Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, June 29, 2005 STATE DEPARTMENT

Improvements Needed to 

Strengthen U.S. Passport 

Fraud Detection Efforts 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-05-853T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-853T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

202-512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-853T, testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

June 29, 2005 

STATE DEPARTMENT

Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 

Passport Fraud Detection Efforts 

Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of those 

fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, stolen, or 

damaged passports and child substitution are among the other tactics used. 

Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals conceal their activities 

and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist that they could also be used to 

help facilitate terrorism. 

State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, 

and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from 

terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. citizens listed in the 

federal government’s consolidated terrorist watch list is not systematically 

provided to State. Moreover, State does not routinely obtain from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted 

by federal and state law enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 

federal and state fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State’s 

Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One 

of those not included was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. State does not 

maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, hindering 

information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing reductions and 

interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud referrals at some 

offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and investigative resources also 

hinder fraud detection efforts. 

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on 

State’s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to adjust 

the standards. State began implementing the new standards in January 2004 

to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform 

nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern 

that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to “shortcut” 

fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner 

concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a 

number of other modifications and compromises. 

Crimes Suspected of 37 Federal and State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were Included in Our 

Test 

Type of crime Federal fugitives State fugitives

Murder 5 4

Felonious assault and related acts 2 7

Child sex offenses 4 1

Drug trafficking 3 

Attempted murder 1 1

Bombings 1 

Child kidnapping 1

Other crimes 4 3

Total 20 17

Sources: State Department and other federal agencies. 

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. 

passport is essential to the State 

Department’s efforts to protect U.S. 

citizens from terrorists, criminals, 

and others. State issued about 8.8 

million passports in 2004. During 

the same year, State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security arrested about 

500 individuals for passport fraud, 

and about 300 persons were 

convicted. Passport fraud is often 

intended to facilitate other crimes, 

including illegal immigration, drug 

trafficking, and alien smuggling. 

GAO examined (1) how passport 

fraud is committed, (2) what key 

fraud detection challenges State 

faces, and (3) what effect new 

passport examiner performance 

standards could have on fraud 

detection. 

What GAO Recommends 

In our report State Department: 

Improvements Needed to 

Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud 

Detection Efforts (GAO-05-477, 

May 20, 2005), we recommended 

that the Secretary of State consider 

ways to improve interagency 

information sharing, establish a 

centralized and up-to-date fraud 

prevention library, consider 

augmenting fraud prevention 

staffing, assess the extent to which 

interoffice workload transfers may 

hinder fraud prevention, and 

strengthen fraud prevention 

training and oversight. State 

generally concurred with our 

recommendations and indicated 

that it has begun taking steps to 

implement most of them. 
Page 1 GAO-05-853T 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the State 

Department’s efforts to strengthen U.S. passport fraud detection.1

Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State 

Department’s effort to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and 

others. The department issued about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year 

2004. Each year, State passport examiners refer tens of thousands of 

applications they suspect may be fraudulent to their local fraud prevention 

offices. In fiscal year 2004, State’s Diplomatic Security Service arrested 

about 500 individuals for passport fraud and about 300 were convicted. 

Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate such crimes as illegal 

immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. 

Our report addressed three key issues: (1) how passport fraud is 

committed, (2) what key challenges State faces in its fraud-detection 

efforts, and (3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards 

could have on fraud detection. Today I am going to focus my discussion on 

the first two issues, and I will also discuss our recommendations to State 

and State’s response to them. 

For our work on this subject, we reviewed various fraud statistics and 

investigative case files maintained by relevant State bureaus and observed 

State’s fraud detection efforts at 7 of the 16 domestic passport-issuing 

offices. We also tested State’s use of electronic databases for fraud 

detection and interviewed officials in various State offices and bureaus 

involved in this issue. We conducted our work from May 2004 to March 

2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

We found that identity theft is the primary tactic used by individuals 

fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. Specifically, imposters’ use of 

other people’s legitimate birth and other identification documents 

accounted for 69 percent of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 2004, 

while false claims of lost, stolen, or damaged passports and other methods 

 1

U.S. Government Accountability Office, State Department: Improvements Needed to 

Strengthen U.S. Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, GAO-05-477, (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 

2005) 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-05-853T 

accounted for the remaining 31 percent. According to State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, passport fraud is often committed in connection with 

other crimes, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money 

laundering, and alien smuggling. Fraudulently obtained passports help 

enable criminals to hide their movements and activities, and concerns 

exist that fraudulently obtained passports could also be used to support 

terrorism. U.S. passports allow their holders to enter the United States 

with much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens and also allow 

visa-free passage into many countries around the world, providing obvious 

potential benefits to terrorists and criminals operating on an international 

scale. 

Our report details a number of challenges to State’s passport fraud 

detection efforts, including information sharing deficiencies and 

insufficient fraud prevention staffing, training, oversight, and investigative 

resources. These challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens 

from terrorists, criminals, and others who would harm the United States. 

Specifically, State does not currently receive information on U.S. citizens 

listed in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) database, which is the 

federal government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, nor does State 

routinely obtain from the FBI the names of individuals wanted by both 

federal and state law enforcement authorities. Therefore, many of these 

individuals are not listed in State’s Consular Lookout and Support System 

(CLASS) name-check database for passports,2

 and they could obtain 

passports and travel internationally without the knowledge of appropriate 

authorities. We tested the names of 67 different federal and state 

fugitives—some wanted for serious crimes, including murder and rape—

and found that fewer than half were in State’s system. One of those not 

included was on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. Though State, TSC, and 

the FBI began exploring options for more routine information sharing on 

certain passport-related matters in mid- to late 2004, such arrangements 

are not yet in place. 

In addition, State does not maintain a centralized electronic fraud 

prevention library that enables information sharing on fraud alerts, lost 

and stolen birth and naturalization certificates, counterfeit documents, 

and other fraud prevention resources. Further, we found that fraud 

prevention training is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing 

 2

State maintains a separate CLASS database for visas. References to CLASS throughout this 

testimony relate to the CLASS database for passports only. 
Page 3 GAO-05-853T 

offices, some examiners have not had formal fraud prevention training in 

years, and training and oversight of passport acceptance agent operations 

are even more sporadic. State does not have any way of tracking whether 

many acceptance agent employees are receiving required training, it 

makes oversight visits to only a limited number of acceptance facilities 

each year, and it does not maintain records of all of the individuals 

accepting passport applications at those facilities, posing a significant 

fraud vulnerability. 

Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have 

on State’s fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to 

adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in 

January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more 

uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed 

concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to 

“shortcut” fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and 

examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and 

made a number of other modifications and compromises. 

We are recommending that State, as it works to improve the coordination 

and execution of passport fraud detection efforts, take several actions to 

improve and expedite information sharing, specifically by ensuring that 

State’s CLASS system for passports contains a more comprehensive list of 

individuals identified in the Terrorist Screening Center database as well as 

state and federal fugitives, and by establishing and maintaining a 

centralized electronic fraud prevention library. We are also recommending 

that State consider designating additional positions for fraud prevention 

coordination and training in some domestic passport-issuing offices; 

examine the impact of other workload-related issues on fraud prevention; 

and strengthen its fraud prevention training and acceptance agent 

oversight programs. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally concurred with our 

findings and conclusions. State indicated that it has already begun taking, 

plans to take, or is considering measures to address most of our 

recommendations. 

A U.S. passport is not only a travel document but also an official 

verification of the bearer’s origin, identity, and nationality. Under U.S. law, Background 
Page 4 GAO-05-853T 

the Secretary of State has the authority to issue passports. Only U.S. 

nationals3

 may obtain a U.S. passport, and evidence of citizenship or 

nationality is required with every passport application. Federal regulations 

list those who do not qualify for a U.S. passport, including those who are 

subjects of a federal felony warrant. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services oversees the 

Passport Services Office, the largest component of State’s Consular Affairs 

Bureau. Passport Services consists of three headquarters offices: Policy 

Planning and Legal Advisory Services; Field Operations; and Information 

Management and Liaison. Also within Consular Affairs is the Office of 

Consular Fraud Prevention, which addresses passport, visa, and other 

types of consular fraud; the Consular Systems Division, responsible for the 

computer systems involved in passport services and other consular 

operations; and the Office for American Citizens Services, which handles 

most issues relating to passport cases at overseas posts. The Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security is responsible for investigating individual cases of 

suspected passport and visa fraud. The State Department Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) also has some authority to investigate passport 

fraud. 

State operates 16 domestic passport-issuing offices, which employ 

approximately 480 passport examiners who approve and issue most U.S. 

passports that are printed each year. The number of passports issued by 

domestic passport offices has risen steadily in recent years, increasing 

from about 7.3 million in fiscal year 2000 to 8.8 million in fiscal year 2004. 

Overseas posts deal with a much lower volume of passports by 

comparison, handling about 300,000 worldwide in fiscal year 2004. 

The majority of passport applications are submitted by mail or in-person at 

one of almost 7,000 passport application acceptance facilities nationwide.4

The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for, 

among other things, verifying whether an applicant’s identification 

document (such as a driver’s license) actually matches the applicant. 

 3

National means a citizen of the United States or a noncitizen owing permanent allegiance 

to the United States. 

4

Number is as of March 2005. State officials noted that this number changes frequently as 

new acceptance facilities are added and others are dropped. 

State Passport Operations 

Passport Application and 

Approval Process 
Page 5 GAO-05-853T 

Then, through a process called adjudication, passport examiners 

determine whether they should issue each applicant a passport. 

Adjudication requires the examiner to scrutinize identification and 

citizenship documents presented by applicants to verify their identity and 

U.S. citizenship. The passport adjudication process is facilitated by 

computer systems, including the Travel Document Issuance System, which 

appears on passport examiners’ screens when the adjudication begins and 

automatically checks the applicant’s name against several databases. 

Figure 1 identifies the key computer databases available to help examiners 

adjudicate passport applications and detect potential fraud. 

Figure 1: Electronic Databases Available to Passport Examiners 

In addition, examiners scrutinize paper documents and other relevant 

information during the fraud detection process, watch for suspicious 

behavior and travel plans, and request additional identification when they 

feel the documents presented are insufficient. When examiners detect 

potentially fraudulent passport applications, they send the applications to 

their local fraud prevention office for review and potential referral to 

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security for further investigation. 
Page 6 GAO-05-853T 

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigators stated that imposters’ 

use of assumed identities, supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained 

identification documents, was a common and successful way to 

fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport. This method accounted for 69 percent 

of passport fraud detected in fiscal year 2004. Investigators found 

numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens obtaining U.S. passports 

using a false identity or the documentation of others to hide their true 

identity. In one example, in 1997, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Cuba 

stole a Lear jet and transported it to Nicaragua. At the time of his arrest in 

2003, he was using an assumed identity and possessed both false and 

legitimate but fraudulently obtained identification documents, including a 

U.S. passport in the name he used while posing as a certified pilot and 

illegally providing flight instruction. Seized at his residence when he was 

arrested were two Social Security cards, four driver’s licenses, three 

Puerto Rican birth certificates, one U.S. passport, one pilot identification 

card, numerous credit cards and checking account cards, and items used 

to make fraudulent documents. In October 2004, he pled guilty to 

knowingly possessing five or more “authentication devices” and false 

identification documents, for which he was sentenced to 8 months 

confinement. In another case, a man wanted for murdering his wife 

obtained a Colorado driver’s license and a passport using a friend’s Social 

Security number and date and place of birth. Three and four years later he 

obtained renewal and replacement passports, respectively, in the same 

assumed identity. He was later arrested and pled guilty to making a false 

statement in an application for a passport. He was sentenced to about 7 

months time served and returned to California to stand trial for murdering 

his wife. 

Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including 

submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child 

substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Some fraudulently 

obtain new passports by claiming to have lost their passport or had it 

stolen or damaged. For example, one individual who used another 

person’s Social Security number and Ohio driver’s license to report a lost 

passport obtained a replacement passport through the one-day expedited 

service. This fraudulently obtained passport was used to obtain entry into 

the United States 14 times in less than three years. Diplomatic Security 

officials told us that another means of passport fraud is when individuals 

obtain replacement passports by using expired passports containing 

photographs of individuals they closely resemble. This method of fraud is 

more easily and commonly committed with children, with false 

applications based on photographs of children who look similar to the 

Identity Theft a 

Primary Means of 

Committing Fraud 
Page 7 GAO-05-853T 

child applicant.5 Assuming the identity of a deceased person is another 

means of fraudulently applying for a passport. 

