stated and ran with them with haste. I just don’t think that there is 

sufficient engineering, design, and consideration of all the complexities here. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. I would disagree somewhat because I think the 

Commission’s recommendations are a blueprint. The question is in 

the details of implementing. 

Senator CARPER. General Hughes. 

General HUGHES. A similar answer. I would pose the question 

like this: Have we considered carefully the facts that we can understand and the unintended consequences and the possibilities before 

we act? Because this is vitally important to our security. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Mudd, give me one question? 

Mr. MUDD. ‘‘What are the things we have learned from September 11?’’

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you all, and thank you for your 

service to our country. 

45

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Notice I was the only person on 

the Committee who has not praised you for holding these hearings 

during the middle of our——

Chairman COLLINS. And I will remember that. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Well, I will see you—what is it? The 16th? 

Chairman COLLINS. Yes, you have a chance to redeem yourself. 

Senator CARPER. I will try. 

Mr. MUDD. I would like to point out, Senator, the panelists also 

have not praised the Chairman, but we will not—— [Laughter.] 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, let me begin by heaping 

praise on you and Senator Lieberman for calling these hearings. I 

want to make up for Senator Carper’s faux pas. [Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. It is not the first time he has done that for me. 

Senator LEVIN. We created TTIC in order to fuse intelligence so 

that we would have it all coming, relative to foreign intelligence, 

to one place and we could make an assessment, that we would 

avoid the problems that we had on September 11 where information that one agency had fell through the cracks, was not shared 

with other agencies. Indeed, in some cases it was not even shared 

within its own agency in the case of the FBI particularly. 

Now that we have the TTIC in place. What are the shortcomings 

in TTIC that the new Counterterrorist Center would make up for? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The overall framework that we have talked about 

before——

Senator LEVIN. That is too general. I want to get to Mr. Pistole’s 

point. Give me real specifically, what do you not have that you 

need? 

Mr. BRENNAN. We do not have right now the sufficient number 

of analyst managers in order to carry out that primary responsibility for terrorism analysis in the U.S. Government. 

Senator LEVIN. Then you ought to get them. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. And we are in the process of getting them 

now. 

Senator LEVIN. Fine. Now you have them. Now, is there anything 

that you need that you do not have besides analysts? Because the 

new Counterterrorist Center will have the exact same problem. 

They have got to get analysts, too. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. Other than that issue, which is an issue for any 

center that is going to fuse information, what do you not have now 

that you need, specifically? 

Mr. BRENNAN. For the TTIC build-out or for the National 

Counterterrorism Center concept? 

Senator LEVIN. To fuse all intelligence, to give us intelligence assessments of foreign terrorists that fuse all of the information from 

all of the sources. 

Mr. BRENNAN. We are on the path to getting all the technology 

we need to bring together that architecture so we can do those federated searches and connect the dots. That is a process——

Senator LEVIN. You are on that path? 

Mr. BRENNAN. We are on that path. 

46

Senator LEVIN. Will this speed it up if we create a new center? 

Mr. BRENNAN. It will enable it, I believe, as recognition that it 

is the center of gravity within the U.S. Government on this. 

Senator LEVIN. Will it speed up the gaining of technology? Will 

we get it faster if we create a new center? 

Mr. BRENNAN. If we are going to be talking about a new center 

that is going to have, in fact, more partners involved in it, because 

there are five partners in TTIC. But if we are actually going to extend it with a National Counterterrorism Center, one of the things 

we are trying to do is to identify the universe of information that 

is out there that has any relevance to terrorism. 

Senator LEVIN. Is there any reason you cannot extend the TTIC 

to include those other elements? 

Mr. BRENNAN. We are in the process of doing that right now. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Other than what you are in the process 

of doing, what are we going to accomplish by creating the NCTC? 

Mr. BRENNAN. OK, well, that is then a different issue, which is 

putting into this construct then this joint operational planning and 

responsibility and orchestration. That is the major difference between TTIC now and this. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. That is the operational piece. I am not talking about that. I am talking about in terms of assessing information and intelligence to give us one assessment from all sources of 

all intelligence related to foreign terrorism. The assessment side, 

that is what I am focusing on, because that is where the major failures were. The major failures were assessments, information that 

did not get to where it had to go, information which was ignored, 

information which was not shared. On the information side, on the 

assessment side, is there anything that this new center is going to 

do other than hopefully have more analysts, which you can get, 

other than adding elements of sources of information, which you 

are in the process of getting, is there anything that it is going to 

add on the assessment side to what TTIC is doing or in the process 

of doing? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Analysis has many different aspects to it. It is not 

just doing assessments. Those are the finished products that go 

out. It is also empowering the analytical capability that is going to 

empower the operational activities. So, again, part of an overall 

framework that is going to make sure that the National Counterterrorism Center is hooked up and provides the information and 

establishes the sharing mechanisms, because information sharing 

is a very complicated issue, to make sure that a very sensitive 

piece of information that the CIA collects is able to get to the Department of Homeland Security and then beyond to the Federal 

and State level. 

Senator LEVIN. You cannot do that now? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right now, we are, again, on that path. It is a 

build-up in 14 months. 

Senator LEVIN. When you get to where you are going, will you 

be able to do the same thing that the NCTC can do? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Without the operational function. I think that is 

what is envisioned. 

Senator LEVIN. Exactly right. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

47

Senator LEVIN. Putting aside operational function. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. I think that was the plan, to keep moving 

forward with the TTIC model. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. So putting aside the operational side, in 

terms of accumulating, giving assessments and giving estimates, 

you can do the same thing on the path you are on when you reach 

that goal as the projected NCTC can do? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That is exactly right as far as what our analytic 

capability is going to be able to allow us to——

Senator LEVIN. So it is the operational issue which is the key 

question, whether we want to add that to the—or have that exist 

in the NCTC. 

Now, very quickly, if you can, each of you tell us, what are the—

putting aside the issue of you do not want this new entity to go 

into the Executive Office of the President. You have all said that. 

What are the two top differences between your individual views 

and what the 9/11 Commission has recommended? General 

Hughes, let me start with you. 

Just, specifically, quickly, the two differences that you have with 

the 9/11 Commission, other than you would not put this new entity, if we create it, in the Executive Office of the President. 

General HUGHES. Well, the 9/11 Commission is a broad treatment of many problems that now require details to put into effect, 

and those details are not yet present in common understanding. 

That is one. 

Senator LEVIN. That is not one. I am talking about specific recommendations that you disagree with, other than the Executive Office of the President issue. There are a lot of recommendations. 

General HUGHES. Sure. I will give you—I can only give you one. 

Senator LEVIN. That is good. I will settle for one quick one. 

General HUGHES. The three deputies should not be three, if we 

have deputies, and that’s a question we have to discuss. There 

should be four. We are quite different from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. You want four deputies instead of 

three. Should they be dual-hatted? 

General HUGHES. A very complex issue for me. I, personally——

Senator LEVIN. Is that a yes or no? 

General HUGHES. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. The specific structure laid out on—I think it is Page 

413—I agree with Mr. Brennan, I do not believe that National Intelligence Director structure is workable. 

Senator LEVIN. You do not believe what is workable? 

Mr. MUDD. That the structure that is laid out on the diagram on 

Page 413——

Senator LEVIN. And what specifically is not workable? 

Mr. MUDD. It is too diffuse an effort, and I am not sure I buy 

the dual-hatted piece myself. 

Second, if there is a vision that every element of everything we 

should do should be consolidated in one center, and I am not sure 

that this actually advocates that, I would not support that. 

Finally, and very specific, there is a paramilitary recommendation in here that I do not believe we should pursue. 

48

Senator LEVIN. Which is to put all of the paramilitary activity 

into the Department of Defense. 

Mr. MUDD. That is correct, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. PISTOLE. The one that I would question is on the dualhatting of the deputies and question——

Senator LEVIN. Is there a second one besides that? 

Mr. PISTOLE. That is the major one, no. 

Senator LEVIN. And do you agree that the Executive Office of the 

President should not be the place where this is located? 

