COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

MARK RICHARD ROBINSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1837-05-4 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 20, 2005 CARMEN CECILIA ROBINSON

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Richard B. Potter, Judge (Pamela L. Cave; Cave Family Law, on brief), for appellant. (Mary M. Benzinger; Raymond B. Benzinger; Benzinger & Benzinger, P.C, on brief), for appellee.
Mark R. Robinson appeals a de cision of the trial court regard ing the sale of the parties’ marital home. On appeal, husban d contends the trial court erred by: (1) appointing counsel for Carmen C. Robinson, his wife, as commissioner for the sale of the marital home; (2) allowing wife to refinance the marital home; (3 ) failing to address hus band’s motion to be a ppointed as agent for the listing and selling of the marital home; an d (4) failing to hear evidence of the increase in value of the marital home between January 12, 2005 and Ju ne 27, 2005. Upon reviewing the record and briefs, we conclude that this appeal is withou t merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Background On June 3, 2004, th e trial court entered a pendente lite order, awarding husband exclusive use of the marital home and orderi ng husband to pay the mortgage payments on the home. In the final decree of divorce, entered on February 11, 2005, the trial court ordere d the parties to sell the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - house “as soon as possible.” The final decree furthe r provided that wife “s hall list the property for sale at a price of no less than $360,000,” which was the stipulated value of the house. Although the trial court ordered husband to ensure that the mortga ge was paid on the house until its sale, husband failed to pay the mortgage for Oc tober 2004 through February 2005. Wife made thes e payments in order to prevent a default on the mortgage. At a hearing held on March 18, 2005, the trial co urt found that wife had taken action to comply with the final decree by ha ving an agent list the house at the agreed price in the multiple listing service. Wife also made an offer to husband to purchas e the house for $360,000, which husband refused to accept. Th e trial court found husband’s re fusal was unreas onable and in violation of prior orders, and, on February 25, 2005, it directed hus band to accept wife’s offer and proceed with the sale. The written statement of f acts notes that “The fina l decree did not prohibit either [wife] or [husband] from making an offer to buy the marital property.” The court found that husband continued to refuse to cooperate or execute the required documents to complete the sale of the house. The trial court speci fically found that “any delay in the sale of the property was the direct result of the conduct of [husband].” By order entered on April 1, 2005, the court granted wife’s motion to appoint a sp ecial commissioner of sale “to authorize the signature of [husband] in view of [husband]’s obstru ction of the sale.” Husband filed a motion to reconsider, a motion for equita ble relief, a motion for a report from the commissioner, an d a motion for disqualification of the commissioner. The trial court denied husband’s motion fo r equitable relief and disqualification of the commissioner. The trial court also denied husband’s moti on for a report from the commissioner beca use the commissioner reported to the court at the hearing. The trial court entered an orde r directing wife to proceed with closing on or before June 27, 2005.- 3 - The written statement of facts indi cates that on June 3, 2005, “f or the first time, and after the [c]ourt had directed the parties to proceed with the sale, [husband] objected to the $360,000 value of the sale and moved the [c]ourt to set a new valuation on the . . . home.” By order entered on June 27, 2005, the trial court found that the fair market value of the house was $360,000 “as the parties stipulated in January [2005] .” The trial court divided the gr oss equity in the house evenly between the parties, reducing husband’s equity amount for spousal support arrearages and money he owed to wife for her payment of some of th e mortgage payments in 2005 and her payment of supplementary mortgage interest and late fees. Analysis “On appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct . . . . The burden is on the party who alleges reversible error to show by the r ecord that reversal is th e remedy to which he is entitled.” Johnson v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 391, 396, 404 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1991). As a means of dividing or tr ansferring . . . jointly owned marital property, the court may . . . permit either party to purchase the interest of the ot her and direct the allo cation of the proceeds, provided the party purchasing the in terest of the other agrees to assume any indebtedness secu red by the property . . . . Code § 20-107.3(C). The statute further provides as follows: The court shall have the continui ng authority and jurisdiction to make any additional orders necessary to effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to this section, including the authority to: . . . Appoint a special commissione r to transfer any property under subsection C where a party refuses to comply with the order of the court to transfer such property. Code § 20-107.3(K). Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) appoi nting wife’s counsel as commissioner; (2) denying hus band’s request to disqualify th e commissioner; and (3) denying husband’s request that the commissioner provide an accounting in equity. He argues that the commissioner improperly acted in a “judicial capacity” c oncerning the sales process.- 4 - The record supports the tria l court’s finding that husband unreasonably refused to cooperate with the sale of the house. Before it appointed the commi ssioner, the trial court ordered the sale of the house to wife for th e agreed price of $360,000. As a result of the husband’s conduct, the trial court th en ordered that wife’s counsel was “authorized to provide the signature of [husband] wherever re quired to effectuate the sale” of the house. This order did not appoint the commissioner, who wa s authorized only to provide husband’s signature, to act in a judicial capacity. The execution of the necessary documents to complete the sale pursuant to the court’s orders were purely minister ial acts, rather than alterations in the substantive terms of the court orders. Accordingly, we hold that the tr ial court did not err by denying husband’s motions concerning the commissioner. Husband also contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowi ng wife to refinance the house and obtain net proceeds in excess of the equal division or iginally ordered in the final decree. Husband’s argument that wife obtained proceeds in excess of the court’s order is without merit. The trial court orde red the parties to sell the hous e for “no less than $360,000,” the stipulated value, and to divide the proceeds of the sale equally. Wife initially took steps to list the property for sale for the agreed price, and sh e then made an offer to purchase the house for the sales price. As stated in the written statement of facts, “[ t]he final decree did not prohibit either [party] from making an offer to buy the [house].” The fact that the sale took six months to co mplete was at least partially attributable to husband’s unreasonable refusal to cooperate with the sale. Thus , the trial judge did not err by ordering that the proceeds of th e sale were divided equally betw een the parties, with deductions taken from husband’s amount for monies he owed wife.- 5 - Husband further contends the trial court a bused its discretion when it failed to take evidence regarding the increase in value of the house from January 2005 to June 2005. He argues that this omission resulted in a windfall to wife contrary to the court’s initial ruling. The written statement of facts indicates, however, that the tr ial court “heard evidence on all the motions.” Furthermore, the June 27, 2005 order provides: “upon presentation of evidence by both parties as to the review and motions filed herein . . .” hus band’s motion for a new valuation of the property “is de nied.” Accordingly, the record belies husband’s argument that the trial court failed to co nsider evidence on the motion. Husband presents no argument in his opening brief concerning his request to the trial court that the commissioner pr ovide an accounting in equity. In addition, husband’s brief contains no legal authority in support of his th ird question on appeal: his claim concerning his appointment as agent for the sale of the home. “Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit appellate consideration. We will not search the record for errors in order to interpret appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). See also Rule 5A:20. Accordingly, we will not address those issues. Attorney’s Fees Both parties request an awar d of attorney’s fees and co sts incurred in this appeal. The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to determine the propriety of an aw ard of attorney’s fees for efforts expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for requiring additional payment. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996) (footnote omitted). Because we hold husband’s appeal lacks merit, we grant wife’s request for attorney’s fees and- 6 - costs incurred by her in defending this appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination of the attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed and remanded. Affirmed and remanded.