According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport 

fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including 

narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien 

smuggling. According to Diplomatic Security officials, concerns exist 

within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport 

fraud could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. Using a 

passport with a false identity helps enable criminals to conceal their 

movements and activities, and U.S. passports provide their holders free 

passage into our country with much less scrutiny than is given to foreign 

citizens. U.S. passports also allow visa-free passage into many countries 

around the world, providing obvious benefits to criminals operating on an 

international scale. According to State officials, the most common crime 

associated with passport fraud is illegal immigration. For example, one 

woman was recently convicted for organizing and leading a large-scale 

passport fraud ring that involved recruiting American women to sell their 

children’s identities, so that foreign nationals could fraudulently obtain 

passports and enter the United States illegally. According to the 

Department of State, the woman targeted drug-dependent women and 

their children, paying them about $300 for each identity and then using the 

identities to apply for passports. The woman then sold the fraudulently 

obtained passports to illegal aliens for as much as $6,000 each. 

One of the key challenges to State’s fraud detection efforts is limited 

interagency information sharing. Specifically, State currently lacks access 

to the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated terrorist watch list 

database, which was created in 2003 to improve information sharing 

among government agencies. By consolidating terrorist watch lists, TSC is 

intended to enable federal agencies to access critical information quickly 

when a suspected terrorist is encountered or stopped within the United 

States, at the country’s borders, or at embassies overseas. However, 

because State’s CLASS name-check database does not contain the TSC 

information, U.S. citizens with possible ties to terrorism could potentially 

 5

In an effort to address this problem, State established a new requirement in February 2004 

that children aged 14 and under appear with their parents when applying for a passport to 

allow comparison of the children to the photographs being submitted. 

Passports Used to Commit 

Other Crimes 

State Faces 

Challenges to Fraud 

Detection Efforts 
Page 8 GAO-05-853T 

obtain passports and travel internationally without the knowledge of 

appropriate authorities. 

Although TSC has been operational since December 2003, State and TSC 

did not begin exploring the possibility of uploading data from the TSC 

database into passport CLASS until December 2004. State and TSC have 

not reached an agreement about information-sharing, though State sent an 

official proposal to TSC in January 2005. A TSC official told us that she 

does not foresee any technical limitations, and added that TSC agrees that 

it is important to work out an agreement with State. We recommended 

that State and other parties expedite such arrangements, and State said 

that it and the TSC are actively working to do so. 

Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently 

provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law 

enforcement authorities, State’s CLASS name-check system does not 

contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and 

other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports and 

potentially flee the country. The subjects of federal felony arrest warrants 

are not entitled to a U.S. passport. According to FBI officials, FBI 

databases contain the names of approximately 37,000 individuals wanted 

on federal charges. State Department officials acknowledge that many of 

these individuals are not listed in CLASS. We tested the names of 43 

different federal fugitives and found that just 23 were in CLASS; therefore, 

passport examiners would not be alerted about the individuals’ wanted 

status if any of the other 20 not in CLASS applied for a passport. In fact, 

one of these 20 did obtain an updated U.S. passport 17 months after the 

FBI had listed the individual in its database as wanted. A number of the 20 

federal fugitives who were included in our test and were found not to be in 

CLASS were suspected of serious crimes, including murder. One was on 

the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. Table 1 lists the crimes suspected of the 

federal fugitives in our test. 

CLASS Does Not Include 

Names of All Wanted 

Federal and State Fugitives 
Page 9 GAO-05-853T 

Table 1: Crimes Suspected of 20 Federal Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were 

Included in Our Test 

Type of crime Number of fugitives 

Murder 5

Felonious assault and related crimes 2

Child sex offenses 4

Drug trafficking 3

Attempted murder 1

Bombings 1

Other crimes 4

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the State Department’s 

CLASS name-check system. 

State officials told us that they had not initiated efforts to improve 

information sharing with the FBI on passport-related matters until the 

summer of 2004 because they had previously been under the impression 

that the U.S. Marshals Service was already sending to CLASS the names of 

all fugitives wanted by federal law enforcement authorities. State officials 

were not aware that the information in the U.S. Marshal’s database was 

not as comprehensive as that contained in the FBI-operated National 

Crime Information Center database. State officials became aware of this 

situation when the union representing passport examiners brought to their 

attention that a number of individuals on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list 

were not in CLASS. In the summer of 2004, the FBI agreed to State’s 

request to provide the names from the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. As part 

of these discussions, State and the FBI explored other information-sharing 

opportunities as well, and FBI headquarters officials sent a message 

instructing agents in its field offices how to provide names of U.S. citizens 

who are FBI fugitives to State on a case-by-case basis. 

Additionally, State began discussions with the FBI about receiving 

information on individuals with FBI warrants on a more routine and 

comprehensive basis. According to FBI officials, State requested that the 

FBI provide only the names of FBI fugitives and not those of individuals 

wanted by other federal law enforcement entities. However, the FBI is the 

only law enforcement agency that systematically compiles comprehensive 

information on individuals wanted by all federal law enforcement 

agencies, and, according to FBI officials, it is the logical agency to provide 

such comprehensive information to State. We recommended that State 

expedite arrangements to enhance interagency information sharing with 

the FBI to ensure that the CLASS system contains a more comprehensive 
Page 10 GAO-05-853T 

list of federal fugitives. According to State, it sent a written request on this 

issue to the FBI in April 2005. State also noted that it had reached 

agreement in principal with the FBI on information sharing efforts related 

to FBI fugitives. 

In addition to its role in compiling information on federal fugitives, the FBI 

is also the only law enforcement agency that compiles comprehensive 

information on individuals wanted by state and local authorities. 

According to FBI officials, FBI databases contain the names of 

approximately 1.2 million individuals wanted on state and local charges 

nationwide. FBI officials told us that some of the most serious crimes 

committed often involve only state and local charges. We tested the names 

of 24 different state fugitives and found that just 7 were in CLASS; 

therefore, the CLASS system would not flag any of the other 17, were they 

to apply for a passport.6

 Table 2 lists the crimes suspected of the 17 tested 

state fugitives not in CLASS who were included in our test. 

Table 2: Crimes Suspected of 17 State Fugitives Not in CLASS Who Were Included 

in Our Test 

Type of crime Number of fugitives 

Murder 4

Felonious assault and related crimes 7

Child sex offenses 1

Attempted murder 1

Child kidnapping 1

Other crimes 3

Sources: Various law enforcement agency databases and Web sites and the State Department’s 

CLASS name-check system. 

During our review, State Department officials told us that having a 

comprehensive list of names that included both federal and state fugitives 

could “clog” State’s CLASS system and slow the passport adjudication 

process. They also expressed concern that the course of action required of 

State would not always be clear for cases involving passport applicants 

wanted on state charges. We recommended that State work with the FBI 

to ensure that the CLASS system contains a more comprehensive list of 

 6

We also noted that 10 of the 20 tested federal fugitives that were not in CLASS were also 

wanted on state charges. Thus, if State fugitives had been listed in CLASS, these individuals 

would have been flagged, even if information on their federal warrants had been missed. 
Page 11 GAO-05-853T 

state fugitives. In commenting on a draft of our report, State said that it 

now intends to work with the FBI and U.S. Marshals Service to establish 

an automated mechanism for integrating information on state warrants 

into CLASS. 

State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud 

prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office personnel 

to efficiently share fraud prevention information and tools. As a result, 

fraud prevention information is provided inconsistently to examiners 

among the 16 domestic offices. For example, at some offices, examiners 

maintain individual sets of fraud prevention materials. Some print out 

individual fraud alerts and other related documents and file them in 

binders. Others archive individual e-mails and other documents 

electronically. Some examiners told us that the sheer volume of fraudrelated materials they receive makes it impossible to maintain and use 

these resources in an organized and systematic way. 

Other information sharing tools have not been effectively maintained. 

Consular Affairs’ Office of Consular Fraud Prevention maintains a Web 

site and “e-room” with some information on fraud alerts, lost and stolen 

state birth documents, and other resources related to fraud detection, 

though fraud prevention officials told us the Web site is not kept up to 

date, is poorly organized, and is difficult to navigate. We directly observed 

information available on this Web site during separate visits to State’s 

passport-issuing offices and noted that some of the material was outdated 

by as much as more than a year. The issuing office in Seattle developed its 

own online fraud library that included information such as the specific 

serial numbers of blank birth certificates that were stolen, false driver’s 

licenses, fraud prevention training materials, and a host of other fraud 

prevention information resources and links. However, this library is no 

longer updated. Most of the 16 fraud prevention managers we talked to 

believed that the Bureau of Consular Affairs should maintain a centralized 

library of this nature for offices nationwide. 

We recommended that State establish and maintain a centralized and upto-date electronic fraud prevention library that would enable passport 

agency personnel at different locations across the United States to 

efficiently access and share fraud prevention information and tools. 

Commenting on our draft report, State said that it now intends to design a 

centralized online passport “knowledgebase” that will include extensive 

sections on fraud prevention resources. 

Limited Intra-agency 

Information Sharing May 

Be Affecting Fraud 

Detection 
Page 12 GAO-05-853T 

In January 2004, State eliminated the assistant fraud prevention manager 

position that had existed at most of its domestic passport-issuing offices, 

and most Fraud Prevention Managers believe that this action was harmful 

to their fraud detection program. State eliminated the position primarily to 

enable more senior passport examiners to serve in that role on a rotational 

basis to gain deeper knowledge of the subject matter and enhance overall 

fraud detection efforts when they returned to adjudicating passport 

applications. However, managers at 10 of the 12 offices that previously had 

permanent assistants told us that the loss of this position had been 

harmful to their fraud detection program. In particular, managers 

indicated that the loss of their assistant impacted their own ability to 

concentrate on fraud detection by adding to their workload significant 

additional training, administrative, and networking responsibilities, while 

also diverting from their fraud trend analysis and preparation of reports 

and case referrals. 

Fraud Prevention Managers and other State officials have linked declining 

fraud referrals to the loss of the assistant fraud prevention manager 

position. In the 12 offices that previously had permanent assistants, fraud 

referral rates from the managers to Diplomatic Security decreased overall 

by almost 25 percent from fiscal year 2003 through 2004,7

 the period during 

which the position was eliminated, and this percentage was much higher 

in some offices.8

 Without their assistants helping them screen fraud 

referrals, check applicant information, and assist with other duties related 

to the process, managers said they are making fewer fraud referrals to 

Diplomatic Security because they lack the time and do not believe they 

can fully rely on new rotational staff to take on these responsibilities. 

We recommended that State consider designating additional positions for 

fraud prevention coordination and training in domestic passport-issuing 

offices. Passport Services management told us they were not planning to 

re-establish the permanent assistant role, but that they are in the process 

of filling one to two additional fraud prevention manager positions at each 

of the 2 offices with the largest workloads nationwide. State also plans to 

establish one additional fraud prevention manager position at another 

 7

In the 4 offices that did not previously have permanent assistants, fraud referral rates 

decreased on average by only 7 percent during the same period. 

8

Two offices that had assistant fraud prevention managers in 2003 saw increases in their 

fraud referral rates. These 2 offices received just over 8 percent of the total applications 

received by offices that had assistants. 

Staffing Change Reduced 

Time Available to Review 

Fraud Cases 
Page 13 GAO-05-853T 

issuing office with a large workload. Commenting on our draft report, 

State said that it would now also consider rotating GS-12 Adjudication 

Supervisors through local fraud prevention offices to relieve Fraud 

Prevention Managers of some of their training responsibilities. 

State routinely transfers adjudication cases among the different offices to 

balance workloads, and Fraud Prevention Managers at a number of issuing 

offices said they had noticed a lower percentage of fraud referrals 

returned to them from the 3 offices that were assigned a bulk of the 

workload transfers. In fiscal year 2004, 28 percent of passport applications 

were transferred to 1 of these 3 offices for adjudication, while other 

issuing offices adjudicated 72 percent. Although these 3 offices received 28 

percent of the applications, they provided only 11 percent of total fraud 

referrals to the originating agencies. For fiscal year 2003, the 3 processing 

centers adjudicated 26 percent of the applications but provided only 8 

percent of the fraud referrals. In 2004, 1 of the issuing offices transferred 

out to processing centers 63 percent of its applications (about 287,000) but 

received back from the processing centers only 2 percent of the fraud 

referrals it generated that year. In 2003, this office transferred out 66 

percent of its workload while receiving back only 8 percent of its total 

fraud referrals. 

Fraud Prevention Managers and other officials told us that one reason 

fewer fraud referrals return from these 3 offices is that passport examiners 

handling workload transfers from a number of different regions are not as 

familiar with the demographics, neighborhoods, and other local 

characteristics of a particular region as are the examiners who live and 

work there. For example, some officials noted that, in instances when they 

suspect fraud, they might telephone the applicants to ask for additional 

information so they can engage in polite conversation and ask casual 

questions, such as where they grew up, what school they attended, and 

other information. The officials noted that, due to their familiarity with the 

area, applicants’ answers to such questions may quickly indicate whether 

or not their application is likely to be fraudulent. One examiner in an 

office that handled workload transfers from areas with large Spanishspeaking populations said that the office had an insufficient number of 

Spanish-speaking examiners, emphasizing the usefulness of that skill in 

detecting dialects, accents, handwriting, and cultural references that 

conflict with information provided in passport applications. 

We recommended that State assess the extent to which and reasons why 

workload transfers from one domestic passport issuing office to another 

Interoffice Transfers of 

Passport Adjudication 

Workload Result, in Some 

Cases, in Fewer Fraud 

Referrals Back to 

Originating Office 
Page 14 GAO-05-853T 

were, in some cases, associated with fewer fraud referrals and to take any 

corrective action that may be necessary. In its official comments on our 

draft report, State did not address this recommendation. 

State has not established a core curriculum and ongoing training 

requirements for experienced passport examiners, and thus such training 

is provided unevenly at different passport-issuing offices. While State 

recently developed a standardized training program for new hires that was 

first given in August 2004, we reviewed the training programs and 

materials at all 7 issuing offices we visited and discussed the programs and 

materials at other offices with the remaining nine Fraud Prevention 

Managers by telephone and found that the topics covered and the amount 

and depth of training varied widely by office. Some had developed regionspecific materials; others relied more heavily on materials that had been 

developed by passport officials in Washington, D.C., and were largely 

outdated. Some scheduled more regular training sessions, and others did 

so more sporadically. Several examiners told us they had not received any 

formal, interactive fraud prevention training in at least 4 years. Some 

Fraud Prevention Managers hold brief discussions on specific fraud cases 

and trends at monthly staff meetings, and they rely on these discussions to 

serve as refresher training. Some Fraud Prevention Managers occasionally 

invite officials from other government agencies, such as the Secret Service 

or DHS, to share their fraud expertise. However, these meetings take place 

only when time is available. For example, officials at one issuing office 

said the monthly meetings had not been held for several months because 

of high workload; another manager said he rarely has time for any monthly 

meetings; and two others said they do not hold such discussions but e-mail 

to examiners recent fraud trend alerts and information. 

We recommended that State establish a core curriculum and ongoing 

fraud prevention training requirements for all passport examiners. State 

said that it is implementing a standardized national training program for 

new passport examiners but that it is still providing training to existing 

passport examiners on a decentralized basis. State officials told us that 

they intend to develop a national training program for experienced 

examiners, after certain organizational changes are made in State’s 

headquarters passport operation. 

State Lacks Established 

Refresher Training; Such 

Training Is Provided 

Unevenly 
Page 15 GAO-05-853T 

Numerous passport-issuing agency officials and Diplomatic Security 

investigators told us that the acceptance agent program is a significant 

fraud vulnerability. Examples of acceptance agent problems that were 

brought to our attention include important information missing from 

documentation and identification photos that did not match the applicant 

presenting the documentation. Officials at one issuing office said that their 

office often sees the same mistakes multiple times from the same 

acceptance facility. These officials attributed problems with applications 

received through acceptance agents to the sporadic training provided for 

and limited oversight of acceptance agents. State has almost 7,000 

passport acceptance agency offices, and none of the 16 issuing offices 

provide comprehensive annual training or oversight to all acceptance 

agency offices in their area. Instead, the issuing offices concentrate their 

training and oversight visits on agency offices geographically nearest to 

the issuing offices, or in large population centers, or where examiners and 

Fraud Prevention Managers had reported problems, or in high fraud areas. 

Larger issuing offices in particular have trouble reaching acceptance 

agency staff. At one larger issuing office with about 1,700 acceptance 

facilities, the Fraud Prevention Manager said he does not have time to 

provide acceptance agent training and that it is difficult for issuing office 

staff to visit many agencies. A manager at another large issuing office that 

covers an area including 11 states said she does not have time to visit 

some agencies in less populated areas. 

While State officials told us all acceptance agency staff must be U.S. 

citizens, issuing agency officials told us they have no way of verifying that 

all of them are. Management officials at one passport-issuing office told us 

that, while their region included more than 1,000 acceptance facilities, the 

office did not maintain records of the names of individuals accepting 

passport applications at those facilities. 

We recommended that State strengthen its fraud prevention training 

efforts and oversight of passport acceptance agents. In commenting on a 

draft of our report, State said that it is adapting and expanding computerbased training for U.S. Postal Service acceptance facilities for more 

widespread use among acceptance agents nationwide. State also indicated 

that it would institute a nationwide quality review program for its 

acceptance facilities. However, State officials recently told us that the 

quality reviews would focus only on new acceptance facilities and existing 

facilities with reported problems. It is unclear whether State will perform 

quality reviews for the rest of its nearly 7,000 facilities. 

Sporadic Training and 

Limited Oversight of 

Acceptance Agents 

Constitute Significant 

Fraud Vulnerability 
Page 16 GAO-05-853T 

Although State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided additional 

resources for investigating passport fraud in recent years, its agents must 

still divide their time among a number of competing demands, some of 

which are considered a higher priority than investigating passport fraud. A 

Diplomatic Security official told us that, after the September 11th terrorist 

attacks, the bureau hired about 300 additional agents, at least partially to 

reduce investigative backlogs.9

 Diplomatic Security and passport officials 

told us that, while the increased staff resources had helped reduce 

backlogs to some degree, agents assigned to passport fraud investigations 

are still routinely pulled away for other assignments. At most of the offices 

we visited, few of the agents responsible for investigating passport fraud 

were actually there. At one office, all of the agents responsible for 

investigating passport fraud were on temporary duty elsewhere, and the 

one agent covering the office in their absence had left his assignment at 

the local Joint Terrorism Task Force to do so. Agents at one office said 

that five of the eight agents involved in passport fraud investigations there 

were being sent for temporary duty in Iraq, as were many of their 

colleagues at other offices. 

Agents at all but 2 of the 7 bureau field offices we visited said they are 

unable to devote adequate time and continuity to investigating passport 

fraud. We noted that the number of new passport fraud investigations had 

declined by more than 25 percent over the last five years, though 

Diplomatic Security officials attributed this trend, among other factors, to 

refined targeting of cases that merit investigation. The Special-Agent-inCharge of a large Diplomatic Security field office in a high fraud region 

expressed serious concern that, in 2002, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

began requiring, to reduce backlog of old cases, that most cases be closed 

after 12 months, whether or not the investigations were complete. The 

agent said that about 400 incomplete cases at his office were closed. A 

Diplomatic Security official in Washington, D.C., told us that, while field 

offices had been encouraged to close old cases that were not likely to be 

resolved, there had not been a formal requirement to do so. State officials 

agreed that Diplomatic Security agents are not able to devote adequate 

attention to investigating passport fraud, and told us that the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security plans to hire 56 new investigative agents over the next 

few years. According to State officials, these new investigators will be 

 9

State officials also noted that the Bureau of Consular Affairs funds more than 120 

Diplomatic Security agent positions nationwide to help support efforts to investigate 

passport fraud. 

Overstretched 

Investigative Resources 

Hinder Fraud Detection 
Page 17 GAO-05-853T 

solely dedicated to investigating passport and visa fraud and will not be 

pulled away for other duty. 

Although State’s approach to developing new nationwide passport 

examiner production standards, implemented in January 2004, raises 

methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the standards make an 

assessment of their impact on fraud detection premature. State developed 

new nationwide passport examiner production standards in an effort to 

make performance expectations and work processes more uniform among 

its 16 issuing offices. However, State tested examiner production before 

standardizing the passport examination process; differences in work 

processes across offices at the time of the test limited the validity of the 

test results. State then used the results in conjunction with old standards 

to set new nationwide standards. The new standards put additional 

emphasis on achieving quantitative targets. Responding to concerns about 

their fairness due to changes that may have slowed the examination 

process, as well concerns that the new standards led examiners to take 

“shortcuts” in the examination process to meet their number targets, State 

made a number of modifications to the production standards during the 

year. The various modifications have made it unclear what impact the 

standards have had on passport fraud detection. 

Madam Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the 

Committee may have at this time. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact 

Jess Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov, or Michael Courts at (202) 

512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Jeffrey 

Baldwin-Bott, Joseph Carney, Paul Desaulniers, Edward Kennedy, and 

Mary Moutsos. 

Effect of New Examiner 

Performance Standards on 

Fraud Detection Remains 

Unclear 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320360) 
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