General Douglas MacArthur

Military Leadership Writing Competition

Command and General Staff College

2012

Award Winning Essays

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Cover Photograph Brigadier General Courtney Whitney; General Douglas 

MacArthur, Commander in Chief of U.N. Forces; and Major General 

Edward Almond, observe the shelling of Inchon from the U.S.S. Mt. 

McKinley, September 15, 1950., ca. 1900 - 1982

ARC Identifier 531373 / Local Identifier 111-SC-348438

Item from Record Group 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal 

Officer.
General Douglas MacArthur

Military Leadership Writing Competition

Command and General Staff College

2012

Award Winning Essays

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition, 

Command and General Staff College 2012 award winning essays / U.S. 

Army Combined Arms Center.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index

 ISBN 978-0-9885837-4-0 (alk. paper)

 1. Leadership--United States. 2. Soldiers’ writings, American. I. Combat 

Studies Institute (U.S.) II. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. 

 UB210.G4423 2013

 355.3’3041--dc23

 2013001741

First printing 2013

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide 

variety of military history topics. The views expressed in 

this CSI Press publication are those of the author(s) and 

not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the 

Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications 

available for downloading can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as 

an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official 

seal on any republication without the express written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Editor

C. Fischer
iii

Foreword

During each session of the Intermediate Level Education Course, 

the Command and General Staff College holds the General Douglas 

MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition. Students author and 

submit papers on various leadership topics. Winning papers are selected 

by a panel of judges and are evaluated on originality, scholarship, writing 

style and value to the profession.

As part of our mission to promote scholarship and add to the 

professional discourse, the Combat Studies Institute is pleased to publish 

this selection of award winning papers written by students from the 

Command and General Staff College classes 12-01 and 12-02 for the 

Academic Year 2012 General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership 

Writing Competition.

Roderick M. Cox

Colonel, US Army

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Table of Contents

Empirically-Based Leadership

 Integrating the Science of Psychology in

 Building a Better Leadership Model

This paper is the first place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-01.

 Major Sean McDonald........................................................................ 1

Managing Risk in Today’s Army

This paper is the second place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur 

Military Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff 

College of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-01.

 Major Brendan Gallagher ................................................................. 17

Control and Fear

 Enhancing Soldier Performance and Welfare

This paper is the third place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-01.

 Major Hugh W. A. Jones................................................................... 25

Transformational Stories

 How the Weekend Safety Brief

 can be a Forum for the Professional Military Ethic

This paper is the first place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02. 

 Major Joel P. Gleason ....................................................................... 33

Lessons in Leadership

 Simple and Uncomplicated

This paper is the second place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur 

Military Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff 

College of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02.

 Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Pledger, US Navy...................... 47

Counter-Balancing the Imbalance

 An Army Leader’s Role in Balancing

 Organizational Temperament

This paper is the third place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02.

 Chaplain (Major) Doug Ball .......................................................... 55

1

Empirically-Based Leadership

Integrating the Science of Psychology in Building a Better 

Leadership Model1*

 Major Sean McDonald

Introduction

There are very few tasks in the Army more important than developing 

effective, competent leaders. As a significant part of this effort, the Army 

provides Field Manual (FM) 6-22, which establishes leadership doctrine 

and fundamental principles to guide leaders at all levels. In support of 

this important objective, the manual offers a comprehensive framework 

for leadership that explicitly outlines the highly valued characteristics and 

competencies all leaders are expected to aspire and emulate. However, 

as valuable as this framework may be, much of its content is based upon 

intuition and experience. As expressed in FM 6-22, the manual “combines 

the lessons of the past with important insights” in establishing a model for 

competent leadership. 1

While this approach to framing leadership has value, it can also be 

a significant limitation that potentially overlooks other highly influential 

factors to producing successful leadership and positive organizational 

outcomes. Similar to flaws in relying exclusively on anecdotal evidence, 

there may be important factors identified within the empirical literature 

absent or lacking emphasis in FM 6-22. Further, certain characteristics 

or competencies may be more important than others depending on the 

context or leadership position. These limitations suggest a review of 

relevant research is necessary to enhancing the Army’s current model of 

leadership. 

With this in mind, the intent of this paper is to identify those empirically 

based factors most important to a model of influential, competent 

leadership. To obtain this end state, three essential areas require further 

exploration. First, relevant research on key individual characteristics or 

traits of effective leadership will be examined and compared to those 

characteristics established within FM 6-22. Next, contemporary research 

on leadership psychology has placed greater emphasis on social context 

over individual traits in determining effective leadership. On this basis, 

*

 Empirically-Based Leadership: Integrating the Science of Psychology in Building 

a Better Leadership Model by Major Sean McDonald appears in the JanuaryFebruary 2013 issue of Military Review. This paper is the first place winner of 

the General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition at the 

Command and General Staff College of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-

01.
2

the empirical literature on contextual factors will be examined. Finally, in 

light of this analysis, possible improvements to the Army’s current model 

of leadership will be discussed as part of the broader effort to cultivate 

a better understanding of highly competent leadership. While experience 

and intuition are valuable sources of information, integrating relevant 

empiricism into the process is necessary to constructing a more complete 

model of leadership best designed to develop highly competent leaders. 

Individual Characteristics of Effective Leadership

The possession of certain individual characteristics is a critical element 

of the Army’s leadership model as expressed in the simple phrase, “what 

leaders DO emerges from who they are (BE) and what they KNOW.”2

According to this conceptual framework, particular attributes along 

with appropriate knowledge serve as the foundation from which desired 

competencies emerge. In other words, certain characteristics are an 

essential aspect to being an effective leader, and in their absence, desirable 

competencies will not fully develop. While the identification of necessary 

attributes is valuable in structuring and communicating the expectations 

for leadership, what remains unclear is the validity of the inclusion or 

exclusion of particular characteristics beyond the basis of intuition and 

experience. 

FM 6-22 identifies 12 individual characteristics as being necessary to 

competent leadership, which are organized into three categories: character, 

presence, and intellectual capacity. Analyzing all 12 characteristics 

is beyond the scope of this paper, so the discussion in this section will 

primarily focus on the key areas of interest within the empirical literature 

on leadership characteristics or traits. The first major area to be examined 

involves ethical or moral reasoning, which most closely aligns with the 

category of character defined by FM 6-22 as “a person’s moral and ethical 

qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do 

what is appropriate...”3

 Based upon this definition, there is little doubt that 

ethical reasoning is a critically important area within the Army’s model of 

leadership. The consequences both good and bad of moral reasoning within 

leaders carry far greater weight than those of followers, especially in the 

context of life and death situations.4 But what is less known or understood 

is the impact of ethical and moral reasoning on leadership performance, 

which is generally assessed by the attainment of goals or objectives 

within a leadership context.5

 Atwater, Dionne, Camobreco, Avolio, and 

Lau (1998) examined the relationship between the moral reasoning of 

US military cadets and their development and effectiveness as leaders 

as ranked by both their peers and supervisors. Not surprisingly, these 

researchers found that higher levels of moral reasoning were related to 

leader effectiveness in obtaining established objectives,6 which subsequent 

studies have supported.7
3

In examining this relationship in a slightly different light, Turner, 

Barling, and Epitropaki (2002) postulated that leaders with higher moral 

reasoning would be perceived as more transformational than leaders who 

exhibited lower moral reasoning. Transformational leadership is defined as 

a style of leadership that inspires followers to look beyond self-interests for 

the good of the group as opposed to transactional leadership that motivates 

followers through corrective transactions, which is based more on reward 

and punishment. These researchers developed their hypothesis from moral 

development theory which asserts that leaders with more complex moral 

reasoning will be able to utilize greater sophisticated conceptualizations 

of interpersonal situations, are more likely to think about problems in 

different ways, and are cognizant of a larger number of behavioral options. 

Consequently, leaders with more complex moral reasoning are more likely 

to value goals that go beyond immediate self-interest and to foresee the 

benefits of actions that serve the collective good (i.e., transformational 

leadership). The outcome of the study found a significant relationship 

between higher moral development and transformational leadership.8

While the collective outcome of these studies is not particularly 

surprising, an understanding of the professional literature in this category 

remains an important element in developing a model for leadership. To 

some, such an analysis would seem to be a pointless endeavor considering 

the obvious need for sound ethical and moral decision-making, especially 

for the military leader who is frequently confronted with highly complex, 

“gray” situations. However, the science on the topic not only refines our 

understanding of the role of ethics within leadership, but more importantly, 

these studies provide critical insight on the need for ethical and moral 

development among leaders in order to obtain the greatest outcomes 

related to leader performance. 

Another significant area of interest within the empirical literature 

is emotional intelligence, which in recent years has been the focus of 

considerable attention in relationship to leadership efficacy. Emotional 

intelligence (EI) involves an awareness of one’s own emotions as well 

as the ability to control them, social awareness of others and their 

emotions, and the capacity to understand and manage relationships and 

social networks.9 Based on this description, EI is relevant to all three 

categories of Army leader attributes, especially the attributes of empathy 

and interpersonal tact. In discussing empathy, FM 6-22 defines it as “the 

ability to see something from another person’s point of view, to identify 

with and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions.”10 Empathy 

is not typically a quality that most soldiers would readily identify as an 

essential characteristic to effective leadership or necessary to producing 

positive organizational outcomes. Further, FM 6-22 tends to reflect this 

perception given the manual devotes only four paragraphs to discussing 

the attribute. However, the research in this area suggests it is an important 

quality to competent leadership especially as it relates to EI.
4

Based upon the description of EI, empathy is a critical element of 

emotional intelligence. In examining this characteristic, one study 

analyzed the relationship between EI and leadership effectiveness among 

US Navy human resource officers.11 The researchers administered a 

measure of EI, which provided four subscales: perceiving emotions, 

facilitating thought, understanding emotions (both in self and others), 

and ability to manage emotions. The researchers then compared scores to 

managerial performance. Results from the study revealed a positive and 

significant correlation between the officers overall emotional intelligence 

and effectiveness as a leader. More specifically, when analyzing the 

subscales, the researchers detected significant relationship on facilitating 

thought, understanding emotions, and ability to manage emotions to 

leadership effectiveness. In understanding others emotions, an important 

contributing factor to the success of the more effective officers was their 

ability to empathize with their subordinates.12

In another study, researchers conducted a meta-analysis to ascertain 

if a consistent, research-based link could be established between EI and 

effective leadership. A meta-analysis is a particularly powerful study 

because it statistically analyzes the outcomes of a large collection of 

research results for the purpose of integrating the findings versus relying 

upon the results of a single study. Based upon the analysis of 48 studies 

examining this relationship, results of the meta-analysis suggested a strong 

relationship between EI and leadership effectiveness.13 While there have 

been some studies that have minimized this relationship, the empirical 

data strongly supports the inclusion of EI characteristics within a model of 

leadership best designed to produce competent leaders.

A third area of considerable interest in the empirical literature 

is the trait of hardiness or resiliency and it’s relationship to leadership 

effectiveness. As part of the Army’s model of leadership, the characteristic 

of resiliency is listed as one of the 12 attributes of a competent leader. 

FM 6-22 describes the resilient leader as “recovers quickly from setbacks, 

shock, injuries, adversity, and stress while maintaining their mission and 

organizational focus. Their resilience rests on will, the inner drive that 

compels them to keep going, even when exhausted, hungry, afraid, cold, 

and wet. Resilience helps leaders and their organizations to carry difficult 

missions to their conclusion.”14 Unfortunately, FM 6-22’s description of 

resiliency contained in four short paragraphs primarily revolves around its 

application to combat with little discussion on its relevancy to leadership 

within a broader context.15 

Prior to discussing the research on resiliency or hardiness, it is important 

to discuss its conceptual framework. While FM 6-22 characterizes 

resiliency as a behavior, the professional literature generally considers 

it an element of personality that develops early in life and is relatively 
5

stable over time, although amenable to change and trainable under certain 

conditions. Hardy or resilient persons have a high sense of life and work 

commitment, a greater feeling of control, and are more open to change and 

challenges in life. They tend to interpret stressful and painful experiences 

as a normal aspect of existence, part of life that is overall interesting and 

worthwhile.16 Although there is some consistency with the description 

provided by FM 6-22, the important difference is that it contains a broader 

application extending well beyond a particular context (e.g. combat). With 

this understanding established, the research on the topic can now be more 

intelligently examined.

An extensive body of research has accumulated demonstrating that 

resiliency and hardiness acts as considerable protective factor against 

stress while increasing performance. In one study, researchers examined 

personality factors, psychological hardiness, and social judgment (an 

element of EI) as predictors of leader performance. The researchers 

analyzed data collected over four years on West Point cadets and 

graduates. Although they analyzed a number of different factors relevant 

to leadership performance, hardiness emerged as the strongest predictor 

of performance in variety of contexts over more commonly associated 

qualities like mental abilities or emotional intelligence.17 Similar results 

have been obtained in others studies with a variety of occupational groups. 

In addition to moderating against combat exposure in Gulf War soldiers, 

hardiness has emerged as a stress buffer in other populations such as US 

Army casualty assistance workers, peacekeeping soldiers, Israeli soldiers 

in combat training, officer candidates, and members of the Special Forces.18 

This data strongly supports the inclusion of resiliency or hardiness as a 

necessary element of competent leadership.

The final characteristic to be reviewed is intellectual capacity, which 

has been a longstanding area of interest in relation to job performance. 

FM 6-22 makes a similar connection between intellect and performance 

in its definition of intellectual capacity, “mental resources or tendencies 

that shape a leaders’ conceptual abilities and impact effectiveness.”19 

The interest in this relationship intuitively makes sense: as leaders 

gain responsibility, they generally experience greater demands in the 

complexity of problems therefore requiring greater intellectual capacity. 

However, while there is validity to competent leaders possessing higher 

intellect, recent studies suggest that the impact of intelligence to improved 

performance as a leader is generally moderated by other factors not 

directly related to intelligence. In other words, even though intelligence 

is important to leadership, it makes little difference in isolation unless a 

leader is able to effectively complement their intellectual capacity with 

other important characteristics.20
6

For example, the quality of resiliency is an extremely important 

moderator in the pragmatic manifestation of intelligence within a 

leadership role. In a review of professional literature, Fiedler and Gibson 

(2010) found that intellectual ability contributed little to performance 

among leaders who possessed poorer stress tolerance (i.e. low hardiness) 

while subjected to greater levels of situational stress. Conversely, for 

participants who possessed higher resiliency, greater intellectual ability 

tended to have a meaningful impact on leadership performance, especially 

as responsibilities increased.21 One possible explanation for this dynamic 

is that increased anxiety or stress places greater strain on an individual’s 

ability to concentrate on more complex tasks as commonly required in 

leadership positions of greater responsibility. Therefore, individuals who 

possess higher resiliency are better equipped to moderate the effects of 

stress, allowing for greater commitment of their intellectual resources to 

their job demands.

Another important factor in the manifestation of intellect in relation to 

leadership performance is EI. Similar to resiliency, general intelligence has 

little impact on a leader’s performance unless he or she possesses some of 

the social and interpersonal skills necessary in motivating and directing a 

group to a common objective. Bartone, Eid, and Snook (2009) study found 

that leader performance was best predicted by a combination of intellectual 

abilities, hardiness, and social judgment (EI) versus intellectual abilities 

alone. This empirical data suggests that while intellectual capacity is an 

important attribute in a model of leadership, it must be complemented 

by other factors in order to make a meaningful contribution to overall 

performance.

Contextual Factors to Effective Leadership

As seen in the discussion up to this point, much of the past research 

on leadership has primarily centered on the individual traits, abilities, 

or characteristics of effective leaders. FM 6-22 is no different with its 

primary focus on the individual characteristics and behaviors an Army 

leader is expected to demonstrate in order to be most effective. However, 

more recent research indicates this preoccupation on the individual leader 

is missing a powerful contributor to effective leadership: social contextual 

factors. This substantive area of empirical interest strongly suggests that 

leadership is not simply possessing a set of certain qualities alone but 

rather of the relationship between leaders and followers that matters most 

in regards to leader efficacy.22 Although individual traits and competencies 

should not be ignored in establishing a model for leadership, failure to 

understand and integrate the social context of leadership into a model 

is omitting a critical aspect of the formula used to calculate competent 

leadership.
7

In conducting extensive research on this issue, Haslam, Reicher, and 

Platow (2011) determined that context played a more significant role than 

individual traits as emphasized by more traditional views on leadership 

efficacy. More specifically, they discovered three critical factors to 

effective, influential leadership. The first factor they identified is that 

leaders must be viewed by their followers as highly representative of their 

group. This point may seem patently obvious, but often leaders fail in this 

respect simply because they do not recognize or understand their group’s 

identity and/or they fail to see the value in closely aligning themselves 

with the group they supposedly represent.23

In elaborating further, these researchers found that the more an 

individual is viewed by group members as “one of us,” the more influential 

he or she will be within the group and consequently, the more willing other 

group members will be to follow their direction. One of the most important 

areas of interest within the field of leadership is to understand why and 

how some people within a group become more influential than others. 

As seen in much of the past research, many researchers have sought to 

address this issue by identifying a set of specific qualities – attributes and 

behaviors like those in FM 6-22 – that aspiring leaders need to display in 

order to differentiate themselves from their followers. In contrast, Haslam, 

Reicher, and Platow’s (2011) analysis suggests that prospective leaders’ 

primary goal should not be to differentiate themselves from those they 

seek to lead, but seek to emphasize their commonalities.24

There are a broad range of studies that have demonstrated not only the 

most prototypical members (i.e. most embodying the characteristics) of a 

group are the most influential, but also that, given a choice, their fellow 

group members will often prefer leaders who display in-group prototypical 

characteristics ahead of those who display qualities that are stereotypical 

of leaders in general.25 For example, in one study, researchers explored 

leader influence on separate groups whose members either perceived the 

leader as similar to them (“friendly,” “easy going,” and “tolerant”) or 

different (“intellectual,” “high achieving,” and “serious”). The researchers 

found that when group members perceived the leader as embodying the 

characteristics of the group, the leader was rated as more influential and 

charismatic, even though the leader lacked characteristics commonly 

associated with effective leaders (e.g. “high achieving,” “intellectual”). 

Researchers found this to be particularly true if those leaders appeared to 

demonstrate greater interest in the group, and framed their leadership in 

transformational rather than transactional terms.26

A second critical factor in effective leadership identified by Haslam, 

Reicher, and Platow (2011) is that leaders must be viewed by their followers 

as an “in-group champion” – an individual who exerts considerable effort 

for the greater good of the group. To engage followers in a powerful and 
8

influential way, leaders’ actions and visions must promote group interests 

consistent with the norms and values for that particular group. Similar 

to the last factor, this point may seem rather obvious, but again, many 

leaders fail to understand it and more importantly, apply it. According to 

the researchers, the key to this factor has less to do with a leader simply 

exerting great effort on behalf of his or her group, but exerting effort within

the framework of the group’s own norms and values.27 To accomplish this 

objective, aspiring leaders must first understand their group’s identity as 

well as the concept of social identity – a term that relates to an individual’s 

self-concept derived from group membership distinct from other groups.28

To illustrate this factor, the Army is a large organization with it’s own 

set of well-established values and standards. While most of these values 

are explicit and standardized, there are many different units within the 

Army that possess their own unique group norms and values as well as 

distinct group identities from which members derive a significant aspect 

of their self-concept (i.e. social identity). For example, the 101st Airborne 

Division 3d Brigade “Rakkasans” possesses an identity distinct from 

other infantry units in the Army to include other brigades from the 101st 

Airborne Division. This unique group identity serves to communicate a 

positive distinctness from other groups, which consequently, serves to 

affirmatively shape the self-concepts of each soldier that is a member 

of the unit. Further, within the “Rakkasans,” each battalion, company, 

platoon, and squad possess slightly different group identities from which 

soldiers further derive significance. While an infantry officer from another 

unit can be very successful within the “Rakkasans,” his success as a leader 

is most likely predicated upon understanding the group’s unique identity 

as well as the unique values and norms that govern it, not simply exerting 

great effort on behalf of the group.

Extending this point, research strongly suggests that leaders who are 

perceived by their followers in this respect glean a number of important 

benefits. In addition to receiving endorsements from their followers, they 

are likely to be viewed as charismatic, influential in the views of their 

followers, and much more capable of enlisting the efforts of their followers 

in bringing their visions for the group to fruition.29 These are all important 

elements to being an effective leader, but their achievement is based 

upon a leader understanding the group’s social identity and advocating 

consistently within the norms and values of the group.

Finally, Haslam, Reicher, and Platow (2011) identified that effective 

leaders actively construct an identity for their group that is translated 

into reality. Research in this area indicates effective leaders are not 

permanently bound to a group’s identity where they simply operate within 

its boundaries, but they become masters of it. In support of this point, 

history has repeatedly demonstrated that the most effective leaders create 
9

and shape their groups’ identities, and consequently, those identities create 

and shape institutions, organizations, and entire societies. These leaders 

accomplish this in recognition of the fact that a group of people with a 

shared identity possesses much more power than people without it. Indeed, 

one of the central reasons why great leadership is so admired is that it 

gives evidence to the simple fact that history is not made by groups with 

the greatest resources or numbers, but by those groups whose energies 

have been galvanized by leaders into the most coherent social force. These 

leaders take the ideas, values, and priorities of the group and translate 

them into reality. In analyzing this factor, research has strongly suggested 

that group identity is the source of this coherence and transformation and 

therefore, for leaders, it is the most powerful of all leadership resources.30

In addition to empirical support, military history is filled with examples 

that demonstrate this factor in action. For instance, the British Commander, 

General William Slim, during World War II took over the 14th Army in 

Burma at a time when it was defeated, in disarray, and consisting of soldiers 

from very different nationalities. When he assumed command, the 14th 

Army’s identity was best expressed in its informal name “the Forgotten 

Army.” However, in spite of these tremendous challenges, under General 

Slim’s leadership the 14th Army in Burma eventually became highly 

successful against the Japanese.31 Another example is General Matthew 

Ridgeway taking command of the 8th Army in South Korea in December 

1950. Similar to Slim, Ridgeway took over a multinational army that was 

defeated, fragmented, and possessing poor morale. However, like the 

14th Army under Slim, the 8th Army obtained considerable success under 

Ridgeway’s leadership.32

While Ridgeway and Slim possessed different personalities, leadership 

styles, and leader characteristics, one of their first courses of action after 

taking command was to understand their groups’ identity and to begin 

aggressively reshaping it in a positive way.33 Both these leaders supported 

these actions through establishing a vision for their respective groups and 

creating the organizational structures necessary to translate their army’s 

reshaped identity into reality. They recognized in their men that in spite of 

their past failures, they innately desired to be successful, to attain victory, 

and to accomplish the worthwhile, which both leaders effectively tapped 

in order to form a new identity. Based upon extensive research on social 

identity and leadership, it is highly unlikely that either of these leaders 

would have been nearly as successful without this understanding of 

identity, recognizing the critical need to reshape it, and implementing the 

necessary actions to translate the reshaped identity into reality.34

Potential Improvements to the Army’s Model of Leadership

When reflecting on this analysis of relevant empirical information, 

it presents a number of important opportunities for improvement to the 
10

Army’s present model. First, while FM 6-22 identifies several leadership 

attributes consistent with the research on leadership efficacy, greater 

emphasis should be placed on certain characteristics that clearly possess a 

strong empirical relationship to leadership efficacy. The most significant 

example on this point is the attribute of resiliency. To the Army’s credit, 

it recognized the importance of this leadership characteristic by including 

it in the most recent version of FM 6-22. However, the manual devoted 

only four brief paragraphs to this attribute and primarily framed its 

application around combat. Within the empirical literature on leadership, 

the characteristic of resiliency or hardiness possesses one of the strongest 

relationships to leadership efficacy. Further, the data suggests that the 

positive manifestation of other leadership qualities like intellect is 

primarily tied to the possession of strong resiliency. Resiliency also 

contains a much broader application beyond combat in the execution of 

competent leadership. The majority of leaders in the Army will not directly 

experience combat; nonetheless, positions of leadership in the Army 

possess considerable stress demands and responsibility, which require 

substantive resiliency in order to produce positive and lasting results. The 

Army leadership model needs a more balanced emphasis on leadership 

characteristics to reflect this research. 

Second, the empirical information suggests that the Army should 

consider re-conceptualizing its major categories within the leadership 

model. Presently, FM 6-22 divides 12 leadership attributes into three 

categories consisting of leader character, presence, and intellectual 

capacity. While most of the attributes are logically placed within these three 

categories, the placement of empathy and interpersonal tact in their present 

categories does not fit conceptually within their respective domains. For 

example, when considering intellectual capacity, the attributes of mental 

agility, judgment, innovation, and domain knowledge are conceptually 

linked; however, interpersonal tact represents a different skill domain from 

intellectual capacity. Research indicates that interpersonal tact as reflected 

by emotional intelligence measures a different skill set from intellect.35 An 

individual with low intellectual ability is unlikely to demonstrate much 

mental agility, innovative thinking, and the ability to effectively assess 

complex situations and formulate sound decisions on limited information 

(i.e. the attribute of sound judgment). However, the same individual could 

still potentially possess high interpersonal tact. The same argument could 

be directed toward the inclusion of empathy under leader presence. Both 

empathy and interpersonal tact are much more conceptually linked to 

emotional intelligence. Given the importance of EI within the empirical 

literature, empathy and interpersonal tact should be placed within a 

separate domain, which would also provide more appropriate emphasis to 

their importance in competent leadership.
11

Finally, the empirical information on leadership suggests that 

the Army’s model should place much greater emphasis on leaders 

understanding and utilizing social contextual factors. Although FM 

6-22 provides some emphasis on the relationship between leaders and 

followers within leader competencies, the model is ultimately leader 

centric, suggesting the foundation of competent leadership begins with an 

individual possessing certain attributes. As indicated in the last section, 

the research does not support this approach to establishing a model of 

leadership. A balanced model of leadership clearly needs to incorporate 

the understanding and application of group identity in order to produce the 

most effective outcomes for an organization. Undoubtedly, the attributes 

contained in FM 6-22 are important to effective leadership; however, an 

effective leader also recognizes, understands, and actively shapes their 

group’s identity consistent with organizational values, norms, and goals. 

Although FM 6-22 does an excellent job in explicitly communicating 

leadership standards, it is ultimately negligent in applying appropriate and 

balanced emphasis on empirically based factors of leadership.

Conclusion

The FM 6-22 provides a valuable and comprehensive model for 

understanding leadership and the competencies required to be successful 

as a leader in the Army. However, an analysis of relevant empirical 

literature suggest that the model needs to change in order to better reflect 

the factors necessary to developing the most effective leaders. While the 

model stresses several leadership attributes that are empirically based, 

this review revealed that the Army’s model requires greater emphasis 

on certain characteristics (e.g. resiliency, EI) that possess the strongest 

empirical relationship to leadership efficacy. Further, more recent research 

on leadership psychology stresses the significance of social contextual 

factors; however, FM 6-22 has not fully incorporated this critical data 

into the model’s conceptual framework. Although the Army’s model 

relies upon valuable information in formulating the basis for competent 

leadership, this review indicates that the next revision needs to integrate 

greater empirical data in order to establish the best model for influential, 

competent leadership. 
12

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(1998): 559-576.

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131-145.

Bartone, Paul T., Eid, Jarle, and Snook, Scott. “Big five personality 

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performance.” Leadership and Organization Development Journal Vol. 

30 (6) (March 2009): 498-521.

Bradbeer, Thomas. “Setting the Stage: Korea, December 1950.” US 

Army Command and General Staff College, L200 Book of Readings 

(Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, December 2011), 207-212. 

Ciulla, Joanne B. “Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness.” In The 

Nature of Leadership, edited by J. Antonakis, A.T. Cianciolo, and R.J. 

Sternberg. New York: Sage Publications, 2004.

Dwane, Thomas. “Examining the Relationship between Emotional 

Intelligence and Leadership Effectiveness of Navy Human Resource 

Officer.” Proquest Dissertation and Theses Northwestern University 

Publication number 3492174 (May 2010): 200-239.

Fiedler, Fred E. and Gibson, Frederick W. “Determinants of Effective 

Utilization of Leader Abilities.” (2010) online at < http://www.au.af.mil/

au/awc/awcgate/au-24/fiedler.pdf> accessed on 20 February 2012.

Goleman, D. “Emotional Intelligence.” New York, NY: Bantam 

Books, 1995.

Haslam, S. Alexander, Reicher, Stephen D. and Platow, Michael 

J. “The New Psychology of Leadership.” New York, NY: Psychology 

Press, 2011.

Hogg, Michael and Vaughan, Graham. “Social Psychology.” Upper 

Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002.

Jacobsen, Mary-Elaine. “Moral Leadership, Effective Leadership, 

and Intellectual Giftedness: Problems, Parallels, and Possibilities.” In 

Morality, Ethics, and Gifted Minds, edited by Don Ambrose and Tracy 

Cross. New York: Springer Press, 2010.
13

Mills, Lane B. “A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between 

Emotional Intelligence and Effective Leadership.” Journal of Curriculum 

and Instruction Vol 3(2): 22-38.

Northouse, P.G. “Leadership: Theory and practice.” (4th ed.). 

Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2006.

Platow, M.J., van Knippenberg, D., Haslam, S.A., van Knippenberg, 

B., and Spears, R. “A Special Gift we bestow on you for being 

representative of us: Considering leader charisma from a selfcategorization perspective.” British Journal of Social Psychology Vol. 45 

(2006): 317.

Purins, Aivars. “Uncle Bill of ‘the Forgotten Army’ or the Leadership 

of Field-Marshall Lord Slim.” Baltic Security and Defense Review Vol. 

10 (2008): 205-210.

Turner, Nick, Barling, Julian, and Epitropaki, Olga. 

“Transformational Leadership and Moral Reasoning.” Journal of 

Applied Psychology 87(2): 304-311.
14

Notes

1. Department of the Army, FM 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, October 2006), viii. 

2. FM 6-22, v.

3. FM 6-22, 4-1.

4. Joanne B. Ciulla, “Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness.” In The Nature 

of Leadership, edited by J. Antonakis, A.T. Cianciolo, and R.J. Sternberg (New 

York: Sage Publications, 2004), 302-327.

5. P.G. Northouse, “Leadership: Theory and practice,” (4th ed.), (Thousand 

Oaks: Sage Publications, 2006), 14.

6. L.E. Atwater, S.D. Dionne, J.F. Camobreco, B.J. Avolio, and A. Lau, 

“Individual attributes and leadership style: Predicting the use of punishment and 

its effects.” Journal of Organizational Behavior 19: 559-576.

7. Mary-Elaine Jacobsen, “Moral Leadership, Effective Leadership, and 

Intellectual Giftedness: Problems, Parallels, and Possibilities.” In Morality, 

Ethics, and Gifted Minds, edited by Don Ambrose and Tracy Cross (New York: 

Springer Press, 2010), 29-46.

8. Nick Turner, Julian Barling, and Olga Epitropaki, “Transformational 

Leadership and Moral Reasoning.” Journal of Applied Psychology 87(2): 304-

311.

9. D. Goleman, “Emotional Intelligence,” (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 

1995), 6.

10. FM 6-22, 4-9.

11. Thomas Dwane, “Examining the Relationship between Emotional 

Intelligence and Leadership Effectiveness of Navy Human Resource Officer.” 

Proquest Dissertation and Theses Northwestern University Publication number 

3492174 (May 2010): 200-239.

12. Dwane, 200-239.

13. Lane B. Mills, “A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Emotional 

Intelligence and Effective Leadership,” Journal of Curriculum and Instruction Vol 

3(2): 22-38.

14. FM 6-22, 5-3.

15. Gerald F. Sewell, “How Emotional Intelligence Can Make a Difference.” 

Military Review (March-April 2011): 79.

16. Paul T. Bartone, “Resilience Under Military Operational Stress: Can 

Leaders Influence Hardiness?” Military Psychology 18 (Suppl.) (2010): 131-

145.

17. Paul T. Bartone, Jarle Eid, and Scott Snook, “Big five personality factors, 

hardiness, and social judgment as predictors of leader performance.” Leadership 

and Organization Development Journal Vol. 30 (6) (March 2009): 498-521.

18. Bartone, Eid, and Snook 137.
15

19. FM 6-22, A-11.

20. Fred E. Fiedler and Frederick W. Gibson. “Determinants of Effective 

Utilization of Leader Abilities.” (2010) online at < http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/au-24/fiedler.pdf> accessed on 20 February 2012.

21. Fiedler and Gibson, 173.

22. S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platow, “The 

New Psychology of Leadership,” (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2011), 75.

23. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 75.

24. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 106.

25. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 103.

26. M.J. Platow, D. van Knippenberg, S.A. Haslam, B. van Knippenberg, 

and R. Spears, “A Special Gift we bestow on you for being representative of 

us: Considering leader charisma from a self-categorization perspective.” British 

Journal of Social Psychology Vol. 45 (2006): 317.

27. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership, 133.

28. Michael Hogg and Graham Vaughan, “Social Psychology,” (Upper 

Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 16.

29. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership, 134.

30. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 163-164.

31. Aivars Purins, “Uncle Bill of ‘the Forgotten Army’ or the Leadership of 

Field-Marshall Lord Slim.” Baltic Security and Defense Review Vol. 10 (2008): 

205-210.

32. Thomas Bradbeer, “Setting the Stage: Korea, December 1950,” US Army 

Command and General Staff College, L200 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: 

USACGSC, December 2011), 207-212. 

33. Bradbeer, 208-209; Purins, Uncle Bill of the Forgotten Army, 212-215.

34. Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership, 162-

164.

35. Bartone, Eid, and Snook, Big five personality factors, 499-500.

17

Managing Risk in Today’s Army*

Major Brendan Gallagher

Of all the characteristics an organizational-level leader must 

exhibit, one of the most important is the ability to effectively manage risk. 

A three part analysis consisting of first, what recent US Army doctrine has 

to say about the topic; second, how elements of risk are embedded within 

virtually every significant leadership decision in the current operating 

environment; and finally, the implications upon today’s Army helps to 

shed light on this critical leadership issue. Through this approach, one 

can appreciate how and why the manner in which the Army addresses this 

topic will carry important repercussions upon the force as a whole. 

The Doctrinal Context

Recent Army doctrine addresses the topic of risk in several publications, 

each of which addresses it from a slightly different perspective. It is worth 

a brief review of these outlooks to help provide a useful starting point from 

which to further analyze the subject. 

First, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, published in October 

2011, provides a conceptual foundation for the Army’s recent shift to 

Unified Land Operations. Within its trim fourteen page length, it also 

directly addresses risk in the following passage:

The theater of operations often contains more space and people 

than US forces can directly control. Army leaders make risk mitigation 

decisions about where and how to employ their forces to achieve a position 

of relative advantage over the enemy without alienating or endangering 

noncombatants.1

The passage implies that every decision invariably carries an 

opportunity cost. When a leader decides to employ combat power or 

influence in a particular way, then that generally means he or she cannot 

employ those same resources in another potentially deserving location at 

the same time. Therefore a leader must remain cognizant of the operational 

variables (PMESII-PT) and the mission variables (METT-TC) in order to 

understand how the various dynamics interconnect and arrive at a decision. 

FM 5-0 (The Operations Process) dated March 2010 addresses risk 

as well. Specifically, as the manual discusses how to craft an operational 

approach, it expands upon the link between risk and resources. FM 5-0 

stresses that “rarely does one organization directly control all the necessary 

resources,” and therefore a commander must determine “the acceptable 

* This paper is the second place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College 

of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-01.
18

level of risk to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative.”2 Because resources 

are inherently finite, their employment will drive significant decisions 

which can impact which side gains or maintains the initiative. Where to 

allocate limited ISR collection assets, where and when to focus combat 

patrols, and where to emplace a combat outpost all exemplify examples 

of such decisions. In this way, FM 5-0 elaborates upon the connection 

between the allocation of resources and the assumption of risk.

Risk mitigation is addressed from a slightly different angle in FM 

3-07 (Stability Operations), published in October 2008. It describes an 

“interdependent relationship among initiative, opportunity, and risk,” 

and insists that leaders “accept prudent risk to create opportunities when 

they lack clear direction.”3

 FM 3-07’s incorporation of opportunity helps 

expand the horizon of the discussion. If a leader finds himself or herself 

unable or unwilling to assume some degree of risk at critical junctures, 

it could eliminate the possibility of generating or capitalizing upon such 

fleeting opportunities. 

A recent example of this link between risk and opportunity was the 

2007 Awakening in Baghdad, in which groups of former insurgents stepped 

forward to break away from Al Qaeda in Iraq. US commanders at various 

levels knowingly assumed some obvious risk by allying with these groups 

in order to help marginalize or defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Although the Iraqi 

government continues to grapple with the long-term integration of these 

former insurgents, US commanders on the ground positively embraced 

this opportunity. This typified a clear example of the often challenging 

balance between risk and opportunity which FM 3-07 describes.

Finally, a slightly older publication, FM 5-19 (Composite Risk 

Management) dated August 2006 also addresses the topic of risk throughout 

its contents. In contrast to the previous publications, much of the focus of 

FM 5-19 is upon the mechanics of risk management. It lays out a step-bystep process, as depicted in the diagram below. The manual also addresses 

how to apply this process in conjunction with Troop Leading Procedures 

(TLPs), the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and overall 

training management. Although FM 5-19 tends to be somewhat formulaic 

in its approach, it nevertheless provides a concrete sequence for units to 

refer to during the decision making process.

Collectively, these publications demonstrate the manner in which 

official Army doctrine has addressed the topic of risk in recent years. The 

publications help underscore several key points. First, they highlight the 

finite resource constraints which are an inherent part of combat operations, 

and how risk is directly tied to them. Second, the publications underline 

the linkages between risk, initiative, and the exploitation of battlefield 

opportunities. Furthermore, they provide a deliberate process for units to 

attempt to follow as they work through such challenges. This doctrinal 
19

foundation helps set the stage for a consideration of how risk mitigation 

applies to the contemporary operating environment.

The Army’s Composite Risk Management (CRM) Process. 

Source FM 5-19 (Composite Risk Management).4

Risk and the Current Operating Environment

One must appreciate the fact that virtually every leadership decision 

is fraught with risk, since the presence of risk helps comprise the very 

definition of what a ‘decision’ is. According to the Oxford English 

Dictionary, a decision means “the making up of one’s mind on any point 

or course of action; a resolution, determination.”5

 The definition implies 

a tradeoff between different paths—in other words, a leader must choose 

one action over another by comparing the respective costs and benefits. 

If one course of action is entirely risk-free in every way, then a decision 

is probably not required because the correct path is obvious. However 

leaders today rarely find themselves in such simple circumstances. More 

frequently there is a tradeoff, and rather than a straightforward choice 

between good and bad, or black and white, leaders today frequently 

find themselves operating in murkier shades of gray in which such 

stark contrasts are not apparent.6

 In such instances, each potential path 

embodies different degrees of risk in various areas, whether in terms of 

risk to the overall mission, risk to subordinates’ lives, or other areas. It 

falls upon the leader’s shoulders to grapple with these competing factors, 

usually with incomplete information, limited time, and less-than-optimal 

circumstances.
20

A hypothetical example helps demonstrate this all-encompassing 

aspect of risk in practice in the current environment. Suppose a maneuver 

unit deployed to a combat zone receives credible information regarding a 

high value target’s (HVT) whereabouts later tonight. This particular HVT 

is a low-level insurgent financier whose transactions facilitate attacks 

against coalition forces. The unit had previously planned to focus on route 

reconnaissance operations during that same time period because the unit 

has endured numerous IED strikes, and aggressive reconnaissance during 

those hours helps deny key terrain to the enemy. The unit’s commander 

and staff have carefully analyzed the situation and determined that 

unfortunately they do not have sufficient combat power to conduct both 

operations. Tonight, they must choose—either conduct a raid of the HVT’s 

location, or focus on counter-IED patrolling. If they choose the raid, they 

may potentially capture the HVT but at the same time allow IED(s) to be 

emplaced due to the lack of reconnaissance. They can try to creatively 

mitigate that risk using ISR and other assets, but ultimately the unit will 

probably still assume somewhat greater risk from IEDs. Alternatively, a 

focus on route reconnaissance should help secure the routes which may 

help save soldiers’ lives in the short term, but could also allow the insurgent 

financier to slip away for good. Either way, embedded within this decision 

are notable long-term consequences.

To further muddy the waters, suppose the unit also received scattered, 

unconfirmed reporting of an insurgent attack planned against a friendly 

combat outpost sometime in the next two weeks. With this additional 

information, perhaps another course of action would be to forego both the 

raid and the route reconnaissance, and instead use all available combat 

power to bolster the outpost’s defenses. Yet such a decision would heighten 

the risk in those other two areas—facilitating the financier’s possible 

escape, and allowing the emplacement of additional IEDs.

One can see from this admittedly simplistic example why there is 

almost never a straightforward risk-free path. The commander and his 

staff are constantly confronted with many conflicting strands of data and 

intelligence, and each potential path entails differing degrees of risk. The 

risks may include the weighing of short-term versus long-term priorities, 

progress in kinetic versus non-kinetic areas, and countless other tradeoffs. 

The weight of the decision ultimately rests upon the commander’s 

shoulders, yet the staff is also heavily involved, as the staff should provide 

him with a recommended course of action, including a method to mitigate 

the residual risks. Whatever decision the unit arrives at can have life or 

death consequences, and can directly affect mission accomplishment. 

One should further appreciate that at the organizational level, a leader’s 

decisions can generate exceptionally far-reaching effects. Whereas at the 

direct level of leadership units are generally smaller with impacts more 
21

readily apparent, at the organizational level there are usually many more 

factors at play, and results may be simultaneously more indirect yet 

more consequential.7 An organizational level leaders’ job is often more 

challenging for this reason, because he or she must account for a wider 

degree of complexity with more protracted ripple effects. This often 

requires an even more sustained and focused application of judgment, 

experience, and creativity than is required at the direct level of leadership. 

All this renders the leader’s decisions and the management of risk that 

much more important.

In the ‘hybrid’ environment the Army currently confronts, which 

includes both conventional and insurgent threats on an ever-changing 

battlefield, this assessment and mitigation of risk can be exceptionally 

complex. After a suicide blast or IED explosion or some other traumatic 

event, one may be tempted to look back in hindsight and critique the unit’s 

leadership and ask why they didn’t do things differently. Perhaps the 

easiest question to pose in retrospect is: how come they couldn’t see the 

train coming? But before one travels down that road, one should consider 

the myriad of other threat streams and competing demands existing at the 

time of the decision. One must attempt to acquire a true sense of what it 

was like to stand in the leadership’s shoes at the time without the benefit 

of hindsight, in an environment with few unequivocally “right” answers.

Implications and Relevance to Today’s Army

All this carries important implications upon the exercise of leadership 

in the present-day Army. First, it is worth noting at the outset what will not

be a useful technique for leaders to adopt in dealing with this challenge: 

risk aversion. Risk aversion entails an excessive desire to avoid risk at 

virtually any cost, which can paralyze a unit into inaction or squander 

key opportunities. In the current environment, this might be represented 

by units spending most of their time on fortified bases, hunkered down 

behind layers of thick defenses with minimal interaction. Such a posture 

relinquishes the initiative to the enemy, and may create a perception 

that US forces are unwilling or unable to complete their mission.8

 Risk 

aversion contributes to an excessively cautious approach9

 which overly 

centralizes decision-making at higher echelons of authority, and tends to 

stifle individual initiative. Curiously, the only time FM 5-19 (Composite 

Risk Management) directly addresses the topic of risk aversion is in a 

single, brief sentence: “Do not be risk averse.”10 The topic of risk aversion 

deserves further discussion throughout the ranks.

Army leaders at the organizational level and above should appreciate 

that even successful efforts to mitigate risk in the most prudent and logical 

ways can still result in occasional losses or outright disaster. Even when 

all the right precautionary measures are taken, US forces still confront an 

intelligent, thinking, adaptive enemy, and ‘the enemy always gets a vote.’ 
22

Since no unit can guard against every threat at every place and time, there 

will invariably be instances in which the enemy achieves a short-term 

success via a high profile attack, assassination, or some other action. Such 

a negative event may be accompanied by unflattering US media coverage, 

a rise in organizational stress,11 and an accompanying desire to hold 

someone accountable. Yet a rush to judgment may be profoundly unfair to 

the unit closest to the event, and also counterproductive to the long-term 

climate of the Army. A leader’s goal is to try to establish conditions so such 

setbacks occur as rarely as possible, but with the implicit understanding 

that such setbacks cannot ever be entirely eliminated. 

All this is not a recommendation to absolve commanders of 

accountability for their actions. Leaders unequivocally shoulder the 

ultimate responsibility for the decisions they make or fail to make, as well 

as the actions of their subordinate units. Yet there is an enormous gulf 

between a leader who consistently makes the best decisions possible in an 

ambiguous, uncertain environment and a leader who is simply negligent, 

careless, unfit for command, or fosters a poor command climate. There is 

also a fine line between justly holding leaders accountable for their actions, 

and scapegoating. The Army would be wise to bear such key distinctions 

in mind in the years ahead, in order to help foster the best climate possible. 

