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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79137-1-I

)

 Respondent, )

)

 v. )

) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DHILLON, RANDEEP SINGH, )

DOB: 12/01/1971, )

)

 Appellant. )

BOWMAN, J. — Randeep Singh Dhillon appeals his jury conviction for 

aggravated domestic violence felony violation of a no-contact order. He argues 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on improper 

statements his wife made while testifying at trial. Dhillon also filed a statement of 

additional grounds for review. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Dhillon’s motion for a mistrial and that none of the 

arguments made in the statement of additional grounds warrant reversal. We 

affirm the conviction.

FACTS

On December 6, 2017, Everett Municipal Court issued a no-contact order 

prohibiting Dhillon from contacting his teenage daughter G.D. The order 
No. 79137-1-I/2

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prohibited Dhillon from knowingly coming within 500 feet of G.D. and her 

residence, school, and workplace. Dhillon signed the no-contact order. Dhillon 

immediately moved out of the family home he shared with G.D., his younger

daughter R.D., and his wife Kamalpreet1 and moved in with his sister. 

On December 20, 2017, Dhillon became intoxicated and telephoned his 

wife, threatening to kill himself. Dhillon suffered from depression, anxiety, and 

alcoholism and had made similar threats in the past. On December 20, Dhillon 

requested that his wife pick him up from his sister’s house and bring him home. 

Kamalpreet testified that she agreed to bring Dhillon home because G.D. was 

away at work and she feared for her husband’s safety.

At some point after Dhillon returned to the family home, his daughter G.D. 

returned home from work. Dhillon argued with and yelled at his wife and 

daughters and warned them that he would kill himself if they contacted the police.

Dhillon grabbed a kitchen knife and Kamalpreet called 911. Fearing Dhillon 

would overhear her, Kamalpreet disconnected the call. The 911 operator called 

back and Kamalpreet told the operator she had misdialed. Meanwhile, Dhillon 

locked himself in a bedroom.

Everett Police Department officers were dispatched to check on the family. 

The officers arrived at the home and Kamalpreet explained why she called 911 

and told them about the no-contact order. The police discovered Dhillon in the 

home with a self-inflicted stab wound. Medics took Dhillon to the hospital for 

treatment and the police later arrested him.

 

1 We refer to Kamalpreet by her first name for purposes of clarity and mean no disrespect 

by doing so. 
No. 79137-1-I/3

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The State charged Dhillon with domestic violence felony violation of a nocontact order and alleged the aggravating factor that the offense occurred in the 

presence of minor children. Dhillon moved to bifurcate the trial. The court 

denied the motion. Dhillon stipulated he “has been convicted at least twice for 

violating a court order prior to December 20, 2017” and the parties agreed to 

read the stipulation to the jury. Dhillon also moved to exclude evidence of prior 

domestic violence in the home; police familiarity with the residence; and “other 

convictions, infractions, or bad acts.” The court granted the motion. 

At trial, Kamalpreet testified about multiple incidents in the past where she 

called 911 because of Dhillon’s drinking and behavior. Dhillon moved for a

mistrial. The court denied his motion but offered a curative instruction. Dhillon 

declined the instruction.

A jury convicted Dhillon as charged of felony violation of a no-contact 

order. By special verdict, the jury found the crime was an aggravated domestic 

violence offense. The trial court imposed a 41-month standard-range sentence. 

Dhillon appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Dhillon argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. We 

disagree. 

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of 

discretion. State v. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. 251, 254-55, 742 P.2d 190 (1987). A 

trial judge has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for mistrial prior to the 

jury reaching a verdict. State v. Melton, 97 Wn. App. 327, 331-32, 983 P.2d 699 
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(1999). A trial court should grant a mistrial only if the defendant has been so 

prejudiced as to require a new trial. State v. Johnson, 124 Wn.2d 57, 76, 873 

P.2d 514 (1994). To determine whether an irregularity may have influenced a 

jury, the court considers (1) the seriousness of the irregularity, (2) whether the 

statement was cumulative of other evidence properly admitted at trial, and (3) 

whether an instruction to disregard the statement could have cured the 

irregularity. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 254 (citing State v. Weber, 99 Wn.2d 158, 

165-66, 659 P.2d 1102 (1983)). 

The prosecutor questioned Kamalpreet about events leading up to her 911 

call on December 20, 2017 and her conversation with the 911 operator and 

police: 

Q. What happened once [Dhillon] was home?

A. He . . . was still drunk, and yelling. Once he gets drunk, he 

is always yelling. . . .

. . . .

Q. And how did [the 911 call] come about?

A. . . . [He] was really upset, and he — he has been suicidal in 

the past also. He said he was going to kill himself if 911 got 

involved this time, because that is something that really 

makes him mad, calling 911. . . .

. . . . 

Q. Do you remember telling [911] that it was a misdial . . . ? 

A. . . . I don’t remember exactly. It has happened so many 

times that we had to call the police when he was drunk, and 

doing all that, so it could be in this particular situation what I 

did. That’s the reason why I don’t remember exactly what I 

said at this time.

. . . .

Q. Do you remember the officer asking you what prompted 

[Dhillon] to want to harm himself?

A. That’s one of the questions they ask always, so I would say 

yes.

. . . .
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A. . . . [T]here have been so many times that he gets drunk and 

then he yells . . . [s]o that’s why like I don’t remember exactly 

what happened, why — who he was yelling at.

Dhillon did not object to any of the testimony.

The trial court determined that Kamalpreet’s testimony violated its pretrial 

rulings. But not every trial irregularity triggers a mistrial. State v. Garcia, 177 

Wn. App. 769, 784, 313 P.3d 422 (2013). Dhillon argues that Kamalpreet’s 

testimony is a serious irregularity because it amounts to propensity evidence in 

violation of ER 404(b). He cites Escalona in support of his argument. In 

Escalona, the State charged the defendant with second degree assault for 

threatening the victim with a knife. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 252. The victim 

testified that Escalona “already has a record” and “had stabbed someone”

before. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. at 253. We held this was propensity evidence 

because a jury could conclude that Escalona “acted on this occasion in 

conformity with the assaultive character he demonstrated in the past.” Escalona, 

49 Wn. App. at 256. 

Here, the State charged Dhillon with domestic violence felony violation of 

a no-contact order. At issue was whether he knowingly came within 500 feet of 

G.D. or her residence. Kamalpreet’s testimony that she called 911 on prior 

instances due to Dhillon’s drinking and yelling is unrelated to whether he 

knowingly violated the no-contact order with G.D. It does not amount to 

propensity evidence. 

Kamalpreet’s testimony was also cumulative of other testimony elicited at 

trial. Dhillon argued that the testimony “opened the door” to questions on cross-
No. 79137-1-I/6

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examination about Dhillon’s mental illness, prior suicide attempts, and efforts to 

“self-medicate[ ]” with alcohol. The trial court permitted the testimony over the 

State’s objection. Kamalpreet proceeded to testify about family turmoil from 

Dhillon’s mental illness, attempts at self harm, ongoing drinking, fights with his 

daughter, and calls to 911. Dhillon testified he did not want Kamalpreet to call 

911 because during a prior hospitalization, he “didn’t get enough help” and 

“end[ed] up paying a lot of . . . medical bills.” Dhillon used this information to 

bolster his theory that he was mentally ill and did not knowingly violate the nocontact order. 

Finally, the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard Kamalpreet’s 

comments because it did not have the opportunity to do so. Dhillon did not 

object to the testimony and rejected a curative instruction when offered by the 

court.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Kamalpreet’s statements 

were not so prejudicial to require a new trial and the court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Dhillon’s motion for a mistrial. 

Statement of Additional Grounds

Dhillon raises several issues in a statement of additional grounds. First, 

Dhillon argues that the “State erred and or committed mis-conduct when it 

mislead [sic] the court and Jury into believing and Portraying that Appellant 

committed a similar crime in year 2012 when the case was dismissed with 

Prejudice.” It appears that Dhillon is referring to information about a prior 

incident described in the State’s “Affidavit of Probable Cause.” The record does 
No. 79137-1-I/7

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not support Dhillon’s contention that the State used the incident to mislead the 

court and the jury. Indeed, Dhillon does not cite to any instance throughout the 

course of the trial where the State or defense counsel referenced the 2012 

charges. 

Dhillon also argues that his “minor daughter was brought to Trial to testify,

without proper authorization because of her doing mental health [and] behavioral

health treatment at the time of Trial.” Dhillon cites no legal authority for the 

proposition that the State required his authorization to call G.D. as a witness and 

fails to identify any evidence that G.D. was not competent to testify.

2

Next, Dhillon argues:

Appellant was subjected to the in-effective assistance of Counsel 

when Counsel failed to object [to] the State, using the year 2012 

case, that was dismissed with Prejudice; failed to call[ ] Defense 

witness to trial; failed to submit, and use exculpatory evidence,

concerning my/Appellant’s health condition before and during the 

time of Incident on Dec. 20, 2017.

Courts apply a strong presumption that defense counsel’s trial choices fall 

within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Grier, 171 

Wn.2d 17, 38, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). This includes decisions in selecting 

witnesses and excluding evidence. In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Davis, 152 

Wn.2d 647, 742, 101 P.3d 1 (2004); In re Pers. Restraint of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 

552, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). An appellant has the burden to prove his counsel 

provided both deficient performance and resulting prejudice that caused a 

different trial outcome. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-26, 743 P.2d 816 

 

2 Washington permits minors to testify so long as they are competent. State v. S.J.W., 

170 Wn.2d 92, 99-100, 239 P.3d 568 (2010); RCW 5.60.020, .050. Courts presume witnesses 

are competent. S.J.W., 170 Wn.2d at 100.
No. 79137-1-I/8

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(1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 

As already discussed, Dhillon fails to establish that the 2012 incident was 

referenced at trial. Dhillon further clams that his attorney was ineffective 

because she did not call his sister as a witness and did not obtain an unrelated

CPS3report. Dhillon fails to show how his sister had any relevant testimony to 

offer at trial. Dhillon addressed the status of the CPS report with the trial court. 

The court explained to Dhillon that the CPS investigation would have focused on 

the well-being of the children, not on whether Dhillon violated the no-contact 

order. There is no evidence Dhillon received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Finally, Dhillon argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his motion for a mistrial on the grounds that “3 potential jurors” saw him in 

handcuffs. The court determined that only 1 juror was in the hallway during an 

afternoon break when Dhillon was in handcuffs and escorted by uniformed 

officers. The court asked the juror what she saw and the juror said, “Just some 

people walking towards the elevator.” The juror stated she did not discuss what 

she saw with any other juror. The court excused that juror from the panel at 

defense counsel’s request. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Dhillon’s motion for mistrial.

 

3 Child Protective Services. 
No. 79137-1-I/9

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We affirm the jury conviction for aggravated domestic violence felony 

violation of a no-contact order. 

WE CONCUR: