No. 83-546 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

MARGARGT E. BLARELY, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

RAYMOND E. DUPRE and BEATRICE 

A. DUPRE, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Nye & Meyer, Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Joanne M. Briese , Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 9, 1984 

Decided: April 19, 1984 

Filed: iD"c :;j f9& 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is an appeal from the Yellowstone County District 

Court denying Blakely's motion to limit the forty-five-day 

exemption provided by section 25-13-614(1), MCA, to a single, 

one-time exemption for any specific judgment. We affirm. 

Margaret Blakely obtained judgment in the District 

Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District of the State of 

Montana against Raymond E. Dupre and Beatrice A. Dupre on 

October 23, 1980, in the amount of $10,924.93. Thereafter, 

Blakely executed on the earnings of both Raymond and Beatrice 

Dupre. Beatrice filed an affidavit of exemption pursuant to 

section 25-13-614(1), MCA. Raymond filed no affidavit and 

his wages were executed upon. On November 2, 1983, Blakely 

again executed on the wages of the Dupres. On November 10, 

1983, both Dupres filed section 25-13-614(1), MCA, affidavits 

to exempt from execution their earnings within forty-five 

days of the levy. 

Blakely then filed a motion with the District Court to 

limit the Dupres to a single section 25-13-614(1) exemption 

and to further limit them to a single exemption between 

themselves as husband and wife. On December 6, 1983, the 

District Court denied Blakely's motion. Blakely herein 

concedes that both husband and wife are entitled to separate, 

individua 1 forty-five-day exemptions under section 

25-13-614 (1) but appeals the District Court's order refusing 

to limit the exemption to a single forty-five-day exemption 

for each judgment. 

The only issue before this Court is whether the 

forty-five-day exemption on the personal earnings of a 
judgment debtor is limited to a single, one-time exemption 

per judgment under section 25-13-614(1), MCA, or whether the 

exemption may be claimed for an unlimited number of 

forty-five-da.y periods. 

The portion of the statute at issue states: 

"25-13-61.4. Earnings of judgment debtor. 

(1) Except as providedin this section, 

the earnings of the judgment debtor for 

his personal services rendered at any 

time within 45 days next preceding the 

levy of execution or attachment, when it 

appears by the debtor's affidavit or 

otherwise that such earnings are necessary for the use of his family supported 

in whole or in part by his labor, are 

exempt. " 

The language of the statute is clear. There is no 

limit to the number of times a judgment debtor can claim the 

forty-five-day exemption on earnings for personal services. 

Appellant Blakely argues that to construe the statute as 

allowing for mul.tip1.e exemptions makes the vast majority of 

persons who work for wages or salary exempt from execution 

and therefore virtually judgment free. This may well be the 

case. 

However, in construing a statute, the rule is that the 

Court must simply ascertain and declare ". . . what is in 

terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what 

has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 

1-2-101, MCA. It is within the purview of the legislature 

and not that of this Court to modify the exemption provisions 

of a statute. Since the legislature has not elected to 

change this provision, it is beyond the scope of this Court's 

authority to do so. Consequently, the District Court ruled 

properly in denying Blakely's motion to limit the exemption 

to a single forty-five-day exemption per judgment. 

Affirmed. 

~44~ 9JUL& 

Chief Justice - 
We concur: