United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1828 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

CARLOS VÁZQUEZ, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson, 

 Circuit Judges. 

Andrew S. McCutcheon, Research and Writing Specialist, Eric 

Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne M. MarreroTorres, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals 

Section, on brief for appellant. 

Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and 

Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, 

Appellate Division, on brief for appellee. 

April 20, 2017 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant Carlos Vázquez 

appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of 

a drug-trafficking offense and possession with intent to 

distribute controlled substances. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On October 31, 2014, local and federal agents searched 

the residence where Vázquez lived with his girlfriend and their 

two-year-old child; they also searched four vehicles belonging to 

him. The agents discovered cocaine, crack cocaine and marijuana, 

drug paraphernalia, two loaded assault rifles, a loaded pistol, 

and more than one hundred fifty rounds of ammunition. Some of the 

ammunition and "a large quantity of crack cocaine" were lying in 

plain view in the master bedroom, and marijuana, cocaine, and drug 

paraphernalia were lying on the dining room table. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vázquez pled guilty to 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ("Count 1") and 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) ("Count 5"). The parties recommended 

a sentence of sixty months' imprisonment for Count 1, the statutory 

minimum. For Count 5, Vázquez recommended a sentence of thirtyseven months, and the Government recommended sixty months. The 

imprisonment terms were to run consecutively. 

At sentencing, the district court calculated recommended 

sentences of sixty months for Count 1 and thirty-three to fortyone months for Count 5 under the United States Sentencing 
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Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). The district court discussed 

Vázquez's possession of three guns, including "two assault 

weapons," "high-capacity" magazines, and various drugs and drug 

paraphernalia "inside his house where a one-and-a-half-to-twoyear-old minor lived" and in his vehicles. It also "considered 

Mr. Vázquez's upbringing" and the need for deterrence, "especially 

here in Puerto Rico, where . . . there is just too much crime." 

The district court recognized that murder rates had "gone down" 

substantially, which it attributed to "people like Mr. Vázquez 

[being] off the streets" and "the firearms initiative between the 

Department of Justice of Puerto Rico and the United States 

Attorney's Office." 

Weighing the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a), the district court determined that a sixty-month 

sentence for Count 1 was "not an appropriate sentence" because 

even "one pistol, one revolver," would get a sixty-month minimum 

sentence, but Vázquez had "two assault weapons, a pistol, [and] a 

tremendous amount of ammunition." Thus, "sixty months [did] not 

reflect the seriousness of the offense," "protect the public" from 

Vázquez, or promote deterrence. 

The district court therefore sentenced Vázquez to 

eighty-four months' imprisonment for Count 1. However, it 

expressed "concern" about the Government's above-Guidelines 

recommendation of sixty months' imprisonment for Count 5. It 
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therefore sentenced Vázquez within the Guidelines, although it 

considered "a sentence at the higher end" of the Guidelines range 

"appropriate" given "the amount of drugs" and the presence of "a 

toddler" and imposed a sentence of forty-one months for Count 5. 

The sentences were to be served consecutively, for a total of 125 

months of imprisonment. 

Vázquez timely appealed his sentence. 

ANALYSIS 

Vázquez argues that the district court committed 

procedural error by (1) rejecting Vázquez's upbringing as a 

mitigating factor, (2) imposing an upward variance based primarily 

on deterrence, rather than case-specific factors, and (3) failing 

to address his disparity arguments. Vázquez also asserts that the 

sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review sentencing 

decisions for procedural and substantive reasonableness, employing 

a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.1 See United States v. 

Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2015). 

 

1 The Government contends that Vázquez forfeited his arguments 

that the district court did not consider his upbringing, factors 

other than deterrence, or his sentencing disparity precedent. He 

did not. Vázquez addressed his upbringing, the need to consider 

factors other than deterrence, and sentencing disparity in both 

his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, and he 

lodged a general objection after the district court's sentence. 

The district court therefore had notice of Vázquez's arguments and 

his disagreement with the sentence, and that satisfies the purpose 

of the objection requirement. See United States v. OrtizRodríguez, 789 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no forfeiture 

where defendant "raised the same basic challenge to the 
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A. Vázquez's Sentence Was Not Procedurally Unreasonable 

Vázquez's arguments for why the district court committed 

procedural error rest on a misreading of its rationale. First, 

the district court did not "refuse[] to consider his upbringing"; 

it specifically stated that it did so, but it considered the 

circumstances of Vázquez's crime -- particularly his possession of 

multiple weapons and the presence of a child near large quantities 

of drugs -- more important. 

Similarly, the district court did not base its sentence 

"primarily on deterrence" and crime in Puerto Rico. In fact, the 

district court was primarily concerned with the individual aspects 

of Vázquez's crime. Its discussion of crime in Puerto Rico was 

just one of many factors it considered, and "the incidence of 

particular crimes in the relevant community appropriately informs 

and contextualizes the relevant need for deterrence."2 OrtizRodríguez, 789 F.3d at 19 (quoting United States v. Flores–

Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2013)). In addition, we give 

 

reasonableness of the sentence [in the district court] that [he 

then made] on appeal"); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 

(1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that the raise-or-waive rule allows 

district courts to correct errors and "prevents sandbagging"). 

2 If, as Vázquez suggests, the district court had relied primarily 

on its unsupported finding that Puerto Rico's murder rate had 

fallen significantly between 2011 and 2014 "based on the firearms 

initiative" to justify its upward variance, he might have had a 

stronger argument. The district court did not do that here, 

however. 
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"significant weight" to the district court's statement that it 

considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United 

States v. Torres-Landrúa, 783 F.3d 58, 68 n.12 (1st Cir. 2015) 

(quoting United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 233 (1st 

Cir. 2014)). 

Finally, the district court heard Vázquez's disparity 

argument and the Government's counterargument at the sentencing 

hearing, and it stated that it had "considered [Vázquez's] 

sentencing memorandum," which made the disparity argument in 

detail. The district court then explained various individualized 

factors that supported its sentence. "[A] court's reasoning can 

often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties . . . 

with what the judge did." United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 

F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States v. LandrónClass, 696 F.3d 62, 78 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, we can infer that 

the district court determined that the particular facts of this 

case made it dissimilar to the cases cited by Vázquez. It did not 

abuse its discretion in doing so. 

B. Vázquez's Sentence Was Not Substantively Unreasonable 

"[T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible 

sentencing rationale and a defensible result." United States v. 

Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). "Because we have already 

found the district court's sentencing rationale to rest within the 

range of acceptable discretion, 'we limit our review to the 
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question of whether the sentence, in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, resides within the expansive universe of reasonable 

sentences.'" United States v. Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d 829, 837 

(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 308 

(1st Cir. 2014)). 

Vázquez's sentence for Count 5 was within the 

Guidelines, his total sentence was only five months more than the 

120 months requested by the Government pursuant to his plea 

agreement (which would have triggered an appeal waiver), and there 

are aggravating circumstances in this case. The sentence 

therefore "resides within the expansive universe of reasonable 

sentences." Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d at 837 (quoting King, 741 

F.3d at 308); see also United States v. Pantojas-Cruz, 800 F.3d 

54, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2015). 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we affirm Vázquez's sentence. 

Affirmed.