[Cite as State v. Higgins, 2013-Ohio-2555.]

STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) CASE NO. 12 JE 11 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

) 

VS. ) O P I N I O N 

) 

MARK HIGGINS, JR., ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court, Case No. 11CR59. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Jane Hanlin 

Prosecuting Attorney 

Attorney Jeffrey Bruzzese 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

16001 State Route 7 

Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Francesca Carinci 

Suite 904-911, Sinclair Building 

Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Dated: June 17, 2013
[Cite as State v. Higgins, 2013-Ohio-2555.]

VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Mark Higgins, Jr. appeals from his conviction and 

sentence rendered in the Jefferson County Common Pleas Court for two counts of 

rape of a child under the age of 13, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). Three 

issues are presented in this appeal. The first two concern whether the state proved 

essential elements of the crimes. Specifically, whether the state proved when and 

where the rapes occurred and whether the state proved the element of penetration. 

The third issue is whether the trial court’s suppression ruling was correct. Specifically, 

did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that Higgins intelligently waived 

his Miranda rights, which resulted in the denial of his motion to suppress his 

confession? 

{¶2} For the reasons discussed below, all arguments lack merit. The 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Statement of Facts and Case

{¶3} On April 25, 2011, A.V., the victim’s sister, walked into the garage of 

her mother’s house and saw Higgins and the victim with their pants down and 

Higgins finger in the victim’s vagina. Trial Tr. 337. The victim was 8 years old at the 

time. A.V. and the victim then left the garage and A.V. contacted her mother and 

father. 

{¶4} The victim was then taken to Martins Ferry East Ohio Regional Hospital 

where a rape kit was performed. After the nurses and doctor’s observations were 

documented, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department was called and a complaint 

was filed. Higgins was arrested the next day. 

{¶5} Following the arrest and booking, Higgins was interrogated by Sheriff 

Abdalla, Jefferson County’s Sheriff. Prior to giving a statement, Higgins was read his 

Miranda rights and orally waived those rights. During this interrogation, Higgins 

admitted to vaginal penetration and that the victim performed oral sex on him on April 

25, 2011. He also admitted to a prior occurrence of oral and vaginal sex that 

occurred within the previous week. Higgins was then asked to give a written 

statement, which he agreed to do. However, prior to that, he was given a written 
-2-

document titled “Your Rights,” which listed the Miranda rights. After each right, the 

questionnaire asks if the person understands. Higgins responded by writing “yes.” 

The last question on the form is “Having these rights in mind, do wish to talk to us 

now?” Higgins wrote “Yes.” Higgins then proceeded to write a written statement with 

the help of the Sheriff. 

{¶6} On June 1, 2011, Higgins was indicted by the Jefferson County Grand 

Jury for two counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The indictments 

specified that Higgins engaged in sexual conduct with the victim, who was under the 

age of ten, on April 25, 2011 and “on or about April 17 through April 20, 2011.” The 

Bill of Particulars further provided that the sexual conduct in counts one and two of 

the indictment was for oral and vaginal sex. 06/21/11 Bill of Particulars. 

{¶7} Following the indictment, two evaluations were ordered. The first was a 

competency and sanity evaluation. Although Higgins was found to have a lower than 

average range of intellectual functioning, he was deemed to be sane and competent 

to stand trial. The second was performed to evaluate Higgins’ ability to waive his 

Miranda rights. Dr. Kristen Haskins administered this evaluation and opined that 

Higgins did not intelligently waive his Miranda rights. 

{¶8} Thereafter, based on Dr. Haskins’ report and the video of the 

interrogation with Sheriff Abdalla, Higgins filed a motion to suppress his confession. 

Following a suppression hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. 

{¶9} The case then proceeded to a jury trial. A jury returned a guilty verdict 

on both counts of the indictment. Higgins was sentenced to two concurrent life 

sentences without the possibility of parole. 

{¶10} Higgins timely appeals his conviction and sentence. 

First Assignment of Error

{¶11} “The State of Ohio failed to meet its burden in establishing an essential 

element of the crime, namely, during the testimony of the victim it was never 

established that the events occurred in the State of Ohio County of Jefferson on the 

date and place as alleged.” 
-3-

{¶12} Higgins argues that the state failed to prove both subject matter 

jurisdiction and venue. Specifically, he asserts that the state not only failed to prove 

that the rapes occurred in Ohio, but it also failed to prove that it occurred in Jefferson 

County. 

{¶13} The State of Ohio has subject matter jurisdiction over a crime if any 

element of the offense, under the laws of this state, takes place in Ohio. R.C. 

2901.11(A)(1). The Ohio Constitution establishes the right of the accused to have a 

“trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been 

committed.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. R.C. 2901.12 further guarantees 

that right by requiring that a criminal trial shall be held in a court with subject matter 

jurisdiction “in the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was 

committed.” 

{¶14} As for venue, it has been held that the prosecution must prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the crimes alleged were committed in the county where the 

trial was held, if the defendant did not waive this right. State v. Gonzales, 188 Ohio 

App.3d 121, 2010-Ohio-982, 934 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 4 (3rd Dist.), quoting Toledo v. 

Taberner, 61 Ohio App.3d 791, 793, 573 N.E.2d 1173 (6th Dist.1989), citing State v. 

Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477, 453 N.E.2d 716, (1983); State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio 

St.2d 88, 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981); and State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 

N.E.2d 258 (1947), paragraph three of the syllabus. Accordingly, we have explained 

that, “Venue is not a material element of any crime but, unless waived, is a fact that 

must be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Barr, 158 Ohio App.3d 

86, 2004-Ohio-3900, 814 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.). Typically the prosecutor will 

directly establish venue; however, it does not need to be proven in express terms, but 

rather can be established by the totality of facts and circumstances of the case. 

Gonzales at ¶ 4, quoting Taberner at 793. 

{¶15} At the outset, we note that Higgins may have waived the venue 

argument because he failed to raise a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal or any other 

motion that argued that the state failed to prove that the crimes occurred in Jefferson 
-4-

County. See Gonzales at ¶ 5. That said, in the interest of justice we will still address 

the merits of the argument. 

{¶16} At trial, Sheriff Abdalla stated that the site of the rape was at the victim’s 

home located at 1309 County Road 3, Rayland, Ohio. Trial Tr. 171, 217. He further 

provided that this address is in Jefferson County. Trial Tr. 171, 217. The victim’s 

mother testified that at the time of the offense she was living at 1309 County Road 3, 

Rayland, Ohio in Jefferson County. Trial Tr. 304. She indicated that the sexual 

assault occurred at that address. Trial Tr. 306-307. The victim’s father further 

testified that the victim lives with the mother at the 1309 County Road 3, Rayland, 

Ohio residence. Trial Tr. 317, 318. The victim’s sister, who witnessed the sexual 

conduct, also testified that the victim lives with the mom and that she was also 

staying with her mom on April 25, 2001, when the rape occurred. Trial Tr. 334-335. 

While the victim did not testify to the address of the house she was living at, she did 

testify that the rape occurred at that residence. Trial Tr. 329. 

{¶17} Higgins claims that only the victim and her sister, the witness to the 

alleged sexual conduct, can establish where the sexual conduct occurred. He offers 

no citations to support this position. As explained above, where the crime occurred 

can be proven by a totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. Gonzales at ¶ 

4, quoting Taberner at 793. Thus, it can be proven through a collection of every 

person’s testimony and the evidence admitted at trial. See Taberner at 793. 

{¶18} The above testimony was undisputed. Therefore, the state proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape occurred at 1309 County Road 3, Rayland, 

Jefferson County, Ohio. Thus, the state proved both subject matter jurisdiction and 

venue. 

{¶19} In the text of the assignment, Higgins also contends that the state failed 

to prove when the rapes occurred. This argument also fails. Higgins own statement 

to Sheriff Abdalla indicates that sexual conduct occurred on April 25, 2011 and the 

preceding week. Thus, that statement alone, which was not disputed, provides 

evidence of when the rapes occurred. 
-5-

{¶20} Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, we find that there is no merit 

with this assignment of error. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶21} “The State of Ohio failed to establish an essential element of the crime, 

namely that penetration had occurred through direct examination of the child/victim.” 

{¶22} The argument presented in this assignment of error is a sufficiency of 

the evidence argument. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction requires the court to determine whether the state has met its burden of 

production at trial. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 

(1997). On review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether the state's 

evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant 

would support a conviction. Id. An inquiry into sufficiency focuses on whether any 

rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶23} Higgins was convicted of two counts of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(b), which states: 

 (A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another 

who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the 

offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when any of 

the following applies: 

 * * * 

 (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether 

or not the offender knows the age of the other person. 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). 

{¶24} By statutory definition “sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse, anal 

intercourse, and oral sex, i.e. fellatio and/or cunnilingus. R.C. 2907.01(A). It also 

includes insertion of any body part into the vaginal or anal opening of another. R.C. 
-6-

2907.01(A). “Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal 

intercourse.” R.C. 2907.01(A). 

{¶25} The indictment also alleged that the victim was under the age of 10, 

which pursuant to division (B) of R.C. 2907.02, could subject Higgins to life in prison 

without the possibility of parole. 

{¶26} The element Higgins focuses on in this assignment of error is sexual 

conduct and whether the state provided evidence of penetration. 

{¶27} The victim testified at trial that Higgins touched her “private area” with 

his hand and with his “private area”. Trial Tr. 331. Her testimony does not indicate 

whether there was actual digital or penal penetration. Trial Tr. 331. She denies that 

he put his penis in her mouth. Trial Tr. 331. Thus, her testimony does not establish 

sexual conduct to constitute rape; it does not establish digital or penile penetration or 

oral sex. 

{¶28} That said, other evidence of sexual conduct was presented at trial. This 

occurred through Higgins’ April 26, 2011 confession, the victim’s statement to the 

emergency room nurse on April 25, 2011, and the victim’s sister who witnessed one 

alleged incident of sexual conduct. 

{¶29} State’s exhibit 2 and 3, which were both admitted into evidence, are the 

written confession from Higgins and the recorded video confession. Both establish 

penile penetration into the victim’s vagina. Higgins specifically stated that part of the 

head of his penis was in the victim’s vagina. Exhibit 3 Video Confession. As stated 

above, even slight penetration is sufficient for vaginal intercourse. R.C. 2907.01(A). 

Furthermore, in his confession, he also admitted that on April 25, 2011 and the 

previous week, he had the victim perform oral sex on him. This is also sufficient to 

constitute sexual conduct. 

{¶30} Likewise, the nurse who examined the victim also offered evidence of 

penetration and sexual conduct. During her testimony, Exhibit 11 was introduced 

and was later admitted into evidence. Exhibit 11 is a document that is filled out in 

connection with the rape kit. Trial Tr. 236. That document indicates that there was 

penile and oral penetration. Furthermore, on the second page of this document is 
-7-

the Narrative History in the victim’s own words. This section indicates that Higgins 

made the victim perform oral sex on him on April 25, 2011 and that this was not the 

first time this occurred. The victim also told the nurse that Higgins had put his penis 

in her vagina on that date and that he had also done that to her on previous 

occasions. The victim also relayed that prior to that date Higgins had had anal 

intercourse with her. 

{¶31} Lastly, the victim’s sister also testified that on April 25, 2011 she 

witnessed Higgins with his finger in the victim’s vagina. Trial Tr. 337. By definition, if 

believed, this also constituted sexual conduct by means of digital penetration. 

{¶32} Thus, there was evidence of at least five incidents of sexual conduct. 

Considering all of the testimony and evidence admitted at trial, there was sufficient 

evidence of sexual conduct and penetration. This assignment of error lacks merit. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶33} “The Defendant/Appellant was unable to make an intelligent waiver of 

his Miranda rights: therefore, his confession should not have been admitted. It was 

reversible error to permit the taped statement of the interrogation into evidence.” 

{¶34} This assignment of error addresses the trial court’s denial of Higgins’ 

motion to suppress. He contends the confession should have been suppressed and 

thus, it was reversible error for the court to admit the confession into evidence. 

{¶35} Appellate review of a suppression decision presents a mixed question 

of law and fact. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St .3d 71, 2006–Ohio–3665, 850 N.E.2d 

1168, ¶ 100. On factual matters, the trial court occupies the best position to evaluate 

the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence. Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). Thus, factual findings are accorded great 

deference. Roberts, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 

(1982). The trial court's legal conclusions, on the other hand, are reviewed de novo. 

Roberts, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003–Ohio–5372, 797 N.E.2d 

71, ¶ 8. 

{¶36} Higgins’ motion to suppress was based on Dr. Haskins’ conclusion that 

he could not intelligently waive his Miranda rights. For a waiver of the Miranda rights 
-8-

to be effective, it must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 

497 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986). Thus, her conclusion, if believed, would render 

the confession inadmissible.

{¶37} It is the government's burden to prove that the statements made were 

not obtained in violation of the offender's Miranda rights. United States v. Reese

(N.D.Ohio 2010), 1:09 CR 00145, 2010 WL 3730148, citing Miranda v. Arizona

(1966), 384 U.S. 436, 475 and Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168. The United States 

Supreme Court has stated that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is 

adequate to determine whether there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights. Fare 

v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). The totality approach requires inquiry into 

all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Id. This includes evaluation of 

the offender’s age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and whether the 

offender has the capacity to understand the warnings given to him, the nature of his 

Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Id.

{¶38} Previously, we have addressed whether the trial court’s conclusion that 

a criminal defendant did not intelligently waive his Miranda rights was correct. State 

v. Lynn, 7th Dist. No. 11BE18, 2011-Ohio-6404. In that case, Dr. Haskins evaluated 

the defendant and found that he had an IQ of 73, which is in the borderline range. 

She also administered Thomas Grisso's Instruments for Assessing Understanding & 

Appreciation of Miranda rights, which is commonly referred to as the Grisso test and 

as the name suggests it is only used to determine whether a defendant understands 

the Miranda rights. Following the administration of this test, she concluded that Lynn 

did not fully understand the irrevocable nature of the right to remain silent. She noted 

that he only scored 4 out of 10 in the section that relates to the significance of the 

right to remain silent. He thought the right to remain silent meant he did not have to 

talk unless the police told him to. Id. at ¶ 40. 

{¶39} In making our determination on the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, 

in addition to Dr. Haskins’ observation and opinion, we also referenced the fact that 

some of the cases that concluded that there was an understanding of Miranda found 

as such because of conduct that occurred prior to and during the interrogation. 
-9-

However, in Lynn, there was no conduct that could have led the court to believe that 

there was an understanding of the Miranda rights. For example, prior to the 

interrogation, there was no evidence that Lynn made any statement to anyone trying 

to explain away the allegation that he engaged in sexual conduct with the victim. Id.

at ¶ 42. Thus, in that case, there was evidence that there was not an understanding 

of the Miranda rights. 

{¶40} That said, we also acknowledged that there was evidence that the 

waiver was intelligently made. Lynn was twenty-five years old at the time of the 

interrogation, he had completed high school and he had two other experiences with 

the judicial system. Id. at ¶ 43. Furthermore, the waiver he was given was within his 

reading level. Id. 

{¶41} Regardless of those admitted facts, we affirmed the trial court’s 

conclusion that the waiver was not intelligently made. Ultimately we concluded that 

the trial court found Dr. Haskins to be credible and when there is evidence to support 

suppression and evidence to deny suppression, an appellate court will 

overwhelmingly affirm a trial court's decision due to the great deference that it must 

be given in matters of credibility. Id. at ¶ 44. 

{¶42} In the instant case, Dr. Haskins interviewed Higgins for six hours. 

During that time, she administered the Neurobehavioral Cognitive Status 

Examination (COGNISTAT), Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (I.Q. test), the Wide 

Range Achievement Test, Validity Indicator Profile, and the Grisso test. The result of 

the COGNISTAT and the I.Q. tests were that Higgins was borderline to low average 

range of intellectual functioning with an I.Q. of 72. The Wide Range Achievement 

Test indicated in Word Reading he read at a 6th grade, 9th month level. On 

Sentence Comprehension his grade equivalent was at an 8th grade, 2nd month level. 

The Validity Indicator test indicated that the results of the tests were a valid 

representation of Higgins' ability. 

{¶43} As mentioned above, the Grisso test specifically tests for understanding 

of Miranda rights. The Grisso test consists of four parts: Comprehension of Miranda

Rights, Comprehension of Miranda Rights – Recognition, Comprehension of Miranda
-10-

Vocabulary, and Function of Rights in Interrogation. In the Comprehension of 

Miranda Rights, Higgins scored 8 out of 8; his score was better than the mere score 

of 7 found for individuals aged 23 to 26 with an IQ of 71 to 80. In the Comprehension 

of Miranda Rights – Recognition section, he scored 9 out of a possible 12 points. 

This section concluded that he demonstrated a weakness in his comprehension of 

his right to remain silent and of when it is he is entitled to see an attorney. In the 

Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary, he scored 10 out of 12 points. Lastly, in the 

Function of Rights in Interrogation, he scored 10 out of 10 points. 

{¶44} In completing her report, Dr. Haskins also stated that the “Your Rights” 

form that is used by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office for waiver of Miranda rights 

has a Flesch-Kincaid Readability Test of a 4.1 grade level. Thus, she concluded that 

given Mr. Higgins sentence comprehension score on the WRAT4, he was able to 

read and paraphrase the form. However, she added: 

 [E]ven though the waiver and warning were read to Mr. Higgins, 

he still did not have adequate intellect or academic achievement to 

comprehend and appreciate the implications of the statement read to 

him. Additionally, there is no portion or place on the rights form that is 

designated as the waiver or rights waiver. There is simply a question: 

“Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?” Mr. 

Higgins’ “yes” followed by his initials on each of these statements on 

the form he signed was in all probability a simple matter of complying in 

a situation where he was confronted with an authority figure. 

02/24/12 Report from Dr. Haskins. 

{¶45} In all she concluded that Higgins did not intelligently waive his Miranda

rights: 

 “Current assessment of Mr. Higgins capacity to knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights revealed he 

evidenced some understanding of his rights to silence and an attorney. 

However, he did not understand or appreciate the meaning and function 

of those rights. He did not comprehend or understand he had a right to 
-11-

not self-incriminate or not tell on himself or confess. While he 

acknowledged he had a right to an attorney, he poorly understood why 

it was that an attorney would be a good idea or why an attorney would 

be particularly useful in helping him with his legal situation. That is he 

did not adequately understand or appreciate the special training and 

skills an attorney has that could be brought to bear on his legal 

situation. 

 Overall, it is my opinion with reasonable psychological certainty 

that while Mark Higgins has demonstrated a limited knowledge of his 

Miranda rights, he did not intelligently waive those rights because he 

did not appreciate the nature and extent of those rights and the 

meaning of those rights related to his particular situation. Interfering 

with his intelligent waiver of his rights were his limited intellect, his 

depression, his withdrawal from alcohol, opiates and marijuana and his 

fear of Sheriff Abdalla. Mr. Higgins was not physically mistreated or 

disrespected during interrogation. However, there was a speed read of 

his rights, he was interrogated as a jail inmate by the local sheriff 

around whom there has over the years developed considerable 

purported “urban legend” related to treatment of inmates and suspects, 

and no effort was made to ascertain whether or not the defendant 

understood his rights beyond “you understand?” Thus, given the 

circumstances it is difficult to imagine Mr. Higgins voluntarily waived his 

rights. 

02/24/12 Dr. Haskins’ Report. 

{¶46} The trial court disagreed with her conclusion: 

 The defendant’s witness testified that she did not dispute that 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, but that 

the defendant did not intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Defendant’s 

witness based this opinion upon her examination and interview of 

defendant, various tests which she administered to the defendant, 
-12-

historical information supplied or obtained regarding the defendant, 

conversations with the defendant’s attorney and a view of the 

audio/visual recording of defendant’s interview/questioning by the 

Sheriff. 

 Dr. Haskins opined that the defendant has a low I.Q. of 72 (plus 

or minus 5 points) and is not mentally retarded but is on the borderline 

and near to mild mental retardation. The defendant reported 

depression, grieving of recent deaths and withdrawing from drugs and 

alcohol at the time of giving of the statement. 

 The evidence presented does not establish that the defendant 

was withdrawing from any drugs or alcohol at the time of the statement. 

The evidence does not establish that the defendant was suffering from 

grief or depression that would affect his ability to waive his Miranda 

rights. The evidence does establish by a preponderance that the 

defendant was of sufficient intelligence to comprehend and waive his 

Miranda rights; that he understood those rights and that he knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 

 The Court has considered the defendant’s age (26 years), the 

defendant’s mental capacity (I.Q. of 72 and high school/vocation school 

completion). That the defendant had prior criminal involvement and 

was on probation at the time of the statement, that the length and 

intensity of the interrogation was certainly reasonable and appropriate, 

that there was no physical deprivation or mistreatment, that there was 

no existence of a threat or inducement, and that the defendant was 

aware that his statement would be used against him. 

Underline in Original. 03/19/12 J.E. 

{¶47} Thus, the trial court did not find Dr. Haskins’ conclusion to be credible. 

Although Higgins’ rights were read to him in less than 30 seconds, we uphold that 

finding. The trial court’s statements regarding Higgins prior involvement in criminal 

activity and his mental capacity are accurate. At the suppression hearing Sheriff 
-13-

Abdalla stated that Higgins informed him that Higgins has had Miranda rights read to 

him at least on one other occasion. Suppression Tr. 10. Furthermore, as the trial 

court states there is no evidence, besides Higgins’ own statement, that at the time of 

the interrogation he was withdrawing from drug and/or alcohol use. Sheriff Abdalla 

testified that during the interrogation, Higgins did not ask for medical treatment for 

withdrawal and did not appear to be under influence. Suppression Tr. 9-10. Even 

Dr. Haskins admitted on the stand that when watching the video confession she did 

not see any outward signs of intoxication or withdrawal. Suppression Tr. 116. 

Likewise, the recording of the confession indicates that Higgins was not threatened or 

mistreated during the interrogation. Moreover, the Grisso test results and the fact 

that the “Your Rights” form was easily within his reading level indicates that he did 

have a basic understanding of the rights he was waiving. 

{¶48} In Lynn we favorably cited an Illinois Appellate Court decision which 

states: 

 If intelligent knowledge in the Miranda context means anything, it 

means the ability to understand the very words used in the warnings. It 

need not mean the ability to understand far-reaching legal and strategic 

effects of waiving one's rights, or to appreciate how widely or deeply an 

interrogation may probe, or to withstand the influence of stress or fancy; 

but to waive rights intelligently and knowingly, one must at least 

understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what 

their waiver will entail. 

Lynn, 2011-Ohio-6404, at ¶ 21-22, quoting People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill.2d 349, 363–

64 (1990). 

{¶49} Higgins met this test. That said, we take this opportunity to note that 

while the written Miranda warning in Jefferson County is adequate, the questionnaire 

in addition to asking if the offender understands the rights, should probably also 

include a question to the offender asking him if he wishes to waive those rights. 

{¶50} In conclusion, given our standard of review and the information 

provided at the suppression hearing, we uphold the trial court’s suppression ruling; 
-14-

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disagreeing with Dr. Haskins’ conclusion. 

This assignment of error lacks merit. 

Conclusion

{¶51} For the foregoing reasons, all three assignments of error lack merit. The 

judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.