Mr. PISTOLE. I think that is a policy matter that I don’t have a 

strong opinion on. 

Senator LEVIN. You were the only one that did not give your 

opinion on that one. 

Mr. Brennan, in addition to what you have already said, because 

you have been very clear about it, specifically, two recommendations that you disagree with. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Again, the structure, I do not think it will work. 

There are issues about the CIA, in terms of what you want the CIA 

to do, and I think that is a very legitimate issue that has not been 

addressed here. They still have all sorts of analyses and clandestine services under the CIA, but they have taken out paramilitary, 

and I think the CIA should get back to its roots, in terms of clandestine operations activities, espionage, covert action, and that 

should be the focus, and that should be the real sort of driver of 

that U.S. activity. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you all agree that TTIC right now has the primary responsibility for terrorism analysis, except information relating solely to purely domestic terrorism? Do you all agree with that? 

[Witnesses nodding yes.] 

Senator LEVIN. By the way, I am glad that is clear because Senator Collins, Chairman Collins and I spent a year trying to get that 

statement, as to who has primary responsibility for terrorism analysis. It took one year for all of the agencies to get that in writing. 

We are not moving quickly enough, folks, if it takes a year, when 

we are in the middle of a war, for four agencies to agree on who 

has primary responsibility for intelligence analysis. 

The intel assessments—I guess this is my last question—which 

are now done, the assessments and analyses which are now done 

by TTIC, Mr. Brennan, where do they go from you? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Depending on what they address, they go many 

different places. There are many different constituencies that are 

out there for the receipt of those assessments. What we do is make 

sure that we have a robust dissemination system, and what we in 

fact have now is something called TTIC On-line, which is a top secret website that gets out to people. 

Senator LEVIN. Do they all go first to the DCI? 

Mr. BRENNAN. They go simultaneously to hundreds and thousands of people. 

Senator LEVIN. But does the DCI have a role in those assessments and in those analyses before you conclude them? 

Mr. BRENNAN. No. TTIC has the final review authority and release authority for those assessments. 

49

Senator LEVIN. And so the Director of the CIA and the DCI does 

not influence—well, it could influence—but it does not have any 

role directing, deciding what goes in those analyses now and those 

assessments. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Since TTIC has stood up, never has there been an 

assessment that has had to go through the DCI. 

Senator LEVIN. And you understand that would be the same with 

the NCTC or do you not know what that would be? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That is my understanding as well that the head 

of the NCTC would have that final release authority. 

Senator LEVIN. Release, but would have no role in terms of the 

assessment or in terms of the analysis. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, the analysis——

Senator LEVIN. I am looking for independence. We did not have 

independence. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Exactly. We want to make sure, especially in 

NCTC, that analytic independence is maintained separate from operations and policy considerations, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. And separate from the National Director? 

Mr. BRENNAN. As far as the National Director has oversight over 

the entire system, but I think there needs to be, from the part of 

the NCTC head, that analytic, integrity and independence that is 

going to put things out. And that is the way it is right now, and 

I expect it to be that way in the future. 

Senator LEVIN. Thanks. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank our witnesses on this panel. You have been extremely candid in your assessment and in responding to our questions. We appreciate your service. We will be in touch as we continue this investigation or examination. 

Yes, Senator Lieberman? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I just want to add a final word of thanks, 

join Senator Collins in doing that, and to say I was very taken with 

the fact that, in the first go-around, about what you are most lacking, each of you said adequately trained personnel. And we have 

got to figure out how to help you create, in some sense, a marketing campaign like the old ‘‘Uncle Sam Needs You’’ because intelligence is the front line of the war on terrorism. 

And I just believe there is a generation of Americans out there 

who would respond to that call to duty if we frame it in the right 

way. And I hope you will think about that, and you will ask us, 

and your respective agency heads will come back to us and ask us 

for the money to fund that because that is critical. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. Just one comment. We can recruit them, we can train 

them, we just need to have the flexibility with you to get enough 

of them. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. I have just one observation. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

I think in all major legislation initiatives, there will always be 

winners and losers. The details will come from the architecture 

coming out of this Committee, and it will spell it out. I think we 

need to be very careful as we approach this not to weaken or perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
50

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Zelikow and Mr. Kojm appears in the Appendix on page 

96. 

haps begin the dismantling of the CIA because I think that is very 

important because the CIA does things for us other than just dealing with counterterrorism, which is very important. 

And I think, Madam Chairman, as we move along here, we better be very careful in that regard. 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, will the record be kept open 

for all of us for questions? 

Chairman COLLINS. It will, indeed. We have another panel, just 

so that people understand that, and the record is going to remain 

open for 5 days for additional questions of these witnesses, as well 

as our second panel. 

Again, I thank you very much for your testimony this morning, 

and I call forward the second panel of witnesses. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will be in order. 

We will now hear from two individuals who, as the lead staff 

members of the 9/11 Commission, have devoted the last year and 

a half to understanding the events that led up to the September 

11 attacks and our Nation’s antiterrorism preparedness and response. 

Philip Zelikow is the Executive Director of the Commission. He 

also is director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs and is a professor of history at the University of Virginia. 

Christopher Kojm is the Deputy Executive Director of the 9/11 

Commission. He is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Policy at the State Department and served as a senior staff 

member on foreign policy for Representative Lee Hamilton, the 

Vice Chair of the Commission. 

We welcome you here today. We very much appreciate the extraordinary public service that you have rendered over the past 

year and a half, and we look forward to your statement. 

Mr. Zelikow, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP ZELIKOW,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 

UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY CHRISTOPHER A. 

KOJM,1 DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting us to appear. 

This Committee is preparing recommendations to the Senate for 

government reorganization, especially for counterterrorism and intelligence. You have already heard from our chair and vice chair. 

They summarized the Commission’s recommendations. 

We are here to follow up on specifics, specifics about the recommendations, specifics about why the Commission made certain 

choices and specific responses to some of the concerns that have 

been voiced, but before plunging into details, we urge you to keep 

the big picture in view. 

The Commission made recommendations about what to do, a 

global strategy and how to do it, reorganizing the government. 

51

Today, we do not have a government capable of implementing the 

global strategy we recommend. 

Confronting a 21st Century set of threats, we recommended a 

21st Century set of strategies, and we were compelled to look at 

a 21st Century approach to government. These are not just catch 

phrases. The Commissioners brought vast accumulated experience 

in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. I 

have worked in every level of government—Federal, State and 

local—and either for or with almost every national security agency 

we have. Chris Kojm spent 14 years on the Hill and over 4 years 

more as the State Department’s representative to the Intelligence 

Community. 

We are practical people, but with our Commissioners, we had to 

think globally, across the world and across America’s Governments, 

from a firebase near Kandahar to a firehouse in Lower Manhattan. 

We had to think in time charting the way our government has performed yesterday, today, and tomorrow, and we had an exceptional 

opportunity to research, reason, consult, and decide what it all 

meant. 

Returning to that big picture, let us focus for a moment on two 

of our five main organizational recommendations for counterterrorism and for intelligence. 

Counterterrorism. The Executive Branch of our government is organized in accordance with the best management principles of 

1950. We have large, vertically integrated industrial-sized behemoths. What, therefore, happens is that each of the agencies does 

its job and then tries to get others to cooperate and vice versa. If 

they need a lot of help from other agencies, they create their own 

interagency processes. 

The CIA, for instance, runs an interagency meeting at 5 o’clock 

almost every day to enlist help in working on the daily threats. But 

that is only the best-known example. Analogous meetings occur in 

meetings run by the FBI, by the Military Central Command, by the 

Military Special Operations Command and so on. 

As for intelligence, each major agency tries to build its own Fusion Center. This was the basic pattern before September 11. Take, 

for example, the Moussaoui case. Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001 because of his suspicious behavior at a Minnesota flight 

school. The FBI in Minneapolis took charge of the case, worked it 

hard, and ran into frustrating problems in pursuing the investigation. 

None of the senior managers at the FBI heard about the case or 

these problems, but good news—the arrest was brought to the attention of the top official at the CIA. DCI Tenet was told about the 

case in late August. ‘‘Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly’’ was the 

heading on his briefing. 

We asked him—I asked him—what he did about that. His answer was that he made sure his working-level officials were helping 

the FBI with their case. 

‘‘Did he raise it with the President or with other Agency counterparts even at the FBI?’’

‘‘No,’’ he answered, ‘‘with some heat. After all, it was,’’ he insisted, ‘‘the FBI’s case.’’

52

There is one example of the pattern—vertical integration, even 

a willingness to cooperate, but no joint analysis, not joint planning, 

no connection of the case to the national intelligence picture of imminent attack, no involvement by the White House. No one there 

even learned about the case until after the September 11 attacks. 

Other illustrations can be found in the report, especially in Chapter 

11 and Chapter 8. 

Since September 11, we saw evidence of an enormous expansion 

of effort with more numerous and stronger participants, including 

three unified commands in the Defense Department and an entirely new Cabinet Department working in the same outdated, redundant and fragmented system, producing energetic, often effective, but disjointed analysis and action managed by constant improvisation led by a greatly 50-percent enlarged White House staff 

and proliferating interagency working cells around the government. 

Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old ways 

of Executive management in our national security bureaucracy, 

counterterrorism requires an innovative response. 

Mr. KOJM. One source of inspiration for us was in national defense. During World War II, the United States created a joint staff 

that works for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Plans and 

operations were still mainly formulated by the different services—

the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—but the Joint Staff tried 

to coordinate their efforts. Experience showed this coordination was 

not good enough. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

of 1986, the structure has changed again. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff became 

much stronger. The Joint Staff developed joint analysis and joint 

planning for joint action. Then, those plans were directed and executed by combatant commanders or the military departments. The 

military processes are far from perfect, but few, if any, commanders would prefer to go back to the old model. 

Our recommendation calls for a National Counterterrorism Center. The Director of the NCTC should be the President’s principal 

adviser on counterterrorism, intelligence and joint operations. 

The NCTC Directorate of Intelligence—its ‘‘J–2’’—should have 

primary responsibility in the U.S. Government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of intelligence, 

whether collected inside or outside of the United States. It should 

be the reference source for all source information about suspected 

terrorists, their organizations, and their likely capabilities. It 

should propose relevant intelligence collection requirements for action by national and departmental agencies inside and outside of 

the United States. It should have primary responsibility in the U.S. 

Government for net assessment and warning about the terrorism 

danger, comparing enemy capabilities with assessed national 

vulnerabilities. 

The NCTC Directorate of Operations—or the ‘‘J–3’’ in military 

parlance—should have primary responsibility for providing guidance and plans, including strategic plans for joint counterterrorism 

operations by the U.S. Government. The NCTC would not break 

the formal chain of command for Executive agencies, just as the 

Joint Staff today is not part of the formal chain of command beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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tween the President, the Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders. 

If the heads of Executive departments disagree with the joint 

plan, then the NCTC should accede or take responsibility for elevating the issue to the National Security Council and the President 

in order to obtain needed decisions. The NCTC should have substantial overall responsibility and accountability. It must track 

cases, monitor the implementation of plans and update those plans 

to adapt to changing circumstances inside and outside of the 

United States. 

Organization of national intelligence. The present organization of 

national intelligence embodies the same management weaknesses 

we identified in counterterrorism, but on a much larger scale and 

touching many other subjects. Our report identified various weaknesses. 

President Bush has acknowledged the need for a National Intelligence Director separate from the head of the CIA. Senator Kerry 

shares this judgment. We hope you will agree. 

Our recommendations flow from several aspects of the September 

11 story. In December 1998, DCI Tenant sent a memo to the senior 

managers of the Intelligence Communities saying they were at war 

against bin Laden and his associates. A maximum effort was 

needed. There was no evident response. We critiqued the DCI’s 

management strategy for this war, but since he would have been 

hard-pressed to implement even an ideal strategy, there was less 

incentive to devise one. 

We view this recommendation as an enabling, empowering idea. 

There are many particular management issues in the Intelligence 

Community: Reallocating money, improving human intelligence, 

improving the quality of all-source analysis and better integrating 

open-source information. These are just a few. Only a modern management structure can enable the Intelligence Community to 

achieve these goals. Only such a structure can achieve the unity of 

effort and efficiency needed where funds are not unlimited and 

hard choices must be made across agency lines. 

In national intelligence, the work is done by a number of agencies, vertically integrated with weak central direction or control. 

The private sector has increasingly turned to other management 

approaches to get lean, horizontal direction across the large operating divisions. This is sometimes called the Matrix Management 

Model. It is employed by firms like Citigroup and General Electric. 

In national defense, two innovations were key. One was the horizontal direction provided by the Joint Staff, the other was the establishment of more powerful unified commands for joint action. 

The military departments had the job of organizing, training and 

equipping the capabilities to be used by these joint commands. 

There are, thus, two lines of authority to the Secretary of Defense; 

one goes to him from the unified combatant commands, such as 

CENTCOM, SOCOM and NORTHCOM. Another goes to him from 

the military departments—Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

Another source of inspiration for us was the emerging view within the CIA in favor of what one manager called ‘‘the integration imperative’’ for working on key targets. Some writers have called for 

the creation of ‘‘joint mission centers,’’ bringing together experts 

54

from several disciplines working together on a common problem 

like terrorism or proliferation. 

Borrowing some of these ideas from the private sector and from 

government, the Commission thus recommended a National Intelligence Director and a different way of organizing the intelligence 

work in the government. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. The National Intelligence Director should be the 

principal intelligence adviser to the President and the National Security Council. Certain authorities must be clear: The Director 

should receive the appropriation for national intelligence. Such appropriations are now made in three programs: The National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, 

and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program all to 

the Secretary of Defense. These programs should be consolidated 

into two—a national intelligence program appropriated to the National Intelligence Director and consisting of the current NFIP and 

probably much of the current JMIP, and a departmental appropriation for systems and capabilities that will only be used by the Department of Defense. 

The overall appropriation should be unclassified, as should the 

top-line appropriation for the principal intelligence agencies. Congress and the American people should be better able to make broad 

judgments about how much money is being spent and to what general purpose. 

The Director should have hire and fire authority over the heads 

of the national intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence 

officers of the Defense Department, the FBI, and the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

The Director should be able to set common standards for interoperability across the Intelligence Community for personnel, in 

part, to facilitate joint assignments, for security, to reduce unnecessary or inadvertent compartmentation and for information technology. 

The National Intelligence Director should have two principal 

lines of authority, both crossing the foreign-domestic divide. The 

first line of authority should extend to National Intelligence Centers organized for joint missions. These centers, the unified commands of the Intelligence Community, should provide all-source 

analysis drawing on experts from a number of agencies. Guided by 

their analytic work, they should be able to propose collection requirements and task assets. Conflicting demands would be resolved 

by the National Intelligence Director. 

The National Intelligence Director’s second line of authority 

should extend to the national intelligence agencies and the departmental entities that should be the capability builders for the Nation’s intelligence. They should hire, organize, train, and equip the 

people and operate the major systems and platforms. 

The CIA would take the lead in foreign intelligence, concentrating on training the best spies and analysts in the world. 

The Defense Department would take the lead in defense intelligence, honing that craft and acquiring and operating key national 

technical systems. 

The Homeland Security Department and the FBI would take the 

lead in homeland intelligence, harnessing the great potential 

55

knowledge accumulated in the new department and fostering, with 

the leadership of the National Intelligence Director, the FBI’s management reforms to improve its performance as an intelligence 

agency. 

In the exercise of the second line of authority, over the capability 

building agencies, we propose that the National Intelligence Director would share authority with the department head who owns and 

operates those capabilities for the Nation. 

These key managers, such as the Director of the CIA, should be 

the NID’s deputies. These shared authorities exist now, of course, 

in the status quo. In the status quo, the balance of authority favors 

departmental direction, not national direction. We propose altering 

that balance. 

The alternative to shared authorities would be to place the capability-building agencies under the authority of a single official, in 

effect, creating a Department of Intelligence. We were not convinced of the need to take that further step. 

One issue that has arisen is the question of whether to place the 

NID or the NCTC in the Executive Office of the President. 

One, we ask you not to lose sight of the overall goal. The authorities of the Director and the organization of intelligence work are 

critical, wherever they reside. 

Two, we recommended the Executive Office of the President because of the need for proximity to the President and the National 

Security Council and because of the centrality of counterterrorism 

in contemporary national security management. 

Three, if not put in the Executive Office of the President, one alternative would be to create a new agency as a home for the NID 

and the NCTC. Lacking any existing institutional base, such an option would require authorities at least as strong as those we have 

proposed or else it would create a bureaucratic fifth wheel that 

would make the present situation even worse. 

Another alternative would be to place the NID and/or the NCTC 

in another existing agency or department, such as the CIA or the 

Defense Department. These alternatives then have their own serious drawbacks, such as the risk of confusing the mainly foreign 

responsibilities of the CIA and the circumscribed domestic responsibilities of the Defense Department, with the broader domestic 

and foreign span of control being exercise by both the NID and the 

NCTC. 

Placing the NID in the Executive Office of the President would 

have little effect on politicization. Those dangers have always arisen from the functions and relationships that go with the job, regardless of where the person sits, whether at Langley, the Pentagon or in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Those dangers should be offset by selecting a person who believes the President is served by rigorous truth-telling and by making the NID and 

NCTC Director fully accountable to Congress. 

To keep the bright line between policy and intelligence, there is 

no substitute for the integrity of the person selected for the job, no 

substitute for probing questions by policymakers, and no substitute 

for rigorous congressional oversight. 

In closing, we wish to caution, as Chairman Kean and Vice Chair 

Hamilton did last Friday, against cosmetic change. Creating a NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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tional Intelligence Director that just superimposes a chief above 

the other chiefs without taking on the fundamental management 

issues we identify is a step that could be worse than useless. 

Also, please do not forget the strategy, the substance at the heart 

of our recommendations. Do not forget, though it may be the work 

of others, the other organizational suggestions we make, especially 

in information sharing and for reshaping the oversight work of the 

Congress. 

Many voices will rightly caution you against undue haste, but 

the Commission did not act with undue haste in developing these 

recommendations, as it built on ideas that, in some cases have 

been debated for more than 20 years. President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall did not act in undue haste 

when they created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cope with weaknesses made evident by war. The Congress and President Truman 

did not act with undue haste in rapidly adopting a National Security Act in 1947 that, among other things, created a Secretary of 

Defense vehemently denounced at the time as an unnecessary bureaucratic layer. 

A rare opportunity has emerged to recover common purpose and 

take common action across partisan lines, even amid a hotly contested election. Such opportunities take the measure of leaders. We 

have been deeply impressed by the readiness of our Nation’s leaders in both parties to step up and call for prompt action. The response of the Congress, of the Senate and House leadership and of 

this Committee has already moved into unprecedented ground. You 

have already stepped beyond what was probable to consider what 

is possible. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony. All of us have 

scheduling pressures this afternoon, but Senator Specter does have 

a plane that he is trying to catch. So I am going to allow him to 

do the first round of questions. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Gentlemen, congratulations on a fine report, and congratulations 

to your colleagues on the staff. We know how much credit is due 

the staff, so we thank you. 

Starting with the issue of double hatting, and taking for example 

the double hat in the Department of Defense, you already have the 

very forceful testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld in opposition. How 

can it really work if you have a national director telling the deputy 

in Defense what to do, and the deputy in Defense has to respond 

to the Secretary, and inevitably there will be a situation where the 

Secretary of Defense will disagree with the National Director, and 

will tell the deputy in Defense what the Secretary wants? How can 

that person really, as the old saying goes, be accountable to two 

masters? Mr. Zelikow. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. The accountability to two masters is a dominant 

feature of the status quo, sir. So right now the Director of the NSA 

has two masters. The Director of the NGA has two masters. And, 

boy, they know it. So the problem is not whether or not you have 

two masters or not, it’s how you weight the power between them. 

We think right now that balance of power is heavily tilted towards departmental priorities to the department that owns their 

budget. And we suggest that balance needs to be altered so that 

57

national priorities are dominant. If there’s a conflict, sir, then that 

needs to be taken to the National Security Council and the President. 

Senator SPECTER. It is very ‘‘problemsome’’ in my opinion to 

structure reorganization, where you are going to have to take the 

problems to the President. He is a pretty busy guy. 

Picking up on the issue of budget, do you think a National Director of intelligence has a chance to be successful, Mr. Kojm, if the 

Director does not control the budget? 

Mr. KOJM. Senator, I think it’s highly problematic at best if he 

does not control the budget to conduct the responsibility we believe 

he needs to conduct. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Zelikow, when we talk about splitting off 

the counterintelligence of the FBI, I think that can be done. You 

have the CIA for foreign intelligence. But when it comes to the Department of Defense and you have the strategic intelligence, how 

do you structure intelligence in the Department of Intelligence 

Agency so that the battlefield issues remain under the control of 

the Secretary of Defense as opposed to the intelligence matters and 

other lines? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. I think, sir, you have to avoid disrupting the operational control of the executive agencies over their line people in 

the field, and we try to avoid doing that. Sir, the problem is this 

is the problem the private sector routinely confronted in the 1960’s 

and 1970’s as they adopted the matrix organization models that are 

now commonplace and have been now for 20 years in most of the 

large multinational corporations. This was actually innovated a lot 

in the aerospace industry in response to Pentagon demands. They 

have to preserve the concept of unity of effort while responding to 

multiple bosses. 

And to the credit of the Department of Defense, they addressed 

this issue very clearly and early in the 1980’s. They have, in effect, 

a joint staff that provides joint plans, but does so without inserting 

the joint staff into the operational chain of command. 

Senator SPECTER. The issue about putting the National Director 

in the Executive Branch in a nonconfirmed position would characteristically not provide for congressional oversight which is a very 

strong recommendation that the 9/11 Commission has made. Would 

it be giving up just too much not to have—and the President has 

come forward with a national director to be confirmed by the Senate, so you are going to have the traditional oversight. How do you 

reconcile the strong 9/11 Commission position on tough oversight 

with the creation of a national director who would not be subject 

to congressional oversight? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. I think we understand the President and the 9/11 

Commission as being in agreement on the issue of Senate confirmation of the National Intelligence Director. What has not yet been 

specified is whether the Director of the National Counterterrorism 

Center also would be Senate confirmed. On that point the Senate 

was silent, and the Commission has not been silent. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Why do you not go ahead? 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

58

I want to follow up on the testimony that we heard earlier today 

from the director of TTIC in response to questions that Senator 

Levin raised, and also in my private conversations with Director 

Brennan. It is evident that he has had difficulties in getting the 

resources, particularly the trained experts that he needs to staff 

the center. What would make the scenario any different when it 

comes to a National Counterterrorism Center? I think the idea of 

a fusion center staffed with our very best experts is the way to go, 

but I know from visiting TTIC that many of the analysts, while 

very hard working and bright, are extremely young and inexperienced. What would be different about the center that would allow 

it to avoid those same problems? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Thank you, Senator. I listened to that panel too, 

very impressive officials, outstanding officials. And they all described that personnel problem, and it was like four doctors all saying the patient has a terrible fever. But then you say yes, and 

what’s causing that fever? I mean, why is it that they’re having 

these personnel problems? And it’s a fundamental issue of supply 

and demand, as demand is outstripping supply. Why is demand 

outstripping supply? It’s because all the vertically integrated bureaucracies have to take first claim on their own, they are creating 

redundant capabilities, and the joint entity has no capacity to attract or compel the attendance of the best and the brightest. 

Under the proposal we suggest, backed by the authority of the 

proposed National Intelligence Director and the President, the 

NCTC should be much more likely to recruit outstanding analysts, 

including experts in using single-source information like those at 

the NSA. What TTIC now does is it makes due with the analysts 

other agencies can spare. 

I think there was actually a rather acute question on that point 

that called attention to the disparity between TTIC’s manpower 

goals and what it’s been able to attain, because first the agencies 

satisfy their own pressing demands, including their own fusion centers. You can make those joint assignments more attractive to the 

personnel if you have joint personnel policies set across the Intelligence Community that encourage and facilitate joint assignments. 

Personnel standards that we propose also should be set by the National Intelligence Director. 

Chairman COLLINS. One of the major differences between the 

proposed center and TTIC is the Counterterrorism Center would 

have a role in operational planning. Your recommendation in that 

regard is different from the conclusion reached by the Gilmore 

Commission back in 2002. That commission also called for the creation of a national counterterrorism center, but did not give the 

center, or propose that the center have an operational role. That 

is going to be a major issue for this Committee to decide. Would 

you elaborate more on the Commission’s belief that the center 

should have an operational role? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Yes, ma’am. Two things informed us that were unavailable to the Gilmore Commission. First, we studied the September 11 story, and problems in transnational operational management, as we elaborate in Chapter 11 and other places, are just 

central to that story. Second, we spent a lot of time trying to understand how the system is working today, and the problems of 

59

joint planning and joint operational management are actually—

they’re not terribly visible to Congress because they’re very much 

inside the Executive Branch, but they are absolutely central. 

If you were to go as we did—and we went at a particularly bad 

time—to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and look at how they’re working the hunt for bin Laden across agencies on both sides of that 

border with differential legal authorities, and look at, well, where 

is the joint strategic plan for the hunt for bin Laden? Where is the 

person who is in charge every day of the integrated strategic plan 

that updates that plan every day of how we’re hunting bin Laden? 

There is no such joint integrated plan. There isn’t a joint integrated planner for that hunt. There is instead a number of disparate agencies with different legal authorities all doing their 

thing, and then meeting every day in a series of meetings in many 

places, trying to make it all converge. 

Chairman COLLINS. I support most of the Commission’s recommendations, although I may differ on the details. But one that 

causes me considerable concern is the recommendation that paramilitary operations be transferred from the CIA to the Pentagon. 

Over and over when I talk to intelligence experts, they question the 

wisdom of that transfer and point out that the CIA has an agility 

that the Pentagon lacks. Why did you reach the conclusion that responsibility should be transferred to the Department of Defense? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Senator, we concluded that the country cannot afford building basically two Fort Braggs, one in North Carolina and 

one out of Camp Perry, and that we need to have two capabilities 

to both operate and train people to operate crew served weapons, 

small unit assault tactics and so on. We saw in the September 11 

story where the CIA—and it’s in the report—where the CIA took 

the lead in designing a major small unit assault operation, a capture operation in 1998. And because the CIA did it, it was regarded 

as an amateur operation and was not seen as credible by national 

policy makers. It went by the Joint Staff, and they said, ‘‘Well, it 

looks pretty good but we take no ownership of it.’’ Had the Special 

Operations Commander at the time, General Bocanavan, come in 

and said, ‘‘This is my plan and I think it works,’’ we think that 

whole capture operation story is a different story. 

I’ll add that there are a number of issues which we can’t get into 

in open session, having to do with legal authorities and operations 

in the field that are complications. 

I think it’s frankly, the culture issues you see is basically the elephant versus the gazelle stereotype. The problem is those culture 

issues partly arose precisely because of these organizational stovepipes. I think if you—and instead we’d say, ‘‘Well, we have to keep 

those organizational stovepipes because these people have evolved 

into elephants and gazelles.’’ That’s just not, we think, the right 

management approach. I think a better approach would be to try 

to address the culture issues by getting the CIA and DOD cooperating on the ground, training exercises and joint planning, so that 

special ops is challenged to develop that kind of agile culture working with the CIA, and I think they’ll meet that challenge. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

60

Thanks to the two of you for your extraordinary service to the 

Commission. I must say, I listened very intently to your testimony 

today, and again, I thought it was eloquent. I thought it was bold, 

and I thought it was, for me, ultimately convincing, just as the 

Commission’s Report was. You are going to need to continue to 

have all those characteristics, and so are Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, because you can feel the resistance building to 

the changes, or if not a direct confrontation or opposition to what 

the Commission has recommended and embraced, but maybe not 

with all the details. 

So as I said earlier, I was encouraged by the President’s embrace 

of the National Intelligence Director yesterday, but troubled that 

he is reluctant or opposed to giving the director the budgetary authority needed to be strong. 

We got some of the same from the panel that preceded you of 

four extraordinary public servants, and yet extraordinary within 

those stovepipes, and I think still reluctant to—I believe Lee Hamilton said—smash the stovepipes. The stovepipes are now cooperating more, but there is no real coordinating. As you just said a 

moment ago, almost 3 years after September 11, there is still nobody in charge of the hunt for bin Laden, not to mention the overall Intelligence Community. So we have a battle ahead of us, but 

it is critical that we fight it and we win it. 

Let me ask you to comment first on the President’s statement 

yesterday, what you understand to be his position on budget authority for the NID. Incidentally, General Hughes did seem to support it this morning. I appreciated that. A couple of the others were 

uncertain. Then there is some language about the 

Counterterrorism Center in the President’s statement that seems 

to suggest action, planning, jointness, but not clearly. How do you 

read what the President said yesterday, and what is your reaction 

to it? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. And I’d like to ask Chris also to comment on this 

question. 

I saw the President’s statement yesterday and the elaborations 

of it as a constructive opening for the development of important 

ideas into concrete detail. I was struck by the four panelists this 

morning at the constructive tone they all adopted to the recommendations. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very good point with regard to 

both the President and the four, that even though there may be 

disagreements and some resistance to your recommendations, but 

we are beginning a dialog here. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Yes. And from our point of view, the way forward 

here is not to point fingers, but is instead to look for people who 

want to roll up their sleeves and work together. When I heard people’s whose work I admire very much say, ‘‘I basically agree with 

what they’re trying to do. I have all these questions about details. 

I really want to get into the design work,’’ that’s terrific. Then we 

can really have a good constructive discussion on how to proceed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me focus the question. John Brennan 

said today that he thought that your proposal was unworkable. 

That was the term that he used. 

61

Mr. ZELIKOW. Well, in an earlier answer, he seemed to like the 

NCTC idea very much. It was the overall structure of the Intelligence Community and the Goldwater-Nichols structure we proposed that I think both he and Mr. Mudd regarded as unworkable. 

Look, it’s hard. If they have a better solution that they would 

like to propose, a chart of their own, even at the 100,000 foot level, 

we’d welcome examining constructive alternatives, and comparing 

and contrasting them, and try to find the most attractive features 

that you judge to be worth writing into law. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But for now you would say that what you 

have recommended is the best you have seen yet? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Look, it’s hard to actually come out there and actually be—and say, ‘‘Here is what we want,’’ rather than just kind 

of poke potshots at the weaknesses of other proposals. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But you would not have done your job if you 

did not make specific recommendations. Let me ask you a question 

that Senator Levin asked Mr. Brennan. Apart from the absence of 

joint operational planning, which is clear you are adding to the 

Counterterrorism Center, how will the Counterterrorism Center be 

different from the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, TTIC? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Well, the intelligence side of it would be I think 

pretty significantly different, but the operations side of it is totally 

different. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So how would the intelligence side be different? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. On the intelligence side, let me just cite a few 

striking points. First, we all agree that the NCTC and the TTIC 

should be the knowledge bank, primary responsibility, the words 

you fought for for years, Senator Levin, but it would draw strategic 

analysts for this purpose from the present CIA Counterterrorist 

Center, which was a matter left open in a letter the administration 

sent to you. It would draw key analysts from the Pentagon as well. 

I hope you notice that the Department of Defense did not sign the 

letter that was sent to you, Senator Collins, and to you, Senator 

Levin, and did not have a witness at the table here today. So it’s 

not clear—I think the NCTC would very much see DOD as a full 

player in that. 

Second, we think they would do a much better job of recruiting 

the personnel they need for the reasons I cited in answer to a previous question. 