This is particularly relevant as the Army seeks to internalize lessons 

learned from recent high profile events.

This also helps illustrate why an unofficial adoption of a “zero 

defect” approach—a phrase which gained prevalence in the Army during 

the 1990s—would be unfortunate. As the Army appears ready to begin 

a sizeable drawdown of units and personnel, there may be increasing 

pressure to only promote or retain those individuals with a spotless record, 

clear of any blemish whatsoever. Some highly qualified officers and NCOs 

could find their careers cut short due to a singular setback which occurred 

on their watch. Such an environment—or even the perception of such an 

environment—could have negative consequences. It could help prod the 

Army towards a risk averse culture by instilling a perception that leaders 

cannot afford any mistake whatsoever. Commanders could increasingly 

choose to “play it safe” during training and combat operations out of a 

desire to avoid jeopardizing their own careers. The widespread adoption 

of such a mentality could make it harder for Army leaders in the future 

to make a major decision containing significant risk. It would have been 

difficult, perhaps impossible, for Eisenhower to green light an invasion of 

Normandy, for example, had he been paralyzed by risk aversion or a zero 

defect climate.

Risk mitigation is not an exact science, and there is no such thing 

as a riskless decision. The process is an art, and even when performed 

brilliantly, leaders will still occasionally confront setbacks or even outright 
23

failure. The multitude of decisions an organizational leader is responsible 

for every day can literally have life or death impacts, either directly or 

through secondary repercussions. Yet a leader cannot eliminate every risk 

on the modern battlefield because no human could ever achieve such an 

endstate. Rather, a leader must intelligently assume risk in deliberate ways, 

while seeking to mitigate the residual risks in the smartest ways possible. 

Leaders have no choice but to carefully weigh all the various factors in the 

context of their own best judgment and experience, and commit to what 

they believe represents the wisest course of action, despite incomplete and 

often conflicting information. 

True breakthroughs on the battlefield will often arrive through “a 

willingness to accept risk, and do things differently.”12 Operation Overlord 

and Operation Market Garden represented examples of such risk taking 

during World War II, with strikingly different results. In the future, the 

Army’s success may not result from absolute perfection, but rather from 

experimentation, learning from failure, and the implementation of logical 

measures to manage risk. Such techniques should be encouraged rather 

than inadvertently constrained, as the Army strives to find the right 

balance between the instilment of accountability and the encouragement 

of sensible risk taking. These two areas should not be treated as mutually 

opposing goals. Overall, the Army should appreciate that how this timely 

issue is handled will help influence the Army’s trajectory in the years to 

come.
24

Notes

1. Army Training and Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2011), 4.

2. Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: GPO, 

March 2010), 3-11,3-12.

3. FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, October 2008), 

4-2.

4. FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management (Washington, DC: GPO, August 

2006), 1-3.

5. The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, vol. IV, prepared by J.A. 

Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 332. 

6. Jack D. Kem, “The Use of the Ethical Triangle in Military Ethical 

Decision Making” (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff 

College, 2009), 25.

7. FM 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile

(Washington, DC: GPO, October 2006), 11-2.

8. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: GPO, December 2006), 

1-27.

9. Jim Michaels, “Top Officer Sees Military Caution as Backfiring,” USA 

Today (15 June 2010) online at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-

06-15-iraq--afghanistan_N.htm> (19 March 2012).

10. FM 5-19, 1-2.

11. Paul T. Bartone, “Resilience Under Military Operational Stress: Can 

Leaders Influence Hardiness?” Military Psychology 18 (suppl.) (2006): S136.

12. Yvonne Doll and Billy Miller, “Applying the Kotter Model: Making 

Transformational Change in a Large Organization,” The International Journal of 

Knowledge, Culture, and Change Management, vol. 8, (2008): 53.
25

Control and Fear

Enhancing Soldier Performance and Welfare*

Major Hugh W. A. Jones

Anybody who says they’re not afraid of war is either a liar or they’re 

crazy.

—Norman Schwarzkopf

Fear, an emotional response to threat and danger, is a reality of 

combat. In manageable doses, fear creates focus, clarity, and enhances 

physical capabilities by triggering the “fight-or-flight” response. However, 

excessive fear leads to anxiety, an emotional state typically occurring 

without external threat.1

 At extremes, fear leads to decreased performance 

through emotional exhaustion, apathy, resignation, and creates an increased 

likelihood of eventual Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).2 Given the 

inherently dangerous nature of combat, it is therefore critical for combat 

leaders to harness fear, managing and mitigating the effects of fear in their 

organizations. Not only is this in the best interests of the Soldier, but it 

also enhances unit performance and mission accomplishment. Empirical 

observation of human behavior in combat3 and numerous research 

experiments4

 have proven that the perception of control over one’s 

environment greatly decreases fear regardless of the actual probabilities 

and consequences of physical harm. In other words, the belief that one has 

some control over a situation reduces fear, regardless of the actual danger. 

The ability to reduce fear through perceived control in combat operations 

represents a powerful tool for the combat leader, but does not necessarily 

override tactical and operational considerations. 

This article discusses the effects of perceived control on fear, and 

the application of this relationship to combat leadership and operations. I 

will also use personal combat experience and observations to discuss this 

relationship and its potential combat applications. 

The Effect of Control on Fear

Bomber pilots in World War II, flying fixed courses through enemy 

flak, reported experiencing greater fear than fighter pilots despite 

experiencing a significantly lower casualty rate (23 percent versus 48 

percent).5

 A significant difference between bomber pilots and fighter pilots 

is the level of individual control. The fighter pilots had a greater level of 

control over their course and aircraft, than the bomber pilots. It is important 

* This paper is the third place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-01.
26

to note that the bomber pilots were more fearful despite a significantly 

lower casualty rate, or were more fearful despite less actual danger. This 

example illustrates that actual danger is less important in creating fear than 

the individual’s perception of control. The clear parallel in contemporary 

conflict is convoy personnel who drive a fixed route on roads targeted with 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Experiments corroborate and elaborate on this observation. In an 

experiment in which a psychologist administered a panic-provoking agent 

(5.5 percent carbon dioxide) to panic-prone patients, the psychologist told 

half of the patients that they could reduce the concentration of the agent 

by turning a dial when a light was illuminated. The experimenter did not 

provide this option to other half. The group with the dial reported both 

less fear and a shorter duration of fear, despite the dial being completely 

inoperative.6

 The inoperative dial is another instance of perceived control 

reducing fear, despite having no actual effect on the danger. Actual panic 

agent levels were the same for each group, the only difference was that 

the group with the dial thought they had some control. We can therefore 

conclude that, to some degree, the level of actual control is not as important 

as the perception of control.

A study of mountaineers further corroborates this conclusion. Like 

combat, mountaineering is extremely dangerous with some mountains 

having fatality rates approaching 50 percent.7

 However, mountaineers 

make extreme sacrifices to pursue this activity voluntarily, despite the 

danger, much like Soldiers in combat. We see in mountaineers a strong 

distinction between uncontrollable risks and those risks that they can 

mitigate by skill or caution. Mountaineers willingly accept those risks they 

feel they can control, while they disdain those they cannot. “When the 

risks depend solely on chance, not skill, the mountaineer enjoys them as 

little as anyone.”8

From these and other studies, we can conclude that the perception 

of control significantly reduces fear. Reducing fear to manageable levels 

increases individual performance, reduces unhealthy anxiety, and reduces 

the likelihood of eventual PTSD.

Implications for Combat Leaders

Appreciating that the perception of control diminishes fear, there are 

six key considerations for combat leaders. Holding all else equal, these 

considerations are: (1) an individual with more control, such as a leader, 

will tend to experience less fear than a subordinate with less control; (2) 

regardless of actual control, a leader must endeavor to exude control of a 

situation in both action and communication; (3) reasonable delegation of 

control to subordinate leaders will enhance control, and thereby reduce 

fear; (4) new Soldiers will experience relatively more fear than experienced 
27

Soldiers; (5) incoming leaders in particular must consider and mitigate the 

influence of control on fear; and, (6) organizations in offensive operations 

will experience less fear.

Leaders Experience Less Fear than Subordinates

By virtue of their position and authority, leaders have more control 

over a given situation than their subordinates. Therefore, leaders must 

appreciate that they will experience less fear than their subordinates. 

Leaders must remember this consideration when judging the actions of 

their subordinates and consider the relationship between perceived control 

and fear for planning and operations. While a leader faces additional stress 

due to their increased responsibility, in terms of fear, they will experience 

less. My personal observations over two deployments to combat as an 

Infantry company commander support this assertion. Despite a significant 

casualty rate (~20 percent wounded, ~6 percent killed) and approximately 

one enemy contact every two days, I rarely experienced significant levels 

of fear. Additionally, I noticed that this pattern held for my subordinates 

as well, leaders tended to experience less fear than a member of the squad. 

I do not attribute this to significantly greater levels of courage in leaders 

than the average, but rather to their increased control. In circumstances in 

which I did experience greater levels of fear, I typically had less control. 

Leaders Must Exude Control in Both Actions and Communication.

If the perception of control reduces fear, then leaders must demonstrate 

control in both action and communication during dangerous situations, 

regardless of their actual level of control. This is intuitive although it is 

frequently violated, particularly by those with little combat experience, 

and therefore more likely to get overly excited. I know from personal 

experience that in an intense firefight there is nothing worse than getting 

the impression that a leader has lost control of himself, or the situation. 

Conversely, a calming, confident voice over the net seems to sooth the 

situation regardless of the fact that their communication tone has no 

material bearing on the gravity of the situation itself and is in fact, arbitrary.

Delegation to Subordinates

If the perception of control reduces fear, then the greater the authority 

of the leader on the ground, the less fear experienced. The implication is to 

reduce the number of tactical constraints on subordinate leaders as much 

as possible, reduce fear by providing the ability, and authority, to control. 

I.e. avoid constraining authorities for close air support, in-direct fires, 

maneuver, etc. Again, from personal experience, it is always comforting 

to know in the back of your mind that you can call on “the big guns,” or 

take other significant measures, if the situation on the ground becomes 

untenable.
28

New Soldiers Will Experience Relatively More Fear

Apart from simple prior combat experience, newly assigned Soldiers 

will experience more fear that Soldiers who have served in the unit long 

enough to learn unit standard operating procedures, personalities, culture, 

etc. A new Soldier will have relatively less control of a given situation 

than an established Soldier. A new Soldier does not know unit nuances and 

thereby how to best exert control of the tactical situation as appropriate. 

Leaders must appreciate this premise in their integration of newly assigned 

Soldiers; endeavor to create understanding and familiarity.

Incoming Leaders Must Consider and Mitigate the Influence of 

Control on Fear

When a new leader assumes control of a unit in combat, the leader 

must appreciate and understand the relationship between control and 

fear. A new leader will have different expectations, modus operandi, etc. 

These changes will reduce subordinates’ perception of control to varying 

degrees, depending on the new leader’s actions. When possible, the new 

leader should avoid reducing subordinate authority and ease into new 

modus operandi, this will enhance subordinate perception of control and 

thereby reduce the potential for fear.

Organizations in Offensive Operations Will Experience Less Fear

In additional to individual control, as discussed above, it is also 

meaningful to consider the control/fear relationship in organizational control 

of the battlefield and resultant Soldier fear. In other words, in the minds of 

the Soldiers, who controls the battlefield, friendly or enemy forces? Are we 

attacking or defending? What demonstrates organizational control of the 

battlefield? We can deduce that proactive, offensive operations producing 

results demonstrate greater control of the battlefield. This deduction does 

not promote ill-conceived, baseless offensive operations for the sake of 

demonstrating control; this simply says that holding all else equal, an 

offensive mindset and operational mix will result in the perception of more 

organizational control of the battlefield and subsequently, less fear. Of 

course, we must appreciate that reducing fear is not the purpose of combat 

operations; this discussion simply provides additional considerations for 

combat leaders to incorporate when appropriate.

We can best examine the importance of an offensive mindset and its 

effect on the control/fear relationship in a contemporary operational setting. 

Consider a frequently IED targeted road. Some convoys take the approach 

of “blowing through” IED strikes. I.e. upon an IED strike, the convoy 

speeds through the engagement area and continues mission. Disregarding 

the numerous tactical disadvantages of this approach, consider the mindset 

of the convoy personnel. They play “Russian roulette” with IEDs every 
29

day, doing little to control the environment or affect the probability of 

future IED strikes. During the surge my company inherited one of the 

most heavily IED targeted stretches of road in Iraq. We targeted this 

threat as proactively as possible. This consisted of counter-IED Small 

Kill Team ambushes and aggressively targeting IED cells. Additionally, 

if we suffered an IED strike we would do as much as possible to track 

down the culprits, starting as soon as possible (within mission constraints). 

Occasionally this required returning to exploit the site of the strike after 

mission completion. The process would sometimes involve multiple days 

of “police work,” but for approximately 50 percent of IED strikes, we 

eventually arrested or killed those responsible. During our deployment, the 

number of IED strikes on this road decreased 93 percent. Not only did we 

actually decrease the threat, but also cognitively, we were exerting control 

over the environment. I have no doubt that this control reduced fear and 

assisted us in functioning effectively despite the real and significant threat 

from IED attack.

From the IED example, we can theorize that proactive, offensive 

operations producing results create a sense of organizational control of 

the battlefield. This control of the battlefield will result in less experienced 

fear for friendly forces, and most likely increased levels of fear in 

enemy combatants. Therefore, holding all else equal, proactive offensive 

operations and an offensive mindset are preferable to defensive operations 

and a defensive mindset in terms of increasing perceived organizational 

control and decreasing fear.

Conclusion

Through scientific experiments and empirical observations of human 

behavior, we know that perceived control reduces fear. Reducing fear 

improves performance and is best for the individual. By the nature of 

our mission, combat units routinely confront dangerous conditions and 

consequently experience some level of fear. Through appreciating and 

applying the mitigating effects of control with respect to fear, combat 

leaders can significantly reduce fear, improve performance, and improve 

Soldier welfare. 

The control/fear relationship indicates six key considerations for 

combat leaders. Holding all else equal, these considerations are: (1) an 

individual with more control, such as a leader, will tend to experience less 

fear than a subordinate with less control; (2) regardless of actual control, 

a leader must endeavor to exude control of a situation in both action 

and communication; (3) reasonable delegation of control to subordinate 

leaders will enhance control, and thereby reduce fear; (4) new Soldiers will 

experience relatively more fear than experienced Soldiers; (5) incoming 

leaders in particular must consider and mitigate the influence of control 

on fear; and, (6) organizations in offensive operations will experience less 

fear.
30

Importantly the control/fear relationship does not necessarily override 

tactical and operational considerations; rather, the relationship represents 

another tool for the combat leader to employ as appropriate. Additionally, 

a perceived lack of control is not the only source of fear; other factors 

are also important, such as previous combat experience, individual 

psychological resilience, and other factors.
31

Notes

1. A. Ohman, “Fear and Anxiety: Evolutionary, Cognitive, and Clinical 

Perspectives,” in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones eds., Handbook of 

Emotions (New York: The Guilford Press, 2000), 573-93.

2. H. Prince, “Individual Stress and Adjustment,” in Leadership in 

Organizations (New York: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1988), 101-26).

3. Prince., 122.

4. G. Loewenstein, Because It Is There: The Challenge of Mountaineering . 

. . for Utility Theory, in KYKLOS, vol. 52, (1999), 315-44. Fase.

5. H. Prince, “Individual Stress and Adjustment,” in Leadership in 

Organizations (New York: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1988), 101.

6. G. Loewenstein, Because It Is There: The Challenge of Mountaineering . 

. . for Utility Theory, in KYKLOS, vol. 52, (1999), 330. 

7. Loewenstein, 318.

8. Loewenstein, 330.

33

Transformational Stories

How the Weekend Safety Brief can be a Forum for the 

Professional Military Ethic*

Major Joel P. Gleason

 “Now all you recruits, what’s drafted today, 

You shut up your rag-box an’ ‘ark to my lay,

An’ I’ll sing you a soldier as far as I may:

A soldier what’s fit for a soldier...”

-Rudyard KiplingThe Young British Soldier1

Today’s Army is well on its way to codifying a Professional Military 

Ethic (PME) that will define our service and ensure that we retain our 

nation’s trust,2

 but a difficulty remains in translating this high ideal to 

the individual Soldier for safekeeping. Discussions in the past have often 

highlighted a need to successfully articulate and decipher the PME from 

the halls of our learning institutions to the frontline “strategic corporal” 

in order to have an impact on our organizational success. 3 The implied 

transformation from citizens into Soldiers into ethical leaders will take 

place in a multitude of forums from institutional settings to professional 

mentorship and this article cannot cover them all. Instead, let us turn our 

focus to one of the most readily adapted rituals we have in our service.

Friday afternoons across the Army, commanders and their senior 

NCOs face their formations in the perfect setting for a discussion of the 

PME: the weekend safety brief. Sadly, because of a long-standing practice, 

the large majority of these opportunities end up wasted as leaders attempt 

to check the block with unmemorable maxims for Soldiers’ immediate 

behavior. This usually comes in the form of a list of things Soldiers should 

do and things Soldiers should avoid. How much more could this custom 

accomplish if we designed it to focus beyond this simple formality and 

begin to shift Soldiers closer to a commitment to the Army Values using 

memorable engagement?

Adopting a model of Transformational Stories from recent business 

literature will provide leaders with a method that allows them to truly 

engage Soldiers in discussions about the Professional Military Ethic while 

* This paper is the first place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02.
34

continuing to attack the immediate concerns that the weekend safety brief 

should address. In lieu of the customary mode for these safety briefings, 

this article details a better technique for ensuring a lasting impact on our 

Soldiers. That method is to communicate a vision through memorable 

stories. 

Articulating a Professional Military Ethic

Before we look at how to go about re-tooling the weekend safety 

brief, it is vital to show that a change will not be adverse to good order 

and discipline in the short term. To accomplish this reassurance, it is first 

necessary to determine that there is a genuine imperative to instill in our 

Soldiers a PME and that the Army Values are an acceptable tool for the 

job. Second, it is relevant to demonstrate that shifting to an Army Values 

focus will build stronger Soldiers who are more able to handle the stresses 

of combat and day-to-day life. Finally, we will show that shifting Soldiers 

from compliance to Army Values-commitment is a realistic framework for 

modifying the originally targeted unsafe behavior. In the end, leaders must 

still affect improved off-duty judgment within their formations.

Consider for a moment an expansion on the definition of leadership 

from ADRP 6-22. Under the heading of “Improve the Organization,” the 

publication expounds, “Improving is an act of stewardship, striving to 

create effective, efficient organizations.4

” Leaders have a responsibility 

as stewards of the military service to impart upon their Soldiers the 

established values of our service. This challenge is not merely a matter of 

moving Soldiers from compliance to commitment,5

 but of ensuring that 

they understand the values to which they are committed. Researchers have 

demonstrated that leaders cannot fully accomplish an improvement of the 

ethics of subordinates by simply demonstrating ethical leadership. These 

principles must additionally be actively promoted through an ongoing 

dialogue in public and private settings. 6

Likewise, in developing “Soldiers with military competence and 

moral character,7” leaders need to have at their disposal a standard set of 

principles-in-virtue from which to draw their lessons. The literature on the 

PME provides a broad set of creedal and philosophical starting points.8

Although legitimate recommendations for expansion of the Army Values 

exist,9 the list represented by the acronym LDRSHIP has a significant value 

as a starting point for expressing a PME to our Soldiers. The seven values 

taught to every Soldier at basic training “capture important elements of 

the Army Ethic10” and provide talking points for leaders initially engaging 

Soldiers’ moral stance.
35

Engaging Soldiers on ethics goes much further than a simple 

indoctrination into the profession or behavior modification on and off duty. 

Changes to Warrior Resiliency Training developed to aid Soldiers in posttraumatic growth indicate “Army Values, Warrior Ethos, and leadership 

are critical foundations of Army resiliency training that can be skillfully 

integrated into a model promoting internal combat stress control.11” This 

kind of development indicates that the greater the foundation a Soldier 

has in moral understanding, the more likely they are to be able to handle 

combat stress. Likewise, an individual with a stronger moral compass is 

less likely to engage in behaviors that result in psychologically damaging 

guilt and regret. Overall, this is an area that deserves more research but 

leaders cannot dismiss the demonstrated benefits that the Army Values 

have been as an ingredient in our Warrior Resiliency Training programs. 

Of course, no leader should accept a recommendation to change the 

weekend safety brief to a new form if the originally targeted behavior 

is not being addressed and corrected. Weekend safety briefs, after all, 

are implemented to remind Soldiers not to “embarrass the regiment,” as 

the expression goes. These concerns are not unreasonable but a deeper 

examination of theories of leadership influence might demonstrate that the 

goal to develop Soldiers who understand the PME and the goal to keep 

them off of Monday morning’s blotter report are not mutually exclusive.

In Dr. Gene Klann’s essay “The Application of Power and Influence in 

Organizational Leadership,12” a central theme is the leader’s responsibility 

to shift subordinates from a point of mere compliance to a point of 

core commitment. These ideas are usually displayed in diagrams with 

compliance on the left and commitment on the right so we might say for 

our discussion that we are “shifting Soldiers to the right on the values 

spectrum.13” The implication of successfully shifting Soldiers to the right 

is that the foundation of their behavior will move away from requiring 

“hard power” motivation. Instead, the Soldier committed to their own 

standing in a profession will be motivated by an “affiliation” with the 

Army and the organization.

Under a framework in which Soldiers become more interested in 

their own role as members of the profession, the logical consequence is 

that the originally targeted immature and negative behavior will become 

less appealing or relevant. This shift meets leadership expectations of 

“millennials.14” Study has shown, “one of the best ways to keep them 

[millenials] engaged is to communicate a large vision, worthy of their 

devotion, and then set high expectations.15” Communicating a PME, 

instead of a series of “rules for your weekend,” casts a vision appealing to 

millenials.
36

We have established that the weekend safety brief is a valid forum for 

discussions about the PME and that shifting to that topic is likely to have a 

positive impact on the good order and discipline of the organizations that 

make such a change. What we need now is a better method of delivery to 

make such a safety briefing stick with the target audience.

The New Weekend Safety Brief

This conversation begins by describing what we have been doing 

and why that is generally an ineffective method. The next objective is to 

identify exactly what we want to accomplish through the weekend safety 

brief. To close, we will examine a new method for making Soldiers more 

likely to do the right thing. In their 2007 book Made to Stick: Why Some 

Ideas Survive and Others Die, authors Chip and Dan Heath offer a helpful 

model with which we will be able to improve our organizations.

To be intellectually honest, proving that the current mode of weekend 

safety brief is a failed method runs into a small challenge since there is 

no body of literature documenting the topics and formats of weekend 

safety briefs or any scientific data available with which to measure their 

effectiveness. That said, most leaders in the Army can turn to their own 

anecdotal evidence and experience to inform a discussion about the 

value of current techniques. Essentially, the reader is asked to accept this 

argument even though a lack of available records places it in the category 

of a “planning assumption.”

Chip and Dan Heath, in a later book, Switch: How to Change Things 

When Change is Hard, describe a common human situation where the 

obstacle to change can best be described by the confession, “I know what 

I should be doing, but I’m not doing it.16” The Heaths, two brothers, 

consider this a problem that deals with conscious motivation but a lack of 

drive on the emotional side. Our subordinates often know what to do and 

may even believe that they should do it. The problem is that they are not 

motivated enough to do it. The weekend safety brief that consists of a list 

of “do’s & don’ts” speaks only to the part of the human brain that already 

knows not to drink and drive or commit domestic violence. The problem 

is that it fails to address the part of the brain that is going to do something 

about it. In order to motivate Soldiers on that level, we must transform the 

weekend safety brief into something else entirely.

Today’s target recruit is a fairly well-adjusted member of society 

between the ages of 17 and 24.17 The drinking age has been 21 in all 

50 States longer than anyone in the target range has been alive.18 For 
37

the entire lives of this demographic, drinking and driving has also been 

against the law and it was never legal to skip wearing a seatbelt in any US 

State.19 A Friday afternoon reminder of what is illegal in our society is not 

going to be a surprise to any of our Soldiers. They do not need a weekly 

reminder of what the rules are, instead leaders need to broaden Soldiers’ 

interest in the problem and involve them in the solution.20

Additionally, the topics leaders address in these settings often represent 

a laundry list of the problems the organization has most recently suffered. 

Educators will confess they succumb to a similar problem. Frequent 

education gaps are being revealed as “pressure around state-mandated 

exams pushes some teachers to ‘teach to the test.’21” When leaders simply 

chastise their Soldiers to avoid a set of behaviors that those Soldiers already 

know they should be avoiding, those leaders are in essence “teaching to 

the test” and failing to provide any leadership that will result in a lasting 

improvement in the organization. Transforming the weekend safety brief 

shifts the topic from a lecture aimed at behaviors Soldiers already know 

are undesirable to a discussion that motivates them to act in a positive 

manner on that knowledge.

In order to motivate Soldiers to live by the Army Values, we must 

renovate our method and change our topic for the weekend safety brief. 

This brings us to the model of Transformational Stories. The Heath 

brothers’ book, Made to Stick, offers a framework for engaging and 

motivating people in a manner that is more likely to endure. The model 

they propose is built around the acronym SUCCES. Their mnemonic for 

an idea that is “made to stick” describes “a Simple, Unexpected, Concrete, 

Credible, Emotional Story22” which will be more memorable and more 

readily applied. 

Simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional stories; Heath and 

Heath recommend them for everything from organizational change, to 

advertising, to going “viral” on the internet. Our purpose here is a narrow 

slice of organizational change aimed at transforming our Soldiers by shifting 

them to the right on the values spectrum. In order to communicate all of 

these concepts more expediently, we will use the name “Transformational 

Stories.” These Transformational Stories designed to specifically engage 

our Soldiers and shift their values, will both educate the formation in what 

it means to live the Army Values as well as cover the need to make junior 

Soldiers think about personal responsibility in their off-duty environment.

 “Simple” stories work with human memory because our Soldiers 

are more likely to pay attention to the things they understand. Focus 
38

groups organized to develop children’s programming have discovered 

that, despite common assumptions, children stop listening when they 

stop understanding. Kids tune in, even to boring portions of educational 

television, when they understand the message.23 This is not to say that our 

Soldiers are children but rather that keeping our messages understandable, 

even as we delve into the PME, is critical to ensuring that Soldiers remain 

engaged in the discussion.

The next principle from Heath and Heath is “Unexpected” because 

a degree of surprise captures the attention of the audience. The Heath 

brothers further illustrate that an identified gap in knowledge causes the 

human brain to retain interest long after the discussion ends.24 This is why 

the teaser keeps some people from flipping the channel during television 

commercials. This does not mean that every Transformational Story has 

to contain a twist or a shocker but when it is possible to add an element of 

surprise, leaders will do a better job of engaging subordinates.

“Concreteness” has long been a proven method for clarifying ideas to 

the audience. In this regard, we should seek out visual aids and hands-on 

demonstrations of the PME. The idea of an object lesson in a sermon is 

incredibly popular for this same “made to stick” reason. A Google search 

for the phrase “object lesson” or “concrete example” will yield hundreds 

of results.25

The topic of PME does not automatically make a weekend safety brief 

“Credible.” Bear in mind that defining exactly what “Professional Military 

Ethic” means is an ongoing discussion across the Army. Credibility in the 

realms of ethics and morality may be one of our greater challenges in 

the current environment of ethical diversity.26 Additionally, the speaker’s 

credibility in both personal and professional life affects the message. 

The Army Values, because of their pervasive acceptance, make the best 

platform for a credible discussion of PME, while the credibility of the 

speaker is a much larger topic best left for another leadership article.

Continuing with the SUCCES mnemonic, “Emotions” are a key link 

to memory and lasting behavioral change.27 (If emotional displays in 

front of a formation do not sound like your strong point, bear in mind that 

stoicism and the warrior ethos are also displays of emotion.28) A main point 

the Heath brothers convey in both of their books is that there is a strong 

connection between emotions and a willingness to act.29 Additionally the 

chemical and physiological connection between emotion and memory is 

fairly well established.30 Accessing the endorphin-memory link may be as 

easy as holding your brief immediately following an esprit-de-corps unit 

run.
39

Simple, Unexpected, Concrete, Credible, Emotional, and finally, 

“Stories”; we were born to remember a narrative31 but humans must 

work to remember a list. Professional competitive “memory champions” 

actually convert anything they want to remember (even random lists of 

numbers or decks of playing cards) into a “memory palace,” a kind of 

story, in order to remember so many inane details.32 When we hear a well 

told narrative, there is a part of our brain that walks through the story with 

the teller and that aids understanding and retention.33 

It is through this last point; through the telling of stories, that we are 

making the major success-driving change in our weekend safety brief 

format. The story and the object lesson become our starting point for 

engaging subordinates in a common vision of the Army Values.

Telling Transformational Stories

Going back to the beginning of this article, imagine a new Friday. The 

unit finishes a motivational morning run and while Soldiers’ hearts are still 

pumping hard the commander calls them all into an informal “horseshoe” 

formation. He tells them he is not going to insult their intelligence by 

lecturing them to do the right thing over the weekend. They already know 

what the right thing is and he expects them to do it. 

Instead, he wants to talk to them about respect. (It is Simple because 

they already have a foundation for what respect is. Discussing respect 

is also Credible because it is an Army Value.) He tells them about his 

neighbor who is a blind man with a service dog. (That is Unexpected and, 

because the Soldiers realize there is a gap in their knowledge, their natural 

curiosity is piqued.) “The other day I saw him leave home to go for a walk 

and when he got about 100 meters from his house there was a car parked 

across the sidewalk in someone’s driveway.” He is drawing them in to the 

challenge his neighbor is about to face. “The dog stopped him short of the 

car but, having no idea why, my neighbor tried to keep the dog moving. 

The dog stopped him three times and he ended up yelling at the poor dog 

before running into the car himself.34”

Soldiers might be wondering where this is going, but none of them 

have tuned out. The commander continues, “I think there’s a lesson about 

respect we can learn from what happened to my neighbor.” He goes on 

to make a connection between the lack of trust the blind man had for his 

service dog when something unexpected happened and a young Soldier 

who disregards the advice of a wise friend or an NCO. 
40

“I want you to imagine your friend is trying to steer you clear from a 

bad decision this weekend. What are you going to do? Are you going to do 

the right thing or are you going to walk smack-dab into a parked car?” He 

has placed them inside the narrative now and he starts to shift them toward 

commitment. “If you think respect is simply giving your NCOs what’s 

due, you are just beginning to uncover the Army Values...” 

This commander has successfully initiated a dialogue through a 

Transformational Story. When he finishes the discussion after a few more 

points about respect, he has not told them not to drink and drive because 

they already know not to. He has reminded them, on a very personal 

level, that their off-duty behavior is part of who they are and he has high 

expectations of that behavior.35

Every Soldier will not walk away from that formation instantly 

transformed and completely committed to the Army Values but they 

will walk away shifted a little bit more to the right on the spectrum 

from compliance to commitment. Soldiers who are engaged through a 

SUCCES-based series of Transformational Stories may still occasionally 

hit the blotter report but, despite that, leaders will instill in their Soldiers 

something the old-style weekend safety brief does not: the emotionally 

based personal drive to act. Those Soldiers will be more likely to become 

committed to the Professional Military Ethic sooner in their careers than 

others will. 

The simplest thing about this concept is that leaders who have 

themselves shifted from compliance to commitment to the PME carry 

with them the stories that brought them to that point. Without seeking for 

a cleverly contrived anecdote or object lesson, most leaders are capable 

of relaying to Soldiers what it means to be a practitioner of the Army 

Values from their own experience and the experiences of those around 

them. Additionally, leaders who choose to adopt this method will find 

themselves approached by Soldiers who are in the process of shifting to 

the right with their own stories to tell. 

Changing the weekend safety brief into a weekly forum to discuss 

the Professional Military Ethic will build the organization we have been 

seeking through the previous format by targeting the root cause of a 

need to shift Soldiers from compliance to commitment. Redesigning the 

format of what is said from the notorious list of “do’s and don’ts” into 

Transformational Stories will improve the organization because leaders 

will be using researched methods to ensure that these ideas stick with our 

Soldiers once they get past the parking lot. 
41

In order to illustrate the points in the article above the following two 

examples are provided.

Comparing Apples to Oranges: an Object Lesson in Integrity

“We often hear the phrase, “you’re comparing apples to oranges,” 

as if it cannot be done, but have you ever tried it? On the outside, apples 

and oranges are both baseball-sized round fruit. Apples are smooth and 

shiny while oranges are bumpy. However, cut them open and they are 

very different. The apple is consistent while the orange is segmented into 

several pieces. Looking further, we discover that the apple has a core while 

each orange segment is focused on one or two seeds. 

Do you find that your life is segmented or is it consistent? Do you 

do the right thing all day while you are in uniform but put on a different 

personality when you are at home? Do you act right at work and then act 

out when you are at the club? You might be segmented like the orange. 

In this analogy, we would be more professional in our lives if we were 

consistent. 

The Army Value Integrity is about more than just honesty. It is 

about being consistent between our professional selves and our personal 

selves. The word integrity comes from the same root word as the word 

“integer,” the word for a whole number. So if we think about it, integrity 

has something to do with your whole life, being a whole person. Changing 

your behavior depending on your setting might be an indicator of poor 

integrity. 

The main difference between the apple and the orange is that the apple 

has a core to focus on so it is consistent, while the orange has several 

separate seeds. We have a core, we have the Army Values to provide a 

point of focus and make us more consistent like the apple.36

Freedom’s Flag: Loyalty and the Emotions of a Patriot

Transformational Stories do not have to be incredibly complicated, or 

even always “stories” in the strictest sense. One of the quietest weekends 

I ever had while commanding in Korea was after reading this poem to the 

formation.
42

IT’S THE SOLDIER 

It’s the soldier, not the reporter 

who has given us freedom of the press. 

It’s the soldier, not the poet, 

who has given us freedom of speech. 

It’s the soldier, not the campus organizer, 

who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. 

It’s the soldier, not the lawyer, 

who has given us the right to a fair trial. 

It’s the soldier who salutes the flag, serves under the flag and 

whose coffin is draped by the flag, 

who gives the protestor the right to burn the flag. 37

After reading this poem I pulled my American flag from the right 

shoulder of my ACUs and held it aloft to the formation. I said, “This is an 

inspectable item this weekend. Stick it in your pocket before you go out 

and every time you are about to do something questionable, look at that 

flag and ponder whether someone died so you could be free to do that.” 

My first sergeant followed up with a brief discussion about loyalty and 

everyone left with something memorable.
43

Notes

1. Kipling, Rudyard, “The Young British Soldier,” in Barrack-Room 

Ballad,. Kindle e-Reader Edition, (N.P.: Public Domain: Amazon Digital 

Services, 2011), Location 314 of 908. This nineteenth century 13-stanza poem, 

laced with historical reference, depicting the advice of an veteran NCO to new 

recruits is a reflection on an early form of the safety brief.

2. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22: Army Leadership, 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Army, August 2012) page 

6. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22: Army Leadership, 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Army, August 2012) pages 3-1, 

7-15. Also see Dempsey, Martin E., An Army White Paper: The Profession of 

Arms, (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, December 2010).

3. Imiola, Brian, and Danny Cazier, “On the Road to Articulating Our 

Professional Ethic,” Military Review, Special Edition: Center for the Army 

Profession and Ethic, (September 2010), page 14.

4. ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, page 1-2.

5. Klann, Gene. “The Application of Power and Influence in 

Organizational Leadership.” In L100 Book of Readings: Developing 

Organizations and Leaders, by CGSC Department of Leadership, 61-72, (Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 

page 61.

6. Barnes, Christopher M., and Joe Doty, “What Does Contemporary 

Science Say About Ethical Leadership” Military Review, Special Edition: Center 

for the Army Profession and Ethic, (September 2010), pages 90-91.

7. Case, Chris, Bob Underwood, and Sean T. Hannah, “Owning Our 

Army Ethic,” Military Review, Special Edition: Center for the Army Profession 

and Ethic, (September 2010), page 9.

8. A recommended starting point for the interested leader would be this 

publication. Military Review regularly publishes quality articles addressing the 

realm of leadership including a 2010 Special Edition on the Center for the Army 

Profession and Ethic, which includes many of the sources for this article.

9. Fromm, Peter D., “Warriors, the Army Ethos, and the Sacred Trust of 

Soldiers,” Military Review, Special Edition: Center for the Army Profession and 

Ethic, (September 2010), page 23. This article represents one of many authors 

considering changes to the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. In addition to 

asking some thought provoking questions, this article contains several historical 

examples that could be used to design a more engaging weekend safety brief. 

See also: Imiola and Cazier, page 15.

10. Case, Underwood and Hannah, page 4.
44

11. Jarrett, Thomas, “Warrior Resilience Training in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom: Combining Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy, Resiliency, and 

Positive Psychology,” The Army Medical Department Journal, (July-September 

2008), page 37.

12. Klann, pages 61-72. See also ADRP 6-22, chapter 6.

13. I must credit this phrase to my former commander and mentor in 

leadership, COL (P) Bernie B. Banks. The word “right” is not intended to have 

any sort of political connotation.

14. “Millenials” is a generational name identifying our current pool of 

junior Soldiers used by popular media.

15. Rainer III, Sam S. “Next Generation Needs: Leading Millennials 

Requires Exercising a Different Type of Authority.” Leadership Journal, 

(Summer 2011), page 49.

16. Heath, Chip, and Dan Heath, Switch: How to Change Things When 

Change is Hard, (New York: Broadway Books, 2010), page 263.

17. US Army Recruiting Command. “US Army Recruiting Command 

January 2012 Talking Points.” US Army Recruiting Command. (January 31, 

2012. http://www.usarec.army.mil/support/downloads/January%202012%20

talking%20points.pdf) (accessed September 6, 2012), page 1.

18. The, Associated Press. “Last Call in Wyoming as State Gives in, 

Raises Drinking Age.” Orange County Register, Jul 01, 1988. 11, (http://search.

proquest.com/docview/272245554?accountid=28992) (accessed September 9, 

2012).

19. For a more robust list of facts that have “always” or “never” been 

during your subordinates’ lives it is worth occasionally perusing the Beloit 

College Mindset List. Beloit College publishes a list annually to help their 

professors understand the incoming freshmen class. Beloit College, The 

Mindset List, http://www.beloit.edu/mindset/ (accessed September 6, 2012).

20. Heath and Heath, Switch, page 123.

21. Bonem, Mike. “Measuring What Matters.” Leadership Journal Spring 

(2012), page 72.

22. Heath and Heath, Made to Stick, pages 16-18. Readers, if this article 

has caught your interest, please seek out and read this interestingly written and 

well-researched book on how to design ideas to speak to the human mind. 

23. Gladwell, Malcolm, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a 

Big Difference, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), page 102.

24. Heath and Heath, Made to Stick, pages 89-93.

25. Made to Stick has a similarly accessible set of examples.
45

26. Pojman, Louis P., and James Fieser, Ethics: Discovering Right and 

Wrong, 7th Edition Kindle e-Reader Edition, (Boston: Wadsworth, 2012), 

location 5379 of 6078.

27. Heath and Heath, Switch, page 105.

28. Jarrett, pages 34-35. Also see the Fromm article in MR referenced in 

note9 to expand the reader’s understanding of the nuance bound within many of 

the emotional and creedal charters we indicate here.

29. Heath and Heath, Made to Stick, pages 173 & 203. See also ----, 

Switch, pages 101-123.

30. Roediger, III, Henry L., Elizabeth Deutsch Capaldi, Scott G. Paris, 

Janet Polivy, and C. Peter Herman, Psychology, Fourth Edition, (Minneapolis/St. 

Paul: West Publishign Company, 1996), page 283.

31. “Story” could easily be replaced with “Narrative” since the point is 

less “once upon a time,” and more to draw the listener in to the message.

32. Foer, Joshua, Moonwalking With Einstein: The Art and Science of 

Remembering Everything, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2001), pages 9-10.

33. Heath and Heath, Made to Stick, pages209-210.

34. Modified from: Sande, Ken, “The blind ignoring the guide,” 

Leadership Journal, (Summer 2011), page 59.

35. The reader may have noticed some of the principles of SUCCES in 

this story about a commander and her organization. It was simple, concrete, and 

perhaps even unexpected. It may not be possible to hit all six points in every 

Transformational Story but each one adds a layer of “stickiness.” 

36. Although I have been using this object lesson in front of formations so 

long I have made it my own, I recall first hearing it at Flamingo Road Church in 

Cooper City, Florida around 2005 and will place the credit there.

37. Province, Charles Michael, Freedom’s Flag, found on the North 

East Kansas Korean War Memorial in Topeka, Kansas. This poem is often 

misattributed to Father Dennis Edward O’Brien due to a newspaper misprint.

47

Lessons in Leadership

Simple and Uncomplicated*

Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Pledger, US Navy

As the father of a toddler, I have recently discovered the awesome 

task of teaching him some valuable life lessons. Share. Be nice. Treat 

others with respect. It occurred to me that many of these lessons seem to 

be forgotten by many military leaders. 

In my twelve years of commissioned service, I have spent hours upon 

hours learning about leadership. From classroom study to lectures to 

reading anything I can get my hands on, my quest to unlock the secrets 

of leadership have known no bounds but I realized the simple lessons I 

am teaching my son – the same lessons my parents taught me when I 

was growing up - translate directly to my experience as the commanding 

officer of a ship. 

I have come up with a list of simple, yet effective, lessons for any 

leader. These lessons may seem dull and a simple, but I have attempted to 

illustrate each with my own command leadership experiences and explain 

why they are relevant. 

Be nice. Say thank you. Share. Tell the truth. 

You have heard all of these. No one will dispute they are all important 

life lessons. They are also crucial lessons you must master if you are to be 

an effective leader.

Be Nice

Nice guys finish last. So the saying goes. Plenty of people subscribe 

to this saying, and in the process ignore a very powerful leadership tool. 

Colin Powell, in his book “It Worked for Me” notes that kindness is a sign 

of confidence.1

 Showing kindness, displaying a cheerful disposition and 

being pleasant are ways you can enhance your authority and strengthen 

your organization.

Being nice can lead to the commitment of followers. Commitment 

is preferred over compliance because committed followers have personal 

ownership in the organization and are devoted to mission accomplishment. 

* This paper is the second place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College 

of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02.
48

Followers who merely comply with directives and orders may influence 

short term behavior but is not effective for long term or steady results. 

Leaders can gain commitment through the use of referent power. 

Referent power, a subset of personal power, is “the power generated by 

relationships” and “has the highest potential of all the forms of power to 

gain strong commitment from followers.2” As a leader, the challenge is 

identifying what tactics can be used to apply referent power.

Showing kindness, or simply being nice, is an easy and effective way 

to apply referent power and achieve commitment from your followers. 

This falls into the category of “soft tactics” which are “associated with 

personal power” and is “effective at gaining follower commitment.” One 

soft power technique is relationship building, where “leaders build positive 

rapport and a relationship of mutual trust...3

” Showing kindness to your 

subordinates can lead to a strong senior-subordinate relationship where the 

junior feels valued and committed to the organization.

While being a “nice guy” has merits, this is not always what the troops 

want or need. “You want somebody who can take charge and get the job 

done even if he is a little rough sometimes. You are going to favor that 

guy over somebody who wants to hold your hand and pat you on the back 

all the time. Troops know the difference.4” There will be times when you 

need to be forceful, raise your voice and ruffle some feathers but use these 

techniques judiciously. As they may lead to short term accomplishments, 

they will not necessarily inspire long term commitment.

Being nice may not come naturally for many leaders, but it is very 

simple. Smile. Shake people’s hands. Walk around and talk to people. Ask 

them about their life outside of work. Be an active listener and give people 

your full attention. 

While in command, I went to great lengths to be nice. By using 

kindness as an influence tactic, I sought my crew’s trust and commitment. 

I made it a point to regularly walk around the ship and engage Sailors in 

friendly conversation. I adhered to the leadership tenant of praise in public, 

reprimand in private. I wanted my crew to enjoy coming to work and work 

in a friendly environment where they were respected. I knew that we could 

achieve a positive climate only if I, the Commanding Officer, set the right 

tone. 

Say Thank You

Rewards in the military are commonplace. They are given for 

everything from valor in combat, high achievement during a tour of duty, 
49

or exceptional marks during an inspection. Rewards are recognition for 

a job well done. The military reward system ranges from the formal: 

medals and certificates; to the informal: a well deserved day off from the 

Commanding Officer or a pat on the back accompanied by a “Good job.” 

