109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–51 

CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION ACT 

APRIL 21, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 748] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 748) to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent the 

transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating 

to abortion, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that 

the bill as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 4 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 7 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 45 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 45 

Vote of the Committee ............................................................................................. 45 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 50 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 51 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 51 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 52 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 52 

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion .......................................................... 52 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 54 

Markup Transcript .................................................................................................. 58 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 121 

2 

THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act’’. 

SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO 

ABORTION. 

Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 117 the following: 

‘‘CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION 

OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION 

‘‘Sec. 

‘‘2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion. 

‘‘§ 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating 

to abortion 

‘‘(a) OFFENSE.— 

‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly 

transports a minor across a State line, with the intent that such minor obtain 

an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in the 

State where the minor resides, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 

more than one year, or both. 

‘‘(2) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this subsection, an abridgement of 

the right of a parent occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the minor, 

in a State other than the State where the minor resides, without the parental 

consent or notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have been required by that law had the abortion been performed in the State where the 

minor resides. 

‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.— 

‘‘(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering 

physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 

‘‘(2) A minor transported in violation of this section, and any parent of that 

minor, may not be prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a conspiracy 

to violate this section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a violation 

of this section. 

‘‘(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an 

offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation of this section that the defendant— 

‘‘(1) reasonably believed, based on information the defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that before the minor obtained the abortion, 

the parental consent or notification took place that would have been required 

by the law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, had 

the abortion been performed in the State where the minor resides; or 

‘‘(2) was presented with documentation showing with a reasonable degree 

of certainty that a court in the minor’s State of residence waived any parental 

notification required by the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized that the 

minor be allowed to procure an abortion. 

‘‘(d) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm from a violation of subsection 

(a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section— 

‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or prescription of any instrument, 

medicine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the 

pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an intention other than to 

increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 

after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who died as the result of a 

spontaneous abortion, accidental trauma or a criminal assault on the pregnant 

female or her unborn child; 

‘‘(2) the term a ‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion 

decision’ means a law— 

‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either— 

‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor; or 

‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court; and 

3 

‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described in subparagraph (A) notification to or consent of any person or entity who is not described in that subparagraph; 

‘‘(3) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who is not older than the maximum age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings in a State 

court, under the law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision; 

‘‘(4) the term ‘parent’ means— 

‘‘(A) a parent or guardian; 

‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or 

‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care and control of the 

minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides, who is designated by 

the law requiring parental involvement in the minor’s abortion decision as 

a person to whom notification, or from whom consent, is required; and 

‘‘(5) the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the United States.’’. 

SEC. 3. CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION. 

Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 117A the 

following: 

‘‘CHAPTER 117B—CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION 

‘‘Sec. 

‘‘2432. Child interstate abortion notification. 

‘‘§ 2432. Child interstate abortion notification 

‘‘(a) OFFENSE.— ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—A physician who knowingly performs or induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the requirements of this section shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 

‘‘(2) PARENTAL NOTIFICATION.—A physician who performs or induces an 

abortion on a minor who is a resident of a State other than the State in which 

the abortion is performed must provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such parent 

is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made, 24 hours constructive 

notice must be given to a parent. 

‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The notification requirement of subsection (a)(2) does not 

apply if— 

‘‘(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State that has a law in force 

requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision and the physician 

complies with the requirements of that law; 

‘‘(2) the physician is presented with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor’s State of residence has 

waived any parental notification required by the laws of that State, or has otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to procure an abortion; 

‘‘(3) the minor declares in a signed written statement that she is the victim 

of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion 

is performed on the minor, the physician notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in which the 

minor resides of the known or suspected abuse or neglect; or 

‘‘(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of the minor because her life 

was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 

‘‘(c) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm from a violation of subsection 

(a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section— 

‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or prescription of any instrument, 

medicine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the 

pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an intention other than to 

increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 

after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who died as the result of a 

spontaneous abortion, accidental trauma, or a criminal assault on the pregnant 

female or her unborn child; 

‘‘(2) the term ‘actual notice’ means the giving of written notice directly, in 

person; 

‘‘(3) the term ‘constructive notice’ means notice that is given by certified 

mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery to the last known address of 

the person being notified, with delivery deemed to have occurred 48 hours folVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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1 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (‘‘An offense that is not specifically classified by a letter grade 

in the section defining it, is classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is 1 

year or less but more than 6 months, as a Class A misdemeanor.’’), CIANA would be classified 

as a Class A misdemeanor. Under the Federal fine statute, the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death is not more than $100,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5). 

Therefore, the maximum allowable fine under CIANA is $100,000. 2Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 

lowing noon on the next day subsequent to mailing on which regular mail delivery takes place, days on which mail is not delivered excluded; 

‘‘(4) the term a ‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion 

decision’ means a law— 

‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either— 

‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor; or 

‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court; 

‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described in subparagraph (A) notification to or consent of any person or entity who is not described in that subparagraph; 

‘‘(5) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who is not older than 18 years 

and who is not emancipated under State law; 

‘‘(6) the term ‘parent’ means— 

‘‘(A) a parent or guardian; 

‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or 

‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care and control of the 

minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides; 

as determined by State law; 

‘‘(7) the term ‘physician’ means a doctor of medicine legally authorized to 

practice medicine by the State in which such doctor practices medicine, or any 

other person legally empowered under State law to perform an abortion; and 

‘‘(8) the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the United States.’’. 

SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENT. 

The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, 

is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 117 the following new 

items: 

‘‘117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion .............. 2431 

‘‘117B. Child interstate abortion notification ............................................................................................. 2432’’. 

SEC. 5. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE. 

(a) The provisions of this Act shall be severable. If any provision of this Act, 

or any application thereof, is found unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect 

any provision or application of the Act not so adjudicated. 

(b) The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon enactment. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 748, the ‘‘Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act’’ 

(‘‘CIANA’’), has two primary purposes. The first is to protect the 

health and safety of young girls by preventing valid and constitutional state parental involvement laws from being circumvented. 

The second is to protect the health and safety of young girls by protecting the rights of parents to be involved in the medical decisions 

of their minor daughters when such decisions involve interstate 

abortions. To achieve these purposes, CIANA contains two sections, 

each of which creates a new Federal crime subject to a $100,000 

fine, or 1 year in jail, or both.1

First, CIANA makes it a Federal crime to transport a minor 

across state lines to obtain an abortion in another state in order 

to avoid a state law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s 

abortion decision. Twenty-three states currently have parental involvement laws.2 The purpose of the first section of CIANA is to 

prevent people—including abusive boyfriends and older men who 

may have committed rape—from pressuring young girls into cirVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
5 

3 Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ‘‘Parental Guidance Needed,’’ The New York Times (July 12, 1998). 

cumventing their state’s parental involvement laws by receiving a 

secret out-of-State abortion. This section of CIANA does not apply 

to minors themselves, or to their parents. It also does not apply in 

life-threatening emergencies that may require that an abortion be 

provided immediately. 

Second, CIANA applies when a minor from one state crosses 

state lines to have an abortion in another state that does not have 

a state law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion 

decision, or when a minor from one state crosses state lines to have 

an abortion in another state that does have a state law requiring 

parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, but the physician fails to comply with such law. In such a case, CIANA makes 

it a Federal crime for the abortion provider to fail to give one of 

the minor’s parents, or a legal guardian if necessary, 24 hours’ notice (or notice by mail if necessary) of the minor’s abortion decision 

before the abortion is performed. The purpose of this section is to 

protect fundamental parental rights by giving parents a chance to 

help their young daughters through difficult circumstances as best 

they can, including by giving a health care provider their daughter’s medical history to ensure she receives safe medical care and 

any necessary follow-up treatment. 

Dr. Bruce A. Lucero, an abortion provider, has supported this 

legislation because ‘‘parents are usually the ones who can best help 

their teenager consider her options’’ and because ‘‘patients who receive abortions at out-of-State clinics frequently do not return for 

follow-up care, which can lead to dangerous complications.’’ 3 Parental notification also allows parents to assist their daughter in 

the selection of a competent abortion provider. This section of 

CIANA does not apply in the following circumstances: where the 

abortion provider is presented with court papers showing that the 

parental involvement law in effect in the minor’s state of residence 

has been complied with; where the minor states that she has been 

the victim of abuse by a parent and the abortion provider informs 

the appropriate state authorities of such abuse; or where a lifethreatening emergency may require that an abortion be provided 

immediately. 

CIANA supports state laws that provide parents with the necessary information to fulfill their obligation to care for their minor 

children, and it affirms the common-sense notion that parents have 

the legal right to be involved in medical decisions relating to their 

minor children when those decisions involve interstate abortions. 

CIANA does not supercede, override, or in any way alter existing 

state parental involvement laws. CIANA addresses the interstate 

transportation of minors in order to circumvent valid, existing state 

laws, and uses Congress’ authority to regulate interstate activity to 

protect those laws from evasion and to protect parental involvement when minors cross state lines to obtain an abortion. 

A total of 44 States have enacted some form of a parental involvement law. Twenty-three of these States currently enforce statutes that require the consent or notification of at least one parent, 

or court authorization, before a minor can obtain an abortion. Such 

laws reflect widespread agreement that it is the parents of a pregnant minor who are best suited to provide her counsel, guidance, 

6 

and support as she decides whether to continue her pregnancy or 

to undergo an abortion. These laws not only help to ensure the 

health and safety of pregnant young girls, but also protect fundamental parental rights. 

Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws and 

clear public policy considerations justifying them, substantial evidence exists that such laws are regularly evaded by adults who 

transport minors to abortion providers in States that do not have 

parental notification or consent laws. CIANA would curb the interstate circumvention of these laws, thereby protecting the rights of 

parents and the interests of vulnerable minors. CIANA ensures 

that State parental involvement laws are not evaded through interstate activity. 

Parental involvement in the abortion decisions of minor girls will 

lead to improved medical care for minors seeking abortions and 

provide increased protection for young girls against sexual exploitation by adult men. When parents are not involved in the abortion 

decisions of a child, the risks to the child’s health significantly increase. Parental involvement will ensure that parents have the opportunity to provide additional medical history and information to 

abortion providers prior to performance of an abortion. The medical, emotional and psychological consequences of an abortion are 

serious and lasting. An adequate medical and psychological case 

history is important to the physician, and parents can provide such 

information for their daughters as well as any pertinent family 

medical history, refer the physician to other sources of medical history, such as family physicians, and authorize family physicians to 

give relevant data. 

Only parents are likely to know a young girl’s allergies to anesthesia and medication or previous bouts with specific medical conditions, including depression. A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of the patient will enable abortion providers 

to disclose not only medical risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also those risks that may be specific to the pregnant 

minor. 

Parental involvement also improves medical treatment of pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate knowledge to 

recognize and respond to any post-abortion complications that may 

develop. Without the knowledge that their daughters have had 

abortions, parents are unable to ensure that their children obtain 

routine postoperative care and unable to provide an adequate medical history to physicians called upon to treat any complications 

that may arise. These omissions may allow complications such as 

infection, perforation, or depression to continue untreated. Such 

complications may be lethal if left untreated. 

Teenage pregnancies often occur as a result of predatory practices of men who are substantially older than the minor victim, resulting in the transportation of the girl across State lines by an individual who has a great incentive to avoid criminal liability for his 

conduct. Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the 

advantage of their victims obtaining an abortion. Not only does an 

abortion eliminate critical evidence of the criminal conduct, it allows the abuse to continue undetected. Parental involvement laws 

ensure that parents have the opportunity to protect their daughters 

from those who would victimize them further. 

7 

4Quinnipiac University Poll (conducted March 2-7, 2005, with 1,534 registered voters surveyed; margin of error: ±2.5percent). 5Wirthlin Worldwide Poll (October 21-23, 2003). 

6Wirthlin Worldwide National Poll (October 19-22, 2001). 

7Public Opinion Strategies Survey (July 30, 2002). 

8Zogby California Poll (June 2002). 

9F.S.A. Const. Art. 10 § 22. 

10See Jackie Hallifax, ‘‘Group Seeks Parental Notice End,’’ The Brandenton Herald (January 

11, 2005) at 5. 11Lydia Saad, Gallup News Service (January 20, 2003). 12See Los Angeles Times Poll (June 8-13, 2000); CBS News/New York Times Poll (January 

1998). 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

H.R. 748 is much-needed legislation, overwhelmingly supported 

by the American people, that will protect both the health and safety of our minor children and parental rights. 

SUPPORT FOR CIANA

Polls show that the American people overwhelmingly support parental involvement laws by huge majorities that have grown over 

the last decade. As recently as March, 2005, 75 percent of over 

1,500 registered voters surveyed favored ‘‘requiring parental notification before a minor could get an abortion,’’ and only 18 percent 

were opposed.4 According to another poll conducted in 2003, 73 percent of non-whites and 82 percent of Hispanics support parental 

notification laws.5 A Wirthlin Worldwide poll conducted in October, 

2001, found that 83 percent of those surveyed support laws requiring notification to one parent before an abortion can be performed 

on a minor daughter.6

African Americans and Hispanics overwhelmingly support parental notification laws. A Public Opinion Strategies poll surveyed 

1,000 African-American registered voters on the question: ‘‘Would 

you favor or oppose a law that would require a parent or guardian 

to be notified before a minor child, under the age of 18, undergoes 

an abortion procedure?’’ 84 percent favored such a law (74 percent 

‘‘strongly favor’’ and 10 percent ‘‘somewhat favor’’).7 A Zogby poll 

of California voters showed that 71 percent of those surveyed in 

that state support laws requiring notification to one parent before 

an abortion can be performed on a minor daughter.8

Moreover, during the November, 2004, elections, Florida overwhelmingly passed an amendment to its state constitution that 

provides that ‘‘the Legislature is authorized to require by general 

law for notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before the 

termination of the minor’s pregnancy.’’ 9 Nearly 65 percent of Florida voters in November, 2004, approved this state constitutional 

amendment.10

Even more rigid requirements of parental consent are overwhelmingly supported by the American public. A Gallup poll conducted in January, 2003, showed that 78 percent of those surveyed 

favor laws requiring a 24-hour waiting period before an abortion 

can be obtained, and 73 percent favor laws requiring minors to get 

parental consent before an abortion can be obtained.11 These numbers have been confirmed in other polls.12 Similar results are found 

in polls that consistently reflect over 70 percent of the American 

8 

13See, e.g., CBS News/ NY Times Poll (released January 15, 1998) (78 percent of those polled 

favor requiring parental consent before a girl under 18 years of age could have an abortion); 

Americans United for Life, Abortion and Moral Beliefs, A Survey of American Opinion (1991); 

Wirthlin Group Survey, Public Opinion, May-June 1989; Life/Contemporary American Family 

(released December, 1981) (78 percent of those polled believed that ‘‘a girl who is under 18 years 

of age [should] have to notify her parents before she can have an abortion’’). 14Latino Opinions poll (October 5, 2004) (survey of 1,000 national adult Hispanics on the 

question ‘‘[D]o you support or oppose requiring underage teenage girls to get permission from 

their parents before they are allowed to get an abortion?’’ to which 58 percent reported ‘‘strongly 

support’’ and 11 percent reported ‘‘somewhat support’’). 15David Crary, ‘‘Passage of Teen Abortion Bill Called Likely,’’ The Associated Press (January 

31, 2005). 16 NBC News, ‘‘Meet the Press’’ (January 30, 2005) (transcript). 17See Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Fact Sheets: Teenagers, Abortion, and 

Government Intrusion Laws, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/ 

laws.html (last visited February 2, 2005) (‘‘Few would deny that most teenagers, especially 

younger ones, would benefit from adult guidance when faced with an unwanted pregnancy. Few 

would deny that such guidance ideally should come from the teenager’s parents.’’); National 

Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, Young Women: Reproductive Rights Issues, at 

http://www.naral.org/Issues/youngwomen/index.cfm (last visited February 1, 2005) (‘‘Responsible parents should be involved when their young daughters face a crisis pregnancy.’’). 18 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, ‘‘Mandatory Parental 

Consent to Abortion,’’ 269 JAMA 82, 83 (1993). 19 ‘‘Labor of Love Is Deemed Criminal,’’ The National Law Journal (November 11, 1996) at 

A8. 20See ‘‘Woman Charged in Secret Abortion,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, (September 16, 1995). 

public support parental consent or notification laws,13 including 69 

percent of the Hispanic population.14

As the Associated Press has reported, even ‘‘[o]pponents [of parental notice laws] agree that young women are better off telling 

parents about a pregnancy[.]’’ 15 Even Senator John Kerry, the 

former Democratic nominee for President, has said he supports parental notification laws. On the NBC News program ‘‘Meet the 

Press,’’ Senator Kerry said ‘‘I am for parental notification.’’ 16

There is widespread agreement among abortion rights advocates 

and pro-life advocates that it is the parents of a pregnant minor 

who are best suited to provide her counsel, guidance, and support 

as she decides whether to continue her pregnancy or to undergo an 

abortion. Organizations such as Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League all advise 

pregnant minors to consult their parents before proceeding with an 

abortion.17 In addition, the American Medical Association urges 

physicians to ‘‘strongly encourage minors to discuss their pregnancy with their parents’’ and to ‘‘explain how parental involvement can be helpful and that parents are generally very understanding and supportive.’’ 18

THE SCOPE OF THE INTERSTATE PROBLEM CIANA ADDRESSES

There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that the transportation of minors across state lines in order to obtain abortions is 

both a widespread and frequent practice. Even groups opposed to 

this bill acknowledge that large numbers of minors are transported 

across state lines to obtain abortions, in many cases by adults 

other than their parents. In 1995, Kathryn Kolbert, then an attorney with the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (a national 

legal defense organization that supports abortion), stated that 

thousands of adults are helping minors cross state lines to get 

abortions in states whose parental involvement requirements are 

less stringent or non-existent: ‘‘There are thousands of minors who 

cross state lines for an abortion every year and who need the assistance of adults to do that.’’ 19 She asked, ‘‘How does a 14-yearold get to New Hampshire from Boston without getting a ride?’’ 20

9 

21 Jeff Whelan, ‘‘McGreevey Reveals Latest Abortion Stance,’’ The Star-Ledger (August 30, 

2001). 22 ‘‘Teen-Agers Cross State Lines in Abortion Exodus,’’ The New York Times (December 18, 

1995) at B6. 23See id. 24See id. 25See id. 26 Charles V. Zehren, ‘‘New Restrictive Abortion Law,’’ Newsday (February 22, 1994). 27See attachment, page 11, for copies of such advertisements. 

In 2001, New Jersey’s Star-Ledger reported that Laurie 

Lowenstein, Executive Director of Right to Choose, an abortion 

rights advocacy group, stated that she would quit her job to shuttle 

pregnant young girls to states without parental notification laws if 

New Jersey enacted a parental notification law.21 Only Congress, 

with its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, 

can curb such flagrant disregard of state laws. The experience of 

a number of States illuminates the scope of this problem. 

Pennsylvania 

Since Pennsylvania’s current parental consent law took effect in 

March, 1994, news reports have confirmed that many Pennsylvania 

teenagers are going out of state to New Jersey and New York to 

obtain abortions. In 1995, the New York Times reported that 

‘‘Planned Parenthood in Philadelphia has a list of clinics, from New 

York to Baltimore, to which they will refer teenagers, according to 

the organization’s executive director, Joan Coombs.’’ 22 Moreover, 

the New York Times gave accounts of clinics that had seen an increase in patients from Pennsylvania.23 One clinic, in Cherry Hill, 

New Jersey, reported seeing a threefold increase in Pennsylvania 

teenagers coming for abortions.24 Likewise, a clinic in Queens, New 

York, reported that it was not unusual to see Pennsylvania teenagers as patients in 1995, though earlier it had been rare.25

In the period just prior to the Pennsylvania law taking effect, efforts were underway to make it easier for teenagers to go out of 

state for abortions. For instance, Newsday reported that 

‘‘[c]ounselors and activists are meeting to plot strategy and printing 

maps with directions to clinics in New York, New Jersey, Delaware 

and Washington, D.C., where teenagers can still get abortions 

without parental consent . . . ‘We will definitely be encouraging 

teenagers to go out of state,’ said Shawn Towey, director of the 

Greater Philadelphia Woman’s Medical Fund, a nonprofit organization that gives money to women who can’t afford to pay for their 

abortions.’’ 26

Moreover, some abortion clinics in nearby states, such as New 

Jersey and Maryland, and others, use the lack of parental involvement requirements in their own states as a ‘‘selling point’’ in advertising directed at minors in Pennsylvania, stating ‘‘No Parental 

Consent Required.’’ 27 A Rockville, Maryland, abortionist ran a 

similar advertisement in the May 1998-April 1999 Yellow Pages for 

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Such advertisements have appeared in 

telephone directories for Wilkes-Barre and Dallas, Scranton, Clarks 

Summit, and Carbondale, Bethlehem, Allentown, York, and Erie. 

10 

ATTACHMENT 


748AdX.eps
11 

28See Charlotte Ellertson, Ph.D., ‘‘Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana,’’ American Journal of Public Health (August 1997). 29See id. at 1371. 30See Kevin McDermott and Mark Schauerte, ‘‘Illinois May Tighten Rules on Abortions For 

Teens; Parental Consent Is Not Required; Abortion Bill Targets Illinois as Teen Haven For 

Abortion,’’ St. Louis Post-Dispatch (February 25, 1999). 31The Massachusetts law was changed in 1997 to require the consent of one parent (or judicial authorization), rather than both parents as previously required. 32See Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, ‘‘Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of 

the Massachusetts Law,’’ American Journal of Public Health 397 (April 1986). 33See id. at 398. 

Missouri 

A study in the American Journal of Public Health reported that 

a leading abortion provider in Missouri refers minors out of state 

for abortions if the girls do not want to involve their parents. Reproductive Health Services, which performs over half of the abortions performed in Missouri, refers minors to the Hope Clinic for 

Women in Granite City, Illinois.28 Research reveals that based on 

the available data the odds of a minor traveling out of state for an 

abortion increased by over 50 percent when Missouri’s parental 

consent law went into effect. Furthermore, compared to older 

women, underage girls were significantly more likely to travel out 

of state to have their abortions.29

A St. Louis Post-Dispatch news report confirms that the Hope 

Clinic in Illinois attracted underage girls seeking abortions without 

parental involvement.30 A clinic counselor estimates that she sees 

two girls each week seeking to avoid their home state’s parental involvement law. One example was a 16-year-old girl from Missouri 

who had called abortion clinics in St. Louis and learned that parental consent was required before a minor could obtain an abortion. 

According to the report, the Hope Clinic performed 3,200 abortions 

on out-of-State women in 1998, and the clinic’s executive director 

estimates that number is 45 percent of the total abortions performed at the clinic. The executive director also estimates that 13 

percent of the clinic’s clients are minors. 

Massachusetts 

Massachusetts has also seen an increase in out-of-State abortions 

performed on its teenage residents since the state’s parental consent law went into effect in April 1981, according to a published 

study.31 A study published in the American Journal of Public 

Health found that in the 4 months prior to implementation of the 

parental consent law, an average of 29 Massachusetts minors obtained out-of-State abortions each month in Rhode Island, New 

Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York (data for Maine was not 

available).32 After the parental consent law was implemented, however, the average jumped to between 90 and 95 out-of-State abortions per month, using data from the five states of Rhode Island, 

New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, and Maine, representing 

one-third of the abortions obtained by Massachusetts’ minors.33

The study noted that due to what the authors described as ‘‘astute marketing,’’ one abortion clinic in New Hampshire was able to 

nearly double the monthly average of abortions performed on Massachusetts minors (from 14 in 1981 to 27 in 1982). The abortionist 

‘‘began advertising in the 1982 Yellow Pages of metropolitan areas 

12 

34 Id. at 399. 35See M.A.J. McKenna, ‘‘Mass. Abortion Laws Push Teens Over Border,’’ Boston Herald (April 

7, 1991) at A1. 36Stanley K. Henshaw, ‘‘The Impact of Requirements for Parental Consent on Minors’ Abortions in Mississippi,’’ Family Planning Perspectives (June, 1995) at 121. 37 Id. at 122. 38Lisa A. Singh, ‘‘Those Are the People Who Are Being Hurt,’’ Style Weekly (February 11, 

1997). 39 Ellen Nakashima, ‘‘Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions In Virginia,’’ The Washington Post 

(March 3, 1998). 

along the northern Massachusetts border, stating ‘consent for minors not required.’ ’’ 34

In April 1991, the Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts 

estimated that approximately 1,200 Massachusetts minor girls 

travel out of state for abortions each year, the majority of them to 

New Hampshire. Planned Parenthood said that surveys of New 

Hampshire clinics revealed an average of 100 appointments per 

month by Massachusetts minors.35

Mississippi 

A study of the effect of Mississippi’s parental consent law revealed that Mississippi has also experienced an increase in the 

number of minors traveling out of state for abortions. The study, 

published in Family Planning Perspectives, compared data for the 

5 months before the parental consent law took effect in June 1993, 

with data for the 6 months after it took effect, and found that 

‘‘[a]mong Mississippi residents having an abortion in the state, the 

ratio of minors to older women decreased by 13 percent . . . However, this decline was largely offset by a 32 percent increase in the 

ratio of minors to older women among Mississippi residents traveling to other states for abortion services.’’ 36 Based on the available data, the study suggests that the Mississippi parental consent 

law appeared to have ‘‘little or no effect on the abortion rate among 

minors but a large increase in the proportion of minors who travel 

to other states to have abortions, along with a decrease in minors 

coming from other states to Mississippi.’’ 37

Virginia 

Grace S. Sparks, executive director of the Virginia League of 

Planned Parenthood, predicted in February 1997 that if Virginia 

were to pass a parental notification law, teenagers would travel out 

of state for abortions: ‘‘In every state where they’ve passed parental 

notification, . . . there’s been an increase in out-of-State abortions,’’ she said, adding, ‘‘I suspect that that’s what will happen in 

Virginia, that teen-agers who cannot tell their parents . . . will go 

out of state and have abortions . . .’’ 38

Virginia’s parental notification law took effect on July 1, 1997. 

Initial reports indicated that abortions performed on Virginia minors dropped 20 percent during the first 5 months that the law was 

in effect (from 903 abortions during the same time period in 1996 

to approximately 700 abortions in 1997).39 It appears, however, 

that Virginia teenagers are traveling to the District of Columbia in 

order to obtain an abortion without involving their parents. In fact, 

the National Abortion Federation (‘‘NAF’’), which runs a toll-free 

national abortion hotline, said that calls from Virginia teenagers 

seeking information on how to obtain an abortion out of state were 

the largest source of teenage callers seeking out-of-State abortions, 

13 

40See id. 41See id. 42See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., (May 21, 1998) (statement of Joyce 

Farley). 43See id. 44See id. 45See id. 46See id. 47See id. 48See id. 49See id. 

at seven to ten calls per day.40 NAF hotline operator Amy Schriefer 

has gone so far as to talk a Richmond area teenage girl through 

the route (involving a Greyhound bus and the Metro’s Red Line) to 

obtain an abortion in the District of Columbia.41

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIALS HIGHLIGHT

THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

At hearings during the 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th Congresses, the Subcommittee on the Constitution heard testimony 

from two mothers whose daughters were secretly taken for abortions, with devastating consequences. Joyce Farley, the mother of 

a minor girl, recounted how her 12-year-old daughter was provided 

alcohol, raped, and then taken out of state by the rapist’s mother 

for an abortion.42 In the words of Joyce Farley, the abortion was 

arranged to destroy evidence—evidence that her 12-year-old daughter had been raped.43 On August 31, 1995, her daughter, who had 

just turned 13, underwent a dangerous medical procedure without 

anyone present who knew her past medical history (as shown by 

the false medical history that was given to the abortionist).44 Following the abortion, the mother of the rapist dropped off the child 

in another town 30 miles from the child’s home.45 The child returned to her home with severe pain and bleeding which revealed 

complications from an incomplete abortion.46 When Joyce Farley 

contacted the original clinic that performed the abortion, the clinic 

told her that the bleeding was normal and to increase her daughter’s Naprosyn, a medication given to her for pain, every hour if 

needed.47 Fortunately, Ms. Farley, being a nurse, knew this advice 

was wrong and could be harmful, but her daughter would not have 

known this.48 Because of her mother’s intervention, Ms. Farley’s 

daughter ultimately received further medical care and a second 

procedure to complete the abortion.49

As Ms. Farley testified before the House Constitution Subcommittee last year: 

[I]n 1995, my then 12-year-old daughter, Crystal, was intoxicated and raped by a 19-year-old male . . . On August 31, 

1995, I discovered my 13-year-old daughter, Crystal, was missing from home. An investigation by the police, school officials 

and myself revealed the possibility that Crystal had been 

transported out of State for an abortion. I can’t begin to tell 

you the fear that enveloped me not knowing where my daughter was, who she was with, if she was in harm’s way, and to 

learn in this manner that my young daughter was pregnant. 

By early afternoon Crystal was home safe with me, but so 

much had taken place in that 1 day. The mother of this 19- 

year-old male had taken Crystal for an abortion in the State 

14 

50 Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 6-7 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Joyce 

Farley). 

of New York. Apparently, this woman decided this was the 

best solution for the situation caused by her son, with little regard for the welfare of my daughter. Situations such as this is 

what the Child Custody Act [H.R. 1755 in the 108th Congress, 

which included provisions that are also in CIANA] was designed to help prevent. I am a loving, responsible parent, 

whose parenting was interfered with by an adult unknown to 

me. My child was taken for a medical procedure to an unknown facility and physician without my permission. When 

Crystal developed complications from this medical procedure, 

this physician was not available. He refused to supply necessary medical records to a physician that was available to provide Crystal the medical care she needed. I ask you to please, 

in considering the Child Custody Protection Act, to put aside 

your personal opinions on abortion. Please just consider the 

safety of the minor children of our Nation whose lives are put 

at risk when taken out of their home State . . . Please allow 

loving, careful and responsible parents the freedom to provide 

the care their adolescent daughters need without interference 

from criminals or people who think they may be helping, but 

actually cause more harm than good. An abortion is a medical 

procedure with physical and emotional risks. An adolescent 

who’s had an abortion needs the care and support of family. 

Crystal, unfortunately, developed both physical and emotional 

side effects. Some of the effects are still present today after 9 

years have lapsed.50

This year, Marcia Carroll testified before the Constitution Subcommittee and described the following terrifying story that CIANA, 

had it been enacted into law, would have prevented: 

On Christmas Eve 2004, my daughter informed me she was 

pregnant. I assured her I would seek out all resources and help 

that was available. As her parents, her father and I would 

stand beside her and support any decision she made. We 

scheduled appointments with her pediatrician, her private 

counselor, and her school nurse. I followed all of their advice 

and recommendations. They referred us to Healthy Beginnings 

Plus, Lancaster Family Services, and the WIC program. They 

discussed all her options with her. I purposefully allowed my 

daughter to speak alone with professionals so that she would 

speak her mind and not just say what she thought I wanted 

to hear. My daughter chose to have the baby and raise it. My 

family fully supported my daughter’s decision to keep her baby 

and offered her our love and support. 

Subsequently, her boyfriend’s family began to harass my 

daughter and my family. They started showing up at our house 

to express their desire for my daughter to have an abortion. 

When that did not work, his grandmother started calling my 

daughter without my knowledge. They would tell her that if 

she kept the baby, she couldn’t see her boyfriend again. They 

threatened to move out of state. 

15 

I told his family that my daughter had our full support in 

her decision to keep the baby. She also had the best doctors, 

counselors, and professionals to help her through the pregnancy. We all had her best interests in mind. 

The behavior of the boy’s family began to concern me to the 

point where I called my local police department for advice. Additionally, I called the number for an abortion center to see 

how old you have to be to have an abortion in our state. 

I felt safe when they told me my minor daughter had to be 

16 years of age in the state of Pennsylvania to have an abortion without parental consent. I found out later that the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act actually says that parental consent is needed for a minor under 18 years of age. It never occurred to me that I would need to check the laws of other 

states around me. I thought as a resident of the state of Pennsylvania that she was protected by Pennsylvania state laws. 

Boy, was I ever wrong. 

On Feb. 16, I sent my daughter to her bus stop with two dollars of lunch money. I thought she was safe at school. She and 

her boyfriend even had a prenatal class scheduled after school. 

However, what really happened was that her boyfriend and 

his family met with her down the road from her bus stop and 

called a taxi. The adults put the children in the taxi to take 

them to the train station. His stepfather met the children at 

the train station, where he had to purchase my daughter’s ticket since she was only fourteen. They put the children on the 

train from Lancaster to Philadelphia. From there, they took 

two subways to New Jersey. That is where his family met the 

children and took them to the abortion clinic, where one of the 

adults had made the appointment. 

When my daughter started to cry and have second thoughts, 

they told her they would leave her in New Jersey. They 

planned, paid for, coerced, harassed, and threatened her into 

having the abortion. They left her alone during the abortion 

and went to eat lunch. 

After the abortion, his stepfather and grandmother drove my 

daughter home from New Jersey and dropped her off down the 

road from our house. My daughter told me that on the way 

home she started to cry, they got angry at her and told her 

there was nothing to cry about. 

Anything could have happened to my daughter at the abortion facility or on the ride back home. These people did not 

know my daughter’s medical history, yet they took her across 

state lines to have a medical procedure without my knowledge 

or consent. Our family will be responsible for the medical and 

psychological consequences for my daughter as a result of this 

procedure that was completed unbeknownst to me. I was so 

devastated that this could have been done that I called the 

local police department to see what could be done. They were 

just as shocked and surprised as I was that there was nothing 

that could be done in this horrible situation. 

The state of Pennsylvania does have a parental consent law. 

Something has to be done to prevent this from happening to 

other families. This is just not acceptable to me and should not 

happen to families in this country. If your child goes to her 

16 

51See Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Mary Gabay, Phyllis McCarthy, Alana Bame, and Benita Marcus 

Adler, ‘‘Questionable Doctors: Disciplined by States or the Federal Government’’ (State Listing 

for New Jersey; A Public Citizen Health Research Group Report) (March 1996) at 68. 52See American Political Network, ‘‘State Reports Pennsylvania: PA Suspends Abortion Provider’s License,’’ (March 23, 1995) at 6. 53See Kathy Boccella, ‘‘Abortion Doctor Banned One Year,’’ The Philadelphia Inquirer (October 29, 1993) at B1 (‘‘A woman who had been a patient of Kaji’s since 1976 said that ‘numerous 

times (he) made sexual advances toward her and fondled her’ in his office between 1980 and 

1988, the consent order read . . . Kaji knew the woman suffered from severe depression, had 

been sexually abused as a child and had once been hospitalized for psychiatric problems, the 

order read.’’). 54See id. at 68. 55See id. at 68. 

school clinic for a headache, a registered nurse can’t give her 

a Tylenol or aspirin without a parent’s written permission. 

As a consequence of my daughter being taken out of our 

state for an abortion without parental knowledge, she is suffering intense grief. My daughter cries herself to sleep at night 

and lives with this everyday. 

I think about what I could or should have done to keep her 

safe. Everybody tells me I did everything I could have and 

should have done. It doesn’t make me feel any better, knowing 

everything I did was not enough to protect my daughter. 

It does ease my mind to know with your help that we can 

make a difference and change the law to protect other girls 

and their families. I urge your support for The Child Interstate 

Abortion Notification Act. It is critical that this law passes in 

Congress. The right of parents to protect the health and welfare of their minor daughters needs to be protected. No one 

should be able to circumvent state laws by performing an abortion in another state on a minor daughter without parental 

consent. 

The physician who performed an abortion on Marcia Carroll’s 

daughter, Dr. Vikram Kaji, had a long history of sexually abusing 

his patients. Marcia Carroll should have been given an opportunity 

to learn about the history of her child’s doctor. Apparently the people who coerced her daughter into having the abortion did not care 

who performed an abortion on her. Dr. Kaji was professionally disciplined by the State of New Jersey on November 1, 1993, and 

given a 12-month suspension for sexually abusing three patients 

and indiscriminately prescribing controlled dangerous substances.51

He was disciplined for having sex with one patient in his office, 

and for performing ‘‘improper’’ rectal and breast exams on two 

other patients.52 According to a consent order, Dr. Kaji knew the 

woman he had sex with suffered from severe depression, had been 

sexually abused as a child, and had once been hospitalized for psychiatric problems.53 He was also disciplined by the Federal Drug 

Enforcement Agency on February 22, 1994, and made to surrender 

his controlled substance license.54 He was also disciplined by the 

State of Pennsylvania on December 23, 1994, and his license was 

suspended for 36 months.55

When Marcia Carroll was asked why she came to testify on behalf of CIANA, she said, ‘‘[my daughter] does suffer. She has gone 

to counseling for this. I just know that she cries and she wished 

she could redo everything, relive that day over. It’s just sad that 

it had to happen this way and this is what she had to go through. 

But she did want me to come here today and speak on her behalf. 

17 

56See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Eileen 

Roberts). 57See id. While Ms. Roberts’ daughter was not taken to another state, her story is illustrative 

of the harms involved when a child is secretly taken away from her parents for an abortion. 

After this experience, Ms. Roberts formed an organization called Mothers Against Minor Abortions (MAMA). Ms. Roberts testified: ‘‘I speak today for those parents I know around the country, whose daughters have been taken out of State for their abortions.’’ Id. 58See id. 59See id. 60See id. 61See id. 62See id. 

She said, ‘Mom, just one phone call is all it would have taken to 

stop this from happening . . .’ So she asked me to come here for 

her sake and for other girls’ safety to speak and let you know what 

was happening.’’ That is precisely what CIANA affirms: the right 

of parents to be given the chance to help their children through difficult times. The parents of this Nation want to be given the chance 

to make sure their children’s doctors are not potential sexual abusers and controlled substance pushers, and CIANA would give them 

that chance. 

Eileen Roberts also testified that her 13-year-old daughter was 

encouraged by a boyfriend, with the assistance of his adult friend, 

to obtain a secret abortion.56 The adult friend drove Ms. Roberts’ 

daughter to an abortion clinic 45 miles from her home and paid for 

her daughter to receive the abortion.57 After 2 weeks of observing 

their daughter’s depression, Ms. Roberts and her husband learned 

that the young girl had an abortion from a questionnaire they 

found under her pillow, which their daughter had failed to return 

to the abortion clinic.58

Ms. Roberts’ daughter was then hospitalized as a result of the 

depression, and a physical examination revealed that the abortion 

had been incompletely performed and required surgery to repair 

the damage done by the abortionist.59 The hospital called Ms. Roberts and told her that they could not do reparative surgery without 

a signed consent form.60 The following year, Ms. Roberts’ daughter 

developed an infection and was diagnosed with having pelvic inflammatory disease, which again required a 2-day hospitalization 

for antibiotic therapy and a signed consent form.61 Ms. Roberts and 

her family were responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs, all 

of which resulted from this one secret abortion.62

18 

63See Ala. Code §§ 26-21-1 to -8 (2003); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.16.010-030 (Michie 2003); Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 36-2152 (2004); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-16-801 to -808 (Michie 2003); Cal. Health & Safety 

Code § 123450 (West 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West 2004); Conn. Gen. 

Stat. Ann. § 19a-601 (West 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, §§ 1780-1789B (2003); Fla. Stat. Ann. 

ch. 390.01115 (Harrison 2004); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-11-110 to -118 (Harrison 2003); Idaho Code 

§ 18-609A (2003); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 70/1-99 (West 2004); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-18-2-267, 

16-34-2-4 (West 2004); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 135L.1-.8 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6705 

(2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.732 (Michie 2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.5 (West 

2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1597-A (West 2003); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I § 20- 

103 (2004); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 

§§ 722.901-.908 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343 (West 2004); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41- 

51 to -63 (2003); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 188.015, 188.028 (West 2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-20-201 

to -215 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-6901 to - 6909 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 442.255-.257 

(2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 132:24-28 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:17A-1 to -1.12 (West 2004); 

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-5-1 to -3 (Michie 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-21.6 to .10 (2003); N.D. Cent. 

Code §§ 14-02.1-03.1 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2919.12, 2919.121-.122 (West 2004); 18 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3206 (West 2004); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-4.7-6 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-41- 

30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-7 (Michie 2004); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 

10-301 to -304 (2004); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 33.001-.004 (Vernon 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 76- 

7-304 (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-241 (Michie 2004); W. Va. Code §§ 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004); Wis. 

Stat. Ann. § 48.375 (West 2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-6-118 (Michie 2003). 64See Planned Parenthood v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004) (unconstitutional for lack of 

health exception); Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(concluding that the Idaho statute’s definition of a medical emergency is unconstitutionally narrow and that, without an adequate medical exception, the parental consent statute is invalid); 

Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991) (judicial bypass procedure rendered statute unconstitutional); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 CV771, 1996 WL 33293423 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1996) (the Illinois Supreme Ct. refused to issue rules implementing the Illinois statute); Planned Parenthood 

of Alaska, Inc. v. State, No. 3AN-97-6014 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2003) (decision on remand from State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001)) (parental consent 

law with judicial waiver violates state constitution); American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 

940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (parental consent statute violated state constitutional right to privacy); N. Fla. Women’s Health and Counseling Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003) 

(state supreme court held that law violated state right to privacy; however, the state constitution was amended in November 2004 to allow parental notification); Wicklund v. State, No. 

ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 11, 1999) available at http://www.mtbizlaw.com/1stjd99/ 

WICKLUND—2—11.htm (parental notification law violated state constitution); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (parental notification law with 

judicial waiver violates state constitution); N.M. A.G. Op. No. 90-19 (Oct. 3 1990) (State attorney 

general holds law unenforceable due to lack of judicial bypass procedure). In addition, Ohio’s 

parental notification law is in effect because a subsequently enacted parental consent statute 

was enjoined. See Cincinnati Women’s Services v. Voinovich, No. C-1-98-289 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 

1998) (preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the law). 65See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West 2004) (if a minor is living with a relative and not a parent, she may notify that relative instead of her parent); Conn. Gen. Stat. 

Ann. § 19a-601 (West 2003) (stating that the abortion provider need only discuss the possibility 

of parental involvement); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, §§ 1780-1789B (2003) (allowing notice to a 

grandparent or a licensed mental health professional not associated with an abortion provider); 

Iowa Code Ann. §§ 135L.1-.8 (West 2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 22, § 1597-A (West 2003) (allowing notice to an adult family member and allowing a minor 

to give informed consent after counseling by the abortion provider); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. 

I § 20-103 (2004) (providing that notice does not have to be given if the minor does not live with 

a parent or guardian or if a physician determines that parental notice is not in the minor’s best 

interest); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-21.6 to .10 (2003) (allowing notice to a grandparent with whom 

the minor has been living for at least 6 months); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2919.12, 2919.121- 

.122 (West 2004) (allowing notice to a brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain 

qualifications are met); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (allowing notice 

to a grandparent or any person who has been standing in loco parentis to the minor for a period 

not less than sixty days); W. Va. Code §§ 16-2F-1 to -8 (2004) (stating that a physician not affiliated with an abortion provider may waive the notice requirement); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.375 

(West 2003) (allowing notice to any adult family member). The Illinois parental involvement law 

allows notice to be given to an adult family member; however, it is not in effect. 

STATE LAW AND CIANA’S PROTECTION OF STATE LAW

There are currently 44 states with parental involvement statutes 

on the books.63 Of these 44 statutes, 34 are in effect today.64 Although 11 of these thirty-four statutes reflect a legislative intention 

to simply encourage the pregnant minor to consult with her parents, another relative, or a trusted friend before she decides to undergo an abortion,65 the laws on the books in the remaining 23 

states require a parent to either be notified of their minor daughter’s intention to undergo an abortion or to consent to the performance of an abortion on their minor daughter. Despite widespread 

19 

66 A 1989 memo prepared by the Minnesota Attorney General regarding Minnesota’s experience with its parental involvement law states that ‘‘after some 5 years of the statute’s operation, 

the evidence does not disclose a single instance of abuse or forceful obstruction of abortion for 

any Minnesota minor.’’ Testimony before the Texas House of Representatives on Massachusetts’ 

experience with its parental consent law revealed a similar absence of unintended, but harmful, 

consequences. Ms. Jamie Sabino, chair of the Massachusetts Judicial Consent for Minors Lawyer 

Referral Panel, could identify no case of a Massachusetts’ minor being abused or abandoned as 

a result of the law. See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs Comm., 76th 

Leg., R.S. 21 (Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino). 67See Hearing on Tex. H.B. 1073 Before the House State Affairs Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 21 

(Apr. 19, 1999) (statement by Jamie Sabino, testifying that there had been no increase in the 

number of illegal abortions in Massachusetts since the enactment of the statute in 1981). 68Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary, 

2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001) (Lori Burris, representative of Vermont Academy of Pediatrics). 69 Rogers, James L., Boruch, Robert F., Stoms, George B. & DeMoya, Dorothy, ‘‘Impact of the 

Minnesota Parental Notification Law on Abortion and Birth,’’ 81 Amer. J. Pub. Health 294, 297 

(Mar. 1991). Cf. Ellertson, Charlotte, ‘‘Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions: 

Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana,’’ 87 Am. J. Pub. Health 1367, 1372 

(August 1997) (‘‘Evidence concerning delay is mixed.’’). See also id. at 1374 (‘‘During periods of 

the laws’ enforcement in Minnesota and Indiana, the two states with gestational age at abortion, 

in-state abortions for minors were probably delayed into the second month of pregnancy, although probably not into the second trimester.’’). 70 In 2001, 853,485 legal induced abortions were reported to CDC. See Lilo T. Strauss, M.A., 

Joy Herndon, M.S., Jeani Chang, M.P.H., Wilda Y. Parker Sonya, V. Bowens, M.S., Suzanne 

B. Zane, D.V.M., Cynthia J. Berg, M.D., ‘‘Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2001,’’ Centers 

for Disease Control, Division of Reproductive Health, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (November 26, 2004). 

support for parental involvement laws and clear public policy considerations justifying such laws, there exists substantial evidence, 

outlined above, that they are frequently circumvented by adults 

who transport minors to abortion providers in states that do not 

have parental notification or consent laws. One purpose of CIANA 

is to curb the interstate circumvention of these laws, thereby protecting the rights of parents and the interests of vulnerable minors. 

Parental involvement laws have been in force for decades, and 

there is no case where it has been established that these laws led 

to parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury.66 Similarly, there is no 

evidence that these laws have led to an increase in illegal abortions.67

Despite these critical benefits of better-informed selection of 

abortion providers, improved medical histories, appropriate post-operative care, and the affirmation of parental rights, opponents of 

CIANA argue that mandatory parental involvement results in girls’ 

delaying their decisions to obtain abortions, thus increasing the 

risks attendant to the procedure.68 There is no evidence, however, 

that parental involvement laws result in medically significant 

delays in obtaining abortions. A study of Minnesota’s parental notification law found that, ‘‘Regardless [of the reason], the claim that 

the law caused more minors to obtain late abortions is unsubstantiated. In fact, the reverse is true. For ages 15-17, the number of 

late abortions per 1,000 women decreased following the enactment 

of the law. Therefore, an increased medical hazard due to a rising 

number of late abortions was not realized.’’ 69

OTHER PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTES

CIANA will strengthen the effectiveness of state laws designed 

to protect children from the health and safety risks associated with 

abortion.70 Across the country, officials must obtain parental consent before performing even routine medical services such as providing aspirin and before including children in certain activities 

20 

71See, e.g., William D. Valente, 2 Education Law: Public and Private § 19.23 at 212 (acknowledging ‘‘[t]he common school practice of obtaining written parental consents or waivers . . . for 

designated [school field trip] activities’’); Cal. Educ Code Ann § 49302 (requiring parental consent before pupils can be transported). 72See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-17A2; Alaska Stat. § 08.13.217; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1114; 720 

Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-10.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-1953; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 4323; 

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.13102; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 324.520; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-400; Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 842.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-38-302; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§ 146.012. 73See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3721; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:93.2; R.I. Gen. Laws § 23- 

1-39; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-2201; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-371.3. 74See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 652; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.0075(7); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-7; 

S.C. Code Ann. § 44-32-120. 75 Ala. Code 22-17A-2 (prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo, brand or body piercing on 

a minor unless prior written informed consent is obtained from the minor’s parent or legal 

guardian); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3721 (establishes that it is unlawful to either tattoo or body 

pierce anyone under age 18 without the physical presence of the parent or legal guardian; violators are guilty of a Class 6 felony; allows anyone to avoid prosecution if he or she requested 

the ID and relied on the accuracy of the information contained in the ID); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5- 

27-228 (prohibits anyone from tattooing, body piercing or branding a minor without the written 

consent of one of the minor’s parents, a guardian or a custodian; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, will be fined between $20 and $200); Cal. Penal Code § 652 (establishes that it is unlawful to tattoo or offer to tattoo anyone under age 18; violators are guilty 

of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from performing or offering to perform body piercing upon 

anyone under age 18 unless the piercing is performed in the presence of a parent or guardian 

or as directed by and notarized by the minor’s parent or guardian; does not apply to emancipated minors and does not include pierces of the ear); Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-4-2103 (prohibits 

anyone from performing a body art procedure on a minor unless the artist has received express 

consent from the minor’s parent or guardian; failure to obtain permission before performing the 

procedures on a minor shall constitute a petty offense punishable by a fine of $250); Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 19a-92g (establishes that it is illegal to tattoo an unemancipated minor under age 18 

without the written consent of the minor’s parent or guardian; requires written consent of the 

minor’s parent in order to perform body piercing on an unemancipated minor under age 18); 

Del. Code Ann. Title 11, Ch 5 § 1114(a) (it is illegal for a person to either knowingly or negligently tattoo or body pierce a minor without the prior written consent of the parent or legal 

guardian who must be over age 18); Fla. Stat. § 381.0075 (requires written, notarized consent 

of a minor’s parent or legal guardian in order to tattoo a minor; prohibits body piercing of a 

minor without the written, notarized consent of the parent or legal guardian or if he or she is 

accompanied by a parent or legal guardian); Ga. Code § 16-5-71.1 (prohibits the tattooing of anyone under age 18 by anyone other than a licensed osteopath or technician acting under the direct supervision of a licensed physician or osteopath; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from body piercing anyone under age 18 without prior written consent of the custodial parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor); Idaho Chapter No. 127 2004 

(effective July 1, 2004) (prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing of minors under the 

age of 14; prohibits the tattooing, branding or body piercing on anyone between the ages of 14 

and 18 without the written informed consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian; written 

informed consent must be executed in the presence of the person performing the act or an employee or agent of that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and will be fined up to 

$500 and subsequent violations within 1 year will be fined between $500 and $1,000; piercing 

of the ear lobes and piercing for medical purposes are exempted from this legislation) Ill. Compiled Stat. 5/12-10.1 (it is a Class C misdemeanor for anyone, other than a person licensed to 

practice medicine in all branches, to tattoo or offer to tattoo a person under age 21; establishes 

that anyone who pierces the body of a minor under age 18 without written consent of the parent 

or legal guardian commits a Class C misdemeanor; does not apply to emancipated or married 

minors; Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-7 (requires a minor’s parent or legal guardian to be present 

on order to either tattoo or perform body piercing on a minor under age 18; requires the parent 

or guardian to also provide written permission for the minor to receive the tattoo or body piercing); Iowa Code § 135.37 (prohibits anyone from tattooing an unmarried minor under age 18; 

upon conviction, violators are guilty of a serious misdemeanor); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 211.760 (prohibits anyone from tattooing or body piercing minors without the written, notarized consent of 

a parent or guardian); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:93.2 (it is unlawful for anyone to tattoo or body 

pierce a minor under age 18 without the consent of the minor’s accompanying parent or legal 

custodian; upon conviction, violators shall be fined between $100 and $500 or imprisoned between 30 and 100 days, or both); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Title 32, Ch. 64 § 4323 (establishes that 

it is illegal to tattoo anyone under age 18; requires prior written consent of a minor’s parent 

or legal guardian to perform body piercing on anyone under age 18); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 

such as field trips and contact sports.71 Regarding body piercing, 

states require written parental consent,72 a parent to be present 

when a minor is pierced,73 and written permission or a parent’s 

physical presence.74 As of April, 2004, 35 states have laws prohibiting adolescents from getting tattoos without parental consent, 27 

states have laws against body piercing without parental consent, 

and 26 states have laws that prohibit both without parental consent.75 Also, in Maryland, for example, as The Washington Post reVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
21 

§ 333.13102 (prohibits anyone from either tattooing or performing body piercing on a minor without prior written, informed consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian; requires the parent 

or legal guardian to execute the consent in the presence of either the person performing the 

body piercing or tattooing on the minor or in the presence of an employee or agent of the individual; does not include emancipated minors); Minn. Stat. § 609.2246 (it is unlawful for anyone 

under age 18 to receive a tattoo without written parental consent); Miss. Laws § 73-61-3 (prohibits anyone from tattooing or body piercing a minor under age 18; violators are guilty of a 

misdemeanor and will be fined a maximum of $500); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 324.520 (prohibits anyone 

from knowingly tattooing or body piercing a minor without prior written, informed consent of 

the minor’s parent or legal guardian; requires the parent or legal guardian to execute the written consent in the presence of either the person performing the tattooing or body piercing or 

an employee or agent of that person; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and will be fined 

a maximum of $500; subsequent violations within 1 year of the initial violation will be subject 

to a fine of between $500 and $1,000); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-623 (prohibits anyone from knowingly tattooing a child under the age of majority without the explicit in-person consent of the 

child’s parent or guardian; upon conviction, violators will be either fined a maximum of $500, 

imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both; those convicted of a second offense will either be fined 

a maximum of $1,000, imprisoned for up to 6 months, or both); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-400 (prohibits anyone from tattooing a minor under age 18; violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from piercing any part of a minor under age 18 other than the ears 

without the prior consent of the custodial parent; violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor); 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3730.06 (it is illegal to tattoo, body pierce or pierce the ears of anyone 

under age 18 without the consent of the minor’s parent, guardian or custodian; requires the consenting individual to appear in person at the business at the time the procedure is performed 

and sign a document that provides informed consent); Okla. Stat. Title 21 §§ 841 and 842.1 (prohibits anyone other than a licensed practitioner of the healing arts in the course of their practice 

from tattooing or offering to tattoo anyone; it is unlawful for anyone to perform, or offer to perform, body piercing on a child under age 18 unless the parent or legal guardian gives written 

consent for and is present during the procedure; penalties for violations include imprisonment 

for up to 90 days and a fine of up to $500, or both); Pa. Cons. Stat. Title 18 § 6311 (it is unlawful 

to provide tattoo services to anyone under age 18 without the consent of the parent or guardian; 

violators are guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon conviction, will be sentenced 

to either pay a maximum fine of $100 or be imprisoned a maximum of 3 years, or both); R.I. 

General Laws §§ 11-9-15; 23-1-39 (prohibits tattooing or body piercing a minor who is unaccompanied by his or her consenting parent or guardian; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and, 

upon conviction, will either be imprisoned a maximum of 1 year or fined a maximum of $300); 

S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 26-10-19 (requires anyone who is tattooing a minor under age 18 to 

obtain a signed consent form from the minor’s parents authorizing a tattoo; violators are guilty 

of a Class 2 misdemeanor); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 62-38-207; 62-38-305 and 306 (establishes that 

a minor age 16 or older may be tattooed with the written consent of the parent or legal guardian 

to cover up an existing tattoo and requires the parent or legal guardian to be present during 

the procedure; it is a Class C misdemeanor for anyone to tattoo a person under age 18; allows 

a minor age 18 or younger to undergo body piercing with the written consent of the parent, legal 

guardian or legal custodian and requires them to be present during the procedure; they must 

sign a document that explains the procedure and methods for proper care, present proof of age 

and attest in writing that they are the minor’s parent, legal guardian or legal custodian; violators will be charged with a Class C misdemeanor and will be imprisoned for up to 30 days or 

pay a fine of up to $50); Texas Health and Safety Code Ann. §§ 146.012; 146.0125 (prohibits anyone from performing a tattoo on anyone under age 18 without the consent of a parent or guardian who believes it is in the best interest of the minor to cover an obscene of offensive tattoo; 

required consent may be the physical presence of the individual’s parent or guardian or the provision of evidence that he or she is the parent or guardian of the person who is getting the tattoo; prohibits anyone from performing body piercing on an individual under age 18 without the 

consent of the individual’s parent, managing conservator or guardian; consent must specify the 

part of the body to be pierced. Required consent is the physical presence of the individual’s parent or guardian and the provision of evidence stating their parental or guardian status); Utah 

Code Ann. § 76-10-2201 (prohibits anyone from performing or offering to perform a tattoo or 

body piercing upon a minor without receiving the consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian; establishes that a person is not guilty of a violation if he or she (a) had no actual knowledge 

of the minor’s age and (b) reviewed, recorded and maintained a personal identification number 

for the minor prior to performing the body piercing or tattoo; violators are guilty of a Class C 

misdemeanor and the owner or operator of the establishment where the act takes place is subject to a civil penalty of $750 for each violation); Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 26 § 4102 (prohibits anyone 

from tattooing a minor without the written consent of his or her parent or guardian); Va. Code 

§ 18.2-371.3 (prohibits anyone from tattooing or performing body piercing on a person under age 

18, knowing or having reason to believe that the person is under 18 except (a) in the presence 

of the person’s parent or guardian or (b) when done by or under the supervision of a medical 

doctor, registered nurse, or other medical services personnel in the performance of their duties; 

violators are guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation shall be punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor; excludes ear piercing as a form of body piercing); Wash. Rev. 

Code § 26.28.085 (applying a tattoo to a minor under age 18 is illegal and violators are guilty 

of a misdemeanor; prohibits anyone from stating that he or she did not know the minor’s age 

as a defense to prosecution, unless he or she establishes that by a preponderance of evidence 

he or she made a reasonable attempt to determine the true age of the minor by requiring a 

driver’s license or other picture ID card and did nor rely solely on oral allegations); W. Va. Code 

§ 16-38-3 (requires prior written consent from a parent or guardian for the tattooing of a minor); 

Continued 

22 

Wis. Stat. § 948.70 (prohibits anyone other than a physician in the course of his or her professional practice from tattooing or offering to tattoo a child; violators are subject to a Class D forfeiture); Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-107 Chapter 47 2004 (Effective July 1, 2004) (prohibits anyone from 

tattooing a person under the age of majority, except with the consent of the person’s parent or 

legal guardian who is present at the time the procedure is performed; violators are guilty of 

a misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of 6 months, a fine of a maximum of $750, or both; prohibits performing body art on anyone who had not reached the age 

of majority without the consent of the parent or legal guardian and who is present at the time 

of the procedure; violators are guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment for a 

maximum of 6 months, a fine of a maximum of $750, or both; body art is defined as the practice 

of body piercing, branding scarification, sculpting or tattooing). 76See Daniel de Vise, ‘‘Bill Would Legislate Maryland Students’ Use of Sunscreen,’’ The Washington Post (March 29, 2005). 77 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). 78 Id. at 644. 79 Id. Factors that may be considered in determining ‘‘immaturity’’ include work and personal 

experience, appreciation of the gravity of the procedure, and judgment. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). Under the ‘‘best interests’’ analysis, judges often consider medical 

risks to the minor as a result of the time, place, or type of procedure to be performed, medical 

risks particular to the girl, evidence of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse by parents or guardians, and abortion alternatives such as marriage, adoption, and single motherhood. 80See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie 

Lominick). 

ports, eleven school systems require a parent’s note before sunscreen can be applied to a minor student.76 Notwithstanding the 

extensive body of State law requiring parental consent before 

minor children can engage in a range of less consequential activity, 

people other than parents can secretly take children across state 

lines without the consent of their parents for abortions. 

STATE JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURES

In Bellotti v. Baird,77 a plurality of the United States Supreme 

Court set forth the basic test by which judicial bypass proceedings 

pursuant to a parental consent statute, if judicial bypass provisions 

are enacted at all, must be reviewed. Bypass procedures must allow 

the minor to show that she possesses maturity and information to 

make the abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, 

without regard to her parents’ wishes; allow the minor to show 

that, even if she cannot make the decision by herself, the ‘‘desired 

abortion would be in her best interests’’ 78; be confidential; and be 

conducted ‘‘with expedition to allow the minor an effective opportunity to obtain the abortion.’’ 79

Critics of CIANA claim that the measure endangers the health 

of young girls who are forced to travel out of state to obtain abortions because the judges in their home states either refuse to hear 

judicial bypass petitions or deny them arbitrarily. In support of 

this argument, the critics cite cases like that of Ms. Billie 

Lominick, who testified before the Constitution Subcommittee regarding her experience with South Carolina’s judicial bypass procedures. According to Ms. Lominick, who assisted her grandson’s 

girlfriend in obtaining an out-of-State abortion, only two judges in 

the state of South Carolina would hear a judicial bypass petition, 

and one of those judges, according to Ms. Lominick, would hear petitions only from girls residing in his county.80

Such examples ignore the fact that CIANA provides assistance 

only in the enforcement of constitutional state parental notice and 

consent laws. If there are only two judges in an entire state willing 

to hear judicial bypass proceedings, that state’s parental involvement laws are likely unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent, which requires the state to provide a minor the opportunity 

23 

81 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality opinion). 82 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989). 83 Id. at 469 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 777 (D. Minn. 1986)). 84 Id. at 463. 85 Id. at 461 n.6. 86See Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 690 (6th Cir. 1993). 87Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1999). 88 Id. at 1027. 89 Id. at 1030. 90See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997). 91 Id. at 1110-11. 

to seek a judicial bypass with ‘‘sufficient expedition to provide an 

effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.’’ 81

This fact is illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision in Planned 

Parenthood League v. Bellotti (‘‘Bellotti II’’).82 In that case, the 

court held that the plaintiffs could successfully challenge the state’s 

judicial bypass procedures if they could present ‘‘proof of ‘a systemic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious, practical manner.’ ’’ 83 The court of appeals remanded the 

case to the lower court so that the plaintiffs could present evidence 

that, among other things, judges were ‘‘ ‘defacto unavailable’ to 

hear minors’ abortion petitions,’’ 84 and many judges were avoided 

‘‘for reasons of hostility.’’ 85 The Sixth Circuit has also recognized 

that a constitutional challenge may be brought for a state’s systemic failure to provide an expeditious judicial bypass.86

Not only must states provide access to judges who are willing to 

hear judicial bypass petitions, states must also ensure that the 

judges who do hear bypass petitions render their decisions in an 

expedited fashion. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. 

Lawall,87 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down 

an Arizona parental consent statute on the grounds that its judicial 

bypass provision lacked specific time limits and was therefore in 

violation of the Bellotti II expediency requirement. The court 

reached this conclusion even though the Arizona statute stated 

that such proceedings were to be given priority and required that 

‘‘the court shall reach the decision [on a bypass request] promptly 

and without delay to serve the best interests of a pregnant 

minor.’’ 88 The court’s rationale in adopting a strict interpretation 

of the Supreme Court’s timeliness requirement was that ‘‘[o]penended bypass provisions engender substantial possibilities of delay 

for minors seeking abortions.’’ 89

The Fifth Circuit employed essentially identical reasoning in 

striking down a Louisiana judicial bypass procedure having indefinite time limits.90 The court found that ‘‘not only do [the bypass 

procedures] fail to provide any specific time within which a minor’s 

application will be decided, but they give no assurances (assurances 

required by Bellotti II) that the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.’’ 91

As these cases illustrate, judicial bypass procedures must be 

readily accessible and efficient in order to pass constitutional muster. CIANA will assist in the enforcement of only those State parental involvement laws that meet the relevant constitutional criteria. 

In any case, the minority’s own witness at a hearing on H.R. 

1755, the ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act,’’ which contained the 

same provision in CIANA regarding judicial bypass laws, admitted 

that ‘‘I am personally not aware of cases where [a judicial bypass 

24 

92 Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 41 (2004) (testimony of Rev. Lois M. 

Powell). 93 Id. at 37 (statement of Teresa Collett). 94See Orr v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Neb. 1983) (‘‘This statute does not provide that 

the state or anyone else will contest the minor’s claim that she is mature enough to make the 

abortion decision herself. Rather, she will present evidence, and the judge will then make the 

decision as to her maturity. Since there is no adversarial aspect to these proceedings, we find 

that no petitioning minor, indigent or otherwise, is entitled to free court-appointed counsel as 

a matter of right in proceedings under § 28-347(2).’’). Accord Joseph W. Moylan, ‘‘No Law Can 

Give Me the Right to Do What Is Wrong,’’ in LIFE AND LEARNING V: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH

UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE at 234, 235 (1995) (explaining Judge Moylan’s decision to resign from a bench in the juvenile court he had occupied for more than twenty years) 

(‘‘When the bill, taken from a Minnesota law, did get passed, it stated that at the hearing the 

pregnant minor is entitled to have an attorney appointed for her and even a guardian ad litem. 

There is nobody on the other side, unless a judge takes it on himself. Now I know of no other 

case that is like that, where it is truly one-sided. If after that one-sided hearing, the judge finds 

that the girl is mature and can give an informed consent, then the judge is required to authorize 

the abortion physician to perform the abortion.’’). 95 Id. at 648. 96 Robert H. Mnookin, ‘‘Bellotti v. Baird, A Hard Case’’ in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). 97Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, ‘‘Judging Maturity in the Courts: the Massachusetts Consent Statute,’’ 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646, 647 (1988). 98 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986). 

procedure] hasn’t worked.’’ 92 Furthermore, testimony received by 

the Constitution Subcommittee indicates that, where judicial bypass procedures are in place, they are not needed in the overwhelming number of cases because a parent’s involvement is obtained. In 2002, 852 girls received abortions in Alabama with a 

parent’s approval and 12 with a judge’s approval, according to state 

health department records. Idaho similarly reported less than 5 

percent of minors using judicial bypass to avoid that state’s parental consent law (64 minors with parental consent, 3 with judicial 

bypass) in 2002. South Dakota reported 14 of 76 minors obtained 

judicial bypasses, rather than parental consent. In Texas where 

3,654 minors obtained abortions, the Texas Department of Health 

paid for assistance in 284 judicial bypass proceedings. In Wisconsin, less than 10 percent of the minors obtaining abortions did 

so with the use of an order obtained through judicial bypass (727 

with parental involvement, 63 with judicial bypass).93

And far from being too complicated or too intrusive, the judicial 

bypass procedure has been described as ‘‘remarkably simple’’ by the 

Nebraska Supreme Court in Orr v. Knowles.94 In fact, the average 

judicial bypass hearing lasts only 12 minutes, and ‘‘more than 92 

percent of the hearings [were] less than or equal to 20 minutes.’’ 95

The young girl is not subjected to an adversarial process. She is not 

‘‘on trial.’’ A young girl must merely present evidence only about 

her maturity level, not intimate details of her personal life, to the 

court. Then the judge will make his decision. 

Indeed, judicial bypass procedures are overwhelmingly granted 

by the courts. Judicial bypasses provide a safe and effective means 

of insuring the well-being of young girls seeking to abort their 

pregnancies. A survey of Massachusetts cases found that every 

minor who sought judicial authorization to bypass parental consent 

received it.96 Another Massachusetts study found that only 1 of 477 

girls was refused judicial authorization.97 A Minnesota study cited 

that a Federal trial court determined that of the 3,573 bypass petitions filed, six were withdrawn, nine were denied, and 3,558 were 

granted.98 A survey of the Virginia statute requiring parental notiVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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99See Ellen Nakashima, ‘‘Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions in Virginia: Notification Law to 

Get Court Test,’’ The Washington Post (March 3, 1998) at A1 (‘‘In Virginia, since the law took 

effect, 18 teenagers have gone to a judge, who determines whether the girl is mature enough 

to make her own decision about abortion. All but one of the requests were granted eventually.’’). 100 450 U.S. 398, 424 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). 

fication found that out of 18 requests for judicial bypass, ‘‘all but 

one of the requests were granted eventually.’’ 99

CIANA IS BASED ON THE PROPOSITION THAT PARENTS SHOULD BE

GIVEN A CHANCE TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE LIVES OF THEIR MINOR

CHILDREN

Children’s feelings should not trump parental authority. Parents 

are not simply placeholders in a child’s life. They are the 

foundational pillars of civilization. The family unit has provided 

the comfort, stability, and safety necessary to sustain civilization, 

and it has done so for millennia. Parents must be given a chance 

to work with their own children through difficult situations. There 

is no guarantee that parents will be successful in that endeavor, 

and unfortunately there will, no doubt, be a few parents who will 

be indifferent when they are made aware of their daughter’s pregnancy. But that is surely the rare case, and even in that rare case 

nothing in this legislation will bar an abortion. What this legislation affirms is the proposition that parents deserve a chance. Opponents of CIANA must rest their objections on the notion that most 

parents do not deserve that simple chance. But parents do deserve 

that chance, and CIANA would give that chance to parents who 

have not abused or neglected their child. Even famously liberal 

Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring opinion in H.L. v. Matheson 

that ‘‘[t]he possibility that some parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon being informed of their daughter’s 

predicament or that, even if they are receptive, they will incorrectly 

advise her, does not undercut the legitimacy of the State’s attempt 

to establish a procedure that will enhance the probability that a 

pregnant young woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to 

make the abortion decision.’’ 100

Nothing in this bill requires a minor who was abused by her parents to notify an abusive parent before having an abortion. And all 

state judicial bypass provisions that are protected by this bill are 

both the product of state law and required to conform to the Supreme Court’s own standards for judicial bypass provisions. Furthermore, all the various additional exceptions opponents have proposed be added to CIANA are simply legislative excuses to deny 

parents that chance. Those who oppose giving parents a chance 

claim life is hopelessly confusing and therefore Congress should not 

act to protect parental rights. But a sister or a brother, or a minister, or some other third party, is not a parent. Sisters and brothers, and ministers, can of course provide their own counseling if a 

minor girl seeks it. But parents are special, and parents deserve 

unique protections when it comes to their ability to protect the 

health and safety of their children. That much is clear. 

Anyone who is truly interested in the best interests of a pregnant 

girl—be they a minister, a sibling, a friend, or anyone else—will 

encourage her to inform her parents and give them the chance of 

helping her address her situation appropriately. It is beyond dispute that it is not in a pregnant girl’s best interests to allow anyVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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101See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-397 (2002) at 56 (‘‘It seems to me what this bill is, is really 

akin to the Fugitive Slave Act of the 1850’s where you’re enabling one State in the South, which 

had slavery, to reach over into another State . . . and say, ‘We want our slave back.’ ’’) (remarks 

of Mr. Nadler D-NY). 102Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (overturning Washington visitation statute 

which unduly interfered with parental rights). 103Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (rejecting 

claim that minors had right to adversarial proceeding prior to commitment by parents for treatment related to mental health). 104 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 

one to assist her in circumventing state laws providing for parental 

involvement or to allow anyone to give a pregnant girl who has 

crossed state lines a secret abortion that could have serious medical consequences without notifying a parent. 

Unfortunately, during consideration of this legislation, some opponents of this legislation have equated parents with slave owners.101 Parental rights are not those of a slave owner. They are the 

rights of caring people who deserve a chance to work with their 

children through difficult times and should be provided a chance to 

express their love to their children in their children’s moments of 

greatest need. Some opponents of this bill think parents do not deserve to be involved in assisting their children as they confront difficult times because they believe parents are no better than slave 

owners. CIANA rejects that view of America’s parents. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court has described parents’ right to 

control the care of their children as ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.’’ 102 In addressing the right of parents to direct the medical care of their children, 

the Supreme Court has stated: 

Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected 

any notion that a child is ‘‘the mere creature of the State’’ and, 

on the contrary, asserted that parents generally ‘‘have the 

right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 

[their children] for additional obligations.’’ Surely, this includes 

a ‘‘high duty’’ to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and 

follow medical advice. The law’s concept of the family rests on 

a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.103

The parents of a minor child have a fundamental right to direct 

the upbringing and education of that child. The Supreme Court 

first recognized the right to ‘‘establish a home and bring up children’’ as a ‘‘privilege[] long recognized at common law as essential 

to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men’’ in the 1923 case 

of Meyer v. Nebraska in which it struck down as unconstitutional 

a Nebraska law forbidding all schools within its boundaries from 

teaching pupils in any language other than English.104 Two years 

later, striking down an Oregon statute requiring all children, under 

compulsory education laws, to attend public schools, the Court affirmed this principle stating, ‘‘The child is not the mere creature 

of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 

27 

105Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 106See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 107 Unauthorized medical examinations of minors have resulted in liability. See van Emrik v. 

Chemung County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (parental consent required for x-ray); Tenebaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 597-99 (2d Cir. 1999)(parental consent 

required for gynecological exam). 108Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. 109Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-04. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (a parent 

is ‘‘presumed to act in the minor’s best interest and thereby assures that the minor’s decision 

to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate’’). 110Parharm, 442 U.S. at 602. 111 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 112 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-34 (1979) (Bellotti II). 

right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 

additional obligations.’’ 105

Coupled with this right, however, is the duty of parents to provide for the care and safety of their children, including their physical and medical well-being. A parent’s duty to provide medical care 

to his or her child is a duty arising from the relationship of parent 

and child. Indeed, the Court has described the ‘‘care and nurture’’ 

of a child as being a ‘‘primary function’’ of parents.106 Ignoring or 

violating a parent’s legal right to direct the upbringing of their children, including the right to direct the medical care received by 

those children, can result in liability.107 In Meyer, the Court stated, 

‘‘Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the 

parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life 

[.]’’ 108 Certainly this duty to educate includes instructing one’s children on how to best make decisions concerning their health. 

Holding that the State of Georgia’s commitment procedures for 

minor children did not violate the due process rights of minors, the 

Court recognized ‘‘the traditional presumption that the parents act 

in the best interests of their child’’ and warned against discarding 

‘‘wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.’’ 109 The Court 

added, ‘‘Surely, this includes a ‘high duty’ to recognize symptoms 

of illness and to seek and follow medical advice.’’ 110

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that parents 

have a legal right to be involved in their minor daughter’s decision 

to seek medical care, which includes the abortion procedure. Therefore, the Court has consistently affirmed a state’s right to restrict 

the circumstances under which a minor may obtain an abortion in 

ways in which adult women seeking abortions may not be restricted. Holding that a state may not grant to a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over a minor’s decision to have 

an abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court added 

‘‘the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.’’ 111 Indeed, ‘‘the status of minors 

under the law is unique in many respects’’ and the ‘‘unique role in 

our society of the family, the institution by which ‘we inculcate and 

pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,’ 

requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity 

and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children.’’ 112

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT SUPPORTS GIVING PARENTS A CHANCE

TO PLAY A ROLE IN THEIR CHILDREN’S ABORTION DECISIONS

Supreme Court precedents support CIANA. The Supreme Court 

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113 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). 114Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976). 115 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). 116 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 117Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 118 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Bellotti II ) (plurality opinion). 119 Id. at 635. 120See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (‘‘The Utah Statute gives neither parents 

nor judges a veto power over the minor’s abortion decision.’’). 121Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1992). 122Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 363 (4th Cir. 1998). 

sequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting,’’ 113 and 

that ‘‘[i]t seems unlikely that [the minor] will obtain adequate 

counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion 

clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take 

place.’’ 114 Parental involvement in such a decision will lead to improved medical care for minors seeking abortions and provide increased protection for young girls against sexual exploitation by 

adult men. 

On an issue as contentious and divisive as abortion, it is both remarkable and instructive that there is such firm and long-standing 

support for laws requiring parental involvement. Various reasons 

underlie this broad and consistent support. As the Supreme Court, 

including Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, observed in 

Planned Parenthood v. Casey,115 parental consent and notification 

laws related to abortions ‘‘are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often not realize that their parents have 

their best interests at heart.’’ 

In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,116 noted 

liberal Justice Stewart wrote, ‘‘There can be little doubt that the 

State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an 

unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear 

a child.’’ 117 Three years later, in Bellotti v. Baird,118 a plurality of 

the Court acknowledged that parental consultation is critical for 

minors considering abortion because minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. The Bellotti plurality also observed that parental 

consultation is particularly desirable regarding the abortion decision since, for some, the situation raises profound moral and religious concerns.119

Significantly, the Supreme Court has already concluded that notice statutes do not give parents any ‘‘veto power’’ 120 over the minor’s abortion decision. As the Court reiterated in Akron II, ‘‘notice 

statutes are not equivalent to consent statutes because they do not 

give anyone a veto power over a minor’s abortion decision.’’ 121 A 

one-parent notification law such as one containing CIANA’s abuse 

and life-endangerment exception does not require a judicial bypass. 

As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, ‘‘In contrast to its assessment of parental consent statutes, the [Supreme] Court has consistently recognized that the same potential for absolute veto over 

the abortion decision that inheres in a parental consent statute 

does not inhere in a parental notice statute, and therefore that notice statutes are fundamentally different from—and less burdensome than—consent statutes.’’ 122

29 

123 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I). 124 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635 (quotations and citations omitted). 125 Id. at 635. 126See id. at 637. 127 Id. at 648. 128 Id. 129 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 130 Id. at 409-10. 131 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992). 

Parental involvement in a pregnant minor girl’s abortion decision 

is supported by the common-sense realization that minors often 

lack the maturity to fully comprehend the significance and consequences of their actions. In 1976, when it first addressed Massachusetts’ parental consent statute, the Supreme Court recognized 

that with minors, ‘‘there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed consent.’’ 123 During its second review of 

Massachusetts’ parental consent law, the Court stated, ‘‘Viewed together, our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental 

deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal 

system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for 

concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.’’ 124 The 

Court continued to describe its previous rulings to allow states to 

‘‘limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences’’ as being ‘‘grounded in the recognition that, during the 

formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the 

experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid 

choices that could be detrimental to them.’’ 125

The Supreme Court has pointed to the ‘‘guiding role of parents 

in the upbringing of their children’’ as the basis for its rulings preserving for parents a unique legal authority over the conduct of 

their children.126 The Court has reasoned that ‘‘parents naturally 

take an interest in the welfare of their children[.]’’ 127 This, in the 

Court’s view, creates ‘‘an important state interest in encouraging a 

family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor’s abortion decision.’’ 128 In H.L. v. Matheson,129 the Court upheld a Utah statute 

requiring a physician to notify, if possible, parents of a minor upon 

whom an abortion is to be performed and stated: 

There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. 

That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature 

advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that she will 

obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors 

frequently take place.130

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court upheld the parental 

consent provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982, 

stating that they ‘‘provide the parent or parents of a pregnant 

young woman the opportunity to consult with her in private, and 

to discuss the consequences of her decision in the context of the 

values and moral or religious principles of their family.’’ 131 It conVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
30 

132 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637. 133Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)(emphasis added). See also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (‘‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care 

and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 

preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’’); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 

U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (‘‘The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition 

of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the 

parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring 

American tradition.’’). 134Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 135 Id. at 68-69. 136 Id. at 69. 

tinued, ‘‘The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors.’’ 132

It is instructive that the Court has always held that this important duty to ensure and provide for the care and nurture of minor 

children lies only with parents—a conclusion that arises from the 

traditional legal recognition ‘‘that natural bonds of affection lead 

parents to act in the best interests of their children.’’ 133

Significantly for CIANA, the Court recently struck down a Washington State visitation law under which grandparents were granted 

visitation to their grandchildren over the objection of the children’s 

mother precisely because it failed to provide special protection for 

the fundamental right of parents to control with whom their children associate.134 The Court concluded that the lower court ‘‘gave 

no special weight at all’’ to a mother’s conclusion that excessive 

grandparent visitation was not in her minor children’s best interests, and continued, ‘‘so long as a parent adequately cares for his 

or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the 

State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 

question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.’’ 135 This failure, the 

Court stated, ‘‘directly contravened the traditional presumption 

that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.’’ 136

CIANA PROTECTS THE HEALTH OF MINOR GIRLS

Young girls face serious risks to their health and well-being 

when they are secretly taken for abortions without their parents’ 

knowledge. When an abortion is performed on a girl without the 

physician having full knowledge of her medical history—which is 

usually available only from a parent—the risks greatly increase. 

Moreover, minor girls who do not involve their parents usually do 

not return for follow-up treatment, which can lead to dangerous 

complications. In many cases, only a girl’s parents know of her 

prior psychological and medical history, including allergies to medication and anesthesia. Also, parents are usually the only people 

who can provide authorization for post-abortion medical procedures 

or the release of pertinent data from family physicians. None of 

these precautions can be taken when a pregnant girl is taken to 

have an abortion without her parents’ knowledge. Consequently, 

when parents are not involved, the risks to the minor girl’s health 

significantly increase. CIANA is designed to safeguard minor girls’ 

physical and emotional health by helping to ensure parental involvement in their interstate abortion decisions. 

31 

137 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti II). 138See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, Minors’ Issues: Reproductive Choice Issues, at http://www.naral.org/issues/issues—minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 

2001). 139 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). Accord Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive 

Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1990). 140See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). 

The medical care that minors seeking abortions receive is improved when their parents are involved in three ways. 

First, parental involvement allows parents to assist their daughter in the selection of a competent abortion provider. With all medical procedures, one of the most reliable means of guaranteeing patient safety is the professional competence of the physician performing the procedure. In Bellotti v. Baird, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that parents possess a much greater 

ability to evaluate and select competent healthcare providers than 

their minor children often do: 

In this case . . . we are concerned only with minors who, according to the record, range in age from children of 12 years 

to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the latter are less likely than 

adults to know or be able to recognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to have the means to engage such professionals. Many 

minors who bypass their parents probably will resort to an 

abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish the competent 

and ethical from those that are incompetent or unethical.137

The Supreme Court’s concern for that ability of minors to distinguish competent and ethical abortion providers is particularly justified in states where non-physicians are allowed, by statute, to perform abortions. The National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League recommends that patients seeking an abortion confirm 

that the abortion will be performed by a licensed physician in good 

standing with the state Board of Medical Examiners, and that he 

or she have admitting privileges at a local hospital not more than 

20 minutes away from the location where the abortion is to 

occur.138 A well-informed parent seeking to guide her child is more 

likely to inquire into the qualifications of the person performing the 

abortion, and the availability of a physician with local admitting 

privileges, than an emotionally vulnerable young girl faced with 

pregnancy. 

Second, parental involvement will ensure that parents have the 

opportunity to provide additional medical history and information 

to abortion providers prior to performance of the abortion. As the 

Supreme Court has stated: 

The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of 

an abortion are serious and can be lasting . . . An adequate 

medical and psychological case history is important to the physician. Parents can provide medical and psychological data, 

refer the physician to other sources of medical history, such as 

family physicians, and authorize family physicians to give relevant data.139

Take, for example, the story of Sandra, a fourteen-year-old girl 

who committed suicide shortly after obtaining an abortion.140

Sandra’s mother, who learned of her daughter’s abortion only after 

her suicide, sued the abortion provider at which Sandra’s abortion 

32 

141See id. at 624. 142See id. at 628. 143 Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). 144See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519 (1990). 145Stanley K. Henshaw, ‘‘Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective,’’ 

in A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). 146See Florida Dep’t of Health v. North Florida Women’s Health and Counseling Service, 852 

So.2d 254, 264 n.3 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 2001): 

[E]vidence at trial showed, the physician-patient relationship is often attenuated in the 

abortion context, almost to the point of non-existence. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (‘‘It seems unlikely that 

[the minor] will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at 

an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place. ’’). Abortion patients ordinarily see their physicians only once or twice, very briefly. Most of 

their interaction is with the clinic’s staff. Physicians performing abortions often perform 

several in the space of a single hour. Id. 

147Stanley K. Henshaw, ‘‘Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective,’’ 

in A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortions 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). 

Cf. Richard S. Moon, Why I Don’t Do Abortions Anymore, Medical Economics 61 (Mar. 4, 1985). 148Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before the House Comm. on Health 

and Welfare, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001) (Nancy Mosher, President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Northern New England on April 16, 2001) (estimating that two-thirds of Vermont 

women keep their follow up appointments, although ‘‘teenagers are notorious for ‘no-showing’ ’’). 

was performed, asserting that her daughter’s death was due to the 

failure of the abortion provider to obtain a psychiatric history or 

monitor Sandra’s mental health.141 The court concluded that Sandra was not insane at the time she committed suicide and, therefore, her actions broke the chain of causation required for recovery.142 Yet evidence was presented that Sandra had a history of 

psychological illness and that her behavior was noticeably different 

after the abortion.143 If Sandra’s mother had been aware of her 

daughter’s abortion, she would have had the opportunity to notify 

the abortion provider of Sandra’s psychological history, and steps 

could have been taken to minimize the psychological effect of the 

abortion on Sandra’s already fragile mental state. 

A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of the 

patient will enable abortion providers to disclose not only medical 

risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also those risks that 

may be specific to a pregnant minor. Parental involvement provides 

adults with the opportunity to advise and assist the girl in giving 

her informed consent to the procedure. 

Third, parental involvement will improve medical treatment of 

pregnant minors by ensuring that parents have adequate knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion complications 

that may develop.144 The rate of many of the complications associated with abortion are unknown. As a clinician’s guide states, ‘‘The 

abortion reporting systems of some counties and states in the 

United States include entries about complications, but these systems are generally considered to underreport infections and other 

problems that appear some time after the procedure was performed.’’ 145 Furthermore, women typically have no pre-existing relationship with an abortion provider,146 which likely accounts for 

the fact that only about one-third return to the provider for their 

post-operative exam.147 Teenagers are even less likely to return for 

follow-up appointments.148 This failure to return for post-operative 

exams precludes discovery of post-abortion complications by abortion providers and subsequent reporting of these complications. 

Other healthcare providers may be reluctant to report any complications for fear of compromising the secrecy that often surrounds 

abortions. 

33 

149 Reynier v. Delta Women’s Clinic, 359 So.2d 733, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (‘‘All the medical 

testimony was to the effect that a perforated uterus was a normal risk, but the statistics given 

by the experts indicated that it was an infrequent occurrence and it was rare for a major blood 

vessel to be damaged.’’). Frequent injuries from incomplete abortions are discussed in Swate v. 

Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998) (abortionist’s unsuccessful claim of libel 

against journalist for reports based in part upon one disciplinary order that doctor had failed 

to complete abortions performed on several patients and had failed to repair lacerations which 

occurred during abortion procedures). Cf. Sherman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, 557 

A.2d 943, 944 (D.C. 1989) (‘‘Dr. Sherman placed his patients’ lives at risk by using unsterile 

instruments in surgical procedures and by intentionally doing incomplete abortions (using septic 

instruments) to increase his fees by making later surgical procedures necessary. His practices 

made very serious infections (and perhaps death) virtually certain to occur. Dr. Sherman does 

not challenge our findings that his misconduct was willful nor that he risked serious infections 

in his patients for money.’’). 150Phillip G. Stubblefield and David A. Grimes, ‘‘Current Concepts: Septic Abortions,’’ New 

Eng. J. Med. 310 (August 4, 1994). 151Florida Dep’t of Health v. North Florida Women’s Health and Counseling Service, 852 So.2d 

254, 262-63 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2001), quashed by North Florida Women’s Health and Counseling 

Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2003) (striking down state law under state constitution’s ‘‘right to privacy’’). The Florida Constitution was subsequently amended to state ‘‘Notwithstanding a minor’s right to privacy . . . the Legislature is authorized to require by general law 

for notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before the termination of the minor’s pregnancy.’’ Fla. Stat. Ann. Const. Art. 10 § 22. 152See Willard Cates, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Kenneth F. Schulz, M.B.A. & David A. Grimes, M.D., 

The Risks Associated With Teenage Abortion, New Eng. J. of Med., Sept. 15, 1983, at 621-24. 

At least one American court has held that a perforated uterus is 

a ‘‘normal risk’’ associated with abortion.149 Untreated, a perforated uterus may result in an infection, complicated by fever, endometritis, and parametritis. According to one study, ‘‘[t]he risk of 

death from post-abortion sepsis [infection] is highest for young 

women, those who are unmarried, and those who undergo procedures that do not directly evacuate the contents of the uterus . . . 

A delay in treatment allows the infection to progress to bacteremia, 

pelvic abscess, septic pelvic thrombophlebitis, disseminated 

intravascular coagulophy, septic shock, renal failure, and 

death.’’ 150 Evidence about these dangers presented at trial persuaded a Florida appellate court to uphold that State’s parental notification law: 

The State proved that appropriate aftercare is critical in 

avoiding or responding to post-abortion complications. Abortion 

is ordinarily an invasive surgical procedure attended by many 

of the risks accompanying surgical procedures generally. If 

post-abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a minor (like an adult) may 

need medical attention. A guardian unaware that her ward or 

a parent unaware that his minor daughter has undergone an 

abortion will be at a serious disadvantage in caring for her if 

complications develop. An adult who has been kept in the dark 

cannot, moreover, assist the minor in following the abortion 

provider’s instructions for post-surgical care. Failure to follow 

such instructions can increase the risk of complications. As the 

plaintiffs’ medical experts conceded, the risks are significant in 

the best of circumstances. While abortion is less risky than 

some surgical procedures, abortion complications can result in 

serious injury, infertility, and even death.151

Young adolescent girls are particularly at risk of certain adverse 

medical consequences from an abortion. For instance, there is a 

greater risk of cervical injury associated with suction-curettage 

abortions (at 12 weeks’ gestation or earlier) performed on girls 17 

years-old or younger.152 Cervical injury is of serious concern beVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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153See Burkman et al., Morbidity Risk Among Young Adolescents Undergoing Elective Abortion, Contraception, vol. 30 (1984), at 99-105. 154 Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., ‘‘Parental Guidance Needed,’’ The New York Times (July 12, 1998), 

section 4, at 1. 155 Id. 156 Id. 157 Hodsgon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 426 n.7 (1990) (citing Minnesota statute § 144.343, 

subd. 4(a)). 

cause it may predispose the young girl to adverse outcomes in future pregnancies. Girls 17 years-old or younger also face a two and 

a half times greater risk of acquiring endometriosis following an 

abortion than do women 20-29 years-old.153

The particular risks faced by minors upon whom abortions are 

performed were articulated by Dr. Bruce A. Lucero. Dr. Lucero, 

who supported the Child Custody Protection Act (federal legislation 

similar to CIANA) in 1998, wrote in The New York Times about his 

own experience with minor girls seeking abortions. ‘‘In almost all 

cases,’’ Dr. Lucero wrote, ‘‘the only reason that a teen-age girl 

doesn’t want to tell her parents about her pregnancy is that she 

feels ashamed and doesn’t want to let her parents down.’’ 154 However, according to Dr. Lucero, ‘‘parents are usually the ones who 

can best help their teen-ager consider her options. And whatever 

the girl’s decision, parents can provide the necessary emotional 

support and financial assistance.’’ 155 Moreover, Dr. Lucero explained that ‘‘patients who receive abortions at out-of-State clinics 

frequently do not return for follow-up care, which can lead to dangerous complications. And a teen-ager who has an abortion across 

state lines without her parents’ knowledge is even more unlikely to 

tell them that she is having complications.’’ 156

Opponents also argue that the bill needs a broader ‘‘health exception.’’ It does not. CIANA specifically provides that its notification 

requirements would not apply if ‘‘the abortion is necessary to save 

the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical 

disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 

itself.’’ If the concern is about health risks of a non life-threatening 

nature, then the best course of action, of course, is involving the 

parents. Finally, the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional 

a state parental notification statute that did not contain a health 

exception. That state statute provided only for a ‘‘judicial bypass’’ 

exception, which would of course take some time for a minor to utilize, and an exception for cases in which emergency treatment prior 

to notice ‘‘is necessary to prevent the woman’s death.’’ 157

Without the knowledge that their daughters have had abortions, 

parents are incapable of ensuring that their children obtain routine 

post-operative care or of providing an adequate medical history to 

physicians called upon to treat any complications that may arise. 

The first omission may allow complications such as infection, perforation, or depression, to continue untreated. The second omission 

may be lethal. When parents do not know that their daughter had 

an abortion, ignorance prevents swift and appropriate intervention 

by emergency room professionals responding to a life-threatening 

condition. 

In short, the physical and psychological risks of abortions to minors are great, and laws requiring parental involvement in such 

abortions reduce that risk. The widespread practice of evading such 

35 

158 American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, ‘‘Adolescent Pregnancy—Current Trends and Issues: 1998,’’ 103 Pediatrics 516, 519 (1999). 159Mike A. Males, ‘‘Adult Involvement in Teenage Childbearing and STD,’’ 346 Lancet 64 

(July 8, 1995) (emphasis added). 160See id. (citing HP Boyer and D. Fine, ‘‘Sexual Abuse as a Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy 

and Child Maltreatment,’’ 24 Fam. Plan. Perspectives 4 (1992)); See also HP Gershenson, et al. 

‘‘The Prevalence of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers,’’ 24 J. Interpersonal Violence 

4 (1989); American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, ‘‘Adolescent Pregnancy— 

Current Trends and Issues: 1998,’’ 103 Pediatrics 516, 516 (1999) (‘‘Younger teenagers are especially vulnerable to coercive and nonconsensual sex. Involuntary sexual activity has been reported in 74 percent of sexually active girls younger than 14 years and 60 percent of those 

younger than 15 years.’’). 161See Gershenson, et al. ‘‘The Prevalence of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers,’’ 

24 J. Interpersonal Violence 4 (1989). 162See Stanley Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion Decisions, 

Family Planning Perspectives, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 206. 163See Department of Health and Human Services, ‘‘Report to Congress on Out-of-Wedlock 

Childbearing’’ (September 1995) at x (‘‘Evidence also indicates that among unmarried teenage 

mothers, two-thirds of the fathers are age 20 or older, suggesting that differences in power and 

status exist between many sexual partners.’’). 

laws by transporting minors across State lines through interstate 

commerce may be prevented only through Federal legislation. 

CIANA PROTECTS MINOR GIRLS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT

In addition to improving the medical care received by young girls 

dealing with an unplanned pregnancy, parental involvement will 

provide increased protection against sexual exploitation of minors 

by adult men. National studies reveal that ‘‘[a]lmost two thirds of 

adolescent mothers have partners older than 20 years of age.’’ 158

In a study of over 46,000 pregnancies by school-age girls in California, researchers found that ‘‘71 percent, or over 33,000, were fathered by adult post-high-school men whose mean age was 22.6 

years, an average of 5 years older than the mothers . . . Even 

among junior high school mothers aged 15 or younger, most births 

are fathered by adult men 6-7 years their senior. Men aged 25 or 

older father more births among California school-age girls than do 

boys under age 18.’’ 159 Other studies have found that most teenage 

pregnancies are the result of predatory practices by men who are 

substantially older.160

A 1989 study of coercive sexual experiences among teenage mothers found that of the pregnant teens who had unwanted sexual experiences, only 18 percent of the perpetrators were within the victim’s age group. Another 18 percent were three to 5 years older 

than the victim. Seventeen percent were six to 10 years older, and 

40 percent were more than 10 years older than their victims.161

Another study reports that when a minor’s parents have not been 

told about her pregnancy, 58 percent of the time it is the girl’s boyfriend who accompanies her for an abortion, and the minor’s boyfriend helped pay for the abortion 76 percent of the time.162

As Professor Teresa Stanton Collett testified before the House 

Constitution Subcommittee: 

[A]s this Congress learned through a congressional report from 

the Center for Disease Control, two-thirds of the fathers of 

teenage mothers are age 20 years or older, suggesting that 

there is in fact differences in power and status between the 

sexual partners.163 In addition to that, a survey of 1,500 unmarried minors having abortions revealed that among the minors who reported that neither parent knew of the abortion, 89 

percent said that a boyfriend was involved in deciding or arVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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164 Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1755 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 22 (July 20, 2004) (statement of Teresa 

Collett). 165On June 14, 2000, a 36-year-old Omaha man who impersonated the father of his teen-age 

victim in order to assist her in obtaining an abortion was sentenced to 11⁄2-2 years in prison 

for felony child abuse. See Angie Brunkow, ‘‘Man Who Said He Was Girl’s Dad Sentenced,’’ 

Omaha World-Herald (June 14, 2000) at 20. A similar attempt to hide the consequences of statutory rape is reflected in the testimony of Joyce Farley before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution. See, e.g., Child 

Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congress, May 21, 1998 (statement of Joyce Farley). 166See Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1993) (destruction of aborted fetus 

precluded prosecution for forcible rape of a child under the age of sixteen). Compare Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 432 S.E.2d 2 (Va. App. 1993) (prosecution for rape of 14-year-old girl), with 

Hampton v. State, 1987 WL. 28223 (Ark. App. 1987) (prosecution for incest), and State v. Khong, 

502 N.E.2d 682 (Ohio App. 1985) (prosecutor subject to contempt order for failure to comply with 

discovery orders). 167Dee Dee Alonzo testified before the Texas Senate Human Services Committee in support 

of Senate Bill 30, the bill enacting the Texas Parental Notification Act. At age sixteen, she was 

seduced by her high school teacher. When she became pregnant, he persuaded her to have a 

secret abortion. She went to the clinic alone, obtained the abortion her abuser had paid for, and 

returned to continue the abusive relationship for another year. Ms. Alonzo testified ‘‘No matter 

what their reaction would have been, they were my parents and they were adults, and they did 

love me, it would not have been a secret and the man would have been exposed.’’ Testimony 

of Dee Dee Alonzo, Hearing on Tex. S.B. 30 Before the Senate Human Servs. Comm., 76th Leg., 

R.S. 4-5 (Mar. 10, 1999) (tapes available from the Senate Staff Servs. Office and content is from 

private transcripts of those tapes). A similar incident involved another high school student impregnated by her teacher. This is revealed in the settlement related to injuries she suffered during the abortion of her pregnancy. See Clement v. Riston, No.B-131,033, settlement reported in 

Jury Verdict Research, Research, LRP Pub. No. 65904 available on Lexis-Nexis; cf. Patterson 

v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzales, J., concurring) (describing 

the sexual abuse of a young girl that resulted in two pregnancies and two secret abortions). 168Kristin Moore, Ph.D. and Jennifer Manlove, Ph.D., ‘‘A Demographic Portrait of Statutory 

Rape,’’ Presentation given at the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Conference on the Sexual Exploitation of Teens (March 23-24, 2005) (defining statutory rape as occurring when teens aged 15 or younger have sex with a partner 3 or more years older). 169 Id. 170 Id. (of those younger than 14, 18 percent; of those age 15-16, 10 percent; and of those age 

17-19, 5 percent). 171 Id. (Hispanic, 17 percent, black, 16percent, white, 11 percent). 

ranging the abortion, and 93 percent of those 15 and under 

said that the boyfriend was involved.164

Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the advantage of their victims’ obtaining an abortion.165 Not only does an 

abortion eliminate a critical piece of evidence of the criminal conduct,166 but it also allows the abuse to continue undetected.167 As 

a recent presentation given at a U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services Conference on the Sexual Exploitation of Teens 

showed, of minor girls’ first sexual experiences, 13percent constitute statutory rape.168 Further, the younger a sexually experienced teen is, the more likely they are to experience statutory rape. 

Of sexually experienced teens age 13 or younger, 65 percent experienced statutory rape. Of those age 14, 53 percent experienced statutory rape. And of those age 15, 41 percent experienced statutory 

rape.169 And young girls who are younger at their first sexual experience are more likely to say their first sexual experience was nonvoluntary.170 Also, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to experience statutory rape.171 Parental involvement laws help ensure that 

parents have the opportunity to protect their daughters from those 

who would victimize them further. Secret abortions protect and 

perpetuate the illegal conduct of these adult male predators. 

37 

172See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act under Congress’ commerce clause power). 173See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 174There is therefore no need to address the scope of Congress’ power to regulate activity that 

is not, but that affects, commerce among the States. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 

v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. 

McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 175See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 176 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 177 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970). As amended, the statute prohibits the knowing transportation of 

any individual across state lines ‘‘with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in 

any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts 

to do so . . .’’ 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1999). 178See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (noting, in upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act, ‘‘that Congress has power over transportation ‘among the several 

states;’ that the power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt 

not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality 

of police regulations.’’). 179See United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978). 180 Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491. 

CONGRESS HAS CLEAR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT CIANA

CIANA is a regulation of commerce among the several states.172

Commerce, as that term is used in the Constitution, includes travel 

whether or not that travel is for reasons of business.173 To transport another person across state lines is to engage in commerce 

among the states.174 Under current Supreme Court precedents, 

Congress can enact legislation concerning interstate commerce, 

such as CIANA, for reasons related primarily to local activity rather than commerce itself.175

The interstate transportation of minors for the purpose of securing an abortion is clearly a form of interstate commerce which the 

Constitution expressly empowers Congress to regulate.176 CIANA 

regulates only conduct which involves interstate movement, activity which the national government alone is expressly authorized by 

the Constitution to address. 

The Federal Government has long exercised its interstate commerce authority to prohibit interstate activity harmful to minors 

and their families. In 1910, Congress used its Commerce Clause 

power to enact the Mann Act,177 which, before its amendment in 

1986, prohibited the interstate transportation of women or minors 

for purposes of ‘‘prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.’’ The Supreme Court upheld the enactment of this 

law as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power over transportation among the several states. The Court reasoned that if men 

and women employ interstate transportation to facilitate a wrong, 

then their right to interstate travel can be restricted.178 That statute was upheld as applied to the transportation of a person to Nevada for purposes of engaging in prostitution, even though prostitution was legal in Nevada.179 The Mann Act flatly prohibited the 

interstate transportation of women for ‘‘prostitution’’ or for ‘‘any 

other immoral purpose.’’ In upholding the law as a valid exercise 

of Congress’ commerce power, the Court stated: 

The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it 

has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the 

authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.180

38 

181 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993). 182See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (prohibiting the mailing of lottery tickets or letters, circulars, and 

other materials regarding a lottery). 183See 18 U.S.C. § 1301. 184 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 185 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 186See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 187 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 188For the articulation of the ‘‘undue burden’’ standard in Casey, see id. at 874-80. While the 

‘‘undue burden’’ standard as expressed in Casey appeared only to be the views of the three-person plurality, Justice Scalia predicted that ‘‘undue burden’’ would henceforward be the relevant 

standard, see id. at 984-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It now appears that the lower Federal courts 

understand that the ‘‘undue burden’’ standard is the correct one to be applied in abortion cases 

Just as it was appropriate for Congress to use its constitutional 

authority to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from 

‘‘immoral’’ conduct, so it is also appropriate for Congress to exercise 

that authority to keep the channels of interstate commerce free 

from those who transport minors across state lines in order to circumvent state parental involvement laws, or from physicians who 

might not otherwise notify a minor’s parents. 

The Mann Act is not the only example of a Federal law that prohibits interstate activities that might be legal in the state to which 

the activity is directed. Indeed, as long ago as 1876, Congress 

‘‘made it a crime to deposit in the mails any letters or circulars 

concerning lotteries, whether illegal or chartered by state legislatures.’’ 181 A statute to this effect is still in force.182 Congress later 

prohibited the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce, whether or not lotteries are legal in the state to which the 

tickets are transported.183 That provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames 184 and is still in effect. 

CIANA does not supercede, override, or alter existing state laws 

regarding minors’ abortions. Rather, CIANA is predicated on Congress’ authority to regulate interstate activity. The bill does nothing to regulate purely local activity, and it does not impose any 

new rules regarding conduct that occurs solely within one state. 

CIANA embodies rules to regulate interstate activities that involve 

two or more states, as is entirely appropriate under the Commerce 

Clause. In short, CIANA does not encroach on state powers. 

CIANA IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In Roe v. Wade,185 a majority of the Supreme Court found that 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which provides 

that no state shall deprive any person of ‘‘life, liberty, or property’’ 

without due process of law, includes within it a ‘‘substantive’’ component that bars a state from prohibiting abortions under some circumstances. This substantive component of the Due Process 

Clause, also described in that case as including a ‘‘right to privacy,’’ 

was construed to forbid virtually all state prohibitions on abortion 

during the first trimester of pregnancy.186 In Planned Parenthood 

v. Casey,187 the scope of permissible state regulation of abortion 

and the standards to be applied in evaluating the constitutionality 

of the regulation were significantly changed. Instead of declaring 

that the right to seek an abortion was a ‘‘fundamental right’’ requiring a ‘‘compelling state interest’’ in order to be regulated, the 

new holding was that state regulation of abortion was permissible 

so long as such regulation did not place an ‘‘undue burden’’ on a 

woman’s exercise of her constitutional rights with regard to abortion.188

39 

involving babies that are not viable. See, e.g., Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 

1997) (‘‘The trend does appear to be a move away from the strict scrutiny standard toward the 

so-called ‘undue burden’ standard of review.’’). 189 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 190 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 191 Id. at 74. 192 Id. at 74, 75. 193 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 194 In doing so the Court recognized minors bear ‘‘unquestionably greater risks of inability to 

give an informed consent.’’ Id. at 147. 195 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 196 Id. at 638. 

CIANA does not place an undue burden upon a woman’s right to 

an abortion. To the extent that a state rule is inconsistent with the 

Court’s doctrine, that rule is ineffective and CIANA would not 

make it effective. Regarding the bill’s provisions that govern interstate abortions conducted in States without parental involvement 

laws, a requirement that a parent simply be notified is not an 

undue burden. 

Following the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,189 many states enacted parental notice or consent statutes requiring minors to notify 

or seek the consent of their parents before undergoing an abortion. 

Parental consent laws generally require one or both parents to give 

actual consent to the minor’s decision to have an abortion. Parental 

notification laws typically require the physician, or in some statutes another health care provider, to notify one or both of the parents of the minor female at some time prior to the abortion. 

The Court first considered parental involvement in a minor 

daughter’s abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 

Danforth.190 The Missouri statute gave a minor girl’s parent an absolute veto over her decision to have an abortion. The majority, led 

by Justice Blackmun, concluded that such a veto power was unconstitutional.191 The majority noted, however, that the Court ‘‘long 

has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to 

regulate the activities of children than of adults’’ and ‘‘emphasized’’ 

that its holding in the case ‘‘does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age . . . may give effective consent for termination of 

her pregnancy.’’ 192

The Court next addressed state parental involvement laws in 

Bellotti v. Baird,193 remanding a parental consent statute that was 

unclear as to whether the parents had authority to veto the abortion and as to the availability of a judicial bypass procedure.194 The 

statute returned to the Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 

II).195 The statute in Bellotti II required a minor to obtain the consent of her parents or circumvent this requirement through a judicial bypass proceeding that did not take into account whether the 

minor was sufficiently mature to make an informed decision regarding the abortion. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute 

without a majority opinion. 

Justice Powell stated in his plurality opinion, ‘‘constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to 

authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society’’ and that ‘‘[p]roperly 

understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former 

is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.’’ 196 This has become the de facto constitutional standard for parental consent and 

notification laws. In upholding parental involvement laws, the pluVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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197 Id. at 634. 198 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 199 Id. at 409-10. 200 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 201 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 202See id. at 514-15. 203 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 

rality found three reasons why the constitutional rights of minors 

were not identical to the constitutional rights of adults: ‘‘[t]he peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the 

parental role in child rearing.’’ 197 Thus, the plurality sought to design guidelines for a judicial bypass proceeding that allowed states 

to address these interests in a parental consent statute. 

In H.L. v. Matheson,198 a minor girl challenged the constitutional 

validity of a state statute that required a physician to give notice 

to the parents of a minor girl whenever possible before performing 

an abortion on her. By a vote of six to three, the statute was held 

constitutional. The Court held that a state could require notification of the parents of a minor girl because the notification ‘‘furthers 

a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried 

pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child.’’ 199

In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. 

v. Ashcroft,200 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a State law 

that required a minor to obtain the consent of one of her parents 

before obtaining an abortion or, in the alternative, to obtain the 

consent of a juvenile court judge. While there was no majority opinion, this case marked the first time the Court directly upheld a parental consent requirement. 

In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,201 the Supreme 

Court upheld a statute that required a physician to give notice to 

one of the minor’s parents or, under some circumstances, another 

relative, before performing an abortion on the minor. The statute 

permitted the physician and the minor to avoid the requirement by 

a judicial bypass. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held 

that the bypass proceeding did not unconstitutionally impair a minor’s rights by the creation of unnecessary delay.202 The Court established in this case that it will not invalidate state procedures so 

long as they seem to be reasonably designed to provide the minor 

with an expedited process. 

In Hodgson v. Minnesota,203 the Court invalidated a state statute 

that required notification of both parents prior to a minor girl’s 

abortion without the option of a judicial bypass. The Court, however, upheld statutory requirements that both parents be notified 

of the abortion and a 48 hour waiting period between notification 

and the performance of the abortion, if such requirements were accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure that met constitutional 

standards. 

CIANA, consistent with these Supreme Court precedents, requires—in cases in which a minor from one state seeks to obtain 

an abortion in another state without a parental involvement law— 

that before an abortion can be obtained, either (1) the physician is 

presented with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of 

certainty that a court in the minor’s state of residence has waived 

any parental notification required by the laws of that state, or has 

41 

204 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 205Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 206Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997). 207 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and 

quotations omitted). 208 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 209 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990). 

otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to procure an abortion; (2) the minor declares in a signed written statement that she 

is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the minor, the physician notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of child 

abuse or neglect by the law of the State in which the minor resides 

of the known or suspected abuse or neglect; or (3) the abortion is 

necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising 

from the pregnancy itself. 

In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,204 the 

first of a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with parental consent or notification laws, noted liberal Justice Stewart wrote, 

‘‘There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally 

permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to 

seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision of whether or not to bear a child.’’ 205

While the Supreme Court has, to date, ‘‘declined to decide whether a parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass 

provision to be constitutional,’’ 206 it is of note that even famously 

liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring opinion in H.L. v. 

Matheson, that ‘‘[t]he fact that certain members of the class of unmarried minor women who are suffering unwanted pregnancies 

and desire to terminate the pregnancies may actually be emancipated or sufficiently mature to make a well-reasoned abortion decision does not, in my view, undercut the validity of the [state] statute [in question] . . . [A] state legislature has constitutional power 

to utilize, for purposes of implementing a parental-notice requirement, a yardstick based upon the chronological age of unmarried 

pregnant women. That this yardstick will be imprecise or even unjust in particular cases does not render its use by a state legislature impermissible under the Federal Constitution.’’ 207

Furthermore, the Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota,208 wrote that: 

We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor wait 48 

hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an 

abortion would reasonably further the legitimate state interest 

in ensuring that the minor’s decision is knowing and intelligent . . . The brief waiting period provides the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a family physician, and it permits the parent to inquire into the competency 

of the doctor performing the abortion, discuss the religious or 

moral implications of the abortion decision, and provide the 

daughter needed guidance and counsel in evaluating the impact of the decision on her future.’’ 209

The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that a parental notification requirement does not impose an undue burden on a minor’s 

ability to obtain an abortion, finding that ‘‘[a] 48-hour delay imVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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210 Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 211Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 212 Id. at 877 (1992) (emphasis added). 213 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 449 (1990) (emphasis added). 214The Supreme Court elaborated that ‘‘Some guiding principles should emerge. What is at 

stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all 

others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which 

the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of 

the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the 

right to choose.’’ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 215Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878, 895 (1992). 216 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 

poses only a minimal burden on the right of the minor to decide 

whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.’’ 210

The Court then stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that: 

Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 

procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only 

where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s 

ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach 

into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process 

Clause.211

The Court continued that ‘‘[a] finding of an undue burden is a 

shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 

woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.’’ 212 A parental notice requirement, which the Supreme Court has described as a 

‘‘minimal burden’’ 213 is clearly not a ‘‘substantial obstacle’’ 214 to 

receiving an abortion. 

The Supreme Court continued: ‘‘We reject the rigid trimester 

framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take 

measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as 

long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth 

over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on 

the right . . . As with any medical procedure, the State may enact 

regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an 

abortion . . . [P]arental notification or consent requirements . . . 

and our judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the 

quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often not realize 

that their parents have their best interests at heart.’’ 215

Even famously liberal Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring 

opinion in H.L. v. Matheson,216 that: 

In my opinion, the special importance of a young woman’s 

abortion decision . . . provides a special justification for reasonable state efforts intended to ensure that the decision be 

wisely made. Such reasonable efforts surely may include a requirement that an abortion be procured only after consultation 

with a licensed physician. And, because the most significant 

consequences of the [abortion] decision are not medical in charVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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217 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422-24 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and 

quotations omitted). 218 Id. at 413 (citations and quotations omitted). 219 Contrary to claims by some opponents of CIANA, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) does 

not in any way impugn the constitutionality of CIANA. In Saenz, the Supreme Court addressed 

‘‘the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new State of residence.’’ Id. at 505 (emphasis 

added). A minor who is a resident of one state and who crosses state lines to obtain an abortion 

in another state is by definition not a resident of the state in which such abortion is performed. 

Both operative sections of CIANA specifically restrict its applications to situations in which a 

minor resides in one state and seeks an abortion in another state. 

acter, the State unquestionably has an interest in ensuring 

that a young woman receive other appropriate consultation as 

well. In my opinion, the quality of that interest is plainly sufficient to support a state legislature’s determination that such 

appropriate consultation should include parental advice . . . 

[T]he State may legitimately decide that such consultation 

should be made more probable by ensuring that parents are informed of their daughter’s decision: If there is no parental-[notice] requirement, many minors will submit to the abortion 

procedure without ever informing their parents. An assumption 

that the parental reaction will be hostile, disparaging, or violent no doubt persuades many children simply to bypass parental counsel which would in fact be loving, supportive, and, indeed, for some indispensable. It is unrealistic, in my judgment, 

to assume that every parent-child relationship is either (a) so 

perfect that communication and accord will take place routinely or (b) so imperfect that the absence of communication reflects the child’s correct prediction that the parent will . . . 

[act] arbitrarily to further a selfish interest rather than the 

child’s interest. A state legislature may conclude that most 

parents will be primarily interested in the welfare of their children, and further, that the imposition of a parental-[notice] requirement is an appropriate method of giving the parents an 

opportunity to foster that welfare by helping a pregnant distressed child to make and to implement a correct decision.217

Even earlier, the Court stated in H.L. v. Matheson that ‘‘[t]he 

Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its statutes so as 

to encourage or facilitate abortions. To the contrary, state action 

encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is 

rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.’’ 218

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS PRESERVED UNDER CIANA

Opponents also argue that CIANA violates the rights of residents 

of each of the United States and of the District of Columbia to travel to and from any state of the Union for lawful purposes. Those 

opposed to CIANA on these grounds argue that the legislation will 

hold a pregnant minor ‘‘hostage’’ to the laws of her home state. 

As an initial matter, it does not appear that the Supreme Court 

has ever held that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce 

is ever limited by the ‘‘right to travel.’’ Even assuming, however, 

that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is limited by 

the right to travel doctrine,219 the Supreme Court has recognized 

that the right to travel is ‘‘not absolute,’’ and is not violated so long 

as there is a ‘‘substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the 

44 

220Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999). 221See id. at 500. 222 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966). 223 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Bellotti II). 224 Id. at 639. 225 Id. at 634. 226 Id. at 635. 227 Id. 

mere fact that they are citizens of other States.’’ 220 Congress obviously has a substantial interest in protecting the health and wellbeing of minor girls and in protecting the rights of parents to raise 

their children. 

However, the notion that CIANA is inconsistent with the constitutional right to travel is not supportable under the Supreme 

Court’s jurisprudence. Neither a state nor the Federal Government 

can interfere with a citizen’s ability to leave a state for the purpose 

of visiting another State or prevent its citizens from returning; either would violate ‘‘the right of a citizen of one State to enter and 

to leave another State.’’ 221 CIANA does not even implicate this 

limitation, for it does not preclude the minor from traveling. The 

minor’s right to travel to another state is wholly unimpeded by 

CIANA. 

In addition, the Court has recognized that the right to interstate 

travel ‘‘may be regulated or controlled by the exercise of a State’s 

police power’’ and by the Federal Government as well.222 Protecting 

the health and well-being of minor girls and the rights of parents 

to raise their children are substantial, indeed compelling, reasons 

for restricting minors from obtaining an abortion without parental 

involvement. First, young adolescent girls who undergo abortions 

face a heightened risk of suffering from long-term physical and psychological complications. Second, ‘‘[c]onstitutional interpretation 

has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in 

their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic 

in the structure of our society,’’ and that ‘‘[p]roperly understood, 

then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with 

our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the 

basic presuppositions of the latter.’’ 223 Thus, ‘‘[u]nder the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents . . . who have 

[the] primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to 

the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.’’ 224 Third, the fundamental rights of minors, including the 

right to travel, are not equal to those of adults. Although the Court 

has previously concluded that the fundamental rights of a child are 

‘‘virtually coextensive with that of an adult,’’ 225 it also has recognized that ‘‘[t]hese rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults.’’ 226 Thus, ‘‘the State is entitled to 

adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and 

their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.’ ’’ 227

Based upon this reasoning, the Court has allowed States to enact 

laws that ‘‘account for children’s vulnerability’’ and that protect the 

unique role of parents: 

[T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious conVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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228 Id. 229 Id. at 638-39. 

sequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental 

to them.228

Therefore, ‘‘[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s 

chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.’’ 229 Consequently, a State may properly subject minors to more stringent 

limitations than are permissible with respect to adults. Examples 

include laws that prohibit the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors, laws that prohibit the sale of firearms and deadly 

weapons to minors without parental consent, and laws that prohibit third parties from exposing minors to certain types of literature. Similarly, Congress may restrict the right of minors to 

travel across state lines to a greater extent than it may adults. 

CIANA’s opponents sometimes also argue that CIANA violates 

the rights of states to enact and enforce their own laws governing 

conduct within their territorial boundaries. This contention is clearly specious because CIANA does not attempt to regulate conduct 

occurring solely within the territorial boundaries of a state. Rather, 

CIANA regulates interstate commerce, and Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate such activity. 

HEARINGS

The Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on H.R. 748 on March 3, 2005. Testimony was received from 

the following witnesses: Marcia Carroll, Lancaster, Pennsylvania; 

Richard Myers, Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law; Warren 

Seigel, Director of Adolescent Medicine, Chairman of Pediatrics, 

Coney Island Hospital; Teresa S. Collett, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law. Additional material was submitted by individuals and organizations. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On March 17, 2005, the Subcommittee on the Constitution met 

in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 748, 

as amended, by a vote of 7 to 2, a quorum being present. On April 

13, 2005, the Committee met in open session and ordered favorably 

reported the bill H.R. 748 with an amendment by a recorded vote 

of 20 yeas to 13 nays, a quorum being present. 

VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the following 

rollcall votes occurred during the committee’s consideration of H.R. 

748. 

1. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have created an 

additional layer of Federal court review that could be used by sexVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
46 

ual predators to escape conviction under the bill. By a rollcall vote 

of 11 yeas to 16 nays, the amendment was defeated. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon .......................................................................................................

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney .........................................................................................................

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner .........................................................................................................

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Washington) ....................................................................................

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 11 16 

2. Mr. Nadler offered an amendment that would have exempted 

sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if they were 

grandparents or adult siblings of a minor. By a rollcall vote of 12 

yeas to 19 nays, the amendment was defeated. 

ROLLCALL NO. 2 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

47 

ROLLCALL NO. 2—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................

Mr. Feeney ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Weiner .........................................................................................................

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Washington) ....................................................................................

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 12 19 

3. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted 

sexual predators from prosecution if they are taxicab drivers, bus 

drivers, or others in the business of professional transport. By a 

rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 17 nays, the amendment was defeated. 

ROLLCALL NO. 3 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) .............................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon .......................................................................................................

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney ......................................................................................................... X 

48 

ROLLCALL NO. 3—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Weiner .........................................................................................................

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Washington) .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 13 17 

4. Mr. Scott offered an amendment that would have exempted 

from prosecution under the bill those who aid and abet criminals 

who could be prosecuted under the bill. By a rollcall vote of 12 yeas 

to 18 nays, the amendment was defeated. 

ROLLCALL NO. 4 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) .............................................................................................

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon .......................................................................................................

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

49 

ROLLCALL NO. 4—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Washington) .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen ..................................................................................................

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 12 18 

5. Ms. Jackson-Lee offered an amendment that would have exempted sexual predators from prosecution under the bill if they 

were clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first cousins of a minor, 

and would require a study by the Government Accounting Office. 

By a rollcall vote of 13 yeas to 20 nays, the amendment was defeated. 

ROLLCALL NO. 5 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney .........................................................................................................

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ......................................................................................................

Mr. Smith (Washington) .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

50 

ROLLCALL NO. 5—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Total ................................................................................................ 13 20 

6. Motion to Report H.R. 748 with an amendment in the nature 

of a substitute was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 20 yeas to 13 

nays. 

ROLLCALL NO. 6 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney .........................................................................................................

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ......................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Washington) .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen ..................................................................................................

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X 

Total ................................................................................................ 20 13 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

51 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, H.R. 748, the following estimate and comparison prepared 

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

APRIL 21, 2005. 

Hon. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 748, the Child Interstate 

Abortion Notification Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 748—Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act 

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 748 would not result in 

any significant cost to the federal government. Enacting H.R. 748 

could affect direct spending and revenues; however, CBO estimates 

that any such impact would not be significant. H.R. 748 contains 

both an intergovernmental and a private-sector mandate as defined 

in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) by requiring doctors, in certain cases, to provide parental notification before 

preforming an abortion on a minor. CBO estimates the costs for 

public and private doctors to comply with those mandates would be 

minimal and well below the annual thresholds established in 

UMRA ($62 million for intergovernmental mandates and $123 million for private-sector mandates in 2005, adjusted for inflation). 

H.R. 748 would make it a federal crime to transport a minor 

across state lines, under certain circumstances, to obtain an abortion without parental notification; in addition, the bill would make 

it a crime for a physician to perform such an abortion. Violators 

would be subject to imprisonment and fines. As a result, the federal government would be able to pursue cases that it otherwise 

would not be able to prosecute. CBO expects that any increase in 

federal costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant, however, because of the small number of cases likely to be involved. Any such additional costs would 

be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 748 could be 

subject to criminal fines, the federal government might collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of such fines are recorded in the budget as revenues, which are deposited in the Crime 

52 

Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects that any additional 

revenues and direct spending would be negligible. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. This 

estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of Rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 748 would protect the health and safety of young girls by preventing valid and 

constitutional state parental involvement laws from being circumvented, and it would protect the health and safety of young 

girls by protecting the rights of parents to be involved in the medical decisions of their minor daughters when such decisions involve 

interstate abortions. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following discussion describes the bill as reported by the 

Committee. 

Sec. 1. Short title. 

Section 1 provides this Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Interstate 

Abortion Notification Act.’’ 

Sec. 2. Transportation of Minors in Circumvention of Certain Laws 

Relating to Abortion. 

Subsection (a) of Section 2 provides that, unless one of the exceptions listed below is met, whoever knowingly transports a minor 

across a State line, with the intent that such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby abridges the right of a parent under a law (in 

force in the minors state of residence) requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, shall be fined or imprisoned 

not more than 1 year, or both. An abridgement of a parent’s right 

occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the minor, in a 

State other than the State where the minor resides, without the 

parental consent or notification, or the judicial authorization, that 

would have been required by that law had the abortion been performed in the State where the minor resides. 

Subsection (b) of Section 2 provides for the following exceptions 

to prosecuting or suing someone under this section: (1) the prohibition does not apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life 

of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 

itself; (2) the bill exempts from prosecution or suit the minor herself (the girl being transported) and any parent of that minor. 

Subsection (c) of Section 2 provides that a defendant can present 

an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an offense, or to a lawsuit, based on a violation of this section if the defendant: (1) reaVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
53 

sonably believed, based on information the defendant obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that before the minor obtained 

the abortion, the parental consent or notification took place that 

was required under State law had the abortion been performed in 

the State where the minor resides; or (2) was presented with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a 

court in the minor’s State of residence waived any parental notification required by the laws of that State, or otherwise authorized 

that the minor be allowed to obtain an abortion. 

Subsection (d) of Section 2 provides that any parent who suffers 

harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

Subsection (e) of Section 2 provides, among other, the following 

definitions. The term a ‘‘law requiring parental involvement in a 

minor’s abortion decision’’ means a law requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either: (1) notification to, or consent 

of, a parent of that minor; or (2) proceedings in a State court. A 

‘‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision’’ 

does not include a law that allows notification or consent to be 

given by anyone other than a ‘‘parent’’ as defined in the bill. The 

term ‘‘minor’’ means an individual who is not older than the maximum age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings 

in a State court, under the State law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision. The term ‘‘parent’’ means: (1) 

a parent or guardian; (2) a legal custodian; or (3) a person with the 

requisite legal status to have care and control of the minor, and 

with whom the minor regularly resides, who is designated by the 

law requiring parental involvement in the minor’s abortion decision 

as a person to whom notification, or from whom consent, is required. 

Sec. 3. Child Interstate Abortion Notification. 

Subsection (a) of Section 3 provides that a physician who knowingly performs or induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the 

requirements of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. Subsection (a) further provides that, unless one of the exceptions described below is met, a 

physician who knowingly performs or induces an abortion on a 

minor who is a resident of a State other than the State in which 

the abortion is performed must provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the minor before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such parent is not possible after a reasonable effort 

has been made, 24 hours constructive notice must be given to a 

parent. 

Subsection (b) of Section 3 provides that subsection (a) does not 

apply if: (1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State that 

has a law in force requiring parental involvement in a minor’s 

abortion decision and the physician complies with the requirements 

of that law; (2) the physician is presented with documentation 

showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the 

minor’s State of residence has waived any parental notification required by the laws of that State, or has otherwise authorized that 

the minor be allowed to procure an abortion; (3) the minor declares 

in a signed written statement that she is the victim of sexual 

abuse, neglect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an aborVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
54 

tion is performed on the minor, the physician notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of child abuse or neglect by the law 

of the State in which the minor resides of the known or suspected 

abuse or neglect; or (4) the abortion is necessary to save the life 

of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 

itself. 

Subsection (c) of Section 3 provides that any parent who suffers 

harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

Subsection (d) of Section 3 defines the following terms, among 

others. The term ‘‘actual notice’’ means the giving of written notice 

directly, in person. The term ‘‘constructive notice’’ means notice 

that is given by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted 

delivery to the last known address of the person being notified, 

with delivery deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on 

the next day subsequent to mailing on which regular mail delivery 

takes place, days on which mail is not delivered excluded. The term 

a ‘‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision’’ is given the same meaning as in Section 2. The term ‘‘minor’’ 

means an individual who is not older than 18 years and who is not 

emancipated under State law. The term ‘‘parent’’ means a parent 

or guardian; a legal custodian; or a person standing in loco parentis 

who has care and control of the minor, and with whom the minor 

regularly resides, as determined by State law. The term ‘‘physician’’ means a doctor of medicine legally authorized to practice 

medicine by the State in which such doctor practices medicine, or 

any other person legally empowered under State law to perform an 

abortion. 

Sec. 4. Severability and Effective Date. 

Subsection (a) of Section 4 provides that if any provision of this 

Act, or any application thereof, is found unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect any provision or application of the Act not so 

adjudicated. 

Subsection (b) of Section 4 provides that the provisions of this 

Act shall take effect upon enactment. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—CRIMES 

* * * * * * * 

55 

CHAP. Sec. 

1. General provisions ........................................................................ 1 

* * * * * * * 

117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 

relating to abortion ........................................................... 2431 

117B. Child interstate abortion notification .......................................... 2432 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION 

Sec. 

2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion. 

§ 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain 

laws relating to abortion 

(a) OFFENSE.— (1) GENERALLY.—Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State line, with the 

intent that such minor obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact 

abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring parental 

involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in the State 

where the minor resides, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 

(2) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this subsection, an 

abridgement of the right of a parent occurs if an abortion is 

performed or induced on the minor, in a State other than the 

State where the minor resides, without the parental consent or 

notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have been 

required by that law had the abortion been performed in the 

State where the minor resides. 

(b) EXCEPTIONS.— (1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the 

abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her 

life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or 

physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition 

caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 

(2) A minor transported in violation of this section, and 

any parent of that minor, may not be prosecuted or sued for a 

violation of this section, a conspiracy to violate this section, or 

an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this section. 

(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—It is an affirmative defense to a 

prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation 

of this section that the defendant— 

(1) reasonably believed, based on information the defendant 

obtained directly from a parent of the minor, that before the 

minor obtained the abortion, the parental consent or notification took place that would have been required by the law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, 

had the abortion been performed in the State where the minor 

resides; or 

(2) was presented with documentation showing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor’s State of 

residence waived any parental notification required by the laws 

56 

of that State, or otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed 

to procure an abortion. 

(d) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

(e) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘abortion’’ means the use or prescription of any 

instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female known to be 

pregnant with an intention other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 

after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who died as 

the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental trauma or a 

criminal assault on the pregnant female or her unborn child; 

(2) the term a ‘‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision’’ means a law— 

(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a 

minor, either— 

(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of 

that minor; or 

(ii) proceedings in a State court; and 

(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described in subparagraph (A) notification to or 

consent of any person or entity who is not described in that 

subparagraph; 

(3) the term ‘‘minor’’ means an individual who is not older 

than the maximum age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings in a State court, under the law requiring 

parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision; 

(4) the term ‘‘parent’’ means— 

(A) a parent or guardian; 

(B) a legal custodian; or 

(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care 

and control of the minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides, who is designated by the law requiring parental involvement in the minor’s abortion decision as a person 

to whom notification, or from whom consent, is required; 

and 

(5) the term ‘‘State’’ includes the District of Columbia and 

any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the United 

States. 

CHAPTER 117B—CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION 

NOTIFICATION 

Sec. 

2432. Child interstate abortion notification. 

§ 2432. Child interstate abortion notification 

(a) OFFENSE.— 

(1) GENERALLY.—A physician who knowingly performs or 

induces an abortion on a minor in violation of the requirements 

of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 

more than one year, or both. 

(2) PARENTAL NOTIFICATION.—A physician who performs or 

induces an abortion on a minor who is a resident of a State 

other than the State in which the abortion is performed must 

57 

provide at least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the minor 

before performing the abortion. If actual notice to such parent 

is not possible after a reasonable effort has been made, 24 hours 

constructive notice must be given to a parent. 

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The notification requirement of subsection 

(a)(2) does not apply if— 

(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a State that has 

a law in force requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision and the physician complies with the requirements 

of that law; 

(2) the physician is presented with documentation showing 

with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in the minor’s 

State of residence has waived any parental notification required 

by the laws of that State, or has otherwise authorized that the 

minor be allowed to procure an abortion; 

(3) the minor declares in a signed written statement that 

she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse by 

a parent, and, before an abortion is performed on the minor, the 

physician notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of 

child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in which the 

minor resides of the known or suspected abuse or neglect; or 

(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical 

injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical 

condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. 

(c) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action. 

(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘abortion’’ means the use or prescription of any 

instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the pregnancy of a female known to be 

pregnant with an intention other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 

after live birth, or to remove a dead unborn child who died as 

the result of a spontaneous abortion, accidental trauma, or a 

criminal assault on the pregnant female or her unborn child; 

(2) the term ‘‘actual notice’’ means the giving of written notice directly, in person; 

(3) the term ‘‘constructive notice’’ means notice that is given 

by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery to 

the last known address of the person being notified, with delivery deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on the 

next day subsequent to mailing on which regular mail delivery 

takes place, days on which mail is not delivered excluded; 

(4) the term a ‘‘law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision’’ means a law— 

(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a 

minor, either— 

(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of 

that minor; or 

(ii) proceedings in a State court; 

(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described in subparagraph (A) notification to or 

consent of any person or entity who is not described in that 

subparagraph; 

58 

(5) the term ‘‘minor’’ means an individual who is not older 

than 18 years and who is not emancipated under State law; 

(6) the term ‘‘parent’’ means— 

(A) a parent or guardian; 

(B) a legal custodian; or 

(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care 

and control of the minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides; 

as determined by State law; 

(7) the term ‘‘physician’’ means a doctor of medicine legally 

authorized to practice medicine by the State in which such doctor practices medicine, or any other person legally empowered 

under State law to perform an abortion; and 

(8) the term ‘‘State’’ includes the District of Columbia and 

any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the United 

States. 

* * * * * * * 

MARKUP TRANSCRIPT

BUSINESS MEETING 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2005 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

[Intervening business.] 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. We will now go to H.R. 748, the 

‘‘Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act of 2005.’’ The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on the Constitution, for a motion. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee on the Constitution reports favorably the bill H.R. 748 and moves its favorable recommendation to the full House. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the bill will be 

considered as read and open for amendment at any point. 

[The bill, H.R. 748, follows:] 

59 

1

I

109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 748

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent the transportation of

minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 10, 2005

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. PITTS, Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. MCCAUL of

Texas, Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr.

MCCOTTER, Mr. TERRY, Mr. WICKER, Mr. BAKER, Mr. WAMP, Mr.

HAYES, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. AKIN, Mr.

PICKERING, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. LATOURETTE, Ms. HART, Mr.

HAYWORTH, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mr.

PLATTS, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. CANTOR, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr.

BERRY, Mrs. NORTHUP, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. MARIO

DIAZ-BALART of Florida, Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey, Mrs. CUBIN, Mr.

BUYER, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of

Florida, Mr. HYDE, Mr. MCHENRY, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. RYUN

of Kansas, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. DAVIS of Tennessee, Mr. TIAHRT, Mr.

FERGUSON, Mr. EHLERS, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. FRANKS of

Arizona, Mr. SOUDER, Ms. FOXX, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. CHOCOLA, Mr.

HOSTETTLER, Mrs. DRAKE, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr.

BRADY of Texas, Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas,

Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. ADERHOLT, Mr. KENNEDY of Minnesota, Mr.

FORBES, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. KING of New York, Mr.

BURTON of Indiana, Mr. DELAY, Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin, Mr. LATHAM,

Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. RENZI, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr.

NEUGEBAUER, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mrs. MUSGRAVE, Mr. MCCRERY,

Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky, Mr. PENCE, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. COSTELLO,

Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. BARRETT of South Carolina, Mr.

GOODLATTE, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. PUTNAM,

Mr. SULLIVAN, Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, Mr. WESTMORELAND, Miss

MCMORRIS, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mrs. EMERSON, Mr. INGLIS

of South Carolina, Mr. GOODE, Mr. NEY, Mr. MCINTYRE, Mr.

FOSSELLA, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. GUTKNECHT, and Mr. LAHOOD) introduced

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary


I748.AAB
60 

2

•HR 748 IH

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent the transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Interstate Abor5 tion Notification Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION

7 OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION.

8 Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting

9 after chapter 117 the following:

10 ‘‘CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF

11 MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CER12 TAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

13 ‘‘§ 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of

14 certain laws relating to abortion

15 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—

16 ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—Except as provided in sub17 section (b), whoever knowingly transports a minor

18 across a State line, with the intent that such minor

19 obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the

20 right of a parent under a law requiring parental in21 volvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in


I748.AAC
61 

3

•HR 748 IH

1 the State where the minor resides, shall be fined

2 under this title or imprisoned not more than one

3 year, or both.

4 ‘‘(2) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this

5 subsection, an abridgement of the right of a parent

6 occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the

7 minor, in a State other than the State where the

8 minor resides, without the parental consent or notifi9 cation, or the judicial authorization, that would have

10 been required by that law had the abortion been per11 formed in the State where the minor resides.

12 ‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—

13 ‘‘(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not

14 apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life

15 of the minor because her life was endangered by a

16 physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,

17 including a life endangering physical condition

18 caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

19 ‘‘(2) A minor transported in violation of this

20 section, and any parent of that minor, may not be

21 prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a

22 conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense

23 under section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this sec24 tion.


I748.AAD
62 

4

•HR 748 IH

1 ‘‘(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—It is an affirmative

2 defense to a prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action,

3 based on a violation of this section that the defendant rea4 sonably believed, based on information the defendant ob5 tained directly from a parent of the minor or other compel6 ling facts, that before the minor obtained the abortion, the

7 parental consent or notification, or judicial authorization,

8 took place that would have been required by the law re9 quiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion deci10 sion, had the abortion been performed in the State where

11 the minor resides.

12 ‘‘(d) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm

13 from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate

14 relief in a civil action.

15 ‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this

16 section—

17 ‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or pre18 scription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any

19 other substance or device intentionally to terminate

20 the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant

21 with an intention other than to increase the prob22 ability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health

23 of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead un24 born child who died as the result of a spontaneous


I748.AAE
63 

5

•HR 748 IH

1 abortion, accidental trauma or a criminal assault on

2 the pregnant female or her unborn child;

3 ‘‘(2) the term a ‘law requiring parental involve4 ment in a minor’s abortion decision’ means a law—

5 ‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is per6 formed on a minor, either—

7 ‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of,

8 a parent of that minor; or

9 ‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court; and

10 ‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alter11 native to the requirements described in sub12 paragraph (A) notification to or consent of any

13 person or entity who is not described in that

14 subparagraph;

15 ‘‘(3) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who

16 is not older than the maximum age requiring paren17 tal notification or consent, or proceedings in a State

18 court, under the law requiring parental involvement

19 in a minor’s abortion decision;

20 ‘‘(4) the term ‘parent’ means—

21 ‘‘(A) a parent or guardian;

22 ‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or

23 ‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis

24 who has care and control of the minor, and

25 with whom the minor regularly resides, who is


I748.AAF
64 

6

•HR 748 IH

1 designated by the law requiring parental in2 volvement in the minor’s abortion decision as a

3 person to whom notification, or from whom con4 sent, is required; and

5 ‘‘(5) the term ‘State’ includes the District of

6 Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or

7 other territory of the United States.’’.

8 SEC. 3. CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION.

9 Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting

10 after chapter 117A the following:

11 ‘‘CHAPTER 117B—CHILD INTERSTATE

12 ABORTION NOTIFICATION

13 ‘‘§ 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

14 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—

15 ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—A physician who knowingly

16 performs or induces an abortion on a minor in viola17 tion of the requirements of this section shall be fined

18 under this title or imprisoned not more than one

19 year, or both.

20 ‘‘(2) PARENTAL NOTIFICATION.—A physician

21 who performs or induces an abortion on a minor

22 who is a resident of a State other than the State in

23 which the abortion is performed must provide at

24 least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the minor

25 before performing the abortion. If actual notice to


I748.AAG
65 

7

•HR 748 IH

1 such parent is not possible after a reasonable effort

2 has been made, 24 hours constructive notice must be

3 given to a parent.

4 ‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The notification requirement of

5 subsection (a)(2) does not apply if—

6 ‘‘(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a

7 State that has a law in force requiring parental in8 volvement in a minor’s abortion decision and the

9 physician complies with the requirements of that

10 law;

11 ‘‘(2) the physician is presented with documenta12 tion showing with a reasonable degree of certainty

13 that a court in the minor’s State of residence has

14 waived any parental notification required by the laws

15 of that State, or has otherwise authorized that the

16 minor be allowed to procure an abortion;

17 ‘‘(3) the minor declares in a signed written

18 statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse, ne19 glect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an

20 abortion is performed on the minor, the physician

21 notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of

22 child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in

23 which the minor resides of the known or suspected

24 abuse or neglect; or


I748.AAH
66 

8

•HR 748 IH

1 ‘‘(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life

2 of the minor because her life was endangered by a

3 physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,

4 including a life endangering physical condition

5 caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

6 ‘‘(c) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm

7 from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate

8 relief in a civil action.

9 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this

10 section—

11 ‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or pre12 scription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any

13 other substance or device intentionally to terminate

14 the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant

15 with an intention other than to increase the prob16 ability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health

17 of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead un18 born child who died as the result of a spontaneous

19 abortion, accidental trauma, or a criminal assault on

20 the pregnant female or her unborn child;

21 ‘‘(2) the term ‘actual notice’ means the giving

22 of written notice directly, in person;

23 ‘‘(3) the term ‘constructive notice’ means notice

24 that is given by certified mail, return receipt re25 quested, restricted delivery to the last known adVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051

I748.AAI
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9

•HR 748 IH

1 dress of the person being notified, with delivery

2 deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on

3 the next day subsequent to mailing on which regular

4 mail delivery takes place, days on which mail is not

5 delivered excluded;

6 ‘‘(4) the term a ‘law requiring parental involve7 ment in a minor’s abortion decision’ means a law—

8 ‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is per9 formed on a minor, either—

10 ‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of,

11 a parent of that minor; or

12 ‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court;

13 ‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alter14 native to the requirements described in sub15 paragraph (A) notification to or consent of any

16 person or entity who is not described in that

17 subparagraph;

18 ‘‘(5) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who

19 is not older than 18 years and who is not emanci20 pated under State law;

21 ‘‘(6) the term ‘parent’ means—

22 ‘‘(A) a parent or guardian;

23 ‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or


I748.AAJ
68 

10

•HR 748 IH

1 ‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis

2 who has care and control of the minor, and

3 with whom the minor regularly resides;

4 as determined by State law;

5 ‘‘(7) the term ‘physician’ means a doctor of

6 medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by

7 the State in which such doctor practices medicine, or

8 any other person legally empowered under State law

9 to perform an abortion; and

10 ‘‘(8) the term ‘State’ includes the District of

11 Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or

12 other territory of the United States.’’.

13 SEC. 4. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE.

14 (a) The provisions of this Act shall be severable. If

15 any provision of this Act, or any application thereof, is

16 found unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect any

17 provision or application of the Act not so adjudicated.

18 (b) The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon

19 enactment.

Æ


I748.AAK
69 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Subcommittee amendment in 

the nature of a substitute, which the Members have before them, 

will be considered as read, considered as the original text for purposes of amendment, and open for amendment at any point. 

[The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:] 

70 H.L.C.

SUBCOMMITTEE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF

A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 748

[As ordered reported by the Subcommittee on the

Constitution on March 17, 2005]

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the

following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Interstate Abor3 tion Notification Act’’.

4 SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION

5 OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION.

6 Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting

7 after chapter 117 the following:

8 ‘‘CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF

9 MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CER10 TAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

11 ‘‘§ 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of

12 certain laws relating to abortion

13 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—

14 ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—Except as provided in sub15 section (b), whoever knowingly transports a minor

16 across a State line, with the intent that such minor

17 obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the


748A.AAB
71 

2

H.L.C.

1 right of a parent under a law requiring parental in2 volvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in

3 the State where the minor resides, shall be fined

4 under this title or imprisoned not more than one

5 year, or both.

6 ‘‘(2) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this

7 subsection, an abridgement of the right of a parent

8 occurs if an abortion is performed or induced on the

9 minor, in a State other than the State where the

10 minor resides, without the parental consent or notifi11 cation, or the judicial authorization, that would have

12 been required by that law had the abortion been per13 formed in the State where the minor resides.

14 ‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—

15 ‘‘(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not

16 apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life

17 of the minor because her life was endangered by a

18 physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,

19 including a life endangering physical condition

20 caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

21 ‘‘(2) A minor transported in violation of this

22 section, and any parent of that minor, may not be

23 prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a

24 conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense


748A.AAC
72 

3

H.L.C.

1 under section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this sec2 tion.

3 ‘‘(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—It is an affirmative

4 defense to a prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action,

5 based on a violation of this section that the defendant—

6 ‘‘(1) reasonably believed, based on information

7 the defendant obtained directly from a parent of the

8 minor, that before the minor obtained the abortion,

9 the parental consent or notification took place that

10 would have been required by the law requiring pa11 rental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision,

12 had the abortion been performed in the State where

13 the minor resides; or

14 ‘‘(2) was presented with documentation showing

15 with a reasonable degree of certainty that a court in

16 the minor’s State of residence waived any parental

17 notification required by the laws of that State, or

18 otherwise authorized that the minor be allowed to

19 procure an abortion.

20 ‘‘(d) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm

21 from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate

22 relief in a civil action.

23 ‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this

24 section—


748A.AAD
73 

4

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or pre2 scription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any

3 other substance or device intentionally to terminate

4 the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant

5 with an intention other than to increase the prob6 ability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health

7 of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead un8 born child who died as the result of a spontaneous

9 abortion, accidental trauma or a criminal assault on

10 the pregnant female or her unborn child;

11 ‘‘(2) the term a ‘law requiring parental involve12 ment in a minor’s abortion decision’ means a law—

13 ‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is per14 formed on a minor, either—

15 ‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of,

16 a parent of that minor; or

17 ‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court; and

18 ‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alter19 native to the requirements described in sub20 paragraph (A) notification to or consent of any

21 person or entity who is not described in that

22 subparagraph;

23 ‘‘(3) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who

24 is not older than the maximum age requiring paren25 tal notification or consent, or proceedings in a State


748A.AAE
74 

5

H.L.C.

1 court, under the law requiring parental involvement

2 in a minor’s abortion decision;

3 ‘‘(4) the term ‘parent’ means—

4 ‘‘(A) a parent or guardian;

5 ‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or

6 ‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis

7 who has care and control of the minor, and

8 with whom the minor regularly resides, who is

9 designated by the law requiring parental in10 volvement in the minor’s abortion decision as a

11 person to whom notification, or from whom con12 sent, is required; and

13 ‘‘(5) the term ‘State’ includes the District of

14 Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or

15 other territory of the United States.’’.

16 SEC. 3. CHILD INTERSTATE ABORTION NOTIFICATION.

17 Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting

18 after chapter 117A the following:

19 ‘‘CHAPTER 117B—CHILD INTERSTATE

20 ABORTION NOTIFICATION

21 ‘‘§ 2432. Child interstate abortion notification

22 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—

23 ‘‘(1) GENERALLY.—A physician who knowingly

24 performs or induces an abortion on a minor in viola25 tion of the requirements of this section shall be fined


748A.AAF
75 

6

H.L.C.

1 under this title or imprisoned not more than one

2 year, or both.

3 ‘‘(2) PARENTAL NOTIFICATION.—A physician

4 who performs or induces an abortion on a minor

5 who is a resident of a State other than the State in

6 which the abortion is performed must provide at

7 least 24 hours actual notice to a parent of the minor

8 before performing the abortion. If actual notice to

9 such parent is not possible after a reasonable effort

10 has been made, 24 hours constructive notice must be

11 given to a parent.

12 ‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The notification requirement of

13 subsection (a)(2) does not apply if—

14 ‘‘(1) the abortion is performed or induced in a

15 State that has a law in force requiring parental in16 volvement in a minor’s abortion decision and the

17 physician complies with the requirements of that

18 law;

19 ‘‘(2) the physician is presented with documenta20 tion showing with a reasonable degree of certainty

21 that a court in the minor’s State of residence has

22 waived any parental notification required by the laws

23 of that State, or has otherwise authorized that the

24 minor be allowed to procure an abortion;


748A.AAG
76 

7

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(3) the minor declares in a signed written

2 statement that she is the victim of sexual abuse, ne3 glect, or physical abuse by a parent, and, before an

4 abortion is performed on the minor, the physician

5 notifies the authorities specified to receive reports of

6 child abuse or neglect by the law of the State in

7 which the minor resides of the known or suspected

8 abuse or neglect; or

9 ‘‘(4) the abortion is necessary to save the life

10 of the minor because her life was endangered by a

11 physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness,

12 including a life endangering physical condition

13 caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

14 ‘‘(c) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers harm

15 from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate

16 relief in a civil action.

17 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this

18 section—

19 ‘‘(1) the term ‘abortion’ means the use or pre20 scription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any

21 other substance or device intentionally to terminate

22 the pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant

23 with an intention other than to increase the prob24 ability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health

25 of the child after live birth, or to remove a dead unVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051

748A.AAH
77 

8

H.L.C.

1 born child who died as the result of a spontaneous

2 abortion, accidental trauma, or a criminal assault on

3 the pregnant female or her unborn child;

4 ‘‘(2) the term ‘actual notice’ means the giving

5 of written notice directly, in person;

6 ‘‘(3) the term ‘constructive notice’ means notice

7 that is given by certified mail, return receipt re8 quested, restricted delivery to the last known ad9 dress of the person being notified, with delivery

10 deemed to have occurred 48 hours following noon on

11 the next day subsequent to mailing on which regular

12 mail delivery takes place, days on which mail is not

13 delivered excluded;

14 ‘‘(4) the term a ‘law requiring parental involve15 ment in a minor’s abortion decision’ means a law—

16 ‘‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is per17 formed on a minor, either—

18 ‘‘(i) the notification to, or consent of,

19 a parent of that minor; or

20 ‘‘(ii) proceedings in a State court;

21 ‘‘(B) that does not provide as an alter22 native to the requirements described in sub23 paragraph (A) notification to or consent of any

24 person or entity who is not described in that

25 subparagraph;


748A.AAI
78 

9

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(5) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who

2 is not older than 18 years and who is not emanci3 pated under State law;

4 ‘‘(6) the term ‘parent’ means—

5 ‘‘(A) a parent or guardian;

6 ‘‘(B) a legal custodian; or

7 ‘‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis

8 who has care and control of the minor, and

9 with whom the minor regularly resides;

10 as determined by State law;

11 ‘‘(7) the term ‘physician’ means a doctor of

12 medicine legally authorized to practice medicine by

13 the State in which such doctor practices medicine, or

14 any other person legally empowered under State law

15 to perform an abortion; and

16 ‘‘(8) the term ‘State’ includes the District of

17 Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or

18 other territory of the United States.’’.

19 SEC. 4. SEVERABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE.

20 (a) The provisions of this Act shall be severable. If

21 any provision of this Act, or any application thereof, is

22 found unconstitutional, that finding shall not affect any

23 provision or application of the Act not so adjudicated.

24 (b) The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon

25 enactment.


748A.AAJ
79 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, to strike the last word. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Constitution Subcommittee held a legislative hearing on the 

Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, referred to as CIANA, 

on March 3, 2005. The bill was marked up in the Subcommittee on 

March 17, where it was favorably reported with an amendment 

clarifying the criteria that defines the affirmative defense in Section 2 of the bill by a vote of 7 to 2. 

CIANA contains two sections, each of which creates a new Federal crime subject to a $100,000 fine or 1 year in jail, or both. 

The first section of CIANA makes it a Federal crime to transport 

a minor across State lines to obtain an abortion in another State 

in order to avoid a State law requiring parental involvement in a 

minor’s abortion decision. Twenty-three States currently have such 

parental involvement laws. The primary purpose of the first section 

of CIANA is to prevent people, including abusive boyfriends and 

older men who may have committed rape, from pressuring young 

girls into circumventing their State’s parental involvement laws by 

receiving secret, out-of-State abortions unknown to their parents. 

The second section of CIANA applies when a minor from one 

State crosses State lines to have an abortion in another State that 

does not have a State law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision. In such a case, CIANA makes it a Federal 

crime for the abortion provider to fail to give one of the minor’s 

parents, or a legal guardian if necessary, 24 hours’ notice, or notice 

by mail if needed, of the minor’s decision to have an abortion before 

the abortion is performed. The purpose of this section is to protect 

fundamental rights of parents to be involved in their children’s life 

by giving parents a chance to help their young daughters through 

difficult circumstances as best they can, including by giving a 

health care provider their daughter’s complete and accurate medical history to ensure that she receives safe medical care and any 

necessary follow-up treatment. 

CIANA does not give parents any veto power over a minor’s abortion decision. CIANA simply stands for the proposition that parents 

should be given the chance to help their minor daughters in what 

may be the most important and life-altering decision she will make 

in her life. 

CIANA includes carefully crafted exceptions. These exceptions include instances in which a life-threatening emergency may require 

that an abortion be provided immediately or the abortion provider 

is presented with court papers showing that the parental involvement law in effect in the minor’s State of residence has been complied with and where the minor states that she has been the victim 

of abuse by a parent and the abortion provider informs the appropriate State authorities of such abuse so further abuse can be prevented. 

A vivid and heart-rending example of why this legislation is so 

important comes from Marcia Carroll, who testified on behalf of 

CIANA during a Constitution Subcommittee hearing last month. In 

her testimony, she described how her daughter, without her knowlVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
80 

edge, was pressured by her boyfriend’s stepfather to cross State 

lines and have an abortion she did not want, and she now regrets 

it very deeply. Mrs. Carroll said, ‘‘My daughter does suffer. She has 

gone to counseling for this. I just know that she cries and she wishes she could redo everything, relive that day over. It’s just sad that 

it had to happen this way and this is what she had to go through. 

But she did want me to come here today and speak on her behalf. 

She said, ‘Mom, just one phone call is all it would have taken to 

stop this from happening.’ So she asked me to come here for her 

sake and for others girls’ safety to speak and let you know what 

was happening.’’ 

The parents of this country, such as Mrs. Carroll, should be 

given the chance to be involved in the decisions that their daughters make. CIANA would give them that chance. 

The House of Representatives has passed similar legislation by 

over 100-vote margins in recent Congresses, and parental notification laws are overwhelmingly supported by Americans. As recently 

as last month, 75 percent of over 1,500 registered voters surveyed 

favored requiring parental notification before a minor could get an 

abortion, with only 18 percent opposing parental notification. 

The provisions and notification requirements of CIANA are constitutional and constitute—and are consistent with Supreme Court 

precedent. The Supreme Court has described a parents’ right to 

control the care of their children as ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.’’ Further, the 

Court has upheld as constitutional a State parental notification 

statute that did not contain a broad health exception. That State 

statute—that State statute provided only for a judicial bypass exception, which is in this particular bill. 

I would urge my colleagues to join in supporting this much needed legislation that is overwhelmingly supported by the American 

people to protect both the health and safety of our minor children 

and parental rights. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

[Intervening business.] 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Consideration will now resume on 

H.R. 748, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Nadler, for an opening statement. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today we consider legislation that is at once another flagrant 

violation of the Constitution and an assault on the health and wellbeing of young women and their health care providers. Some States 

have chosen to enact parental notification or consent laws. Some, 

like mine, have considered this issue and decided it is not good for 

the welfare of young women and have declined to do so. And they 

have done this for various reasons. 

In some cases, the young woman may not be able to go to her 

parents and can turn only to a grandparent, a sibling, or a member 

of the clergy. Indeed, sometimes the parents may pose a threat to 

the life and health of the young woman. That’s what happened to 

Spring Adams, a 13-year-old from Idaho. She was shot to death by 

her father after he found out that she planned to terminate a pregnancy—a pregnancy caused by his act of incest. 

This bill also—and, by the way, in the case that Mr. Chabot mentioned, forgetting this law, that was a clear case of kidnapping— 

81 

kidnapping, coercion, violation of about half a dozen existing criminal laws. It is hardly a justification for this bill. 

This bill also uses a narrow definition of ‘‘medical emergency’’ 

that applies only where ‘‘an abortion was necessary to save the life 

of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 

itself.’’ That clearly falls far short of the Supreme Court’s requirement that any restriction on the right to choose must have an explicit exception to protect the life or health of the woman. 

There are many things far short of death that threaten the 

health of a young woman. She deserves prompt and professional 

medical care, and the Constitution still protects her right to receive 

that care. Whether or not the majority cares about the Constitution, this bill clearly violates that. Congress should not be tempted 

to play doctor. It is always bad medicine for women. 

In an ideal world, loving, supportive, and understanding families 

would join together to face these challenges. That’s what happens 

in the majority of cases, law or no law. But we do not live in a perfect world. Some parents are violent, some are rapists, some young 

people can turn only to their clergy, to a grandparent, a sibling, or 

some other trusted adult. We should not turn these people into 

criminals simply because they are trying to help a young woman 

in a dire situation. 

This bill is the wrong way to deal with a very real problem. It 

does not provide exceptions to protect a young woman’s health. It 

does not provide exceptions where a parent has raped a young 

woman. It even allows the rapist to sue a clergyperson or doctor 

who tries to help the daughter deal with the effects of that crime. 

This bill would also substitute the judgment of Congress for the 

judgment of people who live in States like New York which have 

chosen not to enact parental involvement laws. In fact, even where 

the young woman’s State of residence and the State in which the 

doctor is located have both decided not to enact such laws, this bill 

would impose a new Federal parental notification law that is more 

draconian and more unconstitutional than the laws of most States. 

Perhaps we should just disband our State legislatures and let the 

people in Washington decide these important family issues for us. 

Perhaps the same mind-set that had Congress pass a special law 

for Terry Schiavo when the Florida Legislature declined to do so 

is operating again. 

In some cases, young women—I’m sorry. I will urge my colleagues to reject this legislation on both constitutional and policy 

grounds. If only for the sake of humanity, I would urge you to join 

in providing the needed flexibility for the most difficult real-world 

cases involving the lives of real young women. We owe them at 

least that much. And we also owe our States the respect to let 

them have their own laws. 

This bill is the only situation I can think of since the Fugitive 

Slave Act of the 1850’s that would have a young person carry the 

law of one State on his back like a cross to another State, to enforce the law of the first State in the second State where it is not 

the law. I doubt the constitutionality of that, but there is also no 

good policy reason to impose on one State the law of another State. 

82 

I hope we will not enact this bill, though I know we will, and I 

know that the Supreme Court will throw it out as unconstitutional. 

So let the politics reign and never mind the policy. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, all Members’ 

opening statements will appear in the record at this point. 

Are there amendments? The gentlewoman from California, Ms. 

Waters, for what purpose do you seek recognition? 

Ms. WATERS. I have an amendment at the desk. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

Ms. WATERS. I have two amendments. I suppose this—I don’t 

know what the number would be, the first amendment. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have the amendments at the 

desk. 

Ms. WATERS. Those amendments should be at the desk, 748— 

here they are. We will take them to the desk right now. Just hold 

those. Take the two sets. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

Ms. WATERS. We have two amendments. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters. 

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) The prohibition of 

subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any other person who has permanent 

or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the 

minor, or by any health or family member.’’ 

[The amendment follows:] 

83 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 748

OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following:

1 ‘‘(3) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not

2 apply if the pregnancy is the result of sexual contact

3 with a parent or any other person who has perma4 nent or temporary care or custody or responsibility

5 for supervision of the minor, or by any household or

6 family member.


748B.AAB
84 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This amendment is being offered because I anticipated that another amendment that I had would not—may not be taken up. So this amendment—this is a Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act amendment. Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. I think we have a little 

problem here. 

This amendment, Mr. Chairman, is an amendment that simply 

recognizes that a young girl may become pregnant as a result of 

sexual contact with a parent or some other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision 

of the minor or by any household family member. 

Unfortunately, the bill as it is drafted does not take into consideration that when we are talking about parent notification, we’re 

asking—we’re asking a woman, a young girl in particular, to go to 

the very person who may be responsible for the pregnancy to—and 

somehow give consent or at least be notified they’re giving information to someone who may have been a party to the pregnancy. 

I think it was just mentioned by my colleague that in the case 

of Spring Adams, a 13-year-old sixth grader from Ohio, who was 

actually shot to death by her father after he learned that she was 

planning to terminate a pregnancy caused by his acts of incest. 

My amendment provides that the person should not have to go 

to perhaps the party that’s responsible for the pregnancy, and so 

I would ask for an aye vote on this amendment. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back? 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back? 

Ms. WATERS. I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Move to strike the last 

word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I rise in opposition to the amendment. 

I believe it should be defeated because it would trump the judicial 

bypass provision in place in States that allow judges to make caseby-case determinations on these issues and allow for alerting the 

appropriate authorities so abusers can be brought to justice. This 

amendment would allow abusers potentially to get off scot free and 

doom the victims of sexual abuse to even more abuse. If the girl 

is afraid to tell her parents of the abortion for fear of past or future 

sexual abuse, she may utilize the judicial bypass process which is 

available in her State. The offense of transporting a minor across 

a State line does not apply if the girl has been granted a judicial 

bypass and the transporter obtained information beforehand that 

the judicial authorization took place. 

This amendment would actually enable potentially a live-in foster brother or uncle or grandfather who has been sexually abusing 

the minor girl to transport her across a State line for the purpose 

of abridging a parent’s right to know. So we think the judicial bypass procedure that’s in effect in most States should be permitted 

to rule and, therefore, I would strongly oppose this amendment. 

85 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee yield for a question? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman move to strike 

the last word? Because—— 

Mr. NADLER. I do indeed. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman—— 

Mr. NADLER. I hate that last word. I move to strike it. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Well, the last word is ‘‘member.’’ The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a question, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. I will yield. 

Mr. NADLER. I was listening to your objection to this amendment, 

and you said that any other—that this would allow a household 

member to take—to get around this bill, essentially. That was your 

objection to the amendment. 

Mr. CHABOT. Among others. The bypass procedure is already in 

effect to protect the girl’s rights, and this I think just muddies up 

the waters. 

Mr. NADLER. Would you still object to the amendment if the last 

phrase was struck from the amendment and it simply said, ‘‘The 

prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy is the 

result of sexual contact with a parent or any other person who has 

permanent or temporary care or custody of responsibility...’’? In 

other words, you don’t have to notify the parent who committed 

the—who created the pregnancy. That’s all it applies to. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, it trumps back—it would trump the bypass 

procedure, which is already in process. I think the bill as currently 

written—— 

Mr. NADLER. But forgetting the bypass, I don’t understand. If a 

stepfather, let’s say, or a father committed incest, and let’s say the 

mother wasn’t alive, so the stepfather committed incest—or the father committed incest, he’s the only person who could give parental 

consent notification, he’s the person you don’t want to go to, what’s 

the point of the judicial bypass? 

Mr. CHABOT. Taking back my time—— 

Mr. NADLER. It’s my time. You can—I yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Oh, did you yield? 

Mr. NADLER. I yield, yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. The bypass procedure I think protects the 

young girl in that particular circumstance, and I think it’s appropriate. 

Mr. NADLER. But I still don’t understand. Let’s assume it does. 

I mean, there are a lot of problems with the bypass procedure. But 

even if it did, why waste the court’s time when the only person 

you’re bypassing is the person who committed incest? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’m not sure I understand your point. 

Mr. NADLER. If the father committed incest and caused the pregnancy, if the mother is not alive, then the only person you’re bypassing is the father who committed the incest and caused the 

86 

pregnancy. Why bother with that? Why waste the court’s time? 

Why not just—I mean, under no circumstances—— 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. Let me just say, under no circumstances presumably should you require parental notification or involvement if the 

parent committed a crime. Yes, I yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. Sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. We want the State bypass procedure to be able to 

work. The court makes that decision, and we think that the court 

is the appropriate place for that decision to be made. 

Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming my time, I just think this illustrates 

how rigid this bill is, even if that amendment would not be accepted under those circumstances. 

I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those in 

favor will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to. 

Are there further—— 

Ms. WATERS. I have another amendment, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Waters. 

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) The prohibitions of 

this section do not apply with respect to an abortion where the 

pregnancy resulted from incest.’’ 

[The amendment follows:] 

87 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 748

OFFERED BY MS. WATERS

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following:

1 ‘‘(3) The prohibitions of this section do not

2 apply with respect to an abortion where the preg3 nancy resulted from incest.


748C.AAB
88 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman and Members, the first amendment really related 

to a pregnancy as a result of maybe a parent or other household 

members, not necessarily a relative. This one is specific to incest, 

and certainly as we take a look, no matter what side of the issue 

you’re on relative to notification, certainly we would not want to 

place a young person, a young woman in the position of having to 

talk with a relative or a parent who’s responsible for the pregnancy. So I would hope that the focus this time would be on a father in particular who we have seen involved in these kind of cases 

and not to have to ask a young lady to share this information, to 

seek support just to know what is happening, when, in fact, they’re 

planning on terminating the pregnancy. I would ask for an aye 

vote. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back? 

Ms. WATERS. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won’t take the 5 minutes. I’ll be very brief. 

Essentially, the response would be the same. In essence, it has 

the same substance as the amendment that we just discussed. The 

judicial bypass procedure that’s available in the States to protect 

the young girl in one of these situations is what the protection is. 

There’s no reason to adopt this amendment; therefore, I’d oppose 

it. 

I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those in 

favor will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment 

is not agreed to. 

Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments. The first 

is Nadler 008. I don’t have eight. I only have two, but 008. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report Nadler 008. 

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler. Page 

3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) Any adult who would be 

subject to prosecution under this Act’’—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

The CLERK.—‘‘who can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that he or she has a reasonable belief that compliance 

with the judicial bypass procedure of the minor’s State of resident 

would either—(A) compromise the minor’s intent to maintain confidentiality with respect to her choice to terminate a pregnancy; or 

(B) be futile because the judicial bypass procedure of the minor’s 

State of residence is unavailable’’—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

89 

The CLERK.—‘‘or ineffective, may apply to a judge of the United 

States District Court in the district in which the minor resides for 

a waiver of the application’’—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to waive 

the reading of the amendment. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent to 

amend the amendment by removing in line 3 the words ‘‘he or she 

has a reasonable belief that...’’ 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the reading of the 

amendment—further reading of the amendment is waived. Is there 

any objection to deleting the language referred to by the gentleman 

from New York? 

[No response.] 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the language is 

deleted, and the gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. 

[The amendment follows:] 

90 


748D.eps
91 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would try to make the bill begin 

to conform to real-world situations. It would allow an adult who, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, can show that a judicial bypass 

procedure in the minor’s State is unavailable. As the testimony we 

received on this bill indicates is sometimes the case, or where a judicial bypass procedure in the minor’s home State might compromise her privacy, the minor would be allowed to go to the Federal district court to seek the required waiver. 

In other words, if you could show by a preponderance of the evidence that going for a judicial district waiver in the State court 

would compromise the privacy or that that is an illusory remedy 

because the remedy is not really available in the State court, you 

could go and apply to the Federal district court for the waiver 

based on the same grounds that you would seek in the State court. 

It does not eliminate—this bill does not—this amendment, rather, does not eliminate the waiver requirement. It simply allows the 

minor to avoid the kinds of real-world problems that exist out there 

in the real world, where local judges, some local judges have made 

clear they will never grant a bypass, or where the local judge is so 

cozy with the young woman’s parents that confidentiality would be 

a joke, sometimes with catastrophic results. 

I know that my colleagues won’t mind removing a small number 

of these cases from State court to Federal court. We seem to make 

a habit of doing that in this Committee. Indeed, the Republican 

leadership dragged us all back from Washington to yank a case out 

of State court into Federal court a few weeks ago. So I hope this 

amendment should not be a problem. 

I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to 

this amendment. The amendment, I believe, should be defeated because it would undermine State judicial bypass proceedings, once 

again. If the State’s judicial bypass procedure, in fact, fails to effectively maintain a pregnant minor’s confidentiality or is unavailable 

or ineffective, under the terms of the amendment, then that State’s 

judicial bypass system would be held unconstitutional under current case law and not enforced under CIANA. CIANA merely reinforces constitutional State parental involvement laws. If a State’s 

parental involvement law is held unconstitutional, CIANA will not 

have any effect on the operation of that State’s laws. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a question? 

Mr. CHABOT. Not at this time. For example, if there are only two 

judges in an entire State willing to hear judicial bypass proceedings, that State’s parental involvement law would be found unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent, which requires the State to provide a minor the opportunity to seek a judicial bypass with ‘‘sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.’’ That’s existing law. This fact 

is illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood 

League v. Bellotti. In that case, the court held that the plaintiffs 

92 

could successfully challenge the State’s judicial bypass procedures 

if they could present ‘‘proof of a systematic failure to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious, practical manner.’’ 

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the lower court so 

that the plaintiffs could present evidence that, among other things, 

judges were de facto unavailable to hear minors’ abortion petitions 

or were avoided for reasons of hostility, as the gentleman mentioned before. 

The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that a constitutional challenge may be brought for a State’s systematic failure to provide an 

expeditious judicial bypass. Opponents of this legislation can’t have 

it both ways by arguing on the one hand that the State law must 

always govern within its State boundaries, regardless of interstate 

effects, and on the other hand that States can’t be trusted to enact 

sufficient judicial bypass laws. 

So for those reasons, I would strongly oppose this amendment, 

and if the gentleman would like me to yield, I’ll yield. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The fact is it’s hard to see how a constitutional challenge to a situation, which may, in fact, only exist 

in the given case where the local judge is a friend of the parents, 

may not be a totally unconstitutional situation Statewide. But, in 

any event, it’s hard to see how a constitutional challenge could be 

taken without getting into the second and third trimester of pregnancy. I mean, the fact is why not let a Federal court judge whether, in fact, the judicial bypass is real on an expeditious basis, which 

is all this amendment says. 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time, I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 

favor will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it. 

Mr. NADLER. A rollcall vote. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A rollcall is requested. Those in 

favor of the Nadler amendment will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. No. 

93 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith? 

94 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish 

to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Green? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further Members who 

wish to either cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report—the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast 

or change their votes? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Watt? 

Mr. WATT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Anybody else who wishes to cast or 

change their votes? If not, the clerk will try again to report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 16 noes. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed 

to. 

Are there further amendments? 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment 

at the desk, number 001. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Nadler. Page 

3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to conduct by a grandparent 

or adult sibling of the minor.’’ 

[The amendment follows:] 

95 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 748

OFFERED BY MR. NADLER

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following:

1 ‘‘(3) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not

2 apply with respect to conduct by a grandparent or

3 adult sibling of the minor.


748E.AAB
96 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, this amendment would simply exempt a grandparent or adult sibling from the criminal and civil penalties in this 

bill. These cases do not involve kidnapping, not when it’s involved 

with a grandparent or brother or sister of the young woman having 

the abortion. These cases do not involve someone from outside the 

family intruding into basic family decisions. They do allow a responsible adult member of the family to intervene in cases involving serious family crises, such as rape, incest, family violence, or 

some other terrible problem that will sometimes arise. 

I realize the bill does not have—does have a mandatory reporting 

requirement for crimes. This does not deal with dangers that are 

not crimes of the kind described in the bill. It does not deal with 

threats. It does not deal with the prospect of violence. The bill does 

not deal with a young person who is away at school and seeks the 

support of the nearest relative, perhaps a grandparent. 

The bill is really an assault on families and the ability of families 

to deal with their problems to the best of their ability. It presumes 

that Congress knows best just how each difficult family situation 

must be resolved, even within the family. 

I do not think Congress possesses that kind of wisdom, although 

it may indeed possess that kind of arrogance. Let us at least not 

turn caring grandparents or siblings into criminals. Let us not 

allow an abusive father to sue his own mother if she tries to intervene and help. We should try to show just a little humanity and 

perhaps a little humility. And, therefore, I urge the adoption of this 

amendment. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. I move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This amendment would codify the circumvention of parental involvement, and the overwhelming majority of Americans support 

parental involvement. In-laws and aunts and uncles and cousins 

and siblings or even priests don’t have the authority now to authorize a medical procedure for a minor child or even ear piercing or 

the dispensing of aspirin at school. So why should a fundamental 

parental right be thrown aside for the abortion procedure alone? 

Anyone supporting this amendment must have a fundamental 

problem with underlying State laws that allow only parents to 

grant consent for this medical procedure. 

This amendment would sever the essential parental-child relationship. Grandparents and adult siblings are not parents. It’s that 

simple. It’s instructive that the Supreme Court has always held 

that this important duty to ensure and provide for the care and 

nurture of minor children lies only with parents, a conclusion 

which arises from the traditional legal recognition that natural 

bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 

own children. 

As Justices O’Connor and Kennedy and Souter observed in 

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, parental consent and notification 

97 

laws related to abortion are based on a quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents 

and that children will often not realize that their parents have 

their best interests at heart. Parents, not anyone else, know and 

can provide their dependent minor children’s complete and accurate medical histories, for example. Before children undergo medical procedures, parents are required to provide the critical information. Without that medical history, an abortion could be a devastating event in a child’s health. 

As the Supreme Court has made clear, the medical, emotional, 

and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can 

be lasting. That is particularly so when the patient is immature. 

An adequate medical and psychological case history is important to 

the physician. Parents can provide medical and psychological data, 

refer the physician to other sources of medical history such as a 

family physician, and authorizes family physicians to give relevant 

data. That’s what the Supreme Court stated. 

So I would strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, the child can go across the State lines with assistance or without assistance. This just says if they’ve got the assistance of the grandparent or adult sibling that you’re not—that that 

not be a crime. And even if the prosecutor won’t prosecute, you 

don’t want civil suits involving family members resulting from a 

violation of this section. 

I would hope that these—these family decisions are bad enough. 

I know the majority in Congress don’t mind involving themselves 

in family decisions and encouraging parents and in-laws to sue 

each other. But we ought not—I think the poll suggested that 80 

percent of the public didn’t appreciate what we did a couple of 

weeks ago, and having civil suits against family members shouldn’t 

be encouraged in this bill. So I would hope that we would adopt 

this amendment, and I will yield to the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and 

I obviously agree with him. And I would want to comment on what 

the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee said when he 

said most Americans or a majority, something to that effect, approve of parental notification and consent laws. That may be. But 

I don’t think most Americans approve of criminalizing the brother 

or sister or grandparent who helps someone get an abortion if that 

abortion resulted from incest. And that’s what we’re talking about 

in this amendment. 

The rhetoric used for this bill basically says that there is—that 

these evil abortion promoters or abortion clinic owners are making 

an industry of spiriting young women across State lines for the 

purpose of evading the parental notification requirement. Well, I 

don’t think that’s true. But even if it were, what this amendment 

is talking about is not anybody connected with an abortion clinic 

or anybody else. It’s a grandparent or a brother or a sister—not a 

cousin, not an uncle or an aunt, but a grandparent or a brother or 

a sister who’s motivated presumably by concern for the welfare of 

98 

the minor and who agrees with the minor that in this particular 

case—not in most cases perhaps, but in this particular case, because of incest, because of parental hostility, because of parental 

drunkenness, for whatever reason, you can’t tell or involve the parent. And maybe that judgment is correct, and maybe they haven’t 

the sophistication to go for judicial bypass. 

All this would say is you don’t make the sibling, the brother or 

the sister, or the grandparent a criminal in this situation where 

they may very well be right about the welfare of the minor. And, 

therefore, it’s very different from the rest of the bill. Even if you 

agree with the rest of the bill, even if you agree with the underlying reasoning of parental involvement, you shouldn’t make a 

criminal out of a sibling or a grandparent who helps the minor. 

That’s all this amendment says, and anyone who respects the 

family and family values will support this amendment, because although we do accord primacy to the parents, not 100 percent of the 

time, not if the parent is drunk and hostile and violent, not if the 

parent committed incest, not in a number of other cases. And we 

can’t know those situations, but the sibling or the grandparent can. 

I yield—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. CONYERS. I wanted to take this time to put my opening 

statement in the record, and I wanted to commend the gentleman 

from New York, the gentleman from Virginia, and the gentlelady 

from California, who are offering opportunities for us to correct legislation that seems unconstitutional in at least three aspects. It’s 

hard for me to imagine that the other body is going to go very far 

with a measure that offers nine different scenarios of parental notice that will be imposed on doctors and women across this Nation. 

This is a terrible problem that we’re dealing with here, dysfunctional families, child abuse, teen pregnancies, and I think we need 

to be far more careful in telling women, young women facing this 

situation, who they must confide in and that the Constitution probably won’t apply to them. 

I ask unanimous consent to have my statement offered into the 

record. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in 

favor will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it. The—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York? 

Mr. NADLER. I ask the ayes and nays. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A rollcall will be ordered. The question is on agreeing to the Nadler amendment. Those in favor will 

as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the 

clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. No. 

99 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake? 

Mr. FLAKE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney? 

Mr. FEENEY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

100 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

Mr. WEXLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish 

to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon? 

Mr. CANNON. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber 

who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed 

to. 

Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, 

Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 748, offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) The prohibitions of this section do not apply with respect to conduct by taxi 

drivers, bus drivers, or others in the business of professional transport.’’ 

[The amendment follows:] 

101 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very simple 

amendment. It will just immunize taxicab drivers and others who 

transport minors under this Act. The bill as written—the bill as 

written would make the taxicab driver a criminal if they do the 

simple task of responding to a call and even if they are not aware 

that the minor is evading a State’s consent laws. If the minor hops 

in the cab and says, ‘‘Take me to the abortion clinic,’’ that would 

make—then the cab driver complies with that direction and accepts 

the fee for the job, that taxicab driver would be in violation of this 

section. 

If you read the language of the bill, page 1 of the Subcommittee 

amendment in the nature of a substitute, it says that ‘‘whoever 

knowingly transports a minor across a State line, with the intent 

that such minor obtain an abortion,’’ and then it clearly says—you 

don’t have to know whether you’re evading parental consent laws 

or not because it says, ‘‘and thereby in fact abridges the right of 

a parent under a law requiring parental involvement...shall be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.’’ 

Now, even if the prosecutor uses intelligent prosecutorial discretion and decides not to prosecute the taxicab driver, the fact is that 

the bill allows civil liability so that the parents can sue the taxicab 

driver for civil damages. 

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that—I don’t think that’s the intent 

of the bill. I would hope that we would exclude taxicab drivers, bus 

drivers, and others who might take someone across a State line 

and technically violate this section. I would hope that we would not 

rope them in and allow parents to sue them to get money if they 

violate—if they violate this section. And I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr> 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move in—I rise in opposition to this amendment. 

First, taxicab drivers are not generally liable under this bill, 

which allows for the conviction of an individual who knowingly 

transports a minor across a State line with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion. So that’s the point: with the intent 

that they obtain the abortion. Although a taxicab driver may have 


748F.eps
102 

the knowledge that the minor that he or she is transporting will 

obtain an abortion as soon as she arrives at her destination, his or 

her intent is not that the minor obtain an abortion; rather, it’s to 

transport the minor to the destination of her choice, whether it’s 

an abortion clinic or a shopping mall. In other words, the taxicab 

driver’s reason for transporting the minor is to receive the fare, not 

to ensure that she obtains an abortion. So a taxicab driver will not 

generally have the requisite intent necessary for prosecution under 

the bill. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. So the amendment is, in my view, unnecessary. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’d be happy to yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. If the young lady asks the cab driver to ‘‘Take me to 

the abortion clinic,’’ wouldn’t he then know what the deal is? 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time, that’s not his purpose for 

transporting her there for the purpose of her getting an abortion. 

It’s to get his fare. 

Now, if—and I know that the gentleman—— 

Mr. SCOTT. I’m reading the bill. 

Mr. CHABOT. Excuse me? 

Mr. SCOTT. I’m reading the bill. 

Mr. CHABOT. That’s fine. But it’s the purpose of—now, if the taxicab driver had impregnated the girl and, therefore, he was taking 

her there with the intent that she obtain an abortion, then he may 

be prosecutable under this particular bill. But if he is taking her 

there for the purpose of obtaining a fare and transporting her 

wherever she wants to go, I cannot imagine that he would be prosecuted under this bill. So I think your amendment is just unnecessary. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’d be happy to yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. It says ‘‘with the intent that such minor obtain an 

abortion.’’ The minor announces that she’s going to the abortion 

clinic, and it doesn’t say anything about purpose. 

Mr. CHABOT. Sure, it does. It says ‘‘with the’’—reclaiming my 

time, it says for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. If he transports her there with the intention that she obtain an abortion, then 

he may be prosecutable. But that’s not his intention. His intention 

is to obtain a fare. He would take her to the movie theater or the 

mall to get her nails done or anything else. He’s not going to be 

prosecutable because of the place that she intends to go. And so I 

think your amendment is just unnecessary, and I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, just continuing this 

little dialogue with Mr. Chabot, it doesn’t say anything about purpose. It says ‘‘with the intent that such minor obtain an abortion.’’ 

The gentleman may be correct. The gentleman may be correct that 

a court might read that as saying, well, he would have taken her, 

you know, for any purpose and he didn’t have the intent. 

On the other hand, a court might read it as saying, well, since 

she said, ‘‘Take me to the ABC Abortion Clinic,’’ he knew damn 

well why she was going there, and that was his intent. So my—— 

103 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman—— 

Mr. NADLER. So my question is: If it’s unnecessary, why not 

make it explicit? What’s the harm of the amendment? Make it 

clear, and then we don’t have to guess. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. Sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. Before it even gets to the court or the judge, the 

prosecutor would have to look at this case, read the law, and believe—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, reclaiming my time, there’s a civil lawsuit, 

too. You don’t need a prosecutor. This bill provides for a civil lawsuit. So my question, which I will yield again to you, is: I understand your intent in the way the bill is written. I think our intent 

is the same. We don’t like the bill, but the intent for this purpose 

is the same. So why not take this amendment and make it clear. 

Nobody has to guess. I yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Again, the cab driver wouldn’t have the requisite 

criminal intent under the law, and relative to a civil case—I mean, 

that’s what the courts are for in this country. Hopefully, in most 

cases, the courts exercise—— 

Mr. NADLER. But, again, I’ll ask: Why not make it clear that 

that’s what you mean? 

Mr. CHABOT. I think it’s unnecessary. I think the bill—— 

Mr. NADLER. But is it harmful? Why not make it clear? 

Mr. CHABOT. All your amendments that are offered on your side 

could make the bill better, arguably on your side. 

Mr. NADLER. No, no, no. My question—but I’m going to ask you 

this again, Steve. Most of the amendments we offer change the bill 

substantively. You’re saying this amendment doesn’t change the 

bill substantively. I’m saying that, well, it makes clear what you 

say is the intent. So why not take it? 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ve already said my principal argument, but I’ll 

just give you another one. 

You could potentially immunize guilty cab drivers if there were 

those out there that were involved in some sort of racket to— 

maybe they were some sort of agent for the abortion clinic. Or, 

again, as I said before, maybe the cab driver impregnated the girl 

to begin with. 

Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming—— 

Mr. CHABOT. There are many instances, and we wouldn’t want 

to immunize—— 

Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming my time, I yield to the gentleman from 

Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

It says, ‘‘whoever knowingly transports a minor across a State line, 

with the intent that such minor obtain an abortion,’’ the minor has 

already announced where she’s going and, in fact, could announce 

what she’s going to do when she gets there. They could get involved—they can get involved in a conversation. 

When the parents find out, the parents are going to be mad and 

are going to be looking for somebody to sue. And when they find 

out it was a taxicab driver with deep pockets, that’s who they’re 

going to sue. And that’s what this bill allows, and I don’t think 

104 

that’s right. Maybe that’s the intent that you’re going to make sure 

that no taxicab driver, no bus driver, nobody else is going to take 

the minor across State lines. On the way, if the minor is with 

somebody, the taxicab driver may hear the conversation and learn 

what the purpose of the trip is, and when the parents find out, 

they’re going to get sued, and deep pockets. And those trial lawyers 

that some Members of this Committee don’t like are going to get 

a fee for suing them. 

Mr. BACHUS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. It’s the gentleman from New York’s time. I yield 

back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Did you say a taxicab driver—— 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is yielding—— 

Mr. BACHUS.—with deep pockets? [Laughter.] 

Mr. NADLER. I think he meant that under the doctrine of agency, 

the taxicab driving company. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Well, the time still belongs to 

the gentleman from Virginia, if he wishes to—the question is 

on—— 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor 

will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it 

Mr. SCOTT. Recorded vote. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A recorded vote is requested and 

will be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott amendment will as your 

names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will 

call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

105 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney? 

Mr. FEENEY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

Mr. WEXLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no. 

106 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber 

who wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast 

or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will try again. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 17 noes. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed 

to. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments? The 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. It’s 

marked number 3. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following: ‘‘(3) Limitation on Prosecution—No prosecution can be brought with respect to 

a violation of this section other than against the person committing 

the offense in the first degree.’’ 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is 

considered as read. 

[The amendment follows:] 

107 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia will be 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would prohibit prosecutions under Section 2 and 3 of the criminal code. It would require the person actually committing the offense—the criminal 

code Sections 2 and 3 say that if you’re a—after the fact, aiding 

and abetting, conspiracy, all get prosecuted similar to the person 

actually committing the crime. This could be a grandmother, sister, 

or friend who offers care and comfort after the fact, someone arranging for transportation back to the—back home, all of this, even 

ministers and relatives who want to ensure that the minor undergoes a safe procedure and comes home unharmed would be considered criminals and subject to civil liability. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would not expand this 

bill to accessories after the fact, those who may be involved as technically conspirators, aiding and abetting, as principals in the first 

degree, not only subject to criminal liability but also to civil liability. I would hope we would adopt the amendment. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman yield back? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back. I’m sorry. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be brief. I rise in opposition to this amendment. 

The amendment should be defeated because it would, for example, exempt from prosecution a sexual predator who pays another 

to transport a young girl across State lines in order to circumvent 


748G.eps
108 

parental involvement laws and destroy evidence of his sexual 

crimes. CIANA contains an exception for the transported minor 

and her parents so that they cannot be prosecuted or sued. 

As to other people, this amendment would excuse—it would create an abortion exception to exclude them from general Federal 

criminal laws and such an exemption is entirely unwarranted. The 

amendment would violate fundamental rules that hold aiders and 

abettors equally responsible for their crimes, and that is wrong and 

that is why I oppose this amendment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’d be happy to yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. If someone offers aid and comfort after the fact, 

would they be subject to civil liability under the bill? 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ll yield, yes. 

Mr. BACHUS. They would not be responsible because they would 

not be transporting the child for the purpose of gaining an abortion. She would have already had an abortion. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you’ll yield. The civil liability occurs—attaches 

when you’ve violated the law. This is a criminal statute. You’ve violated the law—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Well, you’d have to violate the law by transporting 

her across a State line to obtain an abortion. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, reclaiming—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Not after the fact—— 

Mr. CHABOT.—my time—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Aiding and abetting is a crime. 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Aiding and abetting—— 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman 

from Ohio, who wants it back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, reclaiming my time, the gentleman’s amendment refers to a criminal prosecution, and, therefore, that’s what 

you’re talking about. So it would depend upon whether you had the 

necessary criminal intent to have violated this statute, this law. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ll yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if you cannot be criminally prosecuted, you can’t 

be exposed to civil liability. That’s the whole point of the amendment, to get people from—if you’re providing aid and comfort after 

the fact, the criminal code allows you to be prosecuted. And if you 

can be prosecuted, you’re civilly liable. If you can’t be prosecuted, 

you’re not civilly liable under the bill. What I’m trying to do is get 

those who may be offering aid and comfort after the fact—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SCOTT.—from under the provisions of the bill. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs—— 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time, I’ll yield to the gentleman 

from—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, that analogy doesn’t fly under this 

bill. You have to—to be guilty, you have to aid and abet someone 

to cross State lines for the purpose of getting a divorce—I mean 

getting an abortion. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

109 

Mr. BACHUS. After the fact, you’re not aid—when you’re helping 

them return home, you’re not in any way aiding and abetting them 

in gaining—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ll reclaim my time, and I’ll yield to the gentleman 

from Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, what about accessory after the fact? 

Mr. BACHUS. How could you be an accessory after the fact when 

you—— 

Mr. CHABOT. Reclaiming my time, I don’t think it’s relevant to 

this, the bill, and I yield back. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment 

offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor 

will say aye? Opposed, no? 

The noes appear to have it. The gentleman—a rollcall will be ordered. Those in favor of the Scott of Virginia amendment will as 

your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk 

will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

110 

Mr. KING. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney? 

Mr. FEENEY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast 

or change their votes? The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Flake? 

Mr. FLAKE. No. 

111 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Green? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast 

or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report? 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 18 noes. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed 

to. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments? The 

gentlewoman from Texas? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments that 

I’d like to take en bloc, please, 005 and 006. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendments. 

The CLERK. Amendments to H.R. 748, offered by Ms. Jackson 

Lee. Page 3, after line 2, insert the following—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent—— 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Let’s take a look at them first. 

The CLERK. ‘‘(3) The prohibitions of this section do not apply with 

respect to conduct by clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first 

cousins.’’ 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendments 

are considered as read. And without objection, the amendments are 

considered en bloc. 

[The amendments follow:] 

112 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 748

OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON LEE

Page 3, after line 2, insert the following:

1 ‘‘(3) The prohibitions of this section do not

2 apply with respect to conduct by clergy, godparents,

3 aunts, uncles, or first cousins.


748H.AAB
113 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 748

OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON LEE

Add at the end the following:

1 SEC. 4. STUDY BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.

2 The General Accounting Office shall conduct a study

3 detailing the impact of the number of unsafe and illegal

4 abortions performed on minors who would be affected by

5 this law, and report to Congress the results of that study

6 within 1 year of the enactment of this Act.


748I.AAB
114 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentlewoman from Texas is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. I’m hoping that we can 

find some collegiate spirit and recognize the importance of a young 

woman receiving counsel when she makes this significant decision. 

Frankly, I believe that we would honor the integrity of the Constitution if we would allow a young woman her relationship with 

her God and her counsel to help her make these decisions. 

My amendment, the first amendment in the en bloc, allows for 

the young woman to consult with clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, 

or first cousins, and that conduct by those individuals would not be 

criminalized. It’s a very simple amendment but necessary because 

it helps to eliminate the excessive punitive nature of this legislation. A young woman should not lose her right to seek counsel and 

guidance from a member of the clergy, her godparent, or the family 

member enumerated in the text of the amendment. 

Twenty-three States follow all provisions of the Child Custody 

Protection Act which make it a Federal crime for an adult to accompany a minor across State lines. Ten States have a provision 

that requires some parental notice, but other adults may be notified. And 17 States have no law restricting a woman’s access to 

abortion in this case. The law, of course, is confused, and I think 

it’s inappropriate for the Federal law to intrude on States who do 

not have any prohibition whatsoever. This allows for an expanded 

list of individuals not to be criminalized, and I ask my colleagues 

to support it. 

A second amendment deals with asking for a GAO study detailing the impact of the number of unsafe and illegal abortions performed on minors who would be affected by this law and report to 

Congress the results of that study within a year of the enactment 

of this law. This law is suggested to be corrective. I would argue 

that it’s going to increase the number of unsafe abortions because 

young women are going to be forced into the back alleys again because they cannot find a way in an open way to counsel with individuals, to seek clergy support, and, frankly, it is going to take us 

back as opposed to take us further. 

I’d ask my colleagues to support these amendments, and I yield 

my time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Move to strike the last word. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me address the 

study first. I would oppose both. The amendment I believe should 

be defeated because there is no evidence that these laws have led 

to an increase in illegal abortions. During the Committee testimony, we had one of our witnesses, Professor Teresa Stanton 

Collett. She testified that—and I will quote—‘‘Parental involvement 

laws are on the books in over two-thirds of the States, some for 

over 20 years, and there’s almost no case where it’s been established that these laws led to parental abuse or to self-inflicted injury, and there’s no evidence that these laws have led to an increase in illegal abortions.’’ I don’t think the study is necessary. 

115 

Now, relative to the grandparents and aunts and uncles and the 

rest, I already stated previously so I’m not going to go into as much 

detail, but the folks mentioned in the amendment, they don’t have 

the authority now to authorize any medical procedure for a minor 

child. I mean, even ear piercings or anything else, disbursing of aspirin, any of those types of things, has to be the parents who do 

this. So there’s no reason that we can make something that can be 

so significant to this child’s life or teenager’s life as having an abortion that the parents shouldn’t be involved. The parents have the 

best interest of the children involved. We’ve got the bypass procedure if you have a bad parent, as has been argued time and again 

on the other side. So there’s really no reason for this amendment. 

I oppose it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’d be happy to yield. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman very much, and I really 

appreciate how you have sought to engage. 

Let me just say with respect to the first amendment, we should 

expand rights, not deny rights. It’s interesting in the most recent 

case we’re willing—even though it was by law that Terry Schiavo 

had the guardianship of her spouse, we denied parental rights. Obviously, she was an adult. 

In this instance, however, you have three different—three different positions that States have taken: strict rules, less strict, and 

no rules. This is a Federal law that you are impacting on these 

States, and there should be flexibility. Clergy should not be denied. 

On the study, the reason for the study is that this is a new Federal law that will impact more greatly and more severely, and, 

therefore, I believe it’s important to determine how many illegal 

abortions will occur because of this law. We want to do right, I 

would assume, and I’d hope my colleagues with support both 

amendments. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, reclaiming my time, as I stated before, during 

the hearing we had experts who indicated that it was not felt that 

there would be an increase in illegal abortions. And, secondly, 

again, I just want to reiterate that we believe that parents are the 

people that are best in a position to make these types of decisions 

for their minor children, not the aunts or uncles or grandparents 

or taxidrivers or anybody else. And I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendments 

offered by the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, en bloc. 

Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The noes appear to have it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, a rollcall. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A rollcall is ordered. Those in favor 

of the Jackson Lee amendments en bloc will as your names are 

called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the 

roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith? 

116 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

Mr. CANNON. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye. 

117 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

Mr. WEXLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber 

who wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Flake? 

Mr. FLAKE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 

Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to 

cast—Mr. Watt of North Carolina? 

Mr. WATT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 20 noes. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendments are not agreed 

to. 

Are there further amendments? If there are no further amendments, a reporting quorum is present. Without objection, the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute laid down as 

the base text is adopted. The question occurs on the motion to report the bill H.R. 748 favorably as amended. All in favor will say 

aye? Opposed, no? 

The ayes appear to have it—a recorded vote is requested and will 

be ordered. Those in favor of reporting H.R. 748 favorably as 

118 

amended will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, 

no, and the clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon? 

Mr. CANNON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, aye. Mr. Bachus? 

Mr. BACHUS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, aye. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

Mr. PENCE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, aye. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott? 

119 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott—Mr. Watt? 

[No response.] 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will continue to call the 

roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, no. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

Mr. WEXLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, no. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Van Hollen? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members who wish to cast or change 

their votes? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake? 

Mr. FLAKE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake, aye. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, no. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast 

or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentleman from—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Could I ascertain how I’m recorded? 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. How is the gentleman from Virginia 

recorded? 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott is recorded as a no. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 13 noes. 

120 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment to report the 

bill favorably as amended is agreed to. Without objection, the staff 

will be directed to make any technical and conforming changes, and 

all Members will be given 2 days as provided by the House rules 

in which to submit additional, dissenting, supplemental, or minority views. 

[Intervening business.] 

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(121) 

1The proposed law would not require that the defendant know that the state’s parental involvement law has not been satisfied, or that the defendant intend to aid in its circumvention. 

At the subcommittee markup, Representative Chabot offered an amendment that eliminated a 

possible affirmative defense in the original bill that the physicians could use any information 

or ‘‘compelling facts’’ from the minor herself in order to not comply with this bill. The amendment changed the bill to only allow for actual evidence from the parents or reasonable documentation from a court as affirmative defenses. 2 If the physician is in a state where no parental consent or notification law or where a more 

reasonable parental consent or notification law is in force, this section requires that a doctor 

or a member of his staff provide ‘‘actual notice’’ to the parents of a patient in person at least 

24 hours before the doctor provides the abortion. If the doctor is unable to provide actual notice 

after making a reasonable effort, then the doctor must provide 48 hours ‘‘constructive notice’’ 

instead. 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

We strongly dissent from H.R. 748. This legislation will increase 

health risks to young women who choose to have an abortion, is 

anti-family, anti-physician, and is clearly unconstitutional. 

H.R. 748 consists of two dangerous and objectionable new criminal laws—proposed new 18 U.S.C. sections 2431 and 2432. The proposed new section 2431—the Travel Provision—contains the provisions of the bill previously known as the ‘‘Child Custody Protection 

Act,’’ which would impose criminal (including up to 1 year in prison) and civil penalties upon a person other than a parent—including a grandmother, aunt, sibling, or clergy member—who helps a 

teen cross certain state lines for an abortion unless the teen had 

already fulfilled the requirements of her home state’s law restricting teens’ abortions.1

The proposed new section 2432—the Federal Notification Provision—would create a sweeping new parental notification requirement on young women who need abortion services in a state where 

they do not reside, by imposing criminal (up to 1 year in prison) 

and civil penalties on physicians that do not provide at least a 24 

hours notice to the parent, even where the parent brings his or her 

child to the physician.2 Significantly, neither the Travel Provision 

(section 2431) nor the Federal Notification Provision (section 2432) 

contain any exception for when an abortion may be necessary to 

protect a teen’s health, in violation of Supreme Court precedent. 

In effect, H.R. 748 will make those state laws that the Majority 

prefers (those requiring involvement of a parent or guardian) controlling in states with laws that it does not like (those allowing 

other adults to receive notice or provide consent or with no parental involvement requirements). This is an unprecedented Congressional intrusion into what has traditionally been an arena in which 

each state regulates its own citizens. 

It is important to note that twenty-seven states and the District 

of Columbia either have no parental involvement laws or a law 

more lenient than the bill’s definition of a ‘‘parental involvement 

law.’’ Thus, within those states, representing approximately 57% of 

122 

3Fewer than half of the states enforce a requirement for notification or consent of a parent: 

• Twenty-three states have laws that appear to match the Teen Endangerment Act’s restrictive definition of a ‘‘parental involvement law:’’ Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 

Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 

• Ten states have parental involvement laws that do not limit the notification or consent requirement to a parent exclusively, but allow involvement of some other adult, such as a 

grandparent or other relative, or allow a physician to waive the parental involvement requirement in certain situations: Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 

• Eleven states have enacted parental involvement laws that are not enforced within the state 

because the laws are legally defective, as established by court rulings or Attorney General 

opinions: Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 

New Jersey, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. 

• The District of Columbia and the other six states—Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, 

Vermont, and Washington—have not enacted forced parental involvement laws. 4Memorandum from the American Civil Liberties Union, to Members of the House Committee 

on the Judiciary (Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with the minority staff of the House Judiciary Committee); Memorandum from Planned Parenthood, to Members of the House Committee on the 

Judiciary (Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with minority staff of the House Judiciary Committee); Memorandum from National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, to Members of the 

House Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with the minority staff of the House 

Judiciary Committee); American Medical Association, Ethics Op. 2.015 (1994) (discussing mandatory parental consent for minors seeking an abortion); National Abortion Federation, Teen 

Endangerment Act Repackaged: A Menacing Maze for Young Woman, Their Families, and Their 

Doctors (2005) available at http://www.prochoice.org/policy/national/teen—endangerment.html; 

Center for Reproductive Rights, The Teen Endangerment Act: Harming Young Women Who 

Seek Abortions, (April 2005) available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub—bp— 

tea.pdf. For organizations opposed to nearly identical Federal parental consent legislation, see 

also Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; American Medical Women’s Association, Society for Adolescent Medicine, to Members 

of the House of Representatives (Apr. 2, 2001). 

the United States population, H.R. 748 will impose the laws of the 

other twenty-three states, representing just 43% of the population.3

The legislation is opposed by a wide variety of groups that are 

committed to reducing teenage pregnancy and protecting a woman’s right to choose, such as Planned Parenthood, NARAL ProChoice America, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Reproductive Rights.4 In addition, major medical associations, including the American Medical Association, the American 

College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American College of 

Physicians, and the American Public Health Association—have 

longstanding policies opposing mandatory parental-involvement 

laws, such as H.R. 748, because of the dangers they pose to young 

women and the need for confidential access to physicians. The 

American Academy of Pediatrics and Society for Adolescent Medicine oppose the legislation because it increases the risk of harm to 

adolescents by delaying or denying access to appropriate medical 

care. 

We believe the bill denies young women facing unintended pregnancies the assistance of trusted adults, endangers their health, 

and violates their constitutional rights. For these reasons, and the 

reasons set forth below, we dissent from H.R. 748. 

I. LEGISLATION ENDANGERS YOUNG WOMEN

Both the Travel Provision (section 2431) and the Federal Notification Provision (section 2432) will operate to endanger the lives 

and health of young women. 

With regard to the Travel Provision, we would note that although an abortion is generally very safe, it is still far preferable 

and safer to permit a trusted friend or family member to drive a 

123 

5Many teenagers seeking an abortion must travel out-of-state to obtain the procedure, either 

because the closest facility is located in a neighboring state or because there is no in-state provider available. In fact, currently 86% of counties—home to 32% of women of childbearing age— 

lack an physician. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Services in the United States, 1995 and 

1996, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 262, 266 (1998). 6See Hearing on H.R. 3682: The Child Custody Protection Act before the Subcomm. on the 

Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17 (May 28, 1998) (statement 

of Bill and Mary Bell, submitted for the record); See also THE NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, THE TRUE VICTIMS OF S. 1645/H.R. 3682 THE TEEN ENDANGERMENT ACT (1998) (describing the case 

of Keishawn, an eleven year old from Maryland, who was impregnated by her step-father, and 

sought an abortion with the assistance of her aunt, Vicky Simpson, who was awaiting an order 

granting her custody of Keishawn. Upon learning of the pregnancy, Keishawn’s doctors in Maryland recommended that Keishawn have anesthesia during the abortion procedure, but none of 

the hospitals in Maryland would allow the abortion to be provided at their facility. As a result, 

Keishawn’s aunt sought the attention of a specialist practicing in a neighboring state, who 

agreed to provide the abortion. Under H.R. 748, Vicki could have been federally prosecuted for 

helping her young niece cope with this pregnancy resulting from incest). 7See Henshaw, supra note 10, at 196. 

woman home from this surgical procedure.5 Moreover, responsible 

health care providers do not provide these services unless they are 

confident the patient has someone who will accompany them and 

assist them following the procedure. Unfortunately, under the 

Travel Provision, teenagers who are unable to satisfy a state parental involvement law—either because they cannot tell one parent (or 

in some states, both parents) about their pregnancy or because 

they have no fair chance of obtaining a judicial bypass—will be 

forced to travel alone across state lines to obtain an abortion. 

As much as we would prefer the active and supportive involvement of parents in young people’s major decisions, it is not always 

realistic to expect them to seek parental involvement willingly in 

the sensitive area of abortion. Where a child is unwilling or unable 

to seek parental consent, the results can be tragic. The testimony 

of Bill and Mary Bell before the Constitution Subcommittee during 

consideration of predecessor legislation in the 105th Congress is 

telling in this regard.6

The Bells were the parents of a daughter who died after an illegal, unsafe abortion that she sought instead of telling her parents 

about her pregnancy, notwithstanding Indiana’s parental notice 

law. A Planned Parenthood counselor in Indiana informed Becky 

that she would have to notify her parents or petition a judge in 

order to obtain an abortion. Becky responded that she did not want 

to inform her parents because she did not want to hurt them. She 

also replied that if she could not tell her parents, with whom she 

was very close, she would not feel comfortable asking a judge she 

did not even know. Instead of traveling 110 miles away to Kentucky, Becky opted to undergo an illegal abortion close to her 

home. Tragically, Becky developed serious complications from her 

illegal abortion that caused her death. It is unlikely that H.R. 748 

could have changed this outcome or would have convinced Becky to 

confide in her parents about her pregnancy. In fact, the new restrictions and liabilities imposed on health care providers under 

this bill would undoubtedly make such situations even worse. 

Some young women justifiably fear that they would be physically 

abused if forced to disclose their pregnancy to their parents. Nearly 

one-third of minors who choose not to consult with their parents 

have experienced violence in their family, feared violence, or feared 

being forced to leave home.7 Enacting this legislation and forcing 

young women in these circumstances to notify their parents of their 

124 

8See Maggie Boule, An American Tragedy, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Aug. 27, 1989. 9See Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (1983); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 487 U.S. 417, 

476 (1990) (finding that in Minnesota, many judges refuse even to hear bypass proceedings); In 

re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (describing how a judge in Florida, after denying a 

bypass petition to a teenage girl who was in high school, participated in extracurricular activities, worked 20 hours a week, and baby-sat regularly for her mother, suggested that he, as a 

representative of the court, had standing to represent the state’s interest when the minor appealed the denial). 10The courts in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island are not open in the evenings 

or on weekends. See Donovan, supra, at 259. 11See Hearing on H.R. 1218 ‘The Child Custody Protection Act’ before the Subcomm. on the 

Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 23 (May 27, 1999) (statement 

of Billie Lominick). 12 Id. 13See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, JAMA, Jan. 6, 1993, at 83. 

pregnancies will only exacerbate the dangerous cycle of violence in 

dysfunctional families. This is the lesson of Spring Adams, an 

Idaho teenager who was shot to death by her father after he 

learned she was planning to terminate a pregnancy caused by his 

acts of incest.8 It is clear that when a young woman believes that 

she cannot involve her parents in her decision to terminate a pregnancy, the law cannot mandate healthy, open family communication. 

We are well aware of proponents’ claims that the travel provision 

would protect the rights of minors who cannot obtain parental consent because they have the option to appear before judges and obtain a judicial bypass for any parental involvement laws. While bypasses may have some theoretical benefits, in many cases it is difficult if not impossible for troubled young women to obtain them. 

Some teenagers live in regions where the local judges consistently 

refuse to grant bypasses, regardless of the facts involved. For example, one study found that a number of judges in Massachusetts 

either refuse to handle abortion petitions or focus inappropriately 

on the morality of abortion.9 Other young women may live in small 

communities where the judge may be a friend of the parents, a 

family member, or even the parent of a friend. Still others may live 

in regions where the relevant courts are not open in the evenings 

or on weekends, when minors could seek a bypass without missing 

school or arousing suspicion.10

The difficulties in obtaining a judicial bypass were clearly illustrated by Ms. Billie Lominick during her testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. Ms. Lominick was a 63-year-old 

grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a physically and 

sexually abusive household cross state lines to obtain an abortion.11 Ms. Lominick testified that her assistance was essential because the minor was unable to find any judge in her home state 

of South Carolina who would hear her judicial bypass petition.12

Moreover, reliance on the judicial bypass system as an effective 

alternative to parental consent understates the intimidating effect 

of seeking a court-sanctioned abortion. Many minors fear that the 

judicial bypass procedure lacks the necessary confidentiality. The 

American Medical Association has noted that ‘‘because the need for 

privacy may be compelling, minors may be driven to desperate 

measures to maintain the confidentiality of their pregnancies. . . . 

The desire to maintain secrecy has been one of the leading reasons 

for illegal abortion deaths since . . . 1973.’’ 13

125 

14See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, No. 3:89–0520, slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn. 

Aug. 26, 1997); See also Tamar Lewin, Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can 

Vary, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at A1 (describing how a judge in Toledo, Ohio denied permission to a 171⁄2-year-old woman, an ‘‘A’’ student who planned to attend college and who testified 

she was not financially or emotionally prepared for college and motherhood at the same time, 

stating that the girl had ‘‘not had enough hard knocks in her life’’). 15 497 U.S. 417, 460 (1990) (O’Connor, J. concurring) (noting that an abuse report ‘‘requires 

the welfare agency to immediately ‘conduct an assessment;’ ’’ if the ‘‘agency interviews the victim, it must notify the parent of the fact of the interview’’ and the parent has the right to access 

te investigation record). 16 Id. 

Many young women, faced with the violation of confidentiality or 

the prospect of embarrassment and social stigma would resort to 

drastic measures rather than undergo the humiliation of revealing 

intimate details of their lives to a series of strangers in a formal, 

legal process. Young women’s concerns about confidentiality are especially acute in rural areas. For example, in one case a minor discovered that her bypass hearing would be conducted by her former 

Sunday school teacher.14

With respect to the Federal Notification Provision, the section requires a 24-hour or more waiting period and written notification, 

with no medical emergency exception, even if a parent accompanies 

his or her daughter to an out-of-state physician and consents to the 

abortion services. In such cases, this requirement acts as a builtin mandatory delay, imposing logistical and financial hardships on 

functional families who are trying to support their daughters. Even 

in a health emergency, this bill robs a parent of his or her ability 

to authorize immediate care. For example, if a parent and daughter 

were vacationing together in California and the parent brought her 

daughter to a hospital for emergency abortion services, this provision would needlessly require a doctor to wait 24 hours before providing that care. 

We would also observe that the Federal Notification Provision’s 

very limited exceptions provide no safety net for the most vulnerable teens. For example, the section’s ‘‘exception’’ for teen victims 

of certain forms of abuse only applies if the young woman ‘‘declares 

in a signed written statement that she is the victim of abuse.’’ This 

‘‘exception’’ ignores the painful reality that most abused teens are 

too afraid to tell anyone that they are being abused. Moreover, because the bill requires the doctor to notify the authorities of the 

abuse before the abortion is performed, many teens will not report 

the abuse for fear that their parents will discover the abuse report. 

As Justice O’Connor aptly stated in Hodgson v. Minnesota, an ‘‘exception to notification for minors who are victims of neglect or 

abuse is, in reality, a means of notifying the parents.’’ 15 Morever, 

‘‘[t]he combination of the abused minor’s reluctance to report sexual 

or physical abuse . . . with the likelihood that invoking the abuse 

exception for the purpose of avoiding notice will result in notice, 

makes the abuse exception less than effectual.’’ 16

II. LEGISLATION IS ANTI-FAMILY

H.R. 748 is also overtly hostile to families. Despite the proponents’ belief that the bill would enforce parents’ right to counsel 

their daughters, the reality is that it is impossible to legislate complex family relationships. Studies reveal that more than half of all 

young women who do not involve a parent in a decision to termiVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
126 

17See Henshaw, supra, at 207. 18 H.R. 748, § 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2431(e)(2)). 19 Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 Before the House Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37–38 (2005) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 20 Id. at 76, 81 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee). 21 H.R. 748, § 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2431(d)). 22 Id. § 3 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2432(b)(3)). 23 Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2432(c)). 24 Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 Before the House Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 17–18 (2005) (statement of Rep. Waters). 25 Id. at 24–25. 

nate a pregnancy choose to involve another trusted adult, who is 

very often a relative.17

Although the Travel Provision (section 2431) exempts parents 

from criminal and civil liability, non-parent adults who are raising 

a child will be swept in by the bill’s prohibitions. This is because 

the exception is excessively narrow and refers only to a parent or 

guardian; a legal custodian; or a person designated by a state’s parental involvement law as a person to whom notification, or from 

whom consent, is required.18 Several amendments were offered 

during the markup to ameliorate these harsher consequences of 

section 2431. Representative Nadler offered an amendment that 

would have exempted the minor’s grandparent or adult sibling.19

Similarly, Representative Jackson Lee offered an amendment exempting clergy, godparents, aunts, uncles, or first cousins that was 

rejected by a vote of 13 to 20.20

The bill also illogically sanctions the criminal activity of a parent 

by authorizing lawsuits to be brought by parents suffering ‘‘legal 

harm’’ against any person assisting a minor in obtaining an abortion across state lines.21 The private civil remedy aspect of both the 

Travel and Federal Notification Provisions are so broad that even 

a father who committed rape or incest against his own daughter 

would be empowered to bring a lawsuit seeking compensation 

under the legislation. If the pregnancy of the minor is a result of 

incest with her father, the minor must still comply with any parental consent or notification law in the state of her residence under 

this bill unless she signs a written statement and agrees to allow 

the physician to notify the authorities about the sexual abuse.22 If 

the minor decides not to sign a written statement or notify the authorities and is accompanied by her grandmother across state lines 

to a doctor in another state for abortion services, the father who 

committed the incest can bring a civil action against the grandmother and the doctor, effectively profiting from his own criminal 

wrongdoing.23

Representative Waters offered an amendment at markup that 

would have provided an exception to this civil liability if the pregnancy was the result of sexual contact with the parent or any other 

person that had permanent or temporary custody of the minor.24

Representative Waters also offered an additional amendment that 

would only provide an exception if the pregnancy resulted directly 

from acts of incest.25 Both amendments were defeated. 

III. LEGISLATION IS DANGEROUSLY OVER BROAD

Supporters of this bill claim the Travel Provision merely targets 

predatory individuals who force and coerce a minor into obtaining 

an abortion. However, the net cast by this section is far broader 

127 

26 H.R. 748, § 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2431(a)(1)). 27 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000). 28 Id. 29The affirmative defense available in H.R. 748 does not address this problem. 30 Id. 

and more problematic. The Travel Provision includes a criminal 

penalty against persons who ‘‘knowingly transport an individual 

who has not attained the age of 18 years across a State line, with 

the intent that such individual obtain an abortion.’’ 26 In other 

words, this provision would make it a federal crime to assist a 

pregnant minor to obtain an abortion that would be lawful in the 

state in which it was provided. The bill does not require proof of 

any intent to avoid state parental consent laws. Anyone simply 

transporting a minor—a bus driver, taxi driver, family member or 

friend—could be jailed for up to a year or fined or both. The same 

applies to emergency medical personnel who may be aware they 

are taking a minor across state lines to obtain an abortion but 

would have no choice if a medical emergency were occurring. 

Similarly, a nurse at a clinic providing directions to a minor or 

her driver could be convicted as an accessory under this legislation. 

A doctor who procures a ride home for a minor and the person accompanying her because of car troubles coupled with the minor’s 

expressed fear of calling her parents for assistance could be convicted as an accessory after the fact. A sibling of the minor who 

merely agrees to transport a minor across state lines without any 

knowledge of any intent to evade the resident state’s parental consent or notification laws could be thrown in jail and convicted of 

a conspiracy to violate this statute. 

The supporters of this bill inaccurately compare it to the Mann 

Act, which prohibits the transport of ‘‘any individual under the age 

of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory 

or Possession of the U.S., with intent that such individual engage 

in prostitution, or in a sexual activity for which any person can be 

charged with a criminal offense. . . .’’ 27

The Mann Act, like most other criminal laws, contains a specific 

mens rea component, that requires that criminally liable individuals have an intention to break the law.28 A person convicted of 

possessing stolen property, for example, must know or have reason 

to know that the property they possess is stolen. The Travel Provision has no such specific intent requirement and, therefore, imposes strict criminal liability for anyone in violation.29 Where the 

Mann Act purports to guard against corruption of minors, a laudable but not constitutionally-protected purpose, the Travel Provision imposes significant restrictions on a constitutionally-protected 

right to an abortion. Moreover, the Mann Act requires that the 

minor be transported across state lines for the purpose of engaging 

in an act that is illegal, while this legislation would impose civil 

and criminal liability for the act of taking a minor across state 

lines to engage in an activity which is legal in that second state, 

and constitutionally protected.30

In an attempt to clarify who would face criminal or civil liability, 

Representative Scott offered two amendments to the Travel Provision. The first would have exempted taxicab drivers, bus drivers, 

and others in the business transportation profession from the 

128 

31 Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 Before the House Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49–51 (2005) (statement of Rep. Scott). 32 Id. at 61. 33 Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act: Markup of H.R. 748 Before the House Comm. on 

the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 63 (2005) (statement of Rep. Scott). 

criminal provisions of this statute.31 This amendment was defeated 

by a vote of 13 to 17.32 Representative Scott also offered an amendment that would have limited criminal liability to persons who had 

committed the crimes in the first degree, excluding potential defendants who had helped the minor after the fact, or individuals 

with a tangential role in the act.33 The amendment was defeated 

by a vote of 12 to 18. 

IV. LEGISLATION IMPOSES CONVOLUTED AND COMPLEX LEGAL

REQUIREMENTS. 

Both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions operating 

separately and in conjunction, serve to impose an impossibly complex patchwork of legal requirements, on both young women and 

physicians. In essence, the legislation creates a Byzantine system 

of parental notification mandates that would impose extra hurdles 

on some teens and leave others with no options and expose physicians to new and unprecedented legal liability. 

For example, under the Travel Provision, many young women 

would have to comply with two states’ teen abortion laws. Thus, a 

minor who travels with assistance from Missouri to Kansas for an 

abortion must comply with both Missouri’s law and Kansas’ law. A 

young woman who is unable to involve her parents in her abortion 

decision, and thus pursues a court waiver, must therefore obtain a 

judicial bypass in both her home state and the provider’s state before she can obtain an abortion. 

Likewise, the Federal Notification Provision also imposes complex and absurd requirements for physicianss and their patients. 

As noted above, section 2432 would require that the physician give 

24 hours ‘‘actual notice’’ to a parent before performing an abortion 

on a minor from out-of-state. This provision would apply even if the 

minor came from a state that did not have a parental consent or 

notification law, and even if the parent went to the other state fully 

intending and approving of his or her child’s abortion. The section 

defines ‘‘actual notice’’ as ‘‘the giving of a written notice directly, 

in person.’’ This section would seem to require that the physician 

or a member of her staff travel out-of-state to visit the parents of 

the patient in person. The section would allow for the physician to 

give ‘‘constructive notice’’ to the patient’s parents if it is not possible to provide them with ‘‘actual notice’’ after the physician has 

made a ‘‘reasonable effort’’ to do so. The section defines ‘‘constructive notice’’ as notice that is given by certified mail, to the last 

known address of the person being notified with delivery deemed 

to have occurred 48 hours following noon—on the day after the 

mailing occurred. The section does not define ‘‘reasonable effort.’’ 

Consider the incredible new burdens this provision imposes on 

physicians. Under the threat of civil and criminal penalties, the 

Federal Notification Provision requires doctors to make ‘‘reasonable’’ efforts to provide in-person, written notice of an out-of-state 

teen’s parents. It provides no guidance to help a physician know 

129 

34Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United 

States in 2000, 35 Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 6 (2003). 

what efforts suffice as ‘‘reasonable’’ to track down a parent in another state to provide this in-person written notice. This requirement places extremely burdensome, if not impossible, demands on 

doctors. Because many communities do not have physicians, women 

often have to travel to a neighboring state to obtain an abortion; 

thus, doctors could routinely be forced to travel hundreds of miles 

out-of-state in order to comply with the bill’s in-person notification 

mandate. This Federal in-person notification requirement is more 

onerous than even the most stringent state laws. Moreover, because the bill operates differently depending on a teen’s state of origin, it requires health care providers to be familiar with the legal 

regimes of all 50 states and to understand the interaction between 

these varying legal regimes and the local state laws of the provider. 

The requirements on physicians if a young woman informs him 

or her that she is a victim of abuse are equally convoluted. Under 

Section 2432 such a conversation then triggers a new mandate on 

the doctor to not only notify the ‘‘authorities’’ of the parents’ abuse, 

but to provide such notification in another state. Each state has its 

own legal requirements in this area, and its own agencies to which 

the behavior must be reported—and in some cases the reports must 

be filed in the county. Additionally, the Federal Notification Provision establishes no mechanism for this new type of cross-state reporting, and does not specify in what manner or with what level 

of detail the reporting must occur. This is far from being a mere 

bureaucratic headache; the legislation gives doctors no guidance 

about to whom or what detail the report must be made, and therefore they cannot be sure that even their most thorough and goodfaith attempts to comply with the law will keep them from risking 

fines or a prison sentence. 

It is important to note that these requirements will quite frequently come into play when young women are forced to cross state 

lines to obtain an abortion, not because of differing laws, but because of sheer availability. As of 2000, there were no known physicians in 87 percent of the counties in the United States.34 For 

many young women, the closest available physician is located in 

another state, and others may be unable to obtain an abortion anywhere in their home state. 

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

By imposing substantial new obstacles and dangers in the path 

of a minor seeking an abortion, the Travel and Federal Notification 

Provisions raise at least three serious constitutional concerns. 

First, the legislation raises numerous federalism and equal protection problems. It is impermissible to pass a law which has the 

effect of imposing one state’s legal requirements on another state, 

as both section 2431 and 2432 do. In essence the bill imposes on 

states and physicians the laws of the states that have the most 

stringent requirements on abortion. Federalism dictates that one 

has the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in another state as delinVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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35Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–01 (1999). 36 Id. at 502. 37 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1978). 38Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 39 Id. 40Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976). 41 Id. at 508. One may argue that this means that Congress itself cannot pass laws that treat 

non-residents visiting a particular state differently than residents of that particular state. 42 As Professors Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School and Peter Rubin of Georgetown University Law Center explained that the predecessor version of this legislation ‘‘amounts to a statutory attempt to force this most vulnerable class of young women to carry the restrictive laws 

of their home states strapped to their backs, bearing the great weight of those laws like the 

bars of a prison that follows them wherever they go (unless they are willing to go alone).’’ Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe & Ralph S. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard 

University and Peter J. Rubin, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, to 

the House Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2 (September 2, 2001). 

eated by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.35

The Court held in Saenz that a state cannot discriminate against 

the citizen of another state when there is no substantial reason for 

the discrimination except for the fact that they are citizens of another state.36 The Court has found that certain rights are protected 

by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they bear ‘‘upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity’’ or those rights that are deemed ‘‘fundamental.’’ 37 The Court in 

Saenz specifically referred to Doe v. Bolton where it held that a 

state could not limit access to its medical care facilities for abortions to in-state residents.38 A state must treat all that are seeking 

medical care within that state in an equal manner.39 This protection would extend to minors since the Court held in Danforth that 

minors have a constitutional right to choose whether to terminate 

a pregnancy or not.40 The Court further held that Congress also 

does not have the power to validate a law that violates the rights 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.41

In the present case, both the Travel and Federal Notification 

Provisions cause young women to carry their own state laws with 

them, ‘‘strapped on their backs’’ 42 when they travel to other states. 

For example, this bill treats a young woman who travels to a state, 

or who resides in a state temporarily (such as a college student), 

differently than a minor living in that state. Thus, because New 

York does not have a law restricting teen abortions, a minor living 

in New York need not notify her parents in order to obtain an abortion. However, a minor who travels into New York, or who temporarily resides in New York, is saddled with an entirely different 

legal scheme: she must either obtain a court bypass from her home 

state or, if no bypass is available, be subject to the bill’s mandatory 

notice requirements. The bill thus would discriminate against teenagers within the same state on the basis of their state or origin and 

would deprive teens of their right to travel to engage in conduct 

legal in another state in violation of constitutionally protected 

rights to equal protection and interstate travel. 

Second, both the Travel and Federal Notification Provisions have 

an unconstitutionally narrow life exception for the woman and no 

health exception. These exceptions are especially important in light 

of the tremendous uncertainty and onerous civil and criminal penalties responsible adults and health care providers would face. In 

particular, the delay that the bill’s notice requirements would imVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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43Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). 44Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000). Courts have held that the recently enacted 

Partial-Birth Abortion Act is unconstitutional because of concerns similar to those in Stenberg, 

see Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2001); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women 

v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 

F.3d 127, 142 (3rd Cir. 2000). Additionally, courts have also struck down these statutes because 

they were overbroad. See Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797–98 

(8th Cir. 1999). 45Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938. The Court further stated that ‘‘where substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women’s health’’ a health exception is needed. Id. 46 Id. at 930 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). 47Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (determining that the partial-birth ban act 

did need a health exception when the procedure is necessary in the doctor’s judgment for the 

preservation of the health or life of the woman); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879–80 (1992) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute that defined a medical 

emergency as a condition that requires an abortion of the fetus or a condition that would ‘‘create 

serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function’’ because it 

would not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 

164–65 (1973) (finding that a state may regulate or proscribe post-viability abortions with the 

exception where it is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the woman). 48Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 

pose under section 2432 could prove fatal or dangerous to a young 

woman’s health and future fertility. 

The narrowness of the ‘‘life’’ exception in both sections—applying 

only ‘‘if the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself’’ would also 

place health care providers in an impossible position. Just how severe must a physical threat to a woman’s health be before a physician feels confident that a life exception may be invoked? How 

much would a court second-guess a medical decision of this type in 

a future court proceeding? What would be the cost of defending 

such a case even if a physician ultimately prevails in a civil or 

criminal case, or both? As the Supreme Court has recognized, laws 

containing life exceptions cannot pick and choose among life-threatening circumstances.43

The lack of any health exception is also constitutionally problematic. In Stenberg v Carhart, the Court held that a statute must provide a pre-viability and post-viability health exception in order to 

be constitutional.44 The majority held that the Partial Birth Ban 

Act lacked a health exception required under Roe when the procedure is necessary in the doctor’s judgment for the preservation of 

the health or life of the woman.45 Any restriction on abortion must 

have an exception ‘‘where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 

judgment, for the preservation of the life or the health of the mother.’’ 46 Yet the legislation contains no health exception whatsoever, 

in clear violation of Supreme Court precedent.47

Third, both the Federal Notification and Travel Provisions are in 

conflict with the courts holding that any restriction that has the 

purpose or effect of placing an ‘‘undue burden’’ on a woman’s right 

to choose to have an abortion up until pre-viability is unconstitutional.48 The Federal Notification Provision does this in two ways. 

As an initial matter, it denies many young women the option of obtaining a court waiver at all. This is because the bill takes away 

the option of going to court for those teens who live in a state withVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
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49The following states do not have enforceable parental involvement laws: AK, CA, CT, FL, 

HI, ID, IL, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OK, OR, VT, WA, and D.C. 50 H.R. 748, § 2 (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2432 (d)(4)). 51 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 420 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive 

Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990). 52 Id. 53Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886 (1992). 54Dr. Michele Wilson, Associate Professor, University of Alabama-Birmingham, Statement 

(Sept. 1, 2001) (on file with author); Beverly Howard, Court-appointed Advocate and Attorney, 

Montgomery, Alabama (June 10, 1998) (on file with author); Bernadette McNabb, Executive Director, Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health (on file with author). 

out an enforceable teen abortion restriction 49 and who seek an 

abortion in another state that either does not have an enforceable 

teen abortion law or has a law that does not meet the bill’s standards for such a law.50 In these situations, the minor’s home state 

has no waiver system in place and the bill does not permit use of 

another state’s waiver system. Accordingly, the teen will not be 

able to obtain an abortion until the doctor provides notice of the 

abortion to one of her parents. The Federal Notification Provision 

thus makes parental involvement mandatory for these teens with 

absolutely no option for a court bypass. The U.S. Supreme Court 

has stated that, in order to be constitutional, a statute requiring 

parental involvement must offer an alternative such as a judicial 

bypass.51

Moreover, the provision in the Federal Notification Provision requiring that the doctor must provide 24 hours actual notice or at 

least 48 hours more constructive notice to the parents of the minor 

before providing the abortion care would also appear to impose an 

undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.52 The Court in Casey 

found the reason the 24-hour delay was constitutional was because 

there was a health exception for the preservation of the life and 

health of the woman.53 Without this exception present, the Federal 

Notification Provision would likely be held unconstitutional because these delays will put an ‘‘undue burden’’ on a woman’s right 

to choose. 

With respect to the Travel Provision, a young woman who determined that she could not involve her parents may have to go 

through a judicial bypass in two states, also constituting an undue 

burden. For instance, if the young woman lived in a state with a 

consent law, but the closest health care provider was in a state 

that also had a consent law, the minor would have to go through 

the judicial bypass in each state if she felt that she could not obtain either parent’s consent. Requiring two judicial proceedings 

necessarily results in delays, thereby further compounding the 

medical risk of the procedure. In addition, the judicial bypass process often does not provide a real alternative for minors who need 

to obtain abortions. Many states have judicial bypass procedures 

that are applied inconsistently by local judges making them an unreliable alternative for minors residing in those states.54

CONCLUSION

While promoting the involvement of parents in decisions concerning the pregnancy of a minor is a laudable and desirable goal, 

the heavy-handed approach in this legislation that ignores the real 

circumstances affecting real people attempting to grapple with 

some of life’s most difficult decisions is neither sound, nor is it huVerDate Aug 04 2004 05:32 Apr 22, 2005 Jkt 039008 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR051.XXX HR051
133 

mane. The rights of parents are important, but the right of young 

people to seek out the protection of responsible adults in difficult 

and sometimes dangerous situations is a value Congress must respect. This bill violates these basic principles of humanity and regard for human dimension of these problems. It is reckless in its 

disregard for the welfare of young people in difficult situations. 

JOHN CONYERS, Jr. 

HOWARD L. BERMAN. 

JERROLD NADLER. 

ROBERT C. SCOTT. 

MELVIN L. WATT. 

ZOE LOFGREN. 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE. 

MAXINE WATERS. 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN. 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT. 

ROBERT WEXLER. 

ANTHONY D. WEINER. 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ. 

ADAM SMITH. 

Æ