Third, the NCTC would have the net assessment function. That 

job was assigned in the letter sent to you, Senator Collins, and you, 

Senator Levin, to the Department of Homeland Security. 

Further, the NCTC should have the power to use its analysis to 

guide collection. You will remember in that same letter that you 

coaxed from the administration, it said it might give TTIC such authority, but the mechanism for doing so was going to be defined 

later. 

Our proposal allows NCTC to draw the authority, that mechanism, from the authority granted to the National Intelligence Director. 

And finally, the current TTIC is of course expressly forbidden 

from being involved in operations, but we believe, like the military 

62

and diplomats and people in finance and law enforcement, that the 

integration of analysis and action is essential to both. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Zelikow, my time is up. Let me ask you 

a quick question and ask for a quick answer. I read the report as 

recommending that most of the existing fusion centers be eliminated and concentrated in the National Counterterrorism Center; 

was I right? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Not entirely, sir. We don’t see this as just kind of 

one giant center, the blob that absorbs all the others. We instead 

see this as the center in which you do the strategic analysis, but 

every one of the executive departments will still need an intelligence unit to support its executive work. 

So, for instance, let’s take the military analogy. The military is 

going to conduct an operation. It has a J–2, an intelligence unit attached to the unit in the field. It draws information from the 

knowledge bank, say, in the case of ground operations, the National Ground Intelligence Center, that is the institutional memory 

of the Army about geography, the enemy order of battle. It draws 

what it needs from the knowledge bank. It uses its own intelligence 

unit to support operations, and then from what it learns in that operation, it passes information back to be deposited in the knowledge bank for future reference by another operator. 

So the key executive departments still need their own intelligence support, their own J–2s, in effect. And that’s quite right. 

The CIA CTC will turn into that. It will become the DO targeting 

center in a way that it really has been for most of its history. But 

you still have the central—there would be no question as to who 

has responsibility for strategic analysis and institutional memory. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I am trying to sort out whether we are operating at 10,000 feet 

here or whether we are operating on the ground. I must tell you 

that I do not know right now. I came to this with an openness to 

support a National Intelligence Director. We can have debates 

about budget authority and where it is placed. I share Madam 

Chair’s concern about the recommendations regarding paramilitary 

operations. My comment on that is I think we need to be careful 

in all this discussion of reflecting on the context in which we are 

operating. In 1998 context, clearly you are going to have the problems that, Mr. Zelikow, you expressed, but I do not know if that 

is the case today. What I heard from the panel before was every 

one of them saying we have changed the way we operate, we have 

changed the way we think. And I think we have to keep that in 

mind. We cannot be going back to 1998 reality to construct a 2004–

2005 solution. 

The other concern I have is what I heard from that other panel, 

is that the problems are not structural problems, they are human 

problems, and a great concern about form following function, and 

what we have here—excuse me—actually, function following form. 

You have got, here is the structure now. This is going to change 

the way in which we operate. I must comment that—and I raised 

the question—I did not hear a single thing from the panel today 

that says we are not doing something we should do, that is critiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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cally impacting national security because we do not have this new 

structure. We can do some things perhaps a little better. We need 

to reflect on it. 

But I did not hear, particularly in regard to this question of no 

one in charge, I did not hear from anybody today that there is 

something that we are missing because we do not have a National 

Intelligence Director. So I think we just have to be careful as we 

analyze this thing, what is it that we are getting? My concern is 

will we be able to do that in a month? 

Let me raise one other issue though, and that is the congressional oversight function, because it is very clear from this report 

that congressional oversight is critical, is absolutely key. The question I have is do we have the capacity to do that? I would like to 

have a better understanding from you of what kind of time, what 

kind of effort, what kind of focus are Members of this body supposed to have to do the kind of job that you expect them to do to 

make this work? 

Clearly, in the past—we have a lot of committees we serve on, 

we have a lot of things that we do. We have a Committee that people put time and energy into, but clearly the type of oversight that 

is required has not been done in the past. So help me understand 

better what you are really expecting from Members of this body to 

do the kind of job that you think they need to do to perform the 

kind of oversight function you are expecting of this Congress. 

Mr. KOJM. Senator, let me start on your personnel question. We 

on the Commission share the view that the most important thing 

is the people, and getting the right people and giving them the 

right training. We began our recommendations precisely on this 

point, and nothing is more important than recruiting and keeping 

and rewarding such people in government. 

This is also why we believe the National Intelligence Director 

must have control over personnel policies. We’ve got many different 

policies across the Intelligence Community, many policies across 

Executive Branch agencies. At least with the Intelligence Community we surely need to draw these policies together precisely so we 

can achieve the objectives you outline. 

The panel this morning talked about conversation and cooperation. That’s all important, and that’s all highly useful and puts us 

in a far better place than we were 3 years ago. But we still do believe that alone is not enough to meet the national security challenge in front of us, and we still do believe in the importance of 

a quarterback calling the signals. 

Let me turn to your question about oversight. Both the Chair 

and Vice Chair, Kean and Hamilton, if we had to sum up in one 

word, they believe stronger powers in the Executive Branch for the 

National Intelligence Director, for the Counterterrorism Center, 

but equal powers, stronger powers of oversight, to keep the very 

checks and balances that I know so many members of this panel 

have already cited as important. 

How is oversight well done? Well, I think there’s a very good example on this Committee. Its oversight panel has done superb work 

over many years, and even though it has not had a day-to-day 

focus on the budget, the oversight panel of this Committee has 

64

come up with hallmark proposals and things that work their way 

into legislation that have made a real difference for this country. 

I am presumptuous in telling this panel that oversight work is 

hard. You all know that, and you do it quite well. I think our single 

point would be is you need single committees dealing with single 

problems. The homeland security issues just cover so many committees across government. The intelligence panels don’t have all 

the powers that they need to get their job done. 

One can dispute whether it should be a joint panel or combining 

authorization and appropriation. We just want you to come away 

with the central point, stronger oversight committees, and we leave 

it to the experts to design them. 

Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just to follow up in the 30 seconds I have, 

and maybe I need more time than that. Would it be fair to say that 

oversight in the past failed, that we did not have the kind of oversight that we need today? 

Mr. KOJM. With respect to the Intelligence Community and its 

15 elements, it’s hard to do that oversight task responsibility well 

and correctly, and we know that the committees worked hard at it, 

and did, I am convinced, to the very best of their ability. I think 

our point is not to criticize actions of the past, but to set up structures for the future that can enable good people working hard to 

accomplish those goals. Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

One of the issues raised in the 9/11 report is a lack of skilled analysts, especially in the area of foreign languages, available for recruitment by the Intelligence Community. I was interested to hear 

from each of our witnesses on the first panel that recruiting, training and deploying skilled personnel is their most pressing need. I 

agree with their assessment, which is why several of us on this 

Committee have offered legislation to address the need to hire people to fill the void. 

The Senate has passed our bill in November 2003, which has not 

been acted upon by the House. I hope my colleagues will join me 

in my effort to encourage the House to take up S. 589. 

I would like to follow up on something you said earlier. You stated that the NCTC will not have the same personnel problems as 

the TTIC because it will likely have the ability to recruit the best 

and the brightest people before they go to the other intelligence 

agencies. Are you concerned that this will deplete the number of 

qualified personnel at organizations like the CIA and the FBI? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Senator, I would like to more optimistically envision a world of fruitful competition. You may remember there was 

a time when no self-respecting, high-flying military officer wanted 

to work on the Joint Staff. Now it is indispensable for the high-flying military officer to get an assessment on the Joint Staff. Now, 

that does not mean that the Air Force feels it cannot find good officers anymore. So you want to create incentives for joint work. 

But beyond that, measures perhaps like your legislation, Senator, need to be taken to change the whole supply-side equation. 

Senator Coleman, you asked, How does having a National IntelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:40 Apr 29, 2005 Jkt 095506 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\95506.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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ligence Director make a difference? It makes a difference because 

then you have a management strategy, maybe 4 or 5 years ago, 

that addressed the supply side of the equation. I earlier talked 

about the demand side. Everybody wants people. The supply side 

of the equation means years ago you had said we are confronting 

Islamist terrorism. What is our personnel need going to be for that? 

What kind of resources and language training slots and the whole 

slice of things that go with that do we need across the community? 

And then there is a budget and a management strategy that goes 

with gearing up. That time passed. 

Now we still need to have that capability, that flexibility to have 

agile management strategies to do the supply-side work to address 

your concern, Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. One reason that demand is outpacing the supply 

of skilled analysts and linguists is because our schools do not promote the study of languages. Our school curricula do not always 

match the needs of society, nor is public service always honored. 

Did the Commission discuss any changes to our education system 

to address these deficiencies? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. We did, sir, not at great length. In Chapter 3, we 

actually called attention to the problem in getting people who 

would study Arabic in American higher education and some of the 

trends that were creating that problem. There is perhaps a role for 

both government and the private sector in incentivizing higher education to devote resources. I think that some of that is already happening now, and all of you know that in the past the government 

has done things, such as in the National Defense Education Act 

during the Cold War, to try to incentivize the study of languages 

that might otherwise not draw as many students as one would 

wish. 

Senator AKAKA. Yesterday, President Bush, as we all know, announced that he will create the NCTC by Executive Order and he 

called on Congress to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 

create a National Intelligence Director. Until the NID exists, the 

NCTC will report to the Director of the CIA. 

I am concerned that if Congress does not agree with the President and decides against creating a National Intelligence Director, 

which is a possibility, the NCTC will remain housed under the CIA 

and could end up being a second TTIC. 

Will you comment on the risk of implementing one recommendation without the other and whether the two concepts are dependent 

on each other? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Sir, the NCTC will not work as a subordinate entity of the CIA. It is just as simple as that. Let me give you one example, but there are many. One example is the NCTC is supposed 

to run intelligence operations across the foreign-domestic divide, including, say, in Honolulu or in Phoenix. The head of the CIA 

should not be the person who is responsible for overseeing domestic 

intelligence operations. That is already forbidden by law, and that 

is not a provision of law we propose be repealed. 

Senator AKAKA. Would you like to comment, Mr. Kojm? 

Mr. KOJM. No. I would simply agree with my colleague. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. My 

time has expired. 

66

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to join with others in thanking you for your extensive and 

exhaustive work. It has been a great service to all of us and your 

country. Thank you very much. 

I want to go back to some of the events that you chronicle in the 

report on September 11 itself and some of the discrepancies particularly involving NORAD. A week after September 11, NORAD 

issued a public chronology in response to some of the initial reports 

that they had failed to defend our domestic airspace during the hijackings. And their chronology dated September 18, 2001, stated 

that the FAA notified NORAD of the second hijacking at 8:43 a.m., 

that FAA notified NORAD of the third hijacking at 9:24, that FAA 

notified NORAD of the fourth hijacking at an unspecified time, 

that prior to the crash in Pennsylvania, Langley F–16 Civil Combat 

Air Patrol remains in place to protect D.C., and then in public testimony before your Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated—and I don’t know whether this was under oath or not, but that 

at 9:16 they received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. 

Your report notes that hijacking did not actually occur until 9:28 

a.m., 12 minutes after they said they received that notification. In 

that testimony also before your Commission, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24 they received notice of the hijacking of the third 

plane, American Flight 77, which your Commission’s report also 

states is untrue, that NORAD was never notified that plane was 

hijacked. And they also testified before your Commission that they 

scrambled the Langley, Virginia, fighters to respond to those two 

hijackings, yet the taped remarks, according to your report, at both 

NORAD and FAA reportedly documented that order to scramble 

was in response to an inaccurate FAA report that American Flight 

11 had not hit the first World Trade Tower and was headed to 

Washington. And your report notes that erroneous alert was transmitted by the FAA at 9:24 a.m., 38 minutes after American Flight 

11 had, in fact, exploded into the World Trade Tower. 

Can you give me any way to reconcile their stated versions and 

yours? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. No, sir. We addressed that directly on page 31 and 

34 of the 9/11 Commission Report. We did more or less as you have 

just done, contrasted NORAD and FAA prior statements with the 

conclusions the Commission has reached. 

As you may know, sir, in public testimony, which was sworn, officials of both NORAD and FAA have acknowledged that the Commission’s account of these facts is accurate and their prior accounts 

were indeed incorrect. 

Senator DAYTON. Do they explain how it is that they came to recognize the veracity of yours and the inaccuracy of their own? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Sir, we all regard it as a learning process, and I 

think further questions about the learning process that they are in 

are directed to those agencies. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you. Also, there were various reports 

based on sources shortly after September 11 that stated that very 

shortly after the Pentagon was struck at 9:34, ‘‘Pentagon officials 

ordered up the Airborne Command Post, used only in national 

emergencies.’’ There is another reference in another article to an 

67

AWACS plane being sent up at about that time. Are you aware of 

an AWACS or Airborne Command Post being sent aloft at that—

again, this is between 9:35 and 10 a.m.? Because the report does 

not mention one. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. No, sir. The aircraft you are referring to has to do 

with continuity of government issues that we chose not to discuss 

in the report for reasons of classification. We are, however, aware 

of the aircraft movements you refer to and tracked the movements 

of that and other relevant aircraft completely. If they had borne in 

any material way on the September 11 story, we would have discussed it in our report. 

Senator DAYTON. All right. So is the implication that they are 

aloft and were organizing an air defense of the United States at 

that point in time, domestic air defense, is that——

Mr. ZELIKOW. No, sir. That aircraft had nothing to do with organizing American air defense and played no part whatever in the 

command and control issues that NORAD faced that morning. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you. 

Regarding the 15 agencies, entities of the Federal Government 

now engaged in intelligence-gathering activities, are there any that 

you could recommend to us be merged or consolidated? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Sir, we did not take on the next issue of whether 

or not you need all these separate agencies, but we did do this: We 

did suggest that some of the agencies that are now in the Intelligence Community actually do not really need to be there. For instance, the State Department’s Intelligence Research Bureau 

should just work for the Secretary of State. It should be an intelligence support entity for that Department, and it does not have to 

obey the dictates of the Intelligence Community. 

One of the problems we heard about now is sometimes when you 

want to obstruct action, you call a meeting with all 15 of the agencies there as a way of inducing sclerosis. We were trying in our recommendation to find a way of simplifying and strengthening the 

capability-building structure. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

One of the things that we learned hopefully from the events of 

September 11 is that there was no accountability for the failures 

to do the jobs that were assigned to people. We had in the very 

case that you gave us in the Minneapolis case, we had that information going to the bin Laden desk at the FBI and national headquarters, and they did nothing with that information. We had in 

the case of the CIA folks overseas who saw the two people who 

they knew were part of al Qaeda go to a meeting, get to the United 

States. They were involved in the attack on the USS Cole. Then 

they later got to the United States. The CIA people had the job of 

putting them on a watchlist and did not. So the FBI was never 

alerted. That later resulted in the CIA Director being informed of 

this and saying, well, that is the FBI’s job. 

But before you get to that, you have people who did not do their 

job. It was not just stovepipes. That was a problem. The FBI was 

not notified by the CIA, not because of the stovepipes, but because 

the people who were responsible to notify the Immigration and 

68

Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, the FBI, the people in 

the CIA who were supposed to do that did not do that. 

What do you do about accountability? I mean, that is a failure 

inside the existing system. Now, that led to TTIC, and TTIC was 

supposed to solve this problem. But you still have failure to do 

one’s job. Did you address that issue? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Yes, to some extent. There are two levels. Did they 

do a job that was clearly defined and understood and it is just a 

case of mis-, mal- or non-feasance? If so, that is a proper matter 

for internal discipline by those agencies. And in the case of both 

of the agencies you mention, we are aware of the Inspector General 

work that is being done now by both the CIA and the FBI. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know if——

Mr. ZELIKOW. It was important that we knew about that work 

and knew where they were going with those reports. 

Senator LEVIN. Has there been any discipline? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. As far as I know, sir, neither the FBI nor the CIA 

have taken any disciplinary actions. Their IG reports are in different stages. 

The second point I would just stress very briefly is their jobs 

were not well defined, which is a symptom of the problems in operational management we discussed earlier. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. We had the FBI Director and the CIA 

Director in front of us over at the Joint Intelligence Committee 

hearings, and they said these people did not do their job. The jobs 

were defined. They were supposed to notify the FBI when they 

knew that terrorists that were part of the al Qaeda group came to 

the United States. They were supposed to do that, and they did 

not. But, anyway, we will leave it at that. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. Let’s just not—be sure not to scapegoat low-level 

employees for management failures that go higher up. 

Senator LEVIN. I agree with that. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. They deserve to be dealt with. Others should do 

that and people should do that, but we wanted to avoid that temptation. 

Senator LEVIN. No, I agree with that. But you also have to have 

some accountability in the process at all levels. I don’t want to 

scapegoat anybody at lower levels. I agree with you with the upper 

management failures, miserable failures, but, nonetheless, people 

who had assigned jobs to do did not do them, and there has been 

no accountability at that level either. I don’t think you want to let 

anybody off the hook at any level, do you? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. No, sir. We are against letting people off the hook. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LEVIN. I would hope so. 

Now, your recommendations that you say have been received so 

favorably, it seems to me when you analyze them have been really 

not received so favorably. Everybody says, yes, create a czar. We 

are supposed to have now a DCI, a Director of Central Intelligence, 

who has control presumably over both the analysis and the operations inside the Intelligence Community. It is supposed to be centralized now, that is, Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA Director as well. 

69

But let me go to your specific recommendations to see why it is 

you believe that there has not been greater support for your recommendations at the White House. 

First, they do not want to put it in the Executive Office of the 

President. That is a key recommendation. Second, apparently on 

program purse strings, that is not accepted. 

On hire and fire authority that you would give that Director over 

agency heads in the Intelligence Community, outside of the operations of the NCTC, we have silence on that one. 

So just take three big recommendations in terms of what we 

heard from the White House yesterday. First, the President does 

not want to put it in the Executive Office of the President; second, 

apparently does not accept control over the purse strings; and, 

third, at a minimum silence, is on the question of giving that new 

Director hire and fire authority over agency heads and top personnel in the Intelligence Community. 

Don’t you consider that—those are not details. That is not like 

at 100,000 feet there is a great deal of acceptance here in the 

White House, which is a pretty important actor in this whole process. You have got some real rejection of two key principles and silence on another key principle. So I want you to comment on that. 

Mr. ZELIKOW. On the EOP point, yes, they are against it. 

Senator LEVIN. On the what? 

Mr. ZELIKOW. On the Executive Office of the President point, yes, 

they are against it. They want to create a new agency. OK. Maybe 

that is a good idea. Then let’s step up to that idea and work it. 

They have not explicated that idea. That is a big idea. We have 

made a comment on it in our statement. 

On the budget and personnel issues, we prefer to think of what 

they did as a constructive beginning in a situation where they have 

not really made up their own minds what they want to do. 

To be fair to them, they have had this now for about 10 days. 

Everybody agrees this needs to be handled thoughtfully. You heard 

the panel earlier this morning. We would rather encourage them 

to sit down and focus on the details and see where we go from 

there. 

Mr. KOJM. Senator, I think we heard ice breaking yesterday—

support from the President for a National Intelligence Director, 

support for a National Counterterrorism Center, for joint intelligence and joint planning of operations. These are fundamental 

breakthroughs that many who have looked at the Intelligence Community over two decades have understood the problem and made 

recommendations and, frankly, have gotten nowhere. We think we 

have gotten somewhere as of yesterday. 

But even though the ice broke, there is still a lot of water that 

you have to paddle that is pretty dangerous to get across, and we 

are going to devote ourselves to that effort. 

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for the 

extraordinary work that they have done on this report. We very 

much appreciate your assistance, and we look forward to working 

closely with you as we proceed with the remainder of the Committee’s work. 

70

The hearing record will remain open for 5 days. We hope you will 

be willing to respond to additional questions from the Committee 

Members. 

Again, thank you very much for your service, and this hearing 

is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:53 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(71)

A P P E N D I X 

[The op-ed from the Washington Post, August 3, 2004, follows:]

INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND FALSE URGENCY 

BY CHUCK HAGEL

We stand at a moment filled with potential for bringing about the responsible intelligence reforms needed to meet the threats of the 21st Century. But if we allow 

the current national consensus for intelligence reform to become a tool in the partisan rancor of presidential politics, we risk doing enormous damage to our intelligence community. We must not allow false urgency dictated by the political calendar to overtake the need for serious reform. This is an enormous undertaking 

filled with consequences that will last a generation. 

There is no debate about the need to reform our 20th Century intelligence infrastructure. Yesterday President Bush and Sen. John F. Kerry publicly discussed several reform ideas that Congress will consider. But there is much work to be done 

to bring about the right reforms. Policymakers must not shy away from this responsibility; we must embrace it. The stakes could not be higher. While inaction is unacceptable, serious consequences will come with reform. Policymakers owe it to the 

American people to understand these consequences before they act. 

A mistaken impression has developed that since September 11, 2001, little has 

been done to improve our intelligence capabilities. This is not true. We are unquestionably a safer nation today than we were three years ago. The legislative and executive branches of government have been reviewing and adjusting our intelligence—the gathering, processing and management of it—since September 11. We 

are vastly more prepared to respond to biological or chemical terrorist attacks than 

before September 11. Our border security, documentation, information sharing and 

coordination among government agencies have all been improved. Last month, the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I serve, issued the first part of 

our report on intelligence failures prior to the war in Iraq. We have began the second phase of our report, which will include recommendations on reform of our intelligence community. We have heard and will continue to hear from current and 

former members of that community, intelligence experts and policymakers responsible for making decisions based on the intelligence they are provided. 

In 2001 the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, provided the president with a comprehensive review of the intelligence community and recommendations. 

Last month the 9/11 Commission, led by former New Jersey governor Tom Kean 

and former Indiana representative Lee Hamilton, produced a remarkable bipartisan 

document that offered recommendations for improving our intelligence and security 

structures. All Americans owe them a debt of gratitude for their work. 

This year President Bush designated a bipartisan panel to examine U.S. intelligence capabilities. The commission, led by former senator and governor Chuck 

Robb of Virginia and federal appellate judge Laurence Silberman, has been given 

a broad mandate to ‘‘assess whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained and resourced to . . . support United States 

Government efforts to respond to . . . the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century.’’ They 

are to report their findings to the president by March 31. 

In addition to the intelligence committees, Senate and House committees are 

studying reform of our intelligence community. Some will hold hearings during the 

August congressional recess. The work of intelligence reform cuts a wide swath 

across our government. All these hearings in committees of jurisdiction are critical 

for any reforms to succeed. 

72

The American people should have confidence that our intelligence system is the 

finest in the world. This is no reason to ignore the reforms needed to meet the 

threats we face, but it is reason for the American people to feel secure. They should 

not be misled into believing that they are at risk because of an incompetent, inadequate intelligence system. Panic is not the order of the day. Responsible reform is 

the objective. 

Our society is the most open, transparent and free society in history. Because of 

this, we will always face risks. The leaders charged with keeping this country safe 

should never be satisfied that we have done enough. There will always be room to 

improve our intelligence and security systems. 

We will reform our intelligence community. The responsibilities of leadership require our action. But we must not rush haphazardly through what may be the most 

complicated and significant government reorganization since World War II. By the 

time the commission that President Bush empaneled to examine U.S. intelligence 

reports to him next March, we will have completed a massive series of investigations and hearings and a decisive presidential election. 

The consequences of the decisions we make regarding intelligence reform will ripple far beyond our shores. The security of the next generation of Americans and 

global stability depend on our ability to wisely answer history’s call. We must match 

the timeliness of our actions with wisdom and reason. This requires responsible reform. 

The writer is a Republican Senator from Nebraska.

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