A reward, regardless of the level and formality, is a way the leader says 

“Thank you.” Saying thank you, in whatever way you deem necessary, 

can have a tremendous effect on your unit’s morale. The opposite is true if 

you neglect to show appreciation. 

Morale is an issue of concern for a leader because it is the intangible 

element that bonds a unit together and will keep it fighting in difficult 

situations. In the words of Gen. William T. Sherman, “...no general can 

accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of 

his men...5

” High morale has a direct effect on a unit’s performance 

and combat readiness. There are many jobs in the military that have the 

potential to erode morale and have a negative effect on unit readiness. 

Taking out the trash, cleaning the galley, toilets and showers. These are not 

jobs recruiters advertise, but every junior Sailor has done them. These are 

far from the glamorous jobs seen on T.V. ads and billboards and definitely 

not why people join the military. Even though the filthy and thankless jobs 

must be done, they can wreck the morale of a Sailor and thus affect the 

morale of the unit. The challenge for the leader is to recognize what can 

drive spirits down and how to mitigate low morale. 

Rewards can build and enhance morale within the unit. A leader 

has reward power, a subset of positional power and can be an effective 

way to change and influence behavior in an organization.6

 When in a 

position of leadership, you have the power to reward your followers which 

“can be highly motivational.7

” In addition to being a source of power, 

rewarding is a type of influence technique that can be used to effectively 

change behavior. Leaders control certain resources valued by the unit. As 

the leader, you have the ability to give these resources out in a way to 

recognize and reward certain behaviors.8 By rewarding the behaviors you 

want to see and punishing the behaviors you do not want to see, you will 

eventually see a shift to the desired behaviors. 

My crew worked hard and took a lot of pride in their efforts. I took 

every opportunity I could to say thank you and recognize their work. I 

wanted to continue the positive momentum of working hard, and I also 

wanted to build a culture within the ship where we valued industriousness. 

I also looked for ways to recognize Sailors who did the little things right, 

did their job at a consistently high level, or came to work with a positive 

attitude every day. I saw the behaviors that would make our culture positive 

and one of excellence and I rewarded those actions.
50

With the assistance of our Supply Officer, we created the Impact 

Award. The Impact Award was given by me to Sailors who did anything 

noteworthy. Sailors could be nominated by their chain of command or by 

anyone in a leadership position. I, as the Commanding Officer decided 

whether or not to present the award. The award consisted of a small pin 

in the shape of a mine that could be worn on a ship’s ballcap as well 

as a 24 hour liberty pass. Once I decided the recipients were deserving 

of recognition, I wasted no time in making the award presentation. The 

award “ceremony” was short and informal; it was immediately followed 

by my telling the crew over the ship’s announcing system of the award, the 

recipient and why the Sailor’s actions were significant.

Impact Awards were awarded for everything from emergent equipment 

repairs to maintaining a clean and neat work area. I wanted Sailors to 

know I appreciated their efforts. If we were to do the little things right and 

be excellent in everything we did, I knew I had to reward the behavior that 

would lead to excellence. I also knew the crew highly valued time off. By 

rewarding them with what they wanted and saying thank you in a public 

way, I was able to cultivate the types of performance that would lead to a 

successful command. 

Share

Every leader knows teamwork is an essential component to an 

organization’s success. At the heart of teamwork is the concept of sharing. 

When individuals are willing to give of themselves, to share what they 

have with their teammates, teamwork and cohesion ensue. The mark of a 

well led organization is one where helping teammates is the norm. When 

the team can function as one, it is greater than the talents or abilities of any 

single individual. 

Teamwork can allow a team to overcome even the most challenging 

circumstances. Invariably, in the course of your leadership experience, you 

will realize you and your team have more requirements than resources. 

You won’t have enough time, money, parts or manpower. You will always 

be able to use extra help. However, it isn’t just you who can use the help; it 

may be one of your subordinate units that need a helping hand or even one 

of your peers. Everyone can use assistance from their teammates. In the 

military, no matter what the echelon, we are part of a team. Anyone in the 

military can look around and find teammates who are capable of helping 

overcome an obstacle and reach the objective. The challenge for the leader 

is to build a culture where resources are shared in your organization and 

everyone works toward a common goal.
51

The leader’s job is to build a “team orientation.” This is done by 

creating experiences where team coherence is refined and enhanced.9 In 

psychologist Bruce Tuckman’s Group Development Model, the storming 

phase is where the foundation for teamwork is laid. It is also where potential 

exists to block effective team building. In this stage, there is potential for 

rivalry within the group where individuals resist the push for cooperation. 

The leader must employ processes that promote cooperation among 

teammates. A cooperative environment is characterized, among other 

things by “a readiness to be helpful.10” An organization where colleagues 

are willing to sacrifice and share their resources will lead to mutual trust, 

commitment and eventually pride.11 The leader must determine what 

processes to use that will result in a culture of helping, sharing and unity 

of effort.

Creating a culture of sharing and teamwork is a difficult task for any 

leader, but as Coach Mike Krzyzewski notes, “People, generally, want to 

be on a team...want to be part of something bigger than themselves...

want to be in a situation where they feel that the are doing something 

for the greater good.12” You will have followers who want to help their 

teammates and share whatever it takes to get team wins. This is exactly 

what I experienced while in command.

Going into my command tour, I knew there were deep divisions within 

all Navy ships, mainly between departments and divisions. Also, rivalries 

between ships, which are generally healthy and spirited in nature, can 

get ugly and have negative consequences on a maritime fighting force. I 

looked for ways my crew could build cohesion through sharing its means, 

eventually establishing a culture where we worked as one, not a group of 

individuals. Internally, I knew there would be things that could employ the 

entire crew as one team. Cleanliness is not only a requirement onboard 

a ship, but it is a great way to build team unity. Washing the exterior of 

the ship while underway was always an all-hands evolution. Even though 

only a few divisions were responsible for the day-to-day cleanliness of 

the ship’s exterior, a thorough scrubbing is very manpower intensive. We 

would assign every division an area to clean, sharing the workload among 

the entire crew, not just a fraction of the divisions. The same method 

was employed when preparing the engineering spaces for inspections. 

Extremely dirty due to the numerous pipes, liquids and operating 

equipment, these spaces required a lot of manpower for the requisite deep 

cleaning prior to an inspection. When we received high marks for space 

cleanliness, the entire crew could take pride in the achievement. 
52

Likewise, I did not want my crew thinking they were above helping out 

our fellow ships in the squadron. While there was rivalry and competition 

between all ships in the squadron, I did not want that competition to 

devolve into an unwillingness to share our resources with our squadronmates. When the request came, I made it a priority to support our sister 

ships in any way we could. We provided parts, manpower, technical 

expertise and anything else that would lead to the other ship’s success. Our 

crew’s tongue-in-cheek mantra became, “Hi, I’m from Crew EXULTANT 

and I’m here to help!” A sense of pride began to develop as we shared 

what we had with other ships. Our confidence climbed and we developed a 

reputation as a crew that was a team player and could be counted on. This 

attitude fed the mindset that teamwork was how we did business. 

Tell the Truth

If you don’t have trust in a relationship, that relationship is ineffective. 

As a leader, your life is defined by relationships. You have a relationship 

with your organization, your peers, your leadership team and your boss. 

The absence of trust in each of those relationships results in disunity.

When you are the leader, telling the truth is important because it forms 

the foundation for an ethical command climate. Additionally, it allows you 

to set and maintain a standard within your organization. Honesty in your 

words and actions are paramount if you are to have a well functioning 

team.

Trust is the basis upon which everything in your organization is built as 

trust is “essential to teamwork and mission accomplishment.13” Building 

trust amongst your followers can lead to an ethical culture and effective 

command climate. On a higher level, cultivating and establishing an 

ethical culture “strengthens the social trustee bond between the Nation and 

the military.14” Leaders have a critical role in forming an ethical climate. 

Leaders who demonstrate ethical behavior by being honest and telling the 

truth will positively impact followers.15 For an organization to be one of 

high morals and ethical standards, the leader must be the cornerstone of 

ethical behavior.

Another aspect of telling the truth is the effect it has on standards within 

an organization. To walk past a mistake is condone that action (or inaction). 

“Tolerance of little mistakes and oversights creates an environment that 

will tolerate bigger and ultimately catastrophic mistakes.16” If the leader is 

not enforcing the standards, then those at lower echelons cannot be counted 

on to enforce standards. A culture of honest reporting and adherence to 
53

standards may be damaging to egos, but it can translate to teamwork, 

cohesion and discipline.17 

While in command, I knew my crew was listening to everything I 

said, no matter how insignificant I thought my comments were. At any 

point, if I were to go against what I had said earlier, I knew I would be 

whittling away at any trust I had worked hard to build. Sailors are not 

dumb. They know when you are being honest and forthcoming with them. 

If you are not being honest, they will know it. Whether discussing the 

ship’s schedule or the results of an inspection, I was always honest with 

my crew. And when I said would do something, I did it. That way, there 

was never any doubt as to whether or not I could be trusted. My crew also 

knew what the standard was and what I expected from them. I endeavored 

to provide honest feedback in my counseling sessions and performance 

evaluations. If I was walking around the ship and saw a mistake, I made 

sure not only it was corrected, but I told the chain of command about the 

mistake. My honesty allowed me to foster an environment of trust and 

teamwork and no matter how unpopular my decisions, my crew trusted 

that I was making the best decisions. 

These lessons are direct and simple. They are so simple, in fact, every 

toddler learns these lessons. The challenge lies in implementing these 

lessons when you are in a position of leadership. Over the past several 

years, Navy Commanding Officers have been relieved more for a lack of 

ethical or professional behavior than tactical or technical competence.18

Clearly, following these modest rules is not only essential but to ignore 

them is to jeopardize your position and your organization. Leadership is a 

difficult business with incredible stressors and pressures; adhering to these 

easy to understand leadership tenants requires meaningful effort. If you 

are able to master these rules, however, you will find yourself with leading 

a motivated and dedicated organization poised for success. 
54

Notes

1. Powell, Colin, It Worked for Me (New York, NY: HarperCollins 

Publishers, 2012), 48.

2. Klann, Dr. Gene, “The Application of Power and Influence in 

Organizational Leadership;” reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff 

College L100 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August 2011), 

64-65.

3. Klann, 67.

4. Reed, COL George E., “Toxic Leadership,” Military Review 67-71 

(July-August 2004); reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College 

L100 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, August 2011), 155.

5. Department of the Army, FM 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, 

Confident, and Agile (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 

2006), 7-8.

6. Klann, “The Application of Power and Influence in Organizational 

Leadership,” 63.

7. Klann, 63.

8. FM 6-22, 7-5.

9. Aude, Steven, Baranowski, Laura, Conrad, Trevor, Harvey, Jennifer, 

Mitchell, Deb, Weingart, Eric, Fallsen, Jon, “Leadership Competencies Applied 

to Army Leader Development Processes: Extend the Competency Framework 

to Address Organizational and Situational Differences,” Technical Report 

(Unpublished) for the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 

and Social Sciences, 42-54 (November 2005); reprinted in US Army Command 

and General Staff College L100 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth: 

USACGSC, August 2011), 269.

10. Aude, et. al. 270.

11. Aude, et. al. 270, 272.

12. Krzyzewski, Mike, Leading from the Heart (New York, NY: Warner 

Business Books, 2000), 189.

13. FM 6-22, 4-14.

14. Anderson, Erik N., “Ethics and the Armed Forces Leader” reprinted 

in US Army Command and General Staff College L100 Book of Readings (Fort 

Leavenworth: USACGSC, August 2011), 184.

15. Anderson, 186.

16. Powell, It Worked for Me, 91.

17. FM 6-22, 7-10 & 8-6.

18. Anderson, “Ethics and the Armed Forces Leader,” 174. 
55

Counter-Balancing the Imbalance

An Army Leader’s Role in Balancing Organizational 

Temperament*

Chaplain (Major) Doug Ball

Refuting Irrefutable Logic

 Consider the following illustration of a normal encounter between an 

Army leader and a subordinate. A CSM (or any other leader or rank) sees 

the need one day in Afghanistan to correct a Soldier with a minor uniform 

discrepancy (once again, any minor issue would do). This Soldier has the 

panache to place his sunglasses on his head as he walks into the DFAC. 

The next day, the Soldier moves the sunglasses down to hang around his 

neck, utilizing the lanyard provided by the Army when issuing the eye 

protection, only to be told that is unacceptable as well. Days three and four 

involve hooking the sunglasses on the shirt collar and the reflective belt, 

violations that earn the Soldier more reprimands.

 The Soldier, tired of getting in trouble, asks the CSM why it is so 

important to follow minor uniform regulations. The CSM answers with 

the universally accepted Army mantra: “If you lose discipline regarding 

the little things, you’ll lose discipline on the big things, and you’ll get 

someone killed.” Irrefutable Army logic... that is completely nonsensical 

to 62% of the population! To understand this, let’s evaluate the CSM’s 

statement through the lenses of the four Keirsey-Bates temperaments, 

based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI).1

 The SJ (Sensing-Judging): Like many senior leaders in the military, 

the CSM is most likely an SJ. SJs love organization, structure, and 

institutions. They are the largest temperament group at roughly 38% of the 

US population. They live procedures, rules, regulations and traditions. To 

them, the CSM’s logic makes sense – all rules are meant to be followed 

and bending minor rules is a sign of failing discipline.

 The SP (Sensing-Perceiving): The SP is imminently practical and lives 

in the present. At 35% of the population, they are hands-on, creative, 

easily bored, and fun-loving. The SP sees no connection between the little 

rule about the sunglasses and a future hypothetical situation about some 

other rule. To him, the CSM’s sudden sunglass fixation is arbitrary and 

* This paper is the third place winner of the General Douglas MacArthur Military 

Leadership Writing Competition at the Command and General Staff College of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for class 12-02.
56

obviously meant to take the fun out of life. The SP may even purposefully 

break the rule in the future, just to see the veins pop out on the CSM’s 

forehead. Tomorrow he’ll either lose the sunglasses since he can’t hang 

them around his neck, or build a sunglasses holder out of duct tape and 

attach it to his pistol holster.

 The NT (iNtuitive-Thinking): NTs represent 12% of the population. 

They seek competence above all and strive to understand the big picture. 

NT’s learn by asking ‘why’, questioning authority and challenging the 

system. The CSM’s logic has a reverse effect on the NT. If the CSM 

thinks that uniform regulations are somehow in the same ballpark as 

muzzle awareness with a loaded weapon, then the CSM’s priorities are 

out of whack and he is incompetent. It is the duty of the NT to not follow 

incompetence, so he will henceforth ignore the CSM to include future 

valid rules and/or input.2 An NT can be completely disciplined regarding 

rules he considers important and at the same time ignore those that he does 

not.

 The NF (iNtuitive-Feeling): NFs are all about people and relationships. 

They take criticism and correction personally, and want to live in peace 

and harmony with everyone. Rules matter to the NF if they affect people 

and relationships. The NF will be frustrated that the CSM is adding to 

the stress of deployment by yelling at him. Plus, doesn’t the CSM know 

that he is going through some tough stuff at home? The CSM should 

be getting to know Soldiers personally and supporting them, not acting 

like the uniform police. The NF will usually personally follow the rules – 

but will do so to please the CSM. People are important, not rules, so the 

CSM’s logic is meaningless to the NF.

 To three of the four temperaments then, the CSM’s irrefutable Army 

logic is invalid. For a large percentage of the population his statement is 

meaningless, or even worse, detrimental. Why point this out? Certainly 

not because there is anything wrong with CSMs, or uniform regulations, 

or even SJs, but this familiar Army mantra illustrates the effect of 

temperament and personality type on leadership. Leaders must be aware 

of the interaction between their own temperament and the temperaments 

of their subordinates. They must understand that imposing their own 

personality type on the work environment may be unhelpful or even 

hostile to other temperaments. Furthermore, when an organization (like 

the Army) naturally takes on a collective temperament, leaders must be 

even more aware of how that affects members of the organization who 

don’t match the corporate temperament. As seen below, this is necessary 

not just for the good of the individual subordinates, but for the good of the 

organization as a whole.
57

Imbalance Leads to Greater Imbalance

 The Army is naturally an imbalanced organization in terms of collective 

temperament. One could make an educated and fairly accurate guess as 

to the group type of the Army by looking at the short descriptions of the 

temperaments above. The SJ temperament jumps out immediately; people 

who love organization, structure, and institutions and live procedures, 

rules, regulations and traditions naturally gravitate to the military. People 

of this temperament want to belong to meaningful organizations, they are 

dutiful and dependable, and they enjoy the clearly-defined lifestyle. It is 

no wonder that a temperament nicknamed ‘The Guardian’ would seek out 

and excel in the military.

 It is not necessary to just guess as to the group type of the Army 

since research and experience provide support for this thesis. Although the 

Army does not use or track MBTI across the board, a variety of studies 

show that SJs are overrepresented in the military. A War College survey 

of 1755 officers in 1997 identified roughly 62% of them as SJs – much 

higher than the national average of 38%.3

 The same imbalance was also 

identified in large surveys in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s and a 2009 

paper states that over 50% of War College students are even more narrowly 

defined STJs (which would only be 20% of the national population).4

 A 

study at the Naval Academy shows a 60% SJ population5

 and a smaller 

CGSC study shows an SJ preference over 50%.6

 Although too small to be 

statistically reliable, current group types in staff groups 2A and 2B reflect 

this trend, as did the author’s Career Course. Otto Krueger, one of the main 

proponents of the MBTI who has worked with the Army, points at the 

military as a career choice of SJs, especially ISTJs.7 One could also factor 

in the impact of the NTJs in these studies, another 12-20% of the military 

population, and realize that not only is the Army leaning toward the SJ 

temperament, it is leaning away from the F and P types.

 The fact that the Army naturally attracts SJs is neither good nor bad, 

it just is. Most career fields show a group type imbalance, as people self 

select occupations in line with their personalities and interests. However, 

both War College studies cited above conclude that the Army furthers the 

SJ imbalance through systemic processes such as promotion and retention. 

The Army would need to do long term studies that tracked personnel from 

initial entry through separation to know the specific extent of this effect, 

but it is once again a natural and obvious result in any organization with a 

strong group type.
58

 The opening illustration of this essay involved a minor and insignificant 

incident, but analogous incidents happen to every member of the Army 

almost every day. It is all too easy to imagine (and experientially and 

anecdotally verify) the effect of SJ imbalance on the other personality 

types. The NT soldier gets frustrated with the seeming incompetence of 

his superiors and the constraining environment of authority and either 

leaves the Army or becomes an officer or Special Forces soldier. The SP 

soldier gets frustrated trying to keep up with all the rules and either finds 

a technical MOS where she can ‘just do stuff’ or gets out of the Army 

(and then regrets that spur of the moment decision and seeks to get back 

in a few years later). The NF soldier gets frustrated with the fact that rules 

and plans seem to be more important than people, and either moves into a 

service MOS like the medical corps or leaves the Army. 

 Even in the officer corps, this process works out through separations, 

promotions, and branch choices. It is quite easy to look at the correlation 

between branch and temperament in staff groups 2A and 2B, and realize 

that most non-SJ personality types have gravitated toward functional 

areas and non-movement and maneuver branches. Just as the War College 

studies show, the SJ imbalance in the Army leads to greater SJ imbalance 

in the Army.

Balance Brings Greater Balance

 While many in the Army may dismiss this imbalance as a natural 

occurrence, or even view it as good, most research on temperament and 

type diversity in group settings indicate that imbalance is detrimental. In 

the well known Challenger scenario, over 80% of NASA senior leaders 

were Js and the typological imbalance proved to be a factor in the disaster. 

Staying on schedule and sticking to decisions are important to Js, and 

these bents were part of the reason later data that may have prevented the 

disaster was overlooked.8

 Because of the SJ leaning of the Army, researchers like Charles Allen 

question whether the Army is a learning organization that can be creative 

and think outside the box. According to him, the typical SJ sees himself 

as an efficient problem solver, but not a creative problem solver.9 Survey 

results in Military Review show that only 31% of junior officers believe 

that the Army values innovation.10 The Army has struggled in the past 

decade to adjust to the ‘softer’, more relational aspects of COIN and 

winning hearts and minds. With creativity more normally associated with 

SPs (nicknamed ‘Artisans’) and NTPs (most highly represented among 

entrepreneurs), and relational skills most clearly linked to NF (the least 

represented in the Army), are these concerns at all surprising?
59

 Diversity of temperament is especially important in problem solving 

and planning forums. According to a variety of studies,11 diverse groups 

“perform significantly better and more consistently than similar groups” 

and “group synergy was far greater for the diverse groups.” This comes at 

a price though – homogenous groups worked more quickly, even though 

diverse groups produced significantly higher quality solutions, especially 

on ambiguous, complex tasks. As well, diverse groups had a lower 

quality of presentation even though their solutions were superior. An SJ 

organization that values efficiency and quality presentation (PowerPoint!) 

may be willing to sacrifice innovative better solutions for efficient solutions 

packaged well.

 Despite that tendency, balance and diversity would benefit the Army in 

the long run. In a strategic environment that calls for hybrid warriors that 

can fight a conventional army, rebuild a sewer system, provide logistics for 

natural disaster response, and build relationships with local villagers all in 

the same week, diversity of skill and temperament is necessary. In an era 

of austerity, innovation and creativity are a must. During a time of stress 

and high Army PTSD, mental health, and suicide rates, relational skills 

are in constant demand. A well balanced Army would retain and attract 

a better balance of temperaments, and with that balance of temperaments 

would come a wider range of skills and abilities.

Leaders Provide Counterbalance

 This is where the Army leader comes in. The only way to correct 

imbalance is to provide counterbalance. The Army leader must intentionally 

identify detrimental imbalance and purposefully attempt to counterbalance 

it. Leaders must be aware of their own temperaments and preferences and 

seek the input and perspective of other temperaments in order to avoid 

alienating and disenfranchising differing types of people. This is especially 

true of SJ leaders in the Army, because they fit nicely into the Army system 

and may be unaware of the discomfort and frustration experienced in the 

Army by the other three temperaments.

 Practically speaking, what does this look like? How do leaders provide 

counterbalance in an organization that naturally attracts and retains certain 

personality types? The following suggestions will assist the Army leader 

to avoid misapplications of counterbalance, understand how to provide 

balance through individual leadership, and envision institutional changes 

that could address systemic imbalance. These suggestions are purposefully 

broad, recognizing that there are no simplistic answers and that there is a 

need for more thought and research. They are largely tailored to SJ leaders, 

but are easily transferrable to leaders of every temperament.
60

What Leaders Do Not Need To Do

 1. Fundamentally and completely correct the imbalance of 

the Army. By nature, SJs will be attracted to and loyal to this 

great organization and the Army needs SJs – with apologies to 

the NCO Corps, it is really SJs that are the backbone of the Army. 

The Army must continue to be about duty, respect and standards 

(SJ characteristics) and will always need people who can provide 

detailed planning and organization (natural SJ abilities).

 2. Stereotype SJs as non-creative people lacking relationship 

skills. The beauty of the MBTI is that is speaks to preferences, 

not to abilities. There are many SJs in the Army who have strong 

relational skills, display phenomenal creativity and understand the 

big picture. However, these things may not be their ‘default’ setting, 

and will more naturally come to the other three temperaments, 

especially in times of crisis.

 3. Use temperament or type selection for recruiting or building 

teams. Leaders must not use MBTI as a discriminator or screening 

criteria for selecting, promoting, recruiting or building teams. 

Since MBTI measures preference and not ability, promotion and 

selection should continue to be about performance and potential, 

not personality.

What Leaders Must Do

 1. Know their subordinates and actively seek input from other 

temperaments. Give the NT permission to bring the group out of 

the weeds and back to the big picture during MDMP. Turn to the 

NF at the end of a training meeting and ask him how the training 

schedule will affect the Soldiers. Hand an SP a practical problem 

that requires a creative solution and ask her to bring you three 

‘outside the box’ ideas.

 2. Decide what is most important, and stick to it even when 

uncomfortable. If the best solution to a problem is the goal, accept 

the messiness that comes from a diverse group problem-solving 

session. Is it more important to have everything beautifully laid 

out in the correct 26 pt. font, or is it acceptable to spend formatting 

time on developing a better solution?

 3. Adapt your personality to give other temperaments some 

latitude and accommodation, because that is what the SJ Army asks 
61

of them. When the NF Soldier takes criticism from an SJ personally, 

the Army expects him to get thicker skin. However, when an NT 

officer questions her SJ commander and the commander gets 

upset, no one tells the SJ leader to get thicker skin. Both are cases 

of natural temperamental tendencies. SJ leaders need to realize 

that the SP Soldier in the motor pool doesn’t roll his sleeves up 

because he lacks discipline and wants to tick off the CSM; he does 

it because it’s comfortable and practical and keeps his sleeves 

clean. They need to realize that when an NT subordinate disagrees 

with them, she is not disrespecting their position or authority; she 

naturally asks the question why and values competence over rank. 

SJ leaders need to realize that NFs are not soft or emotional; they 

just have a different logic system – one built around the value of 

people and relational connections.

What The Army Should Do

 1. Realize that loosening up doesn’t always mean becoming 

undisciplined. The Army retains many rules and traditions based on 

reasons that are now overcome by events. Some of these rules and 

regulations are illogical (not allowing Soldiers to use a sunglass 

restraining strap that the Army paid for and issued) or even detrimental 

to Soldiers (sun exposure and skin cancer because the boonie cap is 

not authorized in garrison). If someone suggested that the Army loosen 

haircut grooming standards, allow civilian backpacks to be utilized, 

and discontinue installation decals on cars, many leaders would decry 

the changing Army’s loss of discipline and professionalism. However, 

these are all logical steps taken by the British Army for force protection 

reasons, so that Soldiers are less easily identified when off base and 

off duty!

 2. Overhaul the MDMP process. The MDMP model is a largely SJ 

model.12 It moves from part to whole (S), follows a fairly lock-step 

process with little room for creativity (J), and is too often focused 

on well-presented briefings and products. As one SAMS monograph 

succinctly puts it “less than two-thirds of the officers who use this 

process trust it, and only one in four believe that it consistently 

produces the best solution to a given problem. In short, we are using a 

process that we do not really believe in to produce results that we think 

are sub-optimal.”13 Recent emphasis on Design has been a breath of 

fresh air for big picture NTs, but the Army will need to further refine 

the relationship between Design and MDMP and will need to ensure 
62

that Design is not co-opted to become another rigid and highly defined 

process like MDMP.

 3. Institute long term longitudinal studies of the relationship 

between temperament, career satisfaction, promotion and attrition. 

Unfortunately, the data needed to fully validate or invalidate the 

thrust of this paper is not readily accessible (if it exists). The multiple 

SAMS/MMAS monographs referenced had access to only singleclass voluntary survey samples. No source mentioned any NCO or 

enlisted demographics. Studies at the USAWC take the temperament 

imbalance in the Army most seriously, but focus on the narrow scope of 

senior leadership. Overall, these works have addressed the issue of an 

SJ (and/or TJ) imbalance in the Army from a leadership and problemsolving perspective, but no comprehensive initiative addresses the 

detrimental impact on the organization as a whole, especially in 

regards to retention, promotion and attrition.

 In conclusion, three truths should be clear. First, the Army is an 

imbalanced organization, leaning heavily toward the Sensing-Judging 

temperament with a strong Thinking emphasis. Second, because diversity 

and balance are good for an organization and for problem-solving, this 

imbalance has potentially detrimental side effects. Finally, Army leaders 

can and should provide a counter-balance by intentionally addressing this 

issue through individual efforts and systemic initiatives. 
63

Bibliography

Allen, Charles D. “Creative Thinking for Individuals and Teams.” US 

Army War College. 2009. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/dclm/

AY10%20Creative%20Thinking%20Allen.pdf (accessed September 9, 

2012).

Atwater, Paul E. Roush and Leanne. “Using the MBTI to Understand 

Transformational Leadership and Self-Perception Accuracy.” Military 

Psychology, 1992: 17-34.

Bruhl, Major Joseph. “Gardener-Leaders: A New Paradigm for 

Developing Adaptive, Creative, and Humble Leaders.” Military Review, 

July-August 2012: 41-45.

Danikowski, MAJ David A. Personality and the Planning Process. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States 

Army Command and General Staff College, 2001.

Kroeger, Otto and Thuesen, Janet M. Type Talk: The 16 Personality 

Types That Determine How We Live, Love and Work. New York: Dell 

Publishing, 1988.

Myers, Isabel Briggs, Mary H. McCaulley, Naomi L. Quenk, and Allen 

L. Hammer. MBTI Manual: A Guide to the Development and Use of the 

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Mountain View, CA: CPP, Inc., 2003.

Russell, MAJ Earl D. Relationship Between Army Officer Personality 

Type, Combat Identifier, Leadership Style, And Career Satisfaction. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff 

College, 2011.

Walck, MAJ Ronald D. Integrating Staff Elements, Personality Type 

and Groupthink. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 

Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.
64

Notes

1. Keirsey-Bates temperament information for the next four paragraphs 

comes from Kroeger and Thuesen, Type Talk, 49-61.

2. For purposes of full disclosure, the author is an NT. All MBTI types 

are equal, but ENTPs are the most equal.

3. Walck, Integrating Staff Elements, Personality Type and Groupthink,

16.

4. Allen, Creative Thinking for Individuals and Teams, 3.

5. Roush and Atwater, Using the MBTI to Understand Transformational 

Leadership and Self-Perception Accuracy, 34.

6. Russel, Relationship Between Army Officer Personality Type, Combat 

Identifier, Leadership Style, And Career Satisfaction, 42.

7. Kroeger and Thuesen, Type Talk, 194.

8. Kroeger and Thuesen, Type Talk, 99.

9. Allen, Creative Thinking for Individuals and Teams, 6.

10. Bruhl, Gardener-Leaders, 43.

11. Studies cited in Myers et al., MBTI Manual, 351.

12. See Danikowski, Personality and the Planning Process, for a more 

in-depth study of how temperament interacts with and influences the planning 

process.

13. Walck, Integrating Staff Elements, Personality Type and Groupthink,

